You mean the old bone that an SLC detective and his supervisor violated a nurse's rights and placed her under false arrest while trying to violate an accident victim's 4th Amendment rights, all for an accident that didn't occur in SLC jurisdiction and when the there was no probable cause that the victim was an impaired driver?

No. Your relentless pursuit of why things happened the way they did.

It could be that police departmental policy is that any vehicular accident involving a fatality gives probable cause to draw blood from an unconscious or dead driver. Perhaps that's the policy that's now changed.

Can't blame the cop for that.

Can't blame the cop for that.

Yes we can lamer.

It could be that police departmental policy is that any vehicular accident involving a fatality gives probable cause to draw blood from an unconscious or dead driver. Perhaps that's the policy that's now changed.

You're just making shit up out of thin air.

You're just making shit up out of thin air.

I'm stating possibilities, using words like "could be" and "perhaps".

You're the one making shit up with your "the detective and his supervisor violated a nurse's rights" and "placed her under false arrest" and "while trying to violate an accident victim's 4th Amendment rights" and "when the there was no probable cause that the victim was an impaired driver".

What's your plan -- to apologize later when the truth comes out or temporarily disappear from the forum?

I say the nurse wins, pretty much across the board. Including if she files a lawsuit for a fat settlement from SLC PD.

I say the nurse wins, pretty much across the board. Including if she files a lawsuit for a fat settlement from SLC PD.

Not if it goes to court. Not if we abide by the rule of law. Not if we instituted loser pays.

But *sigh*, none of that will happen. The police department and the city will cave under political correctness and social pressure which people like you will incorrectly interpret as an admission of malfeasance rather than what it really is -- a bribe to just shut up and go away.

They'll cave because their city attorney will tell them they're going to lose badly on the merits.

Merits schmerits. They might lose on the optics or on the emotional aspects, but legal merits? No.

I'm sure the police department will be able to point to dozens of prior instances where they drew blood without incident. They can point to state law. They can point to departmental policy. Both Detective Jeff Payne and his supervisor believed they were operating within legal parameters, even to the point where Payne's supervisor ordered the nurse arrested for obstruction.

The nurse didn't have the legal power to obstruct a police investigation. She exceeded her authority. For that she was briefly arrested. Briefly. Had SHE not resisted that arrest, things would have gone smoothly.

Afterwards, things could have been straightened out. If the state and the city and the police department and the supervisor and the detective were all wrong, the blood evidence couldn't be used at trial -- assuming there ever was one.

Keep in mind, that is the intent of fourth amendment protections -- to prevent evidence being used against you in a court of law. Plenty of time to sort this out.

The one that said they can draw blood from an unconscious driver?

Your imagination knows no bounds. The actual statute is constitutional. Your imaginary content attributed to it is not.

I can't really imagine how or why they went so far in this case when it wasn't even their case to begin with.

I have no actual information to add, but I can imagine why such a request could be made and pursued. Did the person running from the cops have some powerful connection? Could the accident be blamed on a drunk truck driver? That is just an imagining of what could impel such abberent behavior.

I am citing the law which explains the behavior.

Nope, you are citing a law that presumed consent to tests. It does not, and constitutionally cannot, authorized an invasive warrantless blood draw. You may have your license revoked, but the law does not permit an involuntary blood draw without a warrant, absent exigent circumstances. Alcohol dissipation cannot be considered exigent circumstances.

If the statute did provide for a forcible blood draw, which it does not, it would be unconstitutional, null and void, and you would be cited something which, in the eyes of the law, does not exist.

Could the accident be blamed on a drunk truck driver?

Or impaired by prescription drugs or a medical condition.

I would bet they scoured his phone (or tried to) to discover if he had had any texting or phone calls prior to the accident. Some trucks are also equipped with in-cab cameras to record everything the driver does, though the fire did seem pretty extensive to recover much from the accident.

Of course, the truck driver remained in his lane. He did not swerve into oncoming traffic.

Alcohol dissipation cannot be considered exigent circumstances.

I thought the Supremes told us that a warrantless blood draw due to exigency was to be determined on a case-by-case basis. But I'm not sure exactly what they meant by that in practical terms. Seemed kinda vague but IANAL.

Keep in mind, that is the intent of fourth amendment protections -- to prevent evidence being used against you in a court of law.

Keep in mind that it is the intent of the Fourth Amendment to forbid and prevent unlawful searches and seizures. It forbids the Legislature from enacting any legislation authorizing a misterwhite-approved unreasonable search.

If you read a statute to authorize such a search, you are reading the statute wrong.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The nurse didn't have the legal power to obstruct a police investigation. She exceeded her authority. For that she was briefly falsely arrested. Briefly. Had SHE not resisted that arrest, things would have gone smoothly.

What investigation?

Logan PD, perhaps trying to keep its hands clean, says it told SLCPD that it didn't matter if they got the blood after their initial request.

So what was SLCPD investigating? What was its legitimate authority to investigate an accident or collect any evidence in an accident that occurred 81 miles outside its jurisdiction and which involved no SLCPD at all and therefore no probable cause for blood draws or anything else?

SLCPD simply had no jurisdiction in this case at all.

What investigation?

Why, the accident of course. Not paying attention?

"So what was SLCPD investigating?"

They were assisting Logan PD by sending their trained phlebologist to legally collect a blood sample from an unconscious driver who was transported to the hospital.

"Logan PD, perhaps trying to keep its hands clean, ..."

You can bet they want no part of this.

Why, the accident of course. Not paying attention?

Not their investigation, not their turf, not their accident victim.

And Logan says they told them it was no problem if SLCPD didn't get a blood sample.

They were assisting Logan PD by sending their trained phlebologist to legally collect a blood sample from an unconscious driver who was transported to the hospital.

So you say. I'd like more info. No doubt, we will learn more in a few weeks. Probably when the FBI or SLC prosecutors file a case against Rotten Cop and his Rotten Supervisor who obviously conspired to deprive the driver of his 4th Amendment rights and tried to intimidate the nurse with a false arrest.

Recall the video of the arrest. Rotten Cop puts her in the car where she sat until Rotten Supervisor shows up five minutes later. Then we hear Rotten Supervisor saying that "she won't listen to me".

I think it is clear that the false arrest was leverage to get her to allow the blood draw even after the false arrest. That was what Rotten Supervisor was trying to do when he talked to her. Otherwise, he would have released her immediately when he got on the scene. Instead he was trying to persuade her to allow the illegal blood draw. They saw her as the key obstacle blocking them since she was head nurse of the burn unit. So they arrested her to try to intimidate her into allowing the illegal blood draw.

Hang 'em both.

I'm sure the police department will be able to point to dozens of prior instances where they drew blood without incident. They can point to state law. They can point to departmental policy. Both Detective Jeff Payne and his supervisor believed they were operating within legal parameters, even to the point where Payne's supervisor ordered the nurse arrested for obstruction.

The fact is, you are absolutely clueless about you are talking about.

Missouri v. McNeely, S. Ct. 11-1425, 569 U.S. ____ (17 Apr 2013)

[footnotes omitted]

At 2: (Syllabus)

(a) The principle that a warrantless search of the person is reasonable only if it falls within a recognized exception, see, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 224, applies here, where the search involved a compelled physical intrusion beneath McNeely's skin and into his veins to obtain a blood sample to use as evidence in a criminal investigation. One recognized exception "applies when '''the exigencies of the situation" make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable.'" Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. _, _.

[nc] You have admitted there is no claimed exception of exigent circumstances. Thus, the principal applies that the proposed search, involved a compelled physical intrusion beneath McNeely's skin and into his veins to obtain a blood sample to use as evidence in a criminal investigation, required a search warrant.

Read it until you understand it.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

At 4-11: (Opinion of the Court)

II

A

The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” Our cases have held that a warrantless search of the person is reasonable only if it falls within a recognized exception. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 224 (1973). That principle applies to the type of search at issue in this case, which involved a compelled physical intrusion beneath McNeely’s skin and into his veins to obtain a sample of his blood for use as evidence in a criminal investigation. Such an invasion of bodily integrity implicates an individual’s [*5] “most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.” Winston v. Lee, 470 U. S. 753, 760 (1985); see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U. S. 602, 616 (1989).

We first considered the Fourth Amendment restrictions on such searches in Schmerber, where, as in this case, a blood sample was drawn from a defendant suspected of driving while under the influence of alcohol. 384 U. S., at 758. Noting that “[s]earch warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings,” we reasoned that “absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned,” even when the search was conducted following a lawful arrest. Id., at 770. We explained that the importance of requiring authorization by a “‘neutral and detached magistrate’” before allowing a law enforcement officer to “invade another’s body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great.” Ibid. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13–14 (1948)).

As noted, the warrant requirement is subject to exceptions. “One well-recognized exception,” and the one at issue in this case, “applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). A variety of circumstances may give rise to an exigency sufficient to justify a warrantless search, including law enforcement’s need to provide emergency assistance to an occupant of a home, Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U. S. 45, 47–48 (2009) (per curiam), engage in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect, United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42–43 (1976), or enter a burning building to put out a fire and investigate its cause, Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509–510 (1978). As is relevant here, we have also recognized that in some circumstances law enforcement officers may conduct a search without a [*6] warrant to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973); Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 40–41 (1963) (plurality opinion). While these contexts do not necessarily involve equivalent dangers, in each a warrantless search is potentially reasonable because “there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” Tyler, 436 U. S., at 509.

[nc] In the instant case there was time to get a warrant. The detective did not even try.

To determine whether a law enforcement officer faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant, this Court looks to the totality of circumstances. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 406 (2006) (finding officers’ entry into a home to provide emergency assistance “plainly reasonable under the circumstances”); Illinois v. Mc-Arthur, 531 U. S. 326, 331 (2001) (concluding that a warrantless seizure of a person to prevent him from returning to his trailer to destroy hidden contraband was reasonable “[i]n the circumstances of the case before us” due to exigency); Cupp, 412 U. S., at 296 (holding that a limited warrantless search of a suspect’s fingernails to preserve evidence that the suspect was trying to rub off was justified “[o]n the facts of this case”); see also Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385, 391–396 (1997) (rejecting a per se exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug investigations based on presumed exigency, and requiring instead evaluation of police conduct “in a particular case”). We apply this “finely tuned approach”to Fourth Amendment reasonableness in this context because the police action at issue lacks “the traditional justification that . . . a warrant . . . provides.” Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 347, n. 16 (2001). Absent that established justification, “the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry,” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U. S. 33, 39 (1996), demands that we evaluate each case of alleged exigency based “on its own facts and circumstances.” Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 357 [*7] (1931).

Our decision in Schmerber applied this totality of the circumstances approach. In that case, the petitioner had suffered injuries in an automobile accident and was taken to the hospital. 384 U. S., at 758. While he was there receiving treatment, a police officer arrested the petitioner for driving while under the influence of alcohol and ordered a blood test over his objection. Id., at 758–759. After explaining that the warrant requirement applied generally to searches that intrude into the human body, we concluded that the warrantless blood test “in the present case” was nonetheless permissible because the officer “might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened ‘the destruction of evidence.’” Id., at 770 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364, 367 (1964)).

In support of that conclusion, we observed that evidence could have been lost because “the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system.” 384 U. S., at 770. We added that “[p]articularly in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant.” Id., at 770–771. “Given these special facts,” we found that it was appropriate for the police to [*8] act without a warrant. Id., at 771. We further held that the blood test at issue was a reasonable way to recover the evidence because it was highly effective, “involve[d] virtually no risk, trauma, or pain,” and was conducted in a reasonable fashion “by a physician in a hospital environment according to accepted medical practices.” Ibid. And in conclusion, we noted that our judgment that there had been no Fourth Amendment violation was strictly based“on the facts of the present record.” Id., at 772.

Thus, our analysis in Schmerber fits comfortably within our case law applying the exigent circumstances exception. In finding the warrantless blood test reasonable in Schmerber, we considered all of the facts and circumstances of the particular case and carefully based our holding on those specific facts.

B

The State properly recognizes that the reasonableness of a warrantless search under the exigency exception to the warrant requirement must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances. Brief for Petitioner 28–29. But the State nevertheless seeks a per se rule for blood testing in drunk-driving cases. The State contends that whenever an officer has probable cause to believe an individual has been driving under the influence of alcohol, exigent circumstances will necessarily exist because BAC evidence is inherently evanescent. As a result, the State claims that so long as the officer has probable cause and the blood test is conducted in a reasonable manner, it is categorically reasonable for law enforcement to obtain the blood sample without a warrant. It is true that as a result of the human body’s natural metabolic processes, the alcohol level in a person’s blood begins to dissipate once the alcohol is fully absorbed and continues to decline until the alcohol is eliminated. See Skinner, 489 U. S., at 623; Schmerber, 384 U. S., at 770– [*9] 771. Testimony before the trial court in this case indicated that the percentage of alcohol in an individual’s blood typically decreases by approximately 0.015 percent to 0.02 percent per hour once the alcohol has been fully absorbed. App. 47. More precise calculations of the rate at which alcohol dissipates depend on various individual characteristics (such as weight, gender, and alcohol tolerance) and the circumstances in which the alcohol was consumed. See Stripp, Forensic and Clinical Issues in Alcohol Analysis, in Forensic Chemistry Handbook 437–441 (L. Kobilinsky ed. 2012). Regardless of the exact elimination rate, it is sufficient for our purposes to note that because an individual’s alcohol level gradually declines soon after he stops drinking, a significant delay in testing will negatively affect the probative value of the results. This fact was essential to our holding in Schmerber, as we recognized that, under the circumstances, further delay in order to secure a warrant after the time spent investigating the scene of the accident and transporting the injured suspect to the hospital to receive treatment would have threatened the destruction of evidence. 384 U. S., at 770–771.

But it does not follow that we should depart from careful case-by-case assessment of exigency and adopt the categorical rule proposed by the State and its amici. In those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456 (1948) (“We cannot . . . excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made [the search] imperative”). We do not doubt that some circumstances will make obtaining a warrant impractical such that the dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream will support an exigency justifying a properly [*10] conducted warrantless blood test. That, however, is a reason to decide each case on its facts, as we did in Schmerber, not to accept the “considerable overgeneralization” that a per se rule would reflect. Richards, 520 U. S., at 393.

The context of blood testing is different in critical respects from other destruction-of-evidence cases in which the police are truly confronted with a “‘now or never’” situation. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U. S. 496, 505 (1973). In contrast to, for example, circumstances in which the suspect has control over easily disposable evidence, see Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U. S. 103, 116, n. 6 (2006); Cupp, 412 U. S., at 296, BAC evidence from a drunk driving suspect naturally dissipates over time in a gradual and relatively predictable manner. Moreover, because a police officer must typically transport a drunk-driving suspect to a medical facility and obtain the assistance of someone with appropriate medical training before conducting a blood test, some delay between the time of the arrest or accident and the time of the test is inevitable regardless of whether police officers are required to obtain a warrant. See State v. Shriner, 751 N. W. 2d 538, 554 (Minn. 2008) (Meyer, J., dissenting). This reality undermines the force of the State’s contention, endorsed by the dissent, see post, at 3 (opinion of THOMAS, J.), that we should recognize a categorical exception to the warrant requirement because BAC evidence “is actively being destroyed with every minute that passes.” Brief for Petitioner 27. Consider, for example, a situation in which the warrant process will not significantly increase the delay before the blood test is conducted because an officer can take steps to secure a warrant while the suspect is being transported to a medical facility by another officer. In such a circumstance, there would be no plausible justification for an exception to the warrant requirement.

The State’s proposed per se rule also fails to account for [*11] advances in the 47 years since Schmerber was decided that allow for the more expeditious processing of warrant applications, particularly in contexts like drunk-driving investigations where the evidence offered to establish probable cause is simple. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended in 1977 to permit federal magistrate judges to issue a warrant based on sworn testimony communicated by telephone. See 91 Stat. 319. As amended, the law now allows a federal magistrate judge to consider “information communicated by telephone or other reliable electronic means.” Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 4.1. States have also innovated. Well over a majority of States allow police officers or prosecutors to apply for search warrants remotely through various means, including telephonic or radio communication, electronic communication such as e-mail, and video conferencing.

Schmerber is deprecated by McNeely and technology.

Clearly noted is,

In those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so.

And,

The State’s proposed per se rule also fails to account for [*11] advances in the 47 years since Schmerber was decided that allow for the more expeditious processing of warrant applications, particularly in contexts like drunk-driving investigations where the evidence offered to establish probable cause is simple.

[nc] In the instant case there was time to get a warrant. The detective did not even try.

The trucker was transported first by ambulance, then by air ambulance from Logan to SLC's university hospital.

That had to take at least 2 hours. And no one tried to get a warrant, just to get the blood by intimidation.

Recall that Rotten Cop said on video, "they don't have PC (probable cause)". I'd like to know if they tried for a warrant with a judge and got turned down or if they knew they'd get shot down and just tried to intimidate the nurse instead.

Maybe it's time to take a momemt's thought for one of the forgotten victims in this misadventure. Ten bucks is not a lot of money:

www.gofundme.com/BillGray

You have admitted there is no claimed exception of exigent circumstances.

Correct. But the court ruled that, "One recognized exception "applies when '''the exigencies of the situation" ..."

Gosh. That implies there are others, doesn't it? Otherwise the court would have ruled, "The only recognized exception "applies when '''the exigencies of the situation" ..."

But they didn't. You're acting as though they did. Tell me who's "clueless".

That had to take at least 2 hours.

And all that time the alcohol (if any) is being absorbed into the body. You're making a case for exigent circumstances.

"And no one tried to get a warrant"

Could be that the decision to draw blood hadn't been made yet. When the decision was made (for whatever reason) they were running out of time.

Missouri v. McNeely, S. Ct. 11-1425, 569 U.S. ____ (17 Apr 2013)

What did the decision say about a warrantless blood draw from a dead person who had previously given his implied consent? What did it say about a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious person who had previously given his implied consent?

And all that time the alcohol (if any) is being absorbed into the body. You're making a case for exigent circumstances.

It just as easily makes the case that his BAC would be so low after several hours that it would be pointless to test it, from the standpoint of getting a conviction on DUI.

Personally, I think they were playing the odds, hoping he was on some medication or had a medical condition that they could argue left him impaired to some extent.

It just as easily makes the case that his BAC would be so low after several hours that it would be pointless to test it, from the standpoint of getting a conviction on DUI.

Possibly. But he may have started with a high BAC. Doesn't hurt to check.

"Personally, I think they were playing the odds, hoping he was on some medication or had a medical condition that they could argue left him impaired to some extent."

I have no idea if they were trying to help him, harm him or simply following police department procedure in traffic accidents involving a fatality. Moot point. If, as you say, the blood draw was unconstitutional, it would never be admitted as evidence. Right?

Tell me who's "clueless".

You are so clueless, you don't know you are clueless.

What did it say about a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious person who had previously given his implied consent?

You need a search warrant or exigent circumstances to puncture the skin and draw blood for evidentiary purposes. Read McNeely until the 4th Amendment sinks in.

I think we may as well wait to see what the FBI and SLCPD investigations turn up.

In case you missed it, Detective Jeff Payne was fired from his job as a paramedic, he was placed on administrative leave, and a criminal investigation was opened at the request of the DA.

SLC cop who threatened to ‘take good patients elsewhere’ before arresting Utah nurse gets fired from his paramedic job

By Luke Ramseth
6 days ago [nc - 6 Sep]

[excerpt]

Salt Lake City police Detective Jeff Payne has been fired from his part-time paramedic job as the fallout continues from his arrest of a University Hospital nurse in July.

[...]

“Although Jeff was not working for Gold Cross Ambulance at the time of the incident, we take his inappropriate remarks regarding patient transports seriously,” according to a Tuesday company statement about the termination.

Meanwhile, Payne has been placed on administrative leave by the Salt Lake Police Department, pending an internal investigation and another probe by the city’s civilian review board. Also, Salt Lake County’s Unified Police Department has opened a criminal investigation at the request of Salt Lake County District Attorney Sim Gill.

Detective Jeff Payne was fired from his job as a paramedic

Separate issue. He threatened to take all of his indigent patients to that hospital. Not a smart move on his part, but it had ZERO to do with what happened at the hospital.

"he was placed on administrative leave"

He was placed on administrative leave with pay which is SOP in cases like these. And you f**king know that.

"and a criminal investigation was opened at the request of the DA."

Only because of public sympathy and pressure due to misinformation from the MSM. The DA has no case. When the truth emerges, he'll join Mike Nifong if he pursues it.

You need a search warrant or exigent circumstances to puncture the skin and draw blood for evidentiary purposes.

Even on a dead person?

and a criminal investigation was opened at the request of the DA."

Only because of public sympathy and pressure due to misinformation from the MSM. The DA has no case.

Good luck with your delusions.

Correct. But the court ruled that, "One recognized exception "applies when '''the exigencies of the situation" ..."

You do realize that your quote appears nowhere in the opinion of the court and does not constitute a ruling of the court on anything?

All you have proved is that you do not know how to read a court opinion.

Even on a dead person?

The subject of the instant case was not dead.

McNeely struck down warrantless blood draws in all 50 states except under exigent circumstances.

Here, John Giofreddi, a DWI attorney at the Dallas Bar Association website explains how McNeely "gutted the Texas mandatory blood statute."

http://www.dallasbar.org/book-page/dwi-arrests-when-can-police-take-your-blood-against-your-will

Dallas Bar Association

DWI Arrests: When Can the Police Take Your Blood Against Your Will?

Mon, 04/27/2015 - 13:39 -- jsmith

by John Gioffredi

[excerpt]

The mandatory blood draw statute has since been amended to require a mandatory breath or blood test of the suspect whenever the officer reasonably believes that as a direct result of a DWI accident, a person has died or will die; an individual other than the suspect has suffered serious bodily injury; or an individual other than the suspect has suffered bodily injury and been transported to a hospital or other medical facility for medical treatment. The statute also requires a mandatory breath or blood test if, at the time of the arrest, the officer possesses or receives reliable information from a credible source that the person has been previously convicted of or placed on community supervision for DWI with Child Passenger, Intoxication Assault, Intoxication Manslaughter or any two previous DWI cases. So basically, the mandatory blood statute as it is currently worded requires a breath or blood specimen on any DWI which is a felony, or any person who has previously been convicted of a felony DWI or related charges of intoxication assault or intoxication manslaughter.

However, the Texas mandatory blood draw statute has been largely gutted as the result of two recent landmark cases. In April 2013 the U.S. Supreme Court held in Missouri v. McNeely (133 S.Ct. 1552) that when officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before obtaining a DWI blood sample without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Constitution mandates that they do so. On November 26, 2014, in a 5 to 4 decision, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals followed suit in State v. Villarreal (No. PD-0306-14) holding that “a nonconsensual search of a DWI suspect’s blood conducted pursuant to the mandatory blood draw and implied consent provisions in the Transportation Code, when undertaken in the absence of a warrant or any applicable exception to the warrant requirement, violates the Fourth Amendment.”

So as of now, in March of 2015, for the results of a DWI blood test to be admissible, the prosecution would have the burden of showing that the suspect consented to the blood draw, that a warrant for the blood was legally obtained, or that obtaining a warrant under the circumstances would have been unreasonably burdensome due to factors specific to that particular arrest. Circumstances that might excuse a non-consensual warrantless blood draw might include the non-availability of a magistrate to sign the search warrant or an emergency medical situation for someone injured in a DWI accident, if no other officers were available to tend to such matters.

The subject of the instant case was not dead.

I think they might run afoul of the courts even with a dead person.

There is always their estate to consider and family who might not want the body touched for any reason.

Why not just go to a judge and get a warrant? In the case of a dead person, that blood will keep for hours and the BAC or drugs in their system would not be metabolized out.

I think they might run afoul of the courts even with a dead person.

If they are not a coroner.

You do realize that your quote appears nowhere in the opinion of the court and does not constitute a ruling of the court on anything?

Sure it does.

"As noted, the warrant requirement is subject to exceptions. “One well-recognized exception,” and the one at issue in this case, “applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/569/11-1425/opinion3.html

What this shows is that you are clueless.

The subject of the instant case was not dead.

So is there an exception for a dead person or not? We don't know. The court didn't say. Meaning there could be other exceptions.

My point is, exigent circumstances isn't the only exception. The court said is was one exception.

I think they might run afoul of the courts even with a dead person.

And I think they won't.

I have no idea who he is or if he knows what he is talking about (his Twitter profile sez: "MA environment/energy litigator. Trials, appeals, plaintiff, defense, you name it."). But it would be interesting to know if Utah Highway Patrol does have an express policy against high-speed pursuits like the one in which the perp crashed into the trucker.

Lots of PDs do have such a policy, especially in metro areas. I'm not sure if I've ever heard of a state's highway patrol having such a policy.

I have no idea who he is or if he knows what he is talking about

He doesn't. He's an asshole.

Maybe nolu can explain to you how this thing called Supreme Court precedents works. LOL

The Supreme Court cited one exception to a warrantless blood draw -- exigent circumstances. They did not say that was the only exception, meaning there are more. Do you know them all?

Is one of them a blood draw on a dead person with implied consent? Is one of them a blood draw on an unconscious person with implied consent?

Do you know or would you be guessing?

Irony.

Oh, I didn't mean to imply that you were an asshole for posting the shittiest cite I have ever come across.

The Supreme Court cited one exception to a warrantless blood draw -- exigent circumstances. They did not say that was the only exception, meaning there are more. Do you know them all?

Generally, when they cite exceptions, they'll cite all that are applicable. Since "exigent circumstances" is itself quite vague, that would their one exception, even if it might cover a dozen or more actual instances of exigency.

These guys in robes are professional word choppers. You can assume that they say what they mean, no more or less. If we don't understand them, it's probably our fault that we don't or we are not conversant with the entire area of law about which they are issuing a ruling.

Generally, when they cite exceptions, they'll cite all that are applicable.

They rule as narrowly as possible. The case before them involved exigent circumstances. So they ruled on that, clarifying the way that exception must be be be used.

That's it. They said nothing about other exceptions other than they exist.

They rule as narrowly as possible.

Not always. When it suits them, they do. It's a technical point.

They said nothing about other exceptions other than they exist.

And they would all be "exigent" since they would be in cases lacking a warrant.

I think it wouldn't matter what the Court ruled, you'd be looking for a way out of recognizing it, like a trapped rat.