Deckard did just that. Dckard posted an article by Matt Agorist while Stone had restricted him from posting any article byMatt Agorist.

Stone later rescinded that edict - try to keep up assclowns.

You posted the article BEFORE stone rescinded that edict.

Uh, no I didn't. I'm not going to jump through hoops for you and look it up, but Stone rescinded his ban at least a week ago.

But I suppose since you've lied at least once, might as well keep' em coming.

Still ignoring where I smacked down one of your false assertions?

State troopers to stand civil trial for taking protester’s camera, filing charges against him at West Hartford checkpoint (Hartford Courant)

State troopers to stand civil trial for taking protester’s camera, filing charges against him at West Hartford checkpoint (Hartford Courant)

That is a newspaper report.

See the court actual documents.

Show me the date and case number.

That is a newspaper report.

Yeah, it is. Here are the DOCKET REPORT and the COMPLAINT.

DOCKET REPORT Picard v Torneo, DCCT 3-16-Cv-1564-WWE Retrieved 29 Sep 2019

https://www.scribd.com/document/428027798/DOCKET-REPORT-Picard-v-Torneo-DCCT-3-16-Cv-1564-WWE-Retrieved-29-Sep-2019

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Picard v Torneo, DCCT 3-16-cv-1564-WWE (15 Sep 2016) Doc 1, COMPLAINT

https://www.scribd.com/document/428028071/Picard-v-Torneo-Dcct-3-16-Cv-1564-Wwe-15-Sep-2016-Doc-1-Complaint

You are a good Person who has my respect.

Hand Salute,
Gatlin

[Matt Agorist] State-owned roadways and right of ways are public property. The trooper’s assertion that it is illegal to film on his ‘state property’ was entirely false and in violation of Connecticut Bill No. 245, which “protects the right of an individual to photograph or video record peace officers in the performance of their duties.”

That should be Connecticut Senate Bill 245 of 2012, and after it is passed it is an Act, and then it is a law. Mere technicalities.

However, with his usual flair (entirely false), Matt Agorist flubs the dub again. The law in question is not some grossly generalized thing with no exceptions. The law is not so general and has exceptions. Moreover, the Court has already dismissed the associated Count on summary judgment on the grounds that Matt Agorist is full of crap. The Court did not really say that, it was just my inner Agorist coming out. The Court did say, 13 days before the onslaught of Matt Agorist bullshit:

Some district courts have held that in the context of a journalist, who is not subject to the police activity, the First Amendment right to record police activity in public is clearly established. See Stolarik v. City of New York, 2017 WL 4712423, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2017); Higginbotham v. City of New York, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 380. However, the instant plaintiff was not a journalist or even a bystander; he was a subject of defendants’ investigation and performance of their official duties. Accordingly, plaintiff’s right to record police activity or to record a police officer engaged in his official duties was not “clearly established” within this Circuit at the time of September 11, 2015, so that a reasonable defendant officer would have understood from existing law that his conduct was unlawful. See Anderson v. Recore, 317 F.3d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 2003); see also McKenzie, 2019 WL 3288267, at *7; Rivera v. Foley, 2015 WL 1296258, at *9 (D. Conn. March 23, 2015) (qualified immunity granted on basis that right to record police officers engaged in ongoing investigation was not clearly established as matter of constitutional law). Summary judgment will enter in favor of defendants on this claim.

https://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/TOB/S/2012SB-00245-R00-SB.htm

General Assembly

Raised Bill No. 245

February Session, 2012

LCO No. 1357

*01357_______JUD*

Referred to Committee on Judiciary

Introduced by:

(JUD)

AN ACT CONCERNING THE RECORDING OF POLICE ACTIVITY BY THE PUBLIC.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened:

Section 1. (NEW) (Effective October 1, 2012) (a) For the purposes of this section, "peace officer" has the meaning provided in section 53a-3 of the general statutes.

(b) A peace officer who interferes with any person taking a photographic or digital still or video image of such peace officer or another peace officer acting in the performance of such peace officer's duties shall, subject to sections 5-141d, 7-465 and 29-8a of the general statutes, be liable to such person in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress.

(c) A peace officer shall not be liable under subsection (b) of this section if the peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the peace officer was interfering with the taking of such image in order to (1) lawfully enforce a criminal law of this state or a municipal ordinance, (2) protect the public safety, (3) preserve the integrity of a crime scene or criminal investigation, (4) safeguard the privacy interests of any person, including a victim of a crime, or (5) lawfully enforce court rules and policies of the Judicial Branch with respect to taking a photograph, videotaping or otherwise recording an image in facilities of the Judicial Branch.

This act shall take effect as follows and shall amend the following sections:

Section 1
October 1, 2012

New section

Statement of Purpose:

To protect the right of an individual to photograph or video record peace officers in the performance of their duties.

I deal with lies on a first come basis …

No you don't. You didn't mention one lie the cops told. Not one.

How about doing that now. Instead of whining about an accurate title, yes the taxpayers will pay for the asshole liar cops on the video.

Are you capable of addressing the substance of the article or are you to obsessed with Deckard and proving libertarians aren't your equal?

And why Stone changed his mind to once again permit these “flavored news story atrocities” to appear on his web site – only Stone knows.

Free speech and open dialog. Back to my original position on the home page.

and they are promoting a self-interest agenda.

Everyone has their own agenda. Your agenda is to trash libetarians. Now I don't agree with libertarians on moral issues either. But they aren't wrong on everything that is for sure.

c) A peace officer shall not be liable under subsection (b) of this section if the peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the peace officer was interfering with the taking of such image in order to (1) lawfully enforce a criminal law of this state or a municipal ordinance, (2) protect the public safety, (3) preserve the integrity of a crime scene or criminal investigation, (4) safeguard the privacy interests of any person, including a victim of a crime, or (5) lawfully enforce court rules and policies of the Judicial Branch with respect to taking a photograph, videotaping or otherwise recording an image in facilities of the Judicial Branch.

Judges are corrupt and this is bullshit just like Roberts and Obamacare.

The cops said on tape that they had to cover their asses. So they made up stuff after the fact.

The cops should be fired and imprisoned and would be if we had honest judges and prosecutors.

[nolu chan #55 quoting Connecticut state law] c) A peace officer shall not be liable under subsection (b) of this section if the peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the peace officer was interfering with the taking of such image in order to (1) lawfully enforce a criminal law of this state or a municipal ordinance, (2) protect the public safety, (3) preserve the integrity of a crime scene or criminal investigation, (4) safeguard the privacy interests of any person, including a victim of a crime, or (5) lawfully enforce court rules and policies of the Judicial Branch with respect to taking a photograph, videotaping or otherwise recording an image in facilities of the Judicial Branch.

Judges are corrupt and this is bullshit just like Roberts and Obamacare.

The cops said on tape that they had to cover their asses. So they made up stuff after the fact.

The cops should be fired and imprisoned and would be if we had honest judges and prosecutors.

The quote is not from a judge or a court. It is a direct linked quote of a law of the State of Connecticut.

You may call it bullshit, but it undoubtedly the actual law, as opposed to imaginary bullshit law. Real law trumps imaginary bullshit law.

Identifying information as provided at my #55:

https://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/TOB/S/2012SB-00245-R00-SB.htm

General Assembly

Raised Bill No. 245

February Session, 2012

LCO No. 1357

*01357_______JUD*

General Assembly

Raised Bill No. 245

February Session, 2012

LCO No. 1357

*01357_______JUD*

the troopers involved have been ordered to stand trial in the civil suit brought on by the ACLU of Connecticut. The taxpayers, not the officers will be the ones to pay for the crimes.

Is it inferred that the Court will require the taxpayer to pay? That would be false.

As I have noted, no governmental entity is a named defendant in Picard v. Torneo, et al.

Why is no element of government named as defendant?

When you get done with that, the next question is:

How could there be a judgment of liability against the taxpayer where no element of government is a party to the lawsuit?

Just for the record, my agenda is to trash misstatement of law or facts. With Matt Agorist and a few others, such misstatements are in wild abundance.

Strangely enough, after I spend all my time disproving what is in the cop-hating article – I am consequently labeled either a “cop-sucker” or a “boot-licker” when all I have done is to challenge opinions and conclusions.

Get used to it. I does not look like it will change.

And I an thoroughly enjoying doing it ...

[Matt Agorist] The taxpayers, not the officers will be the ones to pay for the crimes.

Picard, Doc 92 at 13-14, the Court stated:

Some district courts have held that in the context of a journalist, who is not subject to the police activity, the First Amendment right to record police activity in public is clearly established. See Stolarik v. City of New York, 2017 WL 4712423, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2017); Higginbotham v. City of New York, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 380. However, the instant plaintiff was not a journalist or even a bystander; he was a subject of defendants' investigation and performance of their official duties. Accordingly, plaintiff's right to record police activity or to record a police officer engaged in his official duties was not “clearly established” within this Circuit at the time of September 11, 2015, so that a reasonable defendant officer would have understood from existing law that his conduct was unlawful. See Anderson v. Recore, 317 F.3d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 2003); see also McKenzie, 2019 WL 3288267, at *7; Rivera v. Foley, 2015 WL 1296258, at *9 (D. Conn. March 23, 2015) (qualified immunity granted on basis that right to record police officers engaged in ongoing investigation was not clearly established as matter of constitutional law)."

Summary judgment will enter in favor of defendants on this claim.

And the Court ruled at 27:

defendants' motion for summary judgment [doc. 76] is GRANTED as to count one and as to the First Amendment retaliation claim based on his asserted First Amendment right to record police activity

Do try to keep up old chap. You do not want to be relegated to the short bus again.

[Matt Agorist] The taxpayers, not the officers will be the ones to pay for the crimes.

One must wonder why the taxpayer will pay if no governmental entity is a party to this lawsuit.

The COMPLAINT at 2, paragraphs 10-13, identifies the Defendants:

10. Defendant John Barone was and is, at all time relevant to this suit, employed by the Division of State Police within the Connecticut Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, with the job title of trooper first class.

11. Defendant Patrick Torneo was and is, at all time relevant to this suit, employed by the Division of State Police within the Connecticut Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, with the job title of master sergeant.

12. Defendant John Jacobi was and is, at all time relevant to this suit, employed by the Division of State Police within the Connecticut Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, with the job title of sergeant.

13. At all times relevant to this action, the defendants were on duty for their employer, and were wearing Connecticut State Police uniforms, badges, and pistols.

No government entity is party to the lawsuit. The three officers are sued in their individual capacity. Just curious, but what is your legal theory of government liability.

Do you infer that the court may order the government to pay, even though they are not party to the lawsuit?

If you have no legal theory, you may have to start riding the short bus again.

short bus

I loath any reminders of the movie with that title. They would consider that a success that I've been so offended for so long. It's about as bad as those Lars Von Trier movies.

[nolu chan #74] No government entity is party to the lawsuit. The three officers are sued in their individual capacity. Just curious, but what is your legal theory of government liability.

[nolu chan #74] Do you infer that the court may order the government to pay, even though they are not party to the lawsuit?

Regarding a legal theory, it appears the legal theory is *c*r*i*c*k*e*t*s*.

https://libertysflame.com/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=60173&Disp=7#C7

[A K A Stone] The free thought project article in question contained no lies. The tax payers will pay.

Why? What is your legal theory? Do you expect the court to order the taxpayers to pay?

Perhaps a U.S. Supreme Court opinion will help rouse y'all from your stupor.

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974)

At 675-677:

But it has not heretofore

415 U. S. 676

been suggested that § 1983 was intended to create a waiver of a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity merely because an action could be brought under that

415 U. S. 677

section against state officers, rather than against the State itself. Though a § 1983 action may be instituted by public aid recipients such as respondent, a federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, Ex parte Young, supra, and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury, Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, supra.

Just asking, trying to clarify what y'all are saying. Do you expect judgment for the plaintiff and against the government?

With a view toward your CLE, here is another U.S. Supreme Court opinion.

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 US 800 (24 Jun 1982) [footnotes omitted]

At 801:

Henceforth, government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate "clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Pp. 815-819.

At 815-19:

B

Qualified or “good faith” immunity is an affirmative de­fense that must be pleaded by a defendant official. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U. S. 635 (1980). Decisions of this Court have established that the “good faith” defense has both an “objec­tive” and a “subjective” aspect. The objective element in­volves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for “basic, unquestioned constitutional rights.” Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 322 (1975). The subjective component refers to “permissible intentions.” Ibid. Characteristically the Court has defined these elements by identifying the circum­stances in which qualified immunity would not be available. Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if an of­ficial “knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would vio­late the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury . . . .” Ibid, (emphasis added).

The subjective element of the good-faith defense fre­quently has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that dis­puted questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on mo­tions for summary judgment. And an official’s subjective good faith has been considered to be a question of fact that some courts have regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a jury.

In the context of Butz’ attempted balancing of competing values, it now is clear that substantial costs attend the litiga­tion of the subjective good faith of government officials. Not only are there the general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial—distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public service. There are special costs to “subjective” inquiries of this kind. Immunity generally is available only to officials performing discretionary functions. In contrast with the thought processes accompanying “minis­terial” tasks, the judgments surrounding discretionary action almost inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker’s ex­periences, values, and emotions. These variables explain in part why questions of subjective intent so rarely can be de­cided by summary judgment. Yet they also frame a back­ground in which there often is no clear end to the relevant evidence. Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation there­fore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including an official’s professional col­leagues. Inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government.

Consistently with the balance at which we aimed in Butz, we conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We therefore hold that government officials performing dis­cretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S., at 322.

Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law, should avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on sum­mary judgment. On summary judgment, the judge appro­priately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred. If the law at that time was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to “know” that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful. Until this threshold immunity ques­tion is resolved, discovery should not be allowed. If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct. Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense claims extraordinary circum­stances and can prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard, the defense should be sustained. But again, the defense would turn primarily on objective factors.

By defining the limits of qualified immunity essentially in objective terms, we provide no license to lawless conduct. The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in compensation of victims remains protected by a test that fo­cuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an official’s acts. Where an official could be expected to know that cer­tain conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate; and a person who suffers in­jury caused by such conduct may have a cause of action. But where an official’s duties legitimately require action in which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better served by action taken “with inde­pendence and without fear of consequences.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554 (1967).

Deckard, where are you? Stand tall and be counted. Hiding in a corner, squatting in your own puddle of warm piss is no way to go through life. I await your legal theory of how the taxpayers are liable. In the meantime, while you hide in silence...

With a view toward your CLE, here is another U.S. Supreme Court opinion.

Anderson v. Creighton et al, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) qualified immunity

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 85-1520. Argued February 23, 1987—Decided June 25, 1987

Petitioner, a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent, participated with other law enforcement officers in a warrantless search of respondents’ home. The search was conducted because petitioner believed that one Dixon, who was suspected of a bank robbery committed earlier that day, might be found there, but he was not. Respondents filed a state-court action against petitioner, asserting a claim for damages under the Fourth Amendment. Petitioner removed the suit to Federal District Court and then filed a motion for dismissal or summary judgment, arguing that the Fourth Amendment claim was barred by his qualified immunity from civil damages liability. Before any discovery occurred, the court granted summary judgment on the ground that the search was lawful. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the search’s lawfulness could not be determined on summary judgment, because factual disputes precluded deciding as a matter of law that the search was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. The court also held that petitioner was not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, since the right he allegedly violated—the right of persons to be protected from warrantless searches of their homes unless the searching officers have probable cause and there are exigent circumstances—was clearly established.

Held:

1. Petitioner is entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds if he can establish as a matter of law that a reasonable officer could have believed that the search comported with the Fourth Amendment even though it actually did not. Whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the “objective legal reasonableness” of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were “clearly established” at the time the action was taken. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800. In order to conclude that the right which the official allegedly violated is “clearly established,” the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. The Court of Appeals—which apparently considered only the fact that the right to be free from warrantless searches of one’s home unless the searching officers have probable cause and there are exigent circumstances was clearly established—erred by refusing to consider the argument that it was not clearly established that the circumstances with which petitioner was confronted did not constitute probable cause and exigent circumstances. The relevant question here is the objective question whether a reasonable officer could have believed petitioner’s warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed. Petitioner’s subjective beliefs about the search are irrelevant. Pp. 638-641.

2. There is no merit to respondents’ argument that it is inappropriate to give officials alleged to have violated the Fourth Amendment—and thus necessarily to have unreasonably searched or seized—the protection of a qualified immunity intended only to protect reasonable official action. Such argument is foreclosed by the fact that this Court has previously extended qualified immunity to officials who were alleged to have violated the Fourth Amendment. Also without merit is respondents’ suggestion that Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, be overruled by holding that qualified immunity may never be extended to officials who conduct unlawful warrantless searches. Nor is there any merit to respondents’ contention that no immunity should be provided to police officers who conduct unlawful warrantless searches of innocent third parties’ homes in search of fugitives. Pp. 642-646.

766 F. 2d 1269, vacated and remanded.

Nice diatribe Perry Mason. You on Company time right now or are you off duty?

Is that your legal theory? Go back to squatting in your puddle of warm piss.

Is that your legal theory?

Objection your Honor. The record will show that Mr. Deckard espoused no so-called "legal theory", He merely compared nolu spam's....er I mean chan....

Ahem...as I was saying, your Honor - Mr. chan has impressed us all with his nose-to-the grindstone efforts, relentlessly scouring through reams of cases that may help him in the admirable yet so sadly and strikingly Sisyphean (H/T: Tooconservative) task he has been performing and will continue to faithfully perform.

The comparison to Perry Mason, the fictional TV lawyer is valid

***

Golly gee, I tell you what. Danged if I don't sound just like one of them fancy lawyer-type people.

And I never even went to law school.

generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate "clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Key word generally. Not always.

The state, faced with the expected testimony of child-protection experts and a social worker’s troubling case notes, has reached a $4.97 million settlement with the father of Athena Angeles, the 3-year-old Windham girl who was beaten to death in 2011 by her mother’s live-in boyfriend despite her bearing the black eyes and bruises of previous abuse and the warning calls of the staff at her pre-school.

The Department of Children and Families, one of the targets of the father’s $20 million wrongful death and malpractice claim, had never removed Athena or her younger sister from the home or interviewed the mother’s boyfriend in the weeks before Athena’s death. The case had repercussions across the state because Athena had been taken to Windham Hospital only hours before her death with head injuries from abuse, but was released after treatment without a mandated report to authorities. She would return to the hospital a short time later, but would not survive her fresh injuries.

https://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-news-athena-angeles-child-abuse-dcf-20190104-rb6ibk7thnaf7o24dg35n2apwq-story.html

There is a different case in connecictut and they settled and payed taxpayer money. So they do pay out and were held liable.

In the end I suspect Connecticut will pay out in the case we are discussing too. If I am wrong I don't care. It is just my opinion of what will happen.

States pay out all the time.

strikingly Sisyphean (H/T: Tooconservative)

See? It's just so easy to sprinkle that term in almost any sentence. Try to work schadenfreude in there as well. Or go for the brass ring by mixing and matching these words at random. Try to fit Sisyphean schadenfreude into a sentence.

Pretty soon you too can sound like the hoity-toity instead of the hoi polloi. LOL

Due to the state's indemnification law, courts may assign liability to parties not named in the original lawsuit. Or so it seems. I can't find anything that indicates that Connecticut's legislature has subsequently changed that law so it does seem that it is still in effect. Unless nolu can prove that avenue of liability has otherwise been closed off. Certainly, AKA has an argument to make here since a court did impose liability on a party (the town) which was not originally named as a plaintiff in the case. And a federal court could do the same, using Connecticut's own indemnification laws and precedents like this case to justify such a decision.

courts may assign liability to parties

Spreading liability (aka passing blame for personal responsibilities) IS A LIBERAL TRAIT.

I’d be cautious about how far you would support such a slippery slope... even if it is a police officer you would like to hem-up.

IMHO, when someone is able to walk to a vehicle, unlock it, sit in it, start it.... and drive it any kind of distance, and they willingly drank alcohol, there is only ONE person 100% responsible.

I’d be cautious about how far you would support such a slippery slope... even if it is a police officer you would like to hem-up.

I am not supporting it at all. I don't live in Connecticut and have no opportunities to change the unique laws of Connecticut. I am simply demonstrating a case where Connecticut law and Connecticut courts and a Connecticut jury did assign liability to a party not named in the lawsuit (the town) when an off-duty cop let a drinking buddy drive and kill himself and a few others.

The jury said, at least in part, that the town was responsible because the job description for town police was that they were considered on-duty 24 hours a day and therefore they were always acting under the city's civil liability, even if the city is not named in a lawsuit.

Unless the laws of Connecticut are changed, it seems to me that in another case where Connecticut state police are being sued, another jury and another court might decide that the state is responsible for their actions.

So do you know whether CT state police are considered legally on-duty 24 hours a day or not? If they are, then how can the state be shielded from liability for any action of state cops as long as it happens on Connecticut soil? There may not be federal laws that can apply to this (as nolu says) but a federal court can and will impose liability if the federal court believes that the state courts are misapplying state laws or are acting corruptly in trying to let responsible agencies off the hook for their liability regarding the conduct of their employees.

Federal courts are not utterly powerless in such cases even if federal laws do not apply directly.

IMHO, when someone is able to walk to a vehicle, unlock it, sit in it, start it.... and drive it any kind of distance, and they willingly drank alcohol, there is only ONE person 100% responsible.

Well, you'd better move to Connecticut and inform the jurors and the voters and the courts of that fact. Have fun with that.

So do you know whether CT state police are considered legally on-duty 24 hours a day or not?

There is case law that state they can make arrests, off duty, provided they have the PC to make that arrest, and if they get hurt making that arrest, they are covered by work insurance.

However, they aren’t paid off duty... so I would think they don’t have to act.

There is case law that state they can make arrests, off duty, provided they have the PC to make that arrest, and if they get hurt making that arrest, they are covered by work insurance.

However, they aren’t paid off duty... so I would think they don’t have to act.

And yet, in the CT case I cited, the jury did hold the town liable.

INDEMNIFICATION In the event that an officer is sued, the law provides that the municipality must indemnify the officer for damage or injury, not wanton or willful, caused in the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment (CGS § 7-465). The statute allows officers “excused from official duty” to be indemnified as long as they are engaged in “the immediate and actual performance of a public duty imposed by law” at the time of the injury (CGS § 7-465). Apparently, in the Seymour case, the jury concluded that the indemnification statute required the town to assume liability for its police officer. According to Frank Szilagyi, attorney for the defendants, because town regulations stated that police officers were on duty 24 hours a day, the town was obliged to indemnify off-duty officers even if they were not engaged in a “public duty imposed by law” as required by the statute. APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY Under Connecticut's comparative negligence statute, the jury or, if there is no jury, the court, apportions responsibility for negligence among the parties in the lawsuit (CGS § 52-572h(f)). The fact that the plaintiff's negligence may have been a proximate cause of the damage does not necessarily prevent the plaintiff from receiving compensation (CGS § 52-572h(b)). But if the plaintiff is found more than 50% responsible for the damage, then he cannot be compensated (CGS § 52-572h(b)). The procedural history of this case led to a complicated apportionment of liability between the parties. The case began as four lawsuits, on behalf of the each occupant of the car involved in the crash, including the driver. The passengers each individually sued the town of Seymour, the driver, and the owner of the bar that served the alcohol. The driver sued the town and the bar. Before trial, these individual suits were consolidated. Yet the jury did not read a collective verdict at the end of the trial, but found different levels of liability among the parties. In the lawsuit where the plaintiff was the car driver, the jury divided responsibility equally between the driver and the town. Yet in the other three lawsuits, the jury found the driver 53% responsible, the town 35%, and the bar that served the alcohol 12%. Douglas Mahoney, attorney for the plaintiffs, said that the inconsistency can be explained by settlements between the parties before the jury reached a verdict. In this case, the car driver's family settled with the bar before the verdict, leaving the jury to apportion liability between only two parties, the driver and the town, rather than three parties. Attorney Szilagyi also said that the bar's withdrawal from the driver's lawsuit caused confusion among the jurors and may have led them to reach the dual verdict.

And yet, in the CT case I cited, the jury did hold the town liable.

Where does your local court pick it’s jury pool from? The same liberally indoctrinated people that watch MSM, get college indoctrinated degrees... and watch indoctrinated Hollyweird on TV.

Pretty soon, we’ll be able to sue a taxi driver for going off duty 5 minutes before a drunk leaves the bar. Of course he could have prevented it.

Pretty soon, we’ll be able to sue a taxi driver for going off duty 5 minutes before a drunk leaves the bar. Of course he could have prevented it.

Well, maybe.

I wonder what the liability is if a veteran police officer poisons a neighbor's cat with a fish poisoned with antifreeze, a piece of bait intended to harm a domestic animal. What would the police officer's employer's liability be? Know of any cases like that?

I know a lot of states have laws to protect domestic animals, even crappy ones like rats and hamsters and ferrets, from being killed even if the laws would otherwise allow it if they were not someone's pet.

You may be able to kill feral cats in all 50 states. But a cat or dog or other pet is pretty hard to consider feral, especially if they have a home base and lack hunting skills to feed themselves which is true of a lot of pets, some of whom may kill prey, like a cat killing a mouse, but won't eat it.

You may be able to kill feral cats in all 50 states. But a cat or dog or other pet is pretty hard to consider feral, especially if they have a home base and lack hunting skills to feed themselves which is true of a lot of pets, some of whom may kill prey, like a cat killing a mouse, but won't eat it.

If it’s roaming free... it’s feral.

do·mes·ti·cate (dY-ms′t--k
t′)

tr.v. do·mes·ti·cat·ed, do·mes·ti·cat·ing, do·mes·ti·cates

1. To cause to feel comfortable at home; make domestic.

Wild animals roam. Domestic pets belong on your property or IN your home.

Do you let your cat shit on your neighbors, too? Be honest.

Cats, well, I don't like the little dead-looking spots they cause for a month when they take a big pee on your lawn. But their turds aren't big enough to make a mess out of the mower. So I wouldn't throw a antifreeze-poisoned fish out on the lawn to kill a trespassing cat to keep it from peeing or pooping on my lawn, you know, like some cops would.

We do have a roaming cat problem in the neighborhood though. Including mama cats who keep crapping out litters of kittens. They were down to two kittens, then one disappeared. Last week, I went out to walk and noticed the last kitten, barely able to navigate on its own, was crying and mewling more than a block away in the alley. I think its mama lost track of it and it wandered off. It's probably dead by now if some softie idiot didn't take it in so they could brag to their friends about "rescuing" that poor kitten, blah-blah-blah. So we're back to a couple of mama cats, waiting to get knocked up and have kittens in the spring, of which only one or two will survive to reproduce. But they don't make a big mess or pee on stuff too much. I suppose they do pose a hazard to other cats and the old bat and her granddaughter who feed the cats (sometimes) and let them live under her porch might catch toxoplasmosis from them but that is their business if they want to catch brain diseases from semi-feral cats. It's a free country and people can have all the cat-based brain diseases they want.

We do have a roaming cat problem in the neighborhood though.

You wanna know how that’s caused? lol. Two things.

1) Lazy cat owners like A K A Flip Flop, who are too fucking lazy and cheap to buy cat litter, and clean a fucking litter box. So they love on the cat for an hour a day and allow it to shit on their neighbors for 23.... that’s called love. Then they EXPECT ME TO VALUE THEIR CAT, LIKE THEY DO.

YOUR CAT is no different than a deer to me. You expect too much.

2) Sheep that allow it, and call animal control... and nothing is done.

For the record, I’ve not killed a single kitty, besides a few unfortunate ones that kamikaze ran under my moving vehicle... and I don’t even know if they died. I just can testify that when I looked in the rear view mirror, the vermin was still flopping around like a fish out of water.