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TRUMP PARDONS ARPAIO!

Bravo!

In pardoning Arpaio, Trump has given a free pass to an unrepentant and habitual abuser of power, a man with insufficient regard for the Constitution he swore to uphold or the separation of powers it enshrines. The move should come as no surprise. The two are kindred spirits.

Jeff Sessions Should Be Screaming Bloody Murder About Joe Arpaio Pardon

Arpaio is not facing six months behind bars for "enforcing the law" or "working to keep people safe," any more than drug dealers are sentenced to prison for "making people happy." Arpaio disregarded a judge's order and was convicted of felony contempt of court. He did the crime, by his own logic and that of the U.S. Attorney General, and he should now do some time.

Trump pardons Arpaio

Good!

So he’s angered the transgenders tonight and now the illegal aliens!!

He’s making lots of friends!!!

Yeah,like they were ever his friends to start with.

This was an excellent thing for him to do.

Name ONE opponent he had for the alleged Republican Primary who would have had the stones to do this.

TRUMP PARDONS ARPAIO!

Bravo!

Couldn't agree more.

Arpaio disregarded a judge's order and was convicted of felony contempt of court. He did the crime, by his own logic and that of the U.S. Attorney General, and he should now do some time.

Anybody that ISN'T in contempt if the judge that issued that order is a traitor and a scumbag.

If the title fits,wear it.

Think of it as jury nullification. Do that and get a box of tissues. Trump just nullified a law he disagreed with. You should be cheering. But you're dumb.

Jury nulliication only applies to laws HE disagrees with.

Jury nulliication only applies to laws HE disagrees with.

Jury nullification applies to laws THE JURY disagrees with and it needs to be wielded a WHOLE LOT MORE on a daily basis in this law-encrusted nation.

Fvck Big Stupid Government. Too many laws to waste our lives buying lobbyists to repeal, so start ignoring them by the thousands, join FIJA, spread the word and nullify them.

Jury nullification applies to laws the jury disagrees with and it needs to be wielded a WHOLE LOT MORE on a daily basis in this law-encrusted nation.

That's one way. Another would be to repeal bad laws.

That's one way. Another would be to repeal bad laws.

Like I said - we don't have our lives' time and money to waste on lobbyists. And there's zero evidence the assholes in Congress care about liberty and justice anymore.
So laugh at and ignore them; it'll crumble.

You keep peeing on that mountain, waiting to wear it away. We're going around it.

Thanks for the link. I downloaded: http://www.fija.org/docs/JG_Jurors_Handbook.pdf; it is a good discussion.

FIJA's been around a long time and they know what they're doing.

As more and more Americans get fed up with Big Stupid Government's bullshit, I'm betting you'll see more and more juries telling BSG to shove it right up their baracks.

I'm betting you'll see more and more juries telling BSG

Well, that means if the accused truly gets a jury of his peers, he can never be convicted, right?

No matter the crime -- say, rape -- fill the jury with rapists and he walks. Child molestation? Boom! Grand theft auto? Ta-ta! Embezzlement? Goodbye.

None of those jurists believe the law for their crime is fair and just. But you're saying they should vote their conscience rather than the rule of law set by society.

You keep peeing on that mountain, waiting to wear it away. We're going around it.

And when those you disagree with do the same, then what?

No matter the crime -- say, rape -- fill the jury with rapists and he walks. Child molestation? Boom! Grand theft auto? Ta-ta! Embezzlement? Goodbye.

Man, so often you're just as dumb as a democRat.

Ever hear of voir dire? No, I didn't think so.

And when those you disagree with do the same, then what?

Then stupid laws, like Prohibition, begin to disappear.

Do you really think bought-and-paid-for politicians are going to repeal laws they were paid to enact? Or their replacements?

You usually complain about stuff like that hypocrite.

What do you expect? Decktard is an anarchist shitbag who uses you to fulfill his pro drug agenda.

It's why I quit posting.

Hope all is well with you and family.

GI

[Deckard] Arpaio disregarded a judge's order and was convicted of felony contempt of court.

Judge G. Murray Snow referred Joe Arpaio to Judge Susan Bolton where he faced a misdemeanor six months maximum incarceration. Judge Bolton held a bench trial (without jury) over the objection of Joe Arpaio. Arpaio appealed the holding of a bench trial to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Arpaio appeal was pending at the time of the Trump pardon. His sentencing had been set for October 5th.

Arpaio Petition to SCOTUS of May 24, 2017

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Did the district court err in denying Petitioner’s request for a jury trial?

Is Petitioner entitled to mandamus relief on his claim that the District Court wrongly deprived him of the right to a jury trial?

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[A K A Stone #7] Think of it as jury nullification.

Perhaps you may think of it as judge nullification. The judge imposed a bench trial with no jury for a misdemeanor charge.

[A K A Stone] So you must think it was ok to deny Sheriff Joe a trial by jury.

That is an interesting legal question. Arpaio's petition to SCOTUS was still pending when the Presidential Pardon was given, so a judicial resolution at SCOTUS is unlikely.

It appears that the prosecutors intentionally limited their prosecution to entail a maximum penalty of 6 months and $500, the maximum possible without automatically invoking the right to a jury trial for criminal contempt.

However, Arpaio notes in his petition to SCOTUS that, "18 U.S.C.A. § 3691 provides that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial if his criminal contempt, as charged, constitutes a separate crime." And he further asserted, "The contempt charged in this case constitutes a criminal offense under 18 U.S.C.A. § 242 ('Deprivation of Civil Rights'), and so Defendant is entitled to a trial by jury."

A jury trial is not required in all trials, but may have been in this trial. This District Court ruled to grant a government request to hold a bench trial over defense objection. The 9th Circuit rejected a petition by Arpaio without significant comment.

District Court ORDER Granting Government Request for Bench Trial: [quoted in full at end]

[Excerpt]

(Def.'s Mot. at Defendant argues that the Court should grant a jury trial because "the objec­tives and motives of Judge Snow" will be called into question and "a trial by jury avoids any appearance of bias or impropriety" on the part of any of the judges in the District of Arizona. (Id. at 2-3.) A defendant charged with criminal contempt does not have a constitutional right to a jury trial where the conviction can result in a sentence of imprisonment not longer than six months. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 475-76 (1975); United States v. Rylander, 714 F.2d 996, 1005 (9th Cir. 1983).

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/422/454/case.html

Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 475-76 (1975)

At 474:

In this case, involving the 1948 revision of the Criminal Code, the House and Senate Reports caution repeatedly against reading substantive changes into the revision, and the Reviser's Note to § 3692 gives absolutely no indication that a substantive change in the law was contemplated. In these circumstances, our cases and the canon of statutory construction which Congress expected would be applied to the revisions of both the Criminal and Judicial Codes require us to conclude, along with all the lower federal courts having considered this question since 1948, save one, that § 3692 does not provide for trial by jury in contempt proceedings brought to enforce an injunction issued at the behest of the Board in a labor dispute arising under the Labor Management Relations Act.

http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/714/996/198907/

United States v. Rylander, 714 F.2d 996, 1005 (9th Cir. 1983)

At 1005:

Finally, Rylander argues that he had a constitutional right to a jury trial which was abridged in the district court.

There is a sixth amendment right to a trial by jury in serious, but not petty, criminal contempt cases. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198, 88 S. Ct. 1477, 1480, 20 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1968). Whether a criminal contempt is serious or petty is determined by the severity of the penalty authorized. Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149, 89 S. Ct. 1503, 1505, 23 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1969). If the contempt is charged under a statute that authorizes a maximum penalty greater than $500 or six months' imprisonment, there is a right to a jury trial regardless of the penalty actually imposed. Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 476-77, 95 S. Ct. 2178, 2190-91, 45 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1975). Absent a specific statutory authorization of a maximum penalty, the severity of the penalty actually imposed determines whether the contempt was serious or petty. Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. at 149, 89 S. Ct. at 1505. Where no maximum penalty is specified, a contemnor may be sentenced to up to six months' imprisonment and fined as much as $500 without a jury trial. Id. at 150, 89 S. Ct. at 1506; United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276, 280 (9th Cir. 1977).

The two contempt charges in this case were tried jointly. The contempt charge for failing to produce the summoned documents arose from Rylander's refusal to comply with a summons issued pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7602. Punishment for disobedience to a section 7602 summons is specifically controlled by 26 U.S.C. §§ 7604(b) and 7210, which authorize a maximum penalty of $1,000 or one year of imprisonment or both. Thus, any criminal contempt charged as a result of disobedience to a section 7602 summons is a serious offense and carries with it the right to a jury trial. Rylander's request for a jury trial therefore should have been granted.

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Arpaio petitioned the 9th Circuit court. The 9th Circuit ORDER stated, "Petitioner has not demonstrated that this case warrants the intervention of this court by means of the extradordinary remedy of mandamus. Accordingly, the petition is denied." That is the full and complete discussion of the issue in the 9th Circuit ORDER.

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Arpaio appealed to SCOTUS but Presidential pardon has been given.

Arpaio Petition to SCOTUS of May 24, 2017 [Excerpt - footnotes omitted]

At 7-10:

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Petitioner is entitled to a jury trial under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3691, because Defendant is charged with criminal contempt for willfully arresting persons without cause. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3691 provides that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial if his criminal contempt, as charged, constitutes a separate crime. Arresting persons without cause and under color of state law is a crime under 18 U.S.C.A. § 242. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to a trial by jury. The wrongful deprivation of a jury trial is traditionally reviewable by mandamus. But even if it were not, the Defendant’s right here is so clear, that there is nothing gained by reserving this issue for a direct appeal. Defendant will suffer a wrongful trial and could suffer a wrongful sentence. If Defendant, who is eighty-four years old, dies before a reversal on direct appeal, then the sentence will stand. Judicial economy also counsels in favor of review by mandamus, since ordering a jury trial in the first instance is less “trying” on the court than conducting a wrongful bench trial and second retrial by jury. Finally, this case is of extraordinary public interest, which uniquely counsels in favor of issuing mandamus to direct a trial by jury. This is a prosecution for criminal contempt that was initiated by the district court against a democratically-elected Sheriff. If mandamus does not issue, then the district court will be sitting in judgment of its own prosecution of the defendant, an elected officer in a “competing” branch of government. This already subjects any verdict to a certain degree of public suspicion, other than raising the specter of something undemocratic. But if the verdict is reversed on direct appeal (for failure to grant a jury trial), then it strongly signals to the public that the district court lacked independence or fealty to our democratic system. By issuing mandamus now, the Court avoids such public scrutiny and disapproval.

The issue of whether mandamus must issue to correct the wrongful deprivation of a jury trial also implicates a long-unresolved circuit split, which Justice Byron White identified in his dissent to Kamen v. Nordberg, 485 U.S. 939 (1988).

Because Petitioner’s trial is set for June 26th, 2017, Petitioner files a Motion for Expedited Consideration herewith, and requests that the Court consider this Petition at its conference on June 15th. Each of the foregoing points is addressed in more detail below.

I. Defendant is entitled to a jury trial

18 U.S.C.A. § 3691 provides that the defendant is entitled to a jury in any criminal contempt case where the “contempt charged…also constitutes a criminal offense under any Act of Congress, or under the laws of any state in which it was done or omitted.” The contempt charged in this case constitutes a criminal offense under 18 U.S.C.A. § 242 (“Deprivation of Civil Rights”), and so Defendant is entitled to a trial by jury.⁹

Defendant is charged with “stop[ping] and detain[ing] persons based on factors including their race, and frequently arrest[ing] and deliver[ ing] such persons to ICE when there were no state charges to bring against them.”¹⁰ This constitutes a criminal offense under 18 U.S.C.A. § 242, which “authorizes the punishment of two different offenses. The one is willfully subjecting any [person, under color of law] to the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution; the other is willfully subjecting any [person, under color of law] to different punishments on account of his color or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens.” United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 327 (1941) (describing section 20 of former 18 U.S.C.A. § 52, now 18 U.S.C. § 242).¹¹ A state enforcement officer who, under color of state law, willfully, without cause, arrests or imprisons a person or injures one who is legally free, commits an offense under 18 U.S.C.A. § 242. This undisputed conclusion is amply supported by the decisions of this Court, in cases such as Ex parte State of Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. at 299; Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); and Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).

The contempt that was charged in this case constitutes the same offense described above. Petitioner, a county Sheriff, was charged with willfully detaining and arresting persons without state charges, “based on factors including their race.” This is clearly the same as “willfully subjecting any [person, under color of law] to the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution,” or “willfully subjecting any [person, under color of law] to different punishments on account of his color or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens.” Because the contempt with which Petitioner was charged also constitutes a criminal offense, Petitioner is entitled to a trial by jury as a matter of law.

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Appendix B of Arpaio Petition to SCOTUS of 24 May 2017

Copy of District Court ORDER Granting Government Request for Bench Trial

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APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, Plaintiff, v.
Joseph M. Arpaio, Defendant.
No. CR-16-01012-001-PHX-SRB

ORDER

At issue are the Government's Brief in Sup­port of Request for Bench Trial ("Gov.'s Mot.") (Doc. 61) and Defendant's Cross-Motion Requesting Jury Trial ("Def.'s Mot.") (Doc. 62).

I. BACKGROUND

This case comes to the Court by way of a crim­inal contempt referral from Judge Snow. (Doc. 1, Order Re Criminal Contempt.) On October 11, 2016, the Court held a Status Conference where the Gov­ernment asked the Court to limit Defendant's poten­tial penalty to no more than six months in prison and requested a bench trial. (Doc. 27, Rep.'s Tr. of Pro­ceedings Status Conference 9:5-16.) Defendant indicated that he wanted time to research the ques­

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tion of whether he was entitled to a jury trial. (Id. 15:19-16:2.) The Court declined to resolve the issue at the Status Conference. (Id. 38:19-39:15.) On October 25, 2016 the Court issued an Order to Show Cause setting forth the essential facts constituting the charged criminal contempt. (Doc. 36.) The Gov­ernment submitted its Brief in Support of Request for Bench Trial on December 15, 2016, Defendant submitted a Cross-Motion Requesting Jury Trial on December 27, 2016, and briefing concluded on Janu­ary 9, 2017. (See Docs. 61, 62, 63, 66, 69.) The Court heard argument on January 25, 2017. (See Doc. 71, Minute Entry.) The Court now rules on the Govern­ment's Request for Bench Trial and Defendant's Cross-Motion Requesting Jury Trial.

II. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS

The Government argues that there is no con­stitutional right to a jury trial for criminal contempt charges if the possible sentence of imprisonment is no greater than six months. (Gov.'s Mot. at 1.) De­fendant concedes that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial when the maximum sentence of im­prisonment cannot exceed six months, but argues that the Court should, in its discretion, grant a jury

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trial. (Def.'s Mot. at Defendant argues that the Court should grant a jury trial because "the objec­tives and motives of Judge Snow" will be called into question and "a trial by jury avoids any appearance of bias or impropriety" on the part of any of the judges in the District of Arizona. (Id. at 2-3.) A defendant charged with criminal contempt does not have a constitutional right to a jury trial where the conviction can result in a sentence of imprisonment not longer than six months. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 475-76 (1975); United States v. Rylander, 714 F.2d 996, 1005 (9th Cir. 1983).

At the January 25, 2017 argument, Defendant, through his counsel, stated "Judge, if the question you posed to me was if it goes jury, all bets are off, if it goes court, it's capped, I would vote court." (Doc. 74, Rep.'s Tr. of Proceedings Pretrial Conference 19:19-21.) The case law is clear, if the Court limits Defendant's potential sentence to six months or less, there is no right to a jury trial. See Muniz, 422 U.S. at 475-76. Furthermore, the Court has found no precedent for granting a jury trial for a charge of

¹ Defendant also argues that a jury trial is statutori-ly required under 18 U.S.C. § 3691. (Doc. 69, Def. Joseph M. Arpaio's Supp. to Reply to Gov. Resp. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot.) Section 3691, however, confers a statutory right when the contumacious conduct also constitutes a separate criminal offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3691. As the Court explained in its December 13, 2016 Order, Defendant's conduct arising out of his disobedience of Judge Snow's preliminary injunction does not constitute a separate criminal offense, and therefore, § 3691 does not apply. (See Doc. 60, Dec.13, 2016 Order at 2-3.)

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criminal contempt when the possible sentence was limited to a maximum of six months in prison. See e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 496 (1974) ("[A] State may choose to try any contempt without a jury if it determines not to impose a sentence longer than six months"); United States v. Aldridge, 995 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1993) (Table) (concluding that Defendant had no right to a jury trial because the district court did not sentence him to more than six months' im­prisonment or fine him more than $500); United States v. Berry, 232 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2000) (Table) (concluding that when the trial court stipulates that it will not impose a sentence longer than six months, Defendant was not entitled to a jury trial).

The Court finds that this case is appropriate for a bench trial. This case focuses on the application of facts to the law to determine if Defendant inten­tionally violated a court order. It does not necessitate an inquiry into the "'motives of the referring judge". At oral argument, Defendant further explained that he thought there was "anger" on the referring judge's part in making the referral. (Id. at 17:2-7.) As the Court pointed out at oral argument, the referring judge's motives are not relevant in determining if Defendant's violations were in fact willful. (Id. at 17:11-16.) While Defendant argues that a jury trial will prevent any appearance of impropriety, this Court does not believe there is any such appearance. Therefore, the Court grants Government's Request for a Bench Trial and denies Defendant's Cross-Motion Requesting Jury Trial.

IT IS ORDERED granting the Government's Brief in Support of Request for Bench Trial (Doc. 61).

Eat a buffet of dicks asshole.