It is inconceivable that our Framers authorized the removal of Presidents who engage in treason or bribery, but disallowed the removal of Presidents who attempt such offenses and are caught before they succeed. Moreover, a President who takes concrete steps toward engaging in impeachable conduct is not entitled to any benefit of the doubt. As one scholar remarks in the context of attempts to manipulate elections, “when a substantial attempt is made by a candidate to procure the presidency by corrupt means, we may presume that he at least thought this would make a difference in the outcome, and thus we should resolve any doubts as to the effects of his efforts against him.”²⁷⁰

[...]

²⁷⁰ Black & Bobbitt, Impeachment, at 93.

By a stroke of good fortune I just happen to have a copy of Black and Bobbitt's Impeachment, and I am able to complete the quote.

The sensible rule ought to be that

when a substantial attempt is made by a candidate to procure the presidency by corrupt means, we may presume that he at least thought this would make a difference in the outcome, and thus we should resolve any doubts as to the effects of his efforts against him.

Yet we must confine the operation of such a rule to truly substantial constitutional crimes, lest we ensnare every successful campaign in an unending postmortem in search of nonconstitutional misdeeds.

That was sure some fine editing by the Majority staff.

As a note for those not acquainted with the "authors" of this book, it was not jointly authored.

Charles L. Black Jr. was a preeminent legal scholar whose short work on impeachment is considered a classic. Part I of this book and ends at page 61. That copyright is from 1974.

Phillip Bobbitt, a nephew of LBJ, is a less eminent legal scholar. He wrote Part II of this book, which is appended to the classic work of Charles Black, and goes from page 65 to page 162, copyright 2018.

Phillip Bobbitt is known for being the then 63 year old Columbia law school professor who married a young lady (Justice Kagan presiding at SCOTUS) who stopped being one of his 3-L students when the relationship became known.

The Bobbitt maid/nanny (Sophia Samuels) sued the Bobbitts this year for violations of minimum and overtime wages, spread-of-hours pay, untimely payment of wages, and notice and record-keeping requirements.

https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/13585162/1/samuels-v-bobbitt/

Samuels v. Bobbitt, SDNY 1:19-cv-00576 (20 Jan 2019) Doc 1 COMPLAINT

https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/26774329/Samuels_v_Bobbitt_et_al

The Docket Report indicates the case was settled on 31 May 2019.

President Trump’s evidentiary challenges are misplaced as a matter of constitutional law and common sense.

The Constitution does not prescribe rules of evidence for impeachment proceedings in the House or Senate. Consistent with its sole powers to impeach and to determine the rules of its proceedings, the House is constitutionally authorized to consider any evidence that it believes may illuminate the issues before it. At this fact- finding stage, “no technical ‘rules of evidence’ apply,” and “ [e]vidence may come from investigations by committee staff, from grand jury matter made available to the committee, or from any other source.” 228 The House may thus “ subpoena documents, call witnesses, hold hearings, make legal de-terminations, and undertake any other activities necessary to fulfill [its] mandate.” 229 When deciding whether to bring charges against the President, the House is not restricted by the Constitution in deciding which evidence to consider or how much weight to afford it.

President Donnell prefers to ignore the Constitution and spin some shuck 'n jive on the Sean Hannity show.

The Constitution does not prescribe rules of evidence for impeachment proceedings in the House or Senate. Consistent with its sole powers to impeach and to determine the rules of its proceedings, the House is constitutionally authorized to consider any evidence that it believes may illuminate the issues before it. At this fact-finding stage, “no technical ‘rules of evidence’ apply,” and “[e]vidence may come from investigations by committee staff, from grand jury matter made available to the committee, or from any other source.” 228

Footnote 228 reads, "228 Black & Bobbitt, Impeachment, at 9."

Fortunately, I just happen to have that book, among others. Sloppy ass incompetent crap. The quote starts at 8, not 9.

Here, the missing material between the two quotes is "(Indeed, I shall argue later that they do not apply even in the Senate trial.)" Theoretically correct, but as a matter of fact, unless the Senate Rules are changed, strict rules of evidence will continue to apply as they have for a few centuries.

At this fact-finding stage, “no technical ‘rules of evidence’ apply,....”

But in that faithful old government publication of Rules of Evidence in an Impeachment Trial, it states: [boldface as in original]

2218. After discussion of English precedents, the Senate ruled decisively in the Peck trial that the strict rules of evidence in force in the courts should be applied.

Witnesses in an impeachment trial are required to state facts and not opinions.

[...]

When they get out of that "fact-finding stage," and get into the trial stage, none of the hearsay or less than "best evidence" comes in. The Republican led Senate is highly unlikely to waive centuries of precedent to help Sloppy Jerry avoid disaster.

2226. In impeachment trials the rule that the best evidence procurable should be presented has been followed.

It was decided in the Belknap trial that a witness might not be examined as to the contents of an existing letter without the letter itself being submitted.

Instance wherein the President pro tempore ruled on evidence during an impeachment trial.

On April 4, 1868,² in the Senate sitting for the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, Mr. Robert S. Chew, chief clerk of the State Department, was sworn as a witness on behalf of the House of Representatives, and examined by Mr. Manager Benjamin F. Butler as to the practice of making temporary appointments of assistant secretaries of Departments to perform the duties of their chiefs in the absence of the latter. The witness testified that the appointments in such cases were made by the President, or by his order. Mr. Butler then asked:

Did the letter of authority in most of these cases * * * proceed from the head of the Department or from the President?

Mr. William M. Evarts, of counsel for the President, objected that the letter of authority showed from whom it came, and was the best evidence on that point. In the discussion which followed, the counsel for the President intimated that they did not object if the question was intended to elicit a reply as to whose manual possession the paper came from. But if it was intended to ascertain who signed the paper, then the paper itself would be the best evidence.

Mr. Butler reduced the question to writing as follows:

Question. State whether any of the letters of authority which you have mentioned came from the Secretary of State or from what other officer?

The Chief Justice³ thereupon made an inquiry which led to this colloquy:

The CHIEF JUSTICE. ‘‘Came from the Secretary of State.’’ Do I understand you to mean signed by him?

Mr. Manager BUTLER. I am not anxious upon that part of it, sir. I am content with the question as it stands.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chief Justice conceives that the question in the form in which it is put is not objectionable, but—

Mr. Manager BUTLER. I will put it, then, with the leave of the Chief Justice.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chief Justice was about to proceed to say that if it is intended to ask the question whether these documents of which a list is furnished were signed by the Secretary, then he thinks it is clearly incompetent without producing them.

Mr. Manager BUTLER. Under favor, Mr. President, I have no list of these documents; none has been furnished.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. Does not the question relate to the list which has been furnished?

Mr. Manager BUTLER. It relates to the people whose names have been put upon the list; but I have no list of the documents at all. I have only a list of the facts that such appointments were made, but I have no list of the letters, whether they came from the President or from the Secretary or from anybody else.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. In the form in which the question is put the Chief Justice thinks it is not objectionable. If any Senator desires to have the question taken by the Senate, he will put it to the Senate. [To the managers, no Senator speaking.] You can put the question in the form proposed.

Mr. Manager BUTLER (to the witness). State whether any of the letters of authority which you have mentioned came from the Secretary of State, or from what other officer.

Mr. CURTIS. I understand the witness is not to answer by whom they were sent.

Mr. Manager BUTLER. I believe I have this witness.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chief Justice will instruct the witness. [To the witness.] You are not to answer at present by whom these documents were signed. You may say from whom they came.

__________

² Second session Fortieth Congress, Globe supplement, p. 118.

³ Salmon P. Chase, of Ohio, Chief Justice.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

2230. In the Swayne trial hearsay testimony introduced to show inconvenience to litigants from respondent’s conduct was ruled out.

[...]

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

2235. In general during impeachment trials questions as to conversations with third parties, not in presence of respondent, have been excluded from evidence.—On March 8, 1803,² in the high court of impeachment during the trial of John Pickering, judge of the United States district court of New Hampshire, Mr. Jonathan Steele was testifying, when, Mr. Joseph H. Nicholson, of Maryland, chairman of the managers for the House of Representatives, addressed the court. He said he wished in case it should be deemed proper by the court, to ask one of the witnesses whether he had conversed with the family physician of Judge Pickering, and what his opinion was as to the origination of his insanity. Mr. Nicholson observed that he had doubts of the propriety of this question, and therefore, in the first instance, stated it to the court.

The court decided the question inadmissible.

Later, on the same day, this witness, in the course of his testimony, was going on to state some conversation he had with Judge Pickering’s physician at this time

which he was induced to ask in consequence of solicitude to gain true information as to the reported intemperance of the Judge, when he was interrupted by the Court,1 and informed that this species of testimony had been already decided to be inadmissible.

__________

² First session Eighth Congress, Annals, pp. 358, 359.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

2238. In the Johnson trial declarations of respondent, made anterior to the act, and even concomitant with it, were held inadmissible as evidence.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

2245. In the Johnson trial the Chief Justice ruled that an official message transmitted after the act was not admissible as evidence to show intent.

Majority Report at 21-22:

With the benefit of hindsight, the House's decision to impeach President Johnson is best understood in a similar frame. Scholars now largely agree that President Johnson's impeachment was motivated not by violations of the Tenure of Office Act, but on his illegitimate use of power to undermine Reconstruction and subordinate African-Americans following the Civil War. In that period, fundamental questions about the nature and future of the Union stood unanswered. Congress therefore passed a series of laws to “reconstruct the former Confederate states into political entities in which black Americans enjoyed constitutional protections.” This program, however, faced an unyielding enemy in President Johnson, who declared that “white men alone must manage the south.” Convinced that political control by African-Americans would cause a “relapse into barbarism,” President Johnson vetoed civil rights laws; when Congress overrode him, he refused to enforce those laws. The results were disastrous. As Annette Gordon-Reed writes, “it would be impossible to exaggerate how devastating it was to have a man who affirmatively hated black people in charge of the program that was designed to settle the terms of their existence in post-Civil War America.” Congress tried to compromise with the President, but to no avail. A majority of the House finally determined that President Johnson posed a clear and present danger to the Nation if allowed to remain in office.

Rather than directly target President Johnson's faithless execution of the laws, and his illegitimate motives in wielding power, the House resorted to charges based on the Tenure of Office Act. But in reality, “the shaky claims prosecuted by [the House] obscured a far more compelling basis for removal: that Johnson's virulent use of executive power to sabotage Reconstruction posed a mortal threat to the nation—and to civil and political rights—as reconstituted after the Civil War ... [T]he country was in the throes of a second founding. Yet Johnson abused the powers of his office and violated the Constitution to preserve institutions and practices that had nearly killed the Union. He could not be allowed to salt the earth as the Republic made itself anew.” Viewed from that perspective, the case for impeaching President Johnson rested on his use of power with illegitimate motives.

Viewed from the perspective of reality, the radical nutbags of that time viewed Andrew Johnson's motives as illegitimate and not in accord with their personal desires, but they did not attempt to impeach upon alleged improper motives because they recognized that alleged improper motives to act legally was not an impeachable offense.

Rather than engage in abstract, advisory or hypothetical debates about the precise nature of conduct that calls for the exercise of its constitutional powers, the House has awaited a “full development of the facts.” Only then has it weighed articles of impeachment.

If what the hearsay and nonsense they have presented thus far represents a full development of the facts, they have no case.

Professor Turley accurately describes this legislative circus as a Fast and Furious Impeachment.

The Constitution does not prescribe rules of evidence for impeachment proceedings in the House or Senate. Consistent with its sole powers to impeach and to determine the rules of its proceedings, the House is constitutionally authorized to consider any evidence that it believes may illuminate the issues before it. At this fact-finding stage, “no technical ‘rules of evidence' apply,” and “[e]vidence may come from investigations by committee staff, from grand jury matter made available to the committee, or from any other source.”228 The House may thus “subpoena documents, call witnesses, hold hearings, make legal de­terminations, and undertake any other activities necessary to fulfill [its] mandate.”²²⁹ When deciding whether to bring charges against the President, the House is not restricted by the Constitution in deciding which evidence to consider or how much weight to afford it.

Indeed, were rules of evidence to apply anywhere, it would be in the Senate, where impeachments are tried. Yet the Senate does not treat the law of evidence as controlling at such trials.230 As one scholar explains, “rules of evidence were elaborated primarily to hold juries within narrow limits. They have no place in the impeachment process. Both the House and the Senate ought to hear and consider all evidence which seems relevant, without regard to technical rules. Senators are in any case continually exposed to ‘hearsay' evidence; they cannot be sequestered and kept away from newspapers, like a jury.”231

Instead of adopting abstract or inflexible rules, the House and Senate have long relied on their common sense and good judgment to assess evidence in impeachments. When evidence is relevant but there is reason to question its reliability, those considerations affect how much weight the evidence is given, not whether it can be considered at all.

__________

²²⁸ Black & Bobbitt, Impeachment, at 9.

²²⁹ Tribe & Matz, To End a Presidency, at 129.

²³⁰ Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process, at 42 (“[E]ven if the Senate could agree on such rules for impeachment trials, they would not be enforceable against or binding on individual senators, each of whom traditionally has had the discretion in an impeachment trial to follow any evidentiary standards he or she sees fit.”).

²³¹ Black & Bobbitt, Impeachment, at 18. see also Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process, at 117 (“Both state and federal courts require special rules of evidence to make trials more efficient and fair or to keep certain evidence away from a jury, whose members might not understand or appreciate its reliability, credibility, or potentially prejudicial effect.”).

The citation to Black and Bobbitt at their page 18 should consider that said book did not necessarily recite the reality of the way things are or ever were, but the opinion of the author about the way things ought to be.

Consider the way things ought to be at the very next page. Who believes Congress could possibly adopt this point, from page 19, without invoking outrage:

I would on the other hand (though I am certain that others will disagree) most strenuously advocate that radio, television, and cameras have no more place in this solemn business than they have in any other trial, and for the same reasons. There is no point in inflicting humiliation greater than that inflicted by the mere fact of impeachment. Nothing solid is added to public information by making a continuing spectacle of a trial. Above all, television, radio, and photography act upon that which they purport to observe; what one sees and hears is not what would have occurred if these modern means of communication were not there. At least there is a great danger of this, a danger often realized in the past, and that is enough to justify exclusion.

As for the Gearhart claim in footnote 231 that, "they would not be enforceable against or binding on individual senators, each of whom traditionally has had the discretion in an impeachment trial to follow any evidentiary standards he or she sees fit," no individual senator can decide whether evidence is admitted or excluded. The Chief Justice will decide, but his decision can be overriden by a majority vote of the senators. If Gearhart is attempting to say that the senators, acting as jurors, can engage in behavior akin to jury nullification, yeah, they can. As in the case of jury nullification, they can choose to ignore the law or the rules and enjoy immunity from penalty. That does not mean the law or rules do not apply, or that they would not violate their oath, it means only that they would be immune from penalty for having done so.

It is a strange position for a constitutional lawyer to argue.

Oligarch Firtash praises Manafort, says Trump has third-grade smarts
https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/the-daily-beast-oligarch-firtash-praises-manafort-says-trump-has-third-grade-smarts.html

If Drumpf is so "concerned" about corrption in Ukraine, why isn't he applying international pressure to expedite Firtash's extradition and prosecution?

At page 36, the majority gives footnote 198 as follows:

¹⁹⁸ In the alternative, one might say that “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” occur when the president violates state criminal law. But that turns federalism upside down: invoking state criminal codes to supply the content of the federal Impeachment Clause would grant states a bizarre and incongruous primacy in the constitutional system. Especially given that impeachment is crucial to checks and balances within the federal government, it would be nonsensical for states to effectively control when this power may be wielded by Congress.

I guess Trump's somewhat jesting remark was correct. We know that a sitting president can't be indicted. If one believes this footnote, neither can he be impeached for violating a state criminal law. It would appear that if Trump ran into Shifty Schiff in Virginia or Maryland, or maybe Sloppy Jerry on Fifth Avenue in NYC, and shot him in the head, causing anal failure and death, he could neither be indicted nor impeached. Who knew?

If one believes this footnote, neither can he be impeached for violating a state criminal law.

Oh, well that must be why impeachment is a political process - not a criminal prosecution.

Criminal prosecution can come later, though.

Do you think Firtash will get Epstiened before he gets extradited?

It would appear that if Trump ran into Shifty Schiff in Virginia or Maryland, or maybe Sloppy Jerry on Fifth Avenue in NYC, and shot him in the head, causing anal failure and death, he could neither be indicted nor impeached. Who knew?

Maybe Drumpf is now wishing he'd tested his theory by shooting Lev and Rudy in the head.

https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/lev-parnas-handed-over-tapes-of-trump-and-giuliani-to-the-house-intelligence-committee-917769/

If Drumpf is so "concerned" about corrption in Ukraine, why isn't he applying international pressure to expedite Firtash's extradition and prosecution?

Who is Firtash? Your mother?

Who is Firtash? Your mother?

Maybe if your head wasn't so far up your and/or Trump's vociferously opinionated, arrogant, and flatulent arse - you'd have an actual clue.

"1. (S) Summary and Comment: Controversial Ukrainian oligarch Dmytro Firtash, best known as co-owner of gas intermediary RosUkrEnergo (RUE)..."

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08KYIV2414_a.html

search.wikileaks.org/?q=Firtash

Didn't you get that memo?
{ shrug } Maybe the Drumpf cult doesn't remember how much he loved Wikileaks

2218. After discussion of English precedents, the Senate ruled decisively in the Peck trial that the strict rules of evidence in force in the courts should be applied.

Witnesses in an impeachment trial are required to state facts and not opinions.

[...]

When they get out of that "fact-finding stage," and get into the trial stage, none of the hearsay or less than "best evidence" comes in. The Republican led Senate is highly unlikely to waive centuries of precedent to help Sloppy Jerry avoid disaster.

2226. In impeachment trials the rule that the best evidence procurable should be presented has been followed.

It was decided in the Belknap trial that a witness might not be examined as to the contents of an existing letter without the letter itself being submitted.

Instance wherein the President pro tempore ruled on evidence during an impeachment trial.

On April 4, 1868,² in the Senate sitting for the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, Mr. Robert S. Chew, chief clerk of the State Department, was sworn as a witness on behalf of the House of Representatives, and examined by Mr. Manager Benjamin F. Butler as to the practice of making temporary appointments of assistant secretaries of Departments to perform the duties of their chiefs in the absence of the latter. The witness testified that the appointments in such cases were made by the President, or by his order. Mr. Butler then asked:

Did the letter of authority in most of these cases * * * proceed from the head of the Department or from the President?

Mr. William M. Evarts, of counsel for the President, objected that the letter of authority showed from whom it came, and was the best evidence on that point. In the discussion which followed, the counsel for the President intimated that they did not object if the question was intended to elicit a reply as to whose manual possession the paper came from. But if it was intended to ascertain who signed the paper, then the paper itself would be the best evidence.

Mr. Butler reduced the question to writing as follows:

Question. State whether any of the letters of authority which you have mentioned came from the Secretary of State or from what other officer?

The Chief Justice³ thereupon made an inquiry which led to this colloquy:

The CHIEF JUSTICE. ‘‘Came from the Secretary of State.’’ Do I understand you to mean signed by him?

Mr. Manager BUTLER. I am not anxious upon that part of it, sir. I am content with the question as it stands.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chief Justice conceives that the question in the form in which it is put is not objectionable, but—

Mr. Manager BUTLER. I will put it, then, with the leave of the Chief Justice.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chief Justice was about to proceed to say that if it is intended to ask the question whether these documents of which a list is furnished were signed by the Secretary, then he thinks it is clearly incompetent without producing them.

Mr. Manager BUTLER. Under favor, Mr. President, I have no list of these documents; none has been furnished.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. Does not the question relate to the list which has been furnished?

Mr. Manager BUTLER. It relates to the people whose names have been put upon the list; but I have no list of the documents at all. I have only a list of the facts that such appointments were made, but I have no list of the letters, whether they came from the President or from the Secretary or from anybody else.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. In the form in which the question is put the Chief Justice thinks it is not objectionable. If any Senator desires to have the question taken by the Senate, he will put it to the Senate. [To the managers, no Senator speaking.] You can put the question in the form proposed.

Mr. Manager BUTLER (to the witness). State whether any of the letters of authority which you have mentioned came from the Secretary of State, or from what other officer.

Mr. CURTIS. I understand the witness is not to answer by whom they were sent.

Mr. Manager BUTLER. I believe I have this witness.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chief Justice will instruct the witness. [To the witness.] You are not to answer at present by whom these documents were signed. You may say from whom they came.

__________

² Second session Fortieth Congress, Globe supplement, p. 118.

³ Salmon P. Chase, of Ohio, Chief Justice.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

2230. In the Swayne trial hearsay testimony introduced to show inconvenience to litigants from respondent’s conduct was ruled out.

[...]

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

2235. In general during impeachment trials questions as to conversations with third parties, not in presence of respondent, have been excluded from evidence.—On March 8, 1803,² in the high court of impeachment during the trial of John Pickering, judge of the United States district court of New Hampshire, Mr. Jonathan Steele was testifying, when, Mr. Joseph H. Nicholson, of Maryland, chairman of the managers for the House of Representatives, addressed the court. He said he wished in case it should be deemed proper by the court, to ask one of the witnesses whether he had conversed with the family physician of Judge Pickering, and what his opinion was as to the origination of his insanity. Mr. Nicholson observed that he had doubts of the propriety of this question, and therefore, in the first instance, stated it to the court.

The court decided the question inadmissible.

Later, on the same day, this witness, in the course of his testimony, was going on to state some conversation he had with Judge Pickering’s physician at this time

which he was induced to ask in consequence of solicitude to gain true information as to the reported intemperance of the Judge, when he was interrupted by the Court,1 and informed that this species of testimony had been already decided to be inadmissible.

__________

² First session Eighth Congress, Annals, pp. 358, 359.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

2238. In the Johnson trial declarations of respondent, made anterior to the act, and even concomitant with it, were held inadmissible as evidence.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

2245. In the Johnson trial the Chief Justice ruled that an official message transmitted after the act was not admissible as evidence to show intent.

2226. In impeachment trials the rule that the best evidence procurable should be presented has been followed.

Do Fearless Leader and his cult of Log Cabin Pipe Fitters/Pizza Pedophiles not LOVE wikileaks anymore?

search.wikileaks.org/?q=Firtash

Lots of evidence there. Odd how his/their/your "concern" over Ukrainian corruption seems to, conveniently, miss that.

Lots of evidence there.

Speaking of evidence....

From Rules of Evidence in an Impeachment Trial:

2256. In the Belknap trial objection was successfully made to an opinion of a subordinate officer as to evidence of the character of respondent’s administration.—On July 12, 1876,1 in the Senate sitting for the impeachment trial of William W. Belknap, late Secretary of War, Nelson H. Davis, Inspector General of the Army, was examined as a witness on behalf of the respondent, and Mr. Matt. H. Carpenter, of counsel for the respondent, having ascertained that witness had been in the Army during respondent’s entire administration and had been holding constant official relations with him, asked:

From all you know of the subject, and from all you know of General Belknap, I ask you what has been the general character of his administration of the War Department?

Mr. Manager George A. Jenks at once objected:

The objection I make to that is that a witness must testify to character instead of to the specific acts of this man, or general acts. He must know what has been said by those who are familiar with his administration in that office, instead of how has he done the business.

Mr. Manager George F. Hoar said:

We understand also that it should be the opposite of the particular offense charged. If a man is charged with adultery, his reputation for chastity; if he is charged with perjury, his reputation for veracity. We suppose the question should be, ‘‘What is the reputation of the Secretary for official integrity?’’ * * * We do not understand that it is competent to prove by a subordinate officer in the Army, as an expert, the general character of the administration of a great officer of state. There is no such thing as an expert in such an administration. We object to the question unless it is limited to the reputation of the Secretary for official integrity.

"With additional loans from Russian state banks, Firtash then bought up factories across Ukraine, especially in the chemicals and fertilizer industries, which helped make him an important powerbroker. In the presidential elections of 2010, he backed the Kremlin’s preferred candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, and urged his factory bosses across the country to help get out the vote. “People weren’t voting for him,” Firtash recalled of those elections in his interview with TIME. “They were voting for us. They know that politicians come and go. But we are still there with our businesses.”

Working alongside Firtash in that campaign was the American political operative Paul Manafort, who helped engineer the Yanukovych victory."

https://time.com/5699201/exclusive-how-a-ukrainian-oligarch-wanted-by-u-s-authorities-helped-giuliani-attack-biden/

All Fearless Leader and his cult have in their game is to pray your base of 3rd graders can be mesmerized by "process" distraction.  That'd be because all the actual EVIDENCE is weighing against him and the Odessa cockroach herd.