especially for a first time, non-violent offender.

Non violent my ass. She assaulted him.

I would have popped the bitch if she took my hat.

You pussy. A real man would have pulled a gun and shot her for stealing his MAGA cap. And then fed her body to feral swine.

And then fed her body to feral swine.

Yeah. Like they did on Hell on Wheels.

At first, I thought that a felony charge seemed kind of severe for stealing someone’s hat.

Yes. But this wasn't stealing.

Stealing (theft) is taking property that is not yours and is most often a misdemeanor. Robbery is theft accomplished through the use of physical force against another and is almost always a felony.

This was a robbery. Press charges and watch her squirm.

You pussy. A real man would have pulled a gun and shot her for stealing his MAGA cap. And then fed her body to feral swine.

Wrong. A real man would have beaten her to death first,retrieved his stolen property,and then shot her in the head to make sure the world would put out of her misery before leaving.

This was a robbery. Press charges and watch her squirm.

She won't squirm because she has been raised to believe that what she did is the moral thing to do.

She has been raised AND educated to believe that the white man is evil and his goal as a racist is to murder all non-whites. Thus her constant charges of "genocide". She,and others like her can't even conceive of living in a world where this isn't recognized fact,and she is blindly convinced that no jury in the world would convict her of stealing a Trump hat from the head of someone she thinks is white.

THAT is why she had the self-confidence to walk right in to the school administrative center with the stolen property in her hand and try to get the victim charged with the crime of supporting genocide.

Logic isn't a part of "Lefty World". If it were,it MIGHT occur to SOME of them to consider the little factoid that for decades the ONLY people on the planet that had nuclear weapons were white people,yet these same white people never ONCE tried to wipe out any nation or tribe of non-white people.

SOME MIGHT even contemplate that THEY are the ones who are racists.

Then again,if they had the ability to reason,they wouldn't be lefties.

Robbery is theft accomplished through the use of physical force

Robbery can be accomplished through use of violence or intimidation, force or fear. Any threat need not be directed at the person himself. If the victim is intimidated into parting with his property, the crime may be robbery even if a different victim would not have been so intimidated.

The hat snatching was a bit more than a simple snatch and go. She remained on scene and taunted her victim. Fearful of possible consequences arising from defending his property, the victim was intimidated into submission, whether by fear of tangling with a crazy woman, or of imagined legal consequences.

In State v. Witherspoon, below, the perp did not touch the victim. He communicated no explicit threat, but she understandably sensed fear. She was transporting property (money) for her employer. He snatched the money with no resistance from the victim. The victim testified, "Q: If you had not been afraid of this person standing there, could he still have accomplished the taking of this money? A: Yes, like I said, I didn't know what was on his mind."

As cited, from Sloan v. State, "the controlling consideration is the state of the victim's mind at the time of submission or compliance with the robber's demands."

The appeals court upheld his conviction for robbery, rather than larceny, grand or petty.

https://www.leagle.com/decision/1983927648sw2d2791919

STATE v. WITHERSPOON

648 S.W.2d 279 (1983)

STATE of Tennessee, Appellee, v. Donald Cedric WITHERSPOON, Appellant.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, at Nashville.

January 25, 1983.

Permission to Appeal Denied April 4, 1983.

Attorney(s) appearing for the Case

David M. Himmelreich, Asst. Atty. Gen., Scott Williams, Asst. Dist. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for appellee.

Fred C. Dance, Nashville, for appellant.

Permission to Appeal Denied by Supreme Court April 4, 1983.

OPINION

DAUGHTREY, Judge.

The central question in this appeal is whether the evidence shows that defendant Donald Cedric Witherspoon is guilty of robbery or merely of grand larceny. The jury found him guilty of robbery and set his sentence at five to seven years imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant contends that the record fails to establish a causal connection between his conduct and the fear experienced by the victim at the time

[648 S.W.2d 280]

of the offense. Because we conclude that the question was properly left to the jury's determination, we decline to reverse on this basis.

The proof at trial showed that on May 29, 1981, Linda Hollins was head cashier at a Nashville supermarket. As part of her regular duties, she drove to a nearby branch bank to get $1550 in change for the store's cash registers.

Hollins carried the money out to her car in a money bag and put it on the floor behind the driver's seat. She sat down in the driver's seat, but before she could pull her left leg into the car, she suddenly saw the defendant standing between her and the open car door, so that she was unable to close the door. The defendant stood there for a few moments without speaking and then asked directions to the interstate. As he was asking directions, he moved closer to Hollins, grabbed the bag, and ran. He was apprehended in the vicinity a few minutes later, and all the money was recovered.

Hollins testified that she was very frightened during the incident and that her fear was caused by the fact that a strange man was standing so close to her. The defendant argues, however, that by her own testimony the victim established a lack of causal connection between her fear and his actions:

Q: [by prosecuting attorney] [A]fter you noticed Mr. Witherspoon standing there ... what happened?

A: Well, I turned around and he was standing there and I thought, you know, at first he didn't say anything and I thought, of, my gosh, you know, and I was naturally scared to death.

Q: What went through your mind at that point?

A: Well, at that point I forgot I had the money and the only thing that I could think that he wanted was rape.

* * * * * *

Q: [by defense counsel] [J]ust turning around and seeing this person standing there, that made you scared?

A: Yes, turning around and seeing a person standing inside my car door that I had never seen before, naturally I was scared.

Q: If you had not been afraid of this person standing there, could he still have accomplished the taking of this money?

A: Yes, like I said, I didn't know what was on his mind.

The defendant contends that the taking was not accomplished by placing the victim in fear, but by the deception of asking for directions and then grabbing the money before the victim could respond. Any fear on her part, he argues, was merely a natural reaction to the unexpected presence of a strange man close to her and thus does not fall within the purview of T.C.A. § 39-3901. We disagree with this interpretation of the testimony in the record.

T.C.A. § 39-3901(a) defines robbery as "the felonious and forceable taking from the person of another, goods or money of any value, by violence or putting the person in fear." The statutory definition raises two questions pertinent to the facts of this case: first, whether the victim was "in fear" for purposes of § 39-3901(a); and, second, whether the facts show a sufficient causal relationship between her fear and the theft.

Under Tennessee law, the standard for determining whether the victim was put "in fear" is largely subjective. In Sloan v. State, 491 S.W.2d 858, 861 (Tenn.Cr.App. 1972), the court held that "the controlling consideration is the state of the victim's mind at the time of submission or compliance with the robber's demands." In the present case, the victim testified that she was fearful from the moment she saw the defendant standing close beside her, positioned in such a way as to prevent her from closing the door to her car. Nor does her fear, whether of rape, robbery, or any other immediate harm, seem unreasonable under the circumstances. As the Sloan court concluded, "[a]fter employing methods intended and calculated to install submissive fear in his victim, a robber cannot be heard to

[648 S.W.2d 281]

say that they did not produce that effect or that the victim's fear was ill-founded and unreasonable." Id. at 862.

The court in Sloan further dealt with the necessary relationship between the victim's fear and the taking, noting that the fear engendered by the assailant must be such as would "induce a man to part with his property for the sake of his person." Id. at 861. Such a rule is followed in a majority of jurisdictions. See generally W. LaFave and A. Scott, Criminal Law 699 (1972). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 362 Mass. 83, 283 N.E.2d 840, 843 (Mass. 1972); Crocker v. State, 272 So.2d 664, 665 (Miss. 1973); State v. Sanchez, 78 N.M. 284, 430 P.2d 781, 782 (N.M.Ct.App. 1967).

To support his argument that the victim's fear did not enable the defendant to take her money, the defendant points to the victim's testimony. He characterizes it as an admission that the taking would have occurred even if the victim had not been afraid and analogizes this situation to "purse snatching" cases in which the offender is liable only for larceny and not robbery.

However, we think the proof in this case shows more than a mere "snatching." Compare and contrast People v. Patton, 76 Ill.2d 45, 27 Ill.Dec. 766, 389 N.E.2d 1174 (Ill. 1979) (where defendant swiftly approached victim and grabbed purse from victim's fingertips, offense held not to constitute robbery). The defendant here did not simply grab the moneybag from an unattentive victim. Instead, he placed himself so close to the victim and blocked her movement in such a way as to make her immediately apprehensive for her own safety. Moreover, the victim testified that she was so gripped by fear that she momentarily forgot about the money she had in her possession. While the facts present an admittedly close case on this question, it appears that the victim may have let down her guard from fear engendered by the defendant, thus permitting him to grab the money without resistance and escape. Hence the record tends to indicate not only that the defendant's intention was to "intimidate and frighten the victim into docile nonresistance and meek compliance," Sloan v. State, supra, 491 S.W.2d at 861, but also that he succeeded in his purpose, whether or not the victim realized it and whether or not she was able to articulate it at trial. At the very least, the facts were sufficient to make out a question for the jury, after proper instructions on both robbery and larceny. Under the standard of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(e), we cannot say that the evidence fails to support their verdict.

We further note that in at least one similar case from another jurisdiction, the courts have reached the same conclusion as we do here. In Flagler v. State, 189 So.2d 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), aff'd 198 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1967), the defendant opened the passenger door of an automobile stopped at a stop sign. He sat in the front seat for several minutes without speaking and then grabbed the victim's handbag and fled. The resulting robbery conviction was upheld by the appellate courts, albeit without extended discussion of the causal link between the victim's fear and the theft.

Finally, we find no merit to the defendant's contention that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on petit as well as grand larceny. The defendant insists that this omission deprived him of the potential benefit of workhouse sentencing for petit larceny, as provided by T.C.A. § 39-4205. He cites as support Lax v. State, 214 Tenn. 162, 378 S.W.2d 782 (1964) (undisputed value of goods $800, defendant convicted of petit larceny and sentenced to workhouse term); and Troglen v. State, 216 Tenn. 447, 392 S.W.2d 925 (1965) (undisputed amount of check $700, defendant convicted of petit larceny and sentenced to workhouse term). But although Lax and Troglen (and T.C.A. § 40-2518) would permit a trial court to charge on petit larceny in a grand larceny case without committing

[648 S.W.2d 282]

reversible error, our Supreme Court has likewise held that the failure to charge on all possible lesser included offenses is not error where there is no evidence in the record to support such offenses. Johnson v. State, 531 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tenn. 1975). Although the distinction between robbery and larceny under the proof in this case is a fine one, no reasonable reading of the record would permit a factfinder to conclude that the defendant took less than $200 from the victim. It follows that the trial court did not err in refusing to charge on petit larceny.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

O'BRIEN and TATUM, JJ., concur.

http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/nonpub/A133399.PDF

People v. J.M., Ct. App. Calif., 1st Dist., Div. 5, A133399 (28 Aug 2012)

In California, it is robbery if either the taking, or the carrying away, was effected by threat or fear. In J.M., it was a simple snatch and go. The taking was effected without touching the victim. Fear or intimidation did not aid the taking by sudden snatching. In the context of robbery, fear imports apprehension rather than fright.

However, to avoid a robbery conviction, the perp must also show that fear or intimidation did not aid the carrying away. In J.M., the victim testified that she did not pursue the perp "[b]ecause he ran really fast." She did not attribute fear as playing a role. Citing this, the court found that it was not robbery.

In the case of our hat snatcher, it is not a simple snatch and go. She hung around and taunted the victim. Why did he make no attempt to take his hat from her? What induced him to submit to her taking away of his hat? If he says he feared combat with a mad woman, or attributes his submission to some apprehension, the crime is converted from grand theft to robbery during the taking away of the MAGA hat. It is a felony, the value of the hat notwithstanding.

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2

The victim demonstrated for the juvenile court that she was “holding the phone in her right hand [with] her fingers on the bottom part of the phone and her thumb . . . on the top of the phone . . . .” Her right arm was bent, and she was “holding [her] phone kind of close to [her] chest area . . . ,” with her hand covering more than half of the phone. The suspect wrapped his hand around the top of the phone, grabbed it, and ran. When he grabbed the phone, he did not touch the victim’s hand or any part of her body, and her arm did not move at all. The victim stated she was scared “[b]ecause I don’t know what happened.”

The victim did not pursue the suspect “[b]ecause he ran really fast.” The victim noticed his build and clothes; he was wearing a black jacket and blue jeans. The lady sitting next to the victim helped her call the police.

[...]

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4

[...]

DISCUSSION

I.

The Juvenile Court’s Robbery Finding J.M. contends the evidence is not sufficient to support a finding that he committed robbery. In evaluating this contention, we “must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whet her it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) “[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 576, quoting Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, italics omitted.) In making this determination, we “‘presume every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact could have reasonably deduced from the evidence.’” (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 806.)¹

Penal Code section 211 sets forth the elements of robbery: “Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” Robbery consists of two components; gaining possession of the victim’s property and carrying it away. (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165.) In order to support a conviction for robbery, the taking, either the gaining possession or the carrying away, must be accomplished by force or fear. (People v. Gomez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 249, 257.) In the absence of force or fear, a taking from the person is grand theft, not robbery. (People v. Morales (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 134, 139.)

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¹ The same standard of review applies to a claim of insufficiency of the evidence in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts and adult criminal trials. (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809.)

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5

J.M. contends the evidence was insufficient to establish the elements of robbery because it does not support a finding he used force or fear to take the victim’s iPhone. We agree. There is no evidence that, to accomplish the taking here, J.M. used the force required to establish robbery. “‘[S]omething more is required than just that quantum of force which is necessary to accomplish the mere seizing of the property.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Burns (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1259 (Burns), quoting Morales, supra, 49 Cal.App.3d at p. 139.) “‘[W]hen actual force is present in a robbery, at the very least it must be a quantum more than that which is needed merely to take the property from the person of the victim . . . .” (Burns, at p. 1259.) There is no evidence here that J.M. used force beyond that necessary to take the victim’s iPhone from her hand. Indeed, she stated that, when J.M. grabbed her phone, he did not touch her hand or any part of her body and did not even cause her arm to move. (Compare People v. Mungia (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1703, 1706-1707 [evidence sufficient for robbery although the victim did not see or hear the defendant before he took her purse, where he shoved her and in a separate motion, took her purse off her shoulder].)

Nor is there any evidence that reasonably supports an inference J.M. used fear to accomplish the taking. The evidence demonstrates only that he appeared suddenly, grabbed the phone from the victim’s hand, and ran away. There is no evidence he threatened or intimidated the victim or that the victim surrendered her phone because she was afraid. Indeed, she stated that she did not see J.M. before he took her phone. She said the incident scared her “[b]ecause I don’t know what happened.” Being startled, however, does not appear to satisfy the fear requirement for robbery. (Pen. Code, § 212 [defining “fear” as it is used in Pen. Code § 211 to mean fear of an unlawful injury].)² There is no evidence that J.M. used the victim’s fear of such injury to accomplish the taking or to prevent the victim from recovering her phone. Although she acknowledged

_____

² Penal Code section 212 states: “The fear mentioned in Section 211 may be either: 1. The fear of an unlawful injury to the person or property of the person robbed, or of any relative of his or member of his family; or, 2. The fear of an immediate and unlawful injury to the person or property of anyone in the company of the person robbed at the time of the robbery.”

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6

that she was “still scared at that time,” she did not attribute her decision not to pursue J.M. to her fear. When the prosecutor asked her: “[W]hy didn’t you run after the person that took your phone?” she responded simply: “Because he ran really fast.”