What is the point?

Exactly. Why ban bump stocks when you can get the same effect with a belt loop? What the ban is saying is that you can't pull the trigger real fast. What a silly law.

But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification was the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty.

Not really. The court has no idea what they're talking about. If they had a weapon at home it was likely a rifle -- virtually useless for volley fire on the battlefield. For that, a smooth-bore musket was required.

But a musket was useless for hunting because it wasn't that accurate. So citizens would have to purchase one if they were in the state militia.

Interpreting the second amendment correctly would protect the right of "the body of all citizens capable of military service" to keep and bear the weapon of the average soldier -- a full-auto M4 carbine.

Why ban bump stocks when you can get the same effect with a belt loop? What the ban is saying is that you can't pull the trigger real fast. What a silly law.

As I said, they can rewrite the regulation to apply to any miscreant doing anything to make a firearm shoot at a more rapid rate, and back it with a 10-year minimum sentence.

What seems silly is someone hooking up his rifle to his belt to achieve rapid fire and making believe he retains aim ability. Even if alone, he should be prosecuted for reckless endangerment of the woods. A certain part of me yearns to hear a defendant argue that this is a constitutional right.

Not really. The court has no idea what they're talking about.

It is not necessary to persuade you that the court knew what it was talking about. It is only necessary to document what they said in establishing precedent now binding on every lower court, State and Federal, in the land.

While you are entitled to your contrary opinion, it carries zero legal weight.

If you get caught carrying a full-auto M4, you and your legal opinion go to prison.

you and your legal opinion go to prison.

That concept is a little too comprehensive for most that post here, to understand.

What seems silly is someone hooking up his rifle to his belt to achieve rapid fire and making believe he retains aim ability.

No one is claiming he "retains aim ability" except you. He increases his ability to hit the target, however, which is the whole point of shooting it to begin with.

Ever see depictions of 1920's gangsters shooting the "Tommy Gun"? Uh-huh. Shooting from the hip.

"A certain part of me yearns to hear a defendant argue that this is a constitutional right."

Well, it was a constitutional right until 1934. Even after 1934 you were only required to register them. Which is why I'm saying bump stocks should be treated the same way -- legal but registered.

It is only necessary to document what they said in establishing precedent now binding on every lower court, State and Federal, in the land.

The court has no power or ability to find fact. That is left to Congress to be presented in a "finding".

The court was simply making it up as they went along, then concluded that certain weapons were yucky and dangerous and that only government troops should have such weapons -- contrary to original intent of the Founding Fathers.

We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.”

Miller also said the second amendment protects weapons which have a " a "reasonable relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia".

Certainly the full-auto M4 qualifies.

Well, it was a constitutional right until 1934. Even after 1934 you were only required to register them. Which is why I'm saying bump stocks should be treated the same way -- legal but registered.

You are allowed your delusions about constitutional rights in 1934. After 1934, machine guns were made unlawful without the need for a constitutional amendment. In any case, this is 2018 and you do not have a time travel machine.

Bump stocks should be legal and there should be a chicken in every pot. Add ten more items and you can cover the twelve days of Christmas.

Heller at 625:

We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. That accords with the historical understanding of the scope of the right, see Part III, infra.

The court has no power or ability to find fact. That is left to Congress to be presented in a "finding".

As a routine matter, trial courts determine the facts of a case. Congress does not find the facts at a trial. Te ury determines the facts of a case at a jury trial. The judge determines the facts at a bench trial. The judge determines the applicable law at both.

The court was simply making it up as they went along, then concluded that certain weapons were yucky and dangerous and that only government troops should have such weapons -- contrary to original intent of the Founding Fathers.

Your argument that the court was just making it up is something for you to submit to the appellate court after the trial court sentences you to prison.

Your vivid imagination about the Founding Fathers does not replace actual laws or opinions of the courts. Being a curmudgeon does not overturn Heller and McDonald.

Miller also said the second amendment protects weapons which have a " a "reasonable relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia".

Certainly the full-auto M4 qualifies.

As you well know, a full-auto M-4 qualifies for years in prison.

You are still stuck on your repeated, wilfull, knowing and wrongheaded misinterpretation of Miller.

Heller at 623:

Miller stands only for the proposition that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons.

It is particularly wrongheaded to read Miller for more than what it said, because the case did not even purport to be a thorough examination of the Second Amendment.

You may repeatedly insist on being as wrongheaded as you choose, and it will not change the controlling authority of Heller.

Heller at 624-25:

We may as well consider at this point (for we will have to consider eventually) what types of weapons Miller permits. Read in isolation, Miller’s phrase “part of ordinary military equipment” could mean that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected. That would be a startling reading of the opinion, since it would mean that the National Firearms Act’s restrictions on machineguns (not challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional, machineguns being useful in warfare in 1939. We think that Miller’s “ordinary military equipment” language must be read in tandem with what comes after: “[O]rdinarily when called for [militia] service [able-bodied] men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.” 307 U. S., at 179. The traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms “in common use at the time” for lawful purposes like self-defense. “In the colonial and revolutionary war era, [small-arms] weapons used by militiamen and weapons used in defense of person and home were one and the same.” State v. Kessler, 289 Ore. 359, 368, 614 P. 2d 94, 98 (1980) (citing G. Neumann, Swords and Blades of the American Revolution 6–15, 252–254 (1973)). Indeed, that is precisely the way in which the Second Amendment’s operative clause furthers the purpose announced in its preface. We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. That accords with the historical understanding of the scope of the right, see Part III, infra.

It is particularly wrongheaded to read Miller for more than what it said,

Miller said that if a weapon did not have a "reasonable relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia" then it wasn't protected by the second amendment. It's right there in their ruling, for crying out loud.

The Heller decision was a joke. The court started with their conclusion -- a citizen has the right to own a handgun (but no other weapon) for self-defense (and no other purpose) in the home (but nowhere else), then worked backwards to justify how the second amendment protected only that much and no more.

Miller stands only for the proposition that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons.

YES! Only weapons which have a "reasonable relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia". That's what Miller said. It's right there in the ruling.

1.The NFA is intended as a revenue-collecting measure and therefore within the authority of the Department of the Treasury.

2.The defendants transported the shotgun from Oklahoma to Arkansas, and therefore used it in interstate commerce.

3.The Second Amendment protects only the ownership of military-type weapons appropriate for use in an organized militia.

4.The "double barrel 12-gauge Stevens shotgun having a barrel less than 18 inches in length, bearing identification number 76230" was never used in any militia organization.

We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.

WHAT!!! Miller never said that or anything even close to that. It said nothing about "law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes". The Heller court simply made that up!

But Miller DID say that a weapon is not protected by the second amendment UNLESS it had a "reasonable relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia". That, it said.

After 1934, machine guns were made unlawful without the need for a constitutional amendment.

Machine guns were regulated, not made unlawful. Which is why a constitutional amendment was not required.

Even if alone, he should be prosecuted for reckless endangerment of the woods.

Tree-hugging gun grabber!

The Heller decision was a joke.

Your hallucination that your personal brainfart overrides the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Heller is a joke.

Show off your bright, shiny new full-auto machine gun and you will have time in a cell to ponder just what a joke it is.

Heller permits you to be a brave and stubborn keyboard commando.

Only weapons which have a "reasonable relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia". That's what Miller said. It's right there in the ruling.

Being obstinate and obtuse does not change the holding in either Miller or Heller. For the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia went to great lengths to explain the wrongheadedness of your misbegotten interpretation and application of Miller.

While Miller does not really confoict with Heller, Heller strickes down all misbegotten misreadings which could conflict with Heller.

Heller at 620-25:

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

Cite as: 554 U. S. 570 (2008)
620
Opinion of the Court

Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 (1886), held that the right to keep and bear arms was not violated by a law that forbade "bodies of men to associate together as military organiza­tions, or to drill or parade with arms in cities and towns unless authorized by law." Id., at 264-265. This does not refute the individual-rights interpretation of the Amend­ment; no one supporting that interpretation has contended that States may not ban such groups. JUSTICE STEVENS

Cite as: 554 U. S. 570 (2008)
621
Opinion of the Court

presses Presser into service to support his view that the right to bear arms is limited to service in the militia by join­ing Presser's brief discussion of the Second Amendment with a later portion of the opinion making the seemingly relevant (to the Second Amendment) point that the plaintiff was not a member of the state militia. Unfortunately for JUSTICE STEVENS' argument, that later portion deals with the Four­teenth Amendment; it was the Fourteenth Amendment to which the plaintiff's nonmembership in the militia was rele­vant. Thus, JUSTICE STEVENS' statement that Presser "suggested that . . . nothing in the Constitution protected the use of arms outside the context of a militia," post, at 674-675, is simply wrong. Presser said nothing about the Second Amendment's meaning or scope, beyond the fact that it does not prevent the prohibition of private paramilitary organizations.

JUSTICE STEVENS places overwhelming reliance upon this Court's decision in Miller, 307 U. S. 174. "[H]undreds of judges," we are told, "have relied on the view of the Amend­ment we endorsed there," post, at 638, and "[e]ven if the textual and historical arguments on both sides of the issue were evenly balanced, respect for the well-settled views of all of our predecessors on this Court, and for the rule of law itself . . . would prevent most jurists from endorsing such a dramatic upheaval in the law," post, at 639. And what is, according to JUSTICE STEVENS, the holding of Miller that demands such obeisance? That the Second Amendment "protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain mili­tary purposes, but that it does not curtail the Legislature's power to regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons." Post, at 637.

Nothing so clearly demonstrates the weakness of JUSTICE STEVENS' case. Miller did not hold that and cannot possibly be read to have held that. The judgment in the case upheld against a Second Amendment challenge two men's federal indictment for transporting an unregistered short-barreled

622
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court

shotgun in interstate commerce, in violation of the National Firearms Act, 48 Stat. 1236. It is entirely clear that the Court's basis for saying that the Second Amendment did not apply was not that the defendants were "bear[ing] arms" not "for . . . military purposes" but for "nonmilitary use," post, at 637. Rather, it was that the type of weapon at issue was not eligible for Second Amendment protection: "In the ab­sence of any evidence tending to show that the possession or use of a [short-barreled shotgun] at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument." 307 U. S., at 178 (emphasis added). "Cer­tainly," the Court continued, "it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equip­ment or that its use could contribute to the common de­fense." Ibid. Beyond that, the opinion provided no expla­nation of the content of the right.

This holding is not only consistent with, but positively suggests, that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms (though only arms that "have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia"). Had the Court believed that the Second Amendment protects only those serving in the militia, it would have been odd to examine the character of the weapon rather than simply note that the two crooks were not militiamen. JUSTICE STEVENS can say again and again that Miller did not "turn on the difference between muskets and sawed-off shotguns; it turned, rather, on the basic difference between the military and nonmilitary use and possession of guns," post, at 677, but the words of the opinion prove otherwise. The most JUSTICE STEVENS can plausibly claim for Miller is that it declined to decide the nature of the Second Amendment right, despite the Solicitor General's argument (made in the alternative) that the right was collective, see Brief for United States, O. T. 1938,

Cite as: 554 U. S. 570 (2008)
623
Opinion of the Court

No. 696, pp. 4-5. Miller stands only for the proposition that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons.

It is particularly wrongheaded to read Miller for more than what it said, because the case did not even purport to be a thorough examination of the Second Amendment. JUS­TICE STEVENS claims, post, at 676-677, that the opinion reached its conclusion "[a]fter reviewing many of the same sources that are discussed at greater length by the Court today." Not many, which was not entirely the Court's fault. The defendants made no appearance in the case, neither filing a brief nor appearing at oral argument; the Court heard from no one but the Government (reason enough, one would think, not to make that case the beginning and the end of this Court's consideration of the Second Amendment). See Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3N. Y. U. J. L. & Liberty 48, 65-68 (2008). The Government's brief spent two pages discussing English legal sources, concluding "that at least the carrying of weapons without lawful occa­sion or excuse was always a crime" and that (because of the class-based restrictions and the prohibition on terrorizing people with dangerous or unusual weapons) "the early Eng­lish law did not guarantee an unrestricted right to bear arms." Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, No. 696, at 9-11. It then went on to rely primarily on the discussion of the English right to bear arms in Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154, for the proposition that the only uses of arms protected by the Second Amendment are those that relate to the militia, not self-defense. See Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, No. 696, at 12-18. The final section of the brief recognized that "some courts have said that the right to bear arms in­cludes the right of the individual to have them for the protec­tion of his person and property," and launched an alternative argument that "weapons which are commonly used by crimi­nals," such as sawed-off shotguns, are not protected. See id., at 18-21. The Government's Miller brief thus provided

624
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court

scant discussion of the history of the Second Amendment—and the Court was presented with no counterdiscussion. As for the text of the Court's opinion itself, that discusses none of the history of the Second Amendment. It assumes from the prologue that the Amendment was designed to preserve the militia, 307 U. S., at 178 (which we do not dispute), and then reviews some historical materials dealing with the na­ture of the militia, and in particular with the nature of the arms their members were expected to possess, id., at 178-­182. Not a word (not a word) about the history of the Sec­ond Amendment. This is the mighty rock upon which the dissent rests its case.

We may as well consider at this point (for we will have to consider eventually) what types of weapons Miller permits. Read in isolation, Miller's phrase "part of ordinary military equipment" could mean that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected. That would be a startling reading of the opinion, since it would mean that the National Fire­arms Act's restrictions on machineguns (not challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional, machineguns being useful in warfare in 1939. We think that Miller's "ordinary mili­tary equipment" language must be read in tandem with what comes after: "[O]rdinarily when called for [militia] service [able-bodied] men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time." 307 U. S., at 179. The traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms "in common use at the time" for lawful purposes like self-defense. "In the colonial

Cite as: 554 U. S. 570 (2008)
625
Opinion of the Court

and revolutionary war era, [small-arms] weapons used by mi­litiamen and weapons used in defense of person and home were one and the same." State v. Kessler, 289 Ore. 359, 368, 614 P. 2d 94, 98 (1980) (citing G. Neumann, Swords and Blades of the American Revolution 6-15, 252-254 (1973)).

Indeed, that is precisely the way in which the Second Amendment's operative clause furthers the purpose an­nounced in its preface. We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. That accords with the historical understanding of the scope of the right, see Part III, infra.

We conclude that nothing in our precedents forecloses our adoption of the original understanding of the Second Amend­ment.

On March 30, 1939, the Supreme Court heard the case. Attorneys for the United States argued four points: ...

3.The Second Amendment protects only the ownership of military-type weapons appropriate for use in an organized militia.

What matters is what the Court decided, not what anybody argued.

What really matters is the most recent holding the the U.S. Supreme Court which is on point. See Heller and McDonald.

Heller at 625:

We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.

- - - - - - - - - -

Miller never said that or anything even close to that.

Your opinion is noted.

The majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald establish that your opinion is wrong and irrelevant.

Heller at 625:

We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.

Machine guns were regulated, not made unlawful. Which is why a constitutional amendment was not required.

Machine gun prohibition without a constitutional amendment in sight.

Illegal possession or transfer of a machine gun lands one in prison, pursuant to federal law. In my experience, valued items requested by inmates are lawbooks. Once inside, they forget about imaginary law.

https://law.justia.com/codes/us/2016/title-18/part-i/chapter-44/sec.-922/

(o)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun.

(2) This subsection does not apply with respect to—

(A) a transfer to or by, or possession by or under the authority of, the United States or any department or agency thereof or a State, or a department, agency, or political subdivision thereof; or

(B) any lawful transfer or lawful possession of a machinegun that was lawfully possessed before the date this subsection takes effect.

https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-100/pdf/STATUTE-100-Pg449.pdf

Public Law 99-308, 100 Stat. 451 (29 May 1986)

Section 110. Effective Date.

[...]

(c) MACHINEGUN PROHIBITION.—Section 102(9) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

Approved May 19, 1986.

Come and get it you tree hugging libtard Hogg Bro!

Are you going to prison to show the gun grabbers that they cannot take your full-auto machine gun away?

Try and stay on topic, spam-boy.

You really think anyone is going to turn in their bump-stocks?

Tell us all how much you support government goons going door-to-door confiscating them.

Illegal possession or transfer of a machine gun lands one in prison

As it should. So I suggest you fill out the proper paperwork.

We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.

They read wrong. The Miller court itself said the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not having a "reasonable relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia".

Miller said nothing about weapons possessed by "law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes". The Heller court made it up.

What matters is what the Court decided, not what anybody argued.

Correct. Attorneys for the United States argued that the Second Amendment protects only the ownership of military-type weapons appropriate for use in an organized militia.

And the Miller court agreed.

Heller strickes down all misbegotten misreadings

What you call "misbegotten misreadings" I call U.S. Supreme Court precedent.

The traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing ar arms "in common use at the time" for lawful purposes like self-defense.

Miller did NOT say that. I'll quote exactly what they said:

"And further, that ordinarily, when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time."

Period. "... for lawful purposes like self-defense" was added by the Heller court.

And I'll say it again, citizens were expected to appear bearing muskets -- a military, volley-fire weapon -- not rifles. This was codified in the Militia Act of 1792.

Meaning, citizens were expected to show up with military weapons. In today's world, that would be a full-auto M4.

[misterwhite #40 quoting nolu chan #32] What matters is what the Court decided, not what anybody argued.

You left off half of it.

[nolu chan actual #32]

What matters is what the Court decided, not what anybody argued.

What really matters is the most recent holding [of] the U.S. Supreme Court which is on point. See Heller and McDonald.

[misterwhite #40] Correct. Attorneys for the United States argued that the Second Amendment protects only the ownership of military-type weapons appropriate for use in an organized militia.

What the attorneys may, or may not, have argued does not make a shit. Nothing the attorneys argue is even evidence, much less an opinion of the court based upon evidence.

Even if your "wrong headed" interpretation of Miller were not just legally ignorant, the 2008 and 2010 holdings of Heller and McDonald are current precedent and strike down anything in the 1939 Miller opinion which is in conflict with the more recent precedents.

Your observation in #39 that "The Heller court made it up," is just your typical bullshit, and changes nothing. Heller and McDonald are the law, and your rejected and "wrong headed" reading of Miller is not.

[misterwhite #39] Miller said nothing about weapons possessed by "law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes". The Heller court made it up.

[misterwhite #40] What matters is what the Court decided, not what anybody argued.

[misterwhite #41] What you call "misbegotten misreadings" I call U.S. Supreme Court precedent.

[misterwhite #42] Miller did NOT say that. I'll quote exactly what they said:

[misterwhite #42] Meaning, citizens were expected to show up with military weapons. In today's world, that would be a full-auto M4.

What the Heller court matters; your legally ignorant rants in defiance of the prevailing holding of the U.S. Supreme Court do not. Your legally ingorant interpretation of Miller has been explicitly been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court and termed "wrong-headed."

Being obstinate and obtuse does not change the holding in either Miller or Heller. For the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia went to great lengths to explain the wrongheadedness of your misbegotten interpretation and application of Miller.

While Miller does not really conflict with Heller, Heller strikes down all misbegotten misreadings which could conflict with Heller.

Heller at 620-25:

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

Cite as: 554 U. S. 570 (2008)
620
Opinion of the Court

Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 (1886), held that the right to keep and bear arms was not violated by a law that forbade "bodies of men to associate together as military organiza­tions, or to drill or parade with arms in cities and towns unless authorized by law." Id., at 264-265. This does not refute the individual-rights interpretation of the Amend­ment; no one supporting that interpretation has contended that States may not ban such groups. JUSTICE STEVENS

Cite as: 554 U. S. 570 (2008)
621
Opinion of the Court

presses Presser into service to support his view that the right to bear arms is limited to service in the militia by join­ing Presser's brief discussion of the Second Amendment with a later portion of the opinion making the seemingly relevant (to the Second Amendment) point that the plaintiff was not a member of the state militia. Unfortunately for JUSTICE STEVENS' argument, that later portion deals with the Four­teenth Amendment; it was the Fourteenth Amendment to which the plaintiff's nonmembership in the militia was rele­vant. Thus, JUSTICE STEVENS' statement that Presser "suggested that . . . nothing in the Constitution protected the use of arms outside the context of a militia," post, at 674-675, is simply wrong. Presser said nothing about the Second Amendment's meaning or scope, beyond the fact that it does not prevent the prohibition of private paramilitary organizations.

JUSTICE STEVENS places overwhelming reliance upon this Court's decision in Miller, 307 U. S. 174. "[H]undreds of judges," we are told, "have relied on the view of the Amend­ment we endorsed there," post, at 638, and "[e]ven if the textual and historical arguments on both sides of the issue were evenly balanced, respect for the well-settled views of all of our predecessors on this Court, and for the rule of law itself . . . would prevent most jurists from endorsing such a dramatic upheaval in the law," post, at 639. And what is, according to JUSTICE STEVENS, the holding of Miller that demands such obeisance? That the Second Amendment "protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain mili­tary purposes, but that it does not curtail the Legislature's power to regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons." Post, at 637.

Nothing so clearly demonstrates the weakness of JUSTICE STEVENS' case. Miller did not hold that and cannot possibly be read to have held that. The judgment in the case upheld against a Second Amendment challenge two men's federal indictment for transporting an unregistered short-barreled

622
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court

shotgun in interstate commerce, in violation of the National Firearms Act, 48 Stat. 1236. It is entirely clear that the Court's basis for saying that the Second Amendment did not apply was not that the defendants were "bear[ing] arms" not "for . . . military purposes" but for "nonmilitary use," post, at 637. Rather, it was that the type of weapon at issue was not eligible for Second Amendment protection: "In the ab­sence of any evidence tending to show that the possession or use of a [short-barreled shotgun] at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument." 307 U. S., at 178 (emphasis added). "Cer­tainly," the Court continued, "it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equip­ment or that its use could contribute to the common de­fense." Ibid. Beyond that, the opinion provided no expla­nation of the content of the right.

This holding is not only consistent with, but positively suggests, that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms (though only arms that "have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia"). Had the Court believed that the Second Amendment protects only those serving in the militia, it would have been odd to examine the character of the weapon rather than simply note that the two crooks were not militiamen. JUSTICE STEVENS can say again and again that Miller did not "turn on the difference between muskets and sawed-off shotguns; it turned, rather, on the basic difference between the military and nonmilitary use and possession of guns," post, at 677, but the words of the opinion prove otherwise. The most JUSTICE STEVENS can plausibly claim for Miller is that it declined to decide the nature of the Second Amendment right, despite the Solicitor General's argument (made in the alternative) that the right was collective, see Brief for United States, O. T. 1938,

Cite as: 554 U. S. 570 (2008)
623
Opinion of the Court

No. 696, pp. 4-5. Miller stands only for the proposition that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons.

It is particularly wrongheaded to read Miller for more than what it said, because the case did not even purport to be a thorough examination of the Second Amendment. JUS­TICE STEVENS claims, post, at 676-677, that the opinion reached its conclusion "[a]fter reviewing many of the same sources that are discussed at greater length by the Court today." Not many, which was not entirely the Court's fault. The defendants made no appearance in the case, neither filing a brief nor appearing at oral argument; the Court heard from no one but the Government (reason enough, one would think, not to make that case the beginning and the end of this Court's consideration of the Second Amendment). See Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3N. Y. U. J. L. & Liberty 48, 65-68 (2008). The Government's brief spent two pages discussing English legal sources, concluding "that at least the carrying of weapons without lawful occa­sion or excuse was always a crime" and that (because of the class-based restrictions and the prohibition on terrorizing people with dangerous or unusual weapons) "the early Eng­lish law did not guarantee an unrestricted right to bear arms." Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, No. 696, at 9-11. It then went on to rely primarily on the discussion of the English right to bear arms in Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154, for the proposition that the only uses of arms protected by the Second Amendment are those that relate to the militia, not self-defense. See Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, No. 696, at 12-18. The final section of the brief recognized that "some courts have said that the right to bear arms in­cludes the right of the individual to have them for the protec­tion of his person and property," and launched an alternative argument that "weapons which are commonly used by crimi­nals," such as sawed-off shotguns, are not protected. See id., at 18-21. The Government's Miller brief thus provided

624
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court

scant discussion of the history of the Second Amendment—and the Court was presented with no counterdiscussion. As for the text of the Court's opinion itself, that discusses none of the history of the Second Amendment. It assumes from the prologue that the Amendment was designed to preserve the militia, 307 U. S., at 178 (which we do not dispute), and then reviews some historical materials dealing with the na­ture of the militia, and in particular with the nature of the arms their members were expected to possess, id., at 178-­182. Not a word (not a word) about the history of the Sec­ond Amendment. This is the mighty rock upon which the dissent rests its case.

We may as well consider at this point (for we will have to consider eventually) what types of weapons Miller permits. Read in isolation, Miller's phrase "part of ordinary military equipment" could mean that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected. That would be a startling reading of the opinion, since it would mean that the National Fire­arms Act's restrictions on machineguns (not challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional, machineguns being useful in warfare in 1939. We think that Miller's "ordinary mili­tary equipment" language must be read in tandem with what comes after: "[O]rdinarily when called for [militia] service [able-bodied] men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time." 307 U. S., at 179. The traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms "in common use at the time" for lawful purposes like self-defense. "In the colonial

Cite as: 554 U. S. 570 (2008)
625
Opinion of the Court

and revolutionary war era, [small-arms] weapons used by mi­litiamen and weapons used in defense of person and home were one and the same." State v. Kessler, 289 Ore. 359, 368, 614 P. 2d 94, 98 (1980) (citing G. Neumann, Swords and Blades of the American Revolution 6-15, 252-254 (1973)).

Indeed, that is precisely the way in which the Second Amendment's operative clause furthers the purpose an­nounced in its preface. We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. That accords with the historical understanding of the scope of the right, see Part III, infra. ²⁵

We conclude that nothing in our precedents forecloses our adoption of the original understanding of the Second Amend­ment.

[...]

²⁵ Miller was briefly mentioned in our decision in Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55 (1980), an appeal from a conviction for being a felon in posses­sion of a firearm. The challenge was based on the contention that the prior felony conviction had been unconstitutional. No Second Amend­ment claim was raised or briefed by any party. In the course of rejecting the asserted challenge, the Court commented gratuitously, in a footnote, that "[t]hese legislative restrictions on the use of firearms are neither based upon constitutionally suspect criteria, nor do they trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties. See United States v. Miller . . . (the Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have 'some reasonable relationship to the preservation or effi­ciency of a well regulated militia')." Id., at 65-66, n. 8. The footnote then cites several Court of Appeals cases to the same effect. It is incon­ceivable that we would rest our interpretation of the basic meaning of any guarantee of the Bill of Rights upon such a footnoted dictum in a case where the point was not at issue and was not argued.

Come and get it you tree hugging libtard Hogg Bro!

Brandish your brand new 2018 fulll-auto machine gun, nitwit.

Illegal possession or transfer of a machine gun lands one in prison, pursuant to federal law. In my experience, valued items requested by inmates are lawbooks. Once inside, they forget about imaginary law.

https://law.justia.com/codes/us/2016/title-18/part-i/chapter-44/sec.-922/

(o)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun.

(2) This subsection does not apply with respect to—

(A) a transfer to or by, or possession by or under the authority of, the United States or any department or agency thereof or a State, or a department, agency, or political subdivision thereof; or

(B) any lawful transfer or lawful possession of a machinegun that was lawfully possessed before the date this subsection takes effect.

https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-100/pdf/STATUTE-100-Pg449.pdf

Public Law 99-308, 100 Stat. 451 (29 May 1986)

Section 110. Effective Date.

[...]

(c) MACHINEGUN PROHIBITION.—Section 102(9) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

Approved May 19, 1986.

Heller and McDonald are the law,

Meaning you'll shut up about Roe v Wade because it is the law?

On March 30, 1939, the Supreme Court heard the case. Attorneys for the United States argued four points:

1.The NFA is intended as a revenue-collecting measure and therefore within the authority of the Department of the Treasury.

2.The defendants transported the shotgun from Oklahoma to Arkansas, and therefore used it in interstate commerce.

3.The Second Amendment protects only the ownership of military-type weapons appropriate for use in an organized militia.

4.The "double barrel 12-gauge Stevens shotgun having a barrel less than 18 inches in length, bearing identification number 76230" was never used in any militia organization.

This laundry list of bullshit is NOT what the Court found.

[1] The Court did find that the NFA was not unconstitutional as an invasion of the reserved power of the states.

[2] The Court observed that "An indictment in the District Court Western District Arkansas charged that Jack Miller and Frank Layton 'did unlawfully, knowingly, wilfully, and feloniously transport in interstate commerce from the town of Claremore in the State of Oklahoma to the town of Siloam Springs in the State of Arkansas a certain firearm....'"

The Trial court made no finding of fact that the charge was true. The Supreme Court observed NOTHING about it other than reciting the charge in the indictment. The case itself was remanded back to the Trial court, which is the finder of facts.

[3] The Supreme Court did NOT find that the Second Amendment protects only the ownership of military-type weapons appropriate for use in an organized militia. The Supreme Court referred to the weapons in common use by civilians who make up the unorganized militia.

You have been told the difference between the two multiple times and can give up feigning ignorance.

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/246

10 U.S. Code § 246 - Militia: composition and classes

(a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of title 32, under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of female citizens of the United States who are members of the National Guard.

(b) The classes of the militia are—

(1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the Naval Militia; and

(2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia.

(Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 14, §?311; Pub. L. 85–861, §1(7), Sept. 2, 1958, 72 Stat. 1439; Pub. L. 103–160, div. A, title V, §524(a), Nov. 30, 1993, 107 Stat. 1656; renumbered §246, Pub. L. 114–328, div. A, title XII, §1241(a)(2), Dec. 23, 2016, 130 Stat. 2497.)

[4] The Supreme Court did NOT find that the "double barrel 12-gauge Stevens shotgun having a barrel less than 18 inches in length, bearing identification number 76230" was never used in any militia organization.

Try to quote that fictional bullshit from the Opinion of the Court.

The brief for the government, filed with first named attorney being Robert H. Jackson, Solicitor General, cited a list of cases and then stated:

That the foregoing cases conclusively establish that the Second Amendment has relation only to the right of the people to keep and bear arms only for lawful purposes and does not conceivably relate to weapons of the type referred to in the National Firearms Act cannot be doubted. Sawed-off shotguns, sawed off rifles and machine guns are clearly weapons which can have no legitimate use in the hands of private citizens. On the contrary they frequently constitute the arsenal of the "public enemy" and the "gangster" and are not weapons of the character which, as was said in People v. Brown, 253 Mich. 537, 542, are recognized by the common opinion of good citizens as proper for defence.

"And further, that ordinarily, when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time."

Period. "... for lawful purposes like self-defense" was added by the Heller court.

The actual opinion in Miller demonstrates what a load of shit your are attempting to shovel. Miller explicitly referred to a militia comprised of civilians, using "arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time." Miller explicitly distinguished these civilians from troops.

The Court referred to the arms in common use by civilians.

United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) [footnotes omitted]

MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

An indictment in the District Court, Western District Arkansas, charged that Jack Miller and Frank Layton

"did unlawfully, knowingly, willfully, and feloniously transport in interstate commerce from the town of Claremore in the State of Oklahoma to the town of Siloam Springs in the State of Arkansas a certain firearm, to-wit, a double barrel 12-gauge Stevens shotgun having a barrel less than 18 inches in length, bearing identification number 76230, said defendants, at the time of so transporting said firearm in interstate commerce as aforesaid, not having registered said firearm as required by Section 1132d of Title 26, United States Code (Act of June 26, 1934, c. 737, Sec. 4 [§ 5], 48 Stat. 1237), and not having in their possession a stamp-affixed written order for said firearm as provided by Section 1132c, Title 2, United States Code (June 26, 1934, c. 737, Sec. 4, 48 Stat. 1237) and the regulations issued under authority of the said Act of Congress known as the 'National Firearms Act,' approved June 26, 1934, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the United States."

307 U. S. 176

A duly interposed demurrer alleged: the National Firearms Act is not a revenue measure, but an attempt to usurp police power reserved to the States, and is therefore unconstitutional. Also, it offends the inhibition of the Second Amendment to the Constitution -- "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."

307 U. S. 177

The District Court held that section eleven of the Act violates the Second Amendment. It accordingly sustained the demurrer and quashed the indictment.

The cause is here by direct appeal.

Considering Sonzinsky v. United States (1937), 300 U. S. 506, 300 U. S. 513, and what was ruled in sundry causes arising

307 U. S. 178

under the Harrison Narcotic Act -- United States v. Jin Fuey Moy (1916), 241 U. S. 394, United States v. Doremus (1919), 249 U. S. 86, 249 U. S. 94; Linder v. United States (1925), 268 U. S. 5; Alston v. United States (1927), 274 U. S. 289; Nigro v. United States (1928), 276 U. S. 332 -- the objection that the Act usurps police power reserved to the States is plainly untenable.

In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment, or that its use could contribute to the common defense. Aymette v. State, 2 Humphreys (Tenn.) 154, 158.

The Constitution, as originally adopted, granted to the Congress power -- "To suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such forces, the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.

The Militia which the States were expected to maintain and train is set in contrast with Troops which they

307 U. S. 179

were forbidden to keep without the consent of Congress. The sentiment of the time strongly disfavored standing armies; the common view was that adequate defense of country and laws could be secured through the Militia -- civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion.

The signification attributed to the term Militia appears from the debates in the Convention, the history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of approved commentators. These show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. "A body of citizens enrolled for military discipline." And further, that ordinarily, when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.

Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol. 2, Ch. 13, p. 409 points out "that king Alfred first settled a national militia in this kingdom," and traces the subsequent development and use of such forces.

Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, Book V, Ch. 1, contains an extended account of the Militia. It is there said: "Men of republican principles have been jealous of a standing army as dangerous to liberty."

"In a militia, the character of the labourer, artificer, or tradesman, predominates over that of the soldier: in a standing army, that of the soldier predominates over every other character, and in this distinction seems to consist the essential difference between those two different species of military force."

"The American Colonies In The 17th Century," Osgood, Vol. 1, ch. XIII, affirms in reference to the early system of defense in New England --

"In all the colonies, as in England, the militia system was based on the principle of the assize of arms. This implied the general obligation of all adult male inhabitants to possess arms, and, with certain exceptions, to

307 U. S. 180

cooperate in the work of defence."

"The possession of arms also implied the possession of ammunition, and the authorities paid quite as much attention to the latter as to the former." "A year later [1632] it was ordered that any single man who had not furnished himself with arms might be put out to service, and this became a permanent part of the legislation of the colony [Massachusetts]."

Also,

"Clauses intended to insure the possession of arms and ammunition by all who were subject to military service appear in all the important enactments concerning military affairs. Fines were the penalty for delinquency, whether of towns or individuals. According to the usage of the times, the infantry of Massachusetts consisted of pikemen and musketeers. The law, as enacted in 1649 and thereafter, provided that each of the former should be armed with a pike, corselet, head-piece, sword, and knapsack. The musketeer should carry a 'good fixed musket,' not under bastard musket bore, not less than three feet, nine inches, nor more than four feet three inches in length, a priming wire, scourer, and mould, a sword, rest, bandoleers, one pound of powder, twenty bullets, and two fathoms of match. The law also required that two-thirds of each company should be musketeers."

The General Court of Massachusetts, January Session 1784, provided for the organization and government of the Militia. It directed that the Train Band should "contain all able bodied men, from sixteen to forty years of age, and the Alarm List, all other men under sixty years of age, . . ." Also,

"That every noncommissioned officer and private soldier of the said militia not under the controul of parents, masters or guardians, and being of sufficient ability therefor in the judgment of the Selectmen of the town in which he shall dwell, shall equip himself, and be constantly provided with a good fire arm,"

etc.

By an Act passed April 4, 1786, the New York Legislature directed:

"That every able-bodied Male Person, being

Page 307 U. S. 181

a Citizen of this State, or of any of the United States, and residing in this State, (except such Persons as are hereinafter excepted) and who are of the Age of Sixteen, and under the Age of Forty-five Years, shall, by the Captain or commanding Officer of the Beat in which such Citizens shall reside, within four Months after the passing of this Act, be enrolled in the Company of such Beat. . . . That every Citizen so enrolled and notified shall, within three Months thereafter, provide himself, at his own Expense, with a good Musket or Firelock, a sufficient Bayonet and Belt, a Pouch with a Box therein to contain not less than Twenty-four Cartridges suited to the Bore of his Musket or Firelock, each Cartridge containing a proper Quantity of Powder and Ball, two spare Flints, a Blanket and Knapsack; . . ."

The General Assembly of Virginia, October, 1785, (12 Hening's Statutes) declared,

"The defense and safety of the commonwealth depend upon having its citizens properly armed and taught the knowledge of military duty."

It further provided for organization and control of the Militia, and directed that "All free male persons between the ages of eighteen and fifty years," with certain exceptions, "shall be inrolled or formed into companies." "There shall be a private muster of every company once in two months."

Also that

"Every officer and soldier shall appear at his respective muster-field on the day appointed, by eleven o'clock in the forenoon, armed, equipped, and accoutred, as follows: . . . every non-commissioned officer and private with a good, clean musket carrying an ounce ball, and three feet eight inches long in the barrel, with a good bayonet and iron ramrod well fitted thereto, a cartridge box properly made, to contain and secure twenty cartridges fitted to his musket, a good knapsack and canteen, and moreover, each non-commissioned officer and private shall have at every muster one pound of good

Page 307 U. S. 182

powder, and four pounds of lead, including twenty blind cartridges, and each serjeant shall have a pair of moulds fit to cast balls for their respective companies, to be purchased by the commanding officer out of the monies arising on delinquencies. Provided, That the militia of the counties westward of the Blue Ridge, and the counties below adjoining thereto, shall not be obliged to be armed with muskets, but may have good rifles with proper accoutrements, in lieu thereof. And every of the said officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, shall constantly keep the aforesaid arms, accoutrements, and ammunition ready to be produced whenever called for by his commanding officer. If any private shall make it appear to the satisfaction of the court hereafter to be appointed for trying delinquencies under this act that he is so poor that he cannot purchase the arms herein required, such court shall cause them to be purchased out of the money arising from delinquents."

Most if not all of the States have adopted provisions touching the right to keep and bear arms. Differences in the language employed in these have naturally led to somewhat variant conclusions concerning the scope of the right guaranteed. But none of them seems to afford any material support for the challenged ruling of the court below.

In the margin, some of the more important opinions and comments by writers are cited.

We are unable to accept the conclusion of the court below, and the challenged judgment must be reversed. The cause will be remanded for further proceedings.

Meaning you'll shut up about Roe v Wade because it is the law?

Roe is the law. I have never made believe otherwise. You are bulbbering absolute bullshit about Miller and denying that Heller and McDonald are the law.

The brief for the government in Miller, filed with first named attorney being Robert H. Jackson, Solicitor General, cited a list of cases and then stated:

That the foregoing cases conclusively establish that the Second Amendment has relation only to the right of the people to keep and bear arms only for lawful purposes and does not conceivably relate to weapons of the type referred to in the National Firearms Act cannot be doubted. Sawed-off shotguns, sawed off rifles and machine guns are clearly weapons which can have no legitimate use in the hands of private citizens. On the contrary they frequently constitute the arsenal of the "public enemy" and the "gangster" and are not weapons of the character which, as was said in People v. Brown, 253 Mich. 537, 542, are recognized by the common opinion of good citizens as proper for defence.

"... denying that Heller and McDonald are the law."

Oh, please. I never denied they were the law. I said I disagreed with the decisions and stated why. Quite succinctly, I might add.

"The brief for the government in Miller ..."

Brief schmeef. The prosecution is free to say what it wants. But the NFA did not ban those weapons. It merely taxed them. If Mr. Miller had a machine gun with a tax stamp he would never have been arrested.

as was said in People v. Brown, 253 Mich. 537, 542,

In 1931, Mr. Brown (a habitual criminal) was caught carrying a blackjack in violation of Michigan state law. He claimed second amendment protection.

This case took place three years before the National Firearms Act was written and had nothing to do with it. Mr. Brown violated STATE law, and states certainly have the power to define which weapons are suitable for their own militia.

Oh, please. I never denied they were the law. I said I disagreed with the decisions and stated why. Quite succinctly, I might add.

You mean this stream of bullshit???

[misterwhite #24] The Heller decision was a joke.

[misterwhite #26] On March 30, 1939, the Supreme Court heard the case. Attorneys for the United States argued four points: ... 3.The Second Amendment protects only the ownership of military-type weapons appropriate for use in an organized militia. [boldface by misterwhite]

[misterwhite #27] WHAT!!! Miller never said that or anything even close to that. It said nothing about "law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes". The Heller court simply made that up!

[misterwhite #28] Machine guns were regulated, not made unlawful. Which is why a constitutional amendment was not required.

[misterwhite #39] Miller said nothing about weapons possessed by "law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes". The Heller court made it up.

[misterwhite #40] Attorneys for the United States argued that the Second Amendment protects only the ownership of military-type weapons appropriate for use in an organized militia.

[misterwhite #41] What you call "misbegotten misreadings" I call U.S. Supreme Court precedent.

[misterwhite #42] Miller did NOT say that. I'll quote exactly what they said:

[misterwhite #42] Meaning, citizens were expected to show up with military weapons. In today's world, that would be a full-auto M4.

What the Heller court said matters; your legally ignorant rants in defiance of the prevailing holding of the U.S. Supreme Court do not. Your legally ingorant interpretation of Miller has been explicitly been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court and termed "wrong-headed."

Being obstinate and obtuse does not change the holding in either Miller or Heller. For the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia went to great lengths to explain the wrongheadedness of your misbegotten interpretation and application of Miller.

While Miller does not really conflict with Heller, Heller strikes down all misbegotten misreadings of Miller which could conflict with Heller.

"The brief for the government in Miller ..."

Brief schmeef. The prosecution is free to say what it wants.

Remember your brain dead bullshit. I will remind you of what you said as many times as your short term memory loss requires.

[misterwhite #40] Attorneys for the United States argued that the Second Amendment protects only the ownership of military-type weapons appropriate for use in an organized militia.

[misterwhite #42] Meaning, citizens were expected to show up with military weapons. In today's world, that would be a full-auto M4.

Of course, the Second Amendment does not protect military-type weapons appropriate for use in an organized militia. It protects weapons in common use by ordinary citizens in the UNORGANIZED militia.

[misterwhite #51] In 1931, Mr. Brown (a habitual criminal) was caught carrying a blackjack in violation of Michigan state law. He claimed second amendment protection.

You have an unerring aim for the capillaries. You really think that paragraph was about Brown? No, you just like to be an asshole when you serve up the same bullshit argument over and over, and it get exposed as bullshit.

Where did your creative account of the argument in Miller come from? The indictment?

The brief for the government, filed with first named attorney being Robert H. Jackson, Solicitor General, cited a list of cases and then stated:

That the foregoing cases conclusively establish that the Second Amendment has relation only to the right of the people to keep and bear arms only for lawful purposes and does not conceivably relate to weapons of the type referred to in the National Firearms Act cannot be doubted. Sawed-off shotguns, sawed off rifles and machine guns are clearly weapons which can have no legitimate use in the hands of private citizens. On the contrary they frequently constitute the arsenal of the "public enemy" and the "gangster" and are not weapons of the character which, as was said in People v. Brown, 253 Mich. 537, 542, are recognized by the common opinion of good citizens as proper for defence.

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/246

10 U.S. Code § 246 - Militia: composition and classes

(a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of title 32, under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of female citizens of the United States who are members of the National Guard.

(b) The classes of the militia are—

(1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the Naval Militia; and

(2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia.

(Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 14, §?311; Pub. L. 85–861, §1(7), Sept. 2, 1958, 72 Stat. 1439; Pub. L. 103–160, div. A, title V, §524(a), Nov. 30, 1993, 107 Stat. 1656; renumbered §246, Pub. L. 114–328, div. A, title XII, §1241(a)(2), Dec. 23, 2016, 130 Stat. 2497.)

Richard Hamblen tried your argument in court. His convictions were upheld.

https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-6th-circuit/1498418.html

United States Court of Appeals,Sixth Circuit.

Richard HAMBLEN, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 09-5025.
Decided: December 30, 2009

Petitioner Richard Hamblen appeals the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, claiming that his convictions for possession of machine guns, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), and possession of unregistered firearms, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), are unconstitutional. Because the Second Amendment does not confer an unrestricted individual right to keep and bear machine guns, we affirm the district court's judgment and deny Hamblen's petition for relief.

[...]

In 2005, Hamblen was charged in a two-count indictment for unlawfully possessing machine guns, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), and possessing unregistered firearms, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). After trial, he was convicted on both counts of the indictment. The district court denied Hamblen's motion for judgment of acquittal, which was based on the allegedly unconstitutional infringement of Hamblen's Second Amendment rights that he claimed would result from his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). In 2006, Hamblen was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of fifteen months for each count, to run concurrently, followed by a two-year period of supervised release.

Hamblen appealed his convictions and two concurrent sentences. United States v. Hamblen, 239 Fed.Appx. 130 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 992, 128 S.Ct. 523, 169 L.Ed.2d 343 (2007). Holding that the statutory prohibition against possessing machine guns did not violate the Second Amendment right to bear arms as applied to Hamblen, that the statutory prohibition against possessing machine guns was not unconstitutionally vague as applied, and that the statutory prohibition against possessing unregistered firearms was not unconstitutional as applied, this court affirmed the judgment of the district court. Id. at 134-37. In 2008, Hamblen filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. The district court denied the motion and issued a certificate of appealability on Hamblen's Second Amendment claim.

[...]

DISCUSSION

The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” In interpreting the scope of the Second Amendment, we are guided by District of Columbia v. Heller, --- U.S. ----, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008). We note, as a preliminary matter, that Hamblen's possession of nine unregistered machine guns was not only outside the scope of his duties as a member of the State Guard, but also directly violated State Guard policy. Therefore, this case does not present a novel issue of law regarding the Second Amendment's prefatory clause.

Hamblen's challenge to his conviction for unlawful possession of unregistered machine guns has been directly foreclosed by the Supreme Court, which specifically instructed in Heller that “the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.” Id. at 2815-16. Moreover, the Heller Court expressly rejected Hamblen's reading of United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939), when it opined that it would be a “startling” interpretation of precedent to suggest that restrictions on machine guns, set forth in the National Firearms Act, might be unconstitutional. See Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2815. Thus, whatever the individual right to keep and bear arms might entail, it does not authorize an unlicensed individual to possess unregistered machine guns for personal use.

AFFIRMED.

Attorneys for the United States argued that the Second Amendment pr protec pr protects only the ownership of military-type weapons appropriate for use in an or organ or organized militia.

I see the problem here. You read that as, "... the Second Amendment protects only the ownership of military-type weapons appropriate for use in an organized militia."

You've completely changed the meaning from "weapons suitable for use in a Militia" to "weapons for use by a Militia. Not what was said.

Keep in mind -- Miller was about the weapon itself. Militia membership had nothing to do with the case.

What the Heller court said matters;

And what the Miller court said doesn't?

"While Miller does not really conflict with Heller …"

Heller conflicts with the U.S. Supreme Court precedent set in Miller at every level. First, Miller was ONLY about the weapon and whether or not it was suitable for use by a State Militia. The U.S. Supreme Court didn't know, so they remanded the case back to the lower court and told them to find out.

The Heller court ignored Miller and took it upon themselves to not only decide which weapons were protected by the second amendment but also who could own them and how they could be used. Judicial activism at it's finest.

You mean this stream of bullshit???

What you call "stream of bullshit" I call "coherent arguments which you have yet to refute". Instead you hide behind "What they ruled is the law and how dare you question it".

That the foregoing cases conclusively establish that the Second Amendment has relation only to the right of the people to keep and bear arms only for lawful purposes and does not conceivably relate to weapons of the type referred to in the National Firearms Act cannot be doubted. Sawed-off shotguns, sawed off rifles and machine guns are clearly weapons which can have no legitimate use in the hands of private citizens.

Mr. Jackson was basically citing verbiage from the National Firearms Act of 1934 passed 5 years before. Miller was challenging that Act as a violation of the second amendment.

Here's the irony. Had Mr. Miller been transporting an unlicensed machine gun, I believe the U.S. Supreme Court would have ruled the National Firearms Act unconstitutional since a machine gun was obviously suitable for use by a militia, and would have overturned Mr. Miller's conviction.

As it was, the U.S. Supreme Court didn't know whether or not a sawed-off shotgun qualified. I'm sure the omniscient Heller court wouldn't have let that stop them from deciding on their own whether or not it qualified.

10 U.S. Code § 246 - Militia: composition and classes

Miller was NOT about Militias. Stop trashing the thread with that bullshit. Miller was SOLELY about the weapon.

"Hamblen's challenge to his conviction for unlawful possession of unregistered machine guns has been directly foreclosed by the Supreme Court, which specifically instructed in Heller"

Yep. Heller ignored Miller and totally screwed up the second amendment and the people's right to bear arms suitable to fend off an out-of-control government.

When government troops come-a-knockin' you can use your self- defense handgun to fight them off.

Moreover, the Heller Court expressly rejected Hamblen's reading of United States v. Miller ... when it opined that it would be a “startling” interpretation of precedent to suggest that restrictions on machine guns, set forth in the National Firearms Act, might be unconstitutional.

Of course the Heller court rejected it. I mean, the Miller court said that second amendment only protected the weapons used by a Militia. Surely the Founding Fathers were joking.

[misterwhite #54] "Attorneys for the United States argued that the Second Amendment pr protec pr protects only the ownership of military-type weapons appropriate for use in an or organ or organized militia."

[misterwhite #54] 'I see the problem here. You read that as, "... the Second Amendment protects only the ownership of military-type weapons appropriate for use in an organized militia."'

[misterwhite #54] 'You've completely changed the meaning from "weapons suitable for use in a Militia" to "weapons for use by a Militia. Not what was said.'

All four quotes are direct quotes of you. You have found that you have completely changed your own words.

What is your source for what the "Attorneys for the United States" argued in the U.S. Supreme Court? The Indictment filed in the District Court?

In the lone brief submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court, the government presented one lone question to the court.

question presented

Whether the District Court erred in sustaining the demurrer of the appellees to the indictment on the ground that Section 11 of the National Firearms Act is invalid as contravening the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Richard Hamblen enlisted in the Tennessee State Militia. He took it upon himself to possess unregistered machine guns appropriate for use in the Tennessee State Militia. Such machine guns were not protected by the Second Amendment, and were not lawful for his possession. Richard "Dick" Hamblen was convicted of felonies and sentenced to prison.

The 6th Circuit Court found,

Hamblen's challenge to his conviction for unlawful possession of unregistered machine guns has been directly foreclosed by the Supreme Court, which specifically instructed in Heller that “the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”

Do try harder to stop being an idiot.

Richard Hamblen enlisted in the Tennessee State Guard. He obtained his own full-auto machine guns and stood ready to use them for Guard and Country. His 2nd Amendment argument failed and he was convicted for unlawful possession and sentenced to prison. It's a sad story.

In Hamblen v. United States, 3:08-1034, TNMD (8 Dec 2008), the court found,

Thus, the Heller Court made clear that the Second Amendment right it recognized did not include possession of weapons by certain categories of individuals, or possession of weapons in certain places, or possession of certain types of weapons. The Court specifically discussed the types of weapons that were not protected by the Second Amendment in distinguishing the Miller case:

Read in isolation, Miller's phrase 'part of ordinary military equipment' could mean that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected. That would be a startling reading of the opinion, since it would mean that the National Firearms Act's restrictions on machineguns (not challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional, machineguns being useful in warfare in 1939. . . . We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. . . .

128 S.Ct. at 2815-16.

The conclusion that the Heller Court did not extend Second Amendment protection to machine guns, in particular, is supported by the lower federal courts that have addressed the issue. In United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 873-74 (8th Cir. 2008), the Eighth Circuit held that the defendant's possession of a machine gun was not protected by the Second Amendment under Heller: "Machine guns are not in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and therefore fall within the category of dangerous and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit for individual use."

In United States v. Gilbert, 286 Fed. Appx. 383, 2008 WL 2740453 (9th Cir. July 15, 2008), the Ninth Circuit approved a jury instruction that an individual does not have a Second Amendment right to possess a machine gun or a short-barreled rifle. The court explained that under Heller, "individuals still do not have the right to possess machineguns or short-barreled rifles, as Gilbert did . . ." 286 Fed. Appx. at 386.2

The Petitioner argues that the limitations placed on the Second Amendment right to bear arms by the majority opinion in Heller can not square with the Court's earlier decision in Miller. Whatever merit there is to that argument, however, this Court is bound by the Heller opinion as written.

As in Hamblen, whatever merit there is to your Miller argument, today's courts are bound by the Heller opinion as written.

Richard "Dick" Hamblen got himself some full-auto machine guns. Dick went to prison. Don't be a Dick.

Your supplemental stream of bullshit is noted and taken under advisement.

What the Heller court said matters;

And what the Miller court said doesn't?

No, it doesn't.

The Heller opinion finds it has no conflict with Miller.

You find that Miller conflicts with Heller and you engage in a never ending stream of bullshit to explain how and why.

It does not matter. If there is a conflict between the holdings of Miller and Heller as you contend, Heller takes precedence as the most recent statement of the law by the Supreme Court and strikes down your imaginary conflicting Miller holdings.

Heller found,

We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. That accords with the historical understanding of the scope of the right, see Part III, infra.

We conclude that nothing in our precedents forecloses our adoption of the original understanding of the Second Amend­ment.

Heller struck down any other interpretation of Miller, including your creative brainfarts. But do prattle on if it makes you feel better. Just be aware that your worngheaded prattling does not change Heller or McDonald.

In Hamblen v. United States, 3:08-1034, TNMD (8 Dec 2008), the court found,

The Petitioner argues that the limitations placed on the Second Amendment right to bear arms by the majority opinion in Heller can not square with the Court's earlier decision in Miller. Whatever merit there is to that argument, however, this Court is bound by the Heller opinion as written.

As in Hamblen, whatever merit there is to your Miller argument, today's courts are bound by the Heller opinion as written.

Richard "Dick" Hamblen got himself some full-auto machine guns. Dick went to prison. Don't be a Dick.

What you call "stream of bullshit" I call "coherent arguments which you have yet to refute". Instead you hide behind "What they ruled is the law and how dare you question it".

If calling your stream of bullshit "coherent arguments," by all means indulge yourself. Of course, as long as you are a good boy and do what the law says, you are free to say the courts are wrong and you are right.

Richard Hamblen enlisted in the Tennessee State Guard. He obtained his own full-auto machine guns and stood ready to use them for Guard and Country. His 2nd Amendment argument failed and he was convicted for unlawful possession and sentenced to prison. It's a sad story.

In Hamblen v. United States, 3:08-1034, TNMD (8 Dec 2008), the court found,

Thus, the Heller Court made clear that the Second Amendment right it recognized did not include possession of weapons by certain categories of individuals, or possession of weapons in certain places, or possession of certain types of weapons. The Court specifically discussed the types of weapons that were not protected by the Second Amendment in distinguishing the Miller case:

Read in isolation, Miller's phrase 'part of ordinary military equipment' could mean that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected. That would be a startling reading of the opinion, since it would mean that the National Firearms Act's restrictions on machineguns (not challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional, machineguns being useful in warfare in 1939. . . . We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. . . .

128 S.Ct. at 2815-16.

The conclusion that the Heller Court did not extend Second Amendment protection to machine guns, in particular, is supported by the lower federal courts that have addressed the issue. In United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 873-74 (8th Cir. 2008), the Eighth Circuit held that the defendant's possession of a machine gun was not protected by the Second Amendment under Heller: "Machine guns are not in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and therefore fall within the category of dangerous and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit for individual use."

In United States v. Gilbert, 286 Fed. Appx. 383, 2008 WL 2740453 (9th Cir. July 15, 2008), the Ninth Circuit approved a jury instruction that an individual does not have a Second Amendment right to possess a machine gun or a short-barreled rifle. The court explained that under Heller, "individuals still do not have the right to possess machineguns or short-barreled rifles, as Gilbert did . . ." 286 Fed. Appx. at 386.2

The Petitioner argues that the limitations placed on the Second Amendment right to bear arms by the majority opinion in Heller can not square with the Court's earlier decision in Miller. Whatever merit there is to that argument, however, this Court is bound by the Heller opinion as written.

As in Hamblen, whatever merit there is to your Miller argument, today's courts are bound by the Heller opinion as written.

Richard "Dick" Hamblen got himself some full-auto machine guns. Dick went to prison. Don't be a Dick.

Your supplemental stream of bullshit is noted and taken under advisement.