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This was an email from the site above..

LOCAL Lawyer: Veteran arrested for "bad thoughts, not threats" It happened more than a year ago, but a local lawyer is now bringing one of his cases to the public’s attention in hopes that it won’t happen to anyone else.

Author: Sara Wagner , WHAS Published: 8:13 PM EDT April 21, 2016 Updated: 8:13 PM EDT April 21, 2016 LOUISVILLE, Ky. (WHAS11) -- It happened more than a year ago, but a local lawyer is now bringing one of his cases to the public’s attention in hopes that it won’t happen to anyone else.

Greg Simms is a partner at Murphy & Associates in downtown Louisville. He said his client, Maki Juillerat, was wrongfully arrested in April 2015.

Juillerat served as a sergeant in the United States Army for 16 years.

“He was deployed to Bosnia, Iraq twice and Afghanistan,” Simms said. “After his tours of duty, he was troubled by some pretty serious PTSD.”

Simms said Juillerat was troubled, but determined to not let the illness control him. He started getting treatment at the Robley Rex Veterans Affairs Medical Center. During a session with his therapist in March 2015, he disclosed that he was having suicidal and violent thoughts. He'd recently been pulled over for a traffic violation and described the officer as disrespectful and rude.

“That triggered some thoughts that Maki had, some violent thoughts about shooting the officer,” Simms said. “Maki knows that these thoughts are not normal. Maki knows that these thoughts are bad thoughts. He goes to the VA for that purpose, to seek help, to seek treatment for these thoughts.”

Simms said however serious the thoughts may be, they were simply that and not actual or credible threats.

“I don’t care how heinous your thoughts are. They could be the worst thoughts on the planet. You can’t be arrested for that,” Simms said. “We don’t regulate people’s thoughts in this country. We regulate people’s actions when you do something wrong. We don’t regulate what you think about. That’s a horrible path to go down.”

His doctor did put those thoughts in his chart that another VA employee saw. That employee emailed LMPD and told them Maki was threatening to shoot an officer. According to Simms, his doctor then tried to clarify to LMPD that this was not a threat, but merely a thought. Still, Maki was arrested and spent ten days in jail.

“It was hell. He didn’t understand why he was in jail. He had been told it was for terroristic threatening, which sounds horrible. You see that on somebody’s record and you think that somebody is a monster,” Simms said.

A judge dropped the charges last May, but Simms said both the VA and LMPD still need to be held accountable.

“It’s extremely important that the people that did wrong are told by their employers ‘you’re not supposed to do this,” Simms said.

Simms said people can’t be punished for their thoughts, but especially not a veteran trying to get help for problems stemming from their service.

“If we can’t afford to treat them correctly, then we can’t afford to send them off,” Simms said. “Maki Juillerat is an American hero. When you serve for 16 years and you’re out there in the thick of things, it’s not like he was just sitting behind a desk, he’s out there really fighting to protect the rights of Americans. If he can’t get that help, that’s a massive problem. It could’ve been catastrophic. Lives could be lost over this type of thing. I mean the bottom line is we don’t treat our veterans like this.”

Finally found this account, above, from the local paper...

Army veteran suffering from PTSD tells VA therapist he thought about shooting Louisville, Ky. police officer (who cited him for minor traffic violation) but that he did not intend to do it.

A VA staff member informs the police (without the therapist's say-so).

http://www.lrc.ky.gov/statutes/statute.aspx?id=44466

KRS 202A.400

Duty of mental health professional to warn intended victim of patient's threat of violence.

(1) No monetary liability and no cause of action shall arise against any mental health professional for failing to predict, warn of or take precautions to provide protection from a patient's violent behavior, unless the patient has communicated to the mental health professional an actual threat of physical violence against a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim, or unless the patient has communicated to the mental health professional an actual threat of some specific violent act.

(2) The duty to warn of or to take reasonable precautions to provide protection from violent behavior arises only under the limited circumstances specified in subsection (1) of this section. The duty to warn a clearly or reasonably identifiable victim shall be discharged by the mental health professional if reasonable efforts are made to communicate the threat to the victim, and to notify the police department closest to the patient's and the victim's residence of the threat of violence. When the patient has communicated to the mental health professional an actual threat of some specific violent act and no particular victim is identifiable, the duty to warn has been discharged if reasonable efforts are made to communicate the threat to law enforcement authorities. The duty to take reasonable precaution to provide protection from violent behavior shall be satisfied if reasonable efforts are made to seek civil commitment of the patient under this chapter.

(3) No monetary liability and no cause of action shall arise against any mental health professional for confidences disclosed to third parties in an effort to discharge a duty arising under subsection (1) of this section according to the provisions of subsection (2) of this section.

(4) For purposes of this section:

(a) "Mental health professional" means:

1. A physician licensed under the laws of Kentucky to practice medicine or osteopathy, or a medical officer of the government of the United States while engaged in conducting mental health services;

2. A psychiatrist licensed under the laws of Kentucky to practice medicine or osteopathy, or a medical officer of the government of the United States engaged in conducting mental health services;

3. A psychologist, a psychological practitioner, a certified psychologist, or a psychological associate, licensed under the provisions of KRS Chapter 319;

4. A registered nurse licensed under the provisions of KRS Chapter 314 engaged in providing mental health services;

5. A licensed clinical social worker licensed under the provisions of KRS 335.100, or a certified social worker licensed under the provisions of KRS 335.080 engaged in providing mental health services;

6. A marriage and family therapist licensed under the provisions of KRS 335.300 to 335.399 engaged in providing mental health services;

7. A professional counselor credentialed under the provisions of KRS Chapter 335.500 to 335.599 engaged in providing mental health services;

8. An art therapist certified under KRS 309.130 engaged in providing mental health services; or

9. A pastoral counselor licensed under the provisions of KRS 335.600 to 335.699 engaged in providing mental health services; and

(b) "Patient" has the same meaning as in KRS 202A.011, except that it also includes a person currently under the outpatient care or treatment of a mental health professional.

Effective:
June 24, 2015

History:
Amended 2015 Ky. Acts ch. 61, sec. 1, effective June 24, 2015.

--

Amended
2014 Ky. Acts ch. 64, sec. 1, effective July 15, 2014.

--

Amended 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 99, sec. 3, effective March 28, 2002.

--

Created 1986 Ky. Acts ch. 348, sec. 1, effective July 15, 1986.

A VA staff member informs the police (without the therapist's say-so).

http://www.lrc.ky.gov/statutes/statute.aspx?id=44466

Duty of mental health professional to warn intended victim of patient's threat of violence.

Here you go again, defending a 'law' against your own liberty/interest.

IMH0, this staff member was no 'mental health professional', --- especially because he/she snitched about a non-threat despite the opinion of the therapist.

When the patient has communicated to the mental health professional an actual threat of some specific violent act and no particular victim is identifiable, the duty to warn has been discharged if reasonable efforts are made to communicate the threat to law enforcement authorities. The duty to take reasonable precaution to provide protection from violent behavior shall be satisfied if reasonable efforts are made to seek civil commitment of the patient under this chapter.

You forgot to emphasize the above part of this dangerous law, which in effect permits so-called mental health professionals and law enforcement authorities to jail/commit practically anyone that is stupid enough to admit 'bad thoughts'...

Here you go again, defending a 'law' against your own liberty/interest.

Here you go again, blowing it out your ass. Read my post again. I did not say a word. I quoted the applicable law without comment.

When the patient has communicated to the mental health professional an actual threat of some specific violent act and no particular victim is identifiable, the duty to warn has been discharged if reasonable efforts are made to communicate the threat to law enforcement authorities. The duty to take reasonable precaution to provide protection from violent behavior shall be satisfied if reasonable efforts are made to seek civil commitment of the patient under this chapter.

You forgot to emphasize the above part of this dangerous law, which in effect permits so-called mental health professionals and law enforcement authorities to jail/commit practically anyone that is stupid enough to admit 'bad thoughts'...

There you go again, wanting to emphasize something irrelevant to the case at hand. The article is clear that the threatened individual was identifiable.

Here you go again, defending a 'law' against your own liberty/interest.

Here you go again, blowing it out your ass. Read my post again. I did not say a word. I quoted the applicable law without comment.

Here you go again, with a post that defends a 'law' that is against your own liberty/interest.

And as usual, instead of addressing my point, your juvenile comment about ass is what? -- An effort to get me to respond in kind?

You've become quite the blowhard.

You forgot to emphasize the above part of this dangerous law, which in effect permits so-called mental health professionals and law enforcement authorities to jail/commit practically anyone that is stupid enough to admit 'bad thoughts'... tpaine

There you go again, wanting to emphasize something irrelevant to the case at hand. The article is clear that the threatened individual was identifiable.

So what?

You're making another juvenile distinction that is in reality a distraction, attempting to cloak your acceptance of this dangerous infringement on our right to have privileged communications with doctors, etc..

You're making another juvenile distinction that is in reality a distraction, attempting to cloak your acceptance of this dangerous infringement on our right to have privileged communications with doctors, etc..

You quoted an email and I just presented the relevant law without comment. You are the one flapping your gums about it. Unfortunately, you do not know what a privileged communication is.

I did not defend any "acceptance of this dangerous infringement on our right to have privileged communications with doctors." The law speaks for itself. Communicating a desire or intent to shoot a cop is not a privileged communication.

A communication which is subject to a reporting law such as Duty to Warn is not a privileged commuunication. The privilege itself is not conferred by God, but by law. If the law specifies an exception, the excepted matter is not privileged.

http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/mental-health-professionals-duty-to-warn.aspx

Mental Health Professionals’ Duty to Warn

9/28/2015

Most states have laws that either require or permit mental health professionals to disclose information about patients who may become violent.

[...]

Under ethical standards tracing back to the Roman Hippocratic Oath, doctors and mental health professionals usually must maintain the confidentiality of information disclosed to them by patients in the course of the doctor-patient relationship. With some exceptions codified in state and federal law, health professionals can be legally liable for breaching confidentiality. One exception springs from an effort to protect potential victims from a patient’s violent behavior. California courts imposed a legal duty on psychotherapists to warn third parties of patients’ threats to their safety in 1976 in Tarasoff v. The Regents of the University of California. This case triggered passage of “duty to warn” or “duty to protect” laws in almost every state as summarized in the map and, in more detail, in the chart below.

https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/the-crime-fraud-exception-the-attorney-client-privilege.html

Most states allow—or require—attorneys to disclose information learned from a client that will prevent death or serious injury. Many have a similar rule where revealing otherwise confidential information would prevent or remedy financial injury due to a crime or fraud.

Communicating a desire or intent to shoot a cop is not a privileged communication.

You're making another juvenile distinction that is in reality a distraction, attempting to cloak your acceptance of this dangerous infringement on our right to have privileged communications with doctors, etc..

The article I posted makes clear that the veteran told his therapist he knew his thoughts about shooting the cop were bad,-- ,and the therapist told authorities the vet wasn't violent, and had no 'desire or intent'.

You're touting an infringement on our liberties, just for your own self- aggrandizement.. For shame..

Communicating a desire or intent to shoot a cop is not a privileged communication.

You're making another juvenile distinction that is in reality a distraction, attempting to cloak your acceptance of this dangerous infringement on our right to have privileged communications with doctors, etc..

You are making a false statement of law that can get one arrested and possibly imprisoned.

Privilege is a creation of the law. It extends only as far as the law says it does. Just about every jurisdiction has defined the communication of a threat as an exception to privilege.

I have accurately stated what the law is. Examples of state laws document that communicated threats are not privileged from disclosure. You may throw temper tantrums all you want, but the law provides that if you communicate a threat against a reasonably identifiable third party to your shrink, your shrink has a duty to report, and the threat is not privileged communication. Ergo, your claim of infringement of the right to have privileged communication in such circumstance is misguided ignorance of the law.

http://www.centerforethicalpractice.org/lawsaffectingconfidentiality

Most states legally impose a “duty to protect” requirement only if the patient poses a threat to others; but a very few states legally impose on therapists a duty to protect a patient from harm to self. (See examples below quoted from statutes in Nebraska and New Jersey.) As described in a later section of this Appendix, however, many states explicitly allow disclosure in circumstances of danger to self, but do not require such disclosure.

Nebraska: § 38-2137 “The duty to warn of or to take reasonable precautions to provide protection from violent behavior shall arise only under the limited circumstances specified in subsection (1) of this section” [i.e., “when the patient has communicated to the mental health practitioner a serious threat of physical violence against himself, herself, or a reasonably identifiable victim or victims.” . . .”The duty shall be discharged by the mental health practitioner if reasonable efforts are made to communicate the threat to the victim or victims and to a law enforcement agency.” [emphasis added]

New Jersey: § 2A:62A-16 – Duty to Warn and Protect “b. A duty to warn and protect is incurred when the following conditions exist: (1) The patient has communicated to that practitioner a threat of imminent, serious physical violence against a readily identifiable individual or against himself and the circumstances are such that a reasonable professional in the practitioner’s area of expertise would believe the patient intended to carry out the threat; or (2) The circumstances are such that a reasonable professional in the practitioner’s area of expertise would believe the patient intended to carry out an act of imminent, serious physical violence against a readily identifiable individual or against himself.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tarasoff_v._Regents_of_the_University_of_California

The California Supreme Court found that a mental health professional has a duty not only to a patient, but also to individuals who are specifically being threatened by a patient. This decision has since been adopted by most states in the U.S. and is widely influential in jurisdictions outside the U.S. as well.

Justice Mathew O. Tobriner wrote the holding in the majority opinion. "We conclude that the public policy favoring protection of the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist communications must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins."

Justice Mosk wrote a partial dissent, arguing that (1) the rule in future cases should be one of the actual subjective prediction of violence on the part of the psychiatrist, which occurred in this case, not one based on objective professional standards, because predictions are inherently unreliable; and (2) the psychiatrists notified the police, who were presumably in a better position to protect Tarasoff than she would be to protect herself.

Justice Clark dissented, quoting a law review article that stated, "…the very practice of psychiatry depends upon the reputation in the community that the psychiatrist will not tell."

Clearly, more than 40 years ago the California Supreme Court handed down the opinion in Tarasoff creating what has become known as the Tarasoff Duty to Warn or Protect. Following the issuance of the Tarasoff opinion, it has been adopted by most states in the United States. Tarasoff states clearly, "The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins."

Moreover, your citation of the doctor-patient relationship to justify a claim for non-disclosure demonstrates the recto-cranial inversion of your position. The duty to report depends on a special relationship such as the doctor-patient relationship.

... the courts have carved out an exception to this [common law] rule in cases in which the defendant stands in some special relationship to either the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or in a relationship to the foreseeable victim of that conduct (see Rest.2d Torts, supra, §§ 315-320).

Tarasoff at 17 Cal. 3d 435

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Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (Cal. 1976)

[S.F. No. 23042. Supreme Court of California. July 1, 1976.]

VITALY TARASOFF et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al.,
Defendants and Respondents

(Opinion by Tobriner, J., with Wright, C. J., Sullivan and Richardson, JJ., concurring. Separate concurring and dissenting opinion by Mosk, J. Separate dissenting opinion by Clark, J., with McComb, J., concurring.)

[...]

OPINION

TOBRINER, J.

[...]

The most important of these considerations in establishing duty is foreseeability. (4) As a general principle, a "defendant owes a duty of *435 care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct, with respect to all risks which make the conduct unreasonably dangerous." (Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1974) 12 Cal. 3d 382, 399 [115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 525 P.2d 669]; Dillon v. Legg, supra, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739; Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 40 [123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36]; see Civ. Code, § 1714.) As we shall explain, however, when the avoidance of foreseeable harm requires a defendant to control the conduct of another person, or to warn of such conduct, the common law has traditionally imposed liability only if the defendant bears some special relationship to the dangerous person or to the potential victim. Since the relationship between a therapist and his patient satisfies this requirement, we need not here decide whether foreseeability alone is sufficient to create a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect a potential victim of another's conduct.

(5) Although, as we have stated above, under the common law, as a general rule, one person owed no duty to control the conduct of another fn. 5 (Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal. 2d 60, 65 [271 P.2d 23]; Wright v. Arcade School Dist. (1964) 230 Cal. App. 2d 272, 277 [40 Cal. Rptr. 812]; Rest.2d Torts (1965) § 315), nor to warn those endangered by such conduct (Rest.2d Torts, supra, § 314, com. c.; Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) § 56, p. 341), the courts have carved out an exception to this rule in cases in which the defendant stands in some special relationship to either the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or in a relationship to the foreseeable victim of that conduct (see Rest.2d Torts, supra, §§ 315-320). Applying this exception to the present case, we note that a relationship of defendant therapists to either Tatiana or Poddar will suffice to establish a duty of care; as explained in section 315 of the Restatement Second of Torts, a duty of care may arise from either "(a) a special relation ... between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation ... between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right of protection."

[...]

*440 The risk that unnecessary warnings may be given is a reasonable price to pay for the lives of possible victims that may be saved. We would hesitate to hold that the therapist who is aware that his patient expects to attempt to assassinate the President of the United States would not be obligated to warn the authorities because the therapist cannot predict with accuracy that his patient will commit the crime.

Defendants further argue that free and open communication is essential to psychotherapy (see In re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal. 3d 415, 431-434 [85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 467 P.2d 557, 44 A.L.R.3d 1]); that "Unless a patient ... is assured that ... information [revealed by him] can and will be held in utmost confidence, he will be reluctant to make the full disclosure upon which diagnosis and treatment ... depends." (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, comment on Evid. Code, § 1014.) The giving of a warning, defendants contend, constitutes a breach of trust which entails the revelation of confidential communications. fn. 12

We recognize the public interest in supporting effective treatment of mental illness and in protecting the rights of patients to privacy (see In re Lifschutz, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 432), and the consequent public importance of safeguarding the confidential character of psychotherapeutic communication. Against this interest, however, we must weigh the public interest in safety from violent assault. The Legislature has undertaken the difficult task of balancing the countervailing concerns. In Evidence Code section 1014, it established a broad rule of privilege to protect confidential communications between patient and psychotherapist. *441 In Evidence Code section 1024, the Legislature created a specific and limited exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege: "There is no privilege ... if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or to the person or property of another and that disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent the threatened danger." fn. 13

[...]

The revelation of a communication under the above circumstances is not a breach of trust or a violation of professional ethics; as stated in the Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association (1957), section 9: "A physician may not reveal the confidence entrusted to him in the course of medical attendance ... unless he is required to do so by law or unless it becomes necessary in order to protect the welfare of *442 the individual or of the community." fn. 15 (Italics added.) We conclude that the public policy favoring protection of the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist communications must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.

Our current crowded and computerized society compels the interdependence of its members. In this risk-infested society we can hardly tolerate the further exposure to danger that would result from a concealed knowledge of the therapist that his patient was lethal. If the exercise of reasonable care to protect the threatened victim requires the therapist to warn the endangered party or those who can reasonably be expected to notify him, we see no sufficient societal interest that would protect and justify concealment. The containment of such risks lies in the public interest. For the foregoing reasons, we find that plaintiffs' complaints can be amended to state a cause of action against defendants Moore, Powelson, Gold, and Yandell and against the Regents as their employer, for breach of a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect Tatiana. fn. 16

[...]

*444 [6] Turning now to the police defendants, we conclude that they do not have any such special relationship to either Tatiana or to Poddar sufficient to impose upon such defendants a duty to warn respecting Poddar's violent intentions. (See Hartzler v. City of San Jose (1975) 46 Cal. App. 3d 6, 9-10 [120 Cal. Rptr. 5]; Antique Arts Corp. v. City of Torrance (1974) 39 Cal. App. 3d 588, 593 [114 Cal. Rptr. 332].) Plaintiffs suggest no theory, fn. 18 and plead no facts that give rise to any duty to warn on the part of the police defendants absent such a special relationship. They have thus failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in denying leave to amend as to the police defendants. (See Cooper v. Leslie Salt Co. (1969) 70 Cal. 2d 627, 636 [75 Cal. Rptr. 766, 451 P.2d 406]; Filice v. Boccardo (1962) 210 Cal. App. 2d 843, 847 [26 Cal. Rptr. 789].)

[...]