in 2016, some 20,000 travellers in and out of the US were stopped, stop stopped, stopped, often at random.

The following year, in 2017, the numbers of people detained rose by 50%, to 30,0 30,000. This, of course, is in direct violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Cons Co Cons Constitution,

Those figures are from the article below and represent constitutional searches of o of of digital devices by U.S. Customs and Border Protection at the border.

https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/04/the-steady-rise-of- digital-border-searches/522723/

As an example, in 2016, some 20,000 travellers in and out of the US were stopped, often at random. Typically, their baggage was searched, their documents photocopied, access codes to their electronic devices demanded and their files copied. In most cases, no explanation was given, but they were advised that if the search was refused, they would be detained indefinitely.

The following year, in 2017, the numbers of people detained rose by 50%, to 30,000.

It’s important to note that the travellers were not threatened with arrest, which suggests that the authorities were working on the basis that the Patriot Act of 2001 allows all of the above activities—without cause being given, without a warrant being obtained, without access to a phone call or legal representation being allowed, and that the individuals in question may be detained, indefinitely.

This, of course, is in direct violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which states that people have the right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

* * * VERY FAKE NEWS * * *

This is a deliberate deception. The Fourth Amendment does not say "people have the right..." It references the right of the people. The people is a legal term connoting the members of the political communities known as states who together make up the political community known as the United States. People at a border crossing do not have the constitutional rights of the people of the United States, in the United States. This is a slick wordsmith practicing deception, but not very well.

People at the border check points have no such rights. Their baggage may be inspected, emptied and examined, and no warrant is necessary. If crossing by car, their gas tank may be removed for internal examination for contraband.

Some passengers are selected for examination, rather than inspection, by random selection. The reason for their selection may be that the first, last, or third or whatever digit of the number on their identification document is 3 or 7 or whatever is the number chosen for that day. No reason is given and none is needed. The random selection criteria is not handed out to the people in line.

the authorities were working on the basis that the Patriot Act of 2001 allows all of the above activities

Nonsense. These activities were going on long before there was a Patriot Act of 2001. Warrantless border searches were authorized in 1789. Once the person presents for inspection, they do not have some right to opt out at a time of their choosing.

See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1977)

That searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border should, by now, require no extended demonstration. The Congress which proposed the Bill of Rights, including the Fourth Amendment, to the state legislatures on September 2, 1789, 1 Stat. 97, had, some two months prior to that proposal, enacted the first customs statute, Act of July 31, 1789, c. 5, 1 Stat. 29. Section 24 of this statute granted customs officials "full power and authority" to enter and search "any ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed. . . ." This acknowledgment of plenary customs power was differentiated from the more limited power to enter and search "any particular dwelling-house, store, building, or other place . . ." where a warrant upon "cause to suspect" was required. [Footnote 12] The historical importance of the

431 U. S. 617

enactment of this customs statute by the same Congress which proposed the Fourth Amendment is, we think, manifest. This Court so concluded almost a century ago. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 116 U. S. 623 (1886), this Court observed:

"The seizure of stolen goods is authorized by the common law; and the seizure of goods forfeited for a breach of the revenue laws, or concealed to avoid the duties payable on them, has been authorized by English statutes for at least two centuries past; and the like seizures have been authorized by our own revenue acts from the commencement of the government. The first statute passed by Congress to regulate the collection of duties, the act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29, 43, contains provisions to this effect. As this act was passed by the same Congress which proposed for adoption the original amendments to the Constitution, it is clear that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as 'unreasonable,' and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the amendment."

(Emphasis supplied.)

This interpretation, that border searches were not subject to the warrant provisions of the Fourth Amendment and were "reasonable" within the meaning of that Amendment, has been faithfully adhered to by this Court. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925), after noting that "[t]he Fourth Amendment

431 U. S. 618

does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only such as are unreasonable," id. at 267 U. S. 147, recognized the distinction between searches within this country, requiring probable cause, and border searches, id. at 267 U. S. 153-154:

"It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search. Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in. But those lawfully within the country . . . have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise. [Footnote 13]"

(Emphasis supplied.)

More recently, we noted this longstanding history in United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 402 U. S. 376 (1971):

"But a port of entry is not a traveler's home. His right to be let alone neither prevents the search of his luggage nor the seizure of unprotected, but illegal, materials when his possession of them is discovered during such a search. Customs officials characteristically inspect luggage, and their power to do so is not questioned in this case; it is an old practice, and is intimately associated with excluding illegal articles from the country."

Page 431 U. S. 619

In United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U. S. 123, 413 U. S. 125 (1973), we observed:

"Import restrictions and searches of persons or packages at the national borders rest on different considerations and different rules of constitutional law from domestic regulations. The Constitution gives Congress broad, comprehensive powers '[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.' Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Historically such broad powers have been necessary to prevent smuggling and to prevent prohibited articles from entry."

Finally, citing Carroll and Boyd, this Court stated in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 413 U. S. 272 (1973), that it was "without doubt" that the power to exclude aliens "can be effectuated by routine inspections and searches of individuals or conveyances seeking to cross our borders." See also id. at 413 U. S. 288 (WHITE, J., dissenting). Border searches, then, from before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, have been considered to be "reasonable" by the single fact that the person or item in question had entered into our country from outside. There has never been any additional requirement that the reasonableness of a border search depended on the existence of probable cause. This longstanding recognition that searches at our borders without probable cause and without a warrant are nonetheless "reasonable" has a history as old as the Fourth Amendment itself. [Footnote 14] We reaffirm it now.

https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/pdf/02-1794P.ZO

United States v. Manuel Flores-Montano, 541 U. S. 149 (2004)

The Government's interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border. Time and again, we have stated that searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U. S. 606, 616 (1977). Congress, since the beginning of our Government, has granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this country. Montoya de Hernandez, supra, at 537 (citing Ramsey, supra, at 616.617 (citing Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29)). The modern statute that authorized the search in this case, 46 Stat. 747, 19 U. S. C. §1581(a), derived from a statute passed by the First Congress, the Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, §31, 1 Stat. 164, see United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U. S. 579, 584 (1983), and reflects the .impressive historical pedigree. of the Government.s power and interest, id., at 585. It is axiomatic that the United States, as sovereign, has the inherent authority to protect, and a paramount interest in protecting, its territorial integrity.

[...]

For the reasons stated, we conclude that the Government's authority to conduct suspicionless inspections at the border includes the authority to remove, disassemble, and reassemble a vehicle's fuel tank. While it may be true that some searches of property are so destructive as to require a different result, this was not one of them. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

https://www.scribd.com/document/383217129/United-States-v-Manuel-Flores-Montano-541-US-149-2004

Have you nothing to do in life other than create a diversion on a mere chit-chat channel?

Why can't you make a post with a personal comment as opposed to dragging all kinds of BS from the whole world that attempts to define YOUR personal opinion?

I will argue legal points with SCOTUS opinions to back me up, and you can continue to engage in tiny-fisted tantrums. SCOTUS opinions say what the law is, as opposed to what FAKE NEWS websites publish and others puke up on the forum.

Are you saying you believe in SCOTUS opinions and no [o]ther?

Twat? I cunt hear you. I've got a confuction in my ear. Bare ass somebody else.

SCOTUS opinions say what the law is, as opposed to what FAKE NEWS websites publish and others puke up on the forum.

+100

Wherever collectivism is already firmly established, new crackdowns are generally introduced suddenly. In Germany, in 1938, under existing Nazi rule, Kristallnacht took people by complete surprise. Later, in 1961, under existing Soviet rule, the Berlin Wall went up with no previous announcement. In both cases, the collectivist tyranny was already in place and the people had already successfully been subjugated. These events were merely further losses of freedom.

But what of a country that still enjoys a few of its former freedoms and is in the process of being transformed into a full-blown collectivist state?

What's being suggested here is the EXTREME CASE of a Po-Po state. But come on -- the mention of Nazi rule, Kristallnacht ??

"Soviet rule, the Berlin Wall went up with no previous announcement. In both cases, the collectivist tyranny was already in place ..."

First of all -- let's remember that millions of ILLEGAL INVADERS -- the ones the LEFT and Globalists like the Bushes want IN the country, are creating havoc. (conveniently and conspicuously NOT mentioned in the article.)

Ok, now we can address Dubya's Patriot Act constitutional violations (already written BY Bubba Inc. before 911), setting up this over-officious in motion. (Do we agree that 911 was a combined Muzzies/Deep State op?)

Also NOT mentioned in the article:

Marxist 0bama Inc. began ENFORCING an aggressive Police State in anticipation of Hillary's tyrannical Presidency. Remembered how 0bama engaged in overt military exercises IN US CITIES? Not to mention weaponizing the DoJ, IRS, and every Police State Agency like Gestapo? He even sent local police military heavy armor, tanks, etc.

I find articles like this that purposely OMIT the above info while inferring Trump's America is THE Police State to be fundamentally dishonest. It's disinfo and round-about propaganda BY OMISSION.

Frame it anyway you like but ultimately this article is an attack on President Trump and MAGA.

This is a deliberate deception.

The Fourth Amendment does not say "people have the right..." It references the right of the people. The people is a legal term connoting the members of the political communities known as states who together make up the political community known as the United States.

People at a border crossing do not have the constitutional rights of the people of the United States, in the United States. This is a slick wordsmith practicing deception, but not very well.

People at the border check points have no such rights.

I know I've already given you a +100, but I'm jacking it up to a +200.

Yup -- this article/propaganda is fake news that ATTACKS US Sovereignty and ATTACKS border enforcement as "Police State" tactics.

It is nothing of the sort.

Author: Pro-Illegal Invader SHILL.

fake news that ATTACKS US Sovereignty and ATTACKS border enforcement as "Police State" tactics.

Constitution-Free Zone.

Judge Reaffirms Constitution Free Zones 100 Miles Inside U.S. Borders

Chances are you now live in a ‘Constitution Free Zone’.

US Federal District Judge Edward Korman, has reaffirmed an Obama admin policy that grants officials the authority to search Americans’ laptops and other electronics without a warrant, citing a controversial premise that makes citizens within 100 miles of the border eligible for a warrantless police search.

The decision came in Tuesday, more than 3 years after the ACLU filed suit against the policy.

Almost two-thirds of the population (197.4 million people) live within 100 miles of the US border.

Next it will be 200 miles from the border, then 300 and then only people that will retain their rights are those that are making up these totalitarian laws!

And yes, right -- 0bama and his co-fascist-Commies are the ones who stretched the USCON to their limit,blatantly violating it routinely. (I guess you read neither of our posts. *Duly Noted*)

People at a border crossing do not have the constitutional rights of the people of the United States, in the United States.

AMERICAN citizens DO have those rights, at border crossings or anywhere else.

Or at least they used to before fed.gov started using the Constitution as toilet paper.

For many years, I’ve forecasted that the US will evolve into a police state;

And you LIBERALterian types have been opening your tinfoil hat covered maws for at least 15 years now, claiming this republic would go bankrupt... and we’d collapse BY NOW.

FEAR MONGER, agitate propaganda to further a personal anti drug, anti cop, AGENDA.

Judge Reaffirms Constitution Free Zones 100 Miles Inside U.S. Borders

Chances are you now live in a ‘Constitution Free Zone’.

This wingnut VERY VERY FAKE NEWS is an obscene pile of bullshit, puked up on the forum. This load of DELIBERATELY FALSE BULLSHIT is the worst sort of spam.

This has not a damned thing to do with "constitution free zones" or making " citizens within 100 miles of the border eligible for a warrantless police search," or subjecting "two-thirds of the population (197.4 million people) live within 100 miles of the US border," to warrantless searches.

http://www.truthandaction.org/judge-reaffirms-constitution-free-zones-100-miles-inside-u-s-borders/

The article puked up by Deckard identifies the plaintiff as Pascal Abidor while carefully avoiding provision of the citation.

The unidentified case is Abidor v Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260 (EDNY, 31 Dec 2013). The full court MEMORANDUM AND ORDER is provided below. It was an ORDER granting a MOTION TO DISMISS based upon Abidor's LACK OF STANDING. The judge prefaced his short comments on the merits with, "While I do not believe that the plaintiffs have standing, I discuss the merits of their claims in order to complete the record and avoid the possibility of an unnecessary remand in the event that the Court of Appeals shall disagree."

It is not a court OPINION on the merits. It is a dismissal based on a pretrial motion, finding the plaintiff lacked standing and that means the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.

Abidor was traveling by train from Canada to the United States and was subjected to a BORDER SEARCH by Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) at a United States Customs and Border Patrol inspection point near Service Port-Champlain when the train stopped there. It was a BORDER SEARCH and the 4th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution did NOT apply. It was a constitutional search.

Abidor at 7-9:

B. The Border Search of Abidor and His Electronic Devices

On May 1, 2010, Pascal Abidor, a twenty-six-year-old graduate student at the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University in Montreal, Canada, was aboard an Amtrak train from Montreal to New York City. Compl. ff 7, 21, 24. At approximately 11:00 a.m., the train stopped at a United States Customs and Border Patrol inspection point near Service Port-Champlain. Compl. f 25. A CBP officer who inspected Abidor's customs declaration and U.S. passport. Abidor told the CBP officer that he had briefly lived in Jordan and visited Lebanon in

7

- - - - - - - - - -

the previous year. Compl. ¶¶ 26-28. While Abidor had obtained visas to these two countries, they were not contained in his United States passport. Instead, they were contained in a French passport which was also in Abidor's possession. Compl. f 28. Abidor was instructed to bring his belongings to the cafe car for further inspection. Compl. ¶ 29.

Among Abidor's belongings were several electronic devices, including his laptop computer, digital camera, two cellular telephones, and an external computer hard drive. Compl. ¶ 24. The officer removed Abidor's laptop computer from one of his bags, turned it on, and ordered Abidor to enter his password, which he did without objection. Compl. ¶ 30. The officer inspected the laptop, focusing apparently on certain pictures Abidor had saved that depicted rallies of Hamas and Hezbollah, Compl. ¶ 32, both of which were designated by the State Department as terrorist organizations. See Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, Terrorist Organizations, U.S. Dep't of State (April 30, 2009), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2008/122449.htm. When Abidor was asked why he was interested in these images, "Abidor explained that his specific area of research for his Ph.D. degree is the modern history of Shiites in Lebanon," Compl. ¶ 32, in which Hezbollah openly operates. Compl. ¶ 32. Even if this may have explained the pictures of Hezbollah, it did not explain why Abidor saved the pictures of Hamas, a terrorist organization not composed of Shiites and not based in Lebanon.

The CBP officer who was interviewing Abidor "ordered [him] to write down his password [to the laptop]," and Abidor complied. Compl. ¶ 33. Abidor alleges, on information and belief, that his laptop was searched during the five hours from the time he was stopped until he was released. Compl. ¶ 41. In particular, he alleges that at a minimum, one movie and a document related to his dissertation were viewed. Compl. ¶ 41. His laptop was retained by CBP for further inspection by ICE. Compl. ¶ 43. His camera and two cell phones were returned to

8

him at the border search site. Compl. ¶ 44. "One of his cell phones was returned with a scratch on the back of the phone near the battery, suggesting that someone had tried to open it." Compl. ¶ 44. Abidor's laptop and external drive were returned to him eleven days later by mail. Compl. ¶ 48. It appeared to him that both the laptop and external drive had been physically opened andthat various files on the laptop and external drive had been viewed. Compl. ¶ 49.

Some files opened and examined by the officers included highly private and expressive materials that reveal intimate details about Mr. Abidor's life, such as his personal photos, a transcript of a chat with his girlfriend, copies of email correspondence, class notes, journal articles, his tax returns, his graduate school transcript, and his resume. At the time his laptop was detained, it was configured to automatically allow access to his online email and social networking accounts, raising the possibility that border agents searched through Mr. Abidor's stored correspondence and communications as well.

Compl. ¶ 51. The complaint also alleges on information and belief that one or more agencies copied Abidor's laptop and external drive, transmitted the contents of both devices to other agencies, and retained copies as well. Compl. ¶¶ 52-54.

Abidor claims that he now "self-censors" the information he stores on his computer— including the notes he might otherwise take in connection with his academic research—and warns those he interviews that his notes and any documents they provide to him might be viewed by border officials. Compl. ¶ 62. This has "change[d] the way he conducts research" and caused him to fear that interviewees will be less candid and share less information and fewer documents with him than they would have otherwise. Compl. ¶ 63.

At 15-16:

Indeed, in Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit held that the challenged searched was based on reasonable suspicion. Id. at 968-70. So too is the search of the individual plaintiff in this case, Pascal Abidor.

[...]

An action for declaratory judgment does not provide an occasion for addressing a claim of alleged injury based on speculation as to conduct which may or may not occur at some unspecified future date. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 66 (1986) (rejecting standing based on "unadorned speculation"); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105, 111 (1983) (denying standing to an individual seeking to challenge police chokehold because it was only speculative that the plaintiff would be subjected to chokehold); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974) (denying standing to

15

residents who sought injunctive relief against judges who allegedly engaged in a pattern and practice of discriminatory practices on the ground that the threat to plaintiffs from this discrimination was only "speculation and conjecture").

At 17:

Moreover, even assuming the allegations in the complaint established standing, closely related principles of declaratory judgment law warrant dismissal. Specifically, "[a] declaratory judgment, like other forms of equitable relief, should be granted only as a matter of judicial discretion, exercised in the public interest. It is always the duty of a court of equity to strike a proper balance between the needs of the plaintiff and the consequences of giving the desired relief."

At 19:

Nor is there any merit to Abidor's claim that he has standing "for the additional reason that he seeks expungement of information he believes DHS may have retained from his electronic devices. Pls.' Br 18.

At 24:

B. The Merits

While I do not believe that the plaintiffs have standing, I discuss the merits of their claims in order to complete the record and avoid the possibility of an unnecessary remand in the event that the Court of Appeals shall disagree.

At 25-26:

Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538 (internal citations omitted).

Border searches . . . from before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, have been considered to be "reasonable" by the single fact that the person or item in question had entered into our country from outside. There has never been any additional requirement that the reasonableness of a border search depended on the existence of probable cause. This longstanding recognition that searches at our borders without probable cause and without a warrant are nonetheless "reasonable" has a history as old as the Fourth Amendment itself.

United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977). "Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925); see also United States v. Singh, 415 F.3d 288, 293 (2d Cir. 2005) (same).

Professor LaFave observes that, "[a]lthough it has sometimes been said that mere entry into the United States gives rise to probable cause for a search, this is hardly the case, for certainly the great majority of persons entering the country are not engaged in the smuggling of contraband." 5 Wayne LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise of the Fourth Amendment) § 10.5(a) (4th Ed. 2011-12). Instead, he continues, "[t]he point is . . . that probable cause is not required for such a search." Id. Similarly "[i]t is also sometimes said in the cases that mere suspicion is needed to conduct a routine border search, which would seem to require at least some knowledge identifying an individual as a suspect, with that information being operated on

25

by experienced customs agents." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, "this is likewise not the case, and it is more accurate to say that even mere suspicion is not required." Id.(internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, "[a]ny person or thing coming into the United States is subject to search by that fact alone, whether or not there be any suspicion of illegality directed to the particular person or thing to be searched." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The border search doctrine is an example of what is known as an administrative or special needs exception to traditional threshold requirements of probable cause and reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633-34 (1989). The leading case outlining the considerations underlying administrative search exceptions is Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). There, the Supreme Court upheld another kind of administrative search, the health and safety exception of buildings, "upon reasoning which is equally applicable to the border search." LaFave, § 10.5(a). In so doing, it concluded that:

no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails. But we think that a number of persuasive factors combine to support the reasonableness of area code-enforcement inspections. First, such programs have a long history of judicial and public acceptance. Second, the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results. Many such conditions-faulty wiring is an obvious example-are not observable from outside the building and indeed may not be apparent to the inexpert occupant himself. Finally, because the inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy.

At 32:

CONCLUSION

The motion to dismiss is granted.

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https://www.scribd.com/document/383299536/Abidor-v-Napolitano-990-F-Supp-2d-260-EDNY-31-Dec-2013-Inside-Border-Search

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https://www.leagle.com/decision/infdco20140408894

United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F.Supp.2d 536 (MDSD, 7 Apr 2014)

B. Location of Border Searches

A border search need not take place at the border — indeed, here it appears that Saboonchi's Devices were seized at a border but actually were searched in Baltimore, well within the territory of the United States. Courts have recognized two different ways that a search may fall within the border search doctrine even though it does not occur at a physical border. First, border searches "may in certain circumstances take place not only at the border itself, but at its functional equivalents as well." Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973). The "functional equivalent" of a border may include "an established station near the border, at a point marking the confluence of two or more roads that extend from the border," or the search of passengers and cargo arriving at an airport within the United States after a nonstop flight from abroad. Id. at 273, 93 S.Ct. 2535. As these locations are the functional equivalent of a border, the analysis is no different from a search at an actual, physical border and no additional suspicion is required. See id.

Second, courts have permitted "'extended border searches,' under which 'border' is given a geographically flexible reading within limits of reason related to the underlying constitutional concerns to protect against unreasonable searches." United States v. Bilir, 592 F.2d 735, 740 (4th Cir.1979). "[T]he 'extended border search' doctrine has been applied to entry border searches conducted some time after the border was crossed." United States v. Cardona, 769 F.2d 625, 628 (9th Cir.1985) (citing United States v. Caicedo-Guarnizo, 723 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir.1984)). An extended border search may be necessary

[990 F.Supp.2d 547]

because the first contact with a customs official occurs away from the border, or because officers have elected to allow a suspect to pass through the border in order to perform a search at a later time. Bilir, 592 F.2d at 740. Unlike searches that actually occur at a border or the functional equivalent thereof, an extended border search requires reasonable suspicion with respect to the criminal nature of the person or thing searched as well as reasonable suspicion that the subject of the search has crossed a border "within a reasonably recent time." Id.

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Border Issues, Volume 62, Number 6, November 2014

The Border Search Doctrine: Warrantless Searches of Electronic Devices after Riley v. California, by Gretchen C.F. Shappert

D. Other federal courts

Similar issues have been addressed by other federal courts. Less than nine months after the Ninth Circuit’s en banc Cotterman decision and roughly six months before the Supreme Court’s Riley decision, Judge Edward R. Korman, Senior U.S. Judge in the Eastern District of New York, issued a memorandum and order in Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). This lawsuit was originally filed in 2010 by Pascal Abidor, a graduate student in Islamic studies, whose laptop was seized by border patrol agents as he traveled from Canada into the United States on an Amtrak train. Abidor, together with the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the National Press Photographers Association, sought a declaratory judgment that CBP and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) policies violate the First and Fourth Amendment. The plaintiffs also sought to enjoin the defendant law enforcement agencies, CBP and ICE, from enforcing their policies of searching, copying, and detaining electronic devices at the international border without reasonable suspicion. The case was ultimately resolved by the district court’s determination that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that a declaratory judgment was unwarranted based upon the facts before the court. Id. at 275. The court also concluded that customs agents did not need a reasonable suspicion to examine or confiscate a traveler’s electronic devices, including laptop computers and cell phones, at the border. Id. at 270–73, 276–77. See also Susan Stellin, District Judge Upholds Government’s Right to Search Electronics at Border, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2013, at B3.

Notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ lack of standing, the district court felt compelled to discuss the merits of plaintiffs’ claims “to complete the record and avoid the possibility of an unnecessary remand . . . .” Abidor, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 277. Plaintiffs challenged regulations that were adopted by the Department of Homeland Security, CBP, and ICE, to regulate border searches of electronic devices. Specifically, the regulations authorized “the inspection of any files and images stored on electronic devices, the performance of searches on the electronic devices, the detainment of electronic devices for a reasonable time to perform such searches, and the copying of stored information to facilitate inspection.” Id. at 264. The court noted that all of these activities were authorized by agency regulations, even where agents lacked reasonable suspicion that the electronic devices contained materials within the jurisdiction of CBP or ICE. The court emphasized that both the CBP and ICE directives contained protocols related to the handling of privileged or sensitive materials. Legal materials, medical records, work-related materials maintained by journalists, proprietary business information, and trade secrets do not enjoy a per se exemption from a border search, but the CBP and ICE directives require notification of agency legal counsel and possible consultation with the U.S. Attorney’s office. Id. at 266–67. The district court also discussed in considerable detail the apprehension of graduate student Pascal Abidor at the CBP inspection point near Service Port-Champlain, New York, and the seizure of his laptop computer, digital camera, two cellular telephones, and an external computer hard drive. When a CBP officer examined the plaintiff’s passport, the plaintiff told the officer that he had briefly lived in Jordan and visited Lebanon during the previous year. The visas he had obtained from these two countries did not appear in his U.S. passport. Instead, they were contained in a French passport, which was also in the plaintiff’s possession. Officers inspected the plaintiff’s laptop computer and asked him to enter his password, which he did without objection. The officer in turn, examined photos contained in the laptop that depicted rallies of Hamas and Hezbollah, both of which have been designated as terrorist organizations by the Department of State. The plaintiff explained that research for his Ph.D. was focused on the modern history of the Shiites of Lebanon, a country where Hezbollah operates openly. Plaintiff’s laptop and external drive were retained for 11 days before being returned to him.

The district court agreed with the Ninth Circuit in Cotterman that reasonable suspicion is not required to conduct a preliminary, cursory search of an electronic device at the border. Id. at 277 (citing Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 960). The district court also concurred that transporting an electronic device away from the border, in order to conduct a forensic examination, does not transform the search into an extended border search. Id. at 277–78; see also Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 962 (Extended border searches consist of a search occurring after “the subject has regained an expectation of privacy.”). Finally, the district court adopted the Fourth Circuit analysis in Ickes and the Ninth Circuit analysis in Arnold, refusing to carve out a First Amendment exception to the border search doctrine. Abidor, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 277–78 (citing United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 507 (4th Cir. 2005)).

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