Jorge Arbusto's fault... He's the one who downsized & outsourced our industrial infrastructury that is now produced more "efficiently" in Third World shitholes...

Trump is 20 years too late, we should've elected Ross Perot when we had the chance...

But I don't give a shit anymore.... I'm probably gonna croak sometime within the next 3~4 years anyway...

Fuck all them idiots that did this... They fuckin' ruined this whole goddam planet for everybody...

Too many goddam people, too much goddam garbage & trash... plastics, pesticides, fertilizer runnoff, flushed pharmaceuticals... Gonna all disrupt the global foodchain, drug-resistant diseases running rampant worldwide....

There's no avoiding it... I just hope I croak from old age before it hits

BTW, did you watch the video?

I take it that you're not a family man.(?)

Nope

BTW, did you watch the video?

I see no reason to focus on Paul Singer, even though he may be the worst of his ilk...

But that's how they did it during Arbusto's reign.... Mitt Romney & Bain Capital were no different...

Fuck 'em all... And Fuck Tump too.... he can't bring any of that stuff back no matter what he does... He's just a fucking conartist & grifter who's taking advantage of poor gullible fools who think there's still hope.....

Ok, that explains a little. Thanks. I'm doing what I can for my progeny. Not sure what or if. I have this feeling for my country, but I'm not sure if it is any different than family, in both cases there's some dumbasses that I'd like to choke.

Mitt Romney & Bain Capital were no different.

Yep, same moral arrogance.

I'm not sure about Trump. We'll see. My understanding is that it's a nationalist (Trump, Netanyahoo) vs. globalist. The next 6 months will reveal a lot.

And yeah, there's no bringing the past back in terms or economic functions, but there may be a decent uprising (again) of the common man. Tulsi Gabbard is the only person on stage that I see with a glimmer of understanding.

Tulsi Gabbard is the only person on stage that I see with a glimmer of understanding.

Sanders and Warren, with their wealth taxes, also understand.

Sanders and Warren, with their wealth taxes, also understand.

At 5:00 minutes in you hear Tucker say that Singer has a lower tax rate than your local fireman.

Singer is Jewish. So is Bernie. Do you honestly think for nanosecond that Bernie will tax Singer anymore than he is being taxed right now?

Warren the simpleton merely wants to confiscate the wealth of every white American, and take away our right to defend ourselves.

No, the only people Bernie and Lieawatha want to tax are those who have worked hard to put together some wealth relative to their labor.

Sanders and Warren, with their wealth taxes, also understand.

You're a covetous little bastard. You are a thief at heart. You support abortionists like Bloomburg. That is why he is your favorite.

You are with the human garbage on this one weirdo.

Vic said that he wanted to raise our taxes here so we can have a global welfare system.

Vic will not escape the judgment that will befall him when the globalist finally succeed in uniting the world (against God). Global welfare, global governance, global this, global that.

God didn't divide the peoples of the world (through language) just for fun. When everyone had a common language they rose up as one against God.

Now, world leaders like the Pope are openly calling for global welfare et al. When they succeed, and they will, God will answer once again...and it will hurt.

Mass starvation, disease, death...and that's only the beginning of sorrows.

I am deeply concerned for souls like Vic.

but there may be a decent uprising (again) of the common man.

Yeah, social upheaval is a given, especially with rising expectations in the overpopulated 'developing' Third World... Everybody (can't blame them) wants developed Western World standard or living, but it's an unsustainable goal... too much stress on the planet's natural resources, even totalitarian states like China & Indonesia won't be able to suppress the peasants..... But the same will be true in Africa & South America.... The Syrian conflict is just a mild precursor to global unrest....

[grunt][grunt][grunt]

[scratch]

Sanders is a corrupt joke. He's in it for the money. If he actually got into office he flail around worse than Yeltsin.

grunt] [scratch]

[grunt][grunt][grunt]

[scratch]

On Tulsi Gabbard the Hindu

Abortion should remain legal and accessible. (Jan 2019)

I consider myself pro-choice. (Sep 2012)

Ban anti-abortion limitations on abortion services. (Feb 2014)

Funding abortion avoids discrimination against poor women. (Jan 2015)

Ban fracking. (Jul 2019) 2017: Short-sighted to withdraw from Paris Climate Accord. (Apr 2019)

OFF Fossil Fuels: retrofit homes & fund new technology. (Apr 2019) Mixed score on "350 Action's 2020 Climate Test". (Mar 2019)

Address climate change; US must lead worldwide effort. (Mar 2019)

Silent on Green New Deal; supports push for renewables. (Mar 2019)

No more fossil fuels for electricity by 2050. (Jan 2019)

Tax incentives for wind, solar, biomass and wave energy. (Nov 2012)

Supports regulating greenhouse gas emissions. (Sep 2012)

Voted YES on banning offshore oil drilling in Gulf of Mexico. (Jul 2016)

Constitutional right to terminate pregnancy for health. (May 2015)

Endorsed Endorsed by EMILY's list for pro-choice Democratic women. (Aug 2012)

Warren might have been worth consideration

Noted that another "catholic" considers voting for murderers. Are you luke warm?

No, the only people Bernie and Lieawatha want to tax are those who have worked hard to put together some wealth relative to their labor.

Well, Pokemecuntas did at least pretend that she was going after the leeches on Wall Street. They didn't like it, you can tell by those "poll" numbers.

Endorsed Endorsed by EMILY's list for pro-choice Democratic women. (Aug 2012)

Yep, she's a politician running for office on the Democrat slate from an overwhelmingly Democrat part of the country.

Like it or not, abortion is the Establishment's policy and it was put in place by Republicans. It will be there until the population declines precipitously. Most young women support it because they don't want as many children as modern medicine allows to survive.

Although I understand the concerns of the pro-abort crowd, I continue to oppose abortion on a moral basis, as it is a crude and vicious form of birth control that corrodes the emotional well being of the people.

When I watch her I see a good hearted woman who is also intelligent and seeks the truth of matters. She may not always be right (re: agree with me), but she is not deliberately corrupt. That alone is worth support.

Finally, her adoption of the mono-theistic (and Christian-like) branch of the Hindu religion is far more acceptable than the anti-Christian Jewish swamp we live with now.

Vic will not escape the judgment that will befall him

Be very, very careful when dealing out the language of judgment and damnation.

Be very, very careful when dealing out the language of judgment and damnation.

Vic, the judgment I refer to will affect us all.

(I'm not referring to the final judgment that will come to those who reject God...that will come later).

In fact, my family knows that we will certainly perish in the immediate judgments that signal the beginning of the Great Tribulation.

The Trib judgments will begin when a New World Order/One World Government is solidified...it's on its way.

I also hate that Catholics are liars like you just did.

Kindly specify my error.

You're a covetous little bastard. You are a thief at heart. You support abortionists like Bloomburg. That is why he is your favorite.

You are with the human garbage on this one weirdo.

(1)

Vic is s thief at heart. He is very covetous.

(2)

Vic said that he wanted to raise our taxes here so we can have a global welfare system. The guy is a communist. Little Vic is a dick commie.

(3)

Gee, I wonder.

Put in place by Republicans. Sorry for calling you a liar but that isn't really true.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)

Opinion of the Court 7-2; 5D, 2R

Blackmun (R) delivered the Opinion of the court joined by 6 more.
Burger (R)
Marshall (D)
Powell (D)
Douglas (D) filed a concurring opinion.
Brennan (D) filed a concurring opinion.
Stewart (R) filed a concurring opinion.

Dissenting justices: 1D, 1R

White (D) filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist joined.
Rehnquist (R) filed a dissenting opinion.

The Court contained 6 nominees by Republican presidents Eisenhower, Nixon and Reagan.

It contained 3 nominees by Democrat presidents FDR, JFK, and LBJ.

Justice Powell was a Democrat nominated by Republican Nixon.

Justice Brennan was a Democrat nominated by Republican Eisenhower.

The Court contained 5 Democrat justices and 4 Republican justices.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harry_Blackmun
(R) Eisenhower

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warren_E._Burger
(R) Nixon

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thurgood_Marshall
(D) LBJ

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lewis_F._Powell,_Jr.
(D) Nixon

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_O._Douglas
(D) FDR

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_J._Brennan,_Jr.
(D) Eisenhower

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potter_Stewart
(R) Eisenhower

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Byron_White
(D) JFK

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Rehnquist
(R) Reagan

Well then, given that the Supreme Court has been continuously controlled by Republican nominees since Nixon, please tell us the date after which the Republican nominees were nominally Republican. I believe that occurred under Reagan.

O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Roberts - these are Republican nominees who are nominally Republican. And they've provided the bulwark to prevent the Republican majority Court from overturning Roe.

So, we're going to count judges nominated by Republican Presidents as "Democrat" judges?

LOL! If the facts are inconvenient, just make something up...

So, we're going to count judges nominated by Republican Presidents as "Democrat" judges?

No, I advocated for no such conclusion. I only reposted my years old recitation of the party of the justices and the presidents who nominated them.

I find the entire argument absurd. Lo these many years, I have never found the abortion clause of the Constitution. I do not find it to be a constitutional matter at all.

Whether a judge is a Catholic, Protestant, Jew or other, he or she should decide based on United States law, not some personal perception of God's law. Finding something morally repugnant or acceptable does nothing to determine it to be either constitutional or unconstitutional.

The first law citing murder was in 1790 and only applied to places under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. Murder elsewhere was not a Federal matter. Even if abortion were considered infanticide, it would not have been a crime against the United States.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/United_States_Statutes_at_Large/Volume_1/1st_Congress/2nd_Session/Chapter_9

SEC. 3. And be it [further] enacted, That if any person or persons shall, within any fort, arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or in any other place or district of country, under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, commit the crime of wilful murder, such person or persons on being thereof convicted shall suffer death.

The argument over Roe proceeds from the false choice of Roe, or a reversal of Roe prohibiting all abortion. I believe it should be a matter of state jurisdiction. Roe should be overturned for lack of jurisdiction, and the matter returned to the States.

Whether a judge is Dem or GOP should not determine how he rules. Jonathan Turley just proved that it is possible for a Democrat attorney to interpret the law independent of the general political leanings of his party.

At the time of Roe, it was entirely possible for a conservative Southern Democrat to be much more conservative than what was then a moderate Northeastern moderate Republican. A party indicator from nearly 50 years ago provides no indicator of that justice's legal leanings. Even a current party indicator does not identify how one would interpret the Constitution.

The party indicator of the nominating official provides less than nothing.

Summary: 'I disagree with Person X, therefore he's a bastard, a piece of garbage and a Communist.' - A K A Stone

Your summary is inaccurate.

It is more like this.

Person X holds an evil act as a good act. So person X is a piece of shit or a communist in your case. In your case because you espouse communist ideology in some manners.

You can disagree and think people that support murdering children are admirable and not pieces of shit. But according to Stones rules if you admire a piece of shit you are a piece of shit.

Jonathan Turley just proved that it is possible for a Democrat attorney to interpret the law independent of the general political leanings of his party.

Yes he did. He is still a bad person though.

So, we're going to count judges

By their political party.

Still the Catholics could end abortion if they wanted to. They must not want to. Which makes sense you being a supporter of an abortion candidate Bloomdork.

I believe it should be a matter of state jurisdiction.

Should states be allowed to make it legal to murder adults or just innocent never hurt anyone babies?

Should states be allowed to make it legal to murder adults or just innocent never hurt anyone babies?

Where should the power lie?

Should the Supreme Court have the power to make it legal to murder adults or anyone's babies?

Should the Supreme Court have such power in the absence of any decision by the Federal political branch (the Legislature) in the form of a law? There was no Federal law at issue in Roe. No Federal law prevented a State from banning abortion. Roe relied on constitutional interpretation to strike down a Texas State law. In doing so, it made that interpretation applicable to all the States, striking down all conflicting State law.

Remember, vesting such power in the Supreme Court can, and did, result in Roe v. Wade, striking down all laws contrary to that vision of the Constitution.

Remember, vesting such power in the Supreme Court can, and did, result in Roe v. Wade, striking down all laws contrary to that vision of the Constitution.

No one vested such power in the Supreme court. They usurped it in Marbury vs Madison.

But you didn't answer the question.

You seem to be ok with allowing states to determine if you can murder a child.

So I will ask again. Should states be allowed to pass laws making it lawful to kill adults?

Why ok for babies but not adults?

Still the Catholics could end abortion if they wanted to. They must not want to.

True.

No one vested such power in the Supreme court. They usurped it in Marbury vs Madison.

Marbury was decided by the Founders. The Founders also manned Congress, the state legislatures and the White House. They did not move to strike down the Marbury decision. Instead, they accepted it, thereby ratifying it.

The Founders, by their decision in Marbury and their ratification of Marbury by their non-reaction to it, demonstrated that Supreme Court review WAS the "original intent" of the Constitution.

The Founders gave us the Constitution, and they gave us Washington's presidential precedents, and they gave us Marbury v. Madison - the Marbury Supremes were Founding Fathers too, and the President Jefferson and Marybury Congress were Founders too. Marbury is part of the "original intent" of the Constitution - it is part of the legacy of the Founding Fathers.

The Founders also...

...had a moral compass.

"Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism, who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens."
--President George Washington, in his Farewell Address

Now it's not even PC to articulate what the Washington Monument represented...

www.google.com/search?&q=washington+monument+compass

Still the Catholics could end abortion if they wanted to.

The subject of abortion is rapidly becoming a moot point in the context of the next level of moral challenge rendered by our self-worshiping technocracy...

www.google.com/search?&q=Designer+Babies+in+ukraine

Got CRISPR?

Well then, given that the Supreme Court has been continuously controlled by...

Human Nature?

"I KNOW BUT ONE CODE OF MORALITY FOR MEN WHETHER ACTING SINGLY OR COLLECTIVELY"

What did Jefferson have in mind and how did that work in the context of the Tyranny of the Majority that was subsequently observed by De Tocqueville?

Should states be allowed to pass laws making it lawful to kill adults?

Only if they're on private property. /sarc.

BTW - Jeffrey Epstein's island was private. How'd that work out?

My understanding is that it's a nationalist (Trump, Netanyahoo) vs. globalist.

Trump and Netanyahoo's playmates are Tribal, Organized Criminal, Oligarchs.  They are not operating under the constraint of a lawful republic - constituted to have TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS as its specified purpose.

The original article “Bratva” (“Bros,” a slang term for “mob”) is abridged and re-structured for the Western readers not familiar with the intricate details of Russian politics and the history of organized crime. I have also inserted links to my research showing the longterm ties between the Russian organized crime bosses and Trump and his immediate environment...

https://web.archive.org/web/20191120173349/https://medium.com/@ZarinaZabrisky/putinism-introduction-7167f6a6ec9d

Put in place by Republicans. Sorry for calling you a liar but that isn't really true.

We could go back to the eugenics movement and find lots of Republicans. Eugenics, birth control (population control), and abortion are tightly linked.

I am going to start with Prescott Bush, who was Finance Chairman of the Birth Control League.

Peggy Goldwater (Barry's wife) helped fund Planned Parenthood.

The California legislature had near parity between R's and D's, yet passed an abortion legalization bill in 1967. Reagan was told that they would override his veto (requiring 2/3). He signed the bill.

George "Rubbers" Bush introduced Family Planning Services Act in 1970. George's main interest in Congress was population control. He supported Planned Parenthood, and he advocated family planning as a way to protect a woman's health & to combat poverty. In those days, family-planning advocates spoke openly of contraception, and legal abortion was the goal of many, including Bush. "He was most definitely pro-choice--then," said former Rep. James Scheuer (D-NY). "He was very supportive until he became Reagan's VP. Then he had to adopt Reagan's backward position. After that, when George would see me in the House, he'd say, 'Jim, don't break my cover.' And I never did--until now. George couldn't have continued supporting family planning and still made the national ticket."

Republican National Committee co-chair Mary Dent Crisp, a former Goldwater supporter and the highest-ranking woman in the party, believed that abortion was a woman's individual right.

These are just a few of the mucky mucks that set the stage for Roe v Wade and Doe v Bolton which struck down Texas and Georgia abortion prohibition laws in 1973. They were authored by Republican SC Justice Harry Blackmun and joined by 3 other Republican Justices to form a 7-2 majority.

Vic said that he wanted to raise our taxes here so we can have a global welfare system. The guy is a communist. Little Vic is a dick commie.

1. What is the velocity of money?
2. How does derivative a$$paper, denominated in Quadrillion, reflect the actual state of the global economy VS the concept of "supply and demand"?
3. To what degree are Organized Criminals profiting from control over the Military Industrial Complex and the economy?
4. What alternatives are there to the Military Industrial / Organized Criminal Complex's selfish manipulation of the velocity of money?

Maybe it's time for a HUMANE Industrial Complex.

If the system is going to run on the velocity of bullshyte anyhow, then the humane thing to do is to have it benefit all of our species - instead of just the apex predators perched atop the pyramid.

The Powell Memorandum thus became the blueprint for the rise of the American conservative movement and the formation of a network of influential right-wing think tanks and lobbying organizations, such as The Heritage Foundation and the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) as well as inspiring the US Chamber of Commerce to become far more politically active.[16][17] CUNY professor David Harvey traces the rise of neoliberalism in the US to this memo.[18][19]

mucky mucks that set the stage for Roe v Wade

Technology set the stage for a hedonistic attempt to alter the consequences of behavior rendered by 1.2 billion years of sexual reproduction.

Human culture is still figuring out how to balance those technological "benefits" against the moral cost of them.

The apex predators perched atop post-modern culture are not the first to figure out that "Sex Sells".

Romans Chapter 1. RTFM.

Putin came up through the system. He appears to be doing good things for his country now.

My impression of Putin is that his ideological affinity with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn appears to be legitimate and is consistent with his support of/by the Russian Orthodox Christian Church.

Putin also appears to be a pragmatist who understands the historical relationships between the Organized Criminals who ran the Soviet Gulag system - and their present-day successors. Ie: Cut off one cockroach head and 6 grow back in its place.

IMHO, the dots connecting Trump (in the role of Useful Idiot) to Simeon Mogilevich's Odessa Mafia are much more self-evident than those connecting Putin to Mogilevich... but YMMV.

"COMMERCE BETWEEN MASTER AND SLAVE IS DESPOTISM"
--Thomas Jefferson

Remember, vesting such power in the Supreme Court can, and did, result in Roe v. Wade, striking down all laws contrary to that vision of the Constitution.

No one vested such power in the Supreme court. They usurped it in Marbury vs Madison.

But you didn't answer the question.

You seem to be ok with allowing states to determine if you can murder a child.

So I will ask again. Should states be allowed to pass laws making it lawful to kill adults?

Why ok for babies but not adults?

Yours is an inapplicable question and I will walk you through why that is so.

10th Amendment

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.

ALL power resides in either:

• The United States, or
• The States, or
• The people

Unless you strike down the Constitution, those are your three choices for who has the power to decide whether abortion is constitutional or unconstitutional, lawful or unlawful.

Either the Federal government or the States must be empowered to decide whether to prohibit abortion, or it is left to the people to decide. You must pick one, and only one.

If you choose the Federal government, then you choose to

• permit the Congress to pass a law making abortion a crime, or prohibiting States from making abortion a crime, or

• permit the Supreme Court to preempt Congress and all States by issuing an opinion based on an interpretation of the Constitution

• do nothing, leaving it to the States

If you choose the States, then you choose to

• empower the State government to pass a law making abortion a crime

• do nothing, leaving it to the people

If you choose the People, then you choose to

• render all abortion legal until the People exercise their sovereign power to amend the Constitution to state, for example, "Abortion is a felony punishable by death."

Nothing is murder, or any crime at all, until there is a law stating that it is murder or a crime. It is an absolute fact that abortion, at this time, is not murder.

Whoever is empowered is empowered to decide abortion is a crime by passing a law so stating. Should they not pass such a law, then abortion is not a crime within that jurisdiction. Whoever is empowered is empowered to pass a law making interference with lawful abortion a crime, or to regulate abortion in the manner of its choosing.

As you seem to support Federal jurisdiction, where the power now resides, States cannot decide whether to make abortion a crime.

So I will ask again. Should states be allowed to pass laws making it lawful to kill adults?

Why ok for babies but not adults?

The inapplicability of your question is shown by the fact that States have no power to declare abortion lawful or unlawful. The Federal government has declared that it is empowered to decide the matter and it has decided it by declaring to all 50 States that abortion is not unlawful, much less murder, and that it is a constitutional right.

Everything is legal unless there is a law stating it is illegal. Whoever is empowered makes something legal by doing nothing. They make something lawful by not passing a law making it unlawful.

No one vested such power in the Supreme court. They usurped it in Marbury vs Madison.

As a matter of law, you are simply wrong about Marbury. However, assume arguendo that you are correct.

You appear perfectly happy to support an activist Supreme Court deciding the legality of abortion, just as long as the majority agrees with you in exercising jurisdiction you alternately appear to deny exists.

Marbury actually resolved whether the Federal courts could strike down a Federal law as repugnant to the Constitution. In Roe, there was no Federal law involved. Had there been an inconsistent Federal law, the Federal law would have prevailed pursuant to Article 6.

This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

It is an absolute fact that abortion, at this time, is not murder.

The birth control pill is, in effect, abortion. Most folks just don't understand how it works -- how it prevents a fertilized egg from implanting in the womb.

And the subject of abortion will be moot in the context of...

www.google.com/search?&q=designer+babies+in+ukraine

The Founders gave us the Constitution, and they gave us Washington's presidential precedents, and they gave us Marbury v. Madison - the Marbury Supremes were Founding Fathers too, and the President Jefferson and Marybury Congress were Founders too. Marbury is part of the "original intent" of the Constitution - it is part of the legacy of the Founding Fathers.

While what you state is absolutely correct, it may also be worth observing that the Constitution and Washington created a Supreme Court that was packed with 100% Federalists. Never since those early days has the court been packed so one-sidedly.

Comparing the Federal government as founded, to the Federal government of today, reveals that something has gone askew.

And the subject of abortion will be moot in the context of...

www.google.com/search?&q=designer+babies+in+ukraine

Abortion has always been moot in the context of strongly desired pregnancies.

Aspiring baby mamas can always find a way to get knocked up the old fashioned way, and subsequently invoke a lady's prerogative to change her mind.

Abortion has always been moot in the context of strongly desired pregnancies.

Will it still be abortion/murder if the zygote is vaporized after a scan detects an undesirable trait in its genome?

Will it still be abortion/murder if the zygote is vaporized after a scan detects an undesirable trait in its genome?

Abortion is not murder. It is not any crime. Aborting a zygote will not be murder.

Nothing is a crime unless a law says it is. Do you have a law in mind that says vaporizing a zygote is murder? Cite the statute.

Abortion is not murder. It is not any crime. Aborting a zygote will not be murder.

Noun: crime krIm
1. (criminal law) an act punishable by law; usually considered an evil act
2. An evil act not necessarily punishable by law

Noun: zygote zIgowt
A zygote is a diploid cell resulting from the union of a haploid spermatozoon and ovum (including the organism that develops from that cell).

You and your buddy like to dehumanize people you want to beat, imprison, or kill, yet that organism is a human being by definition, and completely innocent. Killing a human being is homicide, which may rise to murder if there is premeditation and demonstrated intent, and there is no self-defense or in defense of anothers' life or great bodily harm.

The fact that there is no law at this time that punishes this particular homicide doesn't mean it isn't a crime. Our founding documents cover the sanctity of life, starting with George Mason:

A Declaration of Rights

Is made by the representatives of the good people of Virginia, assembled in full and free convention which rights do pertain to them and their posterity, as the basis and foundation of government.

Section 1. That all men are by nature equally free and independent and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.

Abortion is not murder. It is not any crime. Aborting a zygote will not be murder.

Noun: crime krIm
1. (criminal law) an act punishable by law; usually considered an evil act
2. An evil act not necessarily punishable by law

Noun: zygote zIgowt
A zygote is a diploid cell resulting from the union of a haploid spermatozoon and ovum (including the organism that develops from that cell).

Abortion cannot be a criminal act while it is a constitutional right.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)

This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.

You may disagree with Roe, but it is the law. Any law inconsistent with Roe is unconstitutional, null and void. No State may criminalize abortion.

Try using a real law dictionary.

Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed

Crime. A positive or negative act in violation of penal law; an offense against the State or United States.

"Crime” and "misdemeanor”, properly speaking, are synonymous terms; though in common usage "crime” is made to denote such offenses as are of a more serious nature. In general, violation of an ordinance is not a crime.

A crime may be defined to be any act done in violation of those duties which an individual owes to the community, and for the breach of which the law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. A crime or public offense is an act committed or omitted in violation of a law forbidding or commanding it, and to which is annexed, upon conviction, either, or a combination, of the following punishments: (1) death; (2) imprisonment; (3) fine; (4) removal from office; or (5) disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit. While many crimes have their origin at common law, most have been created by statute; and, in many states, such have been codified. In addition, there are both state and federal crimes (as to the latter, see Title 18, U.S.C.A.).

- - - - - - - - - -

Quasi crimes. This term embraces all offenses not crimes or misdemeanors, but that are in the nature of crimes. A class of offenses against the public which have not been declared crimes, but wrongs against the general or local public which it is proper should be repressed or punished by forfeitures and penalties. This would embrace all qui tarn actions and forfeitures imposed for the neglect or violation of a public duty. A quasi crime would not embrace an indictable offense, whatever might be its grade, but simply forfeitures for a wrong done to the public, whether voluntary or involuntary, where a penalty is given, whether recoverable by criminal or civil process. Also, offenses for which some person other than the actual perpetrator is responsible, the perpetrator being presumed to act by command of the responsible party. Sometimes, injuries which have been unintentionally caused. D.W.I. (driving while intoxicated) offenses are sometimes classified as quasi crimes.

- - - - - - - - - -

The fact that there is no law at this time that punishes this particular homicide doesn't mean it isn't a crime.

Yeah, it does. One cannot be charged with a crime that does not exist. I can say you are guilty of mopery, but you cannot be charged and convicted.

Our founding documents cover the sanctity of life, starting with George Mason

Geroge Mason's Declaration of Rights and Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence are no part of United States law. Thomas Jefferson wrote All men are created equal while being tended to by his slave Jupiter. When Jefferson went to France, he was accompanied by his slave Sally Hemings, who was the half-sister of his wife. TJ father about six kids withy Sally and started a whole branch of the Jefferson family tree. A load of jefferson DNA was discovered in that tree.

Abortion is also clearly a violation of the 9th amendment.

Abortion is a constitution right. See Roe v. Wade, where you defend the jurisdiction of the court.

It isn't in the constitution. The supreme court gave itself powers not given to it by the framers. That is indisputable truth. Abortion is also indisputable murder I

You are welcome to live in your alternate reality. It is indisputable truth that people interfering with others entering or leaving abortion clinics are charged with a crime, while people receiving or performing abortions are not.

The only way to overturn Roe is by constitutional amendment or by another action of the Supreme Court itself. A blog entry declaring Roe null and void does not get it.

You appear to actively support the Court usurping power to impose their opinion upon the fifty states and the federal legislature. Your only disagreement is with the opinion they issued.

Just imagine the Framers' surprise when they learn that they created a constitutional right to gay marriage.

Abortion is murder in this world. The intentional taking of a human life is murder no matter what some douchebag you worship in a black robe says.

It is av violation of the 9th amendment. The right to life once conceived. It is a human being that is being murdered. A human being not a fuckiing zygote. That is idiot liberal talk.

Don't you respect the 9th amendment. I don't think you do. Just like the second amendment didn't give us the right to bear arms. We already had that right. Can you give us some of the rights the 9th gives us. I don't think you can.

Also the Declaration of Independence is superior the constitution. It suts higher in the pecking order. Also no good people give a shit what the Supreme Court says when they get it wrong. If you want to know when they get it wrong ask me and I will tell you.

The constitution means what it says not what the majority votes on a given day.

You can disagree but you would be wrong.

What you promote is color of law. I don't have tine to explain what color of law is go look it up.

The framers didn't make a right to faggots pretending to be married just like they didn't make a right to abortion. Most of the framers would kill, the abortionists with muskets or hanging.

Most of the framers would kill, the abortionists with muskets or hanging.

Preferably after tarring and feathering them to make sure the public understood how amorally repugnant and inhumane the abortionists were.

If you lived in Nazi Germany in stead of abortion murder America. You would be saying the Jew are being gassed and the Germans are gassing and not being arrested.

If I were living in Nazi Germany and you asked me what the law was, I would try to respond with an accurate recitation of Nazi German law. I would not make believe that Nazi German law was an A K A Stone brainfart.

Abortion is murder in this world. The intentional taking of a human life is murder no matter what some douchebag you worship in a black robe says.

Abortion is not murder if the law says it is legal. Murder defines a criminal act punishable under the law. Try charging someone with criminal abortion.

It is av violation of the 9th amendment. The right to life once conceived.

9th Amendment

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

It does not say a mumbling word about abortion or the right to life of a fetus.

5th Amendment

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger....

Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.

Capital case or crime. One in which death penalty may, but need not necessariy, be imposed.

Yea verily, under the Constitution, living people have been gassed, shot, hanged, and electrocuted until dead. And then there is lethal injection.

The right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is in the Declaration of Independence which has never been the law of anyplace. Murder is punished as murder under a murder statute, not the Constitution.

A human being not a fuckiing zygote. That is idiot liberal talk.

Zygotes were brought up at #62 by Anthem, to whom I responded. Take it up with Anthem. I never claimed a zygote is a human being. A zygote is a fertilized egg.

Don't you respect the 9th amendment. I don't think you do.

It appears you either have not read it, or you find therein some imaginary provision that criminalizes abortion. But then, the District Court in Roe found therein the right to abortion, and the Supreme Court opined that, "This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."

Then there is Section 1 of 14th Amendment where SCOTUS finds the imaginary right to abortion,

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

An abortion clinic is not a State.

Remember, you are the one supporting the power of SCOTUS to strike down all the state laws that prohibited abortion. My personal finding is that abortion is not addressed by the Constitution, Roe took up an argument based on a non-existent provision of the Constitution, and the case should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. You, on the other hand, ignore the constitutional and jurisdiction issue and find the court should decide the lawfulness of abortion on constitutional grounds.

Note that at the time of Roe, there was no Federal law banning abortion to overturn. Note also that the final arbiter in interpreting a State law is the highest court of the State, not the U.S. Supreme Court. SCOTUS decided that abortion was a right under some vaguely identified provision emanating from a penumbra.

Just like the second amendment didn't give us the right to bear arms. We already had that right. Can you give us some of the rights the 9th gives us. I don't think you can.

Neither the 9th Amendment, nor the 2nd Amendment, created or gave any new right. Neither purports to do so. The right to keep and bear arms was cut and pasted from English common law, which was the law in the colonies before independence.

Also the Declaration of Independence is superior the constitution. It suts higher in the pecking order.

The DoI sits in equal status with a blog entry as far as being law. It is not law. In fact, it was crafted before there was a United States.

Also no good people give a shit what the Supreme Court says when they get it wrong. If you want to know when they get it wrong ask me and I will tell you.

When SCOTUS gets it wrong according to you or me, their interpretation of the law is still the law of the land.

Tell yourself whatever you want. Since SCOTUS said abortion is a constitutional right, abortion has been legal. Since they said gay marriage is a constitutional right, gay marriage is legal. Recognizing that something is legal is not the same as agreeing with it. Believing something is murder does not make it murder. An act may be murder in Texas and less than murder elsewhere. It simply depends on what the applicable statute says.

The constitution means what it says not what the majority votes on a given day.

SCOTUS is the final arbiter in interpreting the Constitution and what it says is the governing interpretation. Abortions and gay marriage are legal.

You can disagree but you would be wrong.

You can disagree with SCOTUS and it does not change the law. They are empowered as the final arbiter in interpreting Federal law, including the Constitution, and you and I are not. Our opinions are not binding on the courts, Their's are.

What you promote is color of law. I don't have tine to explain what color of law is go look it up.

I will take the time to clear up your evident confusion about color of law and Federal constitutional law.

Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.

Color of law. The appearance or semblance, without the substance, of legal right. Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because wrongdoer is clother with authority of state, is action taken under "color of state law.” Atkins v. Lanning, D.C.Okl., 415 F.Supp. 186, 188.

When used in the context of federal civil rights statutes or criminal law, the term is synonymous with the concept of "state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment, Timson v. Weiner, D.C.Ohio, 395 F.Supp. 1344, 1347; and means pretense of law and includes actions of officers who undertake to perform their official duties, Thompson v. Baker, D.C.Ark., 133 F.Supp. 247; 42 U.S. C.A. § 1983. See Tort (Constitutional tort).

Action taken by private individuals may be "under color of state law” for purposes of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 governing deprivation of civil rights when significant state involvement attaches to action. Wagner v. Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority, C.A.Tenn., 772 F.2d 227, 229.

Acts "under color of any law” of a State include not only acts done by State officials within the bounds or limits of their lawful authority, but also acts done without and beyond the bounds of their lawful authority; provided that, in order for unlawful acts of an official to be done "under color of any law”, the unlawful acts must be done while such official is purporting or pretending to act in the performance of his official duties; that is to say, the unlawful acts must consist in an abuse or misuse of power which is possessed by the official only because he is an official; and the unlawful acts must be of such a nature or character, and be committed under such circumstances, that they would not have occurred but for the fact that the person committing them was an official then and there exercising his official powers outside the bounds of lawful authority. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Color_(law)

Color of law refers to an appearance of legal power to act that may operate in violation of law. For example, if a police officer acts with the "color of law" authority to arrest someone, the arrest, if it is made without probable cause, may actually be in violation of law. In other words, just because something is done with the "color of law" does not mean that the action was lawful. When police act outside their lawful authority and violate the civil rights of a citizen, the FBI is tasked with investigating.

The US Supreme Court has interpreted the US Constitution to construct laws regulating the actions of the law enforcement community. Under "color of law," it is a crime for one or more persons using power given by a governmental agency (local, state or federal), to deprive or conspire wilfully to deprive another person of any right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Criminal acts under color of law include acts within and beyond the bounds or limits of lawful authority. Off-duty conduct may also be covered if official status is asserted in some manner. Color of law may include public officials and non-governmental employees who are not law enforcement officers such as judges, prosecutors, and private security guards.

"Color of law" is completely irrelevant to this discussion.

The framers didn't make a right to faggots pretending to be married just like they didn't make a right to abortion.

And yet, it is the law. Abortion and gay marriage are legal. Pete Buttigieg, a candidate for president, has a husband. We even have laws against using the wrong pronouns. And guys who identify as girls are transformed into record breaking "lady" track stars and "lady" weight lifters.

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. It does not say a mumbling word about abortion or the right to life of a fetus.

Then what rights toes the 9th protect. It doesn't list any. You have to use your common sense.

Mayor buttplug is not married. He is pretending to be married. That is the truth.

If the SUpreme court told you two plus two was five you would believe them.

They don't get it right that often.

I know you are just saying what the government says the law is. But when they lie aboutit why do you go along with it.

Just like when they lied about Obamacare.

The US Supreme Court has interpreted the US Constitution to construct laws regulating the actions of the law enforcement community. Under "color of law," it is a crime for one or more persons using power given by a governmental agency (local, state or federal), to deprive or conspire wilfully to deprive another person of any right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Yep clearly a 9th amendment violation. Clear as day.

The framers didn't make a right to faggots pretending to be married just like they didn't make a right to abortion. And yet, it is the law.

I wanna see that law. Can you cite it? Why not?

And guys who identify as girls are transformed into record breaking "lady" track stars and "lady" weight lifters.

Good example. Is a man a man because he has a penis or because some bullshitting judge says a woman with a vagina is a man?

If the Supreme court says a man is a woman you will have to say you agree. Me I will go with the truth and say the chick has a dick and is a man who belongs in a mental institution.

Then what rights toes the 9th protect. It doesn't list any. You have to use your common sense.

Use YOUR common sense. SCOTUS has held that abortion is a constitutional right. If you want to go there, the right to abortion, not enumerated elsewhere, is protected by the 9th Amendment.

If you want to go there, the right to abortion, not enumerated elsewhere, is protected by the 9th Amendment.

Kook talk. You're better than that Chan.

SCOTUS has held that abortion is a constitutional right.

If their opinons differ from the words of the constitution it is color of law.

They usurped power that is why you can't cite their power in the constitution.

If you want to worship the Supreme court as infallible that is your prerogative.

Sure they rule and their rulings are enforced. Their rulings can put you in jail. But it is still TRUTHFULLY color of law.

I wanna see that law. Can you cite it? Why not?

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2008)

Held: The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a mar­riage between two people of the same sex and to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawful­ly licensed and performed out-of-State.

Obergefell at 4:

(3) The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived from the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way.

I didn't write it, but it is now the law. You can make believe otherwise.

Laws are passed by congress and signed by the president.

Can you cite a law? Because you said it was a law.

I didn't write it, but it is now the law. You can make believe otherwise.

More color of law.

If their opinons differ from the words of the constitution it is color of law.

Yo8u quite obviously refuse to recognize what "color of law" signifies, despite my quoting it to you from Black's Law Dictionary. Your attempted usage is meaningless.

What SCOTUS is the law. What you say is your opinion and does not displace the opinion of SCOTUS. They are empowered by the Constitution as the final arbiter of federal law, you are not.

More color of law.

If you do not know what it means, stop trying to use it.

Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.

Color of law. The appearance or semblance, without the substance, of legal right. Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because wrongdoer is clother with authority of state, is action taken under "color of state law.” Atkins v. Lanning, D.C.Okl., 415 F.Supp. 186, 188.

When used in the context of federal civil rights statutes or criminal law, the term is synonymous with the concept of "state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment, Timson v. Weiner, D.C.Ohio, 395 F.Supp. 1344, 1347; and means pretense of law and includes actions of officers who undertake to perform their official duties, Thompson v. Baker, D.C.Ark., 133 F.Supp. 247; 42 U.S. C.A. § 1983. See Tort (Constitutional tort).

Action taken by private individuals may be "under color of state law” for purposes of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 governing deprivation of civil rights when significant state involvement attaches to action. Wagner v. Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority, C.A.Tenn., 772 F.2d 227, 229.

Acts "under color of any law” of a State include not only acts done by State officials within the bounds or limits of their lawful authority, but also acts done without and beyond the bounds of their lawful authority; provided that, in order for unlawful acts of an official to be done "under color of any law”, the unlawful acts must be done while such official is purporting or pretending to act in the performance of his official duties; that is to say, the unlawful acts must consist in an abuse or misuse of power which is possessed by the official only because he is an official; and the unlawful acts must be of such a nature or character, and be committed under such circumstances, that they would not have occurred but for the fact that the person committing them was an official then and there exercising his official powers outside the bounds of lawful authority. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Color_(law)

Color of law refers to an appearance of legal power to act that may operate in violation of law. For example, if a police officer acts with the "color of law" authority to arrest someone, the arrest, if it is made without probable cause, may actually be in violation of law. In other words, just because something is done with the "color of law" does not mean that the action was lawful. When police act outside their lawful authority and violate the civil rights of a citizen, the FBI is tasked with investigating.

The US Supreme Court has interpreted the US Constitution to construct laws regulating the actions of the law enforcement community. Under "color of law," it is a crime for one or more persons using power given by a governmental agency (local, state or federal), to deprive or conspire wilfully to deprive another person of any right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Criminal acts under color of law include acts within and beyond the bounds or limits of lawful authority. Off-duty conduct may also be covered if official status is asserted in some manner. Color of law may include public officials and non-governmental employees who are not law enforcement officers such as judges, prosecutors, and private security guards.

"Color of law" is completely irrelevant to this discussion.

You just quote what the governent currently says the law is. Even when they get it wrong. You quote what will happen to you if you disobey it.

See i'm different.

I'm interested in the truth of what the words actually mean and not some lawyer spin. The Constitution means what it actually says. Even when a usurping supreme court (yes small letters like in the Constitution) says differently. I agree that they have the actual power to do that. It doesn't make it truth though as the actual meaning and intent of the Constitution. Another example would be the interstate commerce clause doesn't mean what the traitors on the Supreme court said it means. You know that. You do know that. Admit it. Please.

Acts "under color of any law” of a State include not only acts done by State officials within the bounds or limits of their lawful authority,

Yep color of law. The Supreme court usurped authority it didn't have. Now we all pretend the Constitution gave them that power. It didn't which is why you can't cite it.

You also can't cite any rights the 9th gives us. Except your pretend abortion argument that you know isn't true.

What SCOTUS is the law. What you say is your opinion and does not displace the opinion of SCOTUS. They are empowered by the Constitution as the final arbiter of federal law, you are not.

What SCOTUS says is not law but opinion. They even call them opinions.

You are correct what I say does not displace opinions (you got it right that time and called them opinions) of the supreme court.

They are not empowered by the Constitution as the final arbiter of federal laws. If I am incorrect please cite me the passage in the constitution that says such. You can't it doesn't say that. Truthfully he Supreme court usurped authority and give themselves that power with no legislation and no constitutional provisions that say such. You can pretend all you want but truth is that it is not in the Constitution anywhere.

You are also correct that I am not the final arbitrator on the matter. But that doesn't mean I am wrong. It means that they are liars or stupid or corrupt. The words in the Constitution mean what they say. Not black robe spin like interstate commerce and abortion murders.

cts "under color of any law” of a State include not only acts done by State officials within the bounds or limits of their lawful authority, but also acts done without and beyond the bounds of their lawful authority; provided that, in order for unlawful acts of an official to be done "under color of any law”,

You can beat me and shut me up. If you could only prove that the Supreme court is the final arbitrator using the Constitution. You can't do that though. You just ignore that point. You can't do it because those words aren't in there. They aren't Chan and you know it.

Cite the statute.

"You shall not murder"

--Exodus 20:13

Not that you or your fellow Log Cabin Pipe Fitters would ever care about any of those statutes.

If you could only prove that the Supreme court is the final arbitrator using the Constitution. You can't do that though. You just ignore that point. You can't do it because those words aren't in there. They aren't Chan and you know it.

U.S. Constitution, Article III.

Article III

Section 1.

The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

Section 2.

The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority;—to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;—to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;--to controversies to which the United States shall be a party;—to controversies between two or more states;—between a state and citizens of another state;—between citizens of different states;—between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.

[...]

Who do you think is the final arbiter when interpreting the Constitution? Liberty's Flame? Free Republic? Democratic Underground? dKos?

Cite the authority which empowers anyone but the U.S. Supreme Court. SCOTUS is the only court created by the Constitution.

you think is the final arbiter when interpreting the Constitution

Natural Law, as illustrated in Romans Chapter 1.

What is destroying rural America?

Socialist Trumpkin Republican, Wealth Spread.

Natural Law, as illustrated in Romans Chapter 1.

Appeal Roe and Obergefell to the imaginary court of natural law. Enjoy your Big Mike lunch and good luck.

imaginary court of natural law

The CDC provides a plethora of documentation establishing how UN-imaginary the court of Natural Law is.

Got Due Penalty?

Romans Chapter 1. RTFM.

The traditional "family farm" only exists now as a "hobby farm".

There is no such critter as the traditional farmer anymore.

Very true. A farmer either has to go big, specialize, or have a second job "in town".

With one exception...the organic farmer. There are an ever increasing number of organic farmers here in Maine. And I know they are plentiful in upstate NY.

These farmers are making good money on small acreage. Their vegetables and meats are in high demand...and they take food stamps!

There are two organic farms within a mile of my place. One guy has been here for 20 years. The other guy started his farm about 6 years ago. They make big bucks.

A good friend of mine is just starting out. He grew 800 Cornish cross chickens this year and sold every one of them (at around $20 per bird). He grows several organic crops as well.

No way are they going to survive from roadside stands.

what about the HUGE farms in the mid-west,and some areas of the south.

Those huge farms will be okay. As you mentioned, many of them are owned by corporations.

It's the midsize farms that have my attention. The farmer who supplies my hay was running 300 head of beef cattle until this year. Now he has reduced his herd to maybe 50 head. He told me that he cannot sell a year old calf for $700 and make money. He's heading for the door. I'm hearing this from others, as well.

My hay supplier's calves are the calves that find their way to the feed lots and eventually to the grocery stores, etc. And when he quits farming cattle he'll stop making hay which will affect me.

You don't even want to know what is happening to dairy farms. Suffice it to say, I'm glad just to be in the "hobby farm" category...

Today, grain prices went up 15% from my supplier.

People say, "Why do we need farmers? We can just go to the grocery store and get our food" ;-)

[nc #91] Appeal Roe and Obergefell to the imaginary court of natural law.

[Judas Goat #91] The CDC provides a plethora of documentation establishing how UN-imaginary the court of Natural Law is.

By all means, take your case to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and argue God's law in the imaginary CDC Ecclesiastical Court. Good luck and may ooga booga be with you.

Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.

Natural law. This expression, "natural law,” or jus naturale, was largely used in the philosophical speculations of the Roman jurists of the Antonine age, and was intended to denote a system of rules and principles for the guidance of human conduct which, independently of enacted law or of the systems peculiar to any one people, might be discovered by the rational intelligence of man, and would be found to grow out of and conform to his nature, meaning by that word his whole mental, moral, and physical constitution. The point of departure for this conception was the Stoic doctrine of a life ordered "according to nature,” which in its turn rested upon the purely supposititious existence, in primitive times, of a "state of nature;” that is, a condition of society in which men universally were governed solely by a rational and consistent obedience to the needs, impulses, and promptings of their true nature, such nature being as yet undefaced by dishonesty, falsehood, or indulgence of the baser passions. In ethics, it consists in practical universal judgments which man himself elicits. These express necessary and obligatory rules of human conduct which have been established by the author of human nature as essential to the divine purposes in the universe and have been promulgated by God solely through human reason.

Constitutional Law, 6th Ed., Jerome A. Barron and C. Thomas Dienes, Black Letter Series, West Group, 2003, p. 165.

A. THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION

1. NATURAL RIGHTS

Despite some contrary judicial opinion in the early years of the Republic, the claim that there are extra-constitutional "natural rights" limiting governmental power has generally not been accepted by the courts. If the federal government exercises one of its delegated powers or the states exercise their reserved powers, some express or implied constitutional, statutory, or common law limitation must be found if the government action is to be successfully challenged.

Despite some contrary judicial opinion in the early years of the Republic, the claim that there are extra-constitutional "natural rights" limiting governmental power has generally not been accepted by the courts.

That is because the courts have gone rouge.

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Your post shows that originally they knew the truth before asshole liars came to power. Deceivers. Fakers. Murderers.

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Your post shows that originally they knew the truth before asshole liars came to power.

Ah, yes. They knew the troof before asshole liars came to power, and they inserted a clause, (The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people) ensuring that Natural Law, God's Law, philosophical speculations of the Roman jurists of the Antonine age, was retained by the people.

Not to be mistaken, slaves were considered persons. Before the assholes and liars took over, the Framers found a unique way to refer to slaves while bestowing to representation in Congress based on an enumeration of persons (census) and "adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons." Slaves were that "three fifths of all other persons."

And before the asshole liars came to power, the Framers enshrined slaves with the rights of livestock and other property. All men were created equal, but only white people were accorded the right to naturalization. All men and women were equal, but only white, male landowners could vote. In adopting the Law of God into the American legal system, so said the Founders and Framers before the assholes took over.

About seventy-five years later, President Abe Lincoln went on a three-day drunk and passed out in his bed, his bed perhaps being the bed at the Soldier's Home cottage where President Lincoln frequently went to stay, to be joined in his bed by Captain David Derickson, but I digress. A cabinet member awakened Abe from his slumber and gave him the news. Lincoln jumped from his bed startled, and exclaimed, "I freed the who?"

Today, grain prices went up 15% from my supplier.

WHOLESALE prices?????

Yikes!

troof

????

Ah, yes. They knew the troof before asshole liars came to power, and they inserted a clause, (The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people) ensuring that Natural Law, God's Law, philosophical speculations of the Roman jurists of the Antonine age, was retained by the people.

Not to be mistaken, slaves were considered persons. Before the assholes and liars took over, the Framers found a unique way to refer to slaves while bestowing to representation in Congress based on an enumeration of persons (census) and "adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons." Slaves were that "three fifths of all other persons."

And before the asshole liars came to power, the Framers enshrined slaves with the rights of livestock and other property. All men were created equal, but only white people were accorded the right to naturalization. All men and women were equal, but only white, male landowners could vote. In adopting the Law of God into the American legal system, so said the Founders and Framers before the assholes took over.

About seventy-five years later, President Abe Lincoln went on a three-day drunk and passed out in his bed, his bed perhaps being the bed at the Soldier's Home cottage where President Lincoln frequently went to stay, to be joined in his bed by Captain David Derickson, but I digress. A cabinet member awakened Abe from his slumber and gave him the news. Lincoln jumped from his bed startled, and exclaimed, "I freed the who?"

blah blah blah

The 9th amendment is real. It was voted on. It is part of the constitution.

Can you name some of the rights it protects? Or are you going to go off on a strange tangent again?

Yikes!

Your comment prompted me to investigate.

Grain prices went up 15%...but it was specific to this local mill...and specific to dairy grain...go figure.

Not the end of the world yet lol

Grain prices went up 15%...but it was specific to this local mill...and specific to dairy grain...go figure.

Thanks.

I wonder why? Could it be the bank is trying to force them to sell so they can buy it at a bankruptcy sale?

I wonder why?

This mill is a big facility that sells custom blended grain in bulk to farmers.

But I noticed they were making improvements...adding a retail space.

Perhaps they're passing those costs on to me.

Thing is, I can buy Blue Seal Milk Maker at full retail (for 15% cheaper!) at the farm co-op.

To add insult to injury, the mill had to stop selling molasses from their bulk tank (because the FDA inspector decided it was unsanitary). I was only paying $1.80/gallon. The co-op wants $6/gallon for the same molasses!

Between the grain increase and the FDA...well, I'm stunned I tell ya

But that's okay, Pete, we'll just keep on milking!

That isn't a law it is an opinion.

Laws are passed by congress and signed by the president.

Thank you, A K A Stone! Finally, somebody's figured it out.

Do you pretend like the Supreme court or are you REAL honest?

Will Vic go with color of law or real truth?

Do you pretend like the Supreme court or are you REAL honest?

Well, let's see how honest you are.

The FAA regulates interstate flights. I'm sure you agree they have that power.

But they also regulate intrastate flights. According to you they don't have that power, correct?

So let's leave it up to the 50 individual states to do that. Hey, a few mid-air collisions are a small price to pay for honoring the "honest" meaning of the Commerce Clause.

The FAA regulates interstate flights. I'm sure you agree they have that power.

But they also regulate intrastate flights. According to you they don't have that power, correct?

Never thought about it.

I'm talking about something else.

The 9th amendment is real. It was voted on. It is part of the constitution.

Can you name some of the rights it protects?

No. The 9th Amendment states a rule of constitutional construction and does not, in itself, contain a guarantee of any right, or proscription of any infringement.

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Can you name the rights protected by the 9th Amendment? Which ones does the 9th Amendment name?

It only protects against construing the constitution’s enumeration of some rights to attack or deny or disparage others because they are not enumerated. As the right to keep and bear arms is enumerated in the 2nd Amendment, the 9th Amendment has no application to it whatever. However, assuming arguendo the the RKBA were not enumerated, the 9th Amendment would not prohibit restrictions or regulations upon the RKBA.

If the RKBA were not enumerated, the 9th Amendment would prevent denying that right on the sole and exclusive basis that it was not enumerated. That is all.

As an historical note, I would observe that James Madison did NOT write the 2nd Amendment. Madison proposed a set of amendments on 8 June 1789. The introduction of the proposed amendments and the associated colloquy on that occasion are in The Annals of Congress I, at pp. 439-68.

Madison’s draft of what led to the 9th Amendment reads:

The exceptions here or elsewhere in the con­stitution, made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the peo­ple, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.

The assholes of 1789 put Madison’s wording through the congressional committee sausage making process to create the wording that was ultimately offered and ratified, as quoted above.

The purpose of the 9th Amendment was to gain approval for the Constitution as a whole, and the inclusion of a Bill of Rights in particular. Several of the eleven (11) states in the Union at that time were opposed to the enumeration of any rights, lest the enumerated rights be construed as a denial of those rights not so enumerated. Two states were opposed to the Constitution as it was framed and adopted, and had not joined the new Union.

As an historical note I reference the comments of James Madison and Roger Sherman upon the introduction of the proposed amendments.

[Madison, 8 Jun 1789] It cannot be a secret to the gentlemen in this House, that, notwithstanding the unification of this system of Government by eleven of the thirteen United States, in some cases unani­mously, in others by large majorities; yet still there is a great number of our constituents who are dissatisfied with it; among whom are many respectable for their talents and patriotism, and respectable for the jealousy they have for their liberty, which, though mistaken in its object, is laudable in its motive. There is a great body of the people falling under this description, who at present feel much inclined to join their sup­port to the cause of Federalism, if they were satisfied on this one point. We ought not to disregard their inclination, but, on principles of amity and moderation, conform to their wish­es, and expressly declare the great rights of mankind secured under this constitution. The acquiescence which our fellow-citizens show under the Government, calls upon us for a like return of moderation. But perhaps there is a stronger motive than this for our going into a consideration of the subject. It is to provide those securities for liberty which are required by a part of the community; I allude in a par­ticular manner to those two States that have not thought fit to throw themselves into the bosom of the Confederacy. It is a desirable thing, on our part as well as theirs that a re-union should take place as soon as possible. I have no doubt it we proceed to take those steps which would be prudent and requisite at this juncture, that in a short time we should see that disposition prevailing in those States which have not come in, that we have seen prevailing in those States which have embraced the con­stitution.

[...]

[Roger Sherman, 8 June 1789] I do not suppose the consti­tution to be perfect, nor do I imagine if Con­gress and all the Legislatures on the continent were to revise it, that their united labors would make it perfect. I do not expect any perfec­tion on this side the grave in the works of man; but my opinion is, that we are not at present in circumstances to make it better. It is a won­der that there has been such unanimity in adopting it, considering the ordeal it had to un­dergo; and the unanimity which prevailed at its formation is equally astonishing; amidst all the members from the twelve States present at the federal convention, there were only three who did not sign the instrument to attest their opinion of its goodness. Of the eleven States who have received it, the majority have ratified it without proposing a single amendment. This circumstance leads me to suppose that we shall not be able to propose any alterations that are likely to be adopted by nine States; and gentle­men know, before the alterations take effect, they must be agreed to by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the States in the Union.

The 9th Amendment was part of a sales pitch and looks like it says more than it does.

I have frequently made disparaging reference to penumbras formed by emanations from various rights. With the 9th Amendment, you stepped squarely into the penumbras and emanations divined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).

The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 367 U. S. 516-522 (dissenting opinion). Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment, in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent of the owner, is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment, in its Self-Incrimination Clause, enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."

The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 116 U. S. 630, as protection against all governmental invasions "of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." * We recently referred

381 U. S. 485

in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 367 U. S. 656, to the Fourth Amendment as creating a "right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully an particularly reserved to the people." See Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy, 1962 Sup.Ct.Rev. 212; Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw.U.L.Rev. 216 (1960).

We have had many controversies over these penumbral rights of "privacy and repose." See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622, 341 U. S. 626, 341 U. S. 644; Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U. S. 451; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167; Lanza v. New York, 370 U. S. 139; Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 316 U. S. 541. These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for recognition here is a legitimate one.

The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.

While nobody can recite a list of rights guaranteed by the 9th Amendment, some may divine that such rights are found within a penumbra emanated by some fundamental constitutional guarantee within the Bill of Rights.

No. The 9th Amendment states a rule of constitutional construction and does not, in itself, contain a guarantee of any right, or proscription of any infringement.

lol how cute. Words don't mean what they say.

The 9th Amendment states a rule of constitutional construction and does not, in itself, contain a guarantee of any right, or proscription of any infringement.

lol how cute. Words don't mean what they say.

Au contraire, the words of the 9th Amendment mean exactly what they say, neither more, nor less.

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

The subject of that sentence is enumeration. It is the enumeration that shall not be construed as stated.

The text of the Amendment quite clearly states a limit on the manner in which the enumeration of certain rights within the Constitution may be construed.

The Committee of Eleven did not strip out the meaningful portion of Madison’s proposed amendment via some unhappy accident. It was an intentional act that achieved a desired effect. It delayed ratification by more than two years, but the opposition eventually caved.

https://www.constitution.org/9ll/schol/kurt_lash_lost_9th.htm

Volume 83, Number 2, December 2004

Articles

The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment

Kurt T. Lash*

This Article presents previously missed or unrecognized evidence regarding the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment. Obscured by the contemporary assumption that the Ninth Amendment is about rights while the Tenth Amendment is about powers, the historical roots of the Ninth Amendment can be found in the state ratification convention demands for a constitutional amendment prohibiting the constructive enlargement of federal power. James Madison's initial draft of the Ninth Amendment expressly adopted language suggested by the state conventions, and he insisted that the final draft expressed the same rule of construction desired by the states. The altered language of the final draft, however, prompted former Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph to halt his state's efforts to ratify the Bill of Rights due to his concern that the Ninth no longer reflected the demands of the state convention. Antifederalists used Randolph's concerns to delay Virginia's, and thus the country's, ratification of the Bill of Rights for two years. While ratification remained pending in Virginia, Madison delivered a major speech in the House of Representatives explaining that the origin and meaning of the Ninth Amendment in fact were rooted in the proposals of the state conventions and that the Ninth guarded against a "latitude of interpretation" to the injury of the states. Although the Ninth's rule of construction distinguishes it from the Tenth Amendment's declaration of principle, Madison and other legal writers at the time of the Founding viewed the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as twin guardians of our federalist structure of government. Over time, the Tenth Amendment also came to be understood as expressing a federalist rule of construction. The original federalist view of the Ninth Amendment, however, remained constant and was repeated by bench and bar for more than one hundred years.

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/dec/12/james-madison-and-the-acrobatic-history-of-the-nin/

James Madison and the 'acrobatic history' of the Ninth Amendment

By Dr. Lynn Uzzell
Washington Times
Monday, December 12, 2016

The history of constitutional interpretation is notorious for its occasional contortions of speech and logic. But in the case of the Ninth Amendment, history has been truly acrobatic. Whereas the original purpose of this amendment was to guard against expansions of federal power, its recent interpretations have tended (you guessed it) to expand federal authority.

When the Constitution was first being debated during the Ratification period of 1787-88, many Antifederalists denounced the plan of government because it did not contain any bill of rights. Several Federalists, including James Madison, countered that a bill of rights was not only unnecessary in a constitution of limited powers, it was even “dangerous, because an enumeration which is not complete is not safe.”

The Federalists argued that any enumeration of rights would unavoidably imply powers that had never been granted. For instance, if the Framers were to add a provision declaring that Congress had no power to abridge the right of free speech, that prohibition would imply that Congress would have possessed that power without the prohibition. And the Framers did not wish to imply that Congress possessed any powers except the ones that had been enumerated.

When Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson about the prospects of adding a bill of rights, he confessed: “My own opinion has always been in favor of a bill of rights, provided it be so framed as not to imply powers not meant to be included in the enumeration.”

And when proposing a bill of rights to the First Congress, Madison acknowledged that this fear — “that those rights which were not singled out” would be insecure by implication — was “one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights into this system.” But he assured Congress that his proposal for what would eventually become the Ninth Amendment should prevent any such misinterpretation of the Constitution.

Therefore, the Ninth Amendment (like the 10th Amendment) was always intended to be nothing more than a rule of construction: a guide for understanding how the Constitution was meant to be interpreted.

Madison’s initial proposal for the Ninth Amendment makes these intentions clear: “The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution” (emphasis added).

However, Congress streamlined Madison’s wording by removing the clauses about the enlargement of federal powers.

Virginia delegate Edmund Randolph was incensed when saw the revised version, believing that Congress had removed the most important part of the amendment. Virginia’s objections to the final wording of the Ninth Amendment actually delayed that state’s ratification of all the amendments for two years, which delayed ratification of the entire Bill of Rights.

Madison was flummoxed trying to understand the basis of Virginia’s objections, because he believed that the protection of individual rights and the protection against expansions of federal powers were merely two sides of the same coin: “the distinction,” insofar as Madison could see it, was “altogether fanciful.”

Alas, among Madison’s most charming blind spots was this one: He earnestly believed that Americans could always be trusted to interpret the Constitution in accordance with its intended meaning.

Madison’s faith was proved disastrously misplaced with recent interpretations of the Ninth Amendment. In Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), Justice Arthur Goldberg wrote that “the right of privacy in the marital relation is fundamental and basic — a personal right ‘retained by the people’ within the meaning of the Ninth Amendment.” In other words, the Ninth Amendment was being used to grant the Court an authority to decide which rights (unnamed within the Bill of Rights) now deserved protection by the federal government. It was being used as an expansion of federal authority over state laws.

In his dissent, Justice Potter Stewart criticized the Court’s interpretation of this amendment: “to say that the Ninth Amendment has anything to do with this case is to turn somersaults with history.” Nevertheless, the Court’s reasoning in Griswold has turned somersaults in “privacy cases” ever since, including Roe v. Wade (1973). It has been a truly acrobatic history.

• Lynn Uzzell, Ph.D., is a member of the James Madison Society at Princeton University and an adjunct professor of politics at the University of Virginia. She is currently working on an authoritative and impartial appraisal of Madison’s Notes of the Constitutional Convention.

https://www.archives.gov/files/legislative/resources/bill-of-rights/CCBR_IIB.pdf

A Project of the National Archives
Go Inside the First Congress
Amendments in Process
House Article the Fifteenth
Rights Retained by the People

At 148: Ideas Proposed in the State Ratifying Conventions

There are certain natural rights of which men, when they form a social compact cannot deprive or divest their posterity, among which are the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.

Virginia Convention, June 27, 1789

That the Powers of Government may be reassumed by the People, whensoever it shall become necessary to their Happiness; that every Power, Jurisdiction and Right, which is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or to the departments of the Government thereof, remains to the People of the several States or to their respective State Governments to whom they may have granted the same….

New York Convention, July 26, 1788

At 149: As Proposed by James Madison

James Madison proposed that the following language be inserted into Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution between Clauses 3 and 4:

The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.

June 8, 1789

This proposed amendment stated the principle that listing certain rights did not define the total body of rights possessed by the people. Additional rights of equal importance could be unlisted. nor did that listing mean that government could expand its powers.

At 150: As Proposed by the House Committee

Article I, Section 9—Between Clauses 2 and 3 insert:

The enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

July 28, 1789

The committee of eleven shortened Madison’s proposal and focused it on rights alone.

At 151: As passed by the House of Representatives

The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others, retained by the people.

August 24, 1789

The house passed this amendment essentially as proposed by the select committee.

At 152: As Approved or Amended by the Senate

The enumeration in the constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others, retained by the people.

September 7, 1789

The senate adopted this amendment as passed by the house.

The next step occurs after more than a two year delay.

At 153: As Reported by the Conference Committee

The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

December 15, 1791

Passed by both bodies, the amendment was not discussed in the conference committee.

At 154: As sent to the States for Ratification

The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

October 2, 1789

The amendment was sent to the states for ratification in this form.

At 155:

The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

October 2, 1789

The amendment was sent to the states for ratification in this form.

- - - - - - - - - -

Hamilton, Federalist 78, “The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts.”

SCOTUS, Marbury v. Madison, “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”

Randy Barnett, Our Republican Constitution, 1st Ed., Broadside Books, 2016, p. 172, “Then two more amendments were added to ensure the powers of the federal government were limited. The Ninth Amendment was supposed to ensure that the eight amendments protecting rights would not be construed as exclusive.”

Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 2nd Ed., The Foundation Press Inc., 1988, pp. 774-75, “James Madison introduced the ninth amendment in specific response to the arguments of Hamilton and others that enactment of a Bill of Rights might dangerously suggest “that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were consequently insecure.” The ninth amendment, which provides that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people,” therefore at least states a rule of construction pointing away from the reverse incorporation view that only the interests secured by the Bill of Rights are encompassed within the fourteenth amendment, and at most provides a positive source of law for fundamental but unmentioned rights.”

https://pacificlegal.org/whats-the-deal-with-the-9th-amendment/

Consequently, Madison’s original draft of the 9th Amendment read: “The exceptions, here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.”

Unfortunately, a select committee removed the key portion of the proposed amendment—which would have prohibited the power of the federal government from being enlarged through interpretation—before the amendment was enacted. Thus, the entire purpose of the amendment (and its future applicability) was rendered moot.

The 9th Amendment was intended to provide a mode of interpretation for the Constitution, guaranteeing that federal courts would have been expressly forbidden from creating new governmental powers through clever interpretation. Given how much trouble varying interpretations of the Constitution have caused throughout American history, it’s a shame this principle was not explicitly included. A lot of subsequent and continuing constitutional mischief could have been avoided.

https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1850&context=facpub

Texas Law Review Volume 85, Number 1, November 2006

The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says
Randy E. Barnett

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
—U.S. CONST., amend. IX

Although the Ninth Amendment appears on its face to protect unenumerated individual rights of the same sort as those that were enumerated in the Bill of Rights, courts and scholars have long deprived it of any relevance to constitutional adjudication.

U.S. Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).

The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 367 U. S. 516-522 (dissenting opinion). Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment, in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent of the owner, is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment, in its Self-Incrimination Clause, enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."

And from the Legal Information Institute (LII) at Cornell University:

https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-9

UNENUMERATED RIGHTS

NINTH AMENDMENT

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE

The Federalists contended that a bill of rights was unnecessary. They responded to those opposing ratification of the Constitution because of the lack of a declaration of fundamental rights by arguing that, inasmuch as it would be impossible to list all rights, it would be dangerous to list some and thereby lend support to the argument that government was unrestrained as to those rights not listed.¹ Madison adverted to this argument in presenting his proposed amendments to the House of Representatives. “It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard against the admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution.”² It is clear from its text and from Madison’s statement that the Amendment states but a rule of construction, making clear that a Bill of Rights might not by implication be taken to increase the powers of the national government in areas not enumerated, and that it does not contain within itself any guarantee of a right or a proscription of an infringement.³ In 1965, however, the Amendment was construed to be positive affirmation of the existence of rights which are not enumerated but which are nonetheless protected by other provisions.

The Ninth Amendment had been mentioned infrequently in decisions of the Supreme Court4 until it became the subject of some exegesis by several of the Justices in Griswold v. Connecticut.⁵ The Court in that case voided a statute prohibiting use of contraceptives as an infringement of the right of marital privacy. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, asserted that the “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”⁶ Thus, although privacy is not mentioned in the Constitution, it is one of the values served and protected by the First Amendment through its protection of associational rights, and by the Third, the Fourth, and the Fifth Amendments as well. The Justice recurred to the text of the Ninth Amendment, apparently to support the thought that these penumbral rights are protected by one Amendment or a complex of Amendments despite the absence of a specific reference. Justice Goldberg, concurring, devoted several pages to the Amendment.

“The language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments. . . . To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted in our society as the right of privacy in marriage may be infringed because that right is not guaranteed in so many words by the first eight amendments to the Constitution is to ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever. Moreover, a judicial construction that this fundamental right is not protected by the Constitution because it is not mentioned in explicit terms by one of the first eight amendments or elsewhere in the Constitution would violate the Ninth Amendment. . . . Nor do I mean to state that the Ninth Amendment constitutes an independent source of right protected from infringement by either the States or the Federal Government. Rather, the Ninth Amendment shows a belief of the Constitution’s authors that fundamental rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments and an intent that the list of rights included there not be deemed exhaustive.”⁷

Therefore, although neither Douglas’ nor Goldberg’s opinion sought to make the Ninth Amendment a substantive source of constitutional guarantees, both read it as indicating a function of the courts to interpose a veto over legislative and executive efforts to abridge other fundamental rights. Both opinions seemed to concur that the fundamental right claimed and upheld was derivative of several express rights and, in this case, really, the Ninth Amendment added almost nothing to the argument. But, if there is a claim of a fundamental right that cannot reasonably be derived from one of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, even with the Ninth Amendment, how is the Court to determine, first, that it is fundamental, and second, that it is protected from abridgment?⁸

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Footnotes

¹ THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Modern Library ed. 1937).

² 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 439 (1789). Earlier, Madison had written to Jefferson: “My own opinion has always been in favor of a bill of rights; provided it be so framed as not to imply powers not meant to be included in the enumeration. . . . I have not viewed it in an important light—1. because I conceive that in a certain degree . . . the rights in question are reserved by the manner in which the federal powers are granted. 2. because there is great reason to fear that a positive declaration of some of the most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude. I am sure that the rights of conscience in particular, if submitted to public definition would be narrowed much more than they are likely ever to be by an assumed power.” 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 271–72 (G. Hunt ed., 1904). See also 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1898 (1833).

³ To some extent, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments overlap with respect to the question of unenumerated powers, one of the two concerns expressed by Madison, more clearly in his letter to Jefferson but also in his introductory speech.

⁴ In United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94–95 (1947), upholding the Hatch Act, the Court said: “We accept appellant’s contention that the nature of political rights reserved to the people by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments [is] involved. The right claimed as inviolate may be stated as the right of a citizen to act as a party official or worker to further his own political views. Thus we have a measure of interference by the Hatch Act and the Rules with what otherwise would be the freedom of the civil servant under the First, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments.” See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 300–11 (1936), and Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 143–44 (1939). See also Justice Chase’s opinion in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798), and Justice Miller for the Court in Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 662–63 (1875).

⁵ 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

⁶ 381 U.S. at 484. The opinion was joined by Chief Justice Warren and by Justices Clark, Goldberg, and Brennan.

⁷ 381 U.S. at 488, 491, 492. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan joined this opinion. Justices Harlan and White concurred, id. at 499, 502, without alluding to the Ninth Amendment, but instead basing their conclusions on substantive due process, finding that the state statute “violates basic values implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). Id. at 500. It appears that the source of the fundamental rights to which Justices Douglas and Goldberg referred must be found in a concept of substantive due process, despite the former’s express rejection of this ground. Id. at 481–82. Justices Black and Stewart dissented. Justice Black viewed the Ninth Amendment ground as essentially a variation of the due process argument under which Justices claimed the right to void legislation as irrational, unreasonable, or offensive, without finding any violation of an express constitutional provision.

⁸ As Justice Scalia observed, “the [Ninth Amendment’s] refusal to ‘deny or disparage’ other rights is far removed from affirming any one of them, and even further removed from authorizing judges to identify what they might be, and to enforce the judges’ list against laws duly enacted by the people.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (dissenting from recognition of due-process-derived parental right to direct the upbringing of their children). Notice the recurrence to the Ninth Amendment as a “constitutional ‘saving clause’” in Chief Justice Burger’s plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579–80 & n.15 (1980). Scholarly efforts to establish the clause as a substantive protection of rights include J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 34–41 (1980); and C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW (1981), critically reviewed in W. Van Alstyne, Slouching Toward Bethlehem with the Ninth Amendment, 91 YALE L. J. 207 (1981). For a collection of articles on the Ninth Amendment, see THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989).

The Founders who were leery of the Bill of Rights were not opposed to the rights enumerated. Rather, they were concerned about the application to matters of rights of the interpretive doctrine that has come down to us as the "expresio unius" doctrine, from the Latin "expresio unius est exclusio alterius" (literally, to express one thing, or a set of things, in a contract as being covered by that contract is to exclude everything NOT listed).

We see lawyers draft around the "expresio unius" problem by adding the words "including, but not limited to..." before lists in modern contracts.

The 9th Amendment is an 18th Century effort to prevent the application of what we would call "expresio unius" doctrine. The fear was that the list of enumerated rights would be interpreted to exclude all other rights not enumerated, as in a contract. The 9th Amendment says no.

Now the example: the marital right of consortium is long established in Common and Civil Law. It's not mentioned in the Constitution. It did not, therefore, cease to exist with ratification, but rather, is assumed to exist as before. That's what the 9th is for - it's a safeguard against that sort of interpretive game by an unscrupulous government. There is no list of unenumerated rights - that's the whole point of the exercise.

Currently, the meaning

lol

Perhaps an example will help clarify.

The Founders who were leery of the Bill of Rights were not opposed to the rights enumerated. Rather, they were concerned about the application to matters of rights of the interpretive doctrine that has come down to us as the "expresio unius" doctrine, from the Latin "expresio unius est exclusio alterius" (literally, to express one thing, or a set of things, in a contract as being covered by that contract is to exclude everything NOT listed).

We see lawyers draft around the "expresio unius" problem by adding the words "including, but not limited to..." before lists in modern contracts.

The 9th Amendment is an 18th Century effort to prevent the application of what we would call "expresio unius" doctrine. The fear was that the list of enumerated rights would be interpreted to exclude all other rights not enumerated, as in a contract. The 9th Amendment says no.

Now the example: the marital right of consortium is long established in Common and Civil Law. It's not mentioned in the Constitution. It did not, therefore, cease to exist with ratification, but rather, is assumed to exist as before. That's what the 9th is for - it's a safeguard against that sort of interpretive game by an unscrupulous government. There is no list of unenumerated rights - that's the whole point of the exercise.

That makes sense. Kudos.

means what the Supreme Court says it means. Currently, the meaning is so broad

It means what it says. They can regulate interstate commerce. When the Supreme court gets it wrong the meaning of words don't change. It means they got it wrong and we have to live with it or rebel. They are just opinions. The truth is the truth. The truth is whatever I say it is. :)

[Vicomte13 #116 to A K A Stone] The Commerce Clause of the Constitution, like every other clause therein, means what the Supreme Court says it means.

This is the fact, although it tends to be given short shrift around here. SCOTUS is the ultimate arbiter of what the law is. A personal opinion that a Court opinion is wrong does not have any legal effect.

[Vicomte13 #116 to A K A Stone] Currently, the meaning is so broad that I can't off the top of my head think of any commerce not being regulable. Perhaps there is some limiting case law. When I last looked at the issue, long ago in law school, a farmer growing crops on his own farm to feed his own livestock was sufficiently engaged in "interstate commerce" (because of the potential effect of such activity thereupon), that his activity was regulable. I can't think of any economic activity that wouldn't be federally regulable under that broad standard.

For the lurkers to this conversation, I believe the farmer case was Wickard v. Filburn 317 U.S. 111 (1942). In that case, the family farm was in Montgomery County, Ohio.

I agree with your assessment that the Court expanded the Federal power to encompass just about every conceivable act of commerce. It was not easy to attempt expansion of power exceeding every conceivable act of commerce, although Obamacare found a way to try.

With Obamacare, an attempt was made, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, to regulate or penalize inaction, a failure to engage in commerce by not purchasing private, for-profit health insurance. I argued the unconstitutionality of such attempted usage of the Commerce Clause to regulate what was the absence of commerce. Because the individual mandate was declared unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, the mandate was interpreted as a tax and upheld under the taxing power, but SCOTUS recently held that it can no longer be interpreted as a tax as legal changes have stripped it of any ability to raise revenue, eluding the definition of a tax.

At least there is something that escapes the Commerce Clause, although it is not an action, but an inaction. Then again, perhaps an inaction is a nothing.

[Vicomte13 #118 to nolu chan] Perhaps an example will help clarify.

The Founders who were leery of the Bill of Rights were not opposed to the rights enumerated. Rather, they were concerned about the application to matters of rights of the interpretive doctrine that has come down to us as the "expresio unius" doctrine, from the Latin "expresio unius est exclusio alterius" (literally, to express one thing, or a set of things, in a contract as being covered by that contract is to exclude everything NOT listed).

You are perfectly correct in what you state. I would only supplement that Framers saw the original Bill of Rights as only applicable in restraint of the Federal government. It did not apply at all to the States until after the 14th Amendment, and subsequent selective incorporation against the States by the Court.

[Vicomte13 #116 to A K A Stone] The Commerce Clause of the Constitution, like every other clause therein, means what the Supreme Court says it means.

This is the fact, although it tends to be given short shrift around here. SCOTUS is the ultimate arbiter of what the law is. A personal opinion that a Court opinion is wrong does not have any legal effect.

[Vicomte13 #116 to A K A Stone] Currently, the meaning is so broad that I can't off the top of my head think of any commerce not being regulable. Perhaps there is some limiting case law. When I last looked at the issue, long ago in law school, a farmer growing crops on his own farm to feed his own livestock was sufficiently engaged in "interstate commerce" (because of the potential effect of such activity thereupon), that his activity was regulable. I can't think of any economic activity that wouldn't be federally regulable under that broad standard.

For the lurkers to this conversation, I believe the farmer case was Wickard v. Filburn 317 U.S. 111 (1942). In that case, the family farm was in Montgomery County, Ohio.

I agree with your assessment that the Court expanded the Federal power to encompass just about every conceivable act of commerce. It was not easy to attempt expansion of power exceeding every conceivable act of commerce, although Obamacare found a way to try.

With Obamacare, an attempt was made, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, to regulate or penalize inaction, a failure to engage in commerce by not purchasing private, for-profit health insurance. I argued the unconstitutionality of such attempted usage of the Commerce Clause to regulate what was the absence of commerce. Because the individual mandate was declared unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, the mandate was interpreted as a tax and upheld under the taxing power, but SCOTUS recently held that it can no longer be interpreted as a tax as legal changes have stripped it of any ability to raise revenue, eluding the definition of a tax.

At least there is something that escapes the Commerce Clause, although it is not an action, but an inaction. Then again, perhaps an inaction is a nothing.

[Vicomte13 #118 to nolu chan] Perhaps an example will help clarify.

The Founders who were leery of the Bill of Rights were not opposed to the rights enumerated. Rather, they were concerned about the application to matters of rights of the interpretive doctrine that has come down to us as the "expresio unius" doctrine, from the Latin "expresio unius est exclusio alterius" (literally, to express one thing, or a set of things, in a contract as being covered by that contract is to exclude everything NOT listed).

You are perfectly correct in what you state. I would only supplement that Framers saw the original Bill of Rights as only applicable in restraint of the Federal government. It did not apply at all to the States until after the 14th Amendment, and subsequent selective incorporation against the States by the Court.

[Vicomte13 #118 to nolu chan] The 9th Amendment is an 18th Century effort to prevent the application of what we would call "expresio unius" doctrine. The fear was that the list of enumerated rights would be interpreted to exclude all other rights not enumerated, as in a contract. The 9th Amendment says no.

The proposed 9th Amendment was stripped of much of its important content by the Committee of Eleven. The adopted 9th Amendment (and the whole BoR) generally served as a restraint on the Federal government. The text of the 9th served to restrain the Federal government from adopting any construction of the inclusion of enumerated rights as excluding unenumerated rights, as you state.

This only restrained actions against claimed unnumerated rights on the basis of their lack of enumeration.

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

The enumeration of certain rights cannot be cited to deny an unnumerated right. It is left to the Courts to decide what is, or is not, an unnumerated right, and whether that right is "fundamental." Not all legislation that burdens a fundamental right is unconstitutional, but is subject to a stricter standard of review.

For the casual reader, Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.:

Fundamental rights. Those rights which have their source, and are explicitly or implicitly guaranteed, in the federal Constitution, Price v. Cohen, C.A.Pa., 715 F.2d 87, 93, and state constitutions, Sidle v. Majors, 264 Ind. 206, 341 N.E.2d 763. See e.g., Bill of rights.

Challenged legislation that significantly burdens a "fundamental right" (examples include First Amendment rights, (privacy, and the right to travel interstate) will be reviewed under a stricter standard of review. A law will be held violative of the due process clause if it is not closely tailored to promote a compelling or overriding interest of government. A similar principle applies under Equal Protection law.

I would note one quibble with Black's. The Constitution does not guarantee rights, so much as it declares restrictions upon the powers granted to the Federal government. Congress shall pass no law abridging the right to free speech. The restriction is not absolute, as the right to free speech is not absolute. The right itself does not include a "right" to utter libelous or slanderous statements, to shout "fire" in a crowded theater, or to incite a riot.

[Vicomte13 #118 to nolu chan] Now the example: the marital right of consortium is long established in Common and Civil Law. It's not mentioned in the Constitution. It did not, therefore, cease to exist with ratification, but rather, is assumed to exist as before. That's what the 9th is for - it's a safeguard against that sort of interpretive game by an unscrupulous government. There is no list of unenumerated rights - that's the whole point of the exercise.

You are absolutely correct in asserting that, the marital right of consortium is long established in Common and Civil Law.

[Vicomte13 #118 to nolu chan] It did not, therefore, cease to exist with ratification, but rather, is assumed to exist as before. That's what the 9th is for - it's a safeguard against that sort of interpretive game by an unscrupulous government.

However, I would note, the marital right to consortium of two people of the same sex is not long established in Common and Civil Law. Nor does the penumbra of an emanating unnumerated right of privacy broad enough to encompass condoms and abortions seem to be well established in Common and Civil Law.

In Obergefell, Griswold, and Roe, the Court appeared to use the empty vessel of substantive due process to pour new meaning into the Constitution. A criticism of this is that the Court appears almost as an ad hoc Constitutional Convention, expanding Federal power. It is strange that the Bill of Rights is invoked to expand Federal power, when it was designed to prevent the expansion of Federal power.

For an example, the right to privacy is an unnumerated right, as is the right to abortion. The 9th Amendment, inter alia, was cited in support of the right to abortion. The 9th Amendment restrained government denial of the asserted right to abortion via construing the Constitution to deny the existence of said right because it was not enumerated. Application extended to the States by incorporation via the 14th Amendment would appear to restrain the States from denying the asserted right to abortion via construing the Constitution as denying said right's existence because it was not enumerated.

What I fail to see is how the 9th Amendment can be contorted to establish the existence of a positive right to abortion. If it existed as a right in Common or Civil law, I see how it could be found there. But how it is found in a penumbra from an emanation from an unnumerated right eludes me.

I do not find the right to abortion in a penumbra emanating from the unenumerated right to privacy. I simply do not find abortion to be a constitutional right. SCOTUS found that, and they made it law. SCOTUS can overturn Roe and it will no longer be a constitutional right, much as Pluto is no longer a planet.

In the end, what SCOTUS says is the law. Until they change their mind, or the law itself is changed, and then the most recent statement becomes the law.

It means what it says. They can regulate interstate commerce. When the Supreme court gets it wrong the meaning of words don't change.

Even when SCOTUS gets it wrong, what they say is the law. That's the truth. Abortion and gay marriage are constitutional, and growing more than your alloted quota of corn is illegal, and unnumerated rights emanate penumbras broad enough to encompass more unnumerated rights.

Even when SCOTUS gets it wrong, what they say is the law. That's the truth.

Sure it is. It is the system we have. But the truth is still the truth and they get it wrong often. That is why it is color of law.

I know my opinion doesn't count on the law. I'm just stating what I believe to be true. I believe they get it wrong and it is illegitimate when I say it is. :)

In the end, what SCOTUS says is the law. Until they change their mind, or the law itself is changed, and then the most recent statement becomes the law.

If you want to change the law, start with changing the flag with the yellow-fringe on it. usa-the-republic.com/item...interest/flag%20code.html You can read where titled "THE FLAG IS PRECISELY DEFINED BY LAW"

If you want to change the law, start with changing the flag with the yellow-fringe on it. usa-the-republic.com/item...interest/flag%20code.html You can read where titled "THE FLAG IS PRECISELY DEFINED BY LAW"

Your blather is tax protester nonsense which was was disposed of decades ago as being frivolous and of no merit whatever. A lawyer making that argument could be subjected to sanctions for frivolous filing.

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/912/224/1986395/

United States v. Greenstreet, 912 F.Supp. 224 (N.D. Tex. 1996).

[Excerpt]

Finally, Defendant Greenstreet's response to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment identifies this Court as an "Admiralty Court" without further discussing his allegation. If his reference is to be construed as a jurisdictional challenge, his motion is denied. Others have attempted to persuade the judiciary that fringe on an American flag denotes a court of admiralty. In light of the fact that this Court has such a flag in its courtroom, the issue is addressed. The concept behind the theory the proponent asserts is that if a courtroom is adorned with a flag which happens to be fringed around the edges, such decor indicates that the court is one of admiralty jurisdiction exclusively. To think that a fringed flag adorning the courtroom somehow limits this Court's jurisdiction is frivolous. See Vella v. McCammon, 671 F. Supp. 1128, 1129 (S.D.Tex.1987) (describing petitioner's claim that court lacked jurisdiction because flag was fringed as "without merit" and "totally frivolous"). Unfortunately for Defendant Greenstreet, decor is not a determinant for jurisdiction.

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/671/1128/2595134/

Vella v. McCammon, 671 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D. Tex. 1987)

[Excerpt]

The remaining claims that Petitioner has asserted by way of motion to dismiss, e.g. Court lacking jurisdiction because the Court's flag has yellow fringes on it, were denied and the Court considers them to have not only been without merit but also to have been totally frivolous. Petitioner's claims have no arguable basis in law or fact and the appeal is not taken in good faith.

The truth is whatever I say it is. :)

It is good to be The King.

And yes, the Obamacare overreach DID finally result in the Supremes finding a limit to the Commerce Clause - the regulation of INACTION. i think past courts would have found even that within the scope of regulation, but the conservative court has found a limit.

Your blather is tax protester nonsense which was was disposed of decades ago as being frivolous and of no merit whatever. A lawyer making that argument could be subjected to sanctions for frivolous filing.

The Congress shall have Power to Lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excise, to Pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;" The Constitution for the United States of America, Article 1, Section 8, paragraph 1. [emphasis added]

No Capitation or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken." The Constitution for the United States of America, Article 1, Section 9, paragraph 4. [emphasis added]

As for your tax protestor comment I will leave you with the exact tax statute that would be applicable were I held to be liable to collect such a tax.

26 CFR, 601.103 (a) is the only place which tells us who is required to file a return, provided that person has been properly noticed by the District Director to KEEP RECORDS AND THEN NOTICED THAT HE/SHE IS REQUIRED TO FILE. It states, "In general, each taxpayer (or person required to collect and pay over the taxes) is required to file a prescribed form of return ..." Are you a Taxpayer? (l.o.- you must first be a tax collector)

source: http://www.1215.org/lawnotes/lawnotes/irshist.htm

And anyway, it's NECESSARY to fund a first world country that's the linchpin of world peace, so what purpose is served standing against the idea of taxation? It just raises your blood pressure for no advantage at all.

Of course if you just outright refuse to pay taxes, you go to jail and lose your house.

The current tax system is constitutional and legal.

Really, Vicomte13?

http://libertysflame.com/cgi-bin...?ArtNum=60787&Disp=15#C15

Since millions of taxpayers such as myself paid into a penalty fund last year for not having such insurance and then come to find out this so-called fraud tax "law" was indeed unconstitutional just begs for those taxpayers to bring class-action suits. And it was indeed a direct tax.

So if this makes me out to be some tax protestor, remember too that we still do have a First Amendment Right to redress our grievances before a court system. It is both our right and responsibility to redress such pertinent matters of this kind.

As for your tax protestor comment I will leave you with the exact tax statute that would be applicable were I held to be liable to collect such a tax.

26 CFR, 601.103 (a) is the only place which tells us who is required to file a return, provided that person has been properly noticed by the District Director to KEEP RECORDS AND THEN NOTICED THAT HE/SHE IS REQUIRED TO FILE. It states, "In general, each taxpayer (or person required to collect and pay over the taxes) is required to file a prescribed form of return ..." Are you a Taxpayer? (l.o.- you must first be a tax collector)

source: http://www.1215.org/lawnotes/lawnotes/irshist.htm

Consider yourself one of the most gullible dumbshits on the planet. It is an insult that you even tried to run this bullshit past me.

Your criminal wacko, dingbat source:

https://www.1215.org/lawnotes/lawnotes/irshist.htm

Who and What is the IRS?

Historical Note

History & New Evidence that it is a foreign agency.

By Dan Meador
April 1, 2000
dmeador@poncacity.net

Things are looking up for Dan Meador. He did his time in prison and got out. Perhaps you could find a source of legal advice who did not participate in a tax scam, and who is not a convicted criminal with a prison record.

Look what your wacko, criminal dingbat source's bullshit did to some poor bastard:

https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1085748/steinmetz-v-wolgamot/

Steinmetz v. Wilgamot, 2013 Il App (1st) 121375

¶ 10 Mr. Wolgamot also recommended to plaintiff that he contact Mr. Wasson and Mr. Starns regarding the notice of deficiency. Mr. Wasson and Mr. Starns in turn referred plaintiff to a “legal researcher” named Dan Meador. Mr. Meador told plaintiff that the IRS was wrong with respect to the alleged deficiency, and that he would prepare documents that would help plaintiff deal with the IRS. Mr. Meador prepared a series of documents that were delivered by Mr. Starns to plaintiff. Plaintiff signed the documents prepared by Mr. Meador and sent them to the IRS. Plaintiff did not specify the exact dates he spoke with Mr. Wasson, Mr. Starns and Mr. Meador and signed the documents, although the chronology again indicates a time period of 1999-2002. Plaintiff stated he never considered paying the deficiency to the IRS because he “was being reassured by everybody that this was legal.”

¶ 11 Plaintiff testified that in response to Mr. Meador’s documents, the IRS sent him a letter stating that Mr. Meador’s arguments were “frivolous.”

[...]

¶ 34 Plaintiff argues that after receiving the notice of deficiency, his discovery of the actionable legal malpractice claim against defendants was delayed by the acts/omissions of Mr. Wolgamot and of persons referred directly or indirectly by Mr. Wolgamot (i.e., Mr. Starns, Mr. Wasson, Mr. Meador, and Mr. Vallone), who constantly reassured plaintiff that his participation in the AEGIS program was legal and could be defended. Plaintiff also argues that discovery of the actionable legal malpractice claim against defendants was further delayed by Mr. Wolgamot’s admitted intentional concealment of his doubts about the legality of the AEGIS trusts. Plaintiff contends that as result of the actions and omissions of Mr. Wolgamot and the persons to whom plaintiff had been referred, plaintiff did not discover he had an actionable claim for legal malpractice against defendants until December 31, 2003, when Mr. Coobs wrote him that he likely had claims against unspecified third parties. Elsewhere in his appellant’s brief, plaintiff contends he did not discover he had an actionable claim for legal malpractice against defendants until Mr. Pomerance informed him so in January 2004. Plaintiff argues he filed his complaint for legal malpractice on December 22, 2005, within two years of either of the dates on which he allegedly learned of his actionable claim against defendants (December 31, 2003, or January 2004), and thus the trial court erred in finding his legal malpractice action time-barred as a matter of law and granting summary judgment for defendants.

[...]

¶ 38 Even if, for the sake of argument only, we considered the statute of limitations as beginning to run only when plaintiff reasonably should have known he had an actionable claim against defendants, the facts indicate he reasonably should have known of his actionable claim for legal malpractice against defendants no later than October 10, 2003, when he retained the law firm of Meyer Capel to represent him. Specifically, by October 10, 2003, plaintiff had: (1) enrolled in AEGIS at Mr. Wolgamot’s prompting so as to provide him with asset protection and tax savings, despite Mr. Foster’s warning that his participation in AEGIS could lead to an audit; (2) received a notice of deficiency for the first two tax years he had been an AEGIS member; (3) been informed by the IRS that the defense to the notice offered by Mr. Meador was frivolous; (4) been informed by Ms. Ungaro that plaintiff’s participation in the AEGIS program, including its use of offshore trusts and debit cards, could lead him to being charged with money laundering and/or tax evasion; (5) received newsletters from Mr. Vallone relating to “problems” AEGIS members were having with the IRS, including an instance when the AEGIS office was raided by armed IRS agents who carted off documents; (6) received a notice from the IRS stating he owed $247,984.45 in back taxes for the years covering his participation in the AEGIS program; (7) received a notice from the Illinois Department of Revenue that he owed $30,813 in back taxes for the first two tax years he had been an AEGIS member; (8) authorized his secretary to send a letter to Mr. Starns in which she referenced AEGIS as constituting a “scam”; (9) been notified that Mr. Foster had been served with a subpoena from the Illinois Department of Revenue, Bureau of Criminal Investigations, to produce tax documents relating to plaintiff for years he had been an AEGIS member (1997 to 2001); (10) been served with a subpoena compelling him to provide AEGIS-related documents for a federal grand jury on December 3, 2002; and (11) been threatened by the Illinois Department of Revenue that it would refer plaintiff to the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation for proceedings to suspend his medical license if he did not pay the money he owed in back taxes for the years he had been an AEGIS member.

¶ 39 In sum, all these notifications and subpoenas from 1999 to 2003 informed plaintiff that, far from reducing his tax liability as promised by defendants, his participation in the AEGIS program was increasing his tax liabilities and subjecting him to potential criminal prosecution and loss of his medical license. By the time plaintiff retained Meyer Capel on October 10, 2003, to handle any proceedings brought against him by the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation in connection with his failure to pay taxes under AEGIS, he reasonably should have known that he was injured by his participation in the AEGIS program, that his injury was wrongfully caused, and that he had an actionable claim against defendants. Plaintiff still did not file suit for legal malpractice until more than two years lat er, December 22, 2005. Thus, even under plaintiff’s reading of Khan as holding that the twoyear limitations period does not begin to run until plaintiff realizes he has an actionable claim, plaintiff’s legal malpractice action against defendants still was not timely filed. Accordingly, the trial court correctly found plaintiff’s legal malpractice action was timebarred as a matter of law.

¶ 40 Next, plaintiff argues defendants should be estopped from raising a limitations defense, given that Mr. Wolgamot assured plaintiff the AEGIS program was legal and performed legal work to allow plaintiff to continue in AEGIS even after receipt of the notice of deficiency, referred plaintiff to persons who assured him of the legality of the AEGIS program, and withheld the fact that the Seventh Circuit had found the AEGIS program was not a legitimate tax shelter. “The party claiming estoppel has the burden of proving it by clear and unequivocal evidence.” Geddes v. Mill Creek Country Club, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 302, 314 (2001). “To establish equitable estoppel, the party claiming estoppel must demonstrate that: (1) the other person misrepresented or concealed material facts; (2) the other person knew at the time he or she made the representations that they were untrue; (3) the party claiming estoppel did not know that the representations were untrue when they were made and when they were acted upon; (4) the other person intended or reasonably expected that the party claiming estoppel would act upon the representations; (5) the party claiming estoppel reasonably relied upon the representations in good faith to his or her detriment; and (6) the party claiming estoppel would be prejudiced by his or her reliance on the representations if the other person is permitted to deny the truth thereof.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 313-14. “Under Illinois law, equitable estoppel does not give a plaintiff the entire limitations period measured from the date the defendant discontinues the conduct that lulled the plaintiff into inaction.” Butler v. Mayer, Brown & Platt, 301 Ill. App. 3d 919, 925 (1998). Rather, plaintiff is allowed a “reasonable period to bring suit.” Id. at 926.

https://www.1215.org/lawnotes/lawnotes/irshist.htm

Who and What is the IRS?

Historical Note

History & New Evidence that it is a foreign agency.

By Dan Meador
April 1, 2000
dmeador@poncacity.net

https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/

DAN LESLIE MEADOR
Register Number: 07840-062
Age: 75
Race: White
Sex: Male
Released On: 10/02/1998

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp2/45/1263/2498558/

United States v. Meador, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (N.D. Okla. 1999)

US District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma - 45 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (N.D. Okla. 1999)

April 2, 1999

45 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (1999)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,
v.
Dan Leslie MEADOR, Defendant.

No. 96-CR-113-C.

United States District Court, N.D. Oklahoma.

April 2, 1999.

ORDER

H. DALE COOK, District Judge.

Before the Court is defendant, Dan Meador's, motion, styled "Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus." However, since 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the exclusive remedy for a prisoner in federal custody who asserts that his sentence was imposed in violation of federal law, the Court will treat Meador's present application as a motion brought pursuant to § 2255.

In August 1996, Meador was named in a three Count Indictment, charging him with obstruction of justice and unlawfully communicating with a grand juror, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503-1504. Meador proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all Counts on January 10, 1997. In May 1997, the Court denied numerous post-trial motions filed by Meador, including motions for judgment of acquittal and new trial. In June 1997, Meador was sentenced to a term of 16 months' imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and fined $2,000. Meador filed notice of appeal on June 30, 1997. However, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal on December 19, 1997, for lack of prosecution. Meador did not thereafter attempt to seek rehearing or otherwise move to *1264 have his appeal reinstated by the Circuit. Meador mailed his present motion to the Court, and it was received by the Clerk on March 2, 1999.[1]

Prior to addressing the merits of Meador's § 2255 motion, the Court must confront certain issues which may bar consideration of the motion. First, since the record indicates that Meador is no longer incarcerated, the Court must determine whether he qualifies for § 2255 relief. Section 2255 provides that, "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court ... may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." Thus, § 2255 relief is clearly limited to federal prisoners in custody. However, the "in custody" requirement has been broadly construed, and since Meador is continuing to serve a term of supervised release, he may properly be considered "in custody" for purposes of § 2255. See Scanio v. United States, 37 F.3d 858, 860 (2d Cir. 1994) (while the petitioner must satisfy the jurisdictional "in custody" requirement of § 2255 in order to invoke habeas review by a federal court, a petitioner under supervised release may be considered "in custody"); Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491-492, 109 S. Ct. 1923, 104 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1989) (recognizing very liberal construction of the "in custody" requirement).

The Court further recognizes that § 2255, as amended in April 1996, provides for a one-year limitations period in which to file a § 2255 motion after the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final. The judgment of conviction was entered in this case on June 19, 1997. Meador subsequently filed notice of appeal, but the Tenth Circuit ultimately dismissed the appeal on December 19, 1997, for lack of prosecution. Generally, a judgment of conviction is final when the judgment of conviction is rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari has expired. Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258 n. 1, 106 S. Ct. 2878, 92 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1986). However, in the present case, the Court believes that the judgment of conviction became final when the Circuit dismissed the appeal on December 19, 1997, for lack of prosecution. By failing to prosecute his direct appeal, and by subsequently failing to seek rehearing on, or otherwise challenge, the Circuit's order of dismissal, Meador clearly acquiesced in, and accepted, the finality of his judgment of conviction and sentence. Although Meador may have theoretically had 90 days after the Circuit's order of dismissal in which to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari, such a petition would have been limited solely to the issue of whether the Circuit erred in dismissing his appeal for lack of prosecution, and the merits underlying the direct appeal would not have been considered. Thus, the Court can envision no logical or legal reason for setting the date of finality at 90 days from the date of dismissal.[2] The Court will therefore treat the date of the Circuit's mandate dismissing Meador's appeal as the date that his judgment of conviction became final. See also United States v. Burch, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1249, (D.Kan.1998) (because defendant did not file her § 2255 motion within one year of the date that the Tenth Circuit issued its mandate, her motion is time-barred); Gendron v. United States, 154 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir.1998) (federal prisoners who decide not to seek certiorari will have the limitations period begin to run on the date the court of appeals issues the mandate in their direct appeal).[3]

*1265 As the Court has determined that Meador's judgment of conviction became final on December 19, 1997, his present motion, filed on March 2, 1999, is time-barred under § 2255's one-year limitations period.[4]

Accordingly, Meador's present § 2255 motion is hereby DENIED. The Clerk is directed to return to Meador the $5.00 filing fee which he submitted along with his present motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

NOTES

[1] Since the record indicates that Meador is no longer incarcerated, the date that the present motion was actually received by the Clerk will be deemed the date that the motion was filed.

[2] Moreover, Meador never, in fact, petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, and, as noted, the record does not indicate that he otherwise challenged the dismissal of his direct appeal. These facts strongly indicate that Meador intended to permit the judgment of conviction to become final on the date that the Circuit dismissed his direct appeal, if not before then.

[3] The Court notes that the court in Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 570-571 (3rd Cir.1999), disagreed with Gendron, and held that if a defendant does not file a petition for certiorari, the judgment of conviction does not become final until the time for seeking certiorari review expires. While this is an issue which may ultimately need to be decided by the Supreme Court, this Court need not confront this precise issue in the present case. In Kapral, the defendant was convicted of tax evasion, and the Third Circuit affirmed the defendant's judgment of conviction on the merits. The defendant did not file a petition for certiorari, but he later filed a § 2255 motion with the district court. The district court denied the motion as time-barred, using the date that the Circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction as the date that the judgment of conviction became final. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, finding the § 2255 timely filed, as measured from the date on which the defendant could no longer petition for certiorari.

Kapral is thus distinguishable. In the present case, the Circuit did not affirm Meador's judgment of conviction on the merits. Rather, the Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of prosecution. Hence, the rationale and reasoning behind the Kapral decision simply do not apply here. The judgment of conviction in the present case therefore became final when Meador failed to prosecute the merits of his direct appeal and permitted the appeal to be dismissed.

[4] Even if the Court were to consider the merits of the present motion, however, the Court finds that it is patently frivolous and must be denied. The motion merely realleges several arguments that Meador raised during the course of the proceedings in the present case, and which the Court found baseless.

An example of inmate Dan Meador insanity:

https://famguardian.org/PublishedAuthors/Indiv/MeadorDan/Forms/attyge.htm

May 19, 1997

W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Oklahoma State Capitol
Oklahoma City 73105/tdc
OKLAHOMA STATE

Re: Complaint under Oklahoma Corrupt Organization Law

ENCLOSURES: OTC-IRS Agreement & my cover letter to Commissioner Anderson

Dear Attorney General Edmondson:

This letter is to convey a complaint against the Internal Revenue Service and various people supportive of Service initiatives under the Oklahoma Corrupt Organization Act.

The complaint immediately issues against the following: H. Dale Cook, Frank McCarthy, and Sam Joyner, all of whom serve as judicial officers for the Article IV United States District Court, Northern District of Oklahoma; Stephen Lewis, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma; Neal Kirkpatrick, Assistant United States Attorney; and Tracy Foster, an inspector with the Internal Revenue Service, Arkansas-Oklahoma District. In is not necessary to immediately name John and Jane Doe defendants.

You may notify those complaints initially issued against and K. J. Sawyer, District Director for the Arkansas-Oklahoma District of Internal Revenue Service.

You are aware that the Internal Revenue Service is an agency of the Department of the Treasury, Puerto Rico, a foreign-based entity which has no authority in the continental United States. Public notice to that effect published as a legal publication in The Journal Record the last two weeks of June and the first week of July, 1996. Internal Revenue Service principals did not rebut or correct any element of the public notice so the notice must be presumed correct unless or until evidence to the contrary establishes that the Internal Revenue Service is an agency of the United States Treasury Department, or the United States Department of the Treasury -- you will find at 31 U.S.C. §§ 301- 310 that IRS is not listed as a department or agency in the United States Department of the Treasury.

Additional complaints will be filed by other parties with respect to what appears to be opening as a rather expansive conspiracy involving UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. KENNEY F. MOORE, et al. (#96-CR-082-C), UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DAN LESLIE MEADOR (#96-CR-113-C), both in the Article IV United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. HOWARD BOOS, et al. (#97-CR-032-A), in the Article IV United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, and possibly other cases.

Dan Meador Affidavit of Complaint:
Page 1 of 3

Article IV United States District Courts located in the Union of several States party to the Constitution have authority only to prosecute misdemeanor offenses committed within United States jurisdiction under authority of 18 U.S.C. § 3401 and attending Department of Defense and Bureau of Land Management regulations. They do not have general jurisdiction in the Union states. Further, as they accommodate IRS-initiated suits, all of which are under color of law (Subtitle F of the Internal Revenue Code does not become effective as law until Title 26 of the United States Code is enacted as positive law), they function on behalf of the "United States of America", an undisclosed foreign principal (you will find that Titles 18, 26 & 28 authorize the "United States" as plaintiff or defendant, not the "United States of America", and that the Constitution of the United States vests authority in a governmental entity identified as the "United States"), the foreign principals being generally but not particularly identified at 28 CFR, Parts 0.49 & 0.64-1.

The OTC-IRS agreement, with my letter to Commissioner Anderson, demonstrates that IRS and Article IV United States District Courts are operating on a presumed State grant of authority to exceed United States jurisdiction in the Union of several States party to the Constitution of the United States. This is contrary to the Separation of Powers Doctrine (Tenth Amendment), and contrary to the Oklahoma prohibition against Federal officials serving as State officials (Art. II § 12, Okla. Constitution). The OTC-IRS agreement, made with no statutory authority from the Oklahoma Legislature or Congress (the Treasury Department is vested with responsibility for administering the Internal Revenue Code in the continental United States, I.R.C. §§ 7701(a)(12)(a) & 7805(a)), implements administrative law which is of no effect in the geographical United States or the Union of several States. Further, the Article IV United States District Courts operate under Admiralty-Civil Law rules, which is contrary to intent of the "arising under" clause at Article III § 2.1 of the Constitution of the United States, and Article VII §§ 4 & 7 of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma. As legislative courts, they impose bills of attainder, prohibited by the Constitution of the United States at Article I §§ 9.3 & 10.1, and the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma at Article II § 15.

Please be advised that I am filing particular criminal complaints against the above-named parties with the district attorney for Tulsa County, and because there are Federal as well as State offenses involved, will file complaints under the United States anti-terrorism act with Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States.

At this juncture, I am electing not to include State officers at the Oklahoma Tax Commission in complaints as I don't believe most are cognizant of the extent of fraud and tyranny accommodated by the OTC-IRS agreement even though David Smith, the OTC State-Federal coordinator, was aware of the public notice and other initiatives involving the Internal Revenue Service. Commissioner Anderson and others are at least deserving of due diligence notice and the opportunity to terminate the unlawful agreement.

Dan Meador Affidavit of Complaint:
Page 2 of 3

You first received complaints pertaining to illegal Internal Revenue Service initiatives in October or November 1995. You and Mr. Richard Wintory, your first assistant, have been provided with a considerable amount of research pertaining to the Internal Revenue Service, the character and limited authority of other Federal enforcement agencies (FBI in particular), jurisdiction of the Federal Law Enforcement Community, and jurisdiction and operation of Article IV courts of the United States. Yet you have elected to do nothing, and have for all practical purposes accommodated treason against people you pledged by oath to serve. In other words, by your actions, you appear mired in and committed to the Cooperative Federalism scheme, which was designed to over-throw sovereignty of the several States and the Constitution of the United States.

We have arrived at the time to fish or cut bait. The OTC- IRS administrative agreement put the last piece in place necessary to expose one of the more diabolical elements of Cooperative Federalism - an element that has destroyed and otherwise enslaved multitudes in ever-increasing numbers since World War II. It is time to move ahead to correct the problem. The initiative will proceed state-by-state as what we've unearthed, along with my analysis contained in the OTC commissioner letter, will probably be distributed nationally by the time you receive this complaint.

Should you fail to respond with authorities sufficient to overcome those cited herein and in the OTC Commissioner letter, and fail to seek appropriate remedies dictated by the Oklahoma Corrupt Organizations Act, I reserve the right to seek a specially appointed attorney general via political forum (Art. II §§ 1, 3 & 33, Okla. Const.), and otherwise secure lawful remedies. If you elect to investigate complaints conveyed in and with this letter, I would prefer that you appoint someone other than Mr. Wintory to handle the matter.

Regards,

/s/ Dan Meador

Dan Meador

copies: as needed & convenient

Dan Meador Affidavit of Complaint:
Page 3 of 3

# # #

For the complete Meador Manifesto of legal bullshit, see:

https://www.scribd.com/document/441098446/Dan-Meador-Memorandum-of-Law-10th-Cir-97-5128-below-US-v-Meador-OKND-96-cr-113-C

Things never known until Dan Meador showered his wisdom down on the gullible masses.

Highlights:

At 2-3:

Petitioner alleges that the four memorandum segments incorporated in this instrument are adequate: (1) The Article IV United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma has statutory and regulatory capacity to prosecute only misdemeanor and petty offenses, with consent of the accused, on military installations and on land under Department of the Interior jurisdiction, and (b) the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Federal Rules of Evidence, etc., do not apply to proceedings in Article III district courts of the United States, which have original criminal jurisdiction under 18 USC § 3231; (2) all entities involved in prosecution of the instant matter must disclose five essential elements of authority to establish standing and territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction; (3) the "United States of America" is a government foreign to the United States, and has no standing either by Constitutional delegation of authority or Titles 18, 19, 21, 26 and other titles of the United States Code, save Title 48; and (4) contrary to Article I § 9.3 of the Constitution, the Article IV United States District Court, being a legislative rather than judicial court, has effected a bill of attainder against petitioner.

At 3-4:

The fact that judicial officers (magistrates) in United States District Courts preside under the gold-fringed Union Jack (executive martial law/admiralty banner), rather than the official flag of the United States, prescribed at 4 USC § 1, is proof positive of underlying authority and purpose – when the executive admiralty-martial law authority is extended beyond borders of the geographical United States subject to Congress' Article IV § 3.2 legislative jurisdiction, and the authority moves under threat or actual force of arms, it cannot be construed other than as acts of plunder and war, with the sovereign people of the several States being the object of plunder, suppression, sedition and treason.

At 4:

For example, the last sentence of 40 USC § 255 stipulates that until the United States has formally accepted jurisdiction over land acquired by the United States, with jurisdiction ceded by the legislature of the State where the land is acquired, United States jurisdiction is presumed not to exist. Where the instant matter is concerned, counsel for the "United States of America" may prove United States jurisdiction in the county of Kay, or the community of Ponca City, state of Oklahoma, by entering proof that the United States formally accepted jurisdiction to the county or community in compliance with requirements of 40 USC § 255 and Article I § 8.17 of the Constitution.

At 5:

1. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, and all other United States District Courts located in the Union of several States party to the Constitution. (1) Lack authority to prosecute felony crimes. (2) have no jurisdiction authority beyond that prescribed at 18 USC §7(3), and (3) are incompetent at law as contemplated by the "arising under" clause at Article III § 2.1 and the Fifth Article of Amendment to the Constitution.

At 35:

The Fourteenth Amendment and several amendments promulgated since 1870 expand United States authority relative to voting and civil rights violations against "citizens of the United States", and might conceivably extend authority relating to a true income tax levied under authority of the Sixteenth Amendment, but the United States does not have general civil and criminal jurisdiction throughout the Union of several States party to the Constitution. Without a special constitutional grant of authority, per U.S. vs. Constantine and New York vs. United States, supra, courts of the United States, whether Article III judicial courts (district courts of the United States), or Article IV legislative-territorial courts (United States District Courts), lack subject matter jurisdiction within the Union of several States save on Federal enclaves, defined as United States special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, per 18 USC § 7(3). In many instances, prosecutors for the "United States of America" (a government foreign to the United States) predicate prosecution of offenses on the commerce clause (Art. I § 8.3), but there is an inherent fallacy in this notion as no specific authority for prescribing punishment is enumerated in the Constitution (Tenth Amendment block; U.S. vs. Warrall, supra), and Title 18 of the United States Code addresses only offenses committed in the geographical United States subject to Congress' Article IV § 3.2 legislative jurisdiction, and United States admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.

At 44:

The fact that the Internal Revenue Service is not an agency of the Department of the Treasury of the United States is verified by consulting the list of Department of the Treasury agencies in Title 31 of the United States Code. Also of particular significance where the instant matter is concerned, the Department of the Treasury of the United States is an executive department, the Treasury of the United States is a Congressional department, with the General Accounting Office, under direction of the Comptroller General, being distinct, separate, and responsible for collection of obligations to the United States, including taxes owed under provisions of Subtitles A & C of the Internal Revenue Code (Vol. 68A of the Statutes at Large), as amended in 1986 and since.

The Internal Revenue Service, successor of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico, (T.D.O. No. 150-29, 1953), operates out of or in conjunction with Puerto Rico Trust No. 62 (Internal Revenue), which is still administered by the Secretary of the Treasury (31 USC § 1321). The Internal Revenue Service has delegated authority to collect certain customs taxes in United States off-shore territories of the United States, and United States maritime jurisdiction.

The so-called "income tax" prescribed in Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code is not generally included in authority delegated to the Internal Revenue Service. The "income tax" is simply the "normal tax" preserved in the Internal Revenue Act of November 23, 1921, and the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939 (see Statutes at Large). The "normal tax", as the name of the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939 suggests, applies only to Government employees and officers of corporations construed to be instrumentalities of the United States - corporate entities the United States retains a proprietary interest in. Definitions at 26 USC § 3401(c ) & (d), which apply to withholding Subtitle A & C taxes at the source, confirm this allegation. And as various regulations specify, withholding agents, not employees in general, are the persons liable for these taxes (see 26 CFR, Part 1.1441, etc.).

You say I posted nonsense. All that you post is case law which is non-positive law. If you click onto this link, www.tax-freedom.com/ta16013.htm it list all the US Codes that are Positive Law. Title 26 governs the IRS. All those that are Positive Law have an asterisk next to them. If you notice closely, Title 26 has none.

source:www.loc.gov/item/uscode1988-001000002/

"...stories about mice and lizards rising from the dead."

I am more concerned with RATS and RINOS than zombie rodents and reptiles...lol.

And along with that pull 26 CFR, 601.103 (a) I referenced of his, there should also be a Federal Register that cross-references this statute.

You say I posted nonsense. All that you post is case law which is non-positive law. If you click onto this link, www.tax-freedom.com/ta16013.htm it list all the US Codes that are Positive Law. Title 26 governs the IRS. All those that are Positive Law have an asterisk next to them. If you notice closely, Title 26 has none.

Meador's bullshit is not only without merit, it is without arguable merit. It is bullshit which this bloodsucking leach packaged and sold the unsuspecting, and the willfully ignorant. He and his bullshit are beneath contempt.

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/03pdf/02-1389.pdf

United States v. Galletti, 541 U.S. 114 (23 March 2004)

III

We now turn to the question whether the Government must make separate assessments of a single tax debt against persons or entities secondarily liable for that debt in order for § 6502's extended statute of limitations to apply to those persons or entities.4 We hold that the Code contains no such requirement. Respondents' argument that they must be separately assessed turns on a mistaken understanding of the function and nature of an assessment as identical to the initiation of a formal collection action against any person or entity who might be liable for payment of a debt. In its numerous uses throughout the Code, it is clear that the term "assessment" refers to little more than the calculation or recording of a tax liability. See, e. g., 26 U. S. C. § 6201 (assessment authority); § 6203 (method of assessment); § 6204 (supplemental assessments); 26 CFR § 601.103 (2003). See also Black's Law Dictionary 111 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "assessment" as the "[d]etermination of the [tax] rate or amount of something, such as a tax or damages"). "The Federal tax system is basically one of self-assessment," whereby each taxpayer computes the tax due and then files the appropriate form of return along with the requisite payment. 26 CFR § 601.103(a) (2003). In most cases, the Secretary accepts the self-assessment and simply records the liability of the taxpayer. Where the taxpayer fails to file the form of return or miscalculates the tax due, as in this case, the Secretary can assess "all taxes (including interest, additional amounts, additions to the tax, and assessable penalties)," 26 U. S. C. § 6201(a), by "recording the liability of the taxpayer in the office of the Secretary," § 6203. In other words, where the Secretary rejects the self-assessment of the taxpayer or discovers that the taxpayer has failed to file a return, the Secretary calculates the proper amount of liability and records it in the Government's books.

Obviously, the U.S. Supreme Court said you are full of shit.

You cite and misapply a general regulation to overrule a specific statute law.

https://www.scribd.com/document/441137212/United-States-v-Lesonik-et-al-PAWD-12-cv-65-2-Oct-2012-Doc-39-MEMORANDUM-OPINION

This is how Tax Protester bullshit is swatted away in court.

https://www.scribd.com/document/441137212/United-States-v-Lesonik-et-al-PAWD-12-cv-65-2-Oct-2012-Doc-39-MEMORANDUM-OPINION

The United States filed the instant action on March 1, 2012, seeking to reduce federal income tax assessments against Defendant to judgment and foreclose on Defendant’s real property pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7403 in order to satisfy that judgment. The only argument raised in Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is that this action must be dismissed with prejudice because the government “[does] not have a statute that makes an individual LIABLE for INCOME taxes.” (Motion to Dismiss, p. 1) (emphasis in original).

This precise assertion, as well as countless other “frivolous tax-protester arguments,” has been “uniformly and conclusively rejected by every court that has examined the issue,” typically without further discussion.[1] Belmont v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 2007 WL 686388, *1 (U.S. Tax. Ct. 2007) (rejecting petitioner’s taxprotester arguments as “frivolous and without merit”); Jibilian v. United States, 2005 WL 1491908, * (Fed. Cl. 2005) (characterizing the argument that “there is no law that makes [plaintiff] liable for income tax” as “without merit and frivolous”); see also, e.g., Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417, 1417 (5th Cir. 1984) (“We perceive no need to refute these [tax-protester] arguments with somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent; to do so might suggest that these arguments have some colorable merit.”); Upton v. I.R.S., 104 F.3d 543, 545 n. 1 (2nd Cir. 1997) (stating that the plaintiff’s “tax protestor arguments” were “barely worth a footnote”); United States v. Hilgeford, 7 F.3d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1993) (characterizing such arguments as “shop worn” and without merit); Robnett v. United States, 165 B.R. 272, 274 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that tax protest issues are “completely without merit” and serve no purpose “except to clog the court’s dockets, waste judicial time and cause protracted delays in worthy litigation.”); United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that constitutional tax protest issues are “completely without merit, patently frivolous and will be rejected without expending any more of this Court’s resources on their discussion.”); United States v. Drefke, 707 F.2d 978, 981 (8th Cir. 1983) (contention that individuals have no duty to pay income taxes is “totally without arguable merit”); Maxwell v. I.R.S. 2009 WL 920533, *2 (M.D. Tenn. 2009) (argument that “no law exists which imposes an income tax” has been “routinely rejected”); Bonnaccorso v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 2005 WL 3241913, **1-2 (U.S. Tax. Ct. 2005) (argument that petitioner had found “no code section that made [him] liable for any income tax” had been “consistently rejected and characterized as frivolous in innumerable cases” and required no discussion).

[1] We note, parenthetically, that 26 U.S.C. § 1(a) imposes an income tax of "every" United States citizen and that, pursuant to § 1(a), 26 C.F.R. § 1.1-1(b) provides that "all citizens of the United States . . . are liable to the income taxes imposed by the Code . . ." .

In United States v. Drefke, 707 F.2d 978, 981 (8th Cir. 1983), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, in discussing section 6151, that “when a tax return is required to be filed, the person so required ‘shall’ pay such taxes to the internal revenue officer with whom the return is filed at the fixed time and place. The sections of the Internal Revenue Code imposed a duty on Drefke to file tax returns and pay the appropriate rate of income tax, a duty which he chose to ignore.

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/707/978/229711/

United States v Drefke et al, 707 F2d 978 (8th Cir 1983)

United States of America, Appellee, v. Paul M. Drefke, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Richard O. Jameson, Appellant, 707 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1983)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 707 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1983)

Submitted May 9, 1983.
Decided May 13, 1983.
Motion for Stay of Mandate Denied June 7, 1983

Richard O. Jameson, pro se.

Paul M. Drefke, pro se.

Robert G. Ulrich, U.S. Atty., David C. Jones, Asst. U.S. Atty., Springfield, Mo., for appellee.

Before BRIGHT, ROSS and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Paul Drefke and Richard Jameson were both convicted of failure to file income tax returns for the years 1979 and 1980 in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203 and for filing false withholding exemption certificates for the years 1979, 1980 and 1981 in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7205. They were arrested at the same time but tried separately before juries,[1] Jameson approximately two weeks after Drefke. Both were sentenced to two years in the custody of the Attorney General and placed on probation for three years. Because both raise a number of the same issues, we consider their appeals together. Both have filed lengthy pro se briefs with numerous attachments. We affirm all counts of both convictions.

Drefke and Jameson during calendar years 1979, 1980 and 1981 were employed by Roadway Express, Inc. in Strafford, Missouri. In 1979 Drefke had a gross income of $31,651.34 and in 1980 his gross income was $39,497.26. In 1979, Jameson had a gross income of $28,517.98, and in 1980 his gross income was $30,881.76. Both failed to file tax returns for these two years although they had previously filed tax returns for the years 1976, 1977 and 1978. In 1979, 1980 and 1981 Drefke and Jameson filed W-4 forms with their employer in which they claimed that they were exempt from federal income taxes and certified that they had not incurred a liability for federal income taxes in the preceding calendar year.

A five count indictment was returned against both men charging them with failing to file income tax returns for the two years[2] and of filing the three false withholding exemption certificates.[3] The separate trials resulted in the convictions of both Drefke and Jameson on all five counts.

Drefke and Jameson contend that 18 U.S.C. § 3231[4] does not confer jurisdiction on federal courts to try tax offenses. They argue that the general jurisdiction granted to federal courts in Sec. 3231 extends only to those federal crimes which appear in Title 18 of the United States Code. The argument is without merit.

In United States v. Spurgeon, 671 F.2d 1198 (8th Cir. 1982), we held that Sec. 3231 confers jurisdiction on district courts to try charges of failure to file income tax returns. Id. at 1199. Section 3231 grants federal courts jurisdiction over "all offenses against the laws of the United States" (emphasis added). Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution and the Sixteenth Amendment empower Congress to create and enforce an income tax. Pursuant to that power, Congress made federal crimes of certain actions aimed at avoiding payment of income tax. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7210. The district court, then, clearly had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 to try the appellants for the offenses of failure to file income tax returns and filing false withholding exemption certificates.

Drefke also charges that the district court "obstructed justice" by refusing to consider his jurisdictional challenge. This argument is frivolous, and can only be considered as advanced in bad faith because the district court reviewed and denied Drefke's jurisdictional motions in an order issued on April 2, 1982.

Drefke and Jameson both argue that they were denied an administrative hearing on jurisdiction in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. The Act does not impose a requirement of adversary hearings before an agency but only specifies the procedure to be followed when a hearing is required by another statute. Califano v. Saunders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S. Ct. 980, 51 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1977); Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1966). The Internal Revenue Code nowhere grants individuals who are under criminal investigation the right to a hearing to challenge the Service's jurisdiction over them. Therefore the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act cited by Drefke and Jameson are inapplicable.

Drefke argues that taxes are debts which can only be incurred voluntarily when individuals contract with the government for services and that those who choose to enter such contracts do so by signing 1040 and W-4 forms. By refusing to sign those forms, Drefke argues he is "immune" from the Internal Revenue Service's jurisdiction as a "nontaxpayer."

This is an imaginative argument, but totally without arguable merit. 26 U.S.C. § 1 imposes upon "every" individual a certain rate of income tax depending upon their amount of taxable income. 26 U.S.C. § 6012 states that unmarried individuals having a gross income in excess of $4,300, and married individuals entitled to make joint returns having a gross income in excess of $5,400 "shall" file tax returns for the taxable year. Considering Drefke's gross income for 1979 and 1980, he was clearly required to file tax returns for those years.

26 U.S.C. § 6151 states that when a tax return is required to be filed, the person so required "shall" pay such taxes to the internal revenue officer with whom the return is filed at the fixed time and place. The sections of the Internal Revenue Code imposed a duty on Drefke to file tax returns and pay the appropriate rate of income tax, a duty which he chose to ignore.

Jameson argued during voir dire that he would be prejudiced by media coverage of the trial of Paul Drefke. Drefke's trial, which ended two weeks before Jameson's commenced, received substantial media attention. The district court conducted a lengthy voir dire examination to insure an impartial jury, and identified those who knew about Drefke's trial and excluded those persons from the jury. Jameson requested and the district court denied separate written and oral voir dire of the seventy-one prospective jurors.

It is well established that decisions regarding the form and scope of voir dire examination are left largely to the discretion of the district court. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 528, 93 S. Ct. 848, 851, 35 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1973); United States v. Bowman, 602 F.2d 160 (8th Cir. 1979). Absent a finding of substantial prejudice or an abuse of discretion appellate courts will not disturb such decisions. United States v. Kershman, 555 F.2d 198 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 892, 98 S. Ct. 268, 54 L. Ed. 2d 178 (1977). No substantial prejudice or abuse of discretion occurred in the present case from the district court's failure to permit a separate voir dire.

Jameson further argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to quash the entire jury panel for prejudice. During voir dire one venireman, in response to the question whether he could be impartial, stated: "I feel that if the individual was a mature individual with an income, he had knowledge that he should by law file an income tax return." We do not believe that this isolated comment caused substantial prejudice to Jameson and the district court's denial of his motion to quash the panel was not an abuse of discretion.

Jameson argues that he was prejudiced by the district court's denial of several jury instructions including an instruction on "jury nullification," that would have told the jury that it had a right to ignore the court's instructions on the law in the case. He contends that the authors of the Bill of Rights intended the Sixth Amendment to incorporate such a right, and makes a lengthy argument based on historical precedents.

We have specifically held in other cases involving prosecutions under tax laws that there is no right to a jury nullification instruction. United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619, 627 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106, 107 (8th Cir. 1974). In Wiley we said, quoting earlier authority:

To encourage individuals to make their own determinations as to which laws they will obey and which they will permit themselves as a matter of conscience to disobey is to invite chaos. No legal system could long survive if it gave every individual the option of disregarding with impunity any law which by his personal standard was judged morally untenable.

503 F.2d at 107.

Since the Supreme Court's decision in Sparf and Hanson v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 15 S. Ct. 273, 39 L. Ed. 343 (1895), federal courts have uniformly recognized the right and duty of the judge to instruct the jury on the law and the jury's obligation to apply the law to the facts, and that nullification instructions should not be allowed. It would serve no useful purpose to examine the history of nullification instructions further,[5] or to engage in debate concerning the relationship between the general verdict and the court's instructions. The jury returned a general verdict against Jameson finding him guilty on all counts.

Jameson further argues that the district court erred in refusing to define the words "fraudulent" and "income". 26 U.S.C. § 7205 makes it a crime to supply "false" or "fraudulent" information.[6] The government proceeded under the theory that the withholding exemption certificates submitted were false and the term "false" was defined by the district court. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 uses the term "gross income" which was also defined by the district court in an instruction. Jameson's arguments that further definitions were required have no merit.

Drefke argues that 26 U.S.C. §§ 7203 and 7205 giving rise to his conviction constitute punishment for failure to give self-incriminating information. Both the Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit have held that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination does not authorize individuals to refuse to disclose information concerning their income. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 47 S. Ct. 607, 71 L. Ed. 1037 (1927); United States v. Russell, 585 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1978).

Drefke also argues that these sections violate the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition on involuntary servitude because they authorize imprisonment for nonpayment of debts. The Thirteenth Amendment, however, is inapplicable where involuntary servitude is imposed as punishment for a crime. Drefke was prosecuted and convicted for the violation of two federal offenses: failure to file income tax returns and filing false withholding exemption certificates.

Denying Jameson a non-jury trial was not error because the government refused to consent to Jameson's waiver of his right to a jury trial, as is required by Rule 23(a) of the Fed.R. of Crim.P.

Jameson argues that W-4 forms which he had signed in previous years and which were admitted into evidence against him were involuntary confessions. He contends that the district court violated 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (2) by failing to hold a hearing to determine whether these confessions were voluntary and admissible. It is evident that signed W-4 forms are not confessions and that 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) has no relevance to this case.

Jameson's argument that the assistant district attorney created prejudice by referring to him in argument as "Mr. Drefke" is without merit. The attorney stated the occurrence was purely accidental and the reference to Drefke was insignificant because no member of the jury had knowledge of Drefke's trial.

Drefke has submitted over 240 pages of documents in addition to his brief and reply brief, which are labeled exhibits, addendums and supplements. Some of these additional documents are affidavits, earlier prepared petitions or briefs, a lengthy written report concerning jurisdiction to try criminal sanctions in the Internal Revenue Code, and some material that is simply additional argument. Jameson likewise has filed supplemental materials substantially in excess of the brief limitations and which similarly contain affidavits, newspaper articles and written statements of position. Some of the documents evidently were prepared by an information service. There is no showing that these particular items were before the district court. Justice Blackmun, then a Judge of this Court, rejected consideration of affidavits contained in the appendix of a brief in Stearns v. Hertz Corp., 326 F.2d 405, 408 (8th Cir. 1964) and stated:

Plaintiffs' attempt to buttress their statutory purpose argument with a state legislator's affidavit produced for the first time in an appendix to their appellate reply brief is of no consequence. In addition to serious questions of admissibility and of persuasiveness, [citations omitted] the affidavit is not to be considered here because it was not presented to the trial court. The appeal is to be determined upon the record below. Watson v. Rhode Island Ins. Co., 196 F.2d 254, 256 (5 Cir. 1952).

Drefke argues that Rule 28(j) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure supports this filing. We interpret this rule to permit parties briefly to inform the court in a letter of pertinent authorities that have come to their attention after their briefs have been submitted. We do not read the rule to authorize the filing of lengthy printed or specially prepared materials such as both Drefke and Jameson have attempted to do in this case. As we must review the case on the record of the district court, these items may not be considered by the court.

We have considered these and all other allegations of error made in Jameson's and Drefke's pro se briefs. It is apparent that Jameson and Drefke have gone to great lengths to study a mass of materials that they believe relates to the tax laws, criminal procedures and constitutional rights. From perusing the materials attached to and filed with the briefs discussed in VIII, this was at best a wellspring of misinformation. Both had a substantial income and under misguided interpretation of the law chose not to assume the burden that is imposed on all of our citizens. Finding no error, we affirm their convictions on all counts.

ON MOTION FOR STAY OF MANDATE

Appellant Paul M. Drefke moves for a stay of mandate to permit application to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari and moves for release pending issuance of the court's mandate.

This court's opinion affirming Drefke's conviction was filed May 13, 1983. The record reveals that the United States District Attorney filed a motion to revoke bail at approximately 11:00 a.m., May 13, 1983, on the ground that Drefke's appeal is frivolous and taken for the purpose of delay, relying on 18 U.S.C. § 3148. The district court entered an order revoking bail, effective at 3:00 p.m. on May 13, 1983, upon motion of the United States "and for good cause shown." Drefke's motion recites that at approximately 4:00 p.m., May 13, 1983, he was arrested and incarcerated.

Our opinion plainly stated that at least two of the grounds asserted in the appeal by Drefke and co-appellant, Richard O. Jameson, were frivolous or without arguable merit. The opinion demonstrates that all of the issues raised were not only without merit, but without arguable merit, and thus legally frivolous. The order of the district court based on the motion that the appeal was frivolous and taken for delay was fully justified.

Even though the filing of the notice of appeal transferred jurisdiction of this case from the district court to the court of appeals, the district judge retains jurisdiction over a defendant for the limited purpose of reviewing, altering or amending the conditions under which that court released the defendant. The district court is empowered to revoke or forfeit the defendant's bond during pendency of an appeal for any of the reasons which would have supported an initial denial of the defendant's application for release. United States v. Black, 543 F.2d 35, 37 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Elkins, 683 F.2d 143, 145 (6th Cir. 1982).

The issues in the appeal presented to this court were frivolous and issues that may be raised in a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court are also frivolous, and will be taken only for the purpose of delay.

Accordingly, the motion to stay mandate is denied, the order of the district court revoking bail is affirmed, and the motion for release pending issuance of mandate is denied.

[1] Before the Honorable Russell G. Clark, Chief Judge, Western District of Missouri

[2] In violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203 which provides:

Any person required under this title ... to make a return, ... who willfully fails to make such return, ... shall ... be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both, together with costs of prosecution.

[3] In violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7205 which provides:

Any individual required to supply information to his employer ... who willfully supplies false or fraudulent information ... shall ... upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

[4] Section 3231 provides:

The district court of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the states, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.

[5] An exhaustive discussion is contained in United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969) involving the trial of the Vietnam War protestors. The problems attendant on the use of nullification instructions in cases tried pro se was discussed in United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1972)

[6] See note 2 supra

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

Saying 26 CFR § 601.103, harumphhh, does not create an exemption from the income tax mandated by Federal statute.

26 C.F.R. PART 601--STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL RULES

TITLE 26--Internal Revenue

CHAPTER I--INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

SUBCHAPTER H--INTERNAL REVENUE PRACTICE

https://law.justia.com/cfr/title26/26-20.0.1.1.2.1.2.3.html

26 C.F.R. § 601.103

Summary of general tax procedure.

Title 26 - Internal Revenue

PART 601—STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL RULES

Subpart A—General Procedural Rules

§ 601.103 Summary of general tax procedure.

(a) Collection procedure. The Federal tax system is basically one of self-assessment. In general each taxpayer (or person required to collect and pay over the tax) is required to file a prescribed form of return which shows the facts upon which tax liability may be determined and assessed. Generally, the taxpayer must compute the tax due on the return and make payment thereof on or before the due date for filing the return. If the taxpayer fails to pay the tax when due, the district director of internal revenue, or the director of the regional service center after assessment issues a notice and demands payment within 10 days from the date of the notice. In the case of wage earners, annuitants, pensioners, and nonresident aliens, the income tax is collected in large part through withholding at the source. Another means of collecting the income tax is through payments of estimated tax which are required by law to be paid by certain individual and corporate taxpayers. Neither withholding nor payments of estimated tax relieves a taxpayer from the duty of filing a return otherwise required. Certain excise taxes are collected by the sale of internal revenue stamps.

[...]

Says the guy who makes up stories about mice and lizards rising from the dead.

He knows the law. This is about the law, not mice and lizards.

Are you saying too that this here source: www.loc.gov/item/uscode1988-001000002/ is bullshit? Cause this is where Meador got his information from and embellished upon it on his own website. The reason why I mention this link is because in one of my post on this thread, I had mentioned that if you desire to change the laws, you start with the removal of the fringed flag that sits in the courtroom. I I referenced a link concerning that. You see, in our society, we don't use words as much as we do symbols. And in a courtroom setting a fringed flag is a specific symbol which tells us everything we should know before crossing the bar in that room. It has no business being in any courtroom setting at all nor a church or school. However, to my dismay I have witnessed this flag in just about every indoor setting. Meador mentioned this in his essay of flag etiquette and law.

Yes, convicted felon Meador and your link to convicted felon Meador are bullshit. Meador was not only a tax fraud, he was enshrined in the Quatloos Hall of Shame for his shameful efforts. He reached the pinnacle of achievement at being an asshole.

I quoted the U.S. Supreme Court stating, The Federal tax system is basically one of self-assessment," whereby each taxpayer computes the tax due and then files the appropriate form of return along with the requisite payment. 26 CFR § 601.103(a) (2003). They do not seem overly impressed with Meador's bullshit about 26 CFR § 601.103(a). I also provided you a quote of the whole section. You have proceeded to make no legal point, just harumph.

The cited flag law does not prohibit a fringe and contains no penalty for anything. An official opinion of the Attorney General and multiple court opinions have upheld the use of the gold fringe.

From a tax lawyer, Dan Evans:

https://evans-legal.com/dan/tpfaq.html#flagfringes

If the flag of the United States that is in the courtroom has a gold fringe, then the court is operating under martial law.

There is actually some interesting history behind this nonsense.

There is a federal statute that defines the American flag as thirteen horizontal stripes, alternate red and white, with a “union” of a blue field with one white star for each state. 4 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2. The statutory definition says nothing about any kind of fringe of the kind often used on ceremonial flags displayed indoors, and at some point someone in the military wondered whether a flag with a fringe was “legal.” In 1925, the Attorney General issued an opinion that a fringe “does not appear to be regarded as an integral part of the Flag, and its presence cannot be said to constitute an unauthorized addition to the design prescribed by statute,” concluding that “The presence, therefore, of a fringe on military colors and standards does not violate any existing Act of Congress. Its use or disuse is a matter of practical policy, to be determined, in the absence of statute, by the Commander in Chief....” 34 Op. Atty. Gen. 483 (May 15, 1925).

Perhaps you can see where this is going? Because the Attorney General expressed the opinion that the President as Commander-in-Chief can put a fringe on military flags, tax protesters have leapt to the conclusion that all flags with fringes are military flags. This idea has been flatly rejected in numerous court decisions. See, e.g., McCann v. Greenway, 952 F. Supp. 647 (W.D. Mo. 1997); United States v. Greenstreet, 912 F.Supp. 224, 229 (N.D.Tex.1996) (“To think that a fringed flag adorning the courtroom somehow limits this Court’s jurisdiction is frivolous.”); Vella v. McCammon, 671 F.Supp. 1128, 1129 (S.D.Tex.1987) (rejecting argument that a federal court lacks jurisdiction to impose penalties for civil and criminal contempt because its flag is fringed); Commonwealth v. Appel, 438 Pa.Super. 214, 652 A.2d 341, 343 (1994) (rejecting argument that a fringed flag in a state courtroom conferred on the court admiralty or maritime jurisdiction).

In Leverenz v. Torluemlu, 1996 WL 272538, at *1 & n. 3 (N.D.Ill. May 20, 1996), the court noted that the complaint named as defendants a judge, a state attorney general, a doctor, several police officers from different communities, and 600 unnamed John and Jane Does and that “[s]ome idea of what is to come is provided by this legend that Leverenz attaches to his ‘Complaint’ heading: “This case is under the jurisdiction of the American flag of peace of the United States of America. No flags of war will serve this case jurisdiction.” (In National Auto. Dealers & Assocs. Retirement Trust v. Arbeitman, 89 F.3d 496, 502 (8th Cir.1996), a later motion in the Leverenz case was described as “bizarre.”)

Try again.

As for Dan Meador's works, I still stand with what he has relayed to the public. Many people have elected to judge him for his literal works just as they did Irwin Schiff in his works, The Federal Mafia.

I find it interesting that in one of your threads you had posted about the recent ruling by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (this may not be your link you posted) www.texastribune.org/2019...idual-mandate-obamacare/, that the IRS, had been collecting penalty fees all this time knowing this was indeed unconstitutional. This truly exposes the scam both from the United States government in their unlawful mandates but also makes the IRS vulnerable to a lawsuit as well. And it confirms why I posted that link from the Library of Congress concerning the lawful nature of the Title 50 Table of Contents and which are positive law and others that are not.

It is simply silly.

[goldilucky #148]

As for Dan Meador's works, I still stand with what he has relayed to the public. Many people have elected to judge him for his literal works just as they did Irwin Schiff in his works, The Federal Mafia.

I find it interesting that in one of your threads you had posted about the recent ruling by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (this may not be your link you posted) www.texastribune.org/2019...idual-mandate-obamacare/, that the IRS, had been collecting penalty fees all this time knowing this was indeed unconstitutional. This truly exposes the scam both from the United States government in their unlawful mandates but also makes the IRS vulnerable to a lawsuit as well. And it confirms why I posted that link from the Library of Congress concerning the lawful nature of the Title 50 Table of Contents and which are positive law and others that are not.

Do you have any legal experts who are not convicted felons, or is that all you've got?

When cornered for being the rat bastard that he was, Irwin Schiff attempted to plead mental ilness, a delusional disorder. For shoveling this Shiff shit on this board, do you also claim your behavior is the result of your delusional disorder, or do you have a different excuse?

Dr. Ortega hospitalized him in October 2003 for depression and “high risk for suicide.” Dr. Ortega’s professional opinion was as follows:

“In my professional opinion I felt that the patient did not pay taxes because he was convinced that the law does not require him to do so. I think this is a delusional disorder.

[...]

His mental illness makes it “almost impossible… to persuade him he is wrong.” His opinions and thus his conduct is “driven by his mental illness.” Hayes Report, P. 6-7. According to Dr. Ortega he suffers from a “delusional disorder” which has convinced him “that the law does not require him to pay taxes.” Ortega Report, P. 4. Dr. Barry states that Schiff’s “belief system is not under voluntary control.” He has “little or no ability to alter his beliefs.” “Mr. Schiff’s behavior is not rational.” His conduct “is the product of a Delusional Personality Disorder.” Barry Report, P. 2.

Todd M. Leventhal
600 South Third Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
702 384 1990

Michael B. Nash
53 West Jackson Blvd.
Suite 620
Chicago, Illinois
312 236 8788
Counsel for Defendant
Irwin A. Schiff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
IRWIN A. SCHIFF

CR-S-04-119-KJD(LRL)

SCHIFF’S MOTION FOR DOWNWARD DEPARTURE

Defendant Irwin A. Schiff respectfully moves this Court for a downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13. It states as follows:

“A downward departure may be warranted if (1) the defendant committed the offense while suffering from a b>significantly reduced mental capacity[/b]; and (2) the significantly reduced mental capacity contributed substantially to the commission of the offense. Similarly, if a departure is warranted under this police statement, the extent of the departure should reflect the extent to which the reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense.”

The Application Note defines “significantly reduced mental capacity.”

“‘Significantly reduced mental capacity’ means the defendant, although convicted, has a significantly impaired ability to (A) understand the wrongfulness of the behavior comprising the offense or to exercise the power of reason; or (B) control behavior that the defendant knows is wrongful” U.S.S.G § 5K2.13, Application Note 1

The burden is on the defendant to establish that he committed the offense while suffering from a reduced mental capacity, and that it contributed substantially to the commission of the offense. This is not a “but for” test. “(T)he policy statement rejects such a broad basis for departure by explicitly requiring that the defendant‘s reduced capacity merely ‘contribute to’ the offense.” United States v. Leandre, 132 F.3 796,803 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1515 (9th Cir. 1993) the Ninth Circuit noted that the other circuits which had addressed this issue were “unanimous in holding that the disorder need be only a contributing cause, not a but-for cause or sole cause” and it, therefore, “adopt(ed) this commonsense holding.”

There are two issues to examine. The first is whether defendant suffered from a significantly reduced mental capacity. The second is whether that reduced mental capacity contributed substantially to the commission of the offense. The answers to both questions are contained in the reports of Dr. Daniel S. Hayes, Ph.D., L.L.C. Clinical Psychologist, 2199 Ironwood Center Drive, Coeur d’Alene, ID 83814, Dr. Cynthia Barry, Ph.D. Licensed Psychologist PSY 10826, 1066 Saratoga Avenue Ste 100, San Jose, California 95129 and Dr. Luis Carlos Ortega, MD, Valley Hospital and Medical Center, 620 Shadow Lane, Las Vegas, NV 89106, which have previously been supplied to the Court.

Dr. Ortega hospitalized him in October 2003 for depression and “high risk for suicide.” Dr. Ortega’s professional opinion was as follows:

“In my professional opinion I felt that the patient did not pay taxes because he was convinced that the law does not require him to do so. I think this is a delusional disorder. He has this thing for a long time but no medication seems to make him believe otherwise.” Ortega Report, P.4.

Dr. Barry examined Schiff on January 6, 2004 at the request of his then attorney William A. Cohen. Her diagnosis was that Dr. Ortega was correct in concluding that Schiff suffered from Bipolar Disorder. She also stated that he suffered from Delusional Personality Disorder and an “Axis II personality disorder.” Her professional opinion was as follows:

“In my opinion, and in the history detailed above, Mr. Schiff’s distorted beliefs appear to have grown out of the stress of his business failures and his first, undiagnosed manic episode. However, once developed, these delusional beliefs have carried forward quite separate from the state of his bipolar mood swings and the impact of psychiatric medication. With very high probability they will continue unabated in the future. There is a significant element of paranoia in his MMPI protocol; however, he is extremely constricted emotionally so that underlying anger does not surface. His pseudo-rational belief system is confined to one area and this is no disorganization of thought. Further, it does not appear to originate from anti-social tendencies. However, the belief system is not under voluntary control. Individuals suffering from Delusional Disorder have little or no ability to alter their beliefs. Mr. Schiff acknowledges that even his two sons have advised him to pay his taxes and avoid the negative consequences. However, he states that he cannot do so because ‘I cannot pay what I do not owe.’ This despite the fact, that he recently experienced a suicidal depression serious enough to require hospitalization (related in part to recognition of a probable prison sentence if he is found guilty of the current charges.) In short, Mr. Schiff’s behavior is not rational. It is likely the product of a Delusional Personality Disorder that is not amenable to treatment and is unlikely to remit.” Barry Report, P. 2

Dr. Hayes examined Schiff on February 18, 2005 for six (6) hours at the request of Magistrate Judge Lawrence R. Leavitt, District of Nevada. The examination was “to provide an opinion regarding his (Schiff’s) competency to stand trial and desire to represent himself during that trial.” Hayes Report, P. 1. Dr. Hayes’ report gives a brief history of Schiff’s mental health history and Schiff’s version of his history with the Internal Revenue Service. Dr. Hayes concluded his narrative quoting Schiff as follows: “‘If I lose now, I’ll spend the rest of my life in jail.’

He is absolutely sure and confident that he will win this time because he will not ‘make the same mistakes… I know the law. I don’t need it interpreted to me. Why would I mislead my family and everyone else?.... I know I have a tiger by that tail and I have to beat them at this point…. I can’t pretend I don’t know this. It’s not right what they’re doing to the American people.” Hayes Report, P. 3.

Although Dr. Hayes noted that it was not within the scope of his evaluation “to formally assess Mr. Schiff’s cognitive capacity,” he noted that Schiff’s “cognitive functioning appeared to be impacted by what appeared to be a mood disorder, affecting his ability to attend and sustain concentration and focus outside his areas of preoccupation.” Hayes Report, P. 4.

Dr. Hayes’ report clearly established that Schiff suffered from a “significantly reduced mental capacity” and that it contributed substantially to these offenses. He reviewed Dr. Ortega’s and Dr Barry’s diagnosis and concluded that Schiff suffers from “Bipolar II Disorder, with recurrent major episodes and hypomanic episodes, without full inter-episode recovery.” Hayes Report, P. 7. In reaching this conclusion Dr. Hayes stated that Schiff’s beliefs regarding taxation set him “apart from the average individual” and that to a certain degree “Mr. Schiff’s focus on this topic (is) being driven by his mental illness.” Hayes Report, P. 7. The basis for Dr. Hayes’ conclusion are “the years he (Schiff) has devoted to this subject area, the research and documentation he believes to be in support of his beliefs, and the commitment and passion with which he hold his beliefs to be true.” Hayes Report, P. 6.

“He appears to have extremely rigid, fixed, inflexible, doggedly determined opinions and beliefs that cannot be changed by others’ reasoning. And, in his case, even punishment has not had a corrective impact in his thinking or behaviors. He appears impervious to any suggestions that he reconsider his conclusions or his actions, in part because of the thorough research he has conducted which has yielded evidence and facts to support his conclusions, coupled with the fact that he considers himself to be an “expert” with knowledge that supersedes that of any other individual claiming to have expertise in this subject area. Most people have beliefs that have a greater degree of flexibility and openness to change that does Mr. Schiff. Although some may have beliefs that parallel Mr. Schiff’s, they differ from him in that they are unwilling to jeopardize their freedom and suffer the consequences of their beliefs to the degree that Mr. Schiff has. As a result, it would be almost impossible at this point in his life to persuade him that he is wrong, particularly since he feels that there are few, if any, individuals who could match the breadth and depth of knowledge he appears to have as a result of the time, effort, focus, and intellect he has devoted to the subject. Any arguments against him are likely to be seen by him as naïve and sophomoric, and he is likely to dismantle any such arguments quickly and handily by quick reference to materials his opponent is unlikely to have at the ready for consideration and rebuttal.” Hayes Report, P. 6-7.

The purpose of 5K2.13 is to treat with “lenity” a defendant whose mental illness contributes to his offense. “The defendant’s mental condition and the circumstances of the offense must be undertaken ‘with a view of lenity, as section 5K2.13 implicitly recommends.’” United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1511 (9th Cir. 1993), quoting United States v. Chapman, 986 F.2 1446 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Cantu stated that lenity is appropriate because the purpose of 5K2.13 is to treat with “compassion” those with a reduced mental capacity which contributed to their offense. United States v. Cantu, at 1511. See also United States v. Leandre, at 804-805. According to Judge Orlofsky in United States v. Checoura, 176 F Supp 310, 315, (D.C. N.J., 2005) 5K2.13 is an “encouraged departure.” The lynchpin is a defendant’s ability to reason and process information and to voluntarily form the intent to act in a criminal manner. United States v. Withers, 100 F.3 1142, 1148 (4th Cir. 1996). The basis for 5K2.13 is the inability of an individual to fully understand ordinary concepts which others are able to grasp. It is a lack of “full intellectual functioning” or the ability to make “reasoned judgments.” United States v. Cantu, at 1512-1513.

As noted by Dr. Hayes, Schiff’s conduct was a result of extremely rigid, fixed, inflexible doggedly determined opinions and beliefs that cannot be changed by others’ reasoning.” He is “impervious to any suggestions.” His mental illness makes it “almost impossible… to persuade him he is wrong.” His opinions and thus his conduct is “driven by his mental illness.” Hayes Report, P. 6-7. According to Dr. Ortega he suffers from a “delusional disorder” which has convinced him “that the law does not require him to pay taxes.” Ortega Report, P. 4. Dr. Barry states that Schiff’s “belief system is not under voluntary control.” He has “little or no ability to alter his beliefs.” “Mr. Schiff’s behavior is not rational.” His conduct “is the product of a Delusional Personality Disorder.” Barry Report, P. 2. In United States v. Weedle, 30 F.3 532, 540 (4th Cir. 1994) the Fourth Circuit stated explicitly that “U.S.S.G § 5K2.13 is intended to create lenity for those who cannot control their actions but are not actually dangerous.” In United States v. Leandre, the court spoke of “the obligation to treat with lenity defendants who suffer significantly reduced mental capacity.” United States v. Leandre, at 804. In doing so the Leandre court cited United States v. Cantu, a Ninth Circuit case, in which the court stated “(t)he goal of the guideline is lenity toward defendants whose ability to make reasoned decisions is impaired.” United States v. Cantu, at 1511.

There is a very practical side of this section of the Guidelines. Judge Easterbrook in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991) noted that legal sanctions are ineffective in dealing with persons suffering from mental illness. When “a disturbed person’s conduct is non-violent… incapacitation incarceration is less important.” United States v. Poff, at 595. In other words, “the power of specific deterence has little hold over an individual defendant whose conduct is somewhat involuntary.” United States v. Cheroura, at 314.

Schiff’s mental illness is significant and clearly contributed to his commission of the offenses here. Three reputable doctors have stated so unequivocally, one of whom was engaged by the Court. A downward departure is not only appropriate here; to do otherwise is to ignore the mandate of the guidelines.

Respectfully Submitted,

s/Michael B. Nash

Michael B. Nash
53 West Jackson Blvd.
Suite 620
Chicago, IL 60604
(312) 236-8788

As for Dan Meador's works, I still stand with what he has relayed to the public. Many people have elected to judge him for his literal works just as they did Irwin Schiff in his works, The Federal Mafia.

Irwin Schiff, another convicted felon dirtbag enshrined in the Quatloos Hall of Shame.

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/919/830/337866

Irwin A SCHIFF v United States, 919 F2d 830 (2nd Cir, 1990)

Irwin A. Schiff, Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee, 919 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1990)

US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 919 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1990)

Argued Nov. 13, 1990. Decided Nov. 21, 1990

Irwin A. Schiff, New York City, pro se.

Joel A. Rabinovitz, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Stanley A. Twardy, Jr., U.S. Atty., Hartford, Conn., Shirley D. Peterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gary A. Allen, and Ann B. Durney, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., on the brief), for appellee U.S.

Before FEINBERG, TIMBERS and MINER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Irwin A. Schiff appeals from a summary judgment entered September 13, 1989, in the District of Connecticut, Warren W. Eginton, District Judge, in favor of appellee United States in an action commenced by Schiff challenging the assessment and collection of income tax deficiencies owed for the years 1976 through 1978 and penalties imposed.

On appeal, Schiff contends that (1) the tax was collected in violation of the taxing and due process clauses of the Constitution; (2) the tax deficiencies were not properly assessed and collected; (3) the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of civil fraud penalties; and (4) the district judge erred in failing to recuse himself since he ruled against Schiff in a previous case. The government seeks costs and damages for a frivolous appeal.

For the reasons that follow, since we agree with the district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact, we affirm the summary judgment of the district court and impose sanctions on Schiff for bringing a frivolous appeal.

We shall summarize only those facts and prior proceedings believed necessary to an understanding of the issues raised on appeal.

Schiff is no stranger to this court. This is another in a series of cases involving Schiff's refusal to pay income taxes. E.g., United States v. Schiff, 876 F.2d 272 (2 Cir. 1989); United States v. Schiff, 801 F.2d 108 (2 Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 945 (1987); Schiff v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 780 F.2d 210 (2 Cir. 1985); Schiff v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 766 F.2d 61 (2 Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Schiff v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 116 (2 Cir. 1984) (per curiam); United States v. Schiff, 647 F.2d 163 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981); United States v. Schiff, 612 F.2d 73 (2 Cir. 1979). The instant appeal arises from Schiff's failure to pay income taxes for the years 1976 through 1978.

Schiff filed no tax returns at all for the years 1977 and 1978. In April 1977, Schiff did file a Form 1040 with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for the year 1976. That form set forth his name, address and social security number. He did not provide financial information in the relevant portions of the return, but instead placed asterisks in the columns and typed in the margin "I DO NOT UNDERSTAND THIS RETURN NOR THE LAWS THAT MAY APPLY TO ME. THIS MEANS THAT I TAKE SPECIFIC OBJECTION UNDER THE 4th or 5th AMENDMENTS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION TO THE SPECIFIC QUESTION." On page two of the return, Schiff also placed asterisks in the columns and typed at the bottom "THIS MEANS THAT SPECIFIC OBJECTION IS TAKEN TO THE SPECIFIC QUESTION ON THE GROUNDS OF THE 4th AND 5th AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION."

Schiff attached a letter to his Form 1040 addressed to the District Director of the IRS. That letter stated that Schiff had received federal reserve notes in 1976, which he distinguished from taxable dollars. Schiff concluded that federal reserve notes were worthless since he could exchange them only for other federal reserve notes, but not for gold or silver. In support of his contention that federal reserve notes are not dollars, Schiff attached a letter from Russell L. Munk, Assistant General Counsel of the Department of the Treasury, that so stated. That letter also stated that the fact that federal reserve notes could not be exchanged for gold or silver did not render them worthless. The letter concluded by warning Schiff that "there is no legal basis for an arguement [sic] that a taxpayer need not file a return of his income, expressed in dollars, on the ground that Federal Reserve Notes are not 'dollars'...."

On December 2, 1982, the IRS sent Schiff a notice of deficiency with explanations for the years 1976 through 1978. Although the notice informed Schiff of his right of review, Schiff did not challenge those determinations in the Tax Court. Accordingly, on April 1, 1983, the IRS assessed deficiencies in tax plus interest and penalties for failure to pay estimated taxes and for fraud for the years 1976 through 1978. Schiff was notified of the assessments by IRS Form 3552. He was assessed a total of $41,837.35 for 1976, $39,760.99 for 1977, and $110,247.89 for 1978. The form notified Schiff that payment was due within ten days. On April 18, 1983, having received no response from Schiff, the IRS sent him a final notice stating that enforcement action would be taken if he did not make payment within ten days.

Schiff did not satisfy the tax deficiency. The IRS therefore levied on royalties owed to him by Simon & Schuster, the publisher of a book he wrote entitled "How Anyone Can Stop Paying Income Taxes." Schiff's attempt to stop the IRS collection effort failed. Schiff v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 780 F.2d 210 (2 Cir. 1985).

On May 11, 1985, Schiff filed claims for refunds of the amounts the IRS had collected for the years 1976 through 1978. The IRS denied those claims. Schiff commenced the instant action on October 9, 1986, seeking refunds for the years in question. On April 20, 1989, Schiff moved for summary judgment. The government filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on June 12, 1989. On September 6, 1989, the district court granted the government's cross-motion for summary judgment. Judgment was entered on September 13, 1989. Schiff filed two subsequent motions for reconsideration. Both were denied.

This appeal followed.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. EAD Metallurgical, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 905 F.2d 8, 10 (2 Cir. 1990). Summary judgment is proper when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Since summary judgment was granted in favor of the government, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to Schiff. E.g., EAD Metallurgical, supra, 905 F.2d at 10.

With the foregoing in mind, we turn to the merits of Schiff's appeal. We hold that all of his claims are completely lacking in merit.

Initially, Schiff's contentions that the imposition of a validly enacted income tax by Congress violates the taxing clauses of the Constitution have been rejected previously. E.g., Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1916); Schiff v. Commissioner, supra, 751 F.2d at 117; Ficalora v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 85, 87 (2 Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1005 (1985).

Schiff's due process claim likewise is frivolous. He contends that the assessments amounted to a taking of property without due process. The notice of deficiency sent to Schiff clearly informed him of his right to appeal to the Tax Court. Such an appeal would have provided Schiff with an opportunity to be heard and to contest the IRS' calculations. Schiff chose not to avail himself of that opportunity.

We turn next to Schiff's claims regarding the propriety of the IRS' assessments. First, Schiff contends that since 26 U.S.C. § 6201(a) (1) (1988) requires that assessments be made from returns or lists, the IRS must prepare a substitute return pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6020(b) (1988) prior to assessing deficient taxes. It is clear, however, that when a taxpayer does not file a tax return, it is as if he filed a return showing a zero amount for purposes of assessing a deficiency. There is no requirement that the IRS complete a substitute return. Roat v. Commissioner, 847 F.2d 1379, 1381 (9 Cir. 1988); 26 C.F.R. Sec. 301.6211-1(a) (1990); see also Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 174 (1976) ("Where there has been no tax return filed, the deficiency is the amount of tax due").

Schiff also contends that the IRS must use Form 17 to provide notice of a deficiency and make a demand for payment. The Secretary of the Treasury is required to provide notice of a deficiency and make a demand for payment within 60 days of an assessment. 26 U.S.C. § 6303(a) (1988). In the instant case, the IRS gave timely notice to Schiff, using Form 3552. That form clearly stated the amount due and that payment must be made within 10 days. There is no requirement that the Secretary use a specific form to provide notice of a deficiency to a taxpayer. Planned Inv., Inc. v. United States, 881 F.2d 340, 343-44 (6 Cir. 1989).

Schiff further contends that the assessment against him for taxes owed for the year 1976 was barred by the statute of limitations. Generally, an assessment must be made within three years of the filing of a tax return. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(a) (1988). When no return is filed, however, an assessment may be made at any time. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(c) (3) (1988). Schiff's tax return for 1976 set forth no financial information at all. For statute of limitations purposes, such a return is treated as if no return was filed. Morgan v. Commissioner, 807 F.2d 81, 82 (6 Cir. 1986).

In short, we find no merit whatsoever in any of Schiff's claims with respect to the propriety of the IRS' assessments and their collection.

We turn next to Schiff's contention that the district court erred in granting summary judgment with respect to the imposition of civil fraud penalties. He contends that the imposition of such a penalty cannot be based solely on his failure to file a tax return. Stoltzfus v. United States, 398 F.2d 1002, 1005 (3 Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1020 (1969).

The fraud penalty can be imposed if the Commissioner proves "by clear and convincing evidence that taxpayers acted with an intent to evade paying taxes." Douge v. Commissioner, 899 F.2d 164, 168 (2 Cir. 1990). Fraud can be proved by circumstantial evidence. Id. "Such evidence may include (1) consistent and substantial understatement of income, (2) failure to maintain adequate records, (3) failure to cooperate with an IRS investigation, (4) inconsistent or implausible explanations of behavior and (5) awareness of the obligation to file returns, report income and pay taxes." Id.

The frivolous nature of this appeal is perhaps best illustrated by our conclusion that Schiff is precisely the sort of taxpayer upon whom a fraud penalty for failure to pay income taxes should be imposed. It is an understatement to say that Schiff has consistently and substantially under reported his income. The fact is that "he has not filed tax returns since 1973." Schiff v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., supra, 780 F.2d at 211.

A brief review of Schiff's history in this court provides substantial support for our holding that his failure to file tax returns for the years 1976 through 1978 was a fraudulent attempt to evade taxes. He was convicted of willfully failing to file tax returns for the years 1974 and 1975. We affirmed that conviction without opinion, United States v. Schiff, supra, 647 F.2d 163, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 454 U.S. 835. In addition, tax deficiencies and civil penalties were assessed against Schiff for his failure to file tax returns for those years. Schiff v. Commissioner, supra, 751 F.2d at 117. Schiff also was convicted of attempted tax evasion for the years 1980 through 1982 and for failing to file a corporate income tax return for the year 1981, United States v. Schiff, supra, 801 F.2d 108, and again the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 480 U.S. 945. Moreover, Schiff's background makes it inconceivable that he was unaware of his obligation to file returns and pay taxes. In light of Schiff's repeated attempts to evade his obligation to pay income taxes, we hold that summary judgment was justified on the issue of whether civil fraud penalties were properly assessed because of his failure to file returns for the years 1976 through 1978.

We hold that there was no genuine issue of material fact to preclude the district court from granting summary judgment in favor of the government.

This brings us to Schiff's contention that the district judge erred in failing to recuse himself. Schiff contends that the judge should have recused himself since he ruled against Schiff in Schiff's attempt to prevent Simon & Schuster from cooperating in the IRS attachment proceeding. This contention is totally lacking in merit. Prior adverse rulings "without more, ... do not provide a reasonable basis for questioning a judge's impartiality." United States v. Wolfson, 558 F.2d 59, 64 (2 Cir. 1977). There is nothing in the record to suggest that the judge was unable to render an unbiased decision. Indeed, were we to adopt the bright line rule that Schiff suggests, litigious individuals might run out of judges before whom their cases could be heard.

We hold that the district judge did not err in deciding not to recuse himself.

Having held that Schiff's contentions are frivolous, we turn now to the matter of sanctions. We do not undertake lightly a decision to impose sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 38. However, " [r]eady as we are to protect and enforce [a litigant's] rights, we must be equally willing to employ lawful sanctions as a means of preventing needless waste of the court's time and resources." Acevedo v. INS, 538 F.2d 918, 920 (2 Cir. 1976) (per curiam).

As demonstrated above, we repeatedly have rejected Schiff's attacks on the tax system, which he has raised in this Court on numerous occasions. Indeed, we imposed sanctions on Schiff for asserting, on his appeal from the assessment of tax deficiencies resulting from his failure to pay income taxes for the years 1974 and 1975, issues very similar to the ones raised on the instant appeal. Schiff v. Commissioner, supra, 751 F.2d at 117. Moreover, we previously have described Schiff as "an extremist who reserve [s] the right to interpret the decisions of the Supreme Court as he read [s] them from his layman's point of view regardless of and oblivious to the interpretations of the judiciary." United States v. Schiff, supra, 612 F.2d at 75.

We conclude that the instant appeal is yet another in a series of frivolous appeals brought by Schiff "to make public his radical views on tax reform." Schiff v. Commissioner, supra, 751 F.2d at 117. We cannot countenance Schiff's continued resort to this Court to "rehash ... his basic thesis: [that] he does not have to pay taxes." United States v. Schiff, supra, 876 F.2d at 275. "The payment of income taxes is not optional ... and the average citizen knows that the payment of income taxes is legally required." Id. (citations omitted).

The imposition of sanctions against litigants who continuously abuse the appellate process is justified. E.g., In re Hartford Textile Corp., 681 F.2d 895, 897 (2 Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983); In re Hartford Textile Corp., 659 F.2d 299, 303-06 (2 Cir. 1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982); Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 605 F.2d 35, 40 n. 5 (2 Cir. 1979). We hold that " 'the situation here is one of those "highly unusual" instances which permit the imposition of sanctions under Rule 38 because of "a clear showing of bad faith".' " In re Hartford Textile Corp., supra, 659 F.2d at 305 (citation omitted). We order that double costs in this Court and $5,000 damages be awarded against Schiff, to be paid to the United States.

"To make the sanction effective and thereby protect the processes of a court from abuse, a litigant against whom Rule 38 sanctions have been imposed must comply with those sanctions before being permitted to pursue new matters in that court." Schiff v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., supra, 766 F.2d at 62 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, we further order that the clerk of this Court shall not accept any more papers from Schiff for filing except upon proof of payment of the above sanction. E.g., In re Martin-Trigona, 795 F.2d 9, 12 (2 Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Johl v. Johl, 788 F.2d 75, 76 (2 Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 858 (1986); Schiff v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., supra, 766 F.2d at 62; In re Hartford Textile Corp., supra, 681 F.2d at 897-98. This prohibition against further filings does not apply to any petition for rehearing, petition for rehearing en banc, or petition for certiorari—in this case.

We order that the mandate issue forthwith; that the judgment of this Court include the provisions for double costs and damages as ordered above; that execution on the judgment of this Court for damages issue forthwith; and that execution on the judgment of this Court for costs issue within ten days of the date of the taxation of costs according to law. In re Hartford Textile Corp., supra, 659 F.2d at 305-06.

To summarize:

We hold that there was no genuine issue of material fact to preclude the district court from granting summary judgment in favor of the government. We further hold that the district judge did not err in declining to recuse himself. In light of the frivolous nature of this appeal and Schiff's pattern of bringing such appeals, we order that double costs in this Court and $5,000 damages be awarded against Schiff, to be paid to the United States. We further order that the clerk of this Court shall not accept any more papers for filing from Schiff except upon proof of payment of the above sanction.

Affirmed with double costs and $5,000 damages against Schiff.

As for Dan Meador's works, I still stand with what he has relayed to the public. Many people have elected to judge him for his literal works just as they did Irwin Schiff in his works, The Federal Mafia.

Irwin Schiff, another convicted felon dirtbag enshrined in the Quatloos Hall of Shame.

IRWIN SCHIFF SENTENCED TO 163 MONTHS IN PRISON

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/txdv05548.htm

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
MONDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2005
WWW.USDOJ.GOV
TAX
(202) 514-2007
TDD (202) 514-1888

PROFESSIONAL TAX RESISTER IRWIN SCHIFF AND TWO ASSOCIATES CONVICTED IN LAS VEGAS TAX SCAM

WASHINGTON, D.C. - A federal jury in Las Vegas, Nevada convicted Irwin Schiff and two associates, Cynthia Neun and Lawrence Cohen, of aiding and assisting in the preparation of false income tax returns filed by other taxpayers in connection with a tax scam, and convicted Schiff and Neun of conspiring to defraud the United States, the Department of Justice and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced today. Schiff was convicted on all counts, including income tax evasion and of filing false income tax returns for the years 1997 through 2002, and Neun was convicted of willfully failing to file federal income tax returns, Social Security disability fraud, and theft of government property in connection with Neun’s improper receipt of Social Security disability benefits.

According to the indictment and the evidence introduced at trial, beginning in 1995, the defendants directed thousands of taxpayers to file false federal income tax returns with the IRS that reported zero taxable income in spite of the taxpayers earning large amounts of reportable income. The defendants operated the scam through Freedom Books-a business owned by Schiff-that sold books, tapes, and packets encouraging customers not to pay income tax. According to a government witness who testified at trial, between 1997 and 2002 Freedom Books sold more than $4.2 million in products that promoted Schiff’s “anti-tax” scheme.

“People who evade their tax obligations, or encourage or enable others to do so, are cheating all law-abiding taxpayers,” said Eileen J. O’Connor, Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Department’s Tax Division. “The Department of Justice will prosecute these crimes, and juries will convict the offenders.”

The Justice Department filed a civil suit in the same court against Schiff, Neun, and Cohen in March 2003, and the court granted a temporary restraining order barring them from advertising or selling Schiff’s “zero-income tax return” plan; preparing tax returns for others; and assisting others to violate the tax law, including by “selling services, books or other materials that provide direction about how to fill out fraudulent or false tax forms. . . .” The preliminary injunction was affirmed after the defendants’ appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The U.S. Supreme Court this month declined to hear Schiff’s challenge to the Ninth Circuit decision. The Justice Department will ask the district court to convert the preliminary injunction into a permanent one. More information about the injunction may be found on the Tax Division website at http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/txdv03357.htm, and http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/txdv03167.htm.

Evidence presented at trial proved that Schiff evaded the payment of more than $2 million in taxes he owed the IRS from 1979 through 1985. Schiff concealed income he earned from Freedom Books, in part by using offshore bank accounts and conducting financial transactions through secret “warehouse” banking services. The evidence also showed that Schiff used debit cards issued by offshore banks to obtain funds he transferred offshore, that he opened bank accounts using multiple tax identification numbers, and that he titled his ownership of a car in the name of a Pennsylvania corporation.

That marked the third time Schiff had been convicted of tax offenses. “Paying taxes is the price of citizenship. After three strikes, I would hope that even Mr. Schiff realizes that he has struck out,” said IRS Commissioner Mark W. Everson.

Mr. Schiff faced a maximum sentence of 43 years in prison and $3.25 million in fines andwas remanded to the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service.

http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/txdv06098.htm

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2006
WWW.USDOJ.GOV
TAX
(202) 514-2007
TDD (202) 514-1888

PROFESSIONAL TAX RESISTER SENTENCED TO MORE THAN 12 YEARS IN PRISON FOR TAX FRAUD

WASHINGTON, D.C. - Longtime tax protestor Irwin Schiff was sentenced in federal district court in Las Vegas to total of 163 months in prison—151 months for tax fraud and an additional 12 months for contempt of court—the Department of Justice and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced today. In addition, Schiff was ordered to pay more than $4.2 million in restitution and to serve three years of supervised release.

In October 2005, Schiff was convicted of conspiring to defraud the United States, aiding and assisting in the preparation of false income tax returns, filing his own false tax returns, and evading the payment of millions of dollars in back taxes owed. This marks the third time Schiff has been convicted for committing federal tax offenses. Schiff previously has spent more than four years in jail for his tax crimes. Two associates of Schiff, Cynthia Neun and Lawrence Cohen, were also convicted of aiding and assisting other taxpayers in the filing of false tax returns. On February 3, 2006, Cohen was sentenced to 33 months in prison. Neun was sentenced yesterday to 68 months in prison and ordered to pay $1.1 million in restitution.

“Last October, a jury of his peers found Mr. Schiff guilty of serious tax crimes related not only to his own tax evasion, but also to his encouraging and enabling others to file false returns. The prison sentence handed down today reflects the seriousness of those crimes,” said Eileen J. O’Connor, Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Department’s Tax Division. “The Department of Justice is working vigorously to vindicate the interests of law-abiding Americans who file returns and pay the taxes the law requires.”

“Mr. Schiff earned this sentence,” said IRS Commissioner Mark Everson. “For years he has preyed on others by holding out false hope that they need not pay their taxes.”

According to the indictment and the evidence introduced at trial, beginning in 1995, Schiff aided thousands of taxpayers in the filing of false federal income tax returns with the IRS that reported zero taxable income in spite of the taxpayers earning reportable income. Schiff owned and operated Freedom Books, a business that sold books, tapes, and informational packages encouraging customers not to pay income tax. According to a government witness who testified at trial, between 1997 and 2002, Freedom Books sold more than $4.2 million of these products.

The evidence presented at trial also proved that Schiff evaded the payment of more than $2 million in taxes he owed the IRS from 1979 through 1985. Schiff concealed income he earned from Freedom Books, in part, by using offshore bank accounts and conducting financial transactions through secret “warehouse” banking services. The evidence also showed that Schiff used debit cards issued by offshore banks to obtain funds he transferred offshore, that he opened bank accounts using multiple tax identification numbers and that he concealed his wealth by hiding his assets through the use of nominees.

Assistant Attorney General O’Connor thanked Tax Division Trial Attorneys Jeffrey A. Neiman, David J. Ignall, and Melissa Schraibman, who prosecuted the case. She also thanked Criminal Investigation Special Agents David Holland, Adam Steiner, and Autumn Woodard of the IRS, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Nevada, whose assistance was essential to the successful investigation and prosecution of the case.

The idea that gold fringe on a flag, outside of the military, has ANY legal or regulatory significance whatsoever, is belief in witchcraft and magic.

Nah, when Irwin Schiff had to 'splain hisself, he resorted to a claim of Delusional Personality Disorder. The claim failed. Irwin Schiff died in prison. There is nothing like a tax protester who idolizes a convicted tax fraudster who claimed to a court that “a ‘delusional disorder’ [] has convinced him ‘that the law does not require him to pay taxes.’”

Dr. Ortega hospitalized him in October 2003 for depression and “high risk for suicide.” Dr. Ortega’s professional opinion was as follows:

“In my professional opinion I felt that the patient did not pay taxes because he was convinced that the law does not require him to do so. I think this is a delusional disorder.

[...]

His mental illness makes it “almost impossible… to persuade him he is wrong.” His opinions and thus his conduct is “driven by his mental illness.” Hayes Report, P. 6-7. According to Dr. Ortega he suffers from a “delusional disorder” which has convinced him “that the law does not require him to pay taxes.” Ortega Report, P. 4. Dr. Barry states that Schiff’s “belief system is not under voluntary control.” He has “little or no ability to alter his beliefs.” “Mr. Schiff’s behavior is not rational.” His conduct “is the product of a Delusional Personality Disorder.” Barry Report, P. 2.

This crazy claim about gold fringe goes back at least 25 years that I know of.

It was debunked at least 23 years ago, in Greenstreet.

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/912/224/1986395/

United States v. Greenstreet, 912 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Tex. 1996)

US District Court for the Northern District of Texas - 912 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Tex. 1996)

January 18, 1996

912 F. Supp. 224 (1996)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,
v.
Gale E. GREENSTREET, LuAnn Taylor, County Clerk of Dallam County, Texas, and LeRoy Hutton, County Clerk of Randall County, Texas, Defendants.

No. 2:95-CV-119-J.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Amarillo Division.

January 18, 1996.

*225 Nancy Koenig, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Lubbock, TX, Gordon Bryant, Asst. U.S. Attorney, Amarillo, TX, for plaintiff.

Gale Greenstreet, Dalhart, TX, pro se.

Thomas B. Jones, III, Randall Co. Asst. Dist. Atty., Canyon, TX, William Hunter, Greg Oelke, Hunter & Oelke, Dalhart, TX, for defendants.

ORDER

MARY LOU ROBINSON, District Judge.

Before the Court is Plaintiff United States of America's "Motion for Summary Judgment," filed October 31, 1995. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

This case stems from the filing of five UCC-1 financing statements against three U.S. Department of Agriculture employees named as "debtors."[1] The financing statements were filed in Dallam and Randall counties by Defendant Greenstreet and Lawrence Wayne Garth, deceased. None of the federal employees named in the statements were, or ever had been, indebted to either Greenstreet or Garth.

On June 22, 1995, the United States of America, by and through the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Texas, filed its Complaint in this action. The Complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. The Plaintiff desires that the financing statements at issue be declared void ab initio by the Court. The United States also seeks injunctive relief authorizing and directing the Defendant County Clerks to remove and expunge from the county records the fraudulent financing statements submitted for filing by Garth and Greenstreet. Further, the Complaint requests relief permanently enjoining Defendant Greenstreet from presenting similar financing statements for filing in the future.

It appears that as a form of retribution, retaliation, or harassment, Defendant Greenstreet and Mr. Garth caused financing statements to be filed against specific Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) employees. Both Greenstreet and Garth had financed property through the FmHA in the past. Greenstreet defaulted on a promissory note; therefore, his land was foreclosed upon and subsequently sold. Garth was convicted of conversion of property pledged to the FmHA. He was sentenced by this Court in 1985 to serve two years in a federal correctional institution.

Defendant Greenstreet has filed several documents with the Court since this matter was initiated against him. The filings have routinely been voluminous and difficult to comprehend. Apparently, Mr. Greenstreet is of the opinion that "Our One Supreme *226 Court, Republic of Texas, in and for Dallam County" maintains exclusive jurisdiction over the case. He has challenged the Court's jurisdiction and venue, and moved the Court to dismiss the case against him. Mr. Greenstreet's requests were denied.

On October 31, 1995, the United States of America moved that this Court grant it summary judgment. Defendant Greenstreet responded by filing a document entitled "Notice of No Venue to This Statutory, Admiralty Court." Parsing the Response's imprecise, vague, argumentative, conclusory, and sometimes unintelligible prose, this Court gleans that Mr. Greenstreet objects to the Government's position on the following grounds. First, Greenstreet reasserts that this Court lacks jurisdiction over his case and that venue is improper. Further, he maintains that since no one filed a claim of any right, title, or interest in the property he formerly owned in accordance with an Order from "Our One Supreme Court" for the Republic of Texas, he should thus prevail by default. Additionally, Greenstreet argues that since all relevant issues have already been adjudicated by a court of "superior and competent jurisdiction" (common law court for the Republic of Texas), any action now brought by the Plaintiff should be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Finally, Greenstreet contends that Plaintiff's motion should be dismissed as contemptuous, as it is in violation of prior court orders issued by Our One Supreme Court for the Republic of Texas. To support his position, Defendant Greenstreet filed findings of fact signed by 12 "jurors" which resulted from his action to quiet title before a court of common law venue.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set forth the standard for summary judgment in Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Carner, 997 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1993). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court must ask whether,

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. FED. R.CIV.P. 56(c). In making this determination, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Reid v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir.1986).

To defeat a motion for summary judgment, Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the non-moving party to set forth specific facts sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). While the mere allegation of the existence of a dispute over material facts is not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment, if the evidence shows that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party, the dispute is genuine. Id. at 247-48, 106 S. Ct. at 2510.

On the other hand, if a rational trier of fact, based upon the record as a whole, could not find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Amoco Production Co. v. Horwell Energy, Inc., 969 F.2d 146, 147-48 (5th Cir.1992). Such a finding may be supported by the absence of evidence necessary to establish an essential element of the non-moving party's case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 825, 113 S. Ct. 82, 121 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1992); International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Lodge No. 2504 v. Intercontinental Mfg. Co., 812 F.2d 219, 222 (5th Cir.1987).

Finally, where the non-moving party has presented evidence to support the essential elements of its claims but that evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgement may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S. Ct. at 2510-11 (citations omitted). A summary judgment assertion made in an affidavit is simply not enough evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. See *227 Lechuga v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 949 F.2d 790, 798 (5th Cir.1992) (noting that conclusory statements in an affidavit do not provide facts that will counter summary judgment evidence, and testimony based on conjecture alone is insufficient to raise an issue to defeat summary judgment.); Galindo v. Precision American Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir.1985) ([A]ffidavits setting forth ultimate or conclusory facts ... are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment....) (citations omitted). Similarly, it is insufficient for the non-movant to argue in the abstract that the legal theory involved in the case encompasses factual questions. See Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 426 (5th Cir. 1989).

Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Carner, 997 F.2d 94, 97-98 (5th Cir.1993).

III. DISCUSSION

Because the purported financing statements fail to comply with the requisites of law, they are void and of no legal consequence. As a preliminary matter, the federal employees burdened by the financing statements at issue do not fall within Texas' Uniform Commercial Code's definition of a "debtor." TEX.BUS. & COM.CODE ANN. § 9.105(a) (4) (Vernon 1991).[2] There is no evidence before the Court that the federal employees, burdened by the fraudulently filed UCC-1 statements, owed payment or other performance to Defendant Greenstreet or Mr. Garth for any obligation secured.

Furthermore, the federal employees named in the financing statements never signed the documents filed against them. Generally, a debtor's signature is necessary for a financing statement to be valid. The law is well settled that a financing statement is sufficient if it: (1) provides the names of the debtor and the secured party, (2) provides the address for the debtor and secured party, (3) contains a statement describing or indicating the type of collateral, and (4) is signed by the debtor. TEX.BUS. & COM.CODE ANN. § 9.402(a) (Vernon Supp.1995). The Fifth Circuit has recognized the importance of the signature requirement. See Sommers v. Int'l Business Machines, 640 F.2d 686, 689-92 (5th Cir.1981). The situation presently before the Court is precisely the type of problem sought to be avoided by the Code draftsmen in requiring the signature of the debtor on the financing statement. The presence of a debtor's signature provides an indispensable concession to authenticity and a deterrent to inaccurate or malicious filings. As a result, the financing statements at issue are without legal effect and should be removed from the county clerks' records.

Apparently, in an attempt to circumvent the signature requirement, Defendant Greenstreet and Mr. Garth attached to the UCC-1 statements the signature page of letters or other documents previously signed by the alleged debtors. The UCC-1 financing statements in this case do not even purport to contain the signatures of the alleged debtors; instead, the signature box on the UCC-1 statements contain a typed reference to UCC § 3-415[3] and is signed by either Garth or Greenstreet. The addition of documents evincing the signature of the alleged debtors amounts to a crude compliance attempt at best and a forgery at worst.

Basically, there is absolutely no evidence to support the belief that a security agreement exists between the federal employees named in the financing statements and either Mr. Garth or Mr. Greenstreet. To the contrary, all of the subject federal employees signed sworn declarations that they were not and never have been indebted to Defendant Greenstreet or Lawrence Wayne Garth. Absent a valid security agreement, a financing statement by itself does not create an enforceable security interest. In re Wes Dor, Inc., 996 F.2d 237, 239 *228 n. 2 (10th Cir.1993); see generally Sommers, 640 F.2d at 689-90; In re E.A. Fretz Co., Inc., 565 F.2d 366, 370-73 (5th Cir.1978); Mosley v. Dallas Entertainment Co., Inc., 496 S.W.2d 237, 240 (Tex.Civ.App.Tyler 1973, writ dism'd) (stating "The code makes no provision for a naked financing statement to be enforced as a security agreement."). Put differently, a UCC-1 financing statement in and of itself, which does not contain any evidence of an agreement, does not create a security interest or security agreement. Mosley, 496 S.W.2d at 240; cf. In re Maddox, 92 B.R. 707, 709-12 (Bankr.W.D.Tex. 1988). A financing statement exists to perfect an existing security interest and protect it from competing third party claims. Obviously, absent an existing security agreement in some form or fashion, a financing statement, without more, has no legal import or effect. Thus, even if the financing statements at issue were technically sufficient, which they are not, they would still be insufficient to represent enforceable security interests under the circumstances.

Messrs. Greenstreet and Garth's conduct illustrates a disregard for the legal system and should be considered reprehensible. They abused the system by filing fraudulent documents. Mr. Greenstreet compounded the abuse by subsequently flooding the Court with frivolous pleadings. Their actions were costly and inconvenient to many. Although there is little federal case law precisely addressing the specific conduct Greenstreet engaged in before this Court, his tactics are unfortunately not uncommon. As a consequence, more attention to Greenstreet's activity is warranted.

Greenstreet argues that he is of "Freeman Character" and "of the White Preamble Citizenship and not one of the 14th Amendment legislated enfranchised De Facto colored races." He further claims that he is a "white Preamble natural sovereign Common Law De Jure Citizen of the Republic/State of Texas." As a result, he concludes that he is a sovereign, not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. Greenstreet's argument is entirely frivolous. Except for documents allegedly issued from the common law court Greenstreet claims is superior to this Court, no support for his position exists. Greenstreet provides no acceptable authority or cogent analysis to support his contention that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him. See generally United States v. Masat, 948 F.2d 923, 934 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 835, 113 S. Ct. 108, 121 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1992); United States v. Schmitt, 784 F.2d 880, 882 (8th Cir.1986), habeas corpus proceeding, 752 F. Supp. 306 (D.Minn. 1990), aff'd, 938 F.2d 189 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 985, 112 S. Ct. 592, 116 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1991) (describing appellants' argument that district court lacked personal jurisdiction over them because they were "natural freemen" as frivolous). Accordingly, this Court finds Greenstreet's argument lacking in justification.

Likewise, Greenstreet failed to support his position that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. As the Government correctly notes, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Title 28 of the United States Code, §§ 1331 and 1345. In addition, venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because all of the Defendants reside within this district, and the acts giving rise to the Plaintiffs claim for relief occurred within this district. Mr. Greenstreet's contentions to the contrary are simply misstatements of the law. Greenstreet "removed" this case to Our One Supreme Court for the Republic of Texas. Thus, he argues, this Court lacks concurrent subject matter jurisdiction in "Common Law Venue." His position is without merit. In 1992, the Austin Court of Appeals determined that the "Common Law Court for the Republic of Texas" did not exist. Kimmell v. Burnet County Appraisal District, 835 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex.App.Austin 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (stating "We hold that the Common Law Court for the Republic of Texas, if it ever existed, has ceased to exist since February 16, 1846."). That court went on to observe in a footnote that the Republic of Texas adopted the English common law effective March 16, 1840, and the state government was organized on February 16, 1846. Id. at n. 2. The Common Law Court for the Republic of Texas could therefore have only existed between these two dates. By analogy *229 and for the same reasons, this Court holds that the mythical judiciary described as Our One Supreme Court for the Republic of Texas does not exist. As a result, this Court rejects Defendant Greenstreet's subject matter jurisdictional arguments.

Accordingly, this Court also rejects Greenstreet's attempt to defeat the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment based on rulings or orders from the mythical common law court he feels is superior to this Court. Thus, Greenstreet is not entitled to a default judgment because of Plaintiff's non-compliance with orders from a fictitious court. Similarly, Greenstreet will not benefit from a res judicata defense or from his attempt to prove that the Plaintiff's motion is contemptuous. On balance, the authority Greenstreet relies upon has absolutely no legal value.

Perhaps the most bizarre basis for Greenstreet's position rests on the theory that the American system of currency is illegal and unconstitutional. Liberally construing the language of his pleadings before the Court, Greenstreet apparently believes that he has never been provided with funding (i.e. "lawful money") from the FmHA, under their contract, because it failed to give him money in silver or gold. Presumably, he therefore reasons that filing a UCC-1 is an appropriate remedy for him to pursue. Greenstreet contends that federal reserve notes are not legal tender, because they violate Article 1, Section 10, of the United States Constitution. Defendant Greenstreet's argument centers around his view that "the Congress of the United States of America declared a partial NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY on June 5, 1933, under H.J.R. 192 which abrogated the gold clause and deprived the American Citizens of their Constitutional Article 1, Section 10, lawful money" and that the "COINAGE ACT OF 1965 deprived the American Citizens of their required and mandated ... silver coinage." Thus, Greenstreet extrapolates, until he is given funds in silver or gold, he will not consider any past payment to have been acceptable or satisfactory. Attacking the legitimacy of federal reserve notes is not a novel argument. Others have asserted such claims; however, they have been summarily rejected. See, e.g., Rothacker v. Rockwall County Central Appraisal District, 703 S.W.2d 235 (Tex.App.Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing state and federal authority declaring federal reserve notes to be legal tender). This Court will also reject Mr. Greenstreet's coinage arguments. The Court believes that Defendant's position is simply irrational.

Finally, Defendant Greenstreet's response to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment identifies this Court as an "Admiralty Court" without further discussing his allegation. If his reference is to be construed as a jurisdictional challenge, his motion is denied. Others have attempted to persuade the judiciary that fringe on an American flag denotes a court of admiralty. In light of the fact that this Court has such a flag in its courtroom, the issue is addressed. The concept behind the theory the proponent asserts is that if a courtroom is adorned with a flag which happens to be fringed around the edges, such decor indicates that the court is one of admiralty jurisdiction exclusively. To think that a fringed flag adorning the courtroom somehow limits this Court's jurisdiction is frivolous. See Vella v. McCammon, 671 F. Supp. 1128, 1129 (S.D.Tex.1987) (describing petitioner's claim that court lacked jurisdiction because flag was fringed as "without merit" and "totally frivolous"). Unfortunately for Defendant Greenstreet, decor is not a determinant for jurisdiction.

The summary judgment evidence before the Court is clear. Viewing all factual questions in the light most favorable to Defendant Greenstreet, no genuine issue of material fact exists that would necessitate a trial in this case. The United States of America, as the moving party, has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It has satisfied its burden. Once the movant carries its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show that summary judgment should not be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-26, 106 S. Ct. at 2553-54. Unsubstantiated or conclusory assertions that a fact issue exists will not suffice. See Krim v. BanTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d *230 1435, 1442 (5th Cir.1993). Only when "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party" is a full trial on the merits warranted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); see also Kelley v. Price-Macemon, Inc., 992 F.2d 1408, 1413 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 688, 126 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1994). Even under the most generous and liberal of interpretations, the summary judgment evidence provided by Defendant Greenstreet cannot be interpreted to provide a basis whereby a rational jury could return a verdict in his favor.

The evidence before the Court clearly demonstrates that the financing statements filed by Defendant Greenstreet and Mr. Garth are fraudulent. The UCC-1 statements at issue are deficient technically and substantively. Mr. Greenstreet came forward with no understandable evidence to defeat Plaintiff's properly supported motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to relief in this matter.

Thus, the Court enters its judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants as follows:

(1) The financing statements caused to be filed in Dallam and Randall counties by Gale E. Greenstreet and Lawrence Wayne Garth against Mary E. Batenhorst, Neil J. Fleming, and August H. Hesse, III, are HEREBY DECLARED VOID AB INITIO;

(2) This Court FURTHER ORDERS that the County Clerks of Randall and Dallam counties remove and expunge the void financing statements and all of the related documents and filings from the Public Records of their respective counties;

(3) This Court FURTHER ORDERS that Gale E. Greenstreet be permanently enjoined from further similar filings against employees of the United States of America without approval from a United States District Court; and

(4) This Court FURTHER ORDERS that all costs incurred in this lawsuit be assessed against Defendant Greenstreet.

IV. CONCLUSION

Litigants such as Mr. Greenstreet should not be underestimated. They are often motivated and know how to work the system. Unfortunately, the honest taxpayer is victimized as a result. Tactics such as declaring oneself a sovereign, turning to common law courts, challenging the jurisdiction of state and federal trial courts, and contending that federal reserve notes are not legal tender are favorites among these litigants. Such arguments, however, are time consuming for courts to process and routinely futile.

Greenstreet's arguments in this case are fatally without merit. The UCC-1 statements he and Mr. Garth filed are fraudulent and wholly inadequate. They lack the formal requisites required by the law and were not filed in good faith. Thus, the statements enjoy no legal force or effect.

Mr. Greenstreet's improper tactics failed to overcome Plaintiff's properly supported motion for summary judgment. As a result, judgment is appropriately entered against the defendants. Furthermore, it is the expectation of this Court that the equitable relief and assessments granted will reflect the Court's frustration with the arguments and tactics employed by Defendant Greenstreet. Mr. Greenstreet is hereby cautioned that if he continues to take legal positions which are not supported by existing law, severe monetary sanctions may result, his pro se status notwithstanding. Hopefully, litigants like Mr. Greenstreet will be unwilling to pay to harass the government in the future.

It is SO ORDERED.

NOTES

[1] Three of the financing statements were filed against Mary E. Batenhorst. She is employed by the United States Department of Agriculture as a District Director for the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA). The other two financing statements were filed against Neal Fleming and August Hesse, III. Both men are employed as County Supervisors for the FmHA.

[2] Section 9.105(a) (4) defines "debtor" to mean "the person who owes payment or other performance of the obligation secured...."

[3] This Code section, entitled "Contract of Accommodation Party," has nothing to do with a person's ability to sign a financing statement for another. It concerns one party signing a negotiable instrument as a surety for someone already a party to the instrument. Even construed liberally, § 3-415 is simply not applicable under the circumstances.

Many people have elected to judge him for his literal works just as they did Irwin Schiff in his works, The Federal Mafia.

You really should have read the legal disclaimer in Schiff's book, The American Mafia. This was so the simpletons who paid for his book, and swallowed the crap that they didn't have to file or pay income taxes, couldn't sue him when they found themselves in deep legal doo-doo, facing legal fees, penalties, interest, and possibly prison.

https://www.paynoincometax.com/pdf/federal_mafia.pdf

This book is designed to provide the author’s findings and opinion, based on research and analysis of the subject matter covered. This information is not provided for purposes of rendering legal or otherwise professional services, which can only be provided by knowledgeable professionals on a fee basis.

Further, there is always an element of risk in standing up for one’s lawful rights in the face of an opressive taxing authority backed by a biased judiciary.

Therefore, the author and publisher disclaim any responsability for any liability of loss incurred as a consequence of the use and application, either directly or indirectly, of any advice or information presented herin.

Copyright 1990 by Irwin Schiff
Revised Third Edition 1999
Revised Second Edition 1992
First Edition Published 1990
ISBN 0-930374-09-6
01 02 03 5432

That judge went out of his way to be polite in his opinion. Assessing costs was a good move, and should be done routinely in the FIRST instance with this sort of crap.

In my opinion, I view those like Meador and Schiff, as protagonists in an era in which our society does not deserve them because they do not appreciate what has been revealed to them. They cannot handle the truth. When they do appreciate truth, it has to come from a "respectable" person. Who are they to judge anybody lest they also be judged. Leave to judging of these two people (Meador and Schiff) to the Father above.

Meador and Schiff are a few examples of what I consider to be the sages to unraveling and exposing the stench steming within our non-government emtities. We cannot afford to be passive lying dogs that roll over and do as we are told. America was never built on a passive government. We forget that we ( the John Q. Public) are the government that those in D.C. work for. They are not public officers; they are public servants.

If you want to change your laws, change that flag. It is wonder the Europeans laugh at us. We are lacking in spine.

If you want to change your laws, change that flag. It is wonder the Europeans laugh at us. We are lacking in spine.

If they did remove the usual gold fringes on the courtroom flags as you wish, would you then accept all those courts' rulings as lawful and binding on litigants?

If they did remove the usual gold fringes on the courtroom flags as you wish, would you then accept all those courts' rulings as lawful and binding on litigants?

That would be Title 4 U.S.C. Section 1,2, and 3. Then, they would actually have to conduct a lawful constitutional court where:

1) they conduct hearings applying the law of substance rather than the law of procedure.

2) they recognize your right to speak and represent yourself in any case.

3) when you pass the bar, to enter the court, you are not pleading in a military jurisdiction where the judge optionally elects to acknowledge your rights.

This is not just in federal courts but also municipal courts too. It is not the court rulings that bind litigants so much as how it is being conducted.

Once upon a time,

[goldilucky] Actually, nolu chan, I used several of Schiff's statutes back in 2002 in a matter concerning threatening letters a friend of mine received from the IRS just because, although they filed their taxes, they invoked the fifth amendment and other of their lawful rights. Apparently, this upset the IRS so much that they decided to use extortion and other illegal tactics using the US mail service. When my friend received threatening letters from the IRS, it was then that I stepped in and pushed the IRS back by using their own statutes against them. After I fired back letters on my friend's behalf, they never received another threatening letter again. Never.

and they all lived happily after.

I surmise your letters that made the IRS quake in fear were full of the same substance that permeates your every post on LF.

With you as their legal counsel, I suspect they were receiving three hots with their cot, and legal papers that were not letters.

It is a shame you are unable to even express a real legal argument for your bullshit. I would likie a real legal argument so I could crush it.

[goldilucky] Who are they to judge anybody lest they also be judged. Leave to judging of these two people (Meador and Schiff) to the Father above.

I rather suspect two bloodsucking leaches, who profited from the misery they caused others, were directed to exit 1 off the expressway going North, and redirected South to the end of the line.

https://www.quatloosers.com/

I include here only the Tax Protester division of the Quatloser Hall of Shame.

This is from a remnant of the old Quatloos site, so links on the page no longer work. The Quatloos Forum moved to a new location at https://quatloosia.blogspot.com/. Archives of the old forum are there. It was like a Wikipedia of tax fraudsters.

QUATLOSERS HALL OF SHAME

"These special-editions Quatloos commemorates those who have made a name for themselves in their particular business endeavors."

TAX PROTESTERS

Joe Banister

Thurston Bell

Bill Benson

Bill Conklin

Rick Haraka

Eddie Kahn

Devvy Kidd

John Kotmair

Dan Meador

Lynne Meredith

Peymon Mottahedeh

"Judge" John Rizzo

Larken Rose

Irwin Schiff

Bob Schultz

Otto Skinner

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irwin_Schiff

Schiff's followers

In 2003, the Internal Revenue Service had identified about 5,000 tax returns filed by about 3,100 of Schiff's customers in a three-year period, reportedly representing about $56 million in attempted tax evasion.

Convictions for 1997 through 2002 tax years

On October 24, 2005, Schiff was convicted in the U.S. District Court in Las Vegas, Nevada, on multiple counts of filing false tax returns for the years 1997 through 2002, aiding and assisting in the preparation of false tax returns filed by other taxpayers, conspiring to defraud the United States, and (for his own income taxes for tax years 1979 through 1985) tax evasion, and he again began serving jail time.

Despite Schiff's age (he turned 78 years old on the day of sentencing), on February 24, 2006, Schiff was sentenced to 151 months (12 years and 7 months) in prison and was ordered to pay over $4.2 million in restitution to the Internal Revenue Service; Schiff was also sentenced to 12 additional months for contempt of court. On December 26, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed Schiff's convictions except for the criminal contempt convictions. The Court vacated the contempt convictions because of the failure of the trial court judge to file contempt orders under rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The Court of Appeals indicated that the trial judge could file the appropriate paperwork and re-sentence Schiff on the contempt convictions. On September 5, 2008, the trial judge re-sentenced Schiff to 11 months in prison in connection with the contempt of court, effectively lowering Schiff's overall original sentence by another month.

One of Schiff's co-defendants, Lawrence Cohen, was sentenced on February 3, 2006 to 33 months in prison and was ordered to pay $480,000 in restitution. On December 26, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed Cohen's conviction because of the failure of the trial court to allow testimony from a psychiatrist regarding Cohen's mental state. The Court of Appeals remanded the Cohen case for a possible re-trial. On June 16, 2009, Cohen pleaded guilty to aiding and assisting in the filing of a false tax return. However, Cohen died on August 6, 2009, and his case was therefore dismissed.

On February 23, 2006, Cynthia Neun, another co-defendant, was sentenced to 68 months in prison and was ordered to pay over $1.1 million in restitution. Neun's conviction was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. According to the prosecutor's office, Neun sold materials encouraging people not to pay taxes, prepared false tax returns, and represented hundreds of taxpayers in dealings with the IRS where she promoted Schiff's arguments. She was required to submit to three years of supervision following her release, which occurred on December 28, 2010.

In this last case, Schiff's attorneys again asked that the court consider the claim that Schiff had a mental disorder relating to his beliefs about taxes. According to the prosecutor's office, the evidence at trial showed that Schiff had attempted to evade the payment of over $2 million in taxes from 1979 through 1985 and that he had used offshore bank accounts using multiple tax identification numbers and had attempted to hide assets in connection with his tax protester related activity. Convictions of Schiff's followers

Other individuals who have been convicted of federal tax crimes after following Irwin Schiff include Warren J. Burdett; Christopher and Pamela Harrison; Scott D. Haynes; Kenneth Heath; Joseph Letscher; David Middleton; Robert L. Mosel; James C. Payne; David G. Pflum; and Steven A. Swan.

That sort of lunacy just makes me mad, really. I hope the courts make being a lunatic in that manner an expensive hobby.

Here is a lunatic tax protester LAWYER who worked real hard at it until the U.S. Tax Court finally assessed him a $3,000 penalty earlier this month.

Ten to twenty years ago, this tax protester crap was a cottage industry for bloodsucking leeches who did care what harm they did to others. The DOJ finally stepped in and started putting them behind bars and getting restraining orders against their peddling their crap.

There is a bit of crossover between these mopes and birthers. Shady birther lawyers had a cottage industry peddling their incredible garbage and collecting donations to fund their idiotic lawsuits. They had quite a following of useful idiots. Their biggest achievement was helping to get Obama elected. Twice. They looked like idiots, like the shampeachment idiots are doing now.

https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/UstcDockInq/DocketDisplay.aspx?DocketNo=16026210

Tax Court Docket Report, Worsham v. Commissioner

https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/UstcDockInq/DocumentViewer.aspx?IndexID=7723253

PA

T.C. Memo. 2019-155

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

MICHAEL C. WORSHAM, Petitioner
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 26210-16.
Filed December 3, 2019.

Michael C. Worsham, pro se.

David A. Indek and Nancy M. Gilmore, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COLVIN, Judge: This case is before the Court to decide respondent’s motion to impose a penalty under section 6673(a)(1).¹ For reasons discussed below, we will impose on petitioner a penalty of $3,000.

Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times. We round all monetary amounts to the nearest dollar.

SERVED Dec 03 2019

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-2-

[*2] Background

The facts in this case were found in Worsham v. Commissioner (Worsham II), T.C. Memo. 2019-132, and are incorporated by this reference.

A. Petitioner

Petitioner has a bachelor of science degree in chemistry; a master of science degree in civil engineering; and a juris doctor degree from the University of Baltimore School of Law. He moved to Maryland in 1993 to work for the U.S. Army Environmental Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground. During the next several years he attended law school at night. He was admitted to practice law in Maryland in 1998. He left the Army and started a solo law practice in 2001. Petitioner’s law practice was not in the area of tax, and he took no tax courses in law school.

Petitioner filed a Federal income tax return for every year from 1989 (when he had just begun graduate school for his master of science degree) through 2004. Petitioner’s law practice became more profitable during 2005. An accountant suggested that petitioner incorporate his business for tax reasons, which he did under the name of Michael C. Worsham, P.C. (Worsham P.C.). During 2006 Worsham P.C. had a corporate charter in Maryland, elected to be treated as an S corporation, and was wholly owned by petitioner. Also during 2006 petitioner

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-3 -

[*3] discovered information which led him to conclude that he was not required to file Federal tax returns or pay Federal income tax. As a result petitioner did not file an individual Federal income tax return for any year since 2004 through the time of trial.

B. Worsham I and Worsham II

In Worsham v. Commissioner (Worsham I), T.C. Memo. 2012-219, 2012 WL 3101491, aff d, 531 F. App’x 310 (4th Cir. 2013), relating to petitioner’s 2006 tax year, we held that he failed to report taxable income and was liable for additions to tax under section 6651(f) for fraudulent failure to file, section 6651(a)(2) for failure to pay reported tax, and section 6654 for failure to pay estimated income tax. We did not impose a penalty under section 6673, but we warned petitioner not to continue making frivolous arguments. In Worsham I, 2012 WL 3101491, at *4, petitioner argued that “there is no constitutional basis for federal taxes on the ordinary labor of a working American like Petitioner”, that “there is no federal statute that * * * establishes federal tax liability for money earned from the ordinary labor of Americans”, and that respondent failed to account for the basis value of a person’s labor which “would be valued at near or the same as the value of the gross receipts which that same labor generated.”

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-4-

[*4] In this case, which involves petitioner’s 2005 and 2007-10 tax years, petitioner continued to argue that he is entitled to take into account his “basis in labor” and that the value or cost of his labor is its fair market value. Petitioner contends that sections 61, 83, 1001, and 1012 and various regulations under those sections support his “basis in labor” contention. In Worsham II we held that: (1) petitioner had income, self-employment income, and deductions in the amounts determined by respondent for the years at issue; (2) “basis in labor” is not considered in determining Federal income tax liability for income from performance of services; (3) petitioner is liable for tax on his self-employment income and entitled to the deductions for self-employment tax as determined by respondent; (4) we had jurisdiction over the case; (5) petitioner was liable for the additions to tax for failure to timely file tax returns and failure to make estimated tax payments; (6) the statute of limitations bars a refund of petitioner’s overpayments (if any); and (7) section 6673 is not unconstitutional.

Discussion

A. Respondent’s Motion To Impose a Penalty Under Section 6673(a)(1) Respondent filed a motion to impose a penalty of up to $25,000 on petitioner under section 6673(a)(1) for taking positions that are frivolous or groundless. In pertinent part, section 6673(a)(1) authorizes this Court to impose a

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- 5 -

[*5] penalty of up to $25,000 if the taxpayer has instituted or maintained proceedings before the Court primarily for delay or if the taxpayer’s position in the proceedings is frivolous or groundless. “A taxpayer’s position is frivolous if it is contrary to established law and unsupported by a reasoned, colorable argument for change in the law.” Rader v. Commissioner, 143 T.C. 376, 392 (2014) (quoting Goff v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 231, 237 (2010)), affd in part, 616 F. App’x 391 (10th Cir. 2015).

In Worsham I, 2012 WL 3101491, at *5, we said that “[pjetitioner’s argument that no Federal statute imposes a tax on a person’s ordinary labor relies on selective and misguided readings of multiple statutes. Petitioner’s argument that he had a basis in his labor is also frivolous.” We noted that courts have previously held that taxpayers have no basis in their labor and that petitioner’s claim to the contrary is frivolous. Id. We did not impose a penalty under section 6673, but we “strongly wamfed] petitioner that making such arguments before this Court in the future * * * [would] likely result in the imposition of sanctions against him.” Id. at *10.

Worsham I was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which held that petitioner “argues that his earnings as an attorney are not taxable income because they include the ‘basis value’ of his labor. We agree with

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-6-

[*6] the numerous other courts to have addressed this argument that it is meritless.” Worsham v. Commissioner, 531 F. App’x at 311. Petitioner filed his petition in this case in 2016 and continued to raise the “basis in labor” argument, even though the Court of Appeals had warned him that the argument is frivolous. In letters dated February 12, March 30, and April 2, 2018, respondent warned petitioner that raising the basis in labor argument could result in the imposition of a penalty under section 6673. Petitioner failed to heed these warnings from the courts and respondent.

B. Petitioner’s Contentions

Petitioner contends that his positions in this case are not frivolous and are issues of first impression. We disagree. In Worsham I petitioner argued that labor has a basis determined from the value of gross receipts, while in this case he argued that labor has a basis determined from the fair market value of the labor. Petitioner cites authorities to support his argument different from those he cited in Worsham I, but his argument relies upon a selective and misguided reading of those authorities and does not establish an argument different in substance from his argument in Worsham I.

As we have previously told petitioner: “We perceive no need to refute * * * [frivolous] arguments with somber reasoning and copious citation of

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-7 -

[*7] precedent.” Worsham I, 2012 WL 3101491, at *4 (quoting Craig v.Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417, 1417 (5th Cir. 1984)). Because petitioner continues to make frivolous arguments despite numerous warnings, we will require him to pay to the United States a penalty of $3,000 under section 6673.

An appropriate order and decision will be entered.

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https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legal_profession/2014/12/the-maryland-court-of-appeals-has-ordered-disbarment-of-an-attorney-for-tax-crimes-among-other-things-an-attorney-is-an.html

Tuesday, December 23, 2014

Private Attorney General Disbarred

By Legal Profession Prof

The Maryland Court of Appeals has ordered disbarment of an attorney for tax crimes

Among other things, an attorney is an “officer of the legal system and a public citizen.” If this is a special role in a nation that prides itself on the rule of law, then it entails a special responsibility to abide by the law. It also means that, when acting as an advocate, a lawyer must advance only arguments that are good faith interpretations of existing law or good faith efforts to change existing law. Fraudulent conduct and frivolous argument to avoid a civic obligation are antithetical to the lawyer’s role.

Respondent Michael Craig Worsham carved out a practice that concentrated in the private enforcement of federal and state laws prohibiting unsolicited faxes and telephone a role specifically provided in those statutes that augments public enforcement efforts and that is sometimes referred to as a “private attorney general." Mr. Worsham, however, proved to be less law-abiding in the conduct of his private affairs. As his practice grew more lucrative, he ceased to file income tax returns or pay income taxes. When detected, he attempted to justify his conduct with well-worn meritless arguments about the constitutionality and validity of the federal income tax – arguments that he repeated in his filings with us even after he had lost at every level in the federal courts and that, he ultimately conceded, had no bearing on his obligation to comply with State tax laws.

We hold that the willful failure to file income tax returns and pay income taxes, when done with fraudulent intent, merits disbarment.

The attorney was admitted in 1998 in Maryland.

He stopped paying state and federal taxes in 2005. When the IRS got on his trail, he engaged in concealment and raised frivolous claims in the courts. (Mike Frisch)

https://law.justia.com/cases/district-of-columbia/court-of-appeals/2015/14-bg-324.html

Worsham Appeal, D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 14-BG-324

IN RE: MICHAEL C. WORSHAM,
Respondent.

Bar Registration No. 462830 BDN: 96-14

BEFORE: Beckwith, Associate Judge, and King and Reid, Senior Judges.

ORDER

(FILED - May 7, 2015)

On consideration of the certified order indefinitely suspending respondent from the practice of law in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,this court’s April 3, 2014, order suspending respondent and directing him to show cause why reciprocal discipline should not be imposed, the response and respondent’s affidavit as required by D.C. Bar R. XI, §14 (g) filed on May 3, 2014, the statement of Bar Counsel regarding reciprocal discipline and request to stay the proceeding, this court’s June 9, 2014, order staying the matter until resolution of the pending disciplinary matter in the state of Maryland, a certified order of the Court of Appeals of Maryland disbarring respondent from the practice of law in that jurisdiction, see Attorney Grievance Com’n of Maryland v. Worsham, 105 A.3d 515 (Md. 2014), this court’s January 26, 2015, order that vacated the stay and directed respondent to show cause why reciprocal discipline of disbarment should not be imposed, the statement of Bar Counsel, and respondent’s lodged response to Bar Counsel that includes a request for oral argument, and it appearing that respondent does not rely on any of the established bases for challenging reciprocal discipline, see D.C. Bar R. XI § 11 (c), but is attempting to improperly re-litigate the discipline imposed by the state of Maryland, see In re Zdravkovich, 831 A.2d 964, 969 (D.C. 2003) (“Put simply, reciprocal discipline proceedings are not a forum to reargue the foreign discipline”), it is

ORDERED that the Clerk shall file the lodged response of respondent. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that respondent’s request for oral argument is denied. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that Michael C. Worsham is hereby disbarred from the practice of law in the District of Columbia, nunc pro tunc to May 3, 2014.

PER CURIAM

Dan Meador

Lynne Meredith

Peymon Mottahedeh

"Judge" John Rizzo

Larken Rose

Irwin Schiff

Here at LF and back at LP, the relevant ones were John Kotmair Jr., Larken Rose, and Ed & Elaine Brown.

Back when Goldi-Lox, who lived in Maryland at the time, and a poster named christine were just ordinary posters over at LP. Goldi didn't own LP at that time. Go back to the LP archives and look in the early years at the section on Taxation articles.

Petitioner has a bachelor of science degree in chemistry; a master of science degree in civil engineering; and a juris doctor degree from the University of Baltimore School of Law. He moved to Maryland in 1993 to work for the U.S. Army Environmental Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground. During the next several years he attended law school at night. He was admitted to practice law in Maryland in 1998. He left the Army and started a solo law practice in 2001. Petitioner’s law practice was not in the area of tax, and he took no tax courses in law school.

I still don't know why the state of Maryland keeps surfacing in these cases so often. Was it a hotbed of tax rebels or just a state with a low bar to getting admitted to the bar?

The tax law is what it is. One may dislike paying taxes, but one cannot be a licensed attorney, an officer of the court, and yet proclaim that the court and the government itself have no authority to impose or enforce taxes.

"Conquest grants a title that the courts of the conqueror are bound to respect." - John Marshall

This is not just in federal courts but also municipal courts too. It is not the court rulings that bind litigants so much as how it is being conducted.

HOW courts conduct business is determined by the courts themselves, and by statute. It is not determined by the opinions of individual citizens.

Here at LF and back at LP, the relevant ones were John Kotmair Jr., Larken Rose, and Ed & Elaine Brown.

Back when Goldi-Lox, who lived in Maryland at the time, and a poster named christine were just ordinary posters over at LP. Goldi didn't own LP at that time. Go back to the LP archives and look in the early years at the section on Taxation articles.

I did not mention Goldi-Lox, or Christine, and have never linked them to the Save-a-Patriot scam. Christine back then was running Freedom 4um, still is for all I know. Nor did I mention old LF or LP. I don't know that LF was ever connected to Maryland. I joined LF in 2011. I'm not sure what point you are making or contesting.

John Kotmair Sr. made the Quatloos Hall of Shame, not Jr. The only names I bolded and commented upon were Meador and Schiff.

I see no reason to "Go back to the LP archives and look in the early years at the section on Taxation articles." If there is some point you want to make from some old LP tax article, link to it and make it.

For those not steeped in the history of the defunct LP, the original server was run out of the headquarters for the Save-a-Patriot Fellowship (SAPF) scam, of Kotmair Sr. and Jr., both of whom went to federal prison. The video and print publications of SAPF were permanently enjoined by the court in 2006.

Goldi was the Registrant, Admin, and Technical Contact for Information of LP while it was located in Maryland. Kotmair provided the server.

Old Raw Registrar Data February 17, 2010

Registrant Contact Information:
Name: Goldi-Lox
Organization: Liberty Post
Address 1: 12 Carroll Street
Address 2: Suite 6022
City: Westminster
State: MD
Zip: 32256
Country: US
Phone: +1.9048279637
Email: @bellsouth.net

Administrative Contact Information:
Name: Goldi Lox
Organization: Liberty Post
Address 1: 12 Carroll Street
Address 2: Suite 6022
City: Westminster
State: MD
Zip: 32256
Country: US
Phone: +1.9048279637
Email: @bellsouth.net

Technical Contact Information:
Name: Goldi Lox
Organization: Liberty Post
Address 1: 12 Carroll Street
Address 2: Suite 6022
City: Westminster
State: MD
Zip: 21157
Country: US
Phone: +1.9048279637
Email: @bellsouth.net

A Permanent Injunction Order, issued by USDC Maryland on 29 November 2006, ordered Kotmair to stop operating, directly or indirectly, the "Save-A-Patriot Fellowship" (SAPF).

A Court Memorandum Opinion of 29 November 2006 addressed Kotmair word salad logic.

In this case, had the SAP Fellowship had its own bank account in which it maintained its funds it might have little problem in prevailing as to those funds. [n22] Similarly, although perhaps less conclusively, had the SAP Fellowship maintained records of its funds and had Kotmair as Fiduciary keep the association funds completely separate from his own, the Fellowship would have at least a possibility of carrying its burden of proof. However, the Fellowship presents no records whatsoever. Nor does the evidence establish that its funds were maintained separately from those of Kotmair. And, most significantly, there is no evidence from which the Court can determine at what point after Fellowship funds leave the Office in the possession of Kotmair that they cease to be held exclusively as the property of the SAP Fellowship.

The record establishes that Kotmair was entitled to, felt free to, and did, take funds from the Fellowship and use them for his personal sustenance. Kotmair espouses a doctrine that would have funds that he takes to spend for personal use remain the property of the SAP Fellowship. Indeed, in the world according to Kotmair, if he uses Foundation funds for his food, the Foundation ownership extends to the food even as it proceeds through his digestive system. For example:

THE COURT: We are trying to get an understanding of when something belongs to you and when it doesn't. When it belongs to [the SAP Fellowship], so I just want you to try and help me understand that. If you go to the grocery store and you buy Wheaties [with fellowship funds], when is it yours, after you eat it or . . .

Kotmair: That is a hard question to answer.

THE COURT: That is why we ask it.

Kotmair: If the energy from it goes to the Fellowship, and it does, I would say it is to the benefit of the fellowship.

The Court declines to follow the "logic" of Kotmair's position or to dwell upon the point in the digestive process at which Kotmair would agree that the I.R.S. could effect collection. Rather, the Court must conclude that once Kotmair takes Fellowship funds for personal use, those funds can no longer be found to be Fellowship property immune from levy for Kotmair's tax liabilities.

The Court finds from the evidence that the SAP Fellowship obtained, and had ownership of, the cash and money orders it received for memberships and the sales of goods, and, possibly services. If the Fellowship had established that Kotmair's possession of particular assets was solely as Fiduciary for the SAP Fellowship the ownership could remain in the Fellowship. However, at such point as Kotmair took the assets and did not place them in a location [n23] that was exclusively used for the maintenance of Fellowship assets, the ability of the SAP Fellowship to establish ownership in this case was lost. In the context of this case, once the cash and money orders were taken from the office and placed in something other than a Fellowship depository, the funds were available for the immediate personal use of Kotmair, mingled with his own assets, and no longer had the character of Fellowship assets sufficient to avoid levy.

Obviously an attorney who is a tax resister needs to lose his license and no longer be an attorney.

They sound like three-year olds with some of the arguments they come up with. They may as well just ball up their fists and shout "I don't wanna!"

§1. Flag; stripes and stars on

The flag of the United States shall be thirteen horizontal stripes, alternate red and white; and the union of the flag shall be fifty stars representing the fifty states, white in a blue field

§2. Same; additional stars

On the admission of a new State into the Union one star shall be added to the union of the flag; and such addition shall take effect on the fourth day of July then next succeeding such admission

It"s the talismanic force they give to certain words or incidental things 9like fringes on a flag), and the fact they REALLY BELIEVE it that stands out to me. They resemble fanatics handling snakes and proclaiming the REAL meaning of prophesies - such sincere, misguided unrealism.

What is ever freakier and more fanatical. Is a kook who runs around the internet claiming god raised lizards and rats from the dead for them when they were little delusional kids. That is the textbook definition of a kook. Or someone who bumped their head and got brain damage.

That this makes me a kook to you is fine. You're a fanatic for your beliefs.

raise a dead lizard and a dead mouse

Reptiles and mice play "dead" to confuse a predator...perhaps this is what you witnessed.

He healed my broken neck when I was drowning at the bottom of a lake when I was 11.

He grabbed my face and arm and talked to me aloud for the first time when I was 38.

Many people experience miracles from God. Mine convinced me. That is why I originally spoke of them, in discussions long ago, about how I came to the religious beliefs that I have.

Since then, referring back to what I said then has become a standard means by which to attempt to mock me.

Of course it doesn't actually succeed in hitting the mark - I'm blessed, I've always been blessed, and I know it.

In any case, I always correct the record when I get mocked over those miracles.

In any case, I always correct the record when I get mocked over those miracles.

They resemble fanatics handling snakes and proclaiming the REAL meaning of prophesies - such sincere, misguided unrealism.

In light of your being mocked over lizards and mice, why would snake handling seem so fanatical?

(Please note, I do NOT advocate for the handling of serpents to prove one's faith)

Here is what an American flag is supposed to look like according. Anything else is not an American flag by definition.

§1. Flag; stripes and stars on

The flag of the United States shall be thirteen horizontal stripes, alternate red and white; and the union of the flag shall be fifty stars representing the fifty states, white in a blue field

§2. Same; additional stars

On the admission of a new State into the Union one star shall be added to the union of the flag; and such addition shall take effect on the fourth day of July then next succeeding such admission

There is absolutely nothing mandatory about 4 U.S.C., The Flag Code. What you have missed is that there is no enforcement section and, if there were such a section, the Statute would be struck down as unconstitutional.

Legal precedent holds that it is constitutionally protected freedom of political expression to stomp on a flag in protest, burn a flag in protest, fly it upside down, or do whatever with a flag as political protest.

4 U.S.C. is unenforceable etiquette.

It has been judicially determined that a gold fringe is not part of the flag, it is decoration, and that court jurisdiction is not determined by decorations.

Many people experience miracles from God.

This couple didn't experience a miracle such as you did...

https://nypost.com/2019/12/18/california-megachurch-tries-to-resurrect-2-year-old-girl-through-prayer/

Is God capricious?

Is God capricious?

Who am I to judge God? God does what he chooses to do.

He grabbed my face and arm and talked to me aloud for the first time when I was 38.

What did He say?

And why did He grab your face?

I need details...

and proclaiming the REAL meaning of prophesies

Christians know the real meaning of prophecies simply because most prophecies have already been fulfilled.

We can see with crystal clarity the fulfillment of each and every prophecy...which precisely foretell the coming of Christ, and also forewarn of God's dealing with Israel (mostly for disobedience).

There are only a few prophecies remaining that await fulfillment...and we know they will come to pass because they co-exist and intertwine with prophecies that have already been fulfilled.

The "real meaning' of these prophecies have been under the scrutiny of learned men for centuries.

For those who watch and wait, all eyes are on the prophecies of Ezekiel calling for the return of the Jews to Israel (which was fulfilled in 1948)...and now the maneuvering of the key players who will go down to Israel to make war.

Ezekiel 38:1-12(KJV)

And the word of the Lord came unto me, saying,

2 Son of man, set thy face against Gog, the land of Magog, the chief prince of Meshech and Tubal, and prophesy against him,

3 And say, Thus saith the Lord God; Behold, I am against thee, O Gog, the chief prince of Meshech and Tubal:

4 And I will turn thee back, and put hooks into thy jaws, and I will bring thee forth, and all thine army, horses and horsemen, all of them clothed with all sorts of armour, even a great company with bucklers and shields, all of them handling swords:

5 Persia, Ethiopia, and Libya with them; all of them with shield and helmet:

6 Gomer, and all his bands; the house of Togarmah of the north quarters, and all his bands: and many people with thee.

7 Be thou prepared, and prepare for thyself, thou, and all thy company that are assembled unto thee, and be thou a guard unto them.

8 After many days thou shalt be visited: in the latter years thou shalt come into the land that is brought back from the sword, and is gathered out of many people, against the mountains of Israel, which have been always waste: but it is brought forth out of the nations, and they shall dwell safely all of them.

9 Thou shalt ascend and come like a storm, thou shalt be like a cloud to cover the land, thou, and all thy bands, and many people with thee.

10 Thus saith the Lord God; It shall also come to pass, that at the same time shall things come into thy mind, and thou shalt think an evil thought:

11 And thou shalt say, I will go up to the land of unwalled villages; I will go to them that are at rest, that dwell safely, all of them dwelling without walls, and having neither bars nor gates,

12 To take a spoil, and to take a prey; to turn thine hand upon the desolate places that are now inhabited, and upon the people that are gathered out of the nations, which have gotten cattle and goods, that dwell in the midst of the land.

And, Vic, we know who they are: Gog and Magog, Meshech and Tubal, Persia, Ethiopia, Libya, Gomer, Togarmah...they are making headlines this very day.