The Second Amendment says The Federal Government shall not infringe a RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE.

Did they give a reason? I mean, they didn't need to give a reason. But wait. Yes they did. It's written there in the same amendment. They said that a well regulated Militia was necessary to the security of a free State.

Couldn't be any clearer.

Yes they gave a reason. The 2nd Amendment says "the right of the people, to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed."

But the Heller court, defying the precedent of Cruikshank, Presser AND Miller, totally ignored the Militia part and decided for the very first time in 200+ years that the second amendment really protected an individual right to keep a handgun in the home for self-defense.

Nonsense, directly refuted by the content of Heller.

WHAT precedent do you claim was defied by the Heller court?

Heller, 554 U.S. 619-20, concerning Cruickshank:

We now ask whether any of our precedents forecloses the conclusions we have reached about the meaning of the Second Amendment.

United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, in the course of vacating the convictions of members of a white mob for depriving blacks of their right to keep and bear arms, held that the Second Amendment does not by its own force apply to anyone other than the Federal Government. The opinion explained that the right “is not a right granted by the Constitution [or] in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The second amendment... means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress.” Id., at 553. States, we said, were free to restrict or protect the right under their police powers. The limited discussion of the Second Amendment in Cruikshank supports, if anything, the individual-rights interpretation. There was no claim in Cruikshank that the victims had been deprived of their right to carry arms in a militia; indeed, the Governor had disbanded the local militia unit the year before the mob’s attack, see C. Lane, The Day Freedom Died 62 (2008).

Heller, 554 U.S. 620, concerning Presser:

Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 (1886), held that the right to keep and bear arms was not violated by a law that forbade “bodies of men to associate together as military organizations, or to drill or parade with arms in cities and towns unless authorized by law.” Id., at 264–265. This does not refute the individual-rights interpretation of the Amendment; no one supporting that interpretation has contended that States may not ban such groups.

Heller, 554 U.S. 622, concerning Miller:

This holding is not only consistent with, but positively suggests, that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms (though only arms that “have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia”). Had the Court believed that the Second Amendment protects only those serving in the militia, it would have been odd to examine the character of the weapon rather than simply note that the two crooks were not militiamen.

Heller, 554 U.S. 623, concerning Miller:

Miller stands only for the proposition that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons.

It is particularly wrongheaded to read Miller for more than what it said, because the case did not even purport to be a thorough examination of the Second Amendment.

Heller, 554 U.S. 625, concerning Miller:

We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. That accords with the historical understanding of the scope of the right, see Part III, infra.

We conclude that nothing in our precedents forecloses our adoption of the original understanding of the Second Amendment.

The issue of whether the 2nd Amendment applied to the states was not at issue in Heller. Heller arose from a Federal district, not a state.

and the RKBA is an individual right that cannot lawfully be infringed by any state.

But that right will be defined by the U.S. Supreme Court for everyone in every state. That what you want?

How about when the U.S. Supreme Court rules that citizens may own AR-15's, but because they're so lethal they must be kept at a shooting club or state armory?

Much of the country disagrees with Roe v. Wade,

Meaning what? If the majority of the country disagreed with Roe v Wade would the U.S. Supreme Court reverse it's decision? Suddenly discover there is no "right to privacy" in the U.S. Constitution?

Is that what the U.S. Supreme Court is supposed to do -- wet their finger and stick it in the air to see which way the wind is blowing?

Or are they to simply give you a call and ask how they should rule on a case?

Posse Comitatus DOES NOT grant a right to form a militia.

Uh-huh. It only allows for the formation of armed private citizens to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection and repel invasion.

Hey, wait. That's what a militia does.

After the ruling in Heller, the answer is NOTHING.

"We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns."

WHAT??? That wasn't in Miller!!

In Miller the court said, "The Court cannot take judicial notice that a shotgun having a barrel less than 18 inches long has today any reasonable relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia".

The second amendment specifically protects weapons not typically possessed by law abiding citizens for lawful purposes. It protects weapons of war used by a militia! The Miller court was unsure that "a shotgun having a barrel less than 18 inches long" was suitable for use by a militia and therefore protected.

The Heller court, on the other hand, knows everything about weapons, who typically possesses them, and what is a lawful purpose and what isn't. So they plowed ahead and made their ruling.

The issue of whether the 2nd Amendment applied to the states was not at issue in Heller.

That came in McDonald. So what? The two cases are tied together for purposes of discussion.

The 2nd Amendment says "the right of the people, to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed."

No. It says "A well regulated Militia is necessary to the security of a free State".

"he delves into the sole purpose of it being a necessity for every citizen, whether regulated or not, to keep and bear arms, whether they be long or short-barreled, for the purpose of protecting themselves from enemy invasions and rogue governments."

I agree with that. I'm sure most do. I believe it is every citizen's right and duty to keep and bear arms.

But what makes you think the second amendment protects that right? That's what the debate is all about.

You (nolu) keep referring to the Heller case as if it was the only case ever brought before the Supreme Court of the U.S. I suggest you get a hold of a reader entitled, That Every Man Be Armed written by this guy stephenhalbrook.com/everyman.html ----

misterwrong asks: --- what makes you think the second amendment protects that right? That's what the debate is all about.

The concept that our States protect the RKBA's is obviously NOT true, proved by the behaviour of States like California and New York..

Why misterwhite continues to flog this dead horse is only answerable by a mental health specialist.. --- Pity misterwrong, he's either funny in the head, or a troll.

The only question that is really at issue is who are the people that this right protects. The original framers of our Constitution made that clear who those people they were referring to (the general john q. public}. They did not trust a federalized army after what they endured in fighting the British Redcoats that burned down our White House.

The original framers of our Constitution made that clear who those people they were referring to (the general john q public.}.

Article 1, Section 2, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution reads:

"The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature."

When this was ratified in 1788, who were "the people" referenced in the above? Everyone? Every citizen? Women? Children? Non-land owners? Slaves? Illegals? Visitors?

You say "the general john q public" so I assume you mean everyone walking around. All of them were "the people" and could vote in 1788?

Here's an uncomfortable fact for you. In 1788, "the people" were the rich, white guys who had something to lose. No one else -- not women, not children, not slaves, not non-citizens ... no one.

In 1788, only "the people" had full rights as citizens. Their right to vote, run for office, own land, and keep and bear arms as part of a militia were protected. Their right to peaceably assemble, petition the government, and be secure against unreasonable searches were protected. No one else.

Granted, over the years that's changed. But in 1788, that's who "the people" were. The U.S. Constitution needs to be interpreted with that in mind.

You say "the general john q public" so I assume you mean everyone walking around. All of them were "the people" and could vote in 1788?

Yes, I refer to the general public. Back then, it was only white people who could vote, own land, and even firearms. The black people were indentured slaves having been shipped over to New England from Africa. It was our forefathers who recognized these slaves as the biblical Hebrew Israelites. It was the President Teddy Roosevelt who gave the black slaves that opportunity to become free citizens, own land, and firearms on the condition that they served in the militia. Most people today would consider this a gross violation of the Thirteenth Amendment of those black people forced into slavery and having conditions like this as necessary to become a free member of society. In my opinion, Harriet B. Tubman did more for her people than what our government ever did for them. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harriet_Tubman

Finally, it was President Lincoln who abolished slavery but would never view the black people as equal to the whites.

Back then, it was only white people who could vote, own land, and even firearms.

So, back then, the second amendment only protected the RKBA for white people who could vote and own land?

Is it merely a coincidence that those are the same people who constituted a Militia and their arms were protected from federal infringement because of that?

Those (such as Roosevelt) who constituted the federalized militia and the enforcement of slaves into joining for purpose to be free turned this into a constitutional mess.

What changed Teddy Roosevelt's infringement of the black slaves from being free people was the enactment of the first civil rights act of 1866 which is today referred to as The Civil Rights Act of 1866. More here on this https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_Rights_Act_of_1866

But that right will be defined by the U.S. Supreme Court for everyone in every state. That what you want?

That's the way it is. What I want is irrelevant. Whatever dingbat thing you want is also irrelevant. SCOTUS is empowered to expound the law.

Much of the country disagrees with Roe v. Wade,

Meaning what? If the majority of the country disagreed with Roe v Wade would the U.S. Supreme Court reverse it's decision?

NO!!!

Meaning that disagreement with a U.S. Supreme Court decision does not diminish its effect in any way.

Roe v. Wade remains precedent, and any state law prohibiting abortion is subject to being struck down as inconsistent with that existing precedent. All courts inferior to the U.S. Supreme Court are bound by Roe and legally required to follow it.

Posse Comitatus DOES NOT grant a right to form a militia.

Uh-huh. It only allows for the formation of armed private citizens to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection and repel invasion.

Hey, wait. That's what a militia does.

Link, cite and quote to something besides your spider infested mind. What is your source for that fictional bullshit?

Posse comitatus Lat. The power of the county. The entire population of a county above the age of fifteen, which a sheriff may summon to has assistance in certain cases, as to aid him in keeping the peace, in pursuing and arresting felons, etc. Williams v. State, 253 Ark. 973, 490 S.W.2d 117, 121.

Williams v. State, 253 Ark. 973, 490 S.W.2d 117 (1973)

JOHN A. FOGLEMAN, Justice.

Appellants were found guilty of refusal to assist an officer in violation of Ark. Stat. Ann. 6 42-204 (Repl. 1964) and resisting an officer in violation of Ark. Stat. Ann. 41-2801 (Repl. 1964). They contend that Ark. Stat. Ann. 42-204 is void on its face, and as applied, in that it offends the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and that the evidence is not sufficient to show a violation of Ark. Stat. Ann. 41-2801. We do not agree with either argument.

As will be noted, the appellants have assaulted 42-204 by firing a blunderbuss. Some of their arguments seem vague and illusional, but we shall treat them as best we can. The statute reads:

Every person commanded by a public officer to assist him in the execution of process, who, without lawful cause, refuses or neglects to obey the command, is guilty of a misdemeanor and contempt of the court from which the process issued.

[...]

The posse comitatus has an ancient history. It has been defined as the power or force of the county, consisting of the entire population of the county over the age of 15, which a sheriff may summon to his assistance in certain cases, such as keeping the peace, pursuing and arresting felons, etc. Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1324. Its origins are believed to lie in the preconquest English statute of "hue and cry," a method then recognized for issuing and enforcing process to bring one committing a crime before the courts, under which one who came upon evidence of a crime was himself guilty of an offense if he failed to raise the "hue" to call out the neighbors to turn out with weapons they were bound to keep. See II History of English Law, Pollock Maitland, Second Edition, 578, et seq.; Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corporation, 250 N.Y. 14, 164 N.E. 726 (1928). From this practice, the right of the sheriff to call up the local male population to arrest criminals or prevent riots evolved, and became known as the posse comitatus, which in effect was a civil army to be used by the sheriff for these purposes, among others. Lorence, The Constitutionality of the Posse Comitatus Act, 8 U.M.K.C.L. Rev. 164 (1940). Refusal to render the aid sought by the sheriff was an offense punishable by fine and imprisonment. Commonwealth v. Martin, 7 Pa. Dist. Rep. 219 (1897); Annot. 44 Am. St. Rep. 136 (1895). See also, 4 Wharton's Criminal Law Procedure (Anderson) 223, Arrest 1582.

The criminal nature of refusal to aid an officer in the execution of his duties was recognized in Regina v. Brown, 41 Eng. Common Law Reports 175 (1841). A constable, acting upon information he had received, discovered an illegal prize fight in progress but, being unable to arrest the participants without a warrant, charged Brown to assist him. It was there said that one duly called upon to render such assistance was not excused except for physical impossibility or lawful excuse. This case has been followed in many American cases, and the practice has been utilized in law enforcement throughout the history of this country, although the necessity for aid to law enforcement officers may have diminished over the years. See Annot., 44 Am. St. Rep. 136 (1895); Hooker v. Smith, 19 Vt. 151, 47 Am. Dec. 679 (1847); Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corporation, 250 N.Y. 14, 164 N.E. 726 (1928); 4 Wharton's Criminal Law Procedure (Anderson) 223, Arrest 1582. In Babington, a police officer jumped on the running board of a cab and ordered the driver to chase another cab in order that its driver might be arrested. In determining the duty of the driver in these circumstances the court relied upon an 1848 New York statute strikingly similar to Ark. Stat. Ann. 42-204 and reviewed the history of the duty of citizens in such cases. Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the court, said:

The horse has yielded to the motorcar as an instrument of pursuit and flight. The ancient ordinance abides as an interpreter of present duty. Still, as in the days of Edward I, the citizenry may be called upon to enforce the justice of the state, not faintly and with lagging steps, but honestly and bravely and with whatever implements and facilities are convenient and at hand. The incorporeal being, the Yellow Taxi Corporation, would have been bound to respond in that spirit to the summons of the officer if it had been sitting in the driver's seat. In sending Babington upon the highway, it knew or is chargeable with knowledge that man and car alike would have to answer to the call.

Without further elaboration, it is sufficient to say that Ark. Stat. Ann. 42-204 is, at most, an extension of the common law concept of posse comitatus, if not merely a codification thereof. Hooker v. Smith, 29 Vt. 151, 47 Am. Dec. 679 (1847). See also, Robinson v. State, 93 Ga. 77, 18 S.E. 1018, 44 Am. St. Rep. 127 (1893).

In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 432 (1896) posse comitatus

158 US 535

The United States are a nation, whose powers of government, legislative, executive and judicial, within the sphere of action confided to it by the Constitution, are supreme and paramount. Every right, created by, arising under, or dependent upon the Constitution, may be protected and enforced by such means and in such manner as Congress, in the exercise of the correlative duty of protection, or of the legislative powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, may in its discretion deem most eligible and best adapted to attain the object. United States v. Logan, 144 U. S. 293.

158 US 535-36

It is the duty and the right, not only of every peace officer of the United States, but of every citizen, to assist in prosecuting, and in securing the punishment of, any breach of the peace of the United States. It is the right, as well as the duty, of every citizen, when called upon by the proper officer, to act as part of the posse comitatus in upholding the laws of his country. It is likewise his right and his duty to communicate to the executive officers any information which he has of the commission of an offence against those laws; and such information, given by a private citizen, is a privileged and confidential communication, for which no action of libel or slander will lie, and the disclosure of which cannot be compelled without the assent of the government. Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U. S. 311; United States v. Moses, 4 Wash. C. C. 726; Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487.

Filarsky v. Delia, 564 U.S. 377, 388 (2012)

Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Ginsburg, J., post, p. 394, and Sotomayor, J., post, p. 397, filed concurring opinions.

Excerpt at 564 U.S. 388

Sheriffs executing a warrant were empowered by the common law to enlist the aid of the able-bodied men of the community in doing so. See 1 W. Blackstone, Commen­taries on the Laws of England 332 (1765); In re Quarles, 158 U. S. 532, 535 (1895). While serving as part of this “posse comitatus,” a private individual had the same authority as the sheriff, and was protected to the same extent. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 93 Ga. 77, 18 S. E. 1018, 1019 (1893) (“A member of a posse comitatus sum­moned by the sheriff to aid in the execution of a warrant for a felony in the sheriff ’s hands is entitled to the same protection in the discharge of his duties as the sheriff himself ”); State v. Mooring, 115 N. C. 709, 20 S. E. 182 (1894) (considering it “well settled by the courts” that a sheriff may break open the doors of a house to execute a search warrant and that “if he act in good faith in doing so, both he and his posse comitatus will be protected”); North Carolina v. Gosnell, 74 F. 734, 738–739 (CC WDNC 1896) (“Both judicial and ministerial officers, in the execu­tion of the duties of their office, are under the strong protection of the law; and their legally summoned assis­tants, for such time as in service, are officers of the law”); Reed v. Rice, 25 Ky. 44, 46–47 (App. 1829) (private indi­viduals summoned by a constable to execute a search warrant were protected from a suit based on the invalidity of the warrant).

10 USC 331. When a state is unable to control domestic violence and they have requested federal assistance, the use of the militia or Armed Forces is authorized.

10 USC 332. When ordinary enforcement means are unworkable due to unlawful obstructions or rebellion against the authority of the United States, use of the militia or Armed Forces is authorized.

10 USC 333. When a state cannot or will not protect the constitutional rights of the citizens, due to domestic violence or conspiracy to hinder execution of State or Federal law, the use of the militia or Armed Forces is authorized.

18 USC 1835. Section 1385.

Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

Military Law by Charles A. Shanor and L. Lynn Hogue, 1996, West Publishing, p. 39

The direct participation by members of the armed forces in 'search, seizure, arrest or other similar activity' is forbidden. Instead, members of the armed forces can provide assistance to lw enforcement through such means as providing information collected in military training activities and operations, providing military equipment and facilities, providing training and advice to civilian law enforcement officials, and operatng detection and monitoring equipment, conducting aerial reconnaissance, transporting personnel and providing communications.

Code of Federal Regulations] [Title 32, Volume 2] [Revised as of July 1, 2003] From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access [CITE: 32CFR215.4]

[Page 370-371]

TITLE 32--NATIONAL DEFENSE

CHAPTER I--OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (CONTINUED)

PART 215--EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY RESOURCES IN THE EVENT OF CIVIL DISTURBANCES--Table of Contents

Sec. 215.4 Legal considerations.

(a) Under the Constitution and laws of the United States, the protection of life and property and the maintenance of public order are primarily the responsibilities of State and local governments, which have the necessary authority to enforce the laws. The Federal Government may assume this responsibility and this authority only in certain limited instances.

(b) Aside from the constitutional limitations of the power of the Federal Government at the local level, there are additional legal limits upon the use of military forces within the United States. The most important of these from a civil disturbance standpoint is the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. 1385), which prohibits the use of any part of the Army or the Air Force to execute or enforce the laws, except as authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress.

(c) The Constitution and Acts of Congress establish six exceptions, generally applicable within the entire territory of the United States, to which the Posse Comitatus Act prohibition does not apply.

(1) The constitutional exceptions are two in number and are based upon the inherent legal right of the U.S. Government--a sovereign national entity under the Federal Constitution--to insure the preservation of public

[Page 371]

order and the carrying out of governmental operations within its territorial limits, by force if necessary.

(i) The emergency authority. Authorities prompt and vigorous Federal action, including use of military forces, to prevent loss of life or wanton destruction of property and to restore governmental functioning and public order when sudden and unexpected civil disturbances, disasters, or calamities seriously endanger life and property and disrupt normal governmental functions to such an extent that duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situations.

(ii) Protection of Federal property and functions. Authorizes Federal action, including the use of military forces, to protect Federal property and Federal governmental functions when the need for protection exists and duly constituted local authorities are unable or decline to provide adequate protection.

(2) There are four exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act based on Acts of Congress.

(i) In the cases of each of the first three of those described, paragraphs (c)(2)(i) (a), (b), and (c) of this section, personal Presidential action, including the issuance of a proclamation calling upon insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably within a limited time, is a prerequisite.

(a) 10 U.S.C. 331. Authorizes use of the militia and Armed Forces when a State is unable to control domestic violence, and a request for Federal assistance has been made by the State legislature or governor to the President. Implements Article IV, section 4, of the Constitution.

(b) 10 U.S.C. 332. Authorizes use of the militia and Armed Forces to enforce Federal law when unlawful obstructions or rebellion against the authority of the United States renders ordinary enforcement means unworkable. Implements Article II, section 3, of the Constitution.

(c) 10 U.S.C. 333. Authorizes use of the militia and Armed Forces when domestic violence or conspiracy hinders execution of State or Federal law, and a State cannot or will not protect the constitutional rights of the citizens. Implements Article II, section 3, and the 14th Amendment of the Constitution.

(d) House Joint Resolution 1292, June 6, 1968.1 Directs all departments of the Government, upon the request of the Secret Service, to assist that Service in carrying out its statutory duties to protect Government officials and major political candidates from physical harm. Assistance to the Secret Service is governed by DoD Directive 3025.13, ``Employment of Department of Defense Resources in Support of the United States Secret Service,'' July 15, 1968.2

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1 Although this resolution has been placed in the Statutes at Large as Public Law 90-331, 82 Stat. 170, it has not been codified; it is set out in the notes to 18 U.S.C. 3056.

2 Filed as part of original copies available from U.S. Naval Publications and Forms Center, 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19120, Code: 300.

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(ii) It should be noted that none of the above authorities, in and of itself, provides sufficient legal basis to order members of the Reserve components to active Federal service.

Fourth request, what prevents the federal government from disbanding ALL state guard units and going with a federal standing military?

After the ruling in Heller, the answer is NOTHING.

Since the dawn of the republic, the answer is NOTHING.

There is no constitutional requirement to maintain a National Guard.

There is a constitutional provision empowering the Congress "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions."

There is a constitutional provision empowering the Congress "To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."

Those provisions grant the power to do the things specified. They do not command that an organized militia be maintained.

10 U.S.C. § 311: "(a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of title 32, under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of female citizens of the United States who are members of the National Guard."

The unorganized militia of the United States is still there, subject to being called up.

"We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns."

WHAT??? That wasn't in Miller!!

As your interpretation of Miller disagrees with the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court, you should inform SCOTUS of this with a sternly worded letter.

The issue of whether the 2nd Amendment applied to the states was not at issue in Heller.

That came in McDonald. So what? The two cases are tied together for purposes of discussion.

[misterwhite #138]

But the Heller court, defying the precedent of Cruikshank, Presser AND Miller, totally ignored the Militia part and decided for the very first time in 200+ years that the second amendment really protected an individual right to keep a handgun in the home for self-defense.

Only the Heller court was smart enough to see that.

What precedent did Heller defy?

It could not have been the issue of the 2nd Amendment applying to the states, as that had nothing to do with Heller.

The 2nd Amendment says "the right of the people, to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed."

No. It says "A well regulated Militia is necessary to the security of a free State".

The prefacing clause, that "A well regulated Militia is necessary to the security of a free State," gave a reason for protecting the RKBA. It granted no power, it defined no right, it neither commanded nor proscribed anything.

The operative clause, "the right of the people, to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed," restrained the congress from infringing on the specified right of the people.

You keep referring to the Heller case as if it was the only case ever brought before the Supreme Court of the U.S. I suggest you get a hold of a reader entitled, That Every Man Be Armed written by this guy stephenhalbrook.com/everyman.html In it, he delves into the sole purpose of it being a necessity for every citizen, whether regulated or not, to keep and bear arms, whether they be long or short-barreled, for the purpose of protecting themselves from enemy invasions and rogue governments.

I have a copy of Halbrook , That Every Man Be Armed, 2013 Revised and Updated Edition.

This edition cites and quotes Heller and McDonald as the reigning U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Any older opinions you can come up, and interpreted in a manner inconsistent with Heller and McDonald do not mean diddly squat. Note that the precedent setting McDonald cited two of Halbrook's books.

At 228, in chapter "Update to New Edition": (footnotes omitted)

[The] blockbuster opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) held that the Second Amendment guarantees the right of individuals to possess firearms for self-defense, hunting, and militia service. The decision invalidated D.C.'s handgun ban. The 5-4 opinion, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, held that "the right of the people to keep and bar arms" means what it literally says, and that this liberty to have arms for protection is a natural right recognized in the English tradition. It was considered fundamental by our Founders and was consistently regarded as an individual right in the nineteenth century.

At 230, in chapter "Update to New Edition": (footnotes omitted)

Finally, in McDonald v. Chicago (20I0), the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, ruled that the Second Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment because "the right to keep and bear arms is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty," and is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition...." The opinion of the Court — written by Justice Alito, representing a plurality of four Justices — held that the right was incorporated through the Due Process Clause, while Justice Thomas would have incorporated it through the Privileges-or-Immunities Clause.

McDonald followed a long-standing precedent that rights considered fundamental apply to both the federal and state governments. Noting that Blackstone's view of the fundamental nature of the right was "shared by the American colonists," the Court — citing this author's The Founders' Second Amendment as a source — continued: "The right to keep and bear arms was considered no less fundamental by those who drafted and ratified the Bill of Rights." And the Court relied in part on this author's Freedmen book in its history of Reconstruction, concluding that "the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty."

Because the Second Amendment is "a provision of the Bill of Rights that protects a right that is fundamental from an American perspective," it "applies equally to the federal Government and the States." Refusing "to treat the right recognized in Heller as a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees," McDonald rejected the power "to allow state and local governments to enact any gun control law that they deem to be reasonable, including a complete ban on the possession of handguns in the home for self-defense."

At 231, in chapter "Update to New Edition": (footnotes omitted)

Similarly, Heller held that the Second Amendment protects possession of the types of arms commonly possessed by law-abiding persons for lawful purposes such as self-defense and hunting, including handguns and long guns, i.e., rifles and shotguns.

I also have Halbrook,

The Founders' Second Amendment, Origin of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, The Independent Institute, 2008

Freedmen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Right to Bear Arms, 1866-1876, Praeger, 1998.

I also have:

David E. Young, The Founders View of the Right to Bear Arms, A Definitive History of the Second Amendment, Golden Oak Books, 2007.

David E. Young, The Origin of the Second Amendment, A Documentary History of the Bill of Rights 1787-1792, Second Edition, Golden Oaks Books, 2001.

Clayton E. Cramer, Concealed Weapon Law of the Early Republic, Dueling, Southern Violence, and Moral Reform, Praeger, 1999.

My point was, the first part was placed there for a reason. If the second amendment was meant to protect the RKBA of all citizens (as you claim) there would have been no reason whatsoever to include the first part.

No other amendments contain an explanation. So it was placed there for a reason.

Here's an uncomfortable fact for you. In 1788, "the people" were the rich, white guys who had something to lose. No one else -- not women, not children, not slaves, not non-citizens ... no one.

In 1788, only "the people" had full rights as citizens. Their right to vote, run for office, own land, and keep and bear arms as part of a militia were protected. Their right to peaceably assemble, petition the government, and be secure against unreasonable searches were protected. No one else.

Granted, over the years that's changed. But in 1788, that's who "the people" were. The U.S. Constitution needs to be interpreted with that in mind.

"The people" and "citizens" were synonymous terms. Your screed is nonsense. Women and children were citizens. Voting was not a right of citizenship. Slaves had no municipal rights or status and were neither citizens nor aliens. Well before women had a right to vote, they had the right to run for office, and multiple times ran for President of the United States, appeared on the ballot, and won votes. In 1879, a woman attorney was admitted to practice before the U.S. Supreme Court.

Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875)

If the right of suffrage is one of the necessary privileges of a citizen of the United States, then the constitution and laws of Missouri confining it to men are in violation of the Constitution of the United States, as amended, and consequently void. The direct question is, therefore, presented whether all citizens are necessarily voters.

The Constitution does not define the privileges and immunities of citizens. For that definition we must look elsewhere. In this case we need not determine what they are, but only whether suffrage is necessarily one of them.

There is no doubt that women may be citizens. They are persons, and by the fourteenth amendment "all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" are expressly declared to be "citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." But, in our opinion, it did not need this amendment to give them that position. Before its adoption the Constitution of the United States did not in terms prescribe who should be citizens of the United States or of the several States, yet there were necessarily such citizens without such provision. There cannot be a nation without a people. The very idea of a political community, such as a nation is, implies an association of persons for the promotion of their general welfare. Each one of the persons associated becomes a member of the nation formed by the association. He owes it allegiance and is entitled to its protection. Allegiance and protection are, in this connection, reciprocal obligations. The one is a compensation for the other; allegiance for protection and protection for allegiance.

[...]

As early as 1804 it was enacted by Congress that when any alien who had declared his intention to become a citizen in the manner provided by law died before he was actually naturalized, his widow and children should be considered as citizens of the United States, and entitled to all rights and privileges as such upon taking the necessary oath; and in 1855 it was further provided that any woman who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, married, or who should be married to a citizen of the United States, should be deemed and taken to be a citizen.

[...]

From this it is apparent that from the commencement of the legislation upon this subject alien women and alien minors could be made citizens by naturalization, and we think it will not be contended that this would have been done if it had not been supposed that native women and native minors were already citizens by birth.

[...]

It is clear, therefore, we think, that the Constitution has not added the right of suffrage to the privileges and immunities of citizenship as they existed at the time it was adopted. This makes it proper to inquire whether suffrage was coextensive with the citizenship of the States at the time of its adoption. If it was, then it may with force be argued that suffrage was one of the rights which belonged to citizenship, and in the enjoyment of which every citizen must be protected. But if it was not, the contrary may with propriety be assumed.

[...]

Being unanimously of the opinion that the Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of sufrage upon any one, and that the constitutions and laws of the several States which commit that important trust to men alone are not necessarily void, we

AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT.

My point was, the first part was placed there for a reason. If the second amendment was meant to protect the RKBA of all citizens (as you claim) there would have been no reason whatsoever to include the first part.

It is noted that you disagree with the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court. You should write them a sternly worded letter.

"The people" and "citizens" were synonymous terms.

"The people" were citizens, but not all citizens were "the people".

If what you say is true, then all citizens could vote -- which was not the case back then. As you proved with your court case. Women citizens and children citizens and non-land- owning citizens (in some states) could not vote.

Now, maybe there were some exceptions in some states, but they were few and far between. The rich white guys were "the people" and had the power and the full constitutional protections.

And who served in the militias?

It is noted that you disagree with the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court.

As I disagree with the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court on Roe v Wade, Kelo, Obamacare, selective incorporation, and most of their rulings on the commerce clause.

And I bet you do too.

If what you say is true, then all citizens could vote -- which was not the case back then.

This is just dumb obstinancy. Minor v. Happersett clearly held that suffrage was not a right conferred by citizenship. That one could vote did not mean one was a citizen, and that one could not vote did not signify a lack of citizenship.

Notice that about half the able-bodied men in the state of Wisconsin in 1862 were foreigners, had not been naturalized, and yet they enjoyed the right to vote under the state constitution. At that time, there was no federal equirement that one needed to be a citizen to vote in elections for federal office.

Male aliens could vote; women citizens born in the United States could not. Voting rights are conferred by law, not citizenship.

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo.31924079575241;view=1up;seq=381

OFFICIAL RECORDS: Series 3, vol 2, Part 1 (Union Letters, Orders, Reports)

Page 369 UNION AUTHORITIES.

MADISON, WIS., August 12, 1862.

Honorable E. M. STANTON:

About one-half of the able-bodied men between eighteen and forty- five years in this State are foreign born. They have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States. Have the right to vote under our State constitution if twenty-one years old. Have enjoyed and are enjoying all the privileges of citizens. Are they liable to be drafted? They should be liable. Great injustice will be done to our State if they are exempt, and our quota would be too large if they are exempt. Cannot those who are not willing to subject themselves to draft be ordered to leave the country? Answer this immediately. I must have the time for volunteering extended, as asked for by my dispatches of Saturday and yesterday. Please answer them.

E. SALOMON,

Governor of Wisconsin.

- - - - -

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington City, D. C., August 12, 1862.

Governor SALOMON,

Madison, Wis.:

Foreigners who have voted at our elections are regarded as having exercised a franchise that subjects them to military duty. Declaration of intention to become naturalized is not of itself sufficient to prevent their taking advantage of their alienage, but a man who votes must bear arms. Your telegram respecting extension of time for volunteering cannot be answered until tomorrow, some information from different States being required.

EDWIN M. STANTON,

Secretary of War.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

As you proved with your court case. Women citizens and children citizens and non-land- owning citizens (in some states) could not vote.

As proved by Minor v. Happersett, after the 14th Amendment,

1. The word "citizen" is often used to convey the idea of membership in a nation.

2. In that sense, women, if born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction of the United States, have always been considered citizens of the United States, as much so before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution as since.

3. The right of suffrage was not necessarily one of the privileges or immunities of citizenship before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, and that amendment does not add to these privileges and immunities. It simply furnishes additional guaranty for the protection of such as the citizen already had.

4. At the time of the adoption of that amendment, suffrage was not coextensive with the citizenship of the States; nor was it at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.

5. Neither the Constitution nor the fourteenth amendment made all citizens voters.

6. A provision in a State constitution which confines the right of voting to "male citizens of the United States," is no violation of the Federal Constitution. In such a State women have no right to vote.

Syllabus at 88 U.S. 162.

In 1875, after the 14th Amendment, Virginia Minor was held to be a natural born citizen who did not have a right to vote because her state law said so. Suffrage was held to not be a privilege of citizenship.

Your continued attempt to conflate voting rights with citizenship remains misplaced.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Now, maybe there were some exceptions in some states, but they were few and far between. The rich white guys were "the people" and had the power and the full constitutional protections.

According to the law, as expounded by the U.S. Supreme Court, voting is not a right conferred by citizenship. And, "women, if born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction of the United States, have always been considered citizens of the United States."

Your personal misinterpretation of the law is irrelevant.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

And who served in the militias?

Who were members of that militia has varied according to which Militia Act was effective. Generally, it was the able-bodied male population between 18-45 years of age. Originally, it was exclusively white male citizens. The age range is now 17-45, and some females are included, and non-citizens are included.

Those who served in the militia comprise that subset of the members of the militia who were in the militia while called to service. Those who served may include persons who were ineligible due to sex, age, race, or alienage.

As I disagree with the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court on Roe v Wade, ... [et al.]

And I bet you do too.

The difference being that I do not project my personal opinion as being the law of the land.

Whether one agrees with the Court or not, when SCOTUS issues a an opinion interpreting the Constitution, its holding is the law of the land and all inferior courts are bound by that opinion.

Roe v. Wade, whatever one thinks of it, makes it unlawful for a state to prohibit abortion.

Roe at 410 U.S. 153:

This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.

The right of privacy, whatever exactly it is, and whether it is found in the 14th Amendment or 9th Amendment, "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." This is a legal fact of life, even if it emanates from a penumbra. This will remain so until SCOTUS revisits the issue and changes it, or the Constitution is amended to change it.

The difference being that I do not project my personal opinion as being the law of the land.

I am not aware that I ever denied nor disputed the fact that the rulings were the law of the land. Merely that I disagreed with the rulings.

"This is a legal fact of life, even if it emanates from a penumbra."

The legal fact of life being that murder is legal if done in private by the mother. But if the fetus is killed as a result of a violent act by another … it is murder.

That's our U.S. Supreme Court in action. The same court that gave us Heller and McDonald.

half the able-bodied men in the state of Wisconsin in 1862 were foreigners,

That was 1862. Minor v. Happersett was an 1874 ruling.

I'm talking about 1791 when the Bill of Rights was ratified. Who were "the people" (in Article I, S I, Section 2) who were allowed to vote? Rich, white, land-owning adult males.

So then, who were "the people" in the second amendment at that time? Rich, white, land-owning adult males.

Who were the militia? Rich, white, adult males. Only their RKBA was protected because they were the militia.

The legal fact of life being that murder is legal if....

There you go again. Murder is a crime and is never legal.

Well, at least you now recognize the Heller and McDonald are the law of the land and that the 2nd Amendment right to keep and bear arms is an INDIVIDUAL right, historically rooted in English common law, and that the Second Amendment applies to all the states, and that it does not include any right to keep and bear SAMs or atomic bombs.

I am not aware that I ever denied nor disputed the fact that the rulings were the law of the land. Merely that I disagreed with the rulings.

[misterwhite #46]

The Heller Supreme court determines the law? Or the Cruikshank Supreme court? Or the Presser Supreme Court? Or the Miller Supreme court?

Seems to me the only reason you like the Heller decision is because it supports your view. I guess those justices never heard of stare decisis.

Yes. The Heller court determined RKBA law for D.C. and the McDonald court determined RKBA law for the states. To the extent you feel Cruickshank, Presser and Miller are not in accord with Heller and McDonald, they are dead, despite your attempt make believe they overrule Heller or McDonald with some nebulous precedent. You have heard of stare decisis, but the difference is the justices know what it actually means.

half the able-bodied men in the state of Wisconsin in 1862 were foreigners, [had not been naturalized, and yet they enjoyed the right to vote under the state constitution. At that time, there was no federal requirement that one needed to be a citizen to vote in elections for federal office.]

That was 1862. Minor v. Happersett was an 1874 ruling.

That sure is an irrelevant observation with no point whatever.

Half the able bodied men were aliens who had the right to vote. That is absolute proof that having the right to vote was not a mark of citizenship

Women were citizens who did not have the right to vote.

And Minor v. Happersett made the issue clear:

It is clear, therefore, we think, that the Constitution has not added the right of suffrage to the privileges and immunities of citizenship as they existed at the time it was adopted. This makes it proper to inquire whether suffrage was coextensive with the citizenship of the States at the time of its adoption. If it was, then it may with force be argued that suffrage was one of the rights which belonged to citizenship, and in the enjoyment of which every citizen must be protected. But if it was not, the contrary may with propriety be assumed.

[...]

Being unanimously of the opinion that the Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one, and that the constitutions and laws of the several States which commit that important trust to men alone are not necessarily void, we

AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT.

That is the way it was from the beginning of the constitutional republic.

There is no constitutional right to vote.

To this day, the individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States.

I'm talking about 1791 when the Bill of Rights was ratified. Who were "the people" (in Article I, S I, Section 2) who were allowed to vote? Rich, white, land-owning adult males.

The people were the men and women who were citizens. For constitutional purposes, the definition of the people has not changed since 1789.

Voting rights did not have shit to do with defining who were the people.

So then, who were "the people" in the second amendment at that time? Rich, white, land-owning adult males.

The people were men and women who were citizens. For constitutional purposes, the definition of the people has not changed since 1789.

Who were the militia? Rich, white, adult males. Only their RKBA was protected because they were the militia.

RKBA was and is an INDIVIDUAL right. It has never made a shit if one was in the militia or not. If your premise were true, RKBA did not apply to anyone over 45. For constitutional purposes, the definition of the people has not changed since 1789.

The militia originally included ALL the poor, dumb white men between 18 and 45. If the militia only included rich, white, adult males, we would still be British. As ever, the vast majority were poor, not rich. You would have had a small militia indeed. The country did not have enough rich, white, adult males to fill an army.

Keep repeating something really, really dumb, and it just stays dumb.

Half the able bodied men were aliens who had the right to vote.

Provided they intended to become citizens.

Wisconsin State Constitution (1848):

"Every male person of the age of twenty-one years, or upwards, of the following classes, who shall have resided in this State for one year next preceding any election, shall be deemed a qualified elector at such election. 1st. White citizens of the United States 2d. White persons of foreign birth who shall have declared their intention to become citizens conformably to the laws of the United States on the subject of naturalization (...)"; "No person shall be eligible to the legislature, who shall not not have resided one year within the state, and be a qualified elector in the district he may be chosen to represent."

Voting rights did not have shit to do with defining who were the people.

According to Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, only "the people" were allowed to vote. Granted, each state defined the requirements of suffrage, and there were differences between states. But in 1790, on the whole, only those born on U.S. soil, with a connection to the community, property- owning, adult, white males had suffrage. They were "the people".

You say they didn't have to be citizens. True, it wasn't spelled out as a requirement, per se. It was assumed based on the other voting requirements.

If your premise were true, RKBA did not apply to anyone over 45.

The second amendment protected the right of the states to form and maintain a militia consisting of armed militiamen. Taking away their arms would be an infringement and, therefore, unconstitutional.

According to the Militia Act of 1792, white male citizens between the ages of 18 and 45 were conscripted into a local militia company. Those over the age of 45 were not excluded -- meaning, if they volunteered for the militia, their RKBA was protected by the second amendment.

For those not in the militia, their RKBA was protected by their state constitution.

The people were the men and women who were citizens.

Wrong. According to the U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 2, only "the people" voted. In 1790, women did not vote. They weren't allowed to vote. Ergo, they were not part of "the people".

Half the able bodied men were aliens who had the right to vote.

Provided they intended to become citizens.

The men were aliens AND they could lawfully vote. The fact that they intended to become citizens acts as proof that they were aliens and not citizens.

The women were citizens and had no lawful right to vote.

No matter what you choose to make believe, as firmly established by SCOTUS in v Minor v. Happersett, the right to vote was not conferred by citizenship.

Virginia Minor was found to be a natural born U.S. citizen, and like all similarly situated women, had no right to vote. A state law denying her the right to vote was upheld as constitutional.

Voting rights did not have shit to do with defining who were the people.

You say they didn't have to be citizens. True, it wasn't spelled out as a requirement, per se. It was assumed based on the other voting requirements.

Same shit, different post. Alien men could vote, while natural born citizen women could not.

No matter what you choose to make believe, as firmly established by SCOTUS in Minor v. Happersett, the right to vote was not conferred by citizenship.

Virginia Minor was found to be a natural born U.S. citizen, and like all similarly situated women, had no right to vote. A state law denying her the right to vote was upheld as constitutional.

The second amendment protected the right of the states to form and maintain a militia consisting of armed militiamen.

The Second Amendment protected the INDIVIDUAL right to keep and bear arms, not the right of states to form and maintain a militia. The Federal Congress was empowered to "call forth the militia" and "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia...."

McDonald at 561 U.S. 780:

Fifth, the 39th Congress’ response to proposals to disband and disarm the Southern militias is instructive. Despite recognizing and deploring the abuses of these militias, the 39th Congress balked at a proposal to disarm them. See 39th Cong. Globe 914; Halbrook, Freedmen 20–21. Disarmament, it was argued, would violate the members’ right to bear arms, and it was ultimately decided to disband the militias but not to disarm their members. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, § 6, 14 Stat. 487; Halbrook, Freedmen 68–69; Cramer 858–861. It cannot be doubted that the right to bear arms was regarded as a substantive guarantee, not a prohibition that could be ignored so long as the States legislated in an evenhanded manner.

IV

Municipal respondents’ remaining arguments are at war with our central holding in Heller: that the Second Amendment protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, most notably for self-defense within the home. Municipal respondents, in effect, ask us to treat the right recognized in Heller as a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees that we have held to be incorporated into the Due Process Clause. Municipal respondents’ main argument is nothing less than a plea to disregard 50 years of incorporation precedent and return (presumably for this case only) to a bygone era.

The members of the militia enjoyed an individual right to keep and bear arms, and the militia did not have a right to exist, and was disbanded.

SCOTUS rejected your argument to return to a bygone era.

According to the Militia Act of 1792, white male citizens between the ages of 18 and 45 were conscripted into a local militia company.

The Militia Act of 1792 did not conscript anyone. (Neither does registration under the Selective Service Act.) It defined who was included in the UNORGANIZED militia.

Current law states, 10 U.S.C. § 311: "(a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of title 32, under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of female citizens of the United States who are members of the National Guard."

It still defines who are included in the UNORGANIZED militia and conscripts nobody.

And the individual right to keep and bear arms, protected by the Second Amendment, does not expire at age 45, a fact you seem utterly incapable of confronting.

The people were the men and women who were citizens.

Wrong. According to the U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 2, only "the people" voted. In 1790, women did not vote. They weren't allowed to vote. Ergo, they were not part of "the people".

Send a sternly worded letter of your dissent to the U.S. Supreme Court, informing them of their error.

Heller, at 554 U.S. 580-81

What is more, in all six other provisions of the Constitution that mention “the people,” the term unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset. As we said in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259, 265 (1990):

“‘[T]he people’ seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution. . . . [Its uses] sugges[t] that ‘the people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community.”

This contrasts markedly with the phrase “the militia” in the prefatory clause. As we will describe below, the “militia” in colonial America consisted of a subset of “the people”—those who were male, able bodied, and within a certain age range. Reading the Second Amendment as protecting only the right to “keep and bear Arms” in an organized militia therefore fits poorly with the operative clause’s description of the holder of that right as “the people."

We start therefore with a strong presumption that the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all Americans.

The fact that they intended to become citizens acts as proof that they were aliens and not citizens.

Really? That's your argument? You're reaching. One state made one exception (which was conditional) and you then generalize that non-citizens could vote.

"the right to vote was not conferred by citizenship."

I don't think I said that. I did say that those who voted were citizens (or about to be). But each state defined who could vote and I can't believe they would allow non-citizens to take over.

Keep in mind -- Congress has the power to refuse to seat a Congressman and the power to de-certify the result of the electoral college’s vote in a Presidential election if they believe there was foul play by a state.

Alien men could vote, while natural born citizen women could not.

ONE state made ONE exception that allowed male non-citizens to vote PROVIDED THAT they were on a path to citizenship.

States allow you to drive on temporary tags. Are you going to claim that means nobody needs license plates to drive around?

"natural born citizen women could not."

Correct. Neither could children citizens. Or non-land-owning citizens. Or those citizens who didn't live in the state for at least one year. Or those citizens who couldn't pass a literacy test or pay a poll tax. A lot of citizens couldn't vote.

I'll say it again -- in 1790 when the second amendment was ratified, only the rich white guys voted. Adult, white, male citizens who owned property. They were "the people" described in Article I, Section 2. There were exceptions, of course. But they were exceptions.

My point being, they were also "the people" protected by the second amendment. NOT everyone and not even every citizen.

The fact that they intended to become citizens acts as proof that they were aliens and not citizens.

Really? That's your argument? You're reaching.

Cite an example of an alien, or anyone, who intends to become a citizen, who is thereby magically transformed into a citizen without going through the naturalization process.

I linked, cited, and quoted the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion (Civil War) to show the Governor of Wisconsin making an official inquiry to the Secretary of War stating, "About one-half of the able-bodied men between eighteen and forty-five years in this State are foreign born. They have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States. Have the right to vote under our State constitution if twenty-one years old. Have enjoyed and are enjoying all the privileges of citizens. Are they liable to be drafted?"

I don't think I said that. I did say that those who voted were citizens (or about to be).

I said it. Those who voted were aliens. They were not citizens. An expression of intent to become a citizen does not change one from an alien to a citizen. Give it up.

But each state defined who could vote and I can't believe they would allow non-citizens to take over.

BELIEVE. Read history, do not invent your own.

Various states allowed aliens to vote until a Federal law was passed making it unlawful for aliens to vote in Federal elections.

Wisconsin constitution, approved August 6, 1846.

Note that the state constitutions had to be approved by the Federal government.

Article III, Section I, 1st, gave White citizens the right to vote, and Article III, Section I, 2nd, gave White aliens, who have declared their intention to become citizens, the right to vote.

ARTICLE III.

SUFFRAGE.

SECTION I. Every male person, of the age of twenty-one years or upward, belonging to either of the following classes, who shall have resided in the State for one year next preceding any election, shall be deemed a qualified elector at such election:

1st. White citizens of the United States.*

2d. White persons of foreign birth who shall have declared their intention to become citizens conformably to the laws of the United States on the subject of naturalization.*

3d. Persons of Indian blood, who have once been declared by law of Congress to be citizens of the United States, any subsequent law of Congress to the contrary notwithstanding.

4th. Civilized persons of Indian descent, not members of any tribe: Provided, That the legislature may, at any time, extend by law the right of suffrage to persons not herein enumerated; but no such law shall be in force until the same shall have been submitted to a vote of the people at a general election, and approved by a majority of all the votes cast at such election.

SEC. 2. No person under guardianship, non compos mentis, or insane shall be qualified to vote at any election; nor shall any person convicted of treason or felony be qualified to vote at any election unless restored to civil rights.

SEC. 3. All votes shall be given by ballot, except for such township officers as may by law be directed or allowed to be otherwise chosen.

__________

* By a decision of the Supreme Court, made during the year 1866, in case of Gillespie vs. Palmer, the right of suffrage was decided to have been extended to colored persons by vote of tlie people at the general election held November 6, 1849.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

SEC. 4. No person shall be deemed to have lost his residence in this State by reason of his absence on business of the United States or of this State.

SEC. 5. No soldier, seaman, or marine in the Army or Navy of the United States shall be deemed a resident of this State in consequence of being stationed within the same.

SEC. 6. Laws may be passed excluding from the right of suffrage all persons who have been or may be convicted of bribery or larceny, or of any infamous crime, and depriving every person who shall make, or become, directly, or indirectly, interested in, any bet or wager depending upon the result of any election, from the right to vote at such election.

Various states allowed aliens to vote until a Federal law was passed making it unlawful for aliens to vote in Federal elections.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_rights_in_the_United_States

The issue of voting rights in the United States, specifically the enfranchisement and disenfranchisement of different groups, has been contested throughout United States history.

Eligibility to vote in the United States is established both through the federal constitution and by state law. Several constitutional amendments (the 15th, 19th, and 26th specifically) require that voting rights cannot be abridged on account of race, color, previous condition of servitude, sex, or age for those above 21; the constitution as originally written did not establish any such rights during 1787–1870. In the absence of a specific federal law or constitutional provision, each state is given considerable discretion to establish qualifications for suffrage and candidacy within its own respective jurisdiction; in addition, states and lower level jurisdictions establish election systems, such as at-large or single member district elections for county councils or school boards.

Between 1776 and 1807, women voted in New Jersey.

The Constitution of New Jersey of 1776, at IV, stated,

That all inhabitants of this Colony, of full age, who are worth fifty pounds proclamation money, clear estate in the same, and have resided within the county in which they claim a vote for twelve months immediately preceding the election, shall be entitled to vote for Representatives in Council and Assembly; and also for all other public officers, that shall be elected by the people of the county at large.

The legislature of New Jersey amended this constitution September 20, 1777, by substituting the words "State" and "States" for "colony" and "colonies."

Cite an example of an alien, or anyone, who intends to become a citizen, who is thereby magically transformed into a citizen without going through the naturalization process.

I'm not claiming that. I'm saying that one state made an exception to allow a certain group of non-citizens to vote.

"An expression of intent to become a citizen does not change one from an alien to a citizen."

I'm not claiming that. I'm saying that one state made an exception to allow a certain group of non-citizens to vote.

The members of the militia enjoyed an individual right to keep and bear arms, and the militia did not have a right to exist, and was disbanded.

If you choose not to own a gun, does that mean the second amendment no longer protects your right to own a gun? Of course not.

Same thing with the State Militias. Most disbanded because they were no longer needed. That doesn't mean the second amendment no longer protects that right. Almost half the states still have State Defense Forces in addition to the National Guard.

And the individual right to keep and bear arms, protected by the Second Amendment, does not expire at age 45, a fact you seem utterly incapable of confronting.

The second amendment protect the arms of militia members, no matter their age.

ONE state made ONE exception that allowed male non-citizens to vote PROVIDED THAT they were on a path to citizenship.

FALSE. Stop making shit up.

What is your evidence that is was ONLY ONE STATE?

The New Jersey constitution of 1776, as amended September 20, 1777, allowed "all inhabitants of this State, of full age, who are worth fifty pounds proclamation money, clear estate in the same, and have resided within the county in which they claim a vote for twelve months immediately preceding the election, shall be entitled to vote...."

In Wisconsin, the aliens were not on a path to citizenship. They had merely made a statement of intent.

In Massachusetts, the constitution of 1780, Article IX provided,

All elections ought to be free; and all the inhabitants of this commonwealth, having such qualifications as they shall establish by their frame of government, have an equal right to elect officers, and to be elected, for public employments.

Not amended until 1822.

States allow you to drive on temporary tags. Are you going to claim that means nobody needs license plates to drive around?

What the hell does that have to do with states providing aliens the right to vote and doing so in their constitution???

I'll say it again -- in 1790 when the second amendment was ratified, only the rich white guys voted. Adult, white, male citizens who owned property. They were "the people" described in Article I, Section 2. There were exceptions, of course. But they were exceptions.

You can say it again and again all you want. You can blow it out your ass.

I can quote state constitution after state constitution proving, as a matter of fact, that you are just blowing it out your ass.

Voting rights were solely dependent on State law. The Federal Constitution was silent on the question of who could vote. There was no Federal law on the matter. The States were free to choose as they please who was enfranchised within their State. Voting rights were determined by State law, not citizenship.

My point being, they were also "the people" protected by the second amendment. NOT everyone and not even every citizen.

Your point is bullshit, and as stated in McDonald, at war with the Supreme Court decision in Heller.

And there is Heller.

Heller, at 554 U.S. 580-81

What is more, in all six other provisions of the Constitution that mention “the people,” the term unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset. As we said in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259, 265 (1990):

“‘[T]he people’ seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution. . . . [Its uses] sugges[t] that ‘the people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community.”

This contrasts markedly with the phrase “the militia” in the prefatory clause. As we will describe below, the “militia” in colonial America consisted of a subset of “the people”—those who were male, able bodied, and within a certain age range. Reading the Second Amendment as protecting only the right to “keep and bear Arms” in an organized militia therefore fits poorly with the operative clause’s description of the holder of that right as “the people."

We start therefore with a strong presumption that the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all Americans.