I think I would sue the plaintiffs too since they started this crap!

As entertaining as that prospect might be, that might be a difficult case to make, even under the lower standards of proof in a civil suit, because I think the baker would have to demonstrate targeted malicious actions against him to make a point or drive him out of business for being deeply religious, whereas the defendants would simply claim they were exercising a "right" under the current CO law.

I knew the case but didn't dive into the details - perhaps there is documentation demonstrating malicious intent.

I am not a lawyer, nor do I play one on TV or anywhere else. But I know a few things about how the law works.

I think I would sue the plaintiffs too since they started this crap!

Zero chance of victory in that suit. It would be summarily dismissed by the judge.

The plaintiffs had the right to sue under the Colorado statute. The Supreme Court today ruled that the process by which the baker's case was reviewed disregarded his free expression of religion rights, and thus found for him.

They did not rule past that. They didn't overturn the Colorado law. They said that the way it was applied to him, the facts and circumstances of his case, showed an unacceptable anti-religious bias.

Mullins has described their case as symbolizing “the rights of gay people to receive equal service in business … about basic access to public life."

This all started in 1964 with the U.S. Supreme Court case, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States

"The Court held that the Commerce Clause allowed Congress to regulate local incidents of commerce, and that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 passed constitutional muster. The Court noted that the applicability of Title II was "carefully limited to enterprises having a direct and substantial relation to the interstate flow of goods and people. . ." The Court thus concluded that places of public accommodation had no "right" to select guests as they saw fit, free from governmental regulation."

A real bastardization of the Commerce Clause if I ever saw one. Stay at a different motel. Use a different baker. Geez Louise.

A private business is just that. Private. They should be allowed to accept or deny service to anyone, no matter the reason, and accept the results of that decision. No shirt, no shoes, no service works for me.

As entertaining as that prospect might be, that might be a difficult case to make, even under the lower standards of proof in a civil suit, because I think the baker would have to demonstrate targeted malicious actions against him to make a point or drive him out of business for being deeply religious, whereas the defendants would simply claim they were exercising a "right" under the current CO law.

I think you could make the case that they went out of their way to specifically target this baker.

Still a long shot, as you observe.

And he has maintained that it’s his choice: "It's not about turning away these customers, it's about doing a cake for an event -- a religious sacred event -- that conflicts with my conscience," he said last year.

I saw him interviewed. It may be that this verdict worked for him because he made a claim that the cakes were perishable works of religious art.

So there are a lot of other instances and even other bakers that might not prevail.

No word on how broadly or narrowly the Court ruled. Did they protect just this one baker (and others very similar to him) or did they rule more broadly? Since this is 7-2 decision, I'm thinking this is a narrower rather than a broader ruling from the Court.

We'll have to await some analysis of the decision. Or we could just wait for nolu to sleuth it out for us.     : )

A real bastardization of the Commerce Clause if I ever saw one. Stay at a different motel. Use a different baker. Geez Louise.

A private business is just that. Private. They should be allowed to accept or deny service to anyone, no matter the reason, and accept the results of that decision. No shirt, no shoes, no service works for me.

Race is different. The black white racial issue caused the Civil War, killed a million people, caused the Great Migration, and rendered America wretched for nearly two centuries.

By the 1960s one side had a sufficiently dominant political majority to simply impose the final solution on the other side: knock all of that shit off and shut up, forever.

The point of Heart of Atlanta - by explicitly making it a Commerce Clause issue, was to utterly extinguish private rights to be racist, in a black white sense.

You cannot enter the stream of commerce in America in the smallest town in the back of Alabama if you bar blacks. We know you're racist, but you cannot exercise that in business, because all commerce is interstate. That was the point. It was intended to be an absolute extinction of private business power on that issue. And it has worked out to be just that.

BECAUSE of the black-white issue in America and its history.

The whole racial segregation issue is a case apart, because of history.

The gays and others have tried to extend the case law and logic of the racial cases to everything else, but when they do that it is really offensive to a great deal more of the population, and ultimately gets limited in important ways.

There is a fundamental difference between not letting people rent a hotel room along the highway because the owners are bigots, and a baker not wanting to cook a cake for gays. The difference is that having black skin is a widespread thing that is not a moral or religious issue (and the people who claim it IS a religious issue are an evil minority who can be - and have been - completely legally disregarded - freedom of religion is also limited by the black-white thing in America, because of history), while gay marriage is a small beer thing that IS a religious issue.

The opinion of the court goes to page 18. Kagan and Gorsuch filed concurring opinions. Thomas, with whom Gorsuch joined, filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Ginsburg, with whom Sotomayor joined, filed a dissenting opinion. Altogether, the opinions span 59 pages.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD., ET AL. v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF COLORADO

No. 16–111. Argued December 5, 2017—Decided June 4, 2018

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., is a Colorado bakery owned and operated by Jack Phillips, an expert baker and devout Christian. In 2012 he told a same-sex couple that he would not create a cake for their wed­ding celebration because of his religious opposition to same-sex mar­riages—marriages that Colorado did not then recognize—but that he would sell them other baked goods, e.g., birthday cakes. The couple filed a charge with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission (Commission) pursuant to the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA),which prohibits, as relevant here, discrimination based on sexual ori­entation in a “place of business engaged in any sales to the public and any place offering services . . . to the public.” Under CADA’s admin­istrative review system, the Colorado Civil Rights Division first found probable cause for a violation and referred the case to the Commis­sion. The Commission then referred the case for a formal hearing be­fore a state Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who ruled in the cou­ple’s favor. In so doing, the ALJ rejected Phillips’ First Amendment claims: that requiring him to create a cake for a same-sex wedding would violate his right to free speech by compelling him to exercise his artistic talents to express a message with which he disagreed and would violate his right to the free exercise of religion. Both the Commission and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: The Commission’s actions in this case violated the Free Exercise Clause. Pp. 9–18.

(a) The laws and the Constitution can, and in some instances must,protect gay persons and gay couples in the exercise of their civil rights, but religious and philosophical objections to gay marriage are protected views and in some instances protected forms of expression. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. ___, ___. While it is unexceptional

[2]

services on the same terms and conditions as are offered to other members of the public, the law must be applied in a manner that is neutral toward religion. To Phillips, his claim that using his artistic skills to make an expressive statement, a wedding endorsement in his own voice and of his own creation, has a significant First Amendment speech component and implicates his deep and sincere religious beliefs. His dilemma was understandable in 2012, which was before Colorado recognized the validity of gay marriages per­formed in the State and before this Court issued United States v. Windsor, 570 U. S. 744, or Obergefell. Given the State’s position at the time, there is some force to Phillips’ argument that he was not unreasonable in deeming his decision lawful. State law at the time also afforded storekeepers some latitude to decline to create specific messages they considered offensive. Indeed, while the instant enforcement proceedings were pending, the State Civil Rights Division concluded in at least three cases that a baker acted lawfully in declin­ing to create cakes with decorations that demeaned gay persons or gay marriages. Phillips too was entitled to a neutral and respectful consideration of his claims in all the circumstances of the case. Pp. 9–12.

(b) That consideration was compromised, however, by the Commis­sion’s treatment of Phillips’ case, which showed elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs moti­vating his objection. As the record shows, some of the commissioners at the Commission’s formal, public hearings endorsed the view that religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried into the public sphere or commercial domain, disparaged Phillips’ faith as despicable and characterized it as merely rhetorical, and compared his invocation of his sincerely held religious beliefs to defenses of slavery and the Hol­ocaust. No commissioners objected to the comments. Nor were they mentioned in the later state-court ruling or disavowed in the briefs filed here. The comments thus cast doubt on the fairness and impar­tiality of the Commission’s adjudication of Phillips’ case.

Another indication of hostility is the different treatment of Phillips’ case and the cases of other bakers with objections to anti-gay mes­sages who prevailed before the Commission. The Commission ruled against Phillips in part on the theory that any message on the re­quested wedding cake would be attributed to the customer, not to the baker. Yet the Division did not address this point in any of the cases involving requests for cakes depicting anti-gay marriage symbolism. The Division also considered that each bakery was willing to sell oth­er products to the prospective customers, but the Commission found Phillips’ willingness to do the same irrelevant. The State Court of

[3]

Appeals’ brief discussion of this disparity of treatment does not an­swer Phillips’ concern that the State’s practice was to disfavor the re­ligious basis of his objection. Pp. 12–16.

(c) For these reasons, the Commission’s treatment of Phillips’ case violated the State’s duty under the First Amendment not to base laws or regulations on hostility to a religion or religious viewpoint. The government, consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of free ex­ercise, cannot impose regulations that are hostile to the religious be­liefs of affected citizens and cannot act in a manner that passes judgment upon or presupposes the illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520. Factors relevant to the assessment of governmental neu­trality include “the historical background of the decision under chal­lenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history, in­cluding contemporaneous statements made by members of the deci­sion making body.” Id., at 540. In view of these factors, the record here demonstrates that the Commission’s consideration of Phillips’ case was neither tolerant nor respectful of his religious beliefs. The Commission gave “every appearance,” id., at 545, of adjudicating his religious objection based on a negative normative “evaluation of the particular justification” for his objection and the religious grounds for it, id., at 537, but government has no role in expressing or even sug­gesting whether the religious ground for Phillips’ conscience-based objection is legitimate or illegitimate. The inference here is thus that Phillips’ religious objection was not considered with the neutrality required by the Free Exercise Clause. The State’s interest could have been weighed against Phillips’ sincere religious objections in a way consistent with the requisite religious neutrality that must be strictly observed. But the official expressions of hostility to religion in some of the commissioners’ comments were inconsistent with that re­quirement, and the Commission’s disparate consideration of Phillips’ case compared to the cases of the other bakers suggests the same. Pp. 16–18.

370 P. 3d 272, reversed.

Not the broader ruling the Right was hoping for.

NEXT STOP:

Challenging institutionally enforced but un-constitutionally enforced/coerced "Affirmative Action", Quotas, and other "Special Rights" like "Hate" Crime, "Hate Laws, and select application thereof. ALL are based solely ON Race, Creed, Color, AND Sexual Orientation.

Btw Nolu -- good to see you. Godspeed on your continued recuperation.

disparaged Phillips’ faith as despicable and characterized it as merely rhetorical, and compared his invocation of his sincerely held religious beliefs to defenses of slavery and the Hol­ocaust.

The race card

whaT ... the HuTus --- did To The TuTsis

the souThern PoverTy law agenda

100 of Thousands people bludgeoned - hacked To death

MarxisT - African regime CHANGE

love
boris

Not the broader ruling the Right was hoping for.

Not at all. The Court did not really decide the dispute between the baker and the customer. The Court decided that the proceedings before the Colorado Civil Rights Commission were fatally flawed by Commission prejudice, and exhibited disparate treatment when compared with other case rulings. The Court saw the need to invalidate the rulings of the Commission and the State court that enforced the Commission's order.

Kennedy Opinion of the Court at page 18, (boldface added)

The official expressions of hostility to religion in some of the commissioners’ comments—comments that were not disavowed at the Commission or by the State at any point in the proceedings that led to affirmance of the order—were inconsistent with what the Free Exercise Clause requires. The Commission’s disparate consideration of Phillips’ case compared to the cases of the other bakers suggests the same. For these reasons, the order must be set aside.

III

The Commission’s hostility was inconsistent with the First Amendment’s guarantee that our laws be applied in a manner that is neutral toward religion. Phillips was entitled to a neutral decision maker who would give full and fair consideration to his religious objection as he sought to assert it in all of the circumstances in which this case was presented, considered, and decided. In this case the adjudication concerned a context that may well be different going forward in the respects noted above. However later cases raising these or similar concerns are resolved in the future, for these reasons the rulings of the Commission and of the state court that enforced the Commission’s order must be invalidated.

The outcome of cases like this in other circumstances must await further elaboration in the courts, all in the context of recognizing that these disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market. The judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.

The Ginsburg dissenting opinion describes the nature of the cakes requested in the Jack case. Ginsburg dissent at pages 3-4: (boldface added)

I

On March 13, 2014—approximately three months after the ALJ ruled in favor of the same-sex couple, Craig and Mullins, and two months before the Commission heard Phillips’ appeal from that decision—William Jack visited three Colorado bakeries. His visits followed a similar pattern. He requested two cakes

“made to resemble an open Bible. He also requested that each cake be decorated with Biblical verses. [He] requested that one of the cakes include an image of two groomsmen, holding hands, with a red ‘X’ over the image. On one cake, he requested [on] one side[,] . . . ‘God hates sin. Psalm 45:7’ and on the opposite side of the cake ‘Homosexuality is a detestable sin. Leviticus 18:2.’ On the second cake, [the one] with the image of the two groomsmen covered by a red ‘X’ [Jack] requested [these words]: ‘God loves sinners’ and on the other side ‘While we were yet sinners Christ died for us. Romans 5:8.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 319a; see id., at 300a, 310a.

In contrast to Jack, Craig and Mullins simply requested a wedding cake: They mentioned no message or anything else distinguishing the cake they wanted to buy from any other wedding cake Phillips would have sold.

One bakery told Jack it would make cakes in the shape of Bibles, but would not decorate them with the requested messages; the owner told Jack her bakery “does not dis­criminate” and “accept[s] all humans.” Id., at 301a (inter­nal quotation marks omitted). The second bakery owner told Jack he “had done open Bibles and books many times and that they look amazing,” but declined to make the specific cakes Jack described because the baker regarded the messages as “hateful.” Id., at 310a (internal quotation marks omitted). The third bakery, according to Jack, said it would bake the cakes, but would not include the re­quested message. Id., at 319a.²

Jack filed charges against each bakery with the Colorado Civil Rights Division (Division). The Division found no probable cause to support Jack’s claims of unequal treat­ment and denial of goods or services based on his Chris­tian religious beliefs. Id., at 297a, 307a, 316a. In this regard, the Division observed that the bakeries regularly produced cakes and other baked goods with Christian symbols and had denied other customer requests for de­signs demeaning people whose dignity the Colorado Anti-discrimination Act (CADA) protects. See id., at 305a, 314a, 324a. The Commission summarily affirmed the Division’s no-probable-cause finding. See id., at 326a– 331a.

The winning skewering goes to Gorsuch, joined by Alito, concurring. At pages 8-10 of the Gorsuch concurring opinion, (boldface added)

Take the first suggestion first. To suggest that cakes with words convey a message but cakes without words do not—all in order to excuse the bakers in Mr. Jack’s case while penalizing Mr. Phillips—is irrational. Not even the Commission or court of appeals purported to rely on that distinction. Imagine Mr. Jack asked only for a cake with a symbolic expression against same-sex marriage rather than a cake bearing words conveying the same idea. Surely the Commission would have approved the bakers’ intentional wish to avoid participating in that message too. Nor can anyone reasonably doubt that a wedding cake without words conveys a message. Words or not and whatever the exact design, it celebrates a wedding, and if the wedding cake is made for a same-sex couple it cele­brates a same-sex wedding. See 370 P. 3d, at 276 (stating that Mr. Craig and Mr. Mullins “requested that Phillips design and create a cake to celebrate their same-sex wed­ding”) (emphasis added). Like “an emblem or flag,” a cake for a same-sex wedding is a symbol that serves as “a short cut from mind to mind,” signifying approval of a specific “system, idea, [or] institution.” West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 632 (1943).

It is precisely that approval that Mr. Phillips intended to withhold in keeping with his religious faith. The Commission denied Mr. Phillips that choice, even as it afforded the bakers in Mr. Jack’s case the choice to refuse to advance a message they deemed offensive to their secular commitments. That is not neutral.

Nor would it be proper for this or any court to suggest that a person must be forced to write words rather than create a symbol before his religious faith is implicated. Civil authorities, whether “high or petty,” bear no license to declare what is or should be “orthodox” when it comes to religious beliefs, id., at 642, or whether an adherent has “correctly perceived” the commands of his religion, Thomas, supra, at 716. Instead, it is our job to look beyond the formality of written words and afford legal protection to any sincere act of faith. See generally Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 569 (1995) (“[T]he Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words as mediums of expression,” which are “not a condition of constitutional protection”).

The second suggestion fares no better. Suggesting that this case is only about “wedding cakes”—and not a wed­ding cake celebrating a same-sex wedding—actually points up the problem. At its most general level, the cake at issue in Mr. Phillips’s case was just a mixture of flour and eggs; at its most specific level, it was a cake celebrating the same-sex wedding of Mr. Craig and Mr. Mullins. We are told here, however, to apply a sort of Goldilocks rule: describing the cake by its ingredients is too general; un­derstanding it as celebrating a same-sex wedding is too specific; but regarding it as a generic wedding cake is just right. The problem is, the Commission didn’t play with the level of generality in Mr. Jack’s case in this way. It didn’t declare, for example, that because the cakes Mr. Jack requested were just cakes about weddings generally, and all such cakes were the same, the bakers had to pro­duce them. Instead, the Commission accepted the bakers’ view that the specific cakes Mr. Jack requested conveyed a message offensive to their convictions and allowed them to refuse service. Having done that there, it must do the same here.

Any other conclusion would invite civil authorities to gerrymander their inquiries based on the parties they prefer. Why calibrate the level of generality in Mr. Phil­lips’s case at “wedding cakes” exactly—and not at, say, “cakes” more generally or “cakes that convey a message regarding same-sex marriage” more specifically? If “cakes” were the relevant level of generality, the Commis­sion would have to order the bakers to make Mr. Jack’s requested cakes just as it ordered Mr. Phillips to make the requested cake in his case. Conversely, if “cakes that convey a message regarding same-sex marriage” were the relevant level of generality, the Commission would have to respect Mr. Phillips’s refusal to make the requested cake just as it respected the bakers’ refusal to make the cakes Mr. Jack requested. In short, when the same level of generality is applied to both cases, it is no surprise that the bakers have to be treated the same. Only by adjusting the dials just right—fine-tuning the level of generality up or down for each case based solely on the identity of the parties and the substance of their views—can you engi­neer the Commission’s outcome, handing a win to Mr. Jack’s bakers but delivering a loss to Mr. Phillips. Such results-driven reasoning is improper. Neither the Com­mission nor this Court may apply a more specific level of generality in Mr. Jack’s case (a cake that conveys a mes­sage regarding same-sex marriage) while applying a higher level of generality in Mr. Phillips’s case (a cake that conveys no message regarding same-sex marriage).

Not at all. The Court did not really decide the dispute between the baker and the customer.

It is what I meant when I said this was a narrow ruling. It doesn't seem to apply to any other current cases that I know of. Apparently, the way they went after this one baker scared all the others off. But the larger issues of religious conscience versus requirements for equal public accommodation were not addressed at all. So I consider that about as narrow a ruling as they could make.

As soon as I saw it was 7-2 with Breyer in the majority, I knew it had to be very narrow or Breyer wouldn't have joined in.

The winning skewering goes to Gorsuch, joined by Alito, concurring. At pages 8-10 of the Gorsuch concurring opinion, (boldface added)

Gorsuch and Alito need a new hobby.     : )

It's a damned cake, for God's sake.

Eugene Volokh: ------

Do bakers have a First Amendment right to refuse to bake cakes for same-sex weddings, even if there's a state law banning sexual orientation discrimination by such businesses?

Do they have a First Amendment right to refuse to bake such cakes that contain text or symbolism (e.g., rainbow striping) that the bakers disapprove of?

How about wedding photographers or videographers, who create products that (unlike most cakes) are traditionally seen as speech? How about calligraphers or graphic designers, who have an objection to personally writing or typing certain messages?

The Supreme Court's 7-to-2 Masterpiece Cakeshop decision answers none of these questions (not even the first, which seemed to be most squarely raised on the facts of this case). Rather, the decision concludes that, in this particular case, Colorado government agencies unconstitutionally discriminated against the plaintiff based in part on his religiosity; the Court concludes this based on particular statements made in the record, such as the statement by one member of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission that,

Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—we can list hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion to hurt others.

Applying antidiscrimination laws to a baker simply because he violated those laws, the Court said, might be constitutional (depending on whether that violates the Free Speech Clause, a matter on which the majority did not opine). Applying them because you find discrimination generally to be "despicable" would likewise not be impermissible religious discrimination. (Most laws are based on a judgment that the forbidden actions are wrong, and some based on a judgment that the actions are despicable; that does not make them impermissible discrimination against the religious, even if many of those who engage in those actions belong to a particular religion or set of religions.) But applying the laws because you find the defendant's religious views or statements to be "despicable" may be impermissible religious discrimination, and 7 Justices so found, based on this statement and several others.

This is a legitimate basis, to be sure, for deciding the case (though Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor disagreed that such discrimination against the religious was showin this particular case). But it is a basis that will have little effect on other such same-sex wedding service provider cases, especially when government commissioners realize they shouldn't say more about religion than is necessary to deal with the particular religious objections raised in those cases. (In many such cases, there are religious exemption claims raised under state statutory or constitutional religious exemption regimes, such as state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, and those require some discussion about whether the claimant's religious beliefs are sincerely held, and whether the claimant's beliefs forbid him from doing what the law requires.)

Four of the Justices did talk about the free speech issues here, and they split 2-to-2 (Justices Thomas and Alito would have accepted the free speech claim, and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor would have rejected it given the facts of this case, which in their view didn't involve any expression on the cake at all). I'll have more to say on that debate later, and I'll also discuss the religious discrimination arguments as well, especially the weight given to Colorado cases involving William Jack, who has now been proved to have produced a tactical masterstroke. But for now, the important point is that the free speech debate, as well as the broader religious accommodation debate, remains unresolved.

Eugene, as usual, has the definitive opinion on the case...

It's a damned cake, for God's sake.

This whole brouhaw is a fine example of why we should kill all lawyers. ;-)

The problem is, the Commission didn’t play with the level of generality in Mr. Jack’s case in this way.

It didn’t declare, for example, that because the cakes Mr. Jack requested were just cakes about weddings generally, and all such cakes were the same, the bakers had to pro­duce them.

[T]he Commission accepted the bakers’ view that the specific cakes Mr. Jack requested conveyed a message offensive to their convictions and allowed them to refuse service. Having done that there, it must do the same here...

...Any other conclusion would invite civil authorities to gerrymander their inquiries based on the parties they prefer.

Why calibrate the level of generality in Mr. Phil­lips’s case at “wedding cakes” exactly—and not at, say, “cakes” more generally or “cakes that convey a message regarding same-sex marriage” more specifically? If “cakes” were the relevant level of generality, the Commis­sion would have to order the bakers to make Mr. Jack’s requested cakes just as it ordered Mr. Phillips to make the requested cake in his case.

Interesting point and breakdown.

Only by adjusting the dials just right—fine-tuning the level of generality up or down for each case based solely on the identity of the parties and the substance of their views—can you engi­neer the Commission’s outcome, handing a win to Mr. Jack’s bakers but delivering a loss to Mr. Phillips. Such results-driven reasoning [by liberal-Left anti-Christian-bigots] is improper.

Neither the Com­mission nor this Court may apply a more specific level of generality in Mr. Jack’s case (a cake that conveys a mes­sage regarding same-sex marriage) while applying a higher level of generality in Mr. Phillips’s case (a cake that conveys no message regarding same-sex marriage).

It is noted that agenda-driven Leftist-Lib-Dem judges in those infected States ALWAYS warp constitutional law and mangle common sense in order to advance the anti-1A, homofascist agenda. AT the expense of Christians and Conservatives.

Exhibit "A" why the "United" States is no more and actually TWO "Unions".

Thank God for Gorsuch and Alito.

Jameson behind his Starbucks counter MUST not only serve me a bowl of Alphabet cereal, it MUST spell out, "JESUS SAVES!" Otherwise it demonstrates "Christophobia".

This whole brouhaw is a fine example of why we should kill all lawyers. ;-)

Let's be more specific and say that all ACLU/SPLC lawyers be waterboarded, smacked in the head with a rolled-up Church bulletin until sufficiently dizzy, then served up a raw Crow Banquet, unable to leave UNTIL fully consumed.

;-)