He wished gentlemen to consider the situation of the states—seven out of thirteen had thought the constitution very defective, yet five of them has adopted it with a perfect reliance on congress for its improvement....

As I said, they didn't like it but they trusted Madison to add a Bill of Rights.

"The 2nd Amendment protects the RKBA of individuals and is not restricted to militia or any other group."

That's how the Heller court ruled, yes. They were wrong, but that's their ruling.

"However, the RKBA has never protected some imaginary right to bear RPGs, SAMs, machine guns, or flamethrowers."

Not even for the well-regulated and organized State militias? I seem to recall that Article 1, Section 8, Clause 16 calls for "organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia."

We're going to have a dificult time protecting ourselves from an out-of-control Federal government with just the handguns protected by Heller.

We're going to have a dificult time protecting ourselves from an out-of-control Federal government with just the handguns protected by Heller.

You're going to have a difficult time period with just the fact that right now there are millions of seriously armed people in this country that are absolutely not members of the organized professional standing army.

And I can tell you this, that for those like yourselves and others who stand only for an organized trained militia, there will come a time when you will need the backing of those "untrained" ones. I see that coming soon because this country is long overdue for a revolution.

You're going to have a difficult time period with just the fact that right now there are millions of seriously armed people in this country that are absolutely not members of the organized professional standing army.

What happens when some future U.S. Supreme Court rules that the second amendment doesn't protect hanguns? Or assault rifles?

Do you trust them or your own state to protect your gun rights?

As I said, they didn't like it but they trusted Madison to add a Bill of Rights.

It took both houses of Congress and 3/4th of the states to add any amendment. Madison had one vote in the House and no say in the Senate.

That's how the Heller court ruled, yes. They were wrong, but that's their ruling.

The Supreme court determines the law. You are entitled to your opinion, but that does not change the law.

Individuals in and out of the militia have the rights to keep and bear arms brought forward by the colonists into America, and the right is protected by the 2nd Amendment. The ancient right came from English common law and predates the Constitution.

Not even for the well-regulated and organized State militias? I seem to recall that Article 1, Section 8, Clause 16 calls for "organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia."

What arms meant in 1792 is amply described below. It does not expand to any weapon imaginable. The right was not defined in the Constitution because it was well-defined in English common law.

The Militia Act of May 8, 1792 (repealed and replaced 1795).

SECOND CONGRESS. Sess. I. Ch. 33. 1792.

1 Stat. 271

May 8, 1792.

Chap. XXXIII.—An Act more effectually to provide for the National Defence by establishing an Uniform Militia throughout the United States.(a)

Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That and by whom each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective states, resident therein, who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years (except as is herein after excepted) shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia by the captain or commanding officer of the company, within whose bounds such citi­zen shall reside, and that within twelve months after the passing of this act. And it shall at all times hereafter be the duty of every such cap­tain or commanding officer of a company to enrol every such citizen, as aforesaid, and also those who shall, from time to time, arrive at the age of eighteen years, or being of the age of eighteen years and under the age of forty-five years (except as before excepted) shall come to re­side within his bounds; and shall without delay notify such citizen of the said enrolment, by a proper non-commissioned officer of the company, by whom such notice may be proved. That every citizen so enrolled and notified, shall, within six months thereafter, provide himself with a good musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch with a box therein to contain not less than twenty-four cartridges, suited to the bore of his musket or firelock, each cart­ridge to contain a proper quantity of powder and ball: or with a good rifle, knapsack, shot-pouch and powder-horn, twenty balls suited to the bore of his rifle, and a quarter of a pound of powder; and shall appear, so armed, accoutred and provided, when called out to exercise, or into service, except, that when called out on company days to exercise only, he may appear without a knapsack. That the commissioned officers shall severally be armed with a sword or hanger and espontoon, and that from and after five years from the passing of this act, all muskets for arming the militia as herein required, shall be of bores sufficient for

__________

(a) The acts for the establishment of an uniform system for the government of the militia, are: An act more effectually to provide for the national defence by establishing an uniform militia throughout the United States, May 8, 1792, chap. 33; an act providing arms for the militia throughout the United States. July 6, 1798, chap. 65; an act in addition to an act entitled, “An act more effectually to provide for the national defence, by establishing an uniform militia throughout the United States,” March 2, 1803, chap. 15; an act more effectually to provide for the organizing of the militia of the District of Columbia, March 3, 1803, chap. 20; an act establishing rules and articles for the government of the armies of the United States, April 10, 1806, chap. 20; an act in addition to the act entitled, “An act to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and to repeal the act now in force for those purposes,” April 18. 1814, chap. 82; an act concerning field officers of the militia, April 20, 1816, chap. 64; an act to establish an uniform mode of discipline and field exercise for the militia of the United States, May 12, 1820, chap. 96; an act to reduce and fix the military peace establishment of the United States, March 2, 1821, chap. 12, sec. 14.

272

SECOND CONGRESS. Sess. I. Ch. 33. 1792.

balls of the eighteenth part of a pound. And every citizen so enrolled, and providing himself with the arms, ammunition and accoutrements required as aforesaid, shall hold the same exempted from all suits, dis­tresses, executions or sales, for debt or for the payment of taxes.

[snip]

The Supreme court determines the law. You are entitled to your opinion, but that does not change the law.

The Heller Supreme court determines the law? Or the Cruikshank Supreme court? Or the Presser Supreme Court? Or the Miller Supreme court?

Seems to me the only reason you like the Heller decision is because it supports your view. I guess those justices never heard of stare decisis.

The Heller Supreme court determines the law? Or the Cruikshank Supreme court? Or the Presser Supreme Court? Or the Miller Supreme court?

I'm sorry you must make believe you do not know.

Individuals in and out of the militia have the rights to keep and bear arms brought forward by the colonists into America, and the right is protected by the 2nd Amendment.

The second amendment protected the right of the people to keep and bear arms, not all individuals. The second amendment didn't protect the right for non-citizens, children, women, slaves, or illegals.

When you examine it (as I have) it only protected the right for those eligible to participate in a state militia. What a coincidence, huh? And the second amendment references a militia! Another coincidence!

Yet you expect me to believe it applies to all individuals.

misterwhite (#41) ---- We're going to have a dificult time protecting ourselves from an out-of-control Federal government with just the handguns protected by Heller.

You're going to have a difficult time period with just the fact that right now there are millions of seriously armed people in this country that are absolutely not members of the organized professional standing army.

And I can tell you this, that for those like yourselves and others who stand only for an organized trained militia, there will come a time when you will need the backing of those "untrained" ones. I see that coming soon because this country is long overdue for a revolution. ---- goldilucky

Well done, Goldilucky.. ---- You're one of the many here that have come to realize how our resident closet communitarian, misterwhite, spreads his anti- constitutional agitprop..

Keep up the good work.. This guy is (and has been since the early days of FR) a ringer troll, a near perfect example of 'deep state' thinking.

I'm sorry you must make believe you do not know.

As I said. That's how the Heller court ruled, but I don't agree. Those three cases support my view.

That every citizen so enrolled and notified, shall, within six months thereafter, provide himself with a good musket or firelock

Do you know why they had to get a musket? Because they didn't have one. They had rifles for hunting because smoothbore muskets were not accurate.

Now, muskets were fine for volley fire used by the militia, they were cheap, and they were fast reloading. But above the fireplace in the home, proudly displayed, was an expensive rifle.

So what is it? Does the second amendment protect arms in common use at the time (rifles) or does it protect the arms used by the militia (muskets)?

Madison had one vote in the House and no say in the Senate.

And yet ...

That's how the Heller court ruled, but I don't agree. Those three cases support my view.

And Plessy v. Ferguson supports the view that separate but equal is lawful, proving the Plessy was overturned Brown.

So what is it? Does the second amendment protect arms in common use at the time (rifles) or does it protect the arms used by the militia (muskets)?

The 2nd Amdt protects the ancient right to keep and bear arms. It does not protect and alleged right to keep Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs). It protects the right to keep and bear arms which are lawful to possess.

When you examine it (as I have) it only protected the right for those eligible to participate in a state militia.

If you say so.

http://law.justia.com/codes/us/2012/title-10/subtitle-a/part-i/chapter-13/section-311/

THE MILITIA - 10 U.S.C. § 311 (2012)

§311. Militia: composition and classes

(a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of title 32, under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of female citizens of the United States who are members of the National Guard.

(b) The classes of the militia are—

(1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the Naval Militia; and

(2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia.

(Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 14; Pub. L. 85–861, §1(7), Sept. 2, 1958, 72 Stat. 1439; Pub. L. 103–160, div. A, title V, §524(a), Nov. 30, 1993, 107 Stat. 1656.)

You get your RKBA, if you are an able male, when you turn 17 years of age, and are a citizen or have made a declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States. You lose your RKBA when you turn 45 years of age.

If you are female, you get your RKBA if you are a citizen who is a member of the National Guard, and lose your RKBA if you leave the Guard.

Your logic is a marvel to behold.

The 2nd Amdt protects the ancient right to keep and bear arms

Chan -

You have always inferred that individual rights are subject to government regulation. FUCK OFF AND DIE!

You have always inferred that individual rights are subject to government regulation. FUCK OFF AND DIE!

Fuck off and read some history rather than just speak from ignorance.

One needs to determine what was intended by the term "the right of the people to keep and bear arms" to determine what shall not be infringed. As stated in 1802 and quoted in Lynch v. Clarke in 1844, "The constitution is unintelligible without reference, to the common law."

By the interpretation of some, one must find the Framers intended to protect, and did protect, a right that did not then exist and had never existed in the colonies, the several states or the United States.

It was the colonial common law right to keep and bear arms that was carried forth into the union.

Lynch v. Clarke, New York Legal Observer, Vol 3, 236, 245 (1844)

In 1795, Judge Wilson, of the Supreme Court of the United States, in delivering his charge to the grand jury, in the Virginia Circuit, went into an elaborate dissertation on the jurisdiction of the federal courts over crimes, and after enumerating such as he deemed cognizable by the circuit court, he continued as follows: "In the foregoing catalogue, murder, man slaughter, robbery, piracy, forgery, perjury, bribery and extortion, are mentioned as crimes and offences; but they are neither defined nor described. For this reason we must refer to some pre-existing law for their definition or description. To what pre-existing law should this reference be made? This is a question of immence importance and extent. It must receive an answer, but I cannot, in this address, assign my reasons for the answer which I am about to give. The reference should be made to the common law. To the common law then let us resort for the definition or description of the crimes and offences which in the laws of the United States have been named, but have not been described or defined. You will in this manner, gentlemen, be furnished with a legal standard, by the judicious application of which you may ascertain with precision the true nature and qualities of such facts and transactions as shall become the objects of your consideration and research." (3 Wilson's Works, 357, 371.) And in the debates on the judiciary in 1802, to which I have before alluded, Mr. Bayard, of Delaware, in an able speech in the House of Representatives, said on this subject, (what was not disputed, so far as facts were concerned,) that "the judges of the United States have held generally that the Constitution of the United States was predicated upon an existing common law. Of the soundness of that opinion I never had a doubt. I should scarcely go too far were I to say, that stript of the common law, there would be neither constitution nor government. The constitution is unintelligible without reference, to the common law. And were we to go into our courts of justice with the mere statutes of the United States, not a step could be taken, not even a contempt could be punished. There would be no form of pleading, no principles of evidence, no rule of property. Without this law the constitution becomes a dead letter. For ten years it has been the doctrine of our courts that the common law was in force." (Debates on the Judiciary, 1802, p. 372. And see 1 Story's Comm. on the Const., 140, 141,; § 157, 158, and note 2; 2 ibid, 262 to 267 ; § 794 to 797 ; Rawle on the Const. 258.)

Quotes from State Constitutions

Connecticut - 1776

Paragraph 1. Be it enacted and declared by the Governor, and Council, and House of Representatives, in General Court assembled, That the ancient Form of Civil Government, contained in the Charter from Charles the Second, King of England, and adopted by the People of this State, shall be and remain the Civil Constitution of this State, under the sole authority of the People thereof, independent of any King or Prince whatever.

- - - - -

Delaware 1776

Art. 25. The common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law as has been heretofore adopted in practice in this State, shall remain in force, unless they shall be altered by a future law of the legislature; such parts only excepted as are repugnant to the rights and privileges contained in this constitution, and the declaration of rights, &c., agreed to by this convention.

- - - - -

Maryland, 1776

III. That the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the common law of England, and the trial by jury, according to the course of that law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes, as existed at the time of their first emigration, and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and other circumstances, and of such others as have been since made in England, or Great Britain, and have been introduced, used and practised by the courts of law or equity; and also to acts of Assembly, in force on the first of June seventeen hundred and seventy-four, except such as may have since expired, or have been or may be altered by acts of Convention, or this Declaration of Rights—subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of this State: and the inhabitants of Maryland are also entitled to all property, derived to them, from or under the Charter, granted by his Majesty Charles I. to Cæcilius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore.

- - - - -

New Jersey, 1776

XXI. That all the laws of this Province, contained in the edition lately published by Mr. Allinson, shall be and remain in full force, until altered by the Legislature of this Colony (such only excepted, as are incompatible with this Charter) and shall be, according as heretofore, regarded in all respects, by all civil officers, and others, the good people of this Province.

XXII. That the common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law, as have been heretofore practised in this Colony, shall still remain in force, until they shall be altered by a future law of the Legislature; such parts only excepted, as are repugnant to the rights and privileges contained in this Charter; and that the inestimable right of trial by jury shall remain confirmed as a part of the law of this Colony, without repeal, forever.

- - - - -

New York, 1777

XXXV. And this convention doth further, in the name and by the authority of the good people of this State, ordain, determine, and declare that such parts of the common law of England, and of the state law of England and Great Britain, and of the acts of the legislature of the colony of New York, as together did form the law of the said colony on the 19th day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five, shall be and continue the law of this State, subject to such alterations and provisions as the legislature of this State shall, from time to time, make concerning the same. That such of the said acts, as are temporary, shall expire at the times limited for their duration respectively. That all such parts of the said common law, and all such of the said statutes and acts aforesaid, or parts thereof, as may be construed to establish or maintain any particular denomination of Christians or their ministers, or concern the allegiance heretofore yielded to, and the supremacy, sovereignty, government, or prerogatives claimed or exercised by, the King of Great Britain and his predecessors, over the colony of New York and its inhabitants, or are repugnant to this constitution, be, and they hereby are, abrogated and rejected. And this convention doth further ordain, that the resolves or resolutions of the congresses of the colony of New York, and of the convention of the State of New York, now in force, and not repugnant to the government established by this constitution, shall be considered as making part of the laws of this State; subject, nevertheless, to such alterations and provisions as the legislature of this State may, from time to time, make concerning the same.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk1ch1.asp

Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England

Book the First - Chapter the First: Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals (1765)

5. THE fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present mention, is that of having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law. Which is also declared by the same statute 1 W. & M. ft. 2. c. 2. and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.

Sorry concerning your ignorance, but you are a loser.

You get your RKBA, if you are an able male, when you turn 17 years of age, and are a citizen or have made a declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States. You lose your RKBA when you turn 45 years of age.

If you are female, you get your RKBA if you are a citizen who is a member of the National Guard, and lose your RKBA if you leave the Guard.

Your logic is a marvel to behold.

nolu chan

The above 'logic' was addressed to misterwhite. --- It proves my point..

I don't know about you but England's concept of "individual rights" was kicked out of the USA about 250 years ago.

Sorry concerning your ignorance, but you are a loser.

Sorry, all of the original states adopted the English Common law, eiter by the Constitution or by statute for such portions not inconsistent with the Constitution. Sorry to ave to correct your ignorance yet again.

Your logic is a marvel to behold.

Mine? You're presenting the current definition of a militia and using that to interpret the meaning of the second amendment when it was written.

The second amendment mentions a militia, refers to "the people" (not all citizens) and, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, only was a restriction on the federal government.

From that, how do you define the second amendment as protecting an individual right to keep a handgun in the home for self defense? That wasn't the ruling given in the Cruikshank, Presser and Miller courts.

The 2nd Amdt protects the ancient right to keep and bear arms ...

... for Militia members only. Which it why it mentions a Militia.

Prior to the ratification of the Bill of Rights, at least 4 of the 13 states had state constitutions which protected the individual right of their citizens to keep and bear arms. But their "second amendment" language used the phrase, "... the right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the State ..."

"Citizens", not "the people". In defense of themselves. Your individual right to keep and bear arms is, and has always been, protected by your state constitution. Which is why gun laws vary from state to state.

The second amendment mentions a militia, refers to "the people" (not all citizens) and, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, only was a restriction on the federal government.

From that, how do you define the second amendment as protecting an individual right to keep a handgun in the home for self defense?

That's some horseshit you made up, not something I said.

The English common law right spoke to, "the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.

It is an individual right. It was necessary that the individual right be protected so that individuals could protect themselves, and when called up to the militia, that they be armed and ready.

The right is an individual right, not a right belonging to members of the militia only. Your asiten nonsense would mean that nobody would have a right to keep and bear arms until they were 17, and they would all lost their right to keep and bear arms when they reach 45.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk1ch1.asp

Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England

Book the First - Chapter the First: Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals (1765)

5. THE fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present mention, is that of having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law. Which is also declared by the same statute 1 W. & M. ft. 2. c. 2. and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.

That wasn't the ruling given in the Cruikshank, Presser and Miller courts.

Under the ruling from the Dred Scott court, Blacks could never become citizens. And under the 18th Amendment, the sale, transportation, importation, or exportation of booze was prohibited. Heller directly adddressed Cruickshank, Presser, and Miller.

District of Columbia v. Heller, S. Ct. 26 June 2008, Syllabus:

Held:

1. The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. Pp. 2-53.

(a) The Amendment's prefatory clause announces a purpose, but does not limit or expand the scope of the second part, the operative clause. The operative clause's text and history demonstrate that it connotes an individual right to keep and bear arms. Pp. 2-22.

(b) The prefatory clause comports with the Court's interpretation of the operative clause. The "militia" comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. The Antifederalists feared that the Federal Government would disarm the people in order to disable this citizens' militia, enabling a politicized standing army or a select militia to rule. The response was to deny Congress power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and bear arms, so that the ideal of a citizens' militia would be preserved. Pp. 22-28.

(c) The Court's interpretation is confirmed by analogous arms-bearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and immediately followed the Second Amendment. Pp. 28-30.

(d) The Second Amendment's drafting history, while of dubious interpretive worth, reveals three state Second Amendment proposals that unequivocally referred to an individual right to bear arms. Pp. 30-32.

(e) Interpretation of the Second Amendment by scholars, courts and legislators, from immediately after its ratification through the late 19th century also supports the Court's conclusion. Pp. 32-47.

(f) None of the Court's precedents forecloses the Court's interpretation. Neither United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 553, nor Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 264-265, refutes the individual-rights interpretation. United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, does not limit the right to keep and bear arms to militia purposes, but rather limits the type of weapon to which the right applies to those used by the militia, i.e., those in common use for lawful purposes. Pp. 47-54.

2. Like most rights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited. It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose: For example, concealed weapons prohibitions have been upheld under the Amendment or state analogues. The Court's opinion should not be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. Miller's holding that the sorts of weapons protected are those "in common use at the time" finds support in the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons. Pp. 54-56.

3. The handgun ban and the trigger-lock requirement (as applied to self-defense) violate the Second Amendment. The District's total ban on handgun possession in the home amounts to a prohibition on an entire class of "arms" that Americans overwhelmingly choose for the lawful purpose of self-defense. Under any of the standards of scrutiny the Court has applied to enumerated constitutional rights, this prohibition—in the place where the importance of the lawful defense of self, family, and property is most acute—would fail constitutional muster. Similarly, the requirement that any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock makes it impossible for citizens to use arms for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence unconstitutional. Because Heller conceded at oral argument that the D. C. licensing law is permissible if it is not enforced arbitrarily and capriciously, the Court assumes that a license will satisfy his prayer for relief and does not address the licensing requirement. Assuming he is not disqualified from exercising Second Amendment rights, the District must permit Heller to register his handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home. Pp. 56-64.

478 F. 3d 370, affirmed.

The 2nd Amdt protects the ancient right to keep and bear arms ...

... for Militia members only. Which it why it mentions a Militia.

Hosreshit repeated is still horseshit.

District of Columbia v. Heller, S. Ct. 26 June 2008, Syllabus:

Held:

1. The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. Pp. 2-53.

(a) The Amendment's prefatory clause announces a purpose, but does not limit or expand the scope of the second part, the operative clause. The operative clause's text and history demonstrate that it connotes an individual right to keep and bear arms. Pp. 2-22.

- - - - - - - - - -

District of Columbia v Heller, S. Ct. (2008)

From Heller at 581:

Before addressing the verbs “keep” and “bear,” we interpret their object: “Arms.” The 18th-century meaning is no different from the meaning today. The 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson’s dictionary defined “arms” as “weapons of offence, or armour of defence.” 1 Dictionary of the English Language 107 (4th ed.) (hereinafter Johnson). Timothy Cunningham’s important 1771 legal dictionary defined “arms” as “any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.” 1 A New and Complete Law Dictionary (1771); see also N. Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) (reprinted 1989) (hereinafter Webster) (similar).

Heller at 582:

Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only those arms in existence in the 18th century are protected by the Second Amendment. We do not interpret constitutional rights that way. Just as the First Amendment protects modern forms of communications, e.g., Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 849 (1997), and the Fourth Amendment applies to modern forms of search, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27, 35–36 (2001), the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.

Heller at 584:

At the time of the founding, as now, to “bear” meant to “carry.” See Johnson 161; Webster; T. Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of the English Language (1796); 2 Oxford English Dictionary 20 (2d ed. 1989) (hereinafter Oxford). When used with “arms,” however, the term has a meaning that refers to carrying for a particular purpose—confrontation. In Muscarello v. United States, 524 U. S. 125 (1998), in the course of analyzing the meaning of “carries a firearm” in a federal criminal statute, Justice Ginsburg wrote that “[s]urely a most familiar meaning is, as the Constitution’s Second Amendment … indicate[s]: ‘wear, bear, or carry … upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose … of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another person.’ ” Id., at 143 (dissenting opinion) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 214 (6th ed. 1998)). We think that Justice Ginsburg accurately captured the natural meaning of “bear arms.” Although the phrase implies that the carrying of the weapon is for the purpose of “offensive or defensive action,” it in no way connotes participation in a structured military organization.

Heller at 620:

We described the right protected by the Second Amendment as “ ‘bearing arms for a lawful purpose’ ”

Heller at 624-25:

“In the colonial and revolutionary war era, [small-arms] weapons used by militiamen and weapons used in defense of person and home were one and the same.” State v. Kessler, 289 Ore. 359, 368, 614 P. 2d 94, 98 (1980) (citing G. Neumann, Swords and Blades of the American Revolution 6–15, 252–254 (1973)). Indeed, that is precisely the way in which the Second Amendment’s operative clause furthers the purpose announced in its preface. We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. That accords with the historical understanding of the scope of the right, see Part III, infra.

We conclude that nothing in our precedents forecloses our adoption of the original understanding of the Second Amendment.

Heller at 626:

Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. See, e.g., Sheldon, in 5 Blume 346; Rawle 123; Pomeroy 152–153; Abbott 333. For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues. See, e.g., State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann., at 489–490; Nunn v. State, 1 Ga., at 251; see generally 2 Kent *340, n. 2; The American Students’ Blackstone 84, n. 11 (G. Chase ed. 1884).

Heller at 627-28:

It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service—M-16 rifles and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause. But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification was the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty. It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large. Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers and tanks. But the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.

Black's Law Dictionary, 6 Ed.

Arms. Anything that a man wears for his defense, or takes in his hands as a weapon.

The "right to keep and bear arms" existed in the colonies, was brought forth into the states before the union, and was protected by the 2nd Amendment. The right which existed in the colonies came from the English common law. The Framers saw no need to explain to themselves what that right to keep and bear arms was.

Heller at 593-95:

By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had become fundamental for English subjects. See Malcolm 122–134. Blackstone, whose works, we have said, “constituted the preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation,” Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 715 (1999), cited the arms provision of the Bill of Rights as one of the fundamental rights of Englishmen. See 1 Blackstone 136, 139–140 (1765). His description of it cannot possibly be thought to tie it to militia or military service. It was, he said, “the natural right of resistance and self-preservation,” id., at 139, and “the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and defence,” id., at 140; see also 3 id., at 2–4 (1768). Other contemporary authorities concurred. See G. Sharp, Tracts, Concerning the Ancient and Only True Legal Means of National Defence, by a Free Militia 17–18, 27 (3d ed. 1782); 2 J. de Lolme, The Rise and Progress of the English Constitution 886–887 (1784) (A. Stephens ed. 1838); W. Blizard, Desultory Reflections on Police 59–60 (1785). Thus, the right secured in 1689 as a result of the Stuarts’ abuses was by the time of the founding understood to be an individual right protecting against both public and private violence.

And, of course, what the Stuarts had tried to do to their political enemies, George III had tried to do to the colonists. In the tumultuous decades of the 1760’s and 1770’s, the Crown began to disarm the inhabitants of the most rebellious areas. That provoked polemical reactions by Americans invoking their rights as Englishmen to keep arms. A New York article of April 1769 said that “[i]t is a natural right which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed by the Bill of Rights, to keep arms for their own defence.” A Journal of the Times: Mar. 17, New York Journal, Supp. 1, Apr. 13, 1769, in Boston Under Military Rule 79 (O. Dickerson ed. 1936); see also, e.g., Shippen, Boston Gazette, Jan. 30, 1769, in 1 The Writings of Samuel Adams 299 (H. Cushing ed. 1968). They understood the right to enable individuals to defend themselves. As the most important early American edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries (by the law professor and former Antifederalist St. George Tucker) made clear in the notes to the description of the arms right, Americans understood the “right of self-preservation” as permitting a citizen to “repe[l] force by force” when “the intervention of society in his behalf, may be too late to prevent an injury.” 1 Blackstone’s Commentaries 145–146, n. 42 (1803) (hereinafter Tucker’s Blackstone). See also W. Duer, Outlines of the Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States 31–32 (1833).

There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms. Of course the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of free speech was not, see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. ___ (2008). Thus, we do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose. Before turning to limitations upon the individual right, however, we must determine whether the prefatory clause of the Second Amendment comports with our interpretation of the operative clause.

Heller at 626-28:

Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. See, e. g., Sheldon, in 5 Blume 346; Rawle 123; Pomeroy 152–153; Abbott 333. For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues. See, e. g., State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann., at 489–490; Nunn v. State, 1 Ga., at 251; see generally 2 Kent *340, n. 2; The American Students’ Blackstone 84, n. 11 (G. Chase ed. 1884). Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.

We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” 307 U. S., at 179. We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.” See 4 Blackstone 148–149 (1769); 3 B. Wilson, Works of the Honourable James Wilson 79 (1804); J. Dunlap, The New-York Justice 8 (1815); C. Humphreys, A Compendium of the Common Law in Force in Kentucky 482 (1822); 1 W. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Indictable Misdemeanors 271–272 (1831); H. Stephen, Summary of the Criminal Law 48 (1840); E. Lewis, An Abridgment of the Criminal Law of the United States 64 (1847); F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States 726 (1852). See also State v. Langford, 10 N. C. 381, 383–384 (1824); O’Neill v. State, 16 Ala. 65, 67 (1849); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1871); State v. Lanier, 71 N. C. 288, 289 (1874).

It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service—M–16 rifles and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause. But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification was the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty. It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large. Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers and tanks. But the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk1ch1.asp

Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England

Book the First - Chapter the First: Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals

5. THE fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present mention, is that of having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law. Which is also declared by the same statute 1 W. & M. ft. 2. c. 2. and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.

And for future reference, don't cite Roe v Wade, Kelo, or Obamacare (the penalty is a tax). They got it wrong there, too.

Book the First - Chapter the First: Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals

I never said they didn't have the right. They do. Just that the second amendment doesn't protect it.

So you can stop citing Blackstone, too.

"We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.”

Yeah. In common use by the militia. According to Miller:

"... when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time."

Meaning, they were to show up with weapons supplied by themselves and commonly used by the militia. They were not expected to show up with a revolver.

The question before the Miller court was whether or not a sawed-off shotgun had "any reasonable relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia". If it did, then the second amendment protected it.

[misterwhite #65] Don't bother citing Heller. I told you the court got it wrong.

You got it wrong and Heller (and McDonald) are current Supreme Court precedent.

By contrast you want to keeep digging up the corpses of Cruickshank, Presser and Miller, three very old cases that you happen to like.

I will continue to cite and quote current Supreme Court precedent and you are welcome to dig up the corpses of 19th century post civil war cases and drag them before the forum.

[misterwhite #66] I never said they didn't have the right. They do. Just that the second amendment doesn't protect it.

The 2nd Amendment does protect the individual right to keep and bear arms, as explicitly expressed and held by current Supreme Court precedent.

[misterwhite #67] Yeah. In common use by the militia. According to Miller:

[...]

The question before the Miller court was whether or not a sawed-off shotgun had "any reasonable relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia". If it did, then the second amendment protected it.

There ya go, digging up that corpse again. This claptrap was crushed in Heller.

District of Columbia v Heller, 554 US 570 (2008)

[595]

2. Prefatory Clause.

The prefatory clause reads: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State .... "

a. "Well-Regulated Militia." In United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, 179 (1939), we explained that "the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense." That definition comports with founding-era sources.

- - - - - - - - - -

[596]

Petitioners take a seemingly narrower view of the militia, stating that "[m]ilitias are the state- and congressionally-regulated military forces described in the Militia Clauses (art. I, § 8, cls. 15-16)." Brief for Petitioners 12. Although we agree with petitioners' interpretive assumption that "mi­litia" means the same thing in Article I and the Second Amendment, we believe that petitioners identify the wrong thing, namely, the organized militia. Unlike armies and na­vies, which Congress is given the power to create ("to raise . . . Armies"; "to provide . . . a Navy," Art. I, § 8, cls. 12-13), the militia is assumed by Article I already to be in existence. Congress is given the power to "provide for call­ing forth the Militia," § 8, cl. 15; and the power not to create, but to "organiz[e]" it—and not to organize "a" militia, which is what one would expect if the militia were to be a federal creation, but to organize "the" militia, connoting a body al­ready in existence, ibid., cl. 16. This is fully consistent with the ordinary definition of the militia as all able-bodied men. From that pool, Congress has plenary power to organize the units that will make up an effective fighting force. That is what Congress did in the first Militia Act, which specified that "each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective states, resident therein, who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years (except as is herein after excepted) shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia." Act of May 8, 1792, 1 Stat. 271. To be sure, Congress need not conscript every able-bodied man into the militia, because nothing in Article I suggests that in exercising its power to organize, discipline, and arm the militia, Congress must focus upon the entire body. Although the militia consists of all able-bodied men, the federally organized militia may consist of a subset of them.

- - - - - - - - - -

[598]

3. Relationship Between Prefatory Clause and Opera­tive Clause.

We reach the question, then: Does the preface it with an operative clause that creates an individual right to keep and bear arms? It fits perfectly, once one knows the history that the founding generation knew and that we have described above. That history showed that the way tyrants had elimi­nated a militia consisting of all the able-bodied men was not by banning the militia but simply by taking away the peo­ple's arms, enabling a select militia or standing army to sup­press political opponents. This is what had occurred in Eng­land that prompted codification of the right to have arms in the English Bill of Rights.

The debate with respect to the right to keep and bear arms, as with other guarantees in the Bill of Rights, was not over whether it was desirable (all agreed that it was) but over whether it needed to be codified in the Constitution.

- - - - - - - - - -

[599]

It is therefore entirely sensible that the Second Amend­ment's prefatory clause announces the purpose for which the right was codified: to prevent elimination of the militia. The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for self-defense and hunting. But the threat that the new Federal Government would destroy the citizens' militia by taking away their arms was the reason that right—unlike some other English rights—was codified in a written Constitution. JUSTICE BREYER's assertion that individual self-defense is merely a "subsidiary interest" of the right to keep and bear arms, see post, at 714 (dissenting opinion), is profoundly mis­taken. He bases that assertion solely upon the prologue— but that can only show that self-defense had little to do with the right's codification; it was the central component of the right itself.

- - - - - - - - - -

[619]

United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, in the course of vacating the convictions of members of a white mob for depriving blacks of their right to keep and bear arms, held that the Second Amendment does not by its own force apply to anyone other than the Federal Government. The opinion explained that the right "is not a right granted by the Con­stitution [or] in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The second amendment... means no more

620

than that it shall not be infringed by Congress." Id., at 553. States, we said, were free to restrict or protect the right under their police powers. The limited discussion of the Second Amendment in Cruikshank supports, if anything, the individual-rights interpretation. There was no claim in Cruikshank that the victims had been deprived of their right to carry arms in a militia; indeed, the Governor had dis­banded the local militia unit the year before the mob's attack, see C. Lane, The Day Freedom Died 62 (2008). We de­scribed the right protected by the Second Amendment as " 'bearing arms for a lawful purpose' " and said that "the people [must] look for their protection against any violation by their fellow-citizens of the rights it recognizes" to the States' police power. 92 U. S., at 553. That discussion makes little sense if it is only a right to bear arms in a state militia.

Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 (1886), held that the right to keep and bear arms was not violated by a law that forbade "bodies of men to associate together as military organiza­tions, or to drill or parade with arms in cities and towns unless authorized by law." Id., at 264-265. This does not refute the individual-rights interpretation of the Amend­ment; no one supporting that interpretation has contended that States may not ban such groups.

621

JUSTICE STEVENS presses Presser into service to support his view that the right to bear arms is limited to service in the militia by join­ing Presser's brief discussion of the Second Amendment with a later portion of the opinion making the seemingly relevant (to the Second Amendment) point that the plaintiff was not a member of the state militia. Unfortunately for JUSTICE STEVENS' argument, that later portion deals with the Four­teenth Amendment; it was the Fourteenth Amendment to which the plaintiff's nonmembership in the militia was rele­vant. Thus, JUSTICE STEVENS' statement that Presser "suggested that . . . nothing in the Constitution protected the use of arms outside the context of a militia," post, at 674-675, is simply wrong.

- - - - - - - - - -

[621]

JUSTICE STEVENS places overwhelming reliance upon this Court's decision in Miller, 307 U. S. 174. "[H]undreds of judges," we are told, "have relied on the view of the Amend­ment we endorsed there," post, at 638, and "[e]ven if the textual and historical arguments on both sides of the issue were evenly balanced, respect for the well-settled views of all of our predecessors on this Court, and for the rule of law itself . . . would prevent most jurists from endorsing such a dramatic upheaval in the law," post, at 639. And what is, according to JUSTICE STEVENS, the holding of Miller that demands such obeisance? That the Second Amendment "protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes, but that it does not curtail the Legislature's power to regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons." Post, at 637.

Nothing so clearly demonstrates the weakness of JUSTICE STEVENS' case. Miller did not hold that and cannot possibly be read to have held that. The judgment in the case upheld against a Second Amendment challenge two men's federal indictment for transporting an unregistered short-barreled

622

shotgun in interstate commerce, in violation of the National Firearms Act, 48 Stat. 1236. It is entirely clear that the Court's basis for saying that the Second Amendment did not apply was not that the defendants were "bear[ing] arms" not "for . . . military purposes" but for "nonmilitary use," post, at 637. Rather, it was that the type of weapon at issue was not eligible for Second Amendment protection: "In the ab­sence of any evidence tending to show that the possession or use of a [short-barreled shotgun] at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument." 307 U. S., at 178 (emphasis added). "Cer­tainly," the Court continued, "it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equip­ment or that its use could contribute to the common de­fense." Ibid. Beyond that, the opinion provided no expla­nation of the content of the right.

This holding is not only consistent with, but positively suggests, that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms (though only arms that "have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia"). Had the Court believed that the Second Amendment protects only those serving in the militia, it would have been odd to examine the character of the weapon rather than simply note that the two crooks were not militiamen. JUSTICE STEVENS can say again and again that Miller did not "turn on the difference between muskets and sawed-off shotguns; it turned, rather, on the basic difference between the military and nonmilitary use and possession of guns," post, at 677, but the words of the opinion prove otherwise. The most JUSTICE STEVENS can plausibly claim for Miller is that it declined to decide the nature of the Second Amendment right, despite the Solicitor General's argument (made in the alternative) that the right was collective, see Brief for United States, O. T. 1938,

623

No. 696, pp. 4-5. Miller stands only for the proposition that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons.

- - - - - - - - - -

[623]

It is particularly wrongheaded to read Miller for more than what it said, because the case did not even purport to be a thorough examination of the Second Amendment. JUS­TICE STEVENS claims, post, at 676-677, that the opinion reached its conclusion "[a]fter reviewing many of the same sources that are discussed at greater length by the Court today." Not many, which was not entirely the Court's fault. The defendants made no appearance in the case, neither filing a brief nor appearing at oral argument; the Court heard from no one but the Government (reason enough, one would think, not to make that case the beginning and the end of this Court's consideration of the Second Amendment). See Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3N. Y. U. J. L. & Liberty 48, 65-68 (2008). The Government's brief spent two pages discussing English legal sources, concluding " that at least the carrying of weapons without lawful occa­sion or excuse was always a crime" and that (because of the class-based restrictions and the prohibition on terrorizing people with dangerous or unusual weapons) "the early Eng­lish law did not guarantee an unrestricted right to bear arms." Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, No. 696, at 9-11. It then went on to rely primarily on the discussion of the English right to bear arms in Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154, for the proposition that the only uses of arms protected by the Second Amendment are those that relate to the militia, not self-defense. See Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, No. 696, at 12-18. The final section of the brief recognized that "some courts have said that the right to bear arms in­cludes the right of the individual to have them for the protec­tion of his person and property," and launched an alternative argument that "weapons which are commonly used by crimi­nals," such as sawed-off shotguns, are not protected. See id., at 18-21. The Government's Miller brief thus provided

624

scant discussion of the history of the Second Amendment— and the Court was presented with no counter discussion. As for the text of the Court's opinion itself, that discusses none of the history of the Second Amendment. It assumes from the prologue that the Amendment was designed to preserve the militia, 307 U. S., at 178 (which we do not dispute), and then reviews some historical materials dealing with the na­ture of the militia, and in particular with the nature of the arms their members were expected to possess, id., at 178­182. Not a word (not a word) about the history of the Sec­ond Amendment. This is the mighty rock upon which the dissent rests its case.

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

McDonald v Chicago, 561 US 742 (2010)

[Syllabus at 1]

The Seventh Circuit affirmed, relying on three 19th-century cases—United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, and Miller v. Texas, 153 U. S. 535— which were decided in the wake of this Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.

Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.

- - - - - - - - - -

[Syllabus at 2]

(b) The Bill of Rights, including the Second Amendment, originally applied only to the Federal Government, not to the States, see, e.g., Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 247, but the constitutional Amendments adopted in the Civil War's aftermath fundamentally altered the federal system. Four years after the adop­tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court held in the Slaughter­ House Cases, that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only those rights "which owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws," 16 Wall., at 79, and that the fundamental rights predating the creation of the Fed­eral Government were not protected by the Clause, id., at 76. Under this narrow reading, the Court held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only very limited rights. Id., at 79-80. Subse­quently, the Court held that the Second Amendment applies only to the Federal Government in Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, Presser, 116 U. S. 252, and Miller, 153 U. S. 535, the decisions on which the Sev­enth Circuit relied in this case. Pp. 5-9.

- - - - - - - - - -

[Syllabus at 3]

(d) The Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms fully applicable to the States. Pp. 19-33.

- - - - - - - - - -

[9]

The Court reversed all of the convictions, including those relating to the deprivation of the victims' right to bear arms. Cruikshank, 92 U. S., at 553, 559. The Court wrote that the right of bearing arms for a lawful purpose "is not a right granted by the Constitution" and is not "in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its exis­tence." Id., at 553. "The second amendment," the Court continued, "declares that it shall not be infringed; but this . . . means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress." Ibid. "Our later decisions in Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 265 (1886), and Miller v. Texas, 153 U. S. 535, 538 (1894), reaffirmed that the Second Amendment applies only to the Federal Government." Heller, 554 U. S., at_, n. 23 (slip op., at 48, n. 23).

- - - - - - - - - -

[10]

As previously noted, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller doomed petitioners' claims at the Court of Appeals level. Petitioners argue, however, that we should overrule those decisions and hold that the right to keep and bear arms is one of the "privi­leges or immunities of citizens of the United States." In petitioners' view, the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects all of the rights set out in the Bill of Rights, as well as some others, see Brief for Petitioners 10, 14, 15-21, but petitioners are unable to identify the Clause's full scope, Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6, 8-11. Nor is there any consen­sus on that question among the scholars who agree that the Slaughter-House Cases' interpretation is flawed. See Saenz, supra, at 522, n. 1 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).

We see no need to reconsider that interpretation here. For many decades, the question of the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state infringement has been analyzed under the Due Process Clause of that Amendment and not under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. We therefore decline to disturb the Slaughter­ House holding.

At the same time, however, this Court's decisions in Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller do not preclude us from considering whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment right binding on the States. See Heller, 554 U. S., at_, n. 23 (slip op., at 48, n. 23). None of those cases "engage[d] in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later cases." Ibid. As explained more fully below, Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller all preceded the era in which the Court began the process of "selective incorpo­ration" under the Due Process Clause, and we have never previously addressed the question whether the right to keep and bear arms applies to the States under that theory.

11

Indeed, Cruikshank has not prevented us from holding that other rights that were at issue in that case are bind­ing on the States through the Due Process Clause. In Cruikshank, the Court held that the general "right of the people peaceably to assemble for lawful purposes," which is protected by the First Amendment, applied only against the Federal Government and not against the States. See 92 U. S., at 551-552. Nonetheless, over 60 years later the Court held that the right of peaceful assembly was a "fun­damental righ[t] . . . safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364 (1937). We follow the same path here and thus consider whether the right to keep and bear arms applies to the States under the Due Process Clause.

- - - - - - - - - -

[13]

An alternative theory regarding the relationship be-

14

tween the Bill of Rights and §1 of the Fourteenth Amend­ment was championed by Justice Black. This theory held that §1 of the Fourteenth Amendment totally incorporated all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Adamson, supra, at 71-72 (Black, J., dissenting); Duncan, supra, at 166 (Black, J., concurring). As Justice Black noted, the chief congressional proponents of the Four­teenth Amendment espoused the view that the Amend­ment made the Bill of Rights applicable to the States and, in so doing, overruled this Court's decision in Barron. Adamson, 332 U. S., at 72 (dissenting opinion). None-

15

theless, the Court never has embraced Justice Black's "total incorporation" theory.

While Justice Black's theory was never adopted, the Court eventually moved in that direction by initiating what has been called a process of "selective incorporation," i.e., the Court began to hold that the Due Process Clause fully incorporates particular rights contained in the first eight Amendments. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 341 (1963); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 5-6

16

(1964); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 403-404 (1965); Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 18 (1967); Duncan, 391 U. S., at 147-148; Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 794 (1969).

The decisions during this time abandoned three of the previously noted characteristics of the earlier period.11 The Court made it clear that the governing standard is not whether any "civilized system [can] be imagined that would not accord the particular protection." Duncan, 391 U. S., at 149, n. 14. Instead, the Court inquired whether a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice. Id., at 149, and n. 14; see also id., at 148 (referring to those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions" (empha­sis added; internal quotation marks omitted)).

The Court also shed any reluctance to hold that rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights met the requirements for protection under the Due Process Clause. The Court eventually incorporated almost all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Only a handful of the Bill of Rights pro-

17

tections remain unincorporated.

Finally, the Court abandoned "the notion that the Four­teenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights," stating that it would be "incongruous" to apply different standards "depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court." Malloy, 378 U. S., at 10-11 (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the Court decisively held that incorporated Bill of

18

Rights protections "are all to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment." Id., at 10; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 655-656 (1961); Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 33-34 (1963); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 110 (1964); Pointer, 380 U. S., at 406; Duncan, supra, at 149, 157-158; Benton, 395 U. S., at 794-795; Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 48-49 (1985).

Employing this approach, the Court overruled earlier decisions in which it had held that particular Bill of Rights

19

guarantees or remedies did not apply to the States. See, e.g., Mapp, supra (overruling in part Wolf, 338 U. S. 25); Gideon, 372 U. S. 335 (overruling Betts, 316 U. S. 455); Malloy, supra (overruling Adamson, 332 U. S. 46, and Twining, 211 U. S. 78); Benton, supra, at 794 (overruling Palko, 302 U. S. 319).

III

With this framework in mind, we now turn directly to the question whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is incorporated in the concept of due process. In answering that question, as just explained, we must decide whether the right to keep and bear arms is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty, Duncan, 391 U. S., at 149, or as we have said in a related context, whether this right is "deeply rooted in this Nation's his­tory and tradition," Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A

Our decision in Heller points unmistakably to the answer. Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day and in Heller, we held that individual self-defense is "the central component" of the Second Amendment right. 554 U. S., at_(slip op., at 26); see also id., at_(slip op., at 56) (stating that the "inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment right").

- - - - - - - - - -

[31]

In sum, it is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.

- - - - - - - - - -

and Heller (and McDonald) are current Supreme Court precedent.

Which replaced the Cruikshank/Presser/Miller precedent. What good is precedent if the courts ignore precedent?

"three very old cases that you happen to like."

They're old?? How about your citations of English common law?

Miller stands only for the proposition that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons.

Correct. Those used by a militia. The Miller court was unsure whether a sawed-off, double-barrel shotgun was a militia weapon.

We follow the same path here and thus consider whether the right to keep and bear arms applies to the States under the Due Process Clause.

Right. States shall not infringe the right of a state to form a state militia.

When you start distorting the meaning of the second amendment, you end up looking foolish.

Our decision in Heller points unmistakably to the answer. Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day and in Heller, we held that individual self-defense is "the central component" of the Second Amendment right.

Uh-huh. And now 5 justices will tell every citizen the type of weapon they may have for individual self-defense, where they may carry it (if at all), how they may carry it, and when and where they may use it.

Some basic right.

The Court:-----

Our decision in Heller points unmistakably to the answer. Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day and in Heller, we held that individual self-defense is "the central component" of the Second Amendment right. ------ In sum, it is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty

Uh-huh. And now 5 justices will tell every citizen the type of weapon they may have for individual self-defense, where they may carry it (if at all), how they may carry it, and when and where they may use it.

Some basic right. --- misterwrong

It is clear that the Framers protected us from a Supreme Court that can infringe upon the 2nd.

Our resident troll tries to tell us different.. Ignore his bullshit..

and Heller (and McDonald) are current Supreme Court precedent.

[misterwhite #69] Which replaced the Cruikshank/Presser/Miller precedent. What good is precedent if the courts ignore precedent?

Your claimed abject ignorance of the legal system is amusing.

There is no Cruickshank/Presser/Miller precedent on whether the right to keep and bear arms is an individual right.

Cruickshank/Presser/Miller held that the 2nd Amendment had not been incorporated into the 14th Amendment, and therefore did not apply to the states, and only applied to the Federal government.

Under the bullshit you misunderstand, but ignorantly defend, it was held that States, or municipalities in States, could ban ownership of entire classes of weapons, such as handguns. That was held not to be a violation of the 2nd Amendment RKBA because under Cruickshank/Presser/Miller the 2nd Amendment did not apply to them.

Cruickshank/Presser/Miller did not establish a precedent regarding whether the right to keep and bear arms is an individual right or not. In those case, the Court did not directly adddress, or decide, that matter. Dicta does not establish precedent.

You claim ignorance that a precedent established by a court cannot bind itself. It only binds lower courts. No precedent is ever binding upon the U.S. Supreme Court.

"three very old cases that you happen to like."

[misterwhite #69] They're old?? How about your citations of English common law?

The English common law was cited as the original source of the 2nd Amendment right to keep and bear arms. It was not cited as precedent.

Statute law always takes precedent over common law. No federal common law has been created in the United States since the Constitutional government was formed, nor can it be.

Miller stands only for the proposition that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons.

[misterwhite #70] Correct. Those used by a militia. The Miller court was unsure whether a sawed-off, double-barrel shotgun was a militia weapon.

The Court opined,

In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment, or that its use could contribute to the common defense.

There was no brief or appearance for Miller. No evidence was provided except by the government. The court can only consider evidence that is before it.

With no relevant evidence before the court whether a short barrel shotgun bore, "some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia," the court could not "say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument."

You cite that as precedent for what?

We follow the same path here and thus consider whether the right to keep and bear arms applies to the States under the Due Process Clause.

[misterwhite #71] Right. States shall not infringe the right of a state to form a state militia.

When you start distorting the meaning of the second amendment, you end up looking foolish.

No blockhead. SCOTUS was considering whether the 2nd Amendment was incorporated into the 14th Amendment and, therefore, applied against the States.

SCOTUS decided it was incorporated and did apply against the States. Previously, your vaunted 2nd Amendment RKBA had no defense against State action as the 2nd Amendment was not applied to states.

You would choose to march boldly back into the era where States could ban ownership of handguns, or other categories of weapons, and you had no legal recourse.

While we recognize that this case raises controversial issues which engender strong emotions, our task is to apply the law as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court, regardless of whether that Court's interpretation comports with various personal views of what the law should be.

[...]

Appellants concede that municipalities may, under the Illinois Constitution, exercise their police power to enact regulations which prohibit "possession of items legislatively found to be dangerous ...", Quilici br. at 9. They draw a distinction, however, between the exercise of the police power in general and the exercise of police power with respect to a constitutionally protected right. Indeed, they vehemently insist that a municipality may not exercise its police power to completely prohibit a constitutional guarantee.

[...]

We agree that the state may not exercise its police power to violate a positive constitutional mandate, People v. Warren, 11 Ill. 2d 420, 143 N.E.2d 28 (1957), but we reiterate that section 22 simply prohibits an absolute ban on all firearms. Since Ordinance No. 81-11 does not prohibit all firearms, it does not prohibit a constitutionally protected right. There is no right under the Illinois Constitution to possess a handgun, nor does the state have an overriding state interest in gun control which requires it to retain exclusive control in order to prevent home rule units from adopting conflicting enactments. See City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d 101, 51 Ill.Dec. 688, 421 N.E.2d 196 (1981). Accordingly, Morton Grove may exercise its police power to prohibit handguns even though this prohibition interferes with an individual's liberty or property. People v. Warren, 11 Ill. 2d 420, 143 N.E.2d 28 (1957).

[...]

As we have noted, the parties agree that Presser is controlling, but disagree as to what Presser held. It is difficult to understand how appellants can assert that Presser supports the theory that the second amendment right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right which the state cannot regulate when the Presser decision plainly states that "[t]he Second Amendment declares that it shall not be infringed, but this ... means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the National government ...." Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265, 6 S. Ct. 580, 584, 29 L. Ed. 615 (1886). As the district court explained in detail, appellants' claim that Presser supports the proposition that the second amendment guarantee of the right to keep and bear arms is not subject to state restriction is based on dicta quoted out of context. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. at 1181-82. This argument borders on the frivolous and does not warrant any further consideration.

[...]

Since we hold that the second amendment does not apply to the states, we need not consider the scope of its guarantee of the right to bear arms. For the sake of completeness, however, and because appellants devote a large portion of their briefs to this issue, we briefly comment on what we believe to be the scope of the second amendment.

Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982) cert denied 464 U.S. 863 (1983). Your Presser (former) precedent in action.

Yeah, you like that one and want to march boldly right back to it. Three cheers for Presser and your advocacy of it.

Why do you so zealously advocate for the idea of going back to when states, cities and villages could ban handguns, or other classes of weapons, and it was NOT considered a violation of the 2nd Amendment? The good old days when only a Federal law could violate the 2nd Amendment.

You knew the legal significance of the holding in Presser because you stayed at a Holiday Inn Express, right?

Our decision in Heller points unmistakably to the answer. Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day and in Heller, we held that individual self-defense is "the central component" of the Second Amendment right.

[misterwhite #72] Uh-huh. And now 5 justices will tell every citizen the type of weapon they may have for individual self-defense, where they may carry it (if at all), how they may carry it, and when and where they may use it.

Some basic right.

And you are just too dumb to realize that, under your misinterpreted post-civil war opinions, a State or municipality could and did tell citizens exactly what type or class of weapon they may carry or possess. A ban on handguns by a municipality in Illinois was upheld as not infringing the 2nd Amendment because the 2nd Amendment did not apply to anything but the Federal government. Only a law issued by the Federal legislature could violate the 2nd Amendment. A state law, or local ordinance, could not violate any 2nd Amendment right, as the 2nd Amendment was inapplicable to the states. That is what you blather you want to return to?

The U.S. Supreme Court is established as the ultimate arbiter of what the law is. If that does not satisfy you, you should seek out some place where the ultimate arbiter is some blogger.

Self-defense is a basic right,

Yes it is. We are in agreement. BUT, self-defense with a weapon may be restricted, limited, or even prohibited. Can a violent, psychotic felon carry around a machine gun for self-defense?

"we held that individual self- defense is "the central component" of the Second Amendment right."

Why? Why the second amendment? Why can't state constitutions protect the right to individual self-defense? And isn't that preferable?

"... a State or municipality could and did tell citizens exactly what type or class of weapon they may carry or possess."

True. And before the Bill of Rights was selectively incorporated, states banned speech, restricted the press, searched without a warrant, and even had their own state-sanctioned religion.

"That is what you blather you want to return to?"

You bet! I believe in state's rights because I don't believe in one-size-fits-all government. Get the federal government out of my life so MY state can reflect the will of it's citizens.

That's known as a republic -- a form of government Benjamin Franklin challenged us to keep from people like you.

Why the second amendment? Why can't state constitutions protect the right to individual self-defense? And isn't that preferable?

A right protected by the 2nd Amendment cannot be dependent upon the states to choose whether or not they will recognize it.

As the 2nd Amendment RKBA has been incorporated into the 14th Amendment, the states may no longer enforce laws that violate the individual RKBA.

Psychotic felons have no RKBA to carry around a machine gun or any other gun, or flame thrower, or surface to air missile.

The RKBA is subject to regulation, just as the right to free speech is subject to regulation.

Quilici speaks loudly to why our constitutional rights cannot be subjected to unchecked state or municipal government. The people did not give such unchecked power to the Federal government. They retained it for themselves.

Heller and McDonald protect against state overreach.

You cite that as precedent for what?

That the type of weapon protected by the second amendment was relevent to its usefulness to a militia.

Useful? Protected. Not useful? Not protected.

Meaning, the second amendment has nothing to do with protecting some handgun for self-defense in the home. It's a restriction on the federal government to leave the state militias (and their weapons) alone.

Your right to self-defense with a firearm is protected by your state constitution. Always has been. The Heller court got it wrong.

[misterwhite] And before the Bill of Rights was selectively incorporated, states banned speech, restricted the press, searched without a warrant, and even had their own state-sanctioned religion.

"That is what you blather you want to return to?"

[misterwhite] You bet!

So you admit you want to return to when the state constitutionally "banned speech, restricted the press, searched without a warrant, and even had their own state-sanctioned religion."

If you just repeal the Bill of Rights, or make it inapplicable to the States, you can have what you want.

Your right to self-defense with a firearm is protected by your state constitution.

Look at how well that worked in Illinois. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).

Meaning, the second amendment has nothing to do with protecting some handgun for self-defense in the home. It's a restriction on the federal government to leave the state militias (and their weapons) alone.

The RKBA is an individual right. Deal with it. Heller and McDonald.

The RKBA is not a restriction on the federal government to leave the state militias (and their weapons) alone. What sort of right would that be?

There are no more State militias. There is the National Guard.

A right protected by the 2nd Amendment cannot be dependent upon the states to choose whether or not they will recognize it.

Circular reasoning. I'm saying the right is NOT protected by the second amendment and IS protected by state constitutions.

"As the 2nd Amendment RKBA has been incorporated into the 14th Amendment, the states may no longer enforce laws that violate the individual RKBA."

True, but only because recent courts ruled that way. Rulings with which I don't agree.

"The RKBA is subject to regulation, just as the right to free speech is subject to regulation."

Well, you had me worried there with all your talk about "basic rights which can't be infringed" and "common law going back centuries".

"Heller and McDonald protect against state overreach."

Why oh why do you assume the federal government will protect your RKBA better than your own state? Heller and McDonald now give the federal government the exclusive power to decide what firearms are protected by the second amendment, for who, the meaning of "to keep", the meaning of "to bear" -- and their decision will now apply to every citizen in every state.

Five justices will now control your right. What will happen when we have five liberal, gun-grabbing justices who conclude that your RKBA does not include "assault rifles"? That "to bear" only means "to transport unloaded" and "to keep" means locked in a state armory?

You're not only an idiot, you're a traitor.

So you admit you want to return to when the state constitutionally "banned speech, restricted the press, searched without a warrant, and even had their own state-sanctioned religion."

I want to return back to when the citizens of the states had the power to make those decisions.

"If you just repeal the Bill of Rights, or make it inapplicable to the States, you can have what you want."

When the Bill of Rights was written it did not apply to the states. That bullshit started in the 1960's.

Look at how well that worked in Illinois. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).

If that's what the citizens of Morton Grove wanted, who the fuck are you to tell them how to live? Who died and made you King?

You cite that as precedent for what?

That the type of weapon protected by the second amendment was relevent to its usefulness to a militia.

- - - - - - - - - -

In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment, or that its use could contribute to the common defense.

Presser

In the absence of evidence, the court could not say whether the a short barrel shotgun was a weapon in any part of the ordinary military equipment.

What a precedent. In the absence of evidence, the court could not say.

The District of Columbia argues that the prefatory clause declares the Amendment’s only purpose—to shield the state militias from federal encroachment—and that the operative clause, even when read in isolation, speaks solely to military affairs and guarantees a civic, rather than an individual, right. In other words, according to the District, the operative clause is not just limited by the prefatory clause, but instead both clauses share an explicitly civic character. The District claims that the Second Amendment “protects private possession of weapons only in connection with performance of civic duties as part of a well-regulated citizens militia organized for the security of a free state.” Individuals may be able to enforce the Second Amendment right, but only if the law in question “will impair their participation in common defense and law enforcement when called to serve in the militia.” But because the District reads “a well regulated Militia” to signify only the organized militias of the founding era—institutions that the District implicitly argues are no longer in existence today—invocation of the Second Amendment right is conditioned upon service in a defunct institution. Tellingly, we think, the District did not suggest what sort of law, if any, would violate the Second Amendment today—in fact, at oral argument, appellees’ counsel asserted that it would be constitutional for the District to ban all firearms outright. In short, we take the District’s position to be that the Second Amendment is a dead letter.

[...]

We are told by the District that the Second Amendment was written in response to fears that the new federal government would disarm the state militias by preventing men from bearing arms while in actual militia service, or by preventing them from keeping arms at home in preparation for such service. Thus the Amendment should be understood to check federal power to regulate firearms only when federal legislation was directed at the abolition of state militias, because the Amendment’s exclusive concern was the preservation of those entities. At first blush, it seems passing strange that the able lawyers and statesmen in the First Congress (including James Madison) would have expressed a sole concern for state militias with the language of the Second Amendment. Surely there was a more direct locution, such as “Congress shall make no law disarming the state militias” or “States have a right to a well-regulated militia.”

[...]

Both the collective and sophisticated collective theories assert that the Second Amendment was written for the exclusive purpose of preserving state militias, and both theories deny that individuals qua individuals can avail themselves of the Second Amendment today. The latter point is true either because, as the District appears to argue, the “Militia” is no longer in existence, or, as others argue, because the militia’s modern analogue, the National Guard, is fully equipped by the federal government, creating no need for individual ownership of firearms. It appears to us that for all its nuance, the sophisticated collective right model amounts to the old collective right theory giving a tip of the hat to the problematic (because ostensibly individual) text of the Second Amendment.

[...]

In determining whether the Second Amendment’s guarantee is an individual one, or some sort of collective right, the most important word is the one the drafters chose to describe the holders of the right—“the people.” That term is found in the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments. It has never been doubted that these provisions were designed to protect the interests of individuals against government intrusion, interference, or usurpation. We also note that the Tenth Amendment—“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people”—indicates that the authors of the Bill of Rights were perfectly capable of distinguishing between “the people,” on the one hand, and “the states,” on the other. The natural reading of “the right of the people” in the Second Amendment would accord with usage elsewhere in the Bill of Rights.

The District’s argument, on the other hand, asks us to read “the people” to mean some subset of individuals such as “the organized militia” or “the people who are engaged in militia service,” or perhaps not any individuals at all—e.g., “the states.” See Emerson, 270 F.3d at 227. These strained interpretations of “the people” simply cannot be squared with the uniform construction of our other Bill of Rights provisions. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently endorsed a uniform reading of “the people” across the Bill of Rights.

[...]

In sum, the phrase “the right of the people,” when read intratextually and in light of Supreme Court precedent, leads us to conclude that the right in question is individual.

Parker v District of Columbia, 478 F3d 372 (DC Cir 2007), Affirmed U.S. Supreme Court, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)

The RKBA is an individual right. Deal with it. Heller and McDonald.

That's how those courts ruled. I disagree.

"The RKBA is not a restriction on the federal government to leave the state militias (and their weapons) alone. What sort of right would that be?"

That would be the right of a state to form and maintain a well-regulated militia consisting of armed citizens.

"There are no more State militias. There is the National Guard."

21 states have State Defense Forces in addition to the National Guard. If the other 29 wish to have them, the second amendment protects their right to organize them.