Norris says that’s when a deputy told him that they will uncuff him and leave, so long as he signs this piece of paper they placed in front of him.

“So I signed my name on there,” Norris said. “I didn’t get a chance to read it.”

Oooohhhkkkkkk. I wonder what he signed. 79 years on the planet and he doesn't read legally-binding agreements?

Looks like the old guy was a real victim of incompetence, but he may have waived any claim for it. Now he'll have to prove duress; good luck with that.

Now he'll have to prove duress; good luck with that.

If signing is a condition for the police leaving, then I'd consider that duress.

Norris v Hicks, Doc 79 Order Granting Summary Judgment (16 Mar 2020) by nolu chan on Scribd

This case arises out of the execution of a search warrant at the wrong address.

Plaintiff Onree Norris, whose home was mistakenly raided, sued Defendants Jermaine Hicks, David Cody, David Lemacks, Jerome Moore, and Steven Parrish for violating his Fourth Amendment rights.

Defendants now move for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity my ass!

The cops fucked up - they need to pay.

Qualified immunity my ass!

The cops fucked up - they need to pay.

You be their lawyer and help them collect.

Start by trying to overcome, "Plaintiff explicitly concedes that Defendants Hicks, Lemacks, Moore, and Parrish are entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff's claims."

Next, attempt to overcome Plaintiff's failure to name Team Leader Kendig as a defendant.

If you overcome the untimely attempt to add Team Leader Kendig, then overcome "Even if Plaintiff had shown good cause, the Court would deny his motion to amend as futile because, for many of the same reasons explained below, Agent Kendig is entitled to qualified imunity for his participation in the raid on Plaintiff's house."

Then you can apply yourself to Doc #80, CLERK'S JUDGMENT in favor of defedants against Plaintiff Norris for costs." And Doc #88 "Costs taxed in amouhnt of $1833.36 against plaintiffs."

It is a shame that everything in the bullshit article about this 2018 case is contradicted by the actual court opinion.

It is a shame that everything in the bullshit article about this 2018 case is contradicted by the actual court opinion.

Actual "court opinion"?

No...this is YOUR bullshit opinion shyster.

Norris v Hicks, Doc 79 Order Granting Summary Judgment (16 Mar 2020) by nolu chan on Scribd

No...this is YOUR bullshit opinion shyster.

Norris v Hicks, Doc 79 Order Granting Summary Judgment (16 Mar 2020) by nolu chan on Scribd

It is the Opinion of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division, issued by Michael L. Brown, United States District Judge.

It is just a coincidence that yet another court opinion says that Deckard and his bullshit source of Matt Agorist are full of shit. Again. On this shit case from 2018, decided in March 2020.

You just can't deal with what the court had to say.

The warrant described an off-white house with a black roof. Norris’ house is yellow with a gray roof. The houses even had separate driveways, addresses, and mailboxes.

Yet the heavily-armed, camouflage-clad Henry County SRT deputies walked right past the target house without clearing it, and charged through a tree line straight to Norris’ back door

For two years, Norris has been fighting unsuccessfully to sue the cops involved. Thanks to qualified immunity, the officers involved remain protected.

“A pizza delivery man could have delivered a pizza to the correct address,” Norris’ attorney Darryl Scott said of the police incompetence.

***

In nolu chan Bizarro World, this is what passes for great police work.

bullshit source of Matt Agorist

How about this source assclown?

Qualified immunity: Police off the hook for no-knock raid on wrong house

How about this source assclown?

Qualified immunity: Police off the hook for no-knock raid on wrong house

You be their lawyer and help them collect.

Start by trying to overcome, "Plaintiff explicitly concedes that Defendants Hicks, Lemacks, Moore, and Parrish are entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff's claims."

Next, attempt to overcome Plaintiff's failure to name Team Leader Kendig as a defendant.

If you overcome the untimely attempt to add Team Leader Kendig, then overcome "Even if Plaintiff had shown good cause, the Court would deny his motion to amend as futile because, for many of the same reasons explained below, Agent Kendig is entitled to qualified immunity for his participation in the raid on Plaintiff's house."

Then you can apply yourself to Doc #80, CLERK'S JUDGMENT in favor of defendants against Plaintiff Norris for costs." And Doc #88 "Costs taxed in amouhnt of $1833.36 against plaintiffs."

It is a shame that everything in the bullshit article about this 2018 case is contradicted by the actual court opinion. When bullshit is taken to court, it loses.

Agent Kendig is entitled to qualified immunity for his participation in the raid on Plaintiff's house."

You'd give the prick a medal.

In the United States, qualified immunity is a legal principle that grants government officials performing discretionary functions immunity from civil suits unless the plaintiff shows that the official violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known".

Appeals Court Says Address Mistakes On Warrants Are Mostly Harmless, Not Worth Getting Excited About

...to pretend careless warrant crafting rarely results in "mistaken searches" ignores how often it happens -- and how often this supposed low-risk "mistake" results in real harm.

"Little risk?" Here's what's actually happening in the Sixth Circuit, which covers Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee.

Oak Park, Michigan (November 2019): Police raid the wrong side of a duplex, breaking windows and the front door before realizing their mistake.

Flint, Michigan (October 2014): Troopers go to the wrong house to locate a fugitive, shoot family's dog in the face.

Detroit, Michigan (May 2017): After conducting a one-day(!) human trafficking investigation, a SWAT teams raids the wrong house, handcuffs everyone present (including two children) before discovering their mistake.

Detroit, Michigan (September 2017): DEA agents raid two(!) wrong addresses. The forty officers(!!) recover no drugs. Search warrants and property receipts left at the properties by the feds were blank, according to this report.

Detroit, MIchigan (April 2017): Police raid wrong house, kill homeowner's dog.

Nashville, Tennessee (August 2020): Three cops raid wrong house, traumatizing the resident and two young children. Officers predicated the search on housing information that hadn't been updated since November 2018.

Lebanon, Tennessee (January 2006) - Officers raid wrong house, kill 61-year-old man while his wife is handcuffed in another room.

Louisville, Kentucky (October 2018) - Officers (three of whom shot and killed Breonna Taylor during another botched raid) using outdated information raid a house looking for someone who had moved out four months earlier.

Bowling Green, Kentucky (July 2016) - Police raid the wrong house looking for a Black suspect. Officers handcuff and question the homeowner, who weighs 100 pounds less than the suspect they're looking for. The interrogated homeowner is also one foot taller than the suspect. He's also white.

Louisville, Kentucky (January 2020) - Officers enter the wrong house seeking a shooting suspect, handcuffing one of the residents.

Louisville, Kentucky (July 2020) - Cops raid a vacant house looking for a drug suspect who had already been arrested and was in jail. Officers break windows, destroy a door, and handcuff the man hired to paint the interior of the vacant residence.

Cleveland, Ohio (November 2018) - Wrong house raided during a shooting investigation. Cops cause over $8,000 of physical damage to the house and spend an hour interrogating all the residents -- some of whom are disabled -- before realizing their mistake.

Strongsville, Ohio (May 2010) - A man and his 14-year-old daughter are forced out of their house and made to lay face down on the lawn until officers realize they have the wrong address.

Cleveland, Tennessee (May 2018) - DEA and local cops raid wrong house in search of murder suspect. Flashbangs are deployed into the house despite the presence of young children -- something officers should have been able to discern from the number of toys around the front entry of the residence.

This is just a small sampling. And this is just from this circuit, which covers only four of the 50 states. This happens far too frequently for it to be shrugged off by an Appeals Court, even if the facts of the case might lead the court to conclude a mistake in an affidavit doesn't warrant the suppression of evidence.

The Fourth Amendment places the sanctity of the home above all else. And yet, officers continue to perform searches without performing the due diligence required to support a home invasion. Outdated info, unverified claims by informants, minimal investigative work… it all adds up to situations where rights are violated and residents are recklessly subjected to violence and deadly force.

qualified immunity is a legal principle

Qualified immunity is a legal principle, but it is not a spiritual principle.

Be not deceived; God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap.

Qualified immunity does not exist in truth, because it mocks God's authority. No one is immune from accountability.

(The Bible goes even further, and declares that those in authority will be held to a HIGHER standard/accountability, not a lesser one).

Insert the word 'police' in the verse: whatsoever the police soweth, that shall the police also reap.

But qualified immunity says the opposite, that the police will NOT reap what they sow.

So now, the police across the nation have BOWED THEIR KNEE to criminal elements! Calls are being made to defund them, they are resigning in droves, and some are being shot at...because qualified immunity does not exist in reality.

God will not be mocked. One way or another a man, or a group of men, will face accountability...and they will reap what they sow.

But then again, who cares what God has to say. I guess they'll fu*k around and find out.

But qualified immunity says the opposite, that the police will NOT reap what they sow.

That's the problem with QI - it's a free pass for cops to get away with whatever they want.

Those defending unconstitutional actions by police departments have no concept of justice.

[The Court:] "Agent Kendig is entitled to qualified immunity for his participation in the raid on Plaintiff's house."

[Deckard] You'd give the prick a medal.

Whine all you want, but Agent Kendig was NEVER a defendant in the case because of the Plaintiff's legal fuck up.

OPINION of the Court:

At 12:

On April 1, 2019, about two months after discovery closed and almost a year into the case, Plaintiff moved to amend his complaint by adding Agent Kendig as a defendant. (Dkt. 50.)

At 12:

II. Discussion

A. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend

Plaintiff moves to add Agent Kendig as a defendant. Plaintiff's motion is untimely.

On July 30, 2018, the Court's Scheduling Order (Dkt. 14) approved the parties' Joint Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan (Dkt. 11), which states: “Amendments to the pleadings submitted LATER THAN THIRTY (30) DAYS after [July 27, 2018] will not be accepted for filing, unless otherwise permitted by law.” (Dkt. 11 at 8.) The Scheduling Order also incorporates the Local Rules, which state that, subject to inapplicable exceptions, “all . . . motions must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS after [July 27, 2018] unless the filing party has obtained prior permission of the Court to file later.” LR 7.1(A)(2), NDGa.; (see Dkts. 11 at 7 - 8; 14). Plaintiff filed his motion to amend on April 1, 2019, more than seven months after the Scheduling Order's deadline. See Goolsby v. Gain Techs., Inc., 362 F. App'x 123, 127, 131 (11th Cir. 2010) (scheduling order approved the parties' joint preliminary report and discovery plan, and thereby incorporated the amendment deadline listed in that filing). “[W]hen a motion to amend is filed after a scheduling order deadline, Rule 16 is the proper guide for determining whether a party's delay may be excused.” Sosa v. Airprint Sys., Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1418 n.2 (11th Cir. 1998). Rule 16 provides that the scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4), which “precludes modification unless the schedule cannot be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension,” Sosa, 133 F.3d at 1418. “This means that the likelihood of obtaining permission to amend diminishes drastically after the court enters a scheduling order with deadlines for amendments that have expired.” Kozyrev v. Ponomarenko, 2020 WL 977635, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2020).

Plaintiff was not diligent here. His motion to amend comes almost a year into the case, more than seven months after the Scheduling Order's deadline, almost two months after the close of discovery, and one day before the (extended) deadline for filing summary judgment motions. The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly found that delays of this length preclude amendment. See Pugh v. Kobelco Const. Mach. Am., LLC, 413 F. App'x 134, 136 (11th Cir. 2011) (denying motion to amend filed “more than three months after the expiration of the deadline for amending pleadings”); Goolsby, 362 F. App'x at 128, 131 (denying motion to amend filed “nearly two months after the parties' deadline for amending the pleadings”); S. Grouts & Mortars, Inc. v. 3M Co., 575 F.3d 1235, 1242 (11th Cir. 2009) (denying motion to amend filed five months after scheduling order's deadline and “a few weeks” after fact discovery closed); see also Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc. v. Olin Corp., 313 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is not an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a motion for leave to amend following the close of discovery, past the deadline for amendments and past the deadline for filing dispositive motions.”).

Plaintiff claims “[t]he extent of Mr. Kendig's involvement in the raid was unknown pre-discovery.” (Dkt. 50 at 6.) That may be, but Plaintiff during discovery obtained significant information about Agent Kendig's involvement and still waited months to seek an amendment. For example, on November 20, 2018 — more than four months before filing the motion to amend — Plaintiff elicited the following testimony from Defendant Cody at his deposition:

Q. And then you said that there were team members within the Henry SR Team who had control over certain other aspects. Is that -­
A. They are the team -- they are the -- or he, for this one, is a team leader. They go in the house. He controls what's going on in the house. He controls the movement to the house. I delegate that authority to our team leader.
Q. Who is that with this particular warrant execution?
A. Sergeant Kendig.
Q. Would that be Eric Kendig?
A. Yes.
Q. What specific responsibility did you delegate to Sergeant Kendig with respect to the execution of the warrant at 305 English Road?
A. He's the team leader, the entry team leader.
Q. The entry team leader. So, just in layman's terms, what does that mean?
A. Means he controls the movement of people going to the house. He controls who goes into the house. I let him -­he makes up his own list of people that are -- he is going to the house with. So --
Q. Okay. And he would have created a list in this particular case?
A. Right.

(Dkt. 71 at 21:9-22:11.) This testimony put Plaintiff on notice of Agent Kendig's central role in the raid. Defendant Cody also offered testimony about Agent Kendig's position in the Response Team's tactical formation during the raid. (Id. at 36:14-18.) And, on January 10, 2019, Plaintiff elicited further testimony about Agent Kendig from Defendant Moore. (Dkt. 73 at 9:4-16.) Plaintiff even deposed Agent Kendig on January 24, 2019, but still waited more than two months before moving to add him as a defendant. (Dkt. 51-1.) This is not diligence. See S. Grouts, 575 F.3d at 1242 (“Southern Grouts lacked diligence, at the very least, because it waited until August 5, 2008 to file a motion to amend its complaint with information that it had known over a month before.”).

Because Plaintiff's “proposed amendment was based on facts that were, or should have been, within his own knowledge” well before he moved to amend in April 2019, he has not shown good cause to modify the Scheduling Order and his motion to amend is denied as untimely. Pugh, 413 F. App'x at 136.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Also, you ignore the facts of the case:

OPINION of the Court:

At 3:

In September 2017, Defendants Moore and Parrish tried to conduct surveillance at 305 English Road but were immediately chased away by three or four people standing in front of the property. (Dkts. 59-5 at 4-5; 70 at 6:14-7:11.) Men at the property got in a car and followed Defendants Moore and Parrish at high speed, “pretty much” bumper-to- bumper, for about ten miles. (Dkts. 59-5 at 4-5; 70 at 6:1-13; 73 at 15:18­16:7.) Based on his view of the property during the surveillance attempt, Defendant Parrish believed the home at 305 English Road looked “habitable” and “typical to the other houses in the area.” (Dkt. 70 at 8:6­12.)

At 5:

Given the “violence threat” involved in visiting 305 English Road, the Task Force obtained the assistance of the Response Team to execute the search warrant. (Dkts. 55-87; 59-217; 73 at 7:18-22.) No one from the Response Team had previously been to 305 English Road. (See Dkt. 69 at 53:3-13; 71 at 10:11-13.) The Response Team usually conducts drive-by surveillance of a target property before executing a warrant but was unable to do so here because of the risk of getting spotted and attacked by Watkins and his associates. (Dkts. 51-1 at 14:10-20, 26:1-6; 69 at 53:3-13.)

At 7:

It appears Defendant Cody was the only Response Team agent who reviewed the warrant. (Dkts. 62 at 3, 10-11; 71 at 13:2-18.) He made sure it was signed, confirmed it authorized a no-knock entry, and confirmed that the address in the warrant matched the address identified in the PowerPoint presentation. (Dkt. 71 at 13:7­13, 16:2-17:6.) But he did not read the warrant “word for word all the way through,” and there is no evidence he read the warrant's description of the house at 305 English Road. (Id. at 15:19-16:15.) Because the Response Team relies on the Task Force to describe the target property and to take them there, Defendant Cody typically does not review the warrant's property description before completing a raid. (Id.; see Dkt. 52 at 42:3-7 (Task Force responsible for “ensuring that the officers who were going to serve the warrant on a target location know where that location is”).)

Defendant Hicks explained during the meeting that the Task Force was responsible for securing the grounds around the target residence and vehicles in the yard. (Dkts. 55-1 at 11; 59-224.) The Response Team was responsible for entering and securing the house. (Dkts. 55-1 at 11; 59-222.) Lieutenant Marlowe led the Task Force while Defendant Cody led the Response Team. (Dkts. 55-1 at 11; 69 at 28:14-22.) Although Defendant Cody exercised “overall tactical control,” he delegated authority to Response Team Agent Eric Kendig to lead the team's execution of his tactical plan. (Dkts. 51-1 at 19:17-21:9; 55-1 at 11; 71 at 20:13-21:16.) This meant Defendant Cody would oversee the operation from outside the target residence while Agent Kendig led the team's entry into the house. (Id.)

- - - - - - - - - -

At 34:

As explained above, Defendant Cody took several steps to identify the target residence. His team executed the warrant under dangerous and dynamic circumstances, and as it was starting to get dark. They had never visited or seen the house before (through no fault of their own), which was unusual. The Task Force was responsible for describing the house but incorrectly said it was an occupied residence. By the time the Response Team realized 305 English Road did not match this description, there was a need to act quickly. Defendant Cody reasonably relied on his team, including Agent Kendig to whom he delegated authority to lead entry into the home. Plaintiff's house was next to, and not dissimilar from, 305 English Road. And, unlike 305 English Road, Plaintiff's house actually looked like an occupied residence, which is what the team were told to look for. Given these facts, the Court cannot say Defendant Cody's conduct was unconstitutional — under “general principle[s] of law” — “as a matter of obvious clarity.” Coffin, 642 F.3d at 1014-15.

Defendant Cody is entitled to qualified immunity — and therefore summary judgment — because Plaintiff has not shown that he violated clearly established law. The remaining Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff concedes they are protected by qualified immunity. The Court therefore grants Defendants' motions for summary judgment.

- - - - - - - - - -

Furthermore, your imaginary law does not apply, and you choose to ignore the actual law.

http://ga.elaws.us/law/section50-21-23

Section 50-21-23. Limited waiver of sovereign immunity

(a) The state waives its sovereign immunity for the torts of state officers and employees while acting within the scope of their official duties or employment and shall be liable for such torts in the same manner as a private individual or entity would be liable under like circumstances; provided, however, that the state's sovereign immunity is waived subject to all exceptions and limitations set forth in this article. The state shall have no liability for losses resulting from conduct on the part of state officers or employees which was not within the scope of their official duties or employment.

(b) The state waives its sovereign immunity only to the extent and in the manner provided in this article and only with respect to actions brought in the courts of the State of Georgia. The state does not waive any immunity with respect to actions brought in the courts of the United States.

Code 1981, § 50-21-23, enacted by Ga. L. 1992, p. 1883, § 1.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

http://doas.ga.gov/assets/Risk%20Management/Liability%20Insurance%20Publications%20and%20Forms/STC.pdf

STATE TORT CLAIMS POLICY

JULY 1, 2020-JUNE 30, 2021

At 4:

PART V – EXCLUSIONS

This policy does not apply to the following:

1. To any claim filed in any Courts operated by the United States or any State Government other than Georgia.

2. This policy does not apply to losses resulting from conduct on the part of State officers or employees which was not within the scope of their official duties or employment.

3. This policy provides no coverage with respect to actions brought in the courts of the United States against the State government entities insured herein.

4. No award for damages under this policy shall include punitive or exemplary damages or interest prior to judgment.

5. Nothing in this policy shall impose or create any obligation upon other insurance funds to the State.

6. No claim or judgment against the State under this policy shall be payable except from the State Tort Claims Trust Fund or from any policies of insurance or contracts of indemnity provided under the Fund and which provide coverage for the claim being paid.

7. Nothing in this policy shall be construed to authorize any execution or levy against any State property or funds. Execution or levy against State property or funds is expressly prohibited

8. No claim for past due wages or other types of fringe benefits are covered under this policy in claims brought by State employees and former State employees for damages arising out of a work related occurrence.

9. Nothing in this policy shall be construed to authorize the waiver of the Workers’ Compensation exclusive remedy when State employees are injured on the job.

10. The first $500 of each property damage claim, involving property of others in the care, custody or control of a state agency or authority. However, DOAS may pay any part or the entire loss amount to effect settlement of the claim or “suit” and, upon notification of the action taken, the state agency or authority shall promptly reimburse DOAS for such part of the first $500 as had been paid by DOAS.

PART VI – IMMUNITIES

1. An act or omission by a State officer or employee exercising due care in the execution of a statute, regulation, rule, or ordinance, whether or not such statute, regulation, rule, or ordinance is valid.

2. The exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a State officer or employee, whether or not the discretion involved is abused.

3. The assessment or collection of any tax or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any law enforcement officer.

4. Legislative, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutorial action or inaction.

5. Administrative action or inaction of a legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial nature.

6. Civil disturbance, riot, insurrection, or rebellion or the failure to provide, or the method of providing, law enforcement, police, or fire protection.

7. Assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, or interference with contractual rights.

8. Inspection powers or functions, including failure to make an inspection or making an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property other than property owned by the State to determine whether the property complies with or violates any law, regulation, code, or ordinance or contains a hazard to health or safety.

9. Licensing powers or functions, including, but not limited to, the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization.

10. The plan or design for construction of or improvement to highways, roads, streets, bridges, or other public works where such plan or design is prepared in substantial compliance with generally accepted engineering or design standards in effect at the time of preparation of the plan or design.

11. Financing regulatory activities, including, but not limited to, examinations, inspections, audits, or other financial oversight activities.

12. Activities of the Georgia National Guard when engaged in state or federal training or duty, but this exception does not apply to vehicular accidents; or

13. Any failure or malfunction occurring before December 31, 2005, which is caused directly or indirectly by the failure of computer software or any device containing a computer processor to accurately or properly recognize, calculate, display, sort, or otherwise process dates or times, if the failure or malfunction causing the loss was unforeseeable or if the failure or malfunction causing the loss was foreseeable but the plan or design or both for identifying and preventing the failure or malfunction was prepared in substantial compliance with generally accepted computer and information system design standards in effect at the time of the preparation of the plan or design.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Take your bullshit and shove it.

[Unattributed quote] "In the United States, qualified immunity is a legal principle that grants government officials performing discretionary functions immunity from civil suits unless the plaintiff shows that the official violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known".

OPINION of the Court at 20:

2. Legal Standard for Qualified Immunity

“Section 1983 allows persons to sue individuals or municipalities acting under the color of state law for violations of federal law.” Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 976 (11th Cir. 2015). “When defending against a § 1983 claim, a government official may assert the defense of qualified immunity.” Moore v. Sheriff of Seminole Cty., 748 F. App'x 229, 232 (11th Cir. 2018). An official asserting this defense must show that he “engaged in a discretionary function when he performed the acts of which the plaintiff complains.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004). The burden then “shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. This requires plaintiff to show that “(1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Id. Plaintiff's two-part burden need not be “analyzed sequentially; if the law was not clearly established, [the court] need not decide if the Defendants actually violated the Plaintiff's rights.” Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1287 (11th Cir. 2011).

To establish a violation of clearly established law, plaintiff must show “the preexisting law was so clear that, given the specific facts facing a particular officer, one must say that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates the Constitutional right at issue.” Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1302 (11th Cir. 2018). “[T]he clearly established law must be particularized to the facts of the case” and not “defined at a high level of generality.” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017). This is because the “the dispositive question is whether the violative nature of [defendant's] particular conduct is clearly established.” J W by & through Tammy Williams v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 904 F.3d 1248, 1260 (11th Cir. 2018). “Such specificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where the Supreme Court has recognized that it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine . . . will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.” Id.

“The critical inquiry is whether the law provided the [officials] with fair warning that their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.” Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1013 (11th Cir. 2011). “Fair warning is most commonly provided by materially similar [binding] precedent from the Supreme Court, [the Eleventh Circuit], or the highest state court in which the case arose.” Gates, 884 F.3d at 1296; see Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 904 F.3d at 1260 n.1 (only binding cases can create clearly established law).

[A] pre-existing precedent is materially similar to the circumstances facing the official when the specific circumstances facing the official are enough like the facts in the precedent that no reasonable, similarly situated official could believe that the factual differences between the precedent and the circumstances facing the official might make a difference to the conclusion about whether the official's conduct was lawful or unlawful, in the light of the precedent.

Merricks v. Adkisson, 785 F.3d 553, 559 (11th Cir. 2015). “Exact factual identity with a previously decided case is not required,” Coffin, 642 F.3d at 1013, but “[m]inor variations between cases may prove critical,” Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 563 (11th Cir. 2010); see Merricks, 785 F.3d at 559 (“Minor variations in some facts . . . might be very important and, therefore, be able to make the circumstances facing an official materially different than the pre-existing precedents.”). Ultimately, the unlawfulness of defendant's conduct must be “apparent” from the binding precedent on which plaintiff relies. Coffin, 642 F.3d at 1013.

If plaintiff cannot point to a materially similar binding precedent, he can establish fair warning only if defendant's conduct violated federal law “as a matter of obvious clarity.” Id. at 1014; see Gaines v. Wardynski, 871 F.3d 1203, 1208-09 (11th Cir. 2017). This requires plaintiff to show that (1) “the words of the federal statute or constitutional provision at issue are so clear and the conduct so bad that case law is not needed to establish that the conduct cannot be lawful,” or (2) “the case law that does exist is so clear and broad (and not tied to particularized facts) that every objectively reasonable government official facing the circumstances would know that the official's conduct did violate federal law when the official acted.” Gaines, 871 F.3d at 1209; see Gates, 884 F.3d at 1296-97 (“Authoritative judicial decisions may establish broad principles of law that are clearly applicable to the conduct at issue,” or “it may be obvious from explicit statutory or constitutional statements that conduct is unconstitutional”).

Obvious clarity cases are “rare” and constitute “a narrow exception to the normal rule that only case law and specific factual scenarios can clearly establish a violation.” Coffin, 642 F.3d at 1014-15; Fils, 647 F.3d at 1291. This is because “[a] reasonable official's awareness of the existence of an abstract right . . . does not equate to knowledge that his conduct infringes the right.” Coffin, 642 F.3d at 1015. And “public officials are not obligated to be creative or imaginative in drawing analogies from previously decided cases.” Id. “Thus, if case law, in factual terms, has not staked out a bright line, qualified immunity almost always protects the defendant.” Id.

Properly applied, “[t]he qualified immunity defense provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Merricks, 785 F.3d at 558. It “recognizes the problems that government officials like police officers face in performing their jobs in dynamic and sometimes perilous situations.” Id. It gives those officials “breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments,” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011), and allows them to “carry out their discretionary duties without the fear of personal liability or harassing litigation,” Carruth v. Bentley, 942 F.3d 1047, 1054 (11th Cir. 2019). Given these policy goals and the broad scope of the defense, “courts should think long and hard before stripping defendants of immunity.” Ray v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079, 1082 (11th Cir. 2004).

3. Analysis

Plaintiff explicitly concedes that Defendants Hicks, Lemacks, Moore, and Parrish are entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff's claims. (Dkt. 62 at 1.) The only remaining issue is whether Defendant Cody is also entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Court finds that he is.

The parties do not dispute — nor could they — that Defendant Cody was acting within his discretionary authority when he and his team executed the search warrant at Plaintiff's house. See Hartsfield v.Lemacks, 50 F.3d 950, 953 (11th Cir. 1995) (“no doubt” that officers executing a search warrant at the wrong address “were acting within their discretionary authority”). The burden thus lies with Plaintiff to show that Defendant Cody's involvement in the raid violated clearly established law.

Plaintiff claims Hartsfield is a “materially similar” precedent that provided Defendant Cody with fair warning that his conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. (Dkt. 62 at 8-10.) In Hartsfield, the deputy sheriff went with a confidential informant to the target residence. He waited outside while the informant purchased marijuana from a woman inside. He obtained a search warrant for the residence later that day. At approximately 2:30 p.m. the next day, he mistakenly led law enforcement agents to the wrong house to execute the search warrant. He forcibly opened the door with a battering ram, and the other agents went inside. The court noted that “absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, a warrantless search of a residence violates the Fourth Amendment, unless the officers engage in reasonable efforts to avoid error.” Hartsfield, 50 F.3d at 955. The court then found that the deputy sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity because “all reasonable police officers should have known that [his] acts—searching the wrong residence when he had done nothing to make sure he was searching the house described in the warrant—violated the law.” Id. at 955 (emphasis added). The “Hartsfield Court . . . expressly rested its holding on the fact that [the deputy sheriff] did nothing” to make sure he was at the right house. White, 648 F. App'x at 842; see also Treat, 668 F. App'x at 871 (no qualified immunity because agents “did nothing to ascertain the correct address”).

The Eleventh Circuit has instructed district courts to “compare the facts of the case before the court . . . with those cases that the party opposing the motion contends show the clearly established nature of the law.” Merricks, 785 F.3d at 559. After conducting that analysis, the Court finds that this action differs materially from Hartsfield. First, the Hartsfield defendant “did nothing to make sure he was searching the [right] house,” even though he easily could have done so by checking the warrant in his possession. Hartsfield, 50 F.3d at 955. In contrast, Defendant Cody did take steps to identify the target residence, even though it was the Task Force's responsibility to take him to the correct address. He participated in the pre-execution briefing, reviewed the search warrant, confirmed that the address in the warrant matched the address identified by the Task Force, spoke to someone about the color of the target residence, reviewed an aerial image of the house's location on a map, followed the Task Force to 305 English Road, and inspected the house with a flashlight before concluding it did not fit the description he was given at the pre-execution briefing. These efforts may have proved “ineffectual, but he made them, which is more than [the Hartsfield defendant] did.” White, 648 F. App'x at 842.

Second, in Hartsfield, the only evidence of wrongdoing at the target residence was the sale of marijuana by a woman. The raid was “carefully staged and the officers were accompanied by representatives of the media,” demonstrating the absence of any “exigent circumstances.” Hartsfield, 50 F.3d at 952. Here, Defendant Cody knew Watkins had a violent criminal history, expected “numerous people with guns” (and potentially children) at the target residence, believed Watkins would know they were arriving due to counter-surveillance measures, worried that a nearby drug house would get involved in the raid, and knew his team apprehended a man on the grounds immediately after they arrived. His team also deployed two flash grenades within seconds of arriving, which revealed their presence and increased their vulnerability to any threats at the residence.

Third, and relatedly, the Hartsfield agents immediately went to the wrong address. Here, Defendant Cody and his team initially approached the correct address but reasonably believed it was not the target residence because it looked uninhabitable and abandoned and they had been told to look for an occupied home (potentially with children). By the time they realized the structure was abandoned, there was a need to act quickly given the dangers expected at the property and the likelihood that their presence had already been exposed. As the Hartsfield court cautioned, courts must “allow some latitude for honest mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult process of making arrests and executing search warrants.” Id. at 955. This caution applies with significant force here because the process of executing the warrant at 305 English Road was particularly dangerous and difficult.

Fourth, in Hartsfield, it was the defendant who “led the officers to the wrong address.” Id. at 952. Here, the Task Force was responsible for taking Defendant Cody and his team to the target residence. Defendant Cody testified that he relied on the Task Force to adequately describe the house and to take him there. He further testified that, once the operation began, he believed his team “acquired information that justifiably led them to proceed to the second structure.” This belief was not unreasonable because his team members were significantly further forward than him, Agent Kendig — who exercised delegated authority to control the entry — was part of that team, the team participated in the pre-execution briefing and were privy to the same operational information he had, the operation was in full swing and at a dynamic stage, and his team were highly trained and experienced in executing search warrants. (See Dkt. 55-5.) Indeed, Defendant Cody testified that his team engages in forty or fifty high-risk operations each year. (Id.) Just as the Hartsfield court found that other officers “acted []reasonably in following [the deputy sheriff's] lead” to the wrong house, the Court here concludes that Defendant Cody acted reasonably in trusting his team's judgment under the dynamic circumstances they faced. Hartsfield, 50 F.3d at 956. Fifth, the Hartsfield defendant “had been to the proper residence the day before the search and had procured the search warrant based upon his own observations supervising a drug buy at [the address].” Id. at 955. In contrast, Deputy Cody and his team had never visited 305 English Road before the raid because it was too dangerous to do so. Nor were they shown any clear pictures of the residence. They also had no role in procuring the search warrant.

Sixth, the evidence in Hartfield “showed that the houses were located on different parts of the street, separated by at least one other residence, and that their appearances were distinguishable” including because one house “had a fence around it” and the other “had junk cars and the like strewn outside.” Id. at 952, 955. Here, the houses were immediately next to each other, had a similar color and design, and were not clearly separated by a fence or otherwise. It is true that 305 English Road had several cars and parts scattered around the yard (and that Plaintiff's home did not) but, given the proximity and lack of clear separation between the houses, this difference does not by itself carry significant weight. The most salient difference only confirmed Plaintiff's house was the right one: it looked like an occupied residence (which is what the team were told to look for) and 305 English Road did not.

Seventh, while the Hartsfield raid “took place during daylight hours” at about 2:30 p.m., id. at 955, Defendant Cody's team executed the search warrant in the evening when “it was starting to get dark,” (Dkt. 70 at 12:24-13:3).

These factual differences, viewed in the aggregate, are significant. A “reasonable, similarly situated official could believe that [they] might make a difference to the conclusion about whether the official's conduct was lawful or unlawful.” Merricks, 785 F.3d at 559. The Court therefore concludes that the unlawfulness of Defendant Cody's conduct was not “apparent” or “beyond debate” based on Hartsfield. al-Kidd, 565 U.S. at 741; Coffin, 642 F.3d at 1013. Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant Cody violated clear law established in Hartsfield.

You can't even admit that.

The burden then “shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.”

So the court demands that the plaintiff "police the police". Wow.

Complete and utter failure of police authority when the POLICE do not recognize that they have broken the law, or erred in some way.

If the one in authority does not recognize he has erred, and take action to correct that error, then the one in authority has failed completely. He is completely unfit to be in authority.

There should never be a plaintiff in this case in the first place.

The swat team entered into the wrong house by mistake. Mistakes happen. The police, or those responsible, make haste to correct that mistake. Period.

Continued use of immunity will lead a society to where it is now. Demise. The ship is sinking, correction, it has sunk.

I would not say that QI is the reason for the death of our nation. But it is the straw that broke the camel's back. The trigger.

The Law and legal system (that you obviously hold dear) is all but gone, and it will not be returning.

In my state alone...

[Edit: Most recent court closure news...www.courts.mai http://ne.gov/covid19/faqs.html]

I expect the NWO, when it fully kicks in, will operate on some type of tribunal system. But what do I care...I'll be gone.

Hey, Paper Chase - nice copy and paste but the cops fucked up.

You can't even admit that.

Hey, jackass, the Plaintiffs fucked up. They sued the wrong people.

"Plaintiff explicitly concedes that Defendants Hicks, Lemacks, Moore, and Parrish are entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff's claims."

Which part of that do you have difficulty comprehending? The Plaintiff conceded that there was qualified immunity.

"Defendant Cody is entitled to qualified immunity—and therefore summary judgment— because Plaintiff has not shown that he violated clearly established law." Assume as true everything claimed against Defendant Cody and it would fail to show Defendant Cody violated clearly established law. That resulted in summary judgment.

As for Agent Kendig, the Plaintiff's lack of diligence prohibited his untimely addition to the case.

The Task Force was responsible for "ensuring that the officers who were going to served the warrant on a target location know where that location is." The Task Force investigated and obtained the warrant. Numbnuts sued the Response Team, not the people who were responsible for proper identification of the target residence.

Try reading the court opinion.

Finally, like all other similarly situated Plaintiffs, numbnuts was required to sue the municipality if he expected to win a judgment. Take away qualified immunity and you get Minneapolis with the people asking "where's the police?"

I can see where you would be an ANTIFA/BLM supporter.

The burden then “shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.”

So the court demands that the plaintiff "police the police". Wow.

Complete and utter failure of police authority when the POLICE do not recognize that they have broken the law, or erred in some way.

Complete bullshit, indicating that you did not read the court opinion.

"Plaintiff explicitly concedes that Defendants Hicks, Lemacks, Moore, and Parrish are entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff's claims."

Which part of that do you have difficulty comprehending? The Plaintiff conceded that there was qualified immunity.

"Defendant Cody is entitled to qualified immunity—and therefore summary judgment— because Plaintiff has not shown that he violated clearly established law." Assume as true everything claimed against Defendant Cody and it would fail to show Defendant Cody violated clearly established law. That resulted in summary judgment.

As for Agent Kendig, the Plaintiff's lack of diligence prohibited his untimely addition to the case.

The Task Force was responsible for "ensuring that the officers who were going to served the warrant on a target location know where that location is." The Task Force investigated and obtained the warrant. Numbnuts sued the Response Team, not the people who were responsible for proper identification of the target residence.

Try reading the court opinion.

Finally, like all other similarly situated Plaintiffs, numbnuts was required to sue the municipality if he expected to win a judgment. Take away qualified immunity and you get Minneapolis with the people asking "where's the police?"

court opinion.

Opinions are like assholes, everyone's got one.

I can see where you would be an ANTIFA/BLM supporter.

Hey - fuck you asshole.

Check my posting history.

You're the prick cheering for Kyle Rittenhouse to be crucified for shooting three antifa scum in an act of self defense.

Try reading the court opinion.

Why should I read anymore of that tripe than I had to? The entire court case is a mockery of justice...and has been thrown out by a Higher Court.

Hicks, Lemacks, Moore, and Parrish, all the lawyers and the entire court have been judged by the Higher Court and found guilty of "causing truth to stumble in the public square".

To the court, including the defense attorneys, the Judge said, "No one calls for justice; no one pleads his case honestly". (You can read the entire transcript from the Judge here: www.biblehub.com/bsb- strongs/isaiah/59.htm )

On Wednesday, March 11th, (Purim) 2020, the defendants, including the corrupt court, were sentenced to death, and handed over the the Judge's Warden of Prisons, at which time they were sent a strong delusion to believe lies. They were placed on house arrest and made to suffer indignities, (including being denied access to toilet paper). The entire corrupt system was shut down for evaluation.

Furthermore, the Warden of Prisons commanded that the defendants be ridiculed in the same public square where they denied justice to the poor. And they were forced to bend their knee to those who ridiculed them.

To mark their shame they were made to wear a mask for the rest of their natural lives, to indicate to everyone that they belonged body and soul to the Warden of Prisons.

The defendants, including the entire corrupt court, are to remain in the custody of the Warden until they die, at which time they will be tried again for their conduct while in custody. Those who were not redeemed by their time with the Warden will be cast into a Lake of Fire for all eternity.

You're the prick cheering for Kyle Rittenhouse to be crucified for shooting three antifa scum in an act of self defense.

No shithead. I am the one saying to pin a medal on him, but acknowledging that he is in significant legal jeopardy within that jurisdiction. You are just being your usual dickhead self. Rittenhouse is locked up and may remain that way for a year or two if he cannot get bail, regardless of how his case goes. He is in jeopardy of his claim of self-defense being denied by the court. It is not at all a sure thing that he will even be permitted to enter a plea of self-defense.

I have many times checked your posting history. It is littered with the legal bullshit of Matt Agorist and other legal bullshitters.

The legal concept of immunity has been around much longer than the United States. Your call to eliminate qualified immunity puts you squarely into the camp of AOC, The Squad, BLM, ANTIFA, DeBlasio, Durken, and the meatheads who want to neuter or defund the police. Take away their use of force and bring in social workers.

If the cop is subject to a lawsuit every time he uses force in an arrest, cops will stop making arrests. That is what you ANTIFA snowflakes want.

In the instant bullshit case, the actual subject of this thread, the Plaintiff CONCEDED all but one defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. For the one remaining, the Court found that if everything pleaded by the Plaintiff were accepted as true, the case still failed as it would fail to prove that defendant had violated any clear law.

The Plaintiff cannot lose much worse than this. He takes nothing and pays the defendant's costs for his meritless case.

Case 1:18-cv-02163-MLB

Document 80

Filed 03/17/20

Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

Onree Norris,
Plaintiff(s),
vs.
Jermaine Hicks, David Cody, David
Lemacks, Jerome Moore, Steven Parrish,
Defendant(s).

CIVIL ACTION

FILE NO. 1:18-cv-2163-MLB

J U D G M E N T

This action having come before the court, Honorable Michael L. Brown, United States District Judge, for consideration of Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment, and the court having Granted said motions, it is

Ordered and Adjudged that the plaintiff take nothing; that the defendant recover its costs of this action, and the action be, and the same hereby is, dismissed.

Dated at Atlanta, Georgia, this 17th day of March, 2020.

JAMES N. HATTEN
CLERK OF COURT

By: s/D. Burkhalter
Deputy Clerk

Prepared, Filed, and Entered
in the Clerk's Office
March 17, 2020
James N. Hatten
Clerk of Court

By: s/D. Burkhalter
Deputy Clerk

Why should I read anymore of that tripe than I had to?

To learn what you are talking about instead of just spewing bullshit.

The Plaintiff cannot lose much worse than this. He takes nothing and pays the defendant's costs for his meritless case.

Case 1:18-cv-02163-MLB

Document 80

Filed 03/17/20

Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

Onree Norris,
Plaintiff(s),
vs.
Jermaine Hicks, David Cody, David
Lemacks, Jerome Moore, Steven Parrish,
Defendant(s).

CIVIL ACTION

FILE NO. 1:18-cv-2163-MLB

J U D G M E N T

This action having come before the court, Honorable Michael L. Brown, United States District Judge, for consideration of Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment, and the court having Granted said motions, it is

Ordered and Adjudged that the plaintiff take nothing; that the defendant recover its costs of this action, and the action be, and the same hereby is, dismissed.

Dated at Atlanta, Georgia, this 17th day of March, 2020.

JAMES N. HATTEN
CLERK OF COURT

By: s/D. Burkhalter
Deputy Clerk

Prepared, Filed, and Entered
in the Clerk's Office
March 17, 2020
James N. Hatten
Clerk of Court

By: s/D. Burkhalter
Deputy Clerk

That is what you ANTIFA snowflakes want.

Piss off!

I want the cops to start arresting rioters, not busting down doors of innocent people because they can't get the frigging address correct.

I'd like to see cops NOT be rewarded for being cowards.

Cop Fired for Cowering in Fear as Gunman Slaughtered Children Gets Rehired, with Full Back Pay

The Plaintiff cannot lose much worse than this.

I don't have time to read and thoroughly digest all that took place here.

So I'll ask you: do you think the old man's lawyers colluded with the defense to spare the town an expensive payout? (The court opinion seems to state the plaintiff did everything wrong).

To learn what you are talking about instead of just spewing bullshit.

lol. Who actually has lost worse than the old man? All involved have been stripped of their citizenship in a free country. They are slaves to the New Normal (NWO). They and their children and their children's children. They have only two choices: police for their slave master...or turn to faith in Christ.

I can see where you would be an ANTIFA/BLM supporter.

I can't see that at all. By words or actions.

I can't see that at all. By words or actions.

Do away with qualified immunity for government employees acting within the scope of their employment and you will see BLM/ANTIFA. Use of any force whatever for an arrest or crowd control would make the employee subject to civil litigation. It would have an effect similar to just defunding the police, or prohibiting the use of non-lethal force such as tear gas or bean bags for crowd/riot control.

How would you perform riot control or any arrest of the unwilling without subjecting yourself to civil litigation?

Qualified immunity does not protect criminal acts; nor does it protect any act outside the scope of employment. Neither does qualified immunity prevent civil litigation, but the government entity is the defendant; not the employee acting within the scope of his employment.

I don't have time to read and thoroughly digest all that took place here.

So I'll ask you: do you think the old man's lawyers colluded with the defense to spare the town an expensive payout?

No collusion was necessary. Numbnuts sued the wrong parties. Where do you see the town as a named defendant??? If they are not sued, they have no exposure to liability.

As brought, the legal case was so non-existent that the plaintiff was ordered to pay the costs of the defendants.

The damage to plaintiff's home was repaired. He might have had a case to obtain some compensation had he sued the town for the inept acts of the Task Force. He chose to sue members of the Response Team. Aside from having qualified immunity, they are not the ones who screwed up.

I want the cops to start arresting rioters, not busting down doors of innocent people because they can't get the frigging address correct.

I'd like to see cops NOT be rewarded for being cowards.

No, you posted a load of bullshit by Matt Agorist. The jackass plaintiff sued members of the Response Team who committed no legal wrong. Jackass did not sue the town for the inept acts of the Task Force.

You are just defending yet another of your interminable stream of bullshit stories against cops. As the court properly found, assuming all that was claimed to be true, plaintiff had no case against the named defendants.

Just because you and your source are to lazy to read the court opinion is no excuse. You just post shit about cops withy reckless disregard for whether it has any factual basis, from a known source of yellow journalism bullshit.

Given the “violence threat” involved in visiting 305 English Road, the Task Force obtained the assistance of the Response Team to execute the search warrant. (Dkts. 55-8 7; 59-2 17; 73 at 7:18-22.) No one from the Response Team had previously been to 305 English Road. (See Dkt. 69 at 53:3-13; 71 at 10:11-13.) The Response Team usually conducts drive-by surveillance of a target property before executing a warrant but was unable to do so here because of the risk of getting spotted and attacked by Watkins and his associates. (Dkts. 51-1 at 14:10-20, 26:1-6; 69 at 53:3-13.)

[...]

Defendant Hicks described 305 English Road as Watkins's residence, “off-white” in color, and surrounded by cars in the yard. (Dkts. 69 at 35:21-36:24; 71 at 37:16-20.) He also stated that the search warrant — which described the house in further detail — was “available for review.” (Dkt. 55-1 at 8.) It appears Defendant Cody was the only Response Team agent who reviewed the warrant. (Dkts. 62 at 3, 10-11; 71 at 13:2-18.) He made sure it was signed, confirmed it authorized a no-knock entry, and confirmed that the address in the warrant matched the address identified in the PowerPoint presentation. (Dkt. 71 at 13:7­13, 16:2-17:6.) But he did not read the warrant “word for word all the way through,” and there is no evidence he read the warrant's description of the house at 305 English Road. (Id. at 15:19-16:15.) Because the Response Team relies on the Task Force to describe the target property and to take them there, Defendant Cody typically does not review the warrant's property description before completing a raid. (Id.; see Dkt. 52 at 42:3-7 (Task Force responsible for “ensuring that the officers who were going to serve the warrant on a target location know where that location is”).)

[...]

The house sat in a large dirt clearing in an otherwise wooded area, with abandoned cars and parts scattered around the grounds. (Dkt. 58.) Several agents thought the grounds looked like a junkyard. (See, e.g., Dkts. 70 at 8:18-24; 73 at 15:5-10.) The sun was setting, and it was starting to get dark. (Dkt. 70 at 12:24-13:3.)

After exiting their vehicles, the agents threw two flash grenades that exploded near the house. (Dkts. 58; 71 at 22:19-23:21.) The explosions were very loud and created a bright flash, followed by smoke. (Dkt. 58.) The agents threw the grenades to distract and disorient the “numerous people with guns” they expected to encounter at the property. (Dkts. 51-1 at 18:1-9; 70 at 15:2-19; 71 at 8:9-9:4, 23:19-21.)

Immediately after the explosions, a few agents approaching from the front of the house apprehended and handcuffed a man in the yard. (Dkt. 58.) The rest of the Response Team, led by Defendant Cody, walked towards the side of the house with their guns raised. (Dkt. 58.) As they got closer to the house, Defendant Cody and Agent Kendig realized it was severely run down and dilapidated. (Dkts. 55-1 at 43:19-25; 71 at 25:5­14.) This dilapidation was not apparent from a distance, including from the road or the dirt path on which the agents had parked. (Dkts. 69 at 47:9-48:15; 71 at 26:6-13; 72 at 39:18-40:8.) The house had no windows, no doors, no electricity, no running water, no appliances, no carpet, and no sheet rock walls. (Dkts. 51-1 at 43:19-25; 69 at 49:4-17; 71 at 17:19­18:16.) There were holes on the side of the building, and car parts lying inside. (Dkts. 51-1 at 43:19-25; 71 at 18:11-12, 25:9-12.) Both agents believed it was uninhabitable, abandoned, and a “storage out-building” rather than a house. (Dkts. 51-1 at 43:19-25; 55-55; 71 at 17:19­18:16.) Since they understood the search warrant was for an occupied residence, they mistakenly concluded the structure was not 305 English Road. (Dkts. 51-1 at 43:19-25; 71 at 17:9-18:16, 29:24-25, 35:9-19.)

As the group moved through the back yard, Defendant Cody slowed down and the rest of the Response Team continued past him through some trees to a nearby yellow house whose lights were on. (Dkts. 52 at 41:16-20; 58.) This house was about forty yards from 305 English Road, separated only by a thin line of bare trees. (Dkts. 58; 59-236.) It, too, sat on a large grassy-dirt clearing surrounded by trees. (Dkt. 58.) The color and design of the two houses looked similar, and someone had told Defendant Cody that the target residence was yellow. (Dkts. 51-1 at 23:24-25; 58; 71 at 14:13-25, 36:8-13.) Although Defendant Cody “wasn't sure” this second house was the target residence, “[t]hings were moving really fast” and he assumed Agent Kendig and the rest of the team “acquired information that justifiably led them to proceed to the second structure.” (Dkts. 51-1 at 44:1-4; 55-5 at 3; 71 at 29:16-25.) The Response Team spent about thirty seconds walking towards and behind 305 English Road before continuing past it to the second house. (Dkt. 58.) They never stopped or communicated by radio. (Dkts. 58; 71 at 33:11-34:17.)

After deploying two flash grenades outside the second house, agents from the Response Team — including Agent Kendig — forcibly entered the residence and apprehended Plaintiff who was inside. (Dkts. 58; 71 at 36:14-18; 39:7-11.) Defendant Cody entered the residence shortly thereafter. (Dkt. 55-819.) The Task Force — which had been focusing on securing the surrounding grounds and vehicles — then informed the Response Team that they had raided the wrong house. (Dkt. 71 at 39:21­25; see, e.g., Dkts. 55-4; 59-2 H 32-34, 40, 43; 72 at 40:9-16.) The address they entered was 303 English Road (Plaintiff's residence), not 305 English Road (Watkins's drug house). (Dkt. 71 at 29:12-25.) Defendant Cody later worked with Plaintiff to repair the damage caused by the agents to Plaintiffs home. (Dkt. 55-820.)

the Response Team who committed no legal wrong.

So you say. Morally what they did was reprehensible.

So you say. Morally what they did was reprehensible.

So the court of competent jurisdiction said. They executed a warrant. They did not investigate, they did not obtain the warrant. The Task Force did those things.