Wilson Vs. Arkansas

The Court read its earlier Wilson opinion to suggest that such circumstances might include those:

* which present a threat of physical violence

* where there is "reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given"

* where knocking and announcing would be dangerous or "futile"

The Court expressly stated that whether reasonable suspicion exists depends in no way on whether police must destroy property in order to enter.[9]

In a similar manner, where officers reasonably believe that exigent circumstances, such as the destruction of evidence or danger to officers will exist, a no-knock warrant may be issued.

For those of you that claim we don’t live in a police state, I give you this recent Michigan Appeals Court ruling.

For those who think this dirtbag writer for one of Deckard's wingnut rags actually read the Court opinion, I present relevant quotes and the whole opinion to decidie for yourselves.

When Brennan finally opened his door, officer Dawson forced him to take a breathalyzer and arrested him for a probation violation even though he blew a 0.000.

All of this was done without a warrant. (Warrantless breathalyzer tests was not a condition of Brennan’s probation.)

If you think, it is obvious to any reasonable person that his rights were violated. Then you don’t know how the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals interprets the Constitution.

Brennan was subject to unannounced drug tests as a condition of his probation.

At page 11,

Of course, Brennan was subject to at least some warrantless intrusions because his probation required him to take randomly administered breath tests on demand.

Dawson, had qualified immunity.

Brennan at 2

We hold that Dawson violated Brennan’s Fourth Amendment rights when he repeatedly entered and circled the close perimeter of Brennan’s home — remaining fully within its curtilage — searching for Brennan without a warrant. Nevertheless, qualified immunity applies here because the scope of Dawson’s implied license to enter and remain on Brennan’s curtilage was not clearly established when the constitutional violation occurred. Brennan’s remaining claims are also not well-taken. Although we provide no relief to Brennan, we are establishing some limits to a police officer’s implied license to enter and search a home’s curtilage without a warrant.

Because it was unclear how long Dawson could properly remain on Brennan's property after making legal entry, Brennan was covered by qualified immunity. Because the Court opinion made it clear for all future cases, the Daily Sheeple headline is deliberate bullshit.

Let’s get back to the ruling; judge John Nalabandian said that officer Dawson did violate Brennan’s Fourth Amendment rights by searching him without a warrant. All is good so far, right?

This is just fairy tale bullshit. The unlawful search was the prolonged search of the outside property without a warrant, not a search of Brennan or his house.

Brennan at 5:

In January 2016, Brennan filed a five-count complaint against Dawson, Clare County Sheriff John Wilson, and Clare County, Michigan, alleging that the Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Brennan sought equitable and monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count I alleged that Dawson exceeded his implied license to enter Brennan’s property and thus violated Brennan’s Fourth Amendment rights. Count II alleged that the breath test administered on Brennan constituted an illegal search. Counts III and V alleged that Dawson’s arrest of Brennan for failing to comply with his probation was an illegal seizure. Finally, Count IV alleged that Wilson and Clare County, Michigan, failed to adequately train the Clare County deputies and are therefore liable for the constitutional violations.

As may be readily seen, there is no complaint by Brennan alleging an unlawful search of his person or his house. Brennan alleged an unlawful search of the area adjacent to his house (the curtilage).

Not quite, Nalabandian went on to say “police actions that violate the Constitution do not lead to liability.”

Nalabandian said this in the opening paragraph, on page 1. He went on to say everything else in the opinion.

Plaintiff-Appellant Joshua Brennan accuses Dawson of searching his curtilage without a warrant and arresting him for a probation violation without probable cause. As with most civil rights cases that allege Fourth Amendment violations, this one comes with a few twists. And those twists, as they often do, mean that even actions that violate the Constitution do not lead to liability.

When the officer enjoys qualified immunity, he is not civilly liable for damages.

Qualified Immunity. Affirmative defense which shields public officials performing discretionary functions from civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which reasonable person would have known. Lowe v. Letsinger, C.A. Ind. 772 F.2d 308.

Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.

Lowe states, "We note that the clerk may still enjoy immunity under the qualified immunity doctrine. Under this doctrine a public official is shielded from liability if, when he engaged in the alleged violative conduct, the law was not so clearly established that he should have known that it was unconstitutional conduct, or if extraordinary circumstances otherwise excuse his violative conduct. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2736-39, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982); Coleman v. Frantz, 754 F.2d 719, 725-31 (7th Cir. 1985)."

Regarding an unlawful arrest claim made by Brennan, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Brennan, the Court found Dawson had probable cause to make the arrest.

Brennan alleges that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Dawson on his unlawful arrest claim. Brennan contends that, at the very least, there is a genuine dispute of material fact on whether Dawson had probable cause to arrest him for violating the terms of his probation.

Constitutional Violation. A plaintiff who brings an unlawful arrest claim under § 1983 must show that the officer lacked probable cause to make the arrest and in doing so violated his constitutional rights. Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 498 (6th Cir. 2009). When reviewing the claim, this court interprets both state and federal law. Kennedy v. City of Villa Hills, Ky., 635 F.3d 210, 215 (6th Cir. 2011). We look to state law to evaluate the offense for which the officer made the arrest and to federal law to determine whether the officer had probable cause to make the arrest. Id.

Dawson arrested Brennan for a probation violation, under which an officer may arrest a person without first obtaining a warrant if the officer has “reasonable cause to believe the person . . . has violated 1 or more conditions of a . . . probation order imposed by a court of this state, another state, Indian tribe, or United States Territory.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 764.15(g). When determining whether the officer had probable cause to make an arrest, we “examine the totality of the circumstances, and we may ‘consider only the information possessed by the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.’” Everson, 556 F.3d at 498 (quoting Harris v. Bornhorst, 513 F.3d 503, 511 (6th Cir. 2008)). “A finding of probable cause does not require evidence that is completely convincing or even evidence that would be admissible at trial; all that is required is that the evidence be sufficient to lead a reasonable officer to conclude that the arrestee has committed or is committing a crime.” Harris, 513 F.3d at 511.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Brennan, we conclude that Dawson had probable cause to make the arrest.

https://www.scribd.com/document/391823985/Brennan-v-Dawson-17-2210-6th-Cir-15-Oct-2018-Qualified-Immunity

I have to agree with you on this one, nolu chan. The appellant believes they are entitled to some constitutional rights despite they are under a probation period. During a probation period, the judge issues orders that appellant is obligated to follow through with. Now when that probation period is over, then those orders may no longer apply. Then, Brennan may proceed to allege constitutional violations. But in this case, the probation period was still in place and therefore the police do have a qualified immunity from personal suits being brought against them.