Right, I knew central CA was the hotbed of loons.

The problems with the south -- as you note that its where most of the conservatives hold down the fort -- is that it is inundated by La Razan invaders.

CA is in a No-Win situation. The Left has all but annexed it.

tpaine ---- This thread is proof positive that you cannot reason with a wrong-headed idiot, who previously called himself robertpaulsen.

Nolu ---- This thread, with the assistance of a wrong-headed idiot, is a one-stop shopping center with sources to document the falsity and vacuity of his arguments. All it needs is a bookmark for future use.

A bookmark, and an index, without which it would be almost impossible to find the constitutional cites needed, because they are buried by your compulsion to post unneeded 'lost in the weeds' legal cites.

Nevertheless, you've made a good effort, (congrats), but be prepared for the idiot to ignore you and find someone else to target with his agitprop. ---- That is his pattern, along with using other 'personalities' (grandisland, roscoe, etc) for disruptive purposes..

Don’t you proudly live in Communist North Kookifornia?

If he doesn't he'll move there.

You misconstrue the Supremacy Clause

Federal laws trump state laws to the contrary -- whether we're talking about illegal drugs or guns. Period.

Don't try to weasel your way out by citing the "type" of violation or whether or not the government funds prosecution.

And I'm not talking about decriminalization. I'm talking about a state LEGALIZING a federally controlled substance for medical or recreational use. That violates federal laws to the contrary. That violates the Supremacy Clause. That's what the U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Gonzales v. Raich (previously Ashcroft v. Raich), 545 U.S. 1 (2005).

So again I ask. How is that any different than a state legalizing the possession of a weapon banned by the federal government? If you were fucking honest for a fucking change, you'd reply, "There is no difference, misterwhite. None at all."

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in Heller and McDonald that the 2nd Amendment right to keep and bear arms is fundamental and an individual right.

Either they're full of shit or you are. The right may be "fundamental" to some goal, but it's not a fundamental right.

As proof, there's this. Any law infringing on a fundamental right must pass strict scrutiny by a court. Heller was not decided under strict scrutiny.

"The question is not whether some federal act is infringement, but how does a state constitution protect the fundamental individual right to keep and bear arms."

Let's try again.

You said the question is NOT whether some federal act is infringement. Well, federal laws ARE an infringement on the individual RKBA.

The protection of the individual RKBA falls under state constitutions, not the federal government or the second amendment. So when the federal government passes a law that infringes on the individual RKBA, the state is powerless to protect that right.

So the real question IS whether or not the federal government laws are an infringement on the individual RKBA. I say they are because the federal government was not given the power to ban guns.

That's what I meant.

Let's say the Federal government DID act on guns, because IT DID.

True. But you said, "The question is not whether some federal act is infringement."

Well, how do you wish to proceed? You say the Federal government DID infringe on guns ... but that's not the question.

I say it IS the question. A big one. Where did the federal government get the power to ban the individual ownership of guns? And where does that power stop? And what stops that power?

Because once the federal government starts passing laws that infringe on the individual RKBA, the states can't stop that. The states can't shield their citizens from those laws.

And nobody gives a shit it you reject the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court. Their interpretations of the Constitution in Heller and McDonald are the supreme law of the land,

So we can't debate Roe v Wade, or Kelo, or any other U.S. Supreme Court decision because shut up?

Pursuant to Heller and McDonald, individual self-defense is “the central component” of the Second Amendment right,

Only because Heller and McDonald said that individual self- defense is “the central component” of the Second Amendment right.

Circular reasoning. It is because they said it is.

They made it up. They referenced … … nothing. They said it so that means it's true.

Well, the second amendment says NOTHING about individual self defense. It does, however, refer to the security of a free State.

STATE constitutions are very specific. THEY refer to "defense of self and the state".

Subsequent to the Heller ruling, nolu chan says it's the second amendment. When asked what protects state militias and their arms from federal infringement, he says nothing does.

I maintain the Heller decision was wrong, that state constitutions protect the individual citizen's right to keep and bear arms in their state, that the second amendment protects state militias and their arms from federal infringement, and that most federal laws against guns are unconstitutional.

Can you kindly abbreviate the crux of this ongoing debate?

misterwhite is a persistent purveyor of fake law. When the legal whore gets caught streetwalking, he moves to a new corner and starts over as a virgin.

At its core was it Feral vs. State authoritah vis a vis gun "rights" and limitations on certain arms?

At its core, state laws inconsistent with federal laws are null and void, and of no effect. That whole matter is a fake law argument, a dead letter under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.

Our ongoing debate is about which document protects the individual citizen's right to keep and bear arms.

Subsequent to the Heller ruling, nolu chan says it's the second amendment.

nolu chan says it is the 2nd Amendment since 1791.

When asked what protects state militias and their arms from federal infringement, he says nothing does.

The 2nd Amendment protects the individual right of the people to keep and bear arms. That includes those civilians enrolled in the unorganized militia.

The Federal Congress at Art. 1, §8, Cl. 16, was empowered "[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia."

The Federal government has organized the militia as the National Guard and provides ALL the weapons for the National Guard. The weapons remain the property of the Federal government. Being on active duty in the National Guard (or Regular Armed Forces) brings no "right" to keep and bear arms. Medics and clerics are prohibited from keeping and bearing arms, as are those previously convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence.

I maintain the Heller decision was wrong, that state constitutions protect the individual citizen's right to keep and bear arms in their state

For the umpteenth time, Heller did NOT protect the individual citizen's right to keep and bear arms in their state. Dick Heller was a resident of the federal District of Columbia. Heller (2008) did NOT incorporate the 2nd Amendment into the 14th Amendment. McDonald (2010), a case arising in Illinois, incorporated the 2nd Amendment into the 14th Amendment and made its protections fully enforceable against the 50 states.

It is legally impossible for a state constitution to protect against a federal law. The federal law must be challenged in federal court.

that the second amendment protects state militias and their arms from federal infringement,

This is directly contrary to Heller and McDonald.

and that most federal laws against guns are unconstitutional.

The fact is that federal courts have held such laws to be constitutional, and inconsistent provisions of state constitutions are null and void, and of no effect.

I'm talking about a state LEGALIZING a federally controlled substance for medical or recreational use. That violates federal laws to the contrary. That violates the Supremacy Clause.

That does not violate the Supremacy Clause, it violates the inconsistent Federal law. As such, the state law is null and void ab initio, of no effect.

Try to buy a gun, fill out ATF Form 4473, Firearms Transaction Report, which asks and warns at 11(e): [emphasis as in original]

e. Are you an unlawful user of, or addicted to, marijuana or any depressant, stimulant, njazrcotic drug, or any other controlled substance?
Warning: The use pr possession of marijuana remains unlawful under Federal law regardless of whether it has been legalized or decriminalized for medicinal or recreational purposes in the state where you reside.

The warning above the signature block reads in relevant part: (emphasis added)

I certify that my answers in Section A are true, correct, and complete. I have read and understand the Notices, Instructions, and Definitions on ATF Form 4473. ... I understand that a person who answers "yes" to any of the questions 11.b. through 11.i and/or 12.b. through 12.c. is prohibited from purchasing or receiving a firearm. ... I also understand that making any false oral or written statement, or exhibiting any false or misrepresented identification with respect to this transaction, is a crime punishable as a felony under Federal law, and may also violate State and/or local law.

Register to obtain marijuana under an invalid state law and you are considered a drug user. Lie about on your AFT-4473 and commit a felony.

That violates the Supremacy Clause. That's what the U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Gonzales v. Raich (previously Ashcroft v. Raich), 545 U.S. 1 (2005).

That is not any conclusion of Raich which stated:

The Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict between federal and state law, federal law shall prevail.

A federal law prevails over an inconsistent state law. The state law is struck down by the federal law, not for being unconstitutional.

Either they're full of shit or you are. The right may be "fundamental" to some goal, but it's not a fundamental right.

Recycled sewage.

The protection of the individual RKBA falls under state constitutions, not the federal government or the second amendment.

Recycled sewage.

once the federal government starts passing laws that infringe on the individual RKBA, the states can't stop that. The states can't shield their citizens from those laws.

Therefore, the states cannot hypothetically protect the 2nd Amendment fundamental individual right to keep and bear arms from hypothetical Federal infringement. Arguments that it can or does are fake law.

So we can't debate Roe v Wade, or Kelo, or any other U.S. Supreme Court decision because shut up?

You can debate Roe or Kelo or even Dred Scott v. Sandford. What you cannot do is pronounce your misconceived personal bullshit as the actual law, replacing the opinion of SCOTUS.

Only because Heller and McDonald said that individual self- defense is “the central component” of the Second Amendment right.

Recycled sewage.

At #373, mrwrong asks: --- Where did the federal government get the power to ban the individual ownership of guns? And where does that power stop? And what stops that power?

Good question, which you haven't addressed. -- Can you? -- In your own words, please..

GrandIsland (#354) ---- Don’t you proudly live in Communist North Kookifornia?

If he doesn't he'll move there. ---- misterwhite

Here we have two kooky 'personas' responding to itself, making idiotic comments about a previously great state where Governor Reagan began his climb to the Presidency..

After the army, I moved to San Mateo Co. (Bay Area) in 1958, and five years ago retired to Plumas Co. -- Both are considered to be in Northern California, but only the coastal areas are now infested with communistic types who distain our Constitution.. --- As do our two fascistic clowns above.

Strange bedfellows, fascists and communists, who have a special hate for conservatives --- like most of us here on LF..

Where did the federal government get the power to ban the individual ownership of guns? And where does that power stop? And what stops that power?

Where did your get the legal authority to beat your wife, where does that authority end, and when are you going to stop beating your wife?

At #373, mrwrong asks: --- Where did the federal government get the power to ban the individual ownership of guns? And where does that power stop? And what stops that power?

Good question, which you haven't addressed. -- Can you? --- tpaine

Nolu Spam --- Where did your get the legal authority to beat your wife, where does that authority end, and when are you going to stop beating your wife?

Mr.Wrong and I applaud your idiotic response to a valid question...

Got any smarts?

(nolu chan) "At its [the debate] core, state laws inconsistent with federal laws are null and void, and of no effect. That whole matter is a fake law argument, a dead letter under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution."

(misterwhite) "When asked what protects state militias and their arms from federal infringement, he [Nolu] says nothing does.

I maintain...that state constitutions protect the individual citizen's right to keep and bear arms in their state, that the second amendment protects state militias and their arms from federal infringement, and that most federal laws against guns are unconstitutional."

Thank you both for responding and clarifying your respective perspective/opinion. Now I can try and make some sense out of the thread debate.

Perhaps my impression of this debate did apply ("Feral vs. State authoritah vis a vis gun "rights") in the strictest sense.

The Tenth Amendment:

“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”.

We run into potential trouble here as many might see it.

One problem is concern that original intent of the Founders might be mis-interpretated by contemporary federalists.

We also have another problem with constitutional interpretation of those 9 Black Robed SCOTUS (who may believe in a "living, breathing document") -- but that may be another argument for another day.

IF the Supremacy Clause is considered THE final authority of judicial arbitration in the strictest sense, and end-all of debate between Fed vs State Law, then wouldn't (or couldn't) it theoretically render ALL State Law as either irrelevant or un-necessary?

IF the Supremacy Clause is considered THE final authority of judicial arbitration in the strictest sense, and end-all of debate between Fed vs State Law, then wouldn't (or couldn't) it theoretically render ALL State Law as either irrelevant or un-necessary?

Yes. But ONLY if the federal government has the constitutional power to write the law.

IF the Supremacy Clause is considered THE final authority of judicial arbitration in the strictest sense, and end-all of debate between Fed vs State Law, then wouldn't (or couldn't) it theoretically render ALL State Law as either irrelevant or un-necessary? ---- Liberator

The big misconception here, made by nearly everyone, is that SCOTUS opinions change the Constitution and/or constitutional laws.. They do strike down unconstitutional laws, both fed and state.

Otherwise, these opinions only apply to the case at hand/lesser courts, --- they also serve as advisory opinions to guide the legislative/executive branches of fed and state governments on lawmaking and enforcement.

Liberator (#389) ----- IF the Supremacy Clause is considered THE final authority of judicial arbitration in the strictest sense, and end-all of debate between Fed vs State Law, then wouldn't (or couldn't) it theoretically render ALL State Law as either irrelevant or un-necessary?

Yes. But ONLY if the federal government has the constitutional power to write the law. ----- misterwhite

And in this case, the Constitution does NOT give Congress the power to write laws that infringe on our right to bear arms..

In fact, given the principles inherent in all our founding documents, it stands to reason that this right cannot be abriged, -- it cannot be amended away..

“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”.

As for the militia, the Constitution gives the unilateral power to the Congress to, "provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia...."

The operative clause of the 2nd Amendment states, "the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed."

It was a pre-existing right of the people, and the people did not delegate it to either the Federal government or the State government. It is still the right of the people. The Second Amendment was an act of the people, not the government. The 2nd Amendment neither created the right, nor bestowed it upon anyone. The 2nd Amendment was a restriction placed by the people on the federal government, in protection of their right to keep and bear arms.

The right to keep and bear arms was the English common law right of the colonists under British rule. Heller notes that, "By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had become fundamental for English subjects. See Malcolm 122–134. Blackstone, whose works, we have said, “constituted the preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation,” Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 715 (1999), cited the arms provision of the Bill of Rights as one of the fundamental rights of Englishmen. See 1 Blackstone 136, 139–140 (1765). His description of it cannot possibly be thought to tie it to militia or military service. It was, he said, “the natural right of resistance and self-preservation,” id., at 139, and “the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and defence,” id., at 140; see also 3 id., at 2–4 (1768). Other contemporary authorities concurred."

The Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment reads, "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...."

Originally, the Bill of Rights only restrained the federal government. The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment reads, "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." This post-war Amendment applied to the states. For many years, the Supreme Court has acted on the provisions of the Bill of Rights piecemeal, and holdinng that the Due Process Clause incorporates particular rights contained in the first eight Amendments, making them enforceable against the states. McDonald found that the 2nd Amendment right to keep and bear arms is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice. McDonald also observed that, "The right to keep and bear arms was considered no less fundamental by those who drafted and ratified the Bill of Rights," and gives voluminous citation to those early Americans. Heller found, and McDonald affirmed, that "individual self-defense is the central component of the Second Amendment right."

I am not arguing the law that ought to be, but that law that is. One may readily argue that Roe is wrongly decided, and abortion will still be legal in all 50 states, and may not be banned by any state. Arguing that a SCOTUS opinion is wrongly decided does not change it. They are the ultimate arbiter of the law.

And in this case, the Constitution does NOT give Congress the power to write laws that infringe on our right to bear arms..

Congress does not claim any such power. The right to keep and bear arms is not absolute, and never has been. It has never applied to weapons not lawful to possess, and is subject to regulation, just as are other rights. The right to free speech is not the right to utter falsehoods under oath or to commit libel or slander with impunity.

You simply adopt a false definition of the right, then attack your straw man.

The 2nd Amendment right to keep and bear arms does not mean that everyone has a right to keep and bear an illegal-to-possess M-16 or a nuclear bomb.

The big misconception here, made by nearly everyone, is that SCOTUS opinions change the Constitution and/or constitutional laws.. They do strike down unconstitutional laws, both fed and state.

That is complete bullshit, as I have informed you many times over.

SCOTUS interpret constitutional provisions. Those interpretations may change.

Plessy v. Ferguson found seperate but equal to be constitutional. Brown v. Board of Education found seperate but equal to be inherently unequal and unconstitutional. There were segregated schools, and then there were not.

Otherwise, these opinions only apply to the case at hand/lesser courts,

If Roe only applied to the case at hand, why is abortion lawful in all 50 states, and cannot be prohibited by any of the 50 states?

--- they also serve as advisory opinions to guide the legislative/executive branches of fed and state governments on lawmaking and enforcement.

Federal courts are prohibited from issuing advisory opinions.

The opinions they do issue are anything but advisory.

Advisory opinion. Such may be rendered ay a court at the request of the government or an interested party indicating how the court would rule on a matter should adversary litigation develop. An advisory opinion is thus an interpretation of the law without binding effect. While the International Court of Law and Justice and some state courts will render advisory opinions the federal courts will not; their jurisdiction being restricted to cases or controversies.

Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.

https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/advisory_opinion

Advisory Opinion

A court's nonbinding interpretation of law. It states the opinion of a court upon a legal question submitted by a legislature, government official, or another court. Federal courts cannot issue advisory opinions because of the Constitution's case-or-controversy requirement.

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-13-02-0263

George Washington requested an advisory opinion from the U.S. Supreme Court. In a letter signed by Chief Justice John Jay and four associate justices, the Court politely refused.

To George Washington from Supreme Court Justices, 8 August 1793

From Supreme Court Justices

Philadelphia 8 Augt 1793

Sir

We have considered the previous Question stated in a Letter written to us by your Direction, by the Secretary of State, on the 18th of last month.1

The Lines of Separation drawn by the Constitution between the three Departments of Government—their being in certain Respects checks on each other—and our being Judges of a court in the last Resort—are Considerations which afford strong arguments against the Propriety of our extrajudicially deciding the questions alluded to; especially as the Power given by the Constitution to the President of calling on the Heads of Departments for opinions, seems to have been purposely as well as expressly limited to executive Departments.

we exceedingly regret every Event that may cause Embarrassment to your administration; but we derive Consolation from the Reflection, that your Judgment will discern what is Right, and that your usual Prudence, Decision and Firmness will surmount every obstacle to the Preservation of the Rights, Peace, and Dignity of the united States. We have the Honor to be, with perfect Respect, Sir, your most obedient and most h’ble servants

John Jay
James Wilson
John Blair
Ja. Iredell
Wm Paterson

"The operative clause of the 2nd Amendment states, "the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed."

So? You can't cite a portion of the second amendment, call it "The Operative Clause", pretend it stands alone, then sit back like that explains everything. Worse, claim things that aren't there -- like "self-defense is the central component of the right itself".

Huh? What if I claimed that hunting is the central component of the right itself? You buy that? I think you'd ask me to support such a claim.

Anyways, you can't omit the first part -- "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State" -- because that part explains your "operative clause". Why else put in in the second amendment? You don't like it because it totally fucks up your individual rights theory.

Lastly, the phrase "to keep and bear arms" is a military phrase. The Founders intentionally used that phrase because that is what they wished to protect from federal infringement.

The right to keep and bear arms is not absolute, and never has been.

It IS absolute if you read the second amendment the way you should -- protecting state Militias and the RKBA of those who are a part of them from federal infringement. No militia arms may be banned, regulated, registered, or even taxed by the federal governent.

Shall not be infringed. Put there for a reason.

The 2nd Amendment right to keep and bear arms does not mean that everyone has a right to keep and bear an illegal-to-possess M-16 or a nuclear bomb.

Not everyone, no.

But if M-16's and nuclear weapons existed in 1790, the federal government could not prevent the state militias from having them.

ONLY if the federal government has the constitutional power to write the law. ----- misterwhite

And in this case, the Constitution does NOT give Congress the power to write laws that infringe on our right to bear arms.. -------- In fact, given the principles inherent in all our founding documents, it stands to reason that this right cannot be abriged, -- it cannot be amended away.. --- tpaine

Nolu Sham ---- Congress does not claim any such power. The right to keep and bear arms is not absolute, and never has been. It has never applied to weapons not lawful to possess, and is subject to regulation, just as are other rights.

Your opinion that The right to keep and bear arms is not absolute, and has never applied to weapons not lawful to possess, --- is absolute bull that you've made up, or worse, have plagiarized from some bullshit 'legal source'.

You also make the point of that not everyone has a right to keep and bear an illegal-to-possess M-16 or a nuclear bomb.

Full auto rifles are arguably 'illegal', and that opinion will hopefully be re- addressed someday by a more rational Court.. --- Nukes really aren't really bearable arms, as perhaps even a nitpicker like you will admit..

The big misconception here, made by nearly everyone, is that SCOTUS opinions change the Constitution and/or constitutional laws.. They do strike down unconstitutional laws, both fed and state. ----- Otherwise, these opinions only apply to the case at hand/lesser courts, --- they also serve as advisory opinions to guide the legislative/executive branches of fed and state governments on lawmaking and enforcement. ---- tpaine

SCOTUS interpret constitutional provisions. Those interpretations may change. --- If Roe only applied to the case at hand, why is abortion lawful in all 50 states, and cannot be prohibited by any of the 50 states --- Federal courts are prohibited from issuing advisory opinions.

SCOTUS opines on constitutional provisions. Those opinions may change. --

Roe applied to the case at hand and lesser courts, thus abortion is lawful in all 50 states because the lesser courts agree that it cannot be prohibited by any of the 50 states.

Federal courts are prohibited from issuing advisory opinions by the opinions you cited. This opinion is not written in the Constitution itself, and may change..

The right to keep and bear arms is not absolute, and never has been.

It IS absolute if you read the second amendment the way you should -- protecting state Militias and the RKBA of those who are a part of them from federal infringement.

What an incredibly ignorant fuck you are.

Heller at 554 U.S. 592-95

c. Meaning of the Operative Clause.

Putting all of these textual elements together, we find that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation. This meaning is strongly confirmed by the historical background of the Second Amendment. We look to this because it has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right. The very text of the Second Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-existence of the right and declares only that it “shall not be infringed.” As we said in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 553 (1876), “[t]his is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed ....”

[...]

By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had become fundamental for English subjects. See Malcolm 122–134. Blackstone, whose works, we have said, “constituted the preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation,” Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 715 (1999), cited the arms provision of the Bill of Rights as one of the fundamental rights of Englishmen. See 1 Blackstone 136, 139–140 (1765). His description of it cannot possibly be thought to tie it to militia or military service. It was, he said, “the natural right of resistance and self-preservation,” id., at 139, and “the right of having and using arms for selfpreservation and defence,” id., at 140; see also 3 id., at 2–4 (1768). Other contemporary authorities concurred. See G. Sharp, Tracts, Concerning the Ancient and Only True Legal Means of National Defence, by a Free Militia 17–18, 27 (3d ed. 1782); 2 J. de Lolme, The Rise and Progress of the English Constitution 886–887 (1784) (A. Stephens ed. 1838); W. Blizard, Desultory Reflections on Police 59–60 (1785). Thus, the right secured in 1689 as a result of the Stuarts’ abuses was by the time of the founding understood to be an individual right protecting against both public and private violence.

And, of course, what the Stuarts had tried to do to their political enemies, George III had tried to do to the colonists. In the tumultuous decades of the 1760’s and 1770’s, the Crown began to disarm the inhabitants of the most rebellious areas. That provoked polemical reactions by Americans invoking their rights as Englishmen to keep arms. A New York article of April 1769 said that “[i]t is a natural right which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed by the Bill of Rights, to keep arms for their own defence.” A Journal of the Times: Mar. 17, New York Journal, Supp. 1, Apr. 13, 1769, in Boston Under Military Rule 79 (O. Dickerson ed. 1936) (reprinted 1970); see also, e. g., Shippen, Boston Gazette, Jan. 30, 1769, in 1 The Writings of Samuel Adams 299 (H. Cushing ed. 1904) (reprinted 1968). They understood the right to enable individuals to defend themselves. As the most important early American edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries (by the law professor and former Antifederalist St. George Tucker) made clear in the notes to the description of the arms right, Americans understood the “right of self-preservation” as permitting a citizen to “repe[l] force by force” when “the intervention of society in his behalf, may be too late to prevent an injury.” 1 Blackstone’s Commentaries 145–146, n. 42 (1803) (hereinafter Tucker’s Blackstone). See also W. Duer, Outlines of the Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States 31–32 (1833).

There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms. Of course the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of free speech was not, see, e. g., United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285 (2008). Thus, we do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose. Before turning to limitations upon the individual right, however, we must determine whether the prefatory clause of the Second Amendment comports with our interpretation of the operative clause.

Heller at 554 U.S. 598-600

3. Relationship Between Prefatory Clause and Operative Clause.

We reach the question, then: Does the preface fit with an operative clause that creates an individual right to keep and bear arms? It fits perfectly, once one knows the history that the founding generation knew and that we have described above. That history showed that the way tyrants had eliminated a militia consisting of all the able-bodied men was not by banning the militia but simply by taking away the people’s arms, enabling a select militia or standing army to suppress political opponents. This is what had occurred in England that prompted codification of the right to have arms in the English Bill of Rights.

The debate with respect to the right to keep and bear arms, as with other guarantees in the Bill of Rights, was not over whether it was desirable (all agreed that it was) but over whether it needed to be codified in the Constitution. During the 1788 ratification debates, the fear that the Federal Government would disarm the people in order to impose rule through a standing army or select militia was pervasive in Antifederalist rhetoric. See, e. g., Letters from The Federal Farmer III (Oct. 10, 1787), in 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 234, 242 (H. Storing ed. 1981). John Smilie, for example, worried not only that Congress’s “command of the militia” could be used to create a “select militia,” or to have “no militia at all,” but also, as a separate concern, that “[w]hen a select militia is formed; the people in general may be disarmed.” 2 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 508–509 (M. Jensen ed. 1976) (hereinafter Documentary Hist.). Federalists responded that because Congress was given no power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and bear arms, such a force could never oppress the people. See, e. g., A Pennsylvanian III (Feb. 20, 1788), in The Origin of the Second Amendment 275, 276 (D. Young ed., 2d ed. 2001) (hereinafter Young); White, To the Citizens of Virginia (Feb. 22, 1788), in id., at 280, 281; A Citizen of America (Oct. 10, 1787), in id., at 38, 40; Foreign Spectator, Remarks on the Amendments to the Federal Constitution, Nov. 7, 1788, in id., at 556. It was understood across the political spectrum that the right helped to secure the ideal of a citizen militia, which might be necessary to oppose an oppressive military force if the constitutional order broke down.

It is therefore entirely sensible that the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause announces the purpose for which the right was codified: to prevent elimination of the militia. The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for selfdefense and hunting. But the threat that the new Federal Government would destroy the citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the reason that right—unlike some other English rights—was codified in a written Constitution. Justice Breyer’s assertion that individual self-defense is merely a “subsidiary interest” of the right to keep and bear arms, see post, at 714 (dissenting opinion), is profoundly mistaken. He bases that assertion solely upon the prologue—but that can only show that self-defense had little to do with the right’s codification; it was the central component of the right itself.

Besides ignoring the historical reality that the Second Amendment was not intended to lay down a “novel principl[e]” but rather codified a right “inherited from our English ancestors,” Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 281 (1897), petitioners’ interpretation does not even achieve the narrower purpose that prompted codification of the right. If, as they believe, the Second Amendment right is no more than the right to keep and use weapons as a member of an organized militia, see Brief for Petitioners 8—if, that is, the organized militia is the sole institutional beneficiary of the Second Amendment’s guarantee—it does not assure the existence of a “citizens’ militia” as a safeguard against tyranny. For Congress retains plenary authority to organize the militia, which must include the authority to say who will belong to the organized force. That is why the first Militia Act’s requirement that only whites enroll caused States to amend their militia laws to exclude free blacks. See Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 477, 521–525 (1998). Thus, if petitioners are correct, the Second Amendment protects citizens’ right to use a gun in an organization from which Congress has plenary authority to exclude them. It guarantees a select militia of the sort the Stuart kings found useful, but not the people’s militia that was the concern of the founding generation.

But if M-16's and nuclear weapons existed in 1790, the federal government could not prevent the state militias from having them.

What an incredibly ignorant fuck you are.

At Article 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 16, the FEDERAL CONGRESS IS EMPOWERED "to provide for organizing, ARMING, and disciplining the Militia."

The FEDERAL CONGRESS has exercised its constitutional power to ORGANIZE THE MILITIA into the National Guard.

The FEDERAL CONGRESS has exercised its constitutional power to ARM THE MILITIA. The FEDERAL GOVERNMENT provides all the arms, and the FEDERAL GOVERNMENT retains ownership of all the arms.

The Constitution did not empower the states to organize or arm the militia.

Heller at 554 U.S. 627

It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service—M–16 rifles and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause. But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification was the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty.

Your opinion that The right to keep and bear arms is not absolute, and has never applied to weapons not lawful to possess, --- is absolute bull that you've made up, or worse, have plagiarized from some bullshit 'legal source'.

A Supreme Court opinion is not bullshit that I made up, nor is it a bullshit legal source.

Heller at 554 U.S. 595

There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms. Of course the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of free speech was not, see, e. g., United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285 (2008).

Heller at 554 U.S. 625

We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. That accords with the historical understanding of the scope of the right, see Part III, infra

Heller at 554 U.S. 627

It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service—M–16 rifles and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause. But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification was the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty.

Heller at 554 U.S. 627-28

It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large. Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers and tanks. But the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.

Roe applied to the case at hand and lesser courts, thus abortion is lawful in all 50 states because the lesser courts agree that it cannot be prohibited by any of the 50 states.

Roe applied equally to any applicable case pending at SCOTUS and to all states, territories, and the District of Columbia, and is binding precedent on all lower courts. The lower courts need not agree, they just are obligated to follow the binding precedent. The interpretation is automatically applicable to all the states without the lower courts doing anything. When Obergefell came down, it did not be only that Obergefell could get married in Kentucky, it meant that you and your boyfriend misterwhite could get married in any state of the union, as soon as the ruling came down.

Federal courts are prohibited from issuing advisory opinions by the opinions you cited. This opinion is not written in the Constitution itself, and may change..

Advisory opinions are prohibited by the limitations imposed by the Constitution, as cited by the five justices denying the George Washington request for an advisory opinion.

Article 3, Section 2, limits the judicial power to cases and controversies.

Federal courts were not empowered by the Constitution to issue advisory opinions.

Roe applied equally to any applicable case pending at SCOTUS and to all states, territories, and the District of Columbia, and is binding precedent on all lower courts.

(When Obergefell came down, it did not be only that Obergefell could get married in Kentucky, it meant that you and your boyfriend misterwhite could get married in any state of the union, as soon as the ruling came down.)

(Weird aside)

In the spirit of your own words: ----'What an incredibly ignorant nitpicking f-- - you are.'

I wrote PRIOR to your response above: --- Roe applied to the case at hand and lesser courts, thus abortion is lawful in all 50 states because the lesser courts agree that it cannot be prohibited by any of the 50 states.

Certainly, you can, and will, obsess about the legal niceties, being the silly person you are, but any rational person won't care about the differences in our views.

You really should stop pretending to be some sort of 'barrister'. -- You're making a fool of yourself.

The Constitution did not empower the states to organize or arm the militia.

Which is why the second amendment was written. George Mason … argued that there was a danger that Congress could render the militia useless ...

"... by disarming them. Under various pretences, Congress may neglect to provide for arming and disciplining the militia; and the state governments cannot do it, for Congress has an exclusive right to arm them &c."

The desire to prevent enfeebling state militias, which provided a check to a standing army, prompted the ratifying conventions to call for an amendment guaranteeing the right of citizens to bear arms. The First Congress responded, but the Second Amendment did not remove national control over armed forces or the state militias.
-- https://www.heritage.org/constitution/articles/1/essays/68/emoluments- clause#!/articles/1/essays/56/organizing-the-militia

It also appears that you believe if the right is not protected it means you don't have the right.

Third, you believe the only document that protects your right to keep and bear arms is the second amendment.

Lastly, you are woefully ignorant of why the second amendment was added to the Bill of Rights -- it had nothing to do with self-defense and everything to do with defense of the State.

It is absolutely painful to see you twist and distort the words and meaning of the second amendment in order to fit your definition. You redefine "the people" to mean everyone. You redefine "arms" to mean common arms -- whatever they are. You remove the protection of state militias. And you give the federal government powers they don't have in order to regulate all that garbage.

So? You can't cite a portion of the second amendment, call it "The Operative Clause", pretend it stands alone, then sit back like that explains everything.

What an incredibly ignorant fuck you are.

Heller at 554 U.S. 577

The Second Amendment is naturally divided into two parts: its prefatory clause and its operative clause. The former does not limit the latter grammatically, but rather announces a purpose. The Amendment could be rephrased, “Because a well regulated Militia is necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.”

- - - - - - - - - -

Heller at 554 U.S. 579

1. Operative Clause.

a. “Right of the People.” The first salient feature of the operative clause is that it codifies a “right of the people.” The unamended Constitution and the Bill of Rights use the phrase “right of the people” two other times, in the First Amendment’s Assembly-and-Petition Clause and in the Fourth Amendment’s Search-and-Seizure Clause. The Ninth Amendment uses very similar terminology (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people”). All three of these instances unambiguously refer to individual rights, not “collective” rights, or rights that may be exercised only through participation in some corporate body.

- - - - - - - - - -

Heller at 554 U.S. 592-95

c. Meaning of the Operative Clause.

Putting all of these textual elements together, we find that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation. This meaning is strongly confirmed by the historical background of the Second Amendment. We look to this because it has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right. The very text of the Second Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-existence of the right and declares only that it “shall not be infringed.” As we said in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 553 (1876), “[t]his is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed ....”

[...]

By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had become fundamental for English subjects. See Malcolm 122–134. Blackstone, whose works, we have said, “constituted the preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation,” Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 715 (1999), cited the arms provision of the Bill of Rights as one of the fundamental rights of Englishmen. See 1 Blackstone 136, 139–140 (1765). His description of it cannot possibly be thought to tie it to militia or military service. It was, he said, “the natural right of resistance and self-preservation,” id., at 139, and “the right of having and using arms for selfpreservation and defence,” id., at 140; see also 3 id., at 2–4 (1768). Other contemporary authorities concurred. See G. Sharp, Tracts, Concerning the Ancient and Only True Legal Means of National Defence, by a Free Militia 17–18, 27 (3d ed. 1782); 2 J. de Lolme, The Rise and Progress of the English Constitution 886–887 (1784) (A. Stephens ed. 1838); W. Blizard, Desultory Reflections on Police 59–60 (1785). Thus, the right secured in 1689 as a result of the Stuarts’ abuses was by the time of the founding understood to be an individual right protecting against both public and private violence.

And, of course, what the Stuarts had tried to do to their political enemies, George III had tried to do to the colonists. In the tumultuous decades of the 1760’s and 1770’s, the Crown began to disarm the inhabitants of the most rebellious areas. That provoked polemical reactions by Americans invoking their rights as Englishmen to keep arms. A New York article of April 1769 said that “[i]t is a natural right which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed by the Bill of Rights, to keep arms for their own defence.” A Journal of the Times: Mar. 17, New York Journal, Supp. 1, Apr. 13, 1769, in Boston Under Military Rule 79 (O. Dickerson ed. 1936) (reprinted 1970); see also, e. g., Shippen, Boston Gazette, Jan. 30, 1769, in 1 The Writings of Samuel Adams 299 (H. Cushing ed. 1904) (reprinted 1968). They understood the right to enable individuals to defend themselves. As the most important early American edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries (by the law professor and former Antifederalist St. George Tucker) made clear in the notes to the description of the arms right, Americans understood the “right of self-preservation” as permitting a citizen to “repe[l] force by force” when “the intervention of society in his behalf, may be too late to prevent an injury.” 1 Blackstone’s Commentaries 145–146, n. 42 (1803) (hereinafter Tucker’s Blackstone). See also W. Duer, Outlines of the Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States 31–32 (1833).

There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms. Of course the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of free speech was not, see, e. g., United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285 (2008). Thus, we do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose. Before turning to limitations upon the individual right, however, we must determine whether the prefatory clause of the Second Amendment comports with our interpretation of the operative clause.

- - - - - - - - - -

Heller at 554 U.S. 595-97

2. Prefatory Clause.

The prefatory clause reads: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State ....”

a. “Well-Regulated Militia.” In United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, 179 (1939), we explained that “the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense.” That definition comports with founding-era sources. See, e. g., Webster (“The militia of a country are the able bodied men organized into companies, regiments and brigades...and required by law to attend military exercises on certain days only, but at other times left to pursue their usual occupations”); The Federalist No. 46, pp. 329, 334 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison) (“near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands”); Letter to Destutt de Tracy (Jan. 26, 1811), in The Portable Thomas Jefferson 520, 524 (M. Peterson ed. 1975) (“the militia of the State, that is to say, of every man in it able to bear arms”).

Petitioners take a seemingly narrower view of the militia, stating that “[m]ilitias are the state-and congressionally regulated military forces described in the Militia Clauses (art. I, § 8, cls. 15–16).” Brief for Petitioners 12. Although we agree with petitioners’ interpretive assumption that “militia” means the same thing in Article I and the Second Amendment, we believe that petitioners identify the wrong thing, namely, the organized militia. Unlike armies and navies, which Congress is given the power to create (“to raise . . . Armies”; “to provide . . . a Navy,” Art. I, §8, cls. 12–13), the militia is assumed by Article I already to be in existence. Congress is given the power to “provide for calling forth the Militia,” § 8, cl. 15; and the power not to create, but to “organiz[e]” it—and not to organize “a” militia, which is what one would expect if the militia were to be a federal creation, but to organize “the” militia, connoting a body already in existence, ibid., cl. 16. This is fully consistent with the ordinary definition of the militia as all able-bodied men. From that pool, Congress has plenary power to organize the units that will make up an effective fighting force. That is what Congress did in the first Militia Act, which specified that “each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective states, resident therein, who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years (except as is herein after excepted) shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia.” Act of May 8, 1792, 1 Stat. 271. To be sure, Congress need not conscript every able-bodied man into the militia, because nothing in Article I suggests that in exercising its power to organize, discipline, and arm the militia, Congress must focus upon the entire body. Although the militia consists of all able-bodied men, the federally organized militia may consist of a subset of them.

Finally, the adjective “well-regulated” implies nothing more than the imposition of proper discipline and training. See Johnson 1619 (“Regulate”: “To adjust by rule or method”); Rawle 121–122; cf. Va. Declaration of Rights § 13 (1776), in 7 Thorpe 3812, 3814 (referring to “a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms”).

Heller at 554 U.S. 598-603

3. Relationship Between Prefatory Clause and Operative Clause.

We reach the question, then: Does the preface fit with an operative clause that creates an individual right to keep and bear arms? It fits perfectly, once one knows the history that the founding generation knew and that we have described above. That history showed that the way tyrants had eliminated a militia consisting of all the able-bodied men was not by banning the militia but simply by taking away the people’s arms, enabling a select militia or standing army to suppress political opponents. This is what had occurred in England that prompted codification of the right to have arms in the English Bill of Rights.

The debate with respect to the right to keep and bear arms, as with other guarantees in the Bill of Rights, was not over whether it was desirable (all agreed that it was) but over whether it needed to be codified in the Constitution. During the 1788 ratification debates, the fear that the Federal Government would disarm the people in order to impose rule through a standing army or select militia was pervasive in Antifederalist rhetoric. See, e. g., Letters from The Federal Farmer III (Oct. 10, 1787), in 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 234, 242 (H. Storing ed. 1981). John Smilie, for example, worried not only that Congress’s “command of the militia” could be used to create a “select militia,” or to have “no militia at all,” but also, as a separate concern, that “[w]hen a select militia is formed; the people in general may be disarmed.” 2 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 508–509 (M. Jensen ed. 1976) (hereinafter Documentary Hist.). Federalists responded that because Congress was given no power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and bear arms, such a force could never oppress the people. See, e. g., A Pennsylvanian III (Feb. 20, 1788), in The Origin of the Second Amendment 275, 276 (D. Young ed., 2d ed. 2001) (hereinafter Young); White, To the Citizens of Virginia (Feb. 22, 1788), in id., at 280, 281; A Citizen of America (Oct. 10, 1787), in id., at 38, 40; Foreign Spectator, Remarks on the Amendments to the Federal Constitution, Nov. 7, 1788, in id., at 556. It was understood across the political spectrum that the right helped to secure the ideal of a citizen militia, which might be necessary to oppose an oppressive military force if the constitutional order broke down.

It is therefore entirely sensible that the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause announces the purpose for which the right was codified: to prevent elimination of the militia. The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for selfdefense and hunting. But the threat that the new Federal Government would destroy the citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the reason that right—unlike some other English rights—was codified in a written Constitution. Justice Breyer’s assertion that individual self-defense is merely a “subsidiary interest” of the right to keep and bear arms, see post, at 714 (dissenting opinion), is profoundly mistaken. He bases that assertion solely upon the prologue—but that can only show that self-defense had little to do with the right’s codification; it was the central component of the right itself.

Besides ignoring the historical reality that the Second Amendment was not intended to lay down a “novel principl[e]” but rather codified a right “inherited from our English ancestors,” Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 281 (1897), petitioners’ interpretation does not even achieve the narrower purpose that prompted codification of the right. If, as they believe, the Second Amendment right is no more than the right to keep and use weapons as a member of an organized militia, see Brief for Petitioners 8—if, that is, the organized militia is the sole institutional beneficiary of the Second Amendment’s guarantee—it does not assure the existence of a “citizens’ militia” as a safeguard against tyranny. For Congress retains plenary authority to organize the militia, which must include the authority to say who will belong to the organized force. That is why the first Militia Act’s requirement that only whites enroll caused States to amend their militia laws to exclude free blacks. See Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 477, 521–525 (1998). Thus, if petitioners are correct, the Second Amendment protects citizens’ right to use a gun in an organization from which Congress has plenary authority to exclude them. It guarantees a select militia of the sort the Stuart kings found useful, but not the people’s militia that was the concern of the founding generation.

B

Our interpretation is confirmed by analogous armsbearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and immediately followed adoption of the Second Amendment. Four States adopted analogues to the Federal Second Amendment in the period between independence and the ratification of the Bill of Rights. Two of them—Pennsylvania and Vermont—clearly adopted individual rights unconnected to militia service. Pennsylvania’s Declaration of Rights of 1776 said: “That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state ....” § XIII, in 5 Thorpe 3082, 3083 (emphasis added). In 1777, Vermont adopted the identical provision, except for inconsequential differences in punctuation and capitalization. See Vt. Const., ch. 1, § XV, in 6 id., at 3741.

North Carolina also codified a right to bear arms in 1776: “That the people have a right to bear arms, for the defence of the State . . . .” Declaration of Rights § XVII, in 5 id., at 2787, 2788. This could plausibly be read to support only a right to bear arms in a militia—but that is a peculiar way to make the point in a constitution that elsewhere repeatedly mentions the militia explicitly. See N. C. Const., §§ XIV, XVIII, XXXV, in id., at 2789, 2791, 2793. Many colonial statutes required individual arms bearing for public-safety reasons—such as the 1770 Georgia law that “for the security and defence of this province from internal dangers and insurrections” required those men who qualified for militia duty individually “to carry fire arms” “to places of public worship.” 19 Colonial Records of the State of Georgia 137–139 (A. Candler ed. 1911 (pt. 1)) (emphasis added). That broad public-safety understanding was the connotation given to the North Carolina right by that State’s Supreme Court in 1843. See State v. Huntly, 25 N. C. 418, 422–423.

The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution presented another variation on the theme: “The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common defence. . . . ” Pt. First, Art. XVII, in 3 Thorpe 1888, 1892. Once again, if one gives narrow meaning to the phrase “common defence” this can be thought to limit the right to the bearing of arms in a state-organized military force. But once again the State’s highest court thought otherwise. Writing for the court in an 1825 libel case, Chief Justice Parker wrote: “The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was to be responsible in cases of its abuse; like the right to keep fire arms, which does not protect him who uses them for annoyance or destruction.” Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. 304, 313–314. The analogy makes no sense if firearms could not be used for any individual purpose at all. See also Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204, 244 (1983) (19th century courts never read “common defence” to limit the use of weapons to militia service).

We therefore believe that the most likely reading of all four of these pre-Second Amendment state constitutional provisions is that they secured an individual right to bear arms for defensive purposes. Other States did not include rights to bear arms in their pre-1789 constitutions—although in Virginia a Second Amendment analogue was proposed (unsuccessfully) by Thomas Jefferson. (It read: “No freeman shall ever be debarred the use of arms [within his own lands or tenements].” 18 1 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 344 (J. Boyd ed. 1950).)

Between 1789 and 1820, nine States adopted Second Amendment analogues. Four of them—Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, and Missouri—referred to the right of the people to “bear arms in defence of themselves and the State.” See n. 8, supra. Another three States—Mississippi, Connecticut, and Alabama—used the even more individualistic phrasing that each citizen has the “right to bear arms in defence of himself and the State.” See ibid. Finally, two States— Tennessee and Maine—used the “common defence” language of Massachusetts. See Tenn. Const., Art. XI, § 26 (1796), in 6 Thorpe 3414, 3424; Me. Const., Art. I, § 16 (1819), in 3 id., at 1646, 1648. That of the nine state constitutional protections for the right to bear arms enacted immediately after 1789 at least seven unequivocally protected an individual citizen’s right to self-defense is strong evidence that that is how the founding generation conceived of the right. And with one possible exception that we discuss in Part II–D–2, 19thcentury courts and commentators interpreted these state constitutional provisions to protect an individual right to use arms for self-defense. See n. 9, supra; Simpson v. State, 5 Yer. 356, 360 (Tenn. 1833).

The historical narrative that petitioners must endorse would thus treat the Federal Second Amendment as an odd outlier, protecting a right unknown in state constitutions or at English common law, based on little more than an overreading of the prefatory clause.

Huh? What if I claimed that hunting is the central component of the right itself? You buy that? I think you'd ask me to support such a claim.

I would you tell you to get your your head out of your ass and read Heller and McDonald. Affirming Heller, McDonald 561 U.S. at 767 stated, "in Heller we held that individual self-defense is 'the central component of the Second Amendment right. 554 U.S. at 599; see also id. at 628 (stating that the 'inherent right of self-defensehas been central to the Second Amendment right')."

The Constitution did not empower the states to organize or arm the militia.

Which is why the second amendment was written.

Incredible bullshit.

Under the militia law, Congress retains plenary authority to say who will belong to the organized militia, or who will be excluded.

Heller at 554 U.S. 599-600

Besides ignoring the historical reality that the Second Amendment was not intended to lay down a “novel principl[e]” but rather codified a right “inherited from our English ancestors,” Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 281 (1897), petitioners’ interpretation does not even achieve the narrower purpose that prompted codification of the right. If, as they believe, the Second Amendment right is no more than the right to keep and use weapons as a member of an organized militia, see Brief for Petitioners 8—if, that is, the organized militia is the sole institutional beneficiary of the Second Amendment’s guarantee—it does not assure the existence of a “citizens’ militia” as a safeguard against tyranny. For Congress retains plenary authority to organize the militia, which must include the authority to say who will belong to the organized force. That is why the first Militia Act’s requirement that only whites enroll caused States to amend their militia laws to exclude free blacks. See Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 477, 521–525 (1998). Thus, if petitioners are correct, the Second Amendment protects citizens’ right to use a gun in an organization from which Congress has plenary authority to exclude them. It guarantees a select militia of the sort the Stuart kings found useful, but not the people’s militia that was the concern of the founding generation.

It's become obvious that you are confusing "the right the keep and bear arms" wi with "the protection of the right to keep and bear arms".

It also appears that you believe if the right is not protected it means you don't have the right.

It has become obvious that you are simply confused.

Lastly, you are woefully ignorant of why the second amendment was added to the Bill of Rights -- it had nothing to do with self-defense and everything to do with defense of the State.

Your are just wilfully ignorant.

Read Heller and McDonald. Affirming Heller, McDonald 561 U.S. at 767 stated, "in Heller we held that individual self-defense is 'the central component of the Second Amendment right. 554 U.S. at 599; see also id. at 628 (stating that the 'inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment right')."

- - - - - - - - - -

Heller at 554 U.S. 577

The Second Amendment is naturally divided into two parts: its prefatory clause and its operative clause. The former does not limit the latter grammatically, but rather announces a purpose. The Amendment could be rephrased, “Because a well regulated Militia is necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.”

- - - - - - - - - -

Heller at 554 U.S. 579

1. Operative Clause.

a. “Right of the People.” The first salient feature of the operative clause is that it codifies a “right of the people.” The unamended Constitution and the Bill of Rights use the phrase “right of the people” two other times, in the First Amendment’s Assembly-and-Petition Clause and in the Fourth Amendment’s Search-and-Seizure Clause. The Ninth Amendment uses very similar terminology (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people”). All three of these instances unambiguously refer to individual rights, not “collective” rights, or rights that may be exercised only through participation in some corporate body.

- - - - - - - - - -

Heller at 554 U.S. 592-95

c. Meaning of the Operative Clause.

Putting all of these textual elements together, we find that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation. This meaning is strongly confirmed by the historical background of the Second Amendment. We look to this because it has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right. The very text of the Second Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-existence of the right and declares only that it “shall not be infringed.” As we said in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 553 (1876), “[t]his is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed ....”

[...]

By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had become fundamental for English subjects. See Malcolm 122–134. Blackstone, whose works, we have said, “constituted the preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation,” Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 715 (1999), cited the arms provision of the Bill of Rights as one of the fundamental rights of Englishmen. See 1 Blackstone 136, 139–140 (1765). His description of it cannot possibly be thought to tie it to militia or military service. It was, he said, “the natural right of resistance and self-preservation,” id., at 139, and “the right of having and using arms for selfpreservation and defence,” id., at 140; see also 3 id., at 2–4 (1768). Other contemporary authorities concurred. See G. Sharp, Tracts, Concerning the Ancient and Only True Legal Means of National Defence, by a Free Militia 17–18, 27 (3d ed. 1782); 2 J. de Lolme, The Rise and Progress of the English Constitution 886–887 (1784) (A. Stephens ed. 1838); W. Blizard, Desultory Reflections on Police 59–60 (1785). Thus, the right secured in 1689 as a result of the Stuarts’ abuses was by the time of the founding understood to be an individual right protecting against both public and private violence.

And, of course, what the Stuarts had tried to do to their political enemies, George III had tried to do to the colonists. In the tumultuous decades of the 1760’s and 1770’s, the Crown began to disarm the inhabitants of the most rebellious areas. That provoked polemical reactions by Americans invoking their rights as Englishmen to keep arms. A New York article of April 1769 said that “[i]t is a natural right which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed by the Bill of Rights, to keep arms for their own defence.” A Journal of the Times: Mar. 17, New York Journal, Supp. 1, Apr. 13, 1769, in Boston Under Military Rule 79 (O. Dickerson ed. 1936) (reprinted 1970); see also, e. g., Shippen, Boston Gazette, Jan. 30, 1769, in 1 The Writings of Samuel Adams 299 (H. Cushing ed. 1904) (reprinted 1968). They understood the right to enable individuals to defend themselves. As the most important early American edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries (by the law professor and former Antifederalist St. George Tucker) made clear in the notes to the description of the arms right, Americans understood the “right of self-preservation” as permitting a citizen to “repe[l] force by force” when “the intervention of society in his behalf, may be too late to prevent an injury.” 1 Blackstone’s Commentaries 145–146, n. 42 (1803) (hereinafter Tucker’s Blackstone). See also W. Duer, Outlines of the Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States 31–32 (1833).

There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms. Of course the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of free speech was not, see, e. g., United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285 (2008). Thus, we do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose. Before turning to limitations upon the individual right, however, we must determine whether the prefatory clause of the Second Amendment comports with our interpretation of the operative clause.

- - - - - - - - - -

Heller at 554 U.S. 595-97

2. Prefatory Clause.

The prefatory clause reads: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State ....”

a. “Well-Regulated Militia.” In United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, 179 (1939), we explained that “the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense.” That definition comports with founding-era sources. See, e. g., Webster (“The militia of a country are the able bodied men organized into companies, regiments and brigades...and required by law to attend military exercises on certain days only, but at other times left to pursue their usual occupations”); The Federalist No. 46, pp. 329, 334 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison) (“near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands”); Letter to Destutt de Tracy (Jan. 26, 1811), in The Portable Thomas Jefferson 520, 524 (M. Peterson ed. 1975) (“the militia of the State, that is to say, of every man in it able to bear arms”).

Petitioners take a seemingly narrower view of the militia, stating that “[m]ilitias are the state-and congressionally regulated military forces described in the Militia Clauses (art. I, § 8, cls. 15–16).” Brief for Petitioners 12. Although we agree with petitioners’ interpretive assumption that “militia” means the same thing in Article I and the Second Amendment, we believe that petitioners identify the wrong thing, namely, the organized militia. Unlike armies and navies, which Congress is given the power to create (“to raise . . . Armies”; “to provide . . . a Navy,” Art. I, §8, cls. 12–13), the militia is assumed by Article I already to be in existence. Congress is given the power to “provide for calling forth the Militia,” § 8, cl. 15; and the power not to create, but to “organiz[e]” it—and not to organize “a” militia, which is what one would expect if the militia were to be a federal creation, but to organize “the” militia, connoting a body already in existence, ibid., cl. 16. This is fully consistent with the ordinary definition of the militia as all able-bodied men. From that pool, Congress has plenary power to organize the units that will make up an effective fighting force. That is what Congress did in the first Militia Act, which specified that “each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective states, resident therein, who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years (except as is herein after excepted) shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia.” Act of May 8, 1792, 1 Stat. 271. To be sure, Congress need not conscript every able-bodied man into the militia, because nothing in Article I suggests that in exercising its power to organize, discipline, and arm the militia, Congress must focus upon the entire body. Although the militia consists of all able-bodied men, the federally organized militia may consist of a subset of them.

Finally, the adjective “well-regulated” implies nothing more than the imposition of proper discipline and training. See Johnson 1619 (“Regulate”: “To adjust by rule or method”); Rawle 121–122; cf. Va. Declaration of Rights § 13 (1776), in 7 Thorpe 3812, 3814 (referring to “a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms”).

Heller at 554 U.S. 598-603

3. Relationship Between Prefatory Clause and Operative Clause.

We reach the question, then: Does the preface fit with an operative clause that creates an individual right to keep and bear arms? It fits perfectly, once one knows the history that the founding generation knew and that we have described above. That history showed that the way tyrants had eliminated a militia consisting of all the able-bodied men was not by banning the militia but simply by taking away the people’s arms, enabling a select militia or standing army to suppress political opponents. This is what had occurred in England that prompted codification of the right to have arms in the English Bill of Rights.

The debate with respect to the right to keep and bear arms, as with other guarantees in the Bill of Rights, was not over whether it was desirable (all agreed that it was) but over whether it needed to be codified in the Constitution. During the 1788 ratification debates, the fear that the Federal Government would disarm the people in order to impose rule through a standing army or select militia was pervasive in Antifederalist rhetoric. See, e. g., Letters from The Federal Farmer III (Oct. 10, 1787), in 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 234, 242 (H. Storing ed. 1981). John Smilie, for example, worried not only that Congress’s “command of the militia” could be used to create a “select militia,” or to have “no militia at all,” but also, as a separate concern, that “[w]hen a select militia is formed; the people in general may be disarmed.” 2 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 508–509 (M. Jensen ed. 1976) (hereinafter Documentary Hist.). Federalists responded that because Congress was given no power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and bear arms, such a force could never oppress the people. See, e. g., A Pennsylvanian III (Feb. 20, 1788), in The Origin of the Second Amendment 275, 276 (D. Young ed., 2d ed. 2001) (hereinafter Young); White, To the Citizens of Virginia (Feb. 22, 1788), in id., at 280, 281; A Citizen of America (Oct. 10, 1787), in id., at 38, 40; Foreign Spectator, Remarks on the Amendments to the Federal Constitution, Nov. 7, 1788, in id., at 556. It was understood across the political spectrum that the right helped to secure the ideal of a citizen militia, which might be necessary to oppose an oppressive military force if the constitutional order broke down.

It is therefore entirely sensible that the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause announces the purpose for which the right was codified: to prevent elimination of the militia. The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for selfdefense and hunting. But the threat that the new Federal Government would destroy the citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the reason that right—unlike some other English rights—was codified in a written Constitution. Justice Breyer’s assertion that individual self-defense is merely a “subsidiary interest” of the right to keep and bear arms, see post, at 714 (dissenting opinion), is profoundly mistaken. He bases that assertion solely upon the prologue—but that can only show that self-defense had little to do with the right’s codification; it was the central component of the right itself.

Besides ignoring the historical reality that the Second Amendment was not intended to lay down a “novel principl[e]” but rather codified a right “inherited from our English ancestors,” Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 281 (1897), petitioners’ interpretation does not even achieve the narrower purpose that prompted codification of the right. If, as they believe, the Second Amendment right is no more than the right to keep and use weapons as a member of an organized militia, see Brief for Petitioners 8—if, that is, the organized militia is the sole institutional beneficiary of the Second Amendment’s guarantee—it does not assure the existence of a “citizens’ militia” as a safeguard against tyranny. For Congress retains plenary authority to organize the militia, which must include the authority to say who will belong to the organized force. That is why the first Militia Act’s requirement that only whites enroll caused States to amend their militia laws to exclude free blacks. See Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 477, 521–525 (1998). Thus, if petitioners are correct, the Second Amendment protects citizens’ right to use a gun in an organization from which Congress has plenary authority to exclude them. It guarantees a select militia of the sort the Stuart kings found useful, but not the people’s militia that was the concern of the founding generation.

B

Our interpretation is confirmed by analogous armsbearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and immediately followed adoption of the Second Amendment. Four States adopted analogues to the Federal Second Amendment in the period between independence and the ratification of the Bill of Rights. Two of them—Pennsylvania and Vermont—clearly adopted individual rights unconnected to militia service. Pennsylvania’s Declaration of Rights of 1776 said: “That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state ....” § XIII, in 5 Thorpe 3082, 3083 (emphasis added). In 1777, Vermont adopted the identical provision, except for inconsequential differences in punctuation and capitalization. See Vt. Const., ch. 1, § XV, in 6 id., at 3741.

North Carolina also codified a right to bear arms in 1776: “That the people have a right to bear arms, for the defence of the State . . . .” Declaration of Rights § XVII, in 5 id., at 2787, 2788. This could plausibly be read to support only a right to bear arms in a militia—but that is a peculiar way to make the point in a constitution that elsewhere repeatedly mentions the militia explicitly. See N. C. Const., §§ XIV, XVIII, XXXV, in id., at 2789, 2791, 2793. Many colonial statutes required individual arms bearing for public-safety reasons—such as the 1770 Georgia law that “for the security and defence of this province from internal dangers and insurrections” required those men who qualified for militia duty individually “to carry fire arms” “to places of public worship.” 19 Colonial Records of the State of Georgia 137–139 (A. Candler ed. 1911 (pt. 1)) (emphasis added). That broad public-safety understanding was the connotation given to the North Carolina right by that State’s Supreme Court in 1843. See State v. Huntly, 25 N. C. 418, 422–423.

The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution presented another variation on the theme: “The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common defence. . . . ” Pt. First, Art. XVII, in 3 Thorpe 1888, 1892. Once again, if one gives narrow meaning to the phrase “common defence” this can be thought to limit the right to the bearing of arms in a state-organized military force. But once again the State’s highest court thought otherwise. Writing for the court in an 1825 libel case, Chief Justice Parker wrote: “The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was to be responsible in cases of its abuse; like the right to keep fire arms, which does not protect him who uses them for annoyance or destruction.” Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. 304, 313–314. The analogy makes no sense if firearms could not be used for any individual purpose at all. See also Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204, 244 (1983) (19th century courts never read “common defence” to limit the use of weapons to militia service).

We therefore believe that the most likely reading of all four of these pre-Second Amendment state constitutional provisions is that they secured an individual right to bear arms for defensive purposes. Other States did not include rights to bear arms in their pre-1789 constitutions—although in Virginia a Second Amendment analogue was proposed (unsuccessfully) by Thomas Jefferson. (It read: “No freeman shall ever be debarred the use of arms [within his own lands or tenements].” 18 1 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 344 (J. Boyd ed. 1950).)

Between 1789 and 1820, nine States adopted Second Amendment analogues. Four of them—Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, and Missouri—referred to the right of the people to “bear arms in defence of themselves and the State.” See n. 8, supra. Another three States—Mississippi, Connecticut, and Alabama—used the even more individualistic phrasing that each citizen has the “right to bear arms in defence of himself and the State.” See ibid. Finally, two States— Tennessee and Maine—used the “common defence” language of Massachusetts. See Tenn. Const., Art. XI, § 26 (1796), in 6 Thorpe 3414, 3424; Me. Const., Art. I, § 16 (1819), in 3 id., at 1646, 1648. That of the nine state constitutional protections for the right to bear arms enacted immediately after 1789 at least seven unequivocally protected an individual citizen’s right to self-defense is strong evidence that that is how the founding generation conceived of the right. And with one possible exception that we discuss in Part II–D–2, 19thcentury courts and commentators interpreted these state constitutional provisions to protect an individual right to use arms for self-defense. See n. 9, supra; Simpson v. State, 5 Yer. 356, 360 (Tenn. 1833).

The historical narrative that petitioners must endorse would thus treat the Federal Second Amendment as an odd outlier, protecting a right unknown in state constitutions or at English common law, based on little more than an overreading of the prefatory clause.

It is absolutely painful to see you twist and distort the words and meaning of the second amendment in order to fit your definition. You redefine "the people" to mean everyone. You redefine "arms" to mean common arms -- whatever they are. You remove the protection of state militias. And you give the federal government powers they don't have in order to regulate all that garbage.

It is absolutely painful to see you so confused that you cannot comprehend the clear words of the U.S. Supreme Court, and in your dotage cling to imaginary nonsense.

That history showed that the way tyrants had eliminated a militia consisting of all the able-bodied men was not by banning the militia but simply by taking away the people’s arms,

What good what it do to take away the arms of women, children and old men? That would have zero effect on the militia. So why would the second amendment protect their RKBA? Well, it doesn't.

The second amendment protects the RKBA of "all the able-bodied men" who comprise the militia in order to protect the militia from federal infringement.

If, as they believe, the Second Amendment right is no more than the right to keep and use weapons as a member of an organized militia ... that is, the organized militia is the sole institutional beneficiary of the Second Amendment’s guarantee—it does not assure the existence of a “citizens’ militia” as a safeguard against tyranny.

Gobbledygook. In 1790 there was only ONE militia. There was no "organized miltia" or "disorganized miltia" or "active militia" or "inactive militia".

The Second Amendment protected the right to keep and use weapons as a member of THE militia.

The Heller court takes the clear meaning of the second amendment and twists and distorts it to fit their notion of what they think it should say. What a bunch of bullshit.

Thus, if petitioners are correct, the Second Amendment protects citizens’ right to use a gun in an organization from which Congress has plenary authority to exclude them.

Yes. That's why the second amendment was written.

If Congress excluded them from the militia, or if Congress refused to organize a militia, or if Congress refused to arm the militia, the second amendment still protected their RKBA so they could organize and arm themselves as part of a state militia.

But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification was the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty.

At the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification, which weapons were unlawful? I can't think of any. So why make the distinction?

The first salient feature of the operative clause is that it codifies a “right of the people.”

Once again, the Heller court sets up a strawman and knocks it down. They pick the phrase "right of the people” then search the U.S. Constitution for an exact match, finding limited references, none of which refer to a select group, and conclude the phrase must be referring to individuals.

How about they search for "the people" in the operative clause? Well, then they would find that "the people" IS a select group consisting only of adult, white, male, enfranchized citizens -- the same group that formed the militias found in the prefatory clause. What a fucking coincidence, huh?