"I also have a problem with people going to jail for supposed crimes in which there is no victim."

Yeah. I was wondering when you'd get around to disclosing your true intention.

You are so obsessed with our drug laws that it blinds you to all the negative consequences of what you're proposing. Either that or you simply don't care about the negative consequences as long as your precious recreational drugs are legal.

The people don't want legal recreational drugs so you figure you can do an "end around" by using nullification in the courts, hoping to send a message to lawmakers. What a cowardly approach. If the drug laws are bad, repeal them. Don't pervert and corrupt our justice system for this one issue.

And I have a problem with the Land of the Free having the highest per capita incarceration rate in the world.

Disregard the black and Hispanic prisoners and our per capita incarceration rate is no different than any other industrialized nation.

There's nothing wrong with our laws. Our problem is that a disproportionate number of minorities violate them.

Oh, wait! Are you suggesting that we should have a different set of laws for minorities? Was that what you were leading up to?

Easy. It's not fair to inform the juror of only one option -- nullification acquittal. The juror has another -- nullification conviction -- and he should be informed of that option at the same time.

You completely dodged my point. "Fair" to whom? It's not unfair to a jurist to give him any particular set of instructions, regardless of whether it includes or does not include anything about nullification. You are just struggling to invent anything you can against nullification.

How does jury nullification -- which violates the rule of law -- serve society? An otherwise guilty man goes free.

Whether the man is truly guilty or not is determined by the jury. If the jury chooses to acquit due to nullification, then the jury honestly feels that the man was not deserving of a guilty verdict. And if a jury feels that way after all considerations in a trial environment, then who are you as an outsider to tell them they ruled wrongly? If you truly feel that juries should simply rubber stamp popular opinion in a case, then you should probably favor replacing juries with computers.

As for nullification violating the rule of law. I've repeatedly stated it was a final test of criminal law, and a valid one at that, in which case it's no more a violation of law than a presidential veto is of a law passed by Congress, and in fact, far more limited, of course.

Fine. Let's accept that argument. If we are to accept nullification acquittal, then why not nullifiction conviction?

You refer not to what juries can do, as obviously juries are free to do both right now. You are instead referring to instructions given to juries. And the answer is because the benefit of a doubt should always go to the defendant, not the prosecution, and instructing juries that they may convict absent any violation of the law would carve away at that benefit of a doubt. So no, it shouldn't be done for that reason.

If the law, as written, can be considered unfair by the jury because it is too harsh, can't the law be considered unfair by the jury because it is too lenient?

They can, obviously, and may if they feel a true thug would walk free on a mere technicality.

Why should a jury be forced to release a career criminal because of some loophole or minor technicality?

Forced? You're losing this debate with that question. Juries are never forced to rule one way or the other. (The William Tell trial being one exception).

"It's not unfair to a jurist to give him any particular set of instructions, regardless of whether it includes or does not include anything about nullification."

Yes, but you're missing my point. I'm saying IF the jury is informed about nullification acquittal then they should be informed about nullification conviction at the same time. Isn't presenting both sides "fair"?

I'm not in favor of nullification of any kind. I'm merely suggesting that any information or instructions to the jury be complete, balanced, and fair.

The rule of law is to serve and protect society, not the defendant. How does jury nullification -- which violates the rule of law -- serve society?

You are a complete idiot. Go live in mainland China.

"If the jury chooses to acquit due to nullification, then the jury honestly feels that the man was not deserving of a guilty verdict."

He did violate the law, making him a criminal. Even though the jury voted not guilty for other reasons, they still let a criminal go free to roam among the rest of society.

"If you truly feel that juries should simply rubber stamp popular opinion in a case, then you should probably favor replacing juries with computers."

That's a cheap shot. I never said nor implied that. I believe the jury's decision should be guided by the rule of law.

" As for nullification violating the rule of law. I've repeatedly stated it was a final test of criminal law, and a valid one at that"

Fine. Then, as part of the final test of criminal law, also allow for nullification conviction.

You are so obsessed with our drug laws that it blinds you to all the negative consequences of what you're proposing. Either that or you simply don't care about the negative consequences as long as your precious recreational drugs are legal.

Apart from the occasional glass of wine, I don't do drugs. I don't smoke anything either. I'm sure a lot of people posting on this site, perhaps including you, are more into drugs than I am.

The people don't want legal recreational drugs so you figure you can do an "end around" by using nullification in the courts, hoping to send a message to lawmakers. What a cowardly approach. If the drug laws are bad, repeal them. Don't pervert and corrupt our justice system for this one issue.

You want to believe my position is all about drugs. It's not. I do believe the USA is overly bureaucratic (clearly it is) to the point where the founding principles of the country have been long since compromised, and I do see nullification as one means of many to make the USA a better place. I do think marijuana should be legal. I am less sure about what the legal status should be for harder drugs.

I do not think that 535 legislators can reasonably represent the will of 300+ million people. I do favor a massive cut back of federal power, with some of that power restored to local government. I do think that the people of the US would be much better off if it was cut into about 6 smaller countries, so people in California don't have to put up with people from the southeast, and vice versa.

And I see nullification as a way of ensuring that laws passed by a tiny number of representatives meets the approval of the average commoners that have to live under such laws. I think of it as a form of veto power that can be held by the people, in whom all authority rightly rests as per the DoI:

That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed

Jury nullification is a means of ensuring that the governed do indeed lend consent regarding specific laws. It's a good and proper thing.

Oh, wait! Are you suggesting that we should have a different set of laws for minorities? Was that what you were leading up to?

You've entered lala land, and it's clear there is little reason to continue further dialog with you on this thread.

"You are instead referring to instructions given to juries."

Exactly. In the rare instance where instructions on nullification are given.

"And the answer is because the benefit of a doubt should always go to the defendant"

Well, that's an answer. Just not the right one. Benefit of a doubt has nothing to do with it. The jury knows he's guilty -- they just don't want to find him guilty. So they find some excuse to vote not guilty.

"Juries are never forced to rule one way or the other."

"Forced" in the sense that the judge instructs the jury to vote based on the law. If the defendant goes free because the search warrant was signed in blue ink -- and the law says it must be signed in black ink -- I think the jury should be allowed to ignore that.

He did violate the law, making him a criminal. Even though the jury voted not guilty for other reasons, they still let a criminal go free to roam among the rest of society.

He's not a criminal if he's found not guilty. Except perhaps in your head.

"You want to believe my position is all about drugs. It's not."

Ah! Then what "victimless crimes" were you referring to?

"He's not a criminal if he's found not guilty. Except perhaps in your head."

Not guilty is a legal term. It does not mean innocent.

"And I see nullification as a way of ensuring that laws passed by a tiny number of representatives meets the approval of the average commoners that have to live under such laws."

Yeah! Like in the 1800's when white juries used nullification to refuse to convict white men of murdering blacks. The good ol' days, right?

Screw the rule of law. We average commoners will convict who WE want to convict.

You are a complete idiot.

Don't call me an idiot when you're the one who can't comprehend what I'm saying.

The jury knows he's guilty -- they just don't want to find him guilty. So they find some excuse to vote not guilty.

-----------

It so happened that the man whose horse had been stolen had always made it a point to get the best of any person with whom he had any dealings. He had never tried to do anything good for anyone other than himself. Consequently, the man whose horse had been stolen didn’t have a single friend in the entire town. The case was tried and presented to the jury.

The US Constitution is designed to ensure individual rights unlike the perspective of YOUR AUTHORITARIAN COLLECTIVE RIGHTS BULLSHIT.

Thank you. Will that be on the test?

Exactly. In the rare instance where instructions on nullification are given.

About the only such instructions given to jurors by judges is that it is illegitimate to nullify any law, that the duty of the jury is to judge the defendant on the charges and evidence and only on the legal grounds explained by the judge.

I can't say I know of any case where any judge ever explained to a jury that they could nullify the law by exonerating a defendant, even if they were guilty. But there have been many cases where judges tried to intimidate juries or mislead them on this count. It's pretty routine for judges to do this, both state and federal.

Nothing makes judges and prosecutors quite as mad as a jury they suspect of nullification.

Maybe a little review of the origins of jury nullification is in order:

I'll ask again. Once the jury knows ALL their options, how do you think they'll vote?

Once the jury knows all their facts, they will vote with their conscience.

But of course that depends on how the prosecution wants to relay those facts to the jury.

If the jury does not have all the facts, because a corrupt prosecution team has opted to withhold pertinent information, then the jury has no options. It becomes a mistrial and possible collusion as well as misapplication of the law.

The only option that is left is for this entire mess to be reviewed under standard review by the appellate courts.

It would seem to allow for nullified outcomes by jurors, just no bribing or conspiring of jurors as a "rigged jury". So now I'm no longer sure what the exact legal definition of a rigged jury is.

Watch this movie. It's an excellent example of how the jury is manipulated by the prosecution and the lawyers involved. It's one of my favorites and explains how the real world works in our courtrooms. And from personal experience I have known of court clerks colluding with opposing counsel teams to have perfectly legitimate cases thrown out by tampering with witnesses and evidence.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Runaway_Jury

Usually I prefer documentaries or historical films to novels or based-on-a-real-story type movies.

Eh, it's a movie made from a Grisham novel about a widow suing over her husband dying from smoking. So they made it into an anti-gun movie instead.

No it's a movie that reveals tactics that lawyers and prosecution teams apply to obfuscate of matters in law. Jury nullification has become too broadened in applying court procedure that it should be a chapter all in its own on how to deceive and deprive the jury of facts and other tricks used to keep the jury in check all the while the prosecution is playing them all for suckers.

Usually I prefer documentaries or historical films to novels or based-on-a-real-story type movies.

Then I suggest a reader for you to get keen insight on how courts, judges and lawyers prepare you for the trial process to grooming your client. It's entitled, The First Trial by Steven H. Goldberg

Thank you. This is how I know I've won the argument.

That is why you were mentally incapable of responding to even one post.

Judges have the power to vacate jury convictions, but not jury acquittals. Correct me if I'm wrong.

They have the power to vacate both convictions and acquittals and enter a judgment NOV (non obstante veridictum - notwithstanding the verdict).

The problem is that if they do that to override an acquittal, they are very likely (though not absolutely certain) to be overridden on appeal, so they generally don't do it.

They have the power to vacate both convictions and acquittals

They do not have the power to over rule acquittals. That is ridiculous. That would be double jeopardy.

it's a movie that reveals tactics that lawyers and prosecution teams apply to obfuscate of matters in law. Jury nullification has become too broadened in applying court procedure that it should be a chapter all in its own on how to deceive and deprive the jury of facts and other tricks used to keep the jury in check all the while the prosecution is playing them all for suckers.

Yeah, but I still hate the movie for it's libtard gun grabber theme, and the dopey notion that it's the manufactures fault if you get harmed by their product.

Sue the spoon manufacturer for making Michael Moore a fat slob! /s

www.youtube.com/watch?v=6XO2b-45Wnw

They do not have the power to over rule acquittals. That is ridiculous. That would be double jeopardy.

You're right. This is a civil trial option only. In civil trials judges can overrule a jury finding for the defendant.

I suppose a nullified jury is not the same as a rigged jury, although I don't really see the difference in the outcome for an individual defendant.

They are not the same. In one case the jury has been corrupted, typically by a bribe of some sort. Said juror agrees to render a not guilty verdict regardless of the evidence and the law. The juror in question commits a criminal offense.

A juror practicing jury nullification takes the law from the judge, carefully applies it to the facts, determines the proper verdict, and further determines that rendering a verdict of guilty would result in an injustice. He votes his conscience. No crime is committed.

This does not affirm a right. Should the juror state his intent to vote based on nullification, a judge can properly remove him from the jury at ant point before the verdict is rendered, including during deliberations. His conscience prevents him from carrying out the oath he took, but he is not prosecuted criminally.

You don't know that. Jurors are not required to fill out a questionairre describing the reasons the voted the way they did.

As nolu chan pointed out, "... juries will acquit defendants who appear sympathetic, who are charged with violating an unpopular law, who the jurors speculate would otherwise be sentenced too severely, or who haven’t been proven guilty under standards for proof the jurors believe are required despite the judge’s instruction otherwise."

Jurors will do what jurors do, including when they feel a defendant is guilty according to the letter of the law, but that a verdict of guilty would result in an injustice that they are unable to reconcile with their personal conscience.

The judicial result is that shit happens.

Was OJ acquitted because the law against murder was unfair?

OJ was acquitted because the prosecutiion failed miserably to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that OJ committed the crime. Much prosecution evidence, and many witnesses, were destroyed on the stand.

What happened in the courtroom, and what was reported on the evening news and talk shows, frequently differed greatly.

They [nc- Judges] have the power to vacate both convictions and acquittals and enter a judgment NOV (non obstante veridictum - notwithstanding the verdict).

The Count has a point, albeit presented incompletely. A judge may render a Judgment as a Matter of Law [JMOL], a/k/a/ Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or judgment non obstante veredicto, or JNOV, in a civil case.

A judge has the power to set aside a guilty verdict by a jury in a criminal court. The judge's decision to set aside a guilty verdict is appealable. This is in Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

For criminal proceedings, see Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

He has no authority to set aside a jury verdict of acquittal in a criminal court which would federally be known as judgment of acquittal.

Rule 29. Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal

(a) Before Submission to the Jury. After the government closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The court may on its own consider whether the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. If the court denies a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the government's evidence, the defendant may offer evidence without having reserved the right to do so.

(b) Reserving Decision. The court may reserve decision on the motion, proceed with the trial (where the motion is made before the close of all the evidence), submit the case to the jury, and decide the motion either before the jury returns a verdict or after it returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict. If the court reserves decision, it must decide the motion on the basis of the evidence at the time the ruling was reserved.

(c) After Jury Verdict or Discharge.

(1) Time for a Motion. A defendant may move for a judgment of acquittal, or renew such a motion, within 14 days after a guilty verdict or after the court discharges the jury, whichever is later.

(2) Ruling on the Motion. If the jury has returned a guilty verdict, the court may set aside the verdict and enter an acquittal. If the jury has failed to return a verdict, the court may enter a judgment of acquittal.

(3) No Prior Motion Required. A defendant is not required to move for a judgment of acquittal before the court submits the case to the jury as a prerequisite for making such a motion after jury discharge.

(d) Conditional Ruling on a Motion for a New Trial.

(1) Motion for a New Trial. If the court enters a judgment of acquittal after a guilty verdict, the court must also conditionally determine whether any motion for a new trial should be granted if the judgment of acquittal is later vacated or reversed. The court must specify the reasons for that determination.

(2) Finality. The court's order conditionally granting a motion for a new trial does not affect the finality of the judgment of acquittal.

(3) Appeal.

(A) Grant of a Motion for a New Trial. If the court conditionally grants a motion for a new trial and an appellate court later reverses the judgment of acquittal, the trial court must proceed with the new trial unless the appellate court orders otherwise.

(B) Denial of a Motion for a New Trial. If the court conditionally denies a motion for a new trial, an appellee may assert that the denial was erroneous. If the appellate court later reverses the judgment of acquittal, the trial court must proceed as the appellate court directs.

Notes

(As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Pub. L. 99–646, §54(a), Nov. 10, 1986, 100 Stat. 3607; Apr. 29, 1994, eff. Dec. 1, 1994; Apr. 29, 2002, eff. Dec. 1, 2002; Apr. 25, 2005, eff. Dec. 1, 2005; Mar. 26, 2009, eff. Dec. 1, 2009.)

JMOL, Judgment as a Matter of Law

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judgment_notwithstanding_verdict

Judgment notwithstanding the verdict, also called judgment non obstante veredicto, or JNOV, is a type of judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) that is sometimes rendered at the conclusion of a jury trial. In U.S. federal civil court cases, the term has been replaced by the renewed judgment as a matter of law, which emphasizes its relationship to the judgment as a matter of law (formerly called a directed verdict).[1] In U.S. federal criminal cases, the term is "judgment of acquittal".[2]

JNOV is the practice in American courts whereby the presiding judge in a civil jury trial may overrule the decision of a jury and reverse or amend their verdict. In literal terms, the judge enters a verdict notwithstanding the jury findings. This intervention, often requested[citation needed] but rarely granted, permits the judge to exercise discretion to avoid extreme and unreasonable jury decisions.[3]

A judge is not allowed to enter a JNOV of "guilty" following a jury acquittal in United States criminal cases; such an action would violate a defendant's Fifth Amendment right not to be placed in double jeopardy and Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. If the judge grants a motion to set aside judgment after the jury convicts, however, this action may be reversed on appeal by the prosecution.

A JNOV is appropriate only if the judge determines that no reasonable jury could have reached the given verdict. For example, if a party enters no evidence on an essential element of their case, and the jury still finds in their favor, the court may rule that no reasonable jury would have disregarded the lack of evidence on that key point and reform the judgment.

Reversal of a jury's verdict by a judge occurs when the judge believes that there were insufficient facts on which to base the jury's verdict, or that the verdict did not correctly apply the law. This procedure is similar to a situation in which a judge orders a jury to arrive at a particular verdict, called a directed verdict. A judgment notwithstanding the verdict is occasionally made when a jury refuses to follow a judge's instruction to arrive at a certain verdict.[4]

This is a very rare case where a defendant was acquitted in criminal case and later reindicted and convicted for the same crime. It was a bench trial wherein the Chicago gangster bribed the Chicago judge.

http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/138/302/473725/

Aleman v Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County, 138 F3d 302 (7th Cir 1998)

Harry Aleman, Petitioner-appellant, v. the Honorable Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County,criminal Division, Illinois, Honorable Michael P. Toomin,judge Presiding, Honorable Richard Devine, State's Attorneyof Cook County, Illinois, Ernesto Velasco, Executivedirector, Cook County Department of Corrections,respondents-appellees, 138 F.3d 302 (7th Cir. 1998)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 138 F.3d 302 (7th Cir. 1998) Argued Dec. 2, 1997. Decided March 6, 1998

Allan A. Ackerman, Chicago, IL, David I. Bruck (argued), Columbia, SC, for Harry Aleman.

Rita M. Novak, Office of the Attorney General, Chicago, IL, James E. Fitzgerald, John Blakey, Cook County State's Attorney, Chicago, IL, Renee G. Goldfarb (argued), Office of the State's Attorney of Cook County, Criminal Appeals Divison, Chicago, IL, for Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Criminal Division, Michael P. Toomin, Judge, and Ernesto Velasco.

James E. Fitzgerald, John Blakey, Cook County State's Attorney, Chicago, IL, Renee G. Goldfarb (argued), Office of the State's Attorney of Cook County, Criminal Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, for Richard A. Devine.

Before WOOD, Jr., COFFEY, and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

Harry Aleman successfully bribed a Cook County Circuit Judge to acquit him of a murder charge in a 1977 bench trial. A grand jury returned a second indictment against Aleman on this murder charge in 1993 after evidence of the bribery surfaced. In addition, Aleman was indicted for the first time on a different murder charge. Aleman moved to dismiss both indictments, but the Illinois state courts rejected his arguments. In a lastditch effort to avoid (re)trial, Aleman requested a stay of state court proceedings while a federal district court considered his challenge to the indictments in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The case proceeded to trial after the district court denied this petition and motion to stay, and a Cook County jury convicted him of the Logan murder;1 the trial judge thereafter sentenced Aleman to 100-300 years in prison. Aleman appeals the district court's denial of the petition. His conviction will stand, though, because we affirm the district court's denial of Aleman's petition.

While walking to work on the morning of September 27, 1972, William Logan was shot and killed by Harry Aleman. Three years later, in October 1975, Aleman also shot and killed Anthony Reitinger, allegedly because Reitinger neglected to pay a "street tax"2 on his bookmaking operation to local organized crime figures. A grand jury indicted Aleman for the Logan murder in December 1976, but he was not charged at this time with the Reitinger murder. After numerous substitutions of counsel and judges, the Logan case proceeded to a bench trial before Cook County Circuit Court Judge Frank Wilson, who acquitted Aleman of the Logan murder in May 1977.

Nearly twenty years after the trial, however, two witnesses from the Federal Witness Protection Program were made available to testify that Aleman had murdered both Logan and Reitinger and that he had purchased the Logan acquittal with a $10,000 bribe to Judge Wilson. The first witness, Vincent Rizza, was a former Chicago police officer who ran an illegal bookmaking operation in order to supplement his government salary. Rizza paid a street tax to the local mafia and agreed to report bookmakers who were not making such payments to Aleman; one of the independent bookmakers whom Rizza offered up to Aleman was Anthony Reitinger. This evidence would provide a crucial link between Aleman and Reitinger's unsolved murder.

Rizza also supplied corroboration of Aleman's bribe of Judge Wilson in the Logan murder trial. In the early winter of 1977, after Aleman's indictment but before the trial, Aleman told Rizza that the trial was "all taken care of". Aleman said that he requested a bench trial "because the case was all taken care of" and that this way he was not going to jail. Later, when newspaper accounts began to paint a bleak picture of Aleman's chances of gaining an acquittal, he again told Rizza calmly that the case was "taken care of".

The second federal government informant was Robert Cooley, a former lawyer steeped in corruption who admitted that he frequently bribed judges, prosecutors, clerks, and sheriffs before entering the Federal Witness Protection Program.3 Cooley was a close friend of Judge Wilson and, at the request of some local organized crime figures, pitched the idea of a "fix" to Wilson. Cooley told Wilson that the case against Aleman was weak, that it could be handled very easily, and that an acquittal would be worth $10,000. Wilson agreed to fix the case if Aleman's counsel, Thomas Maloney, a good friend of Wilson's, would withdraw from the case in order to reduce the appearance of impropriety.4 Cooley thereupon paid Wilson $2,500, and the two men agreed that Wilson would receive the remaining $7,500 after the acquittal. Unbeknownst to Wilson, Cooley had also arranged a $10,000 payment to secure the favorable testimony of an eyewitness to the murder. Cooley then met with Aleman and assured him that an acquittal was guaranteed.

The evidence against Aleman, however, was not as flimsy as Cooley had indicated to Judge Wilson. After the second day of trial, Cooley met with Wilson, who was upset at Cooley's misrepresentations and at the prosecutor's allegations that a witness had received $10,000 in exchange for offering false testimony. Amazingly, the issue for Wilson was not whether he would still acquit Aleman, but for how much. Wilson expressed annoyance that a witness was getting the same amount of money as a "full circuit judge"; he said to Cooley that he would "receive all kinds of heat" for the acquittal and requested more bribe money: " [T]hat's all I get is ten thousand dollars? I think I deserve more."

Throughout these meetings, the acquittal itself was never in question. Judge Wilson fulfilled his end of the bargain on May 24, 1977, when he acquitted Aleman in a brisk oral ruling and quickly exited the courtroom. Cooley's contacts in organized crime gave him a $3,000 "commission" for his work and an envelope containing $7,500 for Judge Wilson. Cooley and Wilson dined together at a restaurant soon after the trial, and, in the men's room, Cooley slipped Wilson the promised $7,500 envelope. Wilson expressed concern because the press was "all over" him about the seemingly inexplicable acquittal; he complained to Cooley: "That's all I'm going to get? I don't get any more than that?" Wilson then left the restaurant in frustration.

In addition to this extraordinary informant testimony, other evidence confirmed the bribery. An F.B.I. agent interviewed Judge Wilson at his retirement home in Arizona in November 1989. The agent informed Wilson that Cooley had become a government informant, that Cooley had secretly taped a recent conversation with Wilson in which the two men discussed the $10,000 Aleman bribe, and that the Government was currently investigating allegations that Wilson accepted a bribe to acquit Aleman. Wilson denied the accusations, but he failed to appear in Chicago for a grand jury subpoena concerning the matter on December 6, 1989. A few months later, Judge Wilson walked into the backyard of his home and shot himself to death.

Finally, Monte Katz, a friend of Aleman's in federal prison,5 claimed that Aleman admitted that he murdered William Logan. Katz and Aleman became friends in prison, and, apparently, Aleman often discussed his criminal exploits. Specifically, Aleman told Katz that he "fixed" the Logan trial by paying money to "reach" the judge. Aleman stated that he was not worried about being tried again for the murder because it "was a double jeopardy situation."

The Circuit Court noted that the circumstantial evidence of a bribe was also significant. The record revealed "the rather curious spectacle" of Aleman, who originally deemed Judge Wilson to be a prejudiced judge, within the passage of ten weeks, withdrawing his objection and allowing the case to be assigned to Wilson. In addition, Aleman was released from state custody on bond despite facing the state's most serious criminal charge, and the case proceeded to trial in less than five months from the date of his arraignment. The Circuit Court also took pause from the fact that Aleman's attorney, Frank Whalen, set the case for trial within six weeks of filing his appearance and requested no interim continuances to conduct the "adequate preparation one might reasonably anticipate in a case of this magnitude."

Based on this body of evidence, in December 1993, the Cook County State's Attorney again charged Aleman for the Logan murder and for the first time charged Aleman with the murder of Reitinger. A grand jury returned indictments on both counts. Aleman claimed to the Circuit Court, as he claims to us on appeal, that the Logan indictment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and that the prejudicial pre-indictment delay on both charges violated his due process rights. After an evidentiary hearing concerning the alleged bribe, the Circuit Court rejected the double jeopardy argument based on the overwhelming factual evidence that Aleman's first trial was a sham. The Court emphasized its certainty that Aleman had bribed Judge Wilson:

Although the court earlier observed that the State's burden was to establish the bribery by a preponderance of the evidence, the court also concurs in the State's appraisal that the evidence presented also meets the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Were this a prosecution for the substantive offense of bribery, the court would have little difficulty in concluding that the People had presented a credible and coherent case against the defendant. The evidence clearly establishes the tendering of money to a public officer to influence him in the performance of his duties.

(Citations omitted). Based on this factual finding, the Circuit Court held that there was no double jeopardy bar to reprosecuting Aleman for the Logan murder because there was never any jeopardy at the first trial. Furthermore, because crucial witnesses were not available at an earlier time, the court denied Aleman's claims of unconstitutional preindictment delay. These rulings were upheld on appeal. See People v. Aleman, 281 Ill.App.3d 991, 217 Ill.Dec. 526, 667 N.E.2d 615 (Ill.App.), review denied, 168 Ill. 2d 600, 219 Ill.Dec. 567, 671 N.E.2d 734 (1996), and cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S. Ct. 986, 136 L. Ed. 2d 868 (1997). The district court below also rejected these contentions in Aleman's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. United States ex rel. Aleman v. Circuit Court of Cook County, 967 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ill. 1997).

Aleman raises three claims on appeal. First, he takes issue with the Circuit Court's factual findings that he bribed Judge Wilson in the Logan trial. Second, he challenges the effect of those factual findings upon his double jeopardy claim. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1969) (holding that the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause apply to the states). Finally, he urges us to recognize that the pre-indictment delays of twenty-one and eighteen years in the Logan and Reitinger murders, respectively, violated his due process rights. Our collateral review, however, is quite limited. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1), we can only grant Aleman's petition if one of the Circuit Court's legal rulings was either "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Aleman's factual challenge can succeed only if he can show by "clear and convincing evidence" that the Circuit Court's findings are erroneous. See id. § 2254(d) (2). He meets neither of these stringent standards.

Aleman's challenge to the Circuit Court's factual findings can be dismissed in short order. He rightly points out that the common law has always presumed the neutrality of judges. See, e.g., 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (" [T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea."); see also Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1372-73 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying the common-law presumption), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1037, 115 S. Ct. 1404, 131 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1995). Aleman seems to think that reciting this principle alone can somehow overcome the great weight of evidence showing that he bribed Judge Wilson. However, we have always recognized that the presumption of a judge's neutrality is a rebuttable one. See Del Vecchio, 31 F.3d at 1373; see also Bracy v. Gramley, --- U.S. ----, ----, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 1799, 138 L. Ed. 2d 97 (1997). As in Bracy, the Circuit Court found that the ordinary presumption had been soundly rebutted in this case.

Beyond the presumption argument, Aleman argues that the State's witnesses were unreliable based solely on the length of time between the relevant events and the Circuit Court's evidentiary hearing. He relies on dicta from our decision in Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 693 (7th Cir. 1996), in which we commented that the petitioner did not show "good cause" for discovery because, in part, there would be a "pall of doubt" over the reliability of any exculpatory witnesses' testimony based on a fourteen-year interval between the events and an evidentiary hearing. Id. The Supreme Court, however, implicitly expressed its disapproval of this statement when overruling the case. See --- U.S. ----, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 138 L. Ed. 2d 97 (1997). Aleman nevertheless tries to spin gold from this frayed strand. He notes that most of the key players in this story are deceased and, of those that are still living, the events occurred so long ago that their testimony is inherently unreliable.

Aleman's position on this point is flawed on many levels. First, the Supreme Court disagreed with our view of Bracy's ability to show good cause based on such testimony. Second, dicta from our Bracy opinion would not have established any sort of general rule that testimony concerning events from over fourteen years ago was presumptively unreliable. Such a rule would have called into question the constitutionality of countless statutes of limitations. Third, and most importantly, any alleged presumption of unreliability would have been rebutted in this case by the Circuit Court's evaluation of the testimony. The Court heard the evidence and concluded that it was reliable "beyond a reasonable doubt". Aleman did not attempt to rebut the State's strong evidence with anything but vacuous and inapposite presumptions. This is a far cry from the "clear and convincing evidence" of factual error that we require before invalidating Circuit Court findings of fact.

Aleman's legal challenge presents a unique and interesting question, but it ultimately fares no better than his factual one. The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause guarantees that no one shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Aleman argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause unambiguously bars his reindictment on the Logan murder charge because he faced trial on that murder charge in 1977 and was acquitted by Judge Wilson. In support of his position, he points to a long line of Supreme Court cases reiterating that an acquittal on a charge absolutely bars retrial on that charge. See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503, 98 S. Ct. 824, 829, 54 L. Ed. 2d 717 (1978) ("The constitutional protection against double jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a second trial following an acquittal.... If the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair."); Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 671, 16 S. Ct. 1192, 1195, 41 L. Ed. 300 (1896) ("[I]n this country a verdict of acquittal ... is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense."). Aleman argues that it is irrelevant how he obtained his acquittal and that there is no room for courts to question those circumstances and lift the double jeopardy bar to reprosecution. See, e.g., Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 n. 6, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 2147 n. 6, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978) ("[W]here the Double Jeopardy Clause is applicable, its sweep is absolute. There are no 'equities' to be balanced, for the Clause has declared a constitutional policy, based on grounds which are not open to judicial examination."); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143, 82 S. Ct. 671, 672, 7 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1962) (stating that an acquittal triggers the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause even if "the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation"). Aleman contends that the Circuit Court's decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application, of this body of the Supreme Court's interpretations of federal law.

The legal conclusion urged by Aleman might not be an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent,6 but the highly deferential standard of collateral review leads us to hold that the contrary interpretation--the one adopted by the Illinois courts in this case--is also not unreasonable. The Illinois courts viewed the authority cited by Aleman as begging the question; the Double Jeopardy Clause may well be absolute when it applies, see Burks, 437 U.S. at 11 n. 6, 98 S. Ct. at 2147 n. 6, but determining if it applies is the real issue in this case. Similarly, the State argues that the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause only extend to a defendant who was once before in jeopardy of conviction on a particular criminal charge; the State contends that, by bribing Judge Wilson, Aleman created a situation in which he was never in jeopardy at his first trial. The first trial, therefore, was a sham and the acquittal there rendered has no effect for double jeopardy purposes. Under this theory, the State was free to re-indict him because he has never been in jeopardy of conviction on the Logan murder charge.

The Circuit Court concluded that Aleman's first trial was a nullity because he was never truly at risk of conviction. The Supreme Court has emphasized that " [j]eopardy denotes risk. In the constitutional sense, jeopardy describes the risk that is traditionally associated with criminal prosecution." Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528, 95 S. Ct. 1779, 1785, 44 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1975); see also United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569, 97 S. Ct. 1349, 1353-54, 51 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1977) ("The protections afforded by the [Double Jeopardy] Clause are implicated only when the accused has actually been placed in jeopardy.") (emphasis added); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 391-92, 95 S. Ct. 1055, 1064-65, 43 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1975) ("Without risk of a determination of guilt, jeopardy does not attach, and neither an appeal nor further prosecution constitutes double jeopardy.... In particular, it has no significance in this context unless jeopardy has once attached and an accused has been subjected to the risk of conviction."); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331, 90 S. Ct. 1757, 1762, 26 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1970) ("The Double Jeopardy Clause, as we have noted, is cast in terms of the risk or hazard of trial and conviction, not of the ultimate legal consequences of the verdict."). Indeed, the Court has stated that preventing the hazards associated with risking conviction is the raison d'etre of the Double Jeopardy Clause: The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.

Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 78 S. Ct. 221, 223-24, 2 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1957).

Aleman had to endure none of these risks because he "fixed" his case; the Circuit Court found that Aleman was so sanguine about the certainty of his acquittal that he went so far as to tell Vincent Rizza before the trial that jail was "not an option". Aleman may be correct that some risk of conviction still existed after Judge Wilson agreed to fix the case, but it cannot be said that the risk was the sort "traditionally associated" with an impartial criminal justice system.7 See Breed, 421 U.S. at 528, 95 S. Ct. at 1785. It seems only appropriate that a defendant should not be allowed to escape punishment for murder because he bribed the judge. To allow Aleman to profit from his bribery and escape all punishment for the Logan murder would be a perversion of justice, as well as establish an unseemly and dangerous incentive for criminal defendants. The Illinois courts' holdings, therefore, were not contrary to, or unreasonable applications of, federal law as interpreted by the Supreme Court.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court's rejection of the double jeopardy claims contained in Aleman's petition.

[snip]

Keith Woods, a resident of Mecosta County, was charged and recently convicted for the “crime” of standing on a public sidewalk and handing out fliers about juror rights.

More shitposting by Deckard.

He was doing his deed in front of the courthouse. It matters not that he moved as far as the sidewalk in front of the courthouse. His intent to reach jurors was manifest by this and prior behavior.

http://fox17online.com/2017/06/01/jury-finds-man-guilty-of-jury-tampering-by-passing-out-juror-rights-pamphlets/

BIG RAPIDS, Mich. — A jury of six found Keith Wood guilty within 30 minutes Thursday, convicting him of attempting to influence a jury in Mecosta County.

He was convicted of ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE A JURY.

http://law.justia.com/codes/us/2015/title-18/part-i/chapter-73/sec.-1504/

2015 US Code
Title 18 - Crimes and Criminal Procedure (Sections 1 - 6005)
Part I - Crimes (Sections 1 - 2725)
Chapter 73 - Obstruction of Justice (Sections 1501 - 1521)
Sec. 1504 - Influencing juror by writing

18 U.S.C. § 1504 (2015)

§1504. Influencing juror by writing

Whoever attempts to influence the action or decision of any grand or petit juror of any court of the United States upon any issue or matter pending before such juror, or before the jury of which he is a member, or pertaining to his duties, by writing or sending to him any written communication, in relation to such issue or matter, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the communication of a request to appear before the grand jury.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770; Pub. L. 103–322, title XXXIII, §330016(1)(H), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2147.)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(4h1vst4md522er2w1vdprirf))/mileg.aspx?page=getObject&objectName=mcl-750-120a

Section 750.120a

THE MICHIGAN PENAL CODE (EXCERPT)

Act 328 of 1931

750.120a Willfully attempting to influence juror by intimidation or other improper means; retaliating against person for having performed duties as juror; penalties.

Sec. 120a.

(1) A person who willfully attempts to influence the decision of a juror in any case by argument or persuasion, other than as part of the proceedings in open court in the trial of the case, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 1 year or a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or both.

(2) A person who willfully attempts to influence the decision of a juror in any case by intimidation, other than as part of the proceedings in open court in the trial of the case, is guilty of a crime as follows:

(a) Except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c), the person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 4 years or a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or both.

(b) If the intimidation is committed in a criminal case for which the maximum term of imprisonment for the violation is more than 10 years, or the violation is punishable by imprisonment for life or any term of years, the person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a fine of not more than $20,000.00, or both.

(c) If the intimidation involved committing or attempting to commit a crime or a threat to kill or injure any person or to cause property damage, the person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years or a fine of not more than $25,000.00, or both.

(3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not prohibit any deliberating juror from attempting to influence other members of the same jury by any proper means.

(4) A person who retaliates, attempts to retaliate, or threatens to retaliate against another person for having performed his or her duties as a juror is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a fine of not more than $20,000.00, or both. As used in this subsection, “retaliate” means any of the following:

(a) Committing or attempting to commit a crime against any person.

(b) Threatening to kill or injure any person or threatening to cause property damage.

(5) This section does not prohibit a person from being charged with, convicted of, or punished for any other violation of law including any violation of law arising out of the same transaction as the violation of this section.

(6) The court may order a term of imprisonment imposed for violating subsection (2) or (4) to be served consecutively to a term of imprisonment imposed for any other violation of law including any violation of law arising out of the same transaction as the violation of this section.

History: Add. 1955, Act 88, Eff. Oct. 14, 1955 ;-- Am. 2000, Act 450, Eff. Mar. 28, 2001 ;-- Am. 2003, Act 280, Imd. Eff. Jan. 8, 2004

It matters not that he moved as far as the sidewalk in front of the courthouse.

Piss off spam-bot. It was a PUBLIC SIDEWALK.

Keith Woods, a resident of Mecosta County, was charged and recently convicted for the “crime” of standing on a public sidewalk and handing out fliers about juror rights.

All of his article headlines are like that -- the resident was merely "standing on the sidewalk", or "sitting in his car", or "walking down the street".

Yeah. Right.

"OJ was acquitted because the prosecutiion failed miserably to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that OJ committed the crime."

And all along I thought it was because nine African-American jurors in an LA courtroom refused to convict a famous and and admired black man.

I believed Marcia Clark when she said she convicted murderers with a fraction of the evidence in this case. The OJ trial was the poster child for jury nullification.

This does not affirm a right. Should the juror state his intent to vote based on nullification, a judge can properly remove him from the jury at ant point before the verdict is rendered, including during deliberations. His conscience prevents him from carrying out the oath he took, but he is not prosecuted criminally.

True enough. And good reason why any fully-informed juror should never confirm that was how he voted.

BIG RAPIDS, Mich. — A jury of six found Keith Wood guilty within 30 minutes Thursday, convicting him of attempting to influence a jury in Mecosta County.

He was convicted of ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE A JURY.

He was, of his own admission, attempting to influence (educate) jurors with regard to a specific trial that was occurring, potentially both jurors and substitute jurors.

Had he merely been handing out brochures without a specific demonstrable (or confessed) intent to influence a particular jury trial, he would have been fine. If, for instance, he made a habit of handing out pamphlets constantly adjacent to the courthouse (but not on its sidewalk), it would be far harder to prosecute him. But he was trying to influence a specific jury and confessed to it as well as having considerable circumstantial evidence that that was his entire intent.

So, yes, this could be considered tampering but it is a narrow ruling on the law. People can still hand out FIJA literature, just not to try to influence specific juries to produce a particular trial outcome.

§1504. Influencing juror by writing

nolu chan, while you present a federal statute that would be most applicable to a set of jurors to remind them of what their official duties are, it is also the courts obligation to inform those same jurors of their rights. Jurors do have rights. They have a right to question the judge and even the prosecution when there is not sufficient evidence for them to make their votes. If this statute is to apply to jurors then it shall also equally apply to the prosecution team because as you noted in the OJ Simpson acquittal case, we all know how corrupt our courts can be.

Jurors are expected to abide by those laws as the prosecution and lawyers (including judges). Jurors are also a special people in that they are not officers of the courts but are serving in the capacity of those courts in doing official court business.

Piss off spam-bot. It was a PUBLIC SIDEWALK.

He broke the law on a PUBLIC SIDEWALK. That does not change the sentence and it only took 30 minutes for a jury to render a unanimous verdict of guilty.

He moved to the sidewalk this time, thinking it made a difference. His clear intent was to hand out his information in that location because he believed he would reach his target of passing jurors or persons called to jury duty.

The intent to violate the law, and the actual violation, are present in that location. He could always try standing on a soapbox at Speaker's Corner, not near the entrance of a courthouse.

Following your imaginary law earns some poor guy a conviction.

The OJ trial was the poster child for jury nullification.

Curiously, I never get this from people who actually watched the court testimony. The prosecution was a mess.

The evidence was not presented to sustain a conviction. They were so unprepared to go to trial, they diddled about a a few months before presenting evidence that somebody had died.

They screwed up the handling of the blood evidence. For the most part, the state case was dead after Barry Scheck got done destroying the LAPD witnesses.

The jury took four hours to reach a unanimous verdict of acquittal.

Had he merely been handing out brochures without a specific demonstrable (or confessed) intent to influence a particular jury trial, he would have been fine.

As long as his intended target was actual jurors, or persons called for jury duty, he had a problem. His was a failed effort to circumvent the law.

it is also the courts obligation to inform those same jurors of their rights. Jurors do have rights. They have a right to question the judge and even the prosecution when there is not sufficient evidence for them to make their votes.

I wish you the best of luck in arguing your jury nullification to a judge.

It is for the Court to determine the applicable law. The Court instructs the jury on the applicable law. The jury determines the facts, based on the evidence presented.

The evidence was not presented to sustain a conviction.

They had 10X more than they needed.

"For the most part, the state case was dead after Barry Scheck got done destroying the LAPD witnesses."

Pffft! All he did was intentionally confuse the jury. He didn't present anything to cause reasonable doubt.

"The jury took four hours to reach a unanimous verdict of acquittal."

That's the time it took to convince the three non-black jurors.

As long as his intended target was actual jurors, or persons called for jury duty, he had a problem. His was a failed effort to circumvent the law.

That's true.

But can a prosecutor be so certain that he can find a jury who won't nullify a conviction of a FIJA activist?

I'm not sure how often it comes up but the prosecutors have to consider this in deciding to bring a case.

This guy trying to help the Amish with their whole milk customers did target the jurors of that trial and admitted it. And that is probably the only reason they got a conviction on him.

I wish you the best of luck in arguing your jury nullification to a judge.

It is for the Court to determine the applicable law. The Court instructs the jury on the applicable law. The jury determines the facts, based on the evidence presented.

Here are the fact. Marbury vs Madison was usurpation. The courts were NEVER given the power they have under the constitution.

It is also a fact that the first chief justice of the supreme court. A founding father. Said jurors have a right to judge the law.

It is also a fact that you can ignore the judges instructions and render any verdict you want to.

When the judge tells you to ignore that evidence. You can also ignore that and nothing the black robe can do about it.

We have a corrupt judiciary exercising power they were never given by the constitution.

That is why you cannot cite from the constitution the supreme courts authority.

You can only cite the authority they gave themselves. That doesn't make it legitimate. It makes it color of law not real law.

Color of law is a legal term in blacks law dictionary.

You may disagree with me but that is ok.

The evidence was not presented to sustain a conviction.

I'd have to disagree with that. That is nonsense.

That is whey everyone knows OJ is guilty. Even you.