I suppose a nullified jury is not the same as a rigged jury, although I don't really see the difference in the outcome for an individual defendant.

They are not the same. In one case the jury has been corrupted, typically by a bribe of some sort. Said juror agrees to render a not guilty verdict regardless of the evidence and the law. The juror in question commits a criminal offense.

A juror practicing jury nullification takes the law from the judge, carefully applies it to the facts, determines the proper verdict, and further determines that rendering a verdict of guilty would result in an injustice. He votes his conscience. No crime is committed.

This does not affirm a right. Should the juror state his intent to vote based on nullification, a judge can properly remove him from the jury at ant point before the verdict is rendered, including during deliberations. His conscience prevents him from carrying out the oath he took, but he is not prosecuted criminally.

You don't know that. Jurors are not required to fill out a questionairre describing the reasons the voted the way they did.

As nolu chan pointed out, "... juries will acquit defendants who appear sympathetic, who are charged with violating an unpopular law, who the jurors speculate would otherwise be sentenced too severely, or who haven’t been proven guilty under standards for proof the jurors believe are required despite the judge’s instruction otherwise."

Jurors will do what jurors do, including when they feel a defendant is guilty according to the letter of the law, but that a verdict of guilty would result in an injustice that they are unable to reconcile with their personal conscience.

The judicial result is that shit happens.

Was OJ acquitted because the law against murder was unfair?

OJ was acquitted because the prosecutiion failed miserably to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that OJ committed the crime. Much prosecution evidence, and many witnesses, were destroyed on the stand.

What happened in the courtroom, and what was reported on the evening news and talk shows, frequently differed greatly.

They [nc- Judges] have the power to vacate both convictions and acquittals and enter a judgment NOV (non obstante veridictum - notwithstanding the verdict).

The Count has a point, albeit presented incompletely. A judge may render a Judgment as a Matter of Law [JMOL], a/k/a/ Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or judgment non obstante veredicto, or JNOV, in a civil case.

A judge has the power to set aside a guilty verdict by a jury in a criminal court. The judge's decision to set aside a guilty verdict is appealable. This is in Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

For criminal proceedings, see Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

He has no authority to set aside a jury verdict of acquittal in a criminal court which would federally be known as judgment of acquittal.

Rule 29. Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal

(a) Before Submission to the Jury. After the government closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The court may on its own consider whether the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. If the court denies a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the government's evidence, the defendant may offer evidence without having reserved the right to do so.

(b) Reserving Decision. The court may reserve decision on the motion, proceed with the trial (where the motion is made before the close of all the evidence), submit the case to the jury, and decide the motion either before the jury returns a verdict or after it returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict. If the court reserves decision, it must decide the motion on the basis of the evidence at the time the ruling was reserved.

(c) After Jury Verdict or Discharge.

(1) Time for a Motion. A defendant may move for a judgment of acquittal, or renew such a motion, within 14 days after a guilty verdict or after the court discharges the jury, whichever is later.

(2) Ruling on the Motion. If the jury has returned a guilty verdict, the court may set aside the verdict and enter an acquittal. If the jury has failed to return a verdict, the court may enter a judgment of acquittal.

(3) No Prior Motion Required. A defendant is not required to move for a judgment of acquittal before the court submits the case to the jury as a prerequisite for making such a motion after jury discharge.

(d) Conditional Ruling on a Motion for a New Trial.

(1) Motion for a New Trial. If the court enters a judgment of acquittal after a guilty verdict, the court must also conditionally determine whether any motion for a new trial should be granted if the judgment of acquittal is later vacated or reversed. The court must specify the reasons for that determination.

(2) Finality. The court's order conditionally granting a motion for a new trial does not affect the finality of the judgment of acquittal.

(3) Appeal.

(A) Grant of a Motion for a New Trial. If the court conditionally grants a motion for a new trial and an appellate court later reverses the judgment of acquittal, the trial court must proceed with the new trial unless the appellate court orders otherwise.

(B) Denial of a Motion for a New Trial. If the court conditionally denies a motion for a new trial, an appellee may assert that the denial was erroneous. If the appellate court later reverses the judgment of acquittal, the trial court must proceed as the appellate court directs.

Notes

(As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Pub. L. 99–646, §54(a), Nov. 10, 1986, 100 Stat. 3607; Apr. 29, 1994, eff. Dec. 1, 1994; Apr. 29, 2002, eff. Dec. 1, 2002; Apr. 25, 2005, eff. Dec. 1, 2005; Mar. 26, 2009, eff. Dec. 1, 2009.)

JMOL, Judgment as a Matter of Law

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judgment_notwithstanding_verdict

Judgment notwithstanding the verdict, also called judgment non obstante veredicto, or JNOV, is a type of judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) that is sometimes rendered at the conclusion of a jury trial. In U.S. federal civil court cases, the term has been replaced by the renewed judgment as a matter of law, which emphasizes its relationship to the judgment as a matter of law (formerly called a directed verdict).[1] In U.S. federal criminal cases, the term is "judgment of acquittal".[2]

JNOV is the practice in American courts whereby the presiding judge in a civil jury trial may overrule the decision of a jury and reverse or amend their verdict. In literal terms, the judge enters a verdict notwithstanding the jury findings. This intervention, often requested[citation needed] but rarely granted, permits the judge to exercise discretion to avoid extreme and unreasonable jury decisions.[3]

A judge is not allowed to enter a JNOV of "guilty" following a jury acquittal in United States criminal cases; such an action would violate a defendant's Fifth Amendment right not to be placed in double jeopardy and Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. If the judge grants a motion to set aside judgment after the jury convicts, however, this action may be reversed on appeal by the prosecution.

A JNOV is appropriate only if the judge determines that no reasonable jury could have reached the given verdict. For example, if a party enters no evidence on an essential element of their case, and the jury still finds in their favor, the court may rule that no reasonable jury would have disregarded the lack of evidence on that key point and reform the judgment.

Reversal of a jury's verdict by a judge occurs when the judge believes that there were insufficient facts on which to base the jury's verdict, or that the verdict did not correctly apply the law. This procedure is similar to a situation in which a judge orders a jury to arrive at a particular verdict, called a directed verdict. A judgment notwithstanding the verdict is occasionally made when a jury refuses to follow a judge's instruction to arrive at a certain verdict.[4]

This is a very rare case where a defendant was acquitted in criminal case and later reindicted and convicted for the same crime. It was a bench trial wherein the Chicago gangster bribed the Chicago judge.

http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/138/302/473725/

Aleman v Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County, 138 F3d 302 (7th Cir 1998)

Harry Aleman, Petitioner-appellant, v. the Honorable Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County,criminal Division, Illinois, Honorable Michael P. Toomin,judge Presiding, Honorable Richard Devine, State's Attorneyof Cook County, Illinois, Ernesto Velasco, Executivedirector, Cook County Department of Corrections,respondents-appellees, 138 F.3d 302 (7th Cir. 1998)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 138 F.3d 302 (7th Cir. 1998) Argued Dec. 2, 1997. Decided March 6, 1998

Allan A. Ackerman, Chicago, IL, David I. Bruck (argued), Columbia, SC, for Harry Aleman.

Rita M. Novak, Office of the Attorney General, Chicago, IL, James E. Fitzgerald, John Blakey, Cook County State's Attorney, Chicago, IL, Renee G. Goldfarb (argued), Office of the State's Attorney of Cook County, Criminal Appeals Divison, Chicago, IL, for Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Criminal Division, Michael P. Toomin, Judge, and Ernesto Velasco.

James E. Fitzgerald, John Blakey, Cook County State's Attorney, Chicago, IL, Renee G. Goldfarb (argued), Office of the State's Attorney of Cook County, Criminal Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, for Richard A. Devine.

Before WOOD, Jr., COFFEY, and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

Harry Aleman successfully bribed a Cook County Circuit Judge to acquit him of a murder charge in a 1977 bench trial. A grand jury returned a second indictment against Aleman on this murder charge in 1993 after evidence of the bribery surfaced. In addition, Aleman was indicted for the first time on a different murder charge. Aleman moved to dismiss both indictments, but the Illinois state courts rejected his arguments. In a lastditch effort to avoid (re)trial, Aleman requested a stay of state court proceedings while a federal district court considered his challenge to the indictments in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The case proceeded to trial after the district court denied this petition and motion to stay, and a Cook County jury convicted him of the Logan murder;1 the trial judge thereafter sentenced Aleman to 100-300 years in prison. Aleman appeals the district court's denial of the petition. His conviction will stand, though, because we affirm the district court's denial of Aleman's petition.

While walking to work on the morning of September 27, 1972, William Logan was shot and killed by Harry Aleman. Three years later, in October 1975, Aleman also shot and killed Anthony Reitinger, allegedly because Reitinger neglected to pay a "street tax"2 on his bookmaking operation to local organized crime figures. A grand jury indicted Aleman for the Logan murder in December 1976, but he was not charged at this time with the Reitinger murder. After numerous substitutions of counsel and judges, the Logan case proceeded to a bench trial before Cook County Circuit Court Judge Frank Wilson, who acquitted Aleman of the Logan murder in May 1977.

Nearly twenty years after the trial, however, two witnesses from the Federal Witness Protection Program were made available to testify that Aleman had murdered both Logan and Reitinger and that he had purchased the Logan acquittal with a $10,000 bribe to Judge Wilson. The first witness, Vincent Rizza, was a former Chicago police officer who ran an illegal bookmaking operation in order to supplement his government salary. Rizza paid a street tax to the local mafia and agreed to report bookmakers who were not making such payments to Aleman; one of the independent bookmakers whom Rizza offered up to Aleman was Anthony Reitinger. This evidence would provide a crucial link between Aleman and Reitinger's unsolved murder.

Rizza also supplied corroboration of Aleman's bribe of Judge Wilson in the Logan murder trial. In the early winter of 1977, after Aleman's indictment but before the trial, Aleman told Rizza that the trial was "all taken care of". Aleman said that he requested a bench trial "because the case was all taken care of" and that this way he was not going to jail. Later, when newspaper accounts began to paint a bleak picture of Aleman's chances of gaining an acquittal, he again told Rizza calmly that the case was "taken care of".

The second federal government informant was Robert Cooley, a former lawyer steeped in corruption who admitted that he frequently bribed judges, prosecutors, clerks, and sheriffs before entering the Federal Witness Protection Program.3 Cooley was a close friend of Judge Wilson and, at the request of some local organized crime figures, pitched the idea of a "fix" to Wilson. Cooley told Wilson that the case against Aleman was weak, that it could be handled very easily, and that an acquittal would be worth $10,000. Wilson agreed to fix the case if Aleman's counsel, Thomas Maloney, a good friend of Wilson's, would withdraw from the case in order to reduce the appearance of impropriety.4 Cooley thereupon paid Wilson $2,500, and the two men agreed that Wilson would receive the remaining $7,500 after the acquittal. Unbeknownst to Wilson, Cooley had also arranged a $10,000 payment to secure the favorable testimony of an eyewitness to the murder. Cooley then met with Aleman and assured him that an acquittal was guaranteed.

The evidence against Aleman, however, was not as flimsy as Cooley had indicated to Judge Wilson. After the second day of trial, Cooley met with Wilson, who was upset at Cooley's misrepresentations and at the prosecutor's allegations that a witness had received $10,000 in exchange for offering false testimony. Amazingly, the issue for Wilson was not whether he would still acquit Aleman, but for how much. Wilson expressed annoyance that a witness was getting the same amount of money as a "full circuit judge"; he said to Cooley that he would "receive all kinds of heat" for the acquittal and requested more bribe money: " [T]hat's all I get is ten thousand dollars? I think I deserve more."

Throughout these meetings, the acquittal itself was never in question. Judge Wilson fulfilled his end of the bargain on May 24, 1977, when he acquitted Aleman in a brisk oral ruling and quickly exited the courtroom. Cooley's contacts in organized crime gave him a $3,000 "commission" for his work and an envelope containing $7,500 for Judge Wilson. Cooley and Wilson dined together at a restaurant soon after the trial, and, in the men's room, Cooley slipped Wilson the promised $7,500 envelope. Wilson expressed concern because the press was "all over" him about the seemingly inexplicable acquittal; he complained to Cooley: "That's all I'm going to get? I don't get any more than that?" Wilson then left the restaurant in frustration.

In addition to this extraordinary informant testimony, other evidence confirmed the bribery. An F.B.I. agent interviewed Judge Wilson at his retirement home in Arizona in November 1989. The agent informed Wilson that Cooley had become a government informant, that Cooley had secretly taped a recent conversation with Wilson in which the two men discussed the $10,000 Aleman bribe, and that the Government was currently investigating allegations that Wilson accepted a bribe to acquit Aleman. Wilson denied the accusations, but he failed to appear in Chicago for a grand jury subpoena concerning the matter on December 6, 1989. A few months later, Judge Wilson walked into the backyard of his home and shot himself to death.

Finally, Monte Katz, a friend of Aleman's in federal prison,5 claimed that Aleman admitted that he murdered William Logan. Katz and Aleman became friends in prison, and, apparently, Aleman often discussed his criminal exploits. Specifically, Aleman told Katz that he "fixed" the Logan trial by paying money to "reach" the judge. Aleman stated that he was not worried about being tried again for the murder because it "was a double jeopardy situation."

The Circuit Court noted that the circumstantial evidence of a bribe was also significant. The record revealed "the rather curious spectacle" of Aleman, who originally deemed Judge Wilson to be a prejudiced judge, within the passage of ten weeks, withdrawing his objection and allowing the case to be assigned to Wilson. In addition, Aleman was released from state custody on bond despite facing the state's most serious criminal charge, and the case proceeded to trial in less than five months from the date of his arraignment. The Circuit Court also took pause from the fact that Aleman's attorney, Frank Whalen, set the case for trial within six weeks of filing his appearance and requested no interim continuances to conduct the "adequate preparation one might reasonably anticipate in a case of this magnitude."

Based on this body of evidence, in December 1993, the Cook County State's Attorney again charged Aleman for the Logan murder and for the first time charged Aleman with the murder of Reitinger. A grand jury returned indictments on both counts. Aleman claimed to the Circuit Court, as he claims to us on appeal, that the Logan indictment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and that the prejudicial pre-indictment delay on both charges violated his due process rights. After an evidentiary hearing concerning the alleged bribe, the Circuit Court rejected the double jeopardy argument based on the overwhelming factual evidence that Aleman's first trial was a sham. The Court emphasized its certainty that Aleman had bribed Judge Wilson:

Although the court earlier observed that the State's burden was to establish the bribery by a preponderance of the evidence, the court also concurs in the State's appraisal that the evidence presented also meets the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Were this a prosecution for the substantive offense of bribery, the court would have little difficulty in concluding that the People had presented a credible and coherent case against the defendant. The evidence clearly establishes the tendering of money to a public officer to influence him in the performance of his duties.

(Citations omitted). Based on this factual finding, the Circuit Court held that there was no double jeopardy bar to reprosecuting Aleman for the Logan murder because there was never any jeopardy at the first trial. Furthermore, because crucial witnesses were not available at an earlier time, the court denied Aleman's claims of unconstitutional preindictment delay. These rulings were upheld on appeal. See People v. Aleman, 281 Ill.App.3d 991, 217 Ill.Dec. 526, 667 N.E.2d 615 (Ill.App.), review denied, 168 Ill. 2d 600, 219 Ill.Dec. 567, 671 N.E.2d 734 (1996), and cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S. Ct. 986, 136 L. Ed. 2d 868 (1997). The district court below also rejected these contentions in Aleman's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. United States ex rel. Aleman v. Circuit Court of Cook County, 967 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ill. 1997).

Aleman raises three claims on appeal. First, he takes issue with the Circuit Court's factual findings that he bribed Judge Wilson in the Logan trial. Second, he challenges the effect of those factual findings upon his double jeopardy claim. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1969) (holding that the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause apply to the states). Finally, he urges us to recognize that the pre-indictment delays of twenty-one and eighteen years in the Logan and Reitinger murders, respectively, violated his due process rights. Our collateral review, however, is quite limited. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1), we can only grant Aleman's petition if one of the Circuit Court's legal rulings was either "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Aleman's factual challenge can succeed only if he can show by "clear and convincing evidence" that the Circuit Court's findings are erroneous. See id. § 2254(d) (2). He meets neither of these stringent standards.

Aleman's challenge to the Circuit Court's factual findings can be dismissed in short order. He rightly points out that the common law has always presumed the neutrality of judges. See, e.g., 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (" [T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea."); see also Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1372-73 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying the common-law presumption), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1037, 115 S. Ct. 1404, 131 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1995). Aleman seems to think that reciting this principle alone can somehow overcome the great weight of evidence showing that he bribed Judge Wilson. However, we have always recognized that the presumption of a judge's neutrality is a rebuttable one. See Del Vecchio, 31 F.3d at 1373; see also Bracy v. Gramley, --- U.S. ----, ----, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 1799, 138 L. Ed. 2d 97 (1997). As in Bracy, the Circuit Court found that the ordinary presumption had been soundly rebutted in this case.

Beyond the presumption argument, Aleman argues that the State's witnesses were unreliable based solely on the length of time between the relevant events and the Circuit Court's evidentiary hearing. He relies on dicta from our decision in Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 693 (7th Cir. 1996), in which we commented that the petitioner did not show "good cause" for discovery because, in part, there would be a "pall of doubt" over the reliability of any exculpatory witnesses' testimony based on a fourteen-year interval between the events and an evidentiary hearing. Id. The Supreme Court, however, implicitly expressed its disapproval of this statement when overruling the case. See --- U.S. ----, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 138 L. Ed. 2d 97 (1997). Aleman nevertheless tries to spin gold from this frayed strand. He notes that most of the key players in this story are deceased and, of those that are still living, the events occurred so long ago that their testimony is inherently unreliable.

Aleman's position on this point is flawed on many levels. First, the Supreme Court disagreed with our view of Bracy's ability to show good cause based on such testimony. Second, dicta from our Bracy opinion would not have established any sort of general rule that testimony concerning events from over fourteen years ago was presumptively unreliable. Such a rule would have called into question the constitutionality of countless statutes of limitations. Third, and most importantly, any alleged presumption of unreliability would have been rebutted in this case by the Circuit Court's evaluation of the testimony. The Court heard the evidence and concluded that it was reliable "beyond a reasonable doubt". Aleman did not attempt to rebut the State's strong evidence with anything but vacuous and inapposite presumptions. This is a far cry from the "clear and convincing evidence" of factual error that we require before invalidating Circuit Court findings of fact.

Aleman's legal challenge presents a unique and interesting question, but it ultimately fares no better than his factual one. The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause guarantees that no one shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Aleman argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause unambiguously bars his reindictment on the Logan murder charge because he faced trial on that murder charge in 1977 and was acquitted by Judge Wilson. In support of his position, he points to a long line of Supreme Court cases reiterating that an acquittal on a charge absolutely bars retrial on that charge. See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503, 98 S. Ct. 824, 829, 54 L. Ed. 2d 717 (1978) ("The constitutional protection against double jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a second trial following an acquittal.... If the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair."); Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 671, 16 S. Ct. 1192, 1195, 41 L. Ed. 300 (1896) ("[I]n this country a verdict of acquittal ... is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense."). Aleman argues that it is irrelevant how he obtained his acquittal and that there is no room for courts to question those circumstances and lift the double jeopardy bar to reprosecution. See, e.g., Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 n. 6, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 2147 n. 6, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978) ("[W]here the Double Jeopardy Clause is applicable, its sweep is absolute. There are no 'equities' to be balanced, for the Clause has declared a constitutional policy, based on grounds which are not open to judicial examination."); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143, 82 S. Ct. 671, 672, 7 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1962) (stating that an acquittal triggers the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause even if "the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation"). Aleman contends that the Circuit Court's decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application, of this body of the Supreme Court's interpretations of federal law.

The legal conclusion urged by Aleman might not be an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent,6 but the highly deferential standard of collateral review leads us to hold that the contrary interpretation--the one adopted by the Illinois courts in this case--is also not unreasonable. The Illinois courts viewed the authority cited by Aleman as begging the question; the Double Jeopardy Clause may well be absolute when it applies, see Burks, 437 U.S. at 11 n. 6, 98 S. Ct. at 2147 n. 6, but determining if it applies is the real issue in this case. Similarly, the State argues that the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause only extend to a defendant who was once before in jeopardy of conviction on a particular criminal charge; the State contends that, by bribing Judge Wilson, Aleman created a situation in which he was never in jeopardy at his first trial. The first trial, therefore, was a sham and the acquittal there rendered has no effect for double jeopardy purposes. Under this theory, the State was free to re-indict him because he has never been in jeopardy of conviction on the Logan murder charge.

The Circuit Court concluded that Aleman's first trial was a nullity because he was never truly at risk of conviction. The Supreme Court has emphasized that " [j]eopardy denotes risk. In the constitutional sense, jeopardy describes the risk that is traditionally associated with criminal prosecution." Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528, 95 S. Ct. 1779, 1785, 44 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1975); see also United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569, 97 S. Ct. 1349, 1353-54, 51 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1977) ("The protections afforded by the [Double Jeopardy] Clause are implicated only when the accused has actually been placed in jeopardy.") (emphasis added); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 391-92, 95 S. Ct. 1055, 1064-65, 43 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1975) ("Without risk of a determination of guilt, jeopardy does not attach, and neither an appeal nor further prosecution constitutes double jeopardy.... In particular, it has no significance in this context unless jeopardy has once attached and an accused has been subjected to the risk of conviction."); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331, 90 S. Ct. 1757, 1762, 26 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1970) ("The Double Jeopardy Clause, as we have noted, is cast in terms of the risk or hazard of trial and conviction, not of the ultimate legal consequences of the verdict."). Indeed, the Court has stated that preventing the hazards associated with risking conviction is the raison d'etre of the Double Jeopardy Clause: The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.

Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 78 S. Ct. 221, 223-24, 2 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1957).

Aleman had to endure none of these risks because he "fixed" his case; the Circuit Court found that Aleman was so sanguine about the certainty of his acquittal that he went so far as to tell Vincent Rizza before the trial that jail was "not an option". Aleman may be correct that some risk of conviction still existed after Judge Wilson agreed to fix the case, but it cannot be said that the risk was the sort "traditionally associated" with an impartial criminal justice system.7 See Breed, 421 U.S. at 528, 95 S. Ct. at 1785. It seems only appropriate that a defendant should not be allowed to escape punishment for murder because he bribed the judge. To allow Aleman to profit from his bribery and escape all punishment for the Logan murder would be a perversion of justice, as well as establish an unseemly and dangerous incentive for criminal defendants. The Illinois courts' holdings, therefore, were not contrary to, or unreasonable applications of, federal law as interpreted by the Supreme Court.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court's rejection of the double jeopardy claims contained in Aleman's petition.

[snip]

Keith Woods, a resident of Mecosta County, was charged and recently convicted for the “crime” of standing on a public sidewalk and handing out fliers about juror rights.

More shitposting by Deckard.

He was doing his deed in front of the courthouse. It matters not that he moved as far as the sidewalk in front of the courthouse. His intent to reach jurors was manifest by this and prior behavior.

http://fox17online.com/2017/06/01/jury-finds-man-guilty-of-jury-tampering-by-passing-out-juror-rights-pamphlets/

BIG RAPIDS, Mich. — A jury of six found Keith Wood guilty within 30 minutes Thursday, convicting him of attempting to influence a jury in Mecosta County.

He was convicted of ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE A JURY.

http://law.justia.com/codes/us/2015/title-18/part-i/chapter-73/sec.-1504/

2015 US Code
Title 18 - Crimes and Criminal Procedure (Sections 1 - 6005)
Part I - Crimes (Sections 1 - 2725)
Chapter 73 - Obstruction of Justice (Sections 1501 - 1521)
Sec. 1504 - Influencing juror by writing

18 U.S.C. § 1504 (2015)

§1504. Influencing juror by writing

Whoever attempts to influence the action or decision of any grand or petit juror of any court of the United States upon any issue or matter pending before such juror, or before the jury of which he is a member, or pertaining to his duties, by writing or sending to him any written communication, in relation to such issue or matter, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the communication of a request to appear before the grand jury.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770; Pub. L. 103–322, title XXXIII, §330016(1)(H), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2147.)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(4h1vst4md522er2w1vdprirf))/mileg.aspx?page=getObject&objectName=mcl-750-120a

Section 750.120a

THE MICHIGAN PENAL CODE (EXCERPT)

Act 328 of 1931

750.120a Willfully attempting to influence juror by intimidation or other improper means; retaliating against person for having performed duties as juror; penalties.

Sec. 120a.

(1) A person who willfully attempts to influence the decision of a juror in any case by argument or persuasion, other than as part of the proceedings in open court in the trial of the case, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 1 year or a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or both.

(2) A person who willfully attempts to influence the decision of a juror in any case by intimidation, other than as part of the proceedings in open court in the trial of the case, is guilty of a crime as follows:

(a) Except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c), the person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 4 years or a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or both.

(b) If the intimidation is committed in a criminal case for which the maximum term of imprisonment for the violation is more than 10 years, or the violation is punishable by imprisonment for life or any term of years, the person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a fine of not more than $20,000.00, or both.

(c) If the intimidation involved committing or attempting to commit a crime or a threat to kill or injure any person or to cause property damage, the person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years or a fine of not more than $25,000.00, or both.

(3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not prohibit any deliberating juror from attempting to influence other members of the same jury by any proper means.

(4) A person who retaliates, attempts to retaliate, or threatens to retaliate against another person for having performed his or her duties as a juror is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a fine of not more than $20,000.00, or both. As used in this subsection, “retaliate” means any of the following:

(a) Committing or attempting to commit a crime against any person.

(b) Threatening to kill or injure any person or threatening to cause property damage.

(5) This section does not prohibit a person from being charged with, convicted of, or punished for any other violation of law including any violation of law arising out of the same transaction as the violation of this section.

(6) The court may order a term of imprisonment imposed for violating subsection (2) or (4) to be served consecutively to a term of imprisonment imposed for any other violation of law including any violation of law arising out of the same transaction as the violation of this section.

History: Add. 1955, Act 88, Eff. Oct. 14, 1955 ;-- Am. 2000, Act 450, Eff. Mar. 28, 2001 ;-- Am. 2003, Act 280, Imd. Eff. Jan. 8, 2004

It matters not that he moved as far as the sidewalk in front of the courthouse.

Piss off spam-bot. It was a PUBLIC SIDEWALK.

Keith Woods, a resident of Mecosta County, was charged and recently convicted for the “crime” of standing on a public sidewalk and handing out fliers about juror rights.

All of his article headlines are like that -- the resident was merely "standing on the sidewalk", or "sitting in his car", or "walking down the street".

Yeah. Right.

"OJ was acquitted because the prosecutiion failed miserably to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that OJ committed the crime."

And all along I thought it was because nine African-American jurors in an LA courtroom refused to convict a famous and and admired black man.

I believed Marcia Clark when she said she convicted murderers with a fraction of the evidence in this case. The OJ trial was the poster child for jury nullification.

This does not affirm a right. Should the juror state his intent to vote based on nullification, a judge can properly remove him from the jury at ant point before the verdict is rendered, including during deliberations. His conscience prevents him from carrying out the oath he took, but he is not prosecuted criminally.

True enough. And good reason why any fully-informed juror should never confirm that was how he voted.

BIG RAPIDS, Mich. — A jury of six found Keith Wood guilty within 30 minutes Thursday, convicting him of attempting to influence a jury in Mecosta County.

He was convicted of ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE A JURY.

He was, of his own admission, attempting to influence (educate) jurors with regard to a specific trial that was occurring, potentially both jurors and substitute jurors.

Had he merely been handing out brochures without a specific demonstrable (or confessed) intent to influence a particular jury trial, he would have been fine. If, for instance, he made a habit of handing out pamphlets constantly adjacent to the courthouse (but not on its sidewalk), it would be far harder to prosecute him. But he was trying to influence a specific jury and confessed to it as well as having considerable circumstantial evidence that that was his entire intent.

So, yes, this could be considered tampering but it is a narrow ruling on the law. People can still hand out FIJA literature, just not to try to influence specific juries to produce a particular trial outcome.

§1504. Influencing juror by writing

nolu chan, while you present a federal statute that would be most applicable to a set of jurors to remind them of what their official duties are, it is also the courts obligation to inform those same jurors of their rights. Jurors do have rights. They have a right to question the judge and even the prosecution when there is not sufficient evidence for them to make their votes. If this statute is to apply to jurors then it shall also equally apply to the prosecution team because as you noted in the OJ Simpson acquittal case, we all know how corrupt our courts can be.

Jurors are expected to abide by those laws as the prosecution and lawyers (including judges). Jurors are also a special people in that they are not officers of the courts but are serving in the capacity of those courts in doing official court business.

Piss off spam-bot. It was a PUBLIC SIDEWALK.

He broke the law on a PUBLIC SIDEWALK. That does not change the sentence and it only took 30 minutes for a jury to render a unanimous verdict of guilty.

He moved to the sidewalk this time, thinking it made a difference. His clear intent was to hand out his information in that location because he believed he would reach his target of passing jurors or persons called to jury duty.

The intent to violate the law, and the actual violation, are present in that location. He could always try standing on a soapbox at Speaker's Corner, not near the entrance of a courthouse.

Following your imaginary law earns some poor guy a conviction.

The OJ trial was the poster child for jury nullification.

Curiously, I never get this from people who actually watched the court testimony. The prosecution was a mess.

The evidence was not presented to sustain a conviction. They were so unprepared to go to trial, they diddled about a a few months before presenting evidence that somebody had died.

They screwed up the handling of the blood evidence. For the most part, the state case was dead after Barry Scheck got done destroying the LAPD witnesses.

The jury took four hours to reach a unanimous verdict of acquittal.

Had he merely been handing out brochures without a specific demonstrable (or confessed) intent to influence a particular jury trial, he would have been fine.

As long as his intended target was actual jurors, or persons called for jury duty, he had a problem. His was a failed effort to circumvent the law.

it is also the courts obligation to inform those same jurors of their rights. Jurors do have rights. They have a right to question the judge and even the prosecution when there is not sufficient evidence for them to make their votes.

I wish you the best of luck in arguing your jury nullification to a judge.

It is for the Court to determine the applicable law. The Court instructs the jury on the applicable law. The jury determines the facts, based on the evidence presented.

The evidence was not presented to sustain a conviction.

They had 10X more than they needed.

"For the most part, the state case was dead after Barry Scheck got done destroying the LAPD witnesses."

Pffft! All he did was intentionally confuse the jury. He didn't present anything to cause reasonable doubt.

"The jury took four hours to reach a unanimous verdict of acquittal."

That's the time it took to convince the three non-black jurors.

As long as his intended target was actual jurors, or persons called for jury duty, he had a problem. His was a failed effort to circumvent the law.

That's true.

But can a prosecutor be so certain that he can find a jury who won't nullify a conviction of a FIJA activist?

I'm not sure how often it comes up but the prosecutors have to consider this in deciding to bring a case.

This guy trying to help the Amish with their whole milk customers did target the jurors of that trial and admitted it. And that is probably the only reason they got a conviction on him.

I wish you the best of luck in arguing your jury nullification to a judge.

It is for the Court to determine the applicable law. The Court instructs the jury on the applicable law. The jury determines the facts, based on the evidence presented.

Here are the fact. Marbury vs Madison was usurpation. The courts were NEVER given the power they have under the constitution.

It is also a fact that the first chief justice of the supreme court. A founding father. Said jurors have a right to judge the law.

It is also a fact that you can ignore the judges instructions and render any verdict you want to.

When the judge tells you to ignore that evidence. You can also ignore that and nothing the black robe can do about it.

We have a corrupt judiciary exercising power they were never given by the constitution.

That is why you cannot cite from the constitution the supreme courts authority.

You can only cite the authority they gave themselves. That doesn't make it legitimate. It makes it color of law not real law.

Color of law is a legal term in blacks law dictionary.

You may disagree with me but that is ok.

The evidence was not presented to sustain a conviction.

I'd have to disagree with that. That is nonsense.

That is whey everyone knows OJ is guilty. Even you.

And when they demanded that OJ Simpson put on the glove, they blew themselves up. Whether it didn't fit because he scrunched up his fingers, or it didn't fit because he was wearing a latex glove to preserve evidence, the bottom line is that it didn't fit, and OJ got to hold up his hand and say "It doesn't fit."

They pulled a stunt, and in doing so they violated one of the key rules of presenting a case: never ask a question to which you don't already know the answer.

It was the dramatic high point of their case, when the prosecution stood up and demanded OJ to put on the glove. Everything built up to that, all of the exhausting and overdone lessons on DNA evidence, it was all built up to this staged stunt, wherein OJ would slide on the glove, linking him to everything.

It didn't fit.

And with that, the wings were off the plane and the case was going down like a lawn dart.

Johnny Cochrane understood theater too, repeating over and over in his closing argument the mantra "If it doesn't fit, you must acquit."

That's exactly what the jury did. The defense team was very effective. The prosecution was not.

And when they demanded that OJ Simpson put on the glove, they blew themselves up.

Bullshit only a moron was fooled by OJ opening his hands up and pretending.

It didn't fit.

Bullshit. You are very gullible.

The defense team was very effective. The prosecution was not.

I never thought you stupid. But anyone who thinks OJ is not guilty is capital S STUPID!

"or it didn't fit because he was wearing a latex glove to preserve evidence"

After all that handling, do you think OJ's defense team would ever let that glove be used as evidence in the future? Me neither.

Therefore, the prosecution should have conceded that and told OJ to try it on without the latex glove. What have they got to lose?

The evidence was not presented to sustain a conviction.

101 PIECES OF EVIDENCE THAT PROOVE O.J. SIMPSON MURDERED NICOLE:

http://pages.infinit.net/reparvit/nicole12.html

After all that handling, do you think OJ's defense team would ever let that glove be used as evidence in the future? Me neither.

Therefore, the prosecution should have conceded that and told OJ to try it on without the latex glove. What have they got to lose?

Yep. But they didn't. They foolishly staged a grandstanding event, but did not set it up properly, and ran their own case up on the rocks.

And defense counsel seized on the error and pounded it over the prosecution's head.

Our legal system is a game. It has rules. It has well-paid gladiators. It has winners and losers. It amuses me that people get mad at ME because our legal system is crappy.

I never thought you stupid. But anyone who thinks OJ is not guilty is capital S STUPID!

I didn't say what I personally think about his innocence. I merely recounted why the prosecutors lost the case. Apparently that distinction was lost on you. Obviously OJ Simpson is guilty as sin. He won his case in spite of that because the prosecution was weak and the defense team was strong.

Yep. But they didn't. They foolishly staged a grandstanding event, but did not set it up properly, and ran their own case up on the rocks.

51. The glove at the murder scene and the glove at OJ's home are extra large: OJ's size. And they are a matching right and left glove.

52. Both gloves are identical to the type Nicole bought for Simpson at Bloomingdales in December of 1990, one of only two hundred pairs like them sold through out the whole country that year.

53. Photos and videos of OJ show him wearing the gloves that match the ones found at his home and the murder scene.

------------------ -----------------------------------------------

Plus, OJ couldn't produce those gloves. Where did they go? The gloves in evidence were his.

As for trying them on? As a juror I would have looked at the contortions OJ went through to make it look like they didn't fit and concluded they were his. They didn't have to fit.

In retrospect it was a bad move. But only because it gave jurors an excuse to acquit.

Bullshit. You are very gullible.

No, the prosecutors were very stupid. They put themselves in a position where O.J. himself could put on the show he did and torpedo their case, which he did.

I merely recounted what they did, what he did, and how that lost them their case.

If you yourself were on trial for your life, and you could hire Darden or hire me, given all of your comments about my intelligence you'd no doubt hire Darden.

In the bigger picture of things, that would have been for the best, because justice very probably would have been served. Were you to hire me instead, justice would have a much lower probability of being served, because you would have a better chance of getting away with it.

So by all means be sure to hire Dudley Do-right as your defense attorney if you ever get picked up for a DUI. That way you'll be sure to pay society every penny for your crime, as you should, of course. You will also pay Dudley (in advance, no doubt - even Dudley Do-right isn't stupid).

If you want to, you can hire a defense attorney who will make sure justice is served. That's your prerogative.

Most people hire defense attorneys to avoid punishment, whether they are innocent or guilty.

It is always your call as the client.

In retrospect it was a bad move. But only because it gave jurors an excuse to acquit.

In retrospect?

You have a black jury in LA. You don't give them the excuse. You don't give the perp the opportunity to weasel out.

Plus, OJ couldn't produce those gloves. Where did they go? The gloves in evidence were his.

But the LAPD put on cops who perjured themselves, and had a bad chain of evidence.

And the prosecution took six months to present the case, hammered away on domestic violence instead of the DNA evidence, and then had a disaster in the chain of evidence.

The crime occurred in Simi Valley, a white suburb. The prosecutors CHOSE to bring the trial in the heart of black downtown LA, before a mostly female black jury.

They didn't start with their strongest evidence: the DNA, but with weeks of domestic violence evidence. Domestic violence is not probative of murder, particular not before a black jury pool where domestic violence is probably the NORM, but where it hardly ever leads to murder.

The cops broke all sorts of rules, and the prosecution sought to cover it up. Remember: Mark Furhman was later convicted of PERJURY.

Relying on a black inner city jury's faith in the integrity of the police is an error, and putting a dirty cop before them who gets caught in a lie was devastating.

The prosecution blew the case. The defense team played the game brilliantly.

"You don't give them the excuse."

The excuse wasn't given. It was taken by those wanting to acquit.

How did the matching glove get on OJ's property? Why, the racist Mark Fuhrman planted it! Where's the evidence of that? Nowhere. None. Zip.

There's excuse #2. And the list goes on.

"Remember: Mark Furhman was later convicted of PERJURY."

He said on the stand that he had not used a racial epithet in the prior ten years. Turns out he did. THAT'S the perjury charge. Who in the f**k was on trial?

It had nothing to do with the case and doesn't mean he hates blacks -- his minority co-workers supported him. And there was zero evidence he planted or manufactured evidence in the OJ case.

The prosecutors CHOSE to bring the trial in the heart of black downtown LA, before a mostly female black jury.

I agree. Two huge mistakes from the get-go.

But, if you think you have an open and shut case -- and it was -- perhaps the prosecution felt safe in doing this. Trying the case in Simi Valley with an all-white jury could lead to riots in LA with blacks believing THAT was the reason OJ was convicted.

Got it. You made your point. I'll ask again, OJ couldn't produce those gloves. Where did they go?

Here are the fact. Marbury vs Madison was usurpation. The courts were NEVER given the power they have under the constitution.

Here is the fact. Marbury has stood as good law for over two centuries. In a court, you will not be permitted to argue otherwise. You are entitled to your opinion. The Court is empowered to order youk not to attempt to argue such a thing, and to hold you in contempt if you try.

It is also a fact that the first chief justice of the supreme court. A founding father. Said jurors have a right to judge the law.

This is John Jay in a unique case. It is the only jury trial ever held at SCOTUS. However, it was not a jury of one's peers, but of specially selected experts in the subject matter of the case. It is an anomaly, not applicable to any other case.

It is also a fact that you can ignore the judges instructions and render any verdict you want to.

Yes, that is correct. However, it is violating one's oath to do so, and if one states his intent to do so, e.g., to other jurors, it is grounds to be kicked off the jury.

When the judge tells you to ignore that evidence. You can also ignore that and nothing the black robe can do about it.

It sure isn't perfect. As they say, you can't unring a bell. A judge's instruction cannot make one forget what one has heard, but that is the cure available. The alternative is to have every trial a party is losing, to have that party relate something inadmissible as evidence, cause a mistrial. A mistrial is other alternative.

I'd have to disagree with that. That is nonsense.

That is whey everyone knows OJ is guilty. Even you.

You are welcome to present the evidence, or even start another thread on the OJ criminal case. I believe it was possible that two people were there, possibly O.J. and another. I know that the criminal prosecution failed to prove its case against O.J.

What you may "know" is not the relevant issue. What did the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt?

There were massive failures.

101 PIECES OF EVIDENCE THAT PROOVE O.J. SIMPSON MURDERED NICOLE:

http://pages.infinit.net/reparvit/nicole12.html

1. Nicole's pet dog Kato, a ferocious Akita, did not attack the killer, suggesting the murderer was someone who the dog knew, such as OJ.

Reason #1 is typical. Accepted as true, it does not prove much of anything.

Pick one out from the laundry list that you feel is strong, or strongest, and I will take it on.

"Pick one out from the laundry list that you feel is strong, or strongest, and I will take it on."

Well, when you post "101 Reasons" you know there are going to be some lame ones.

But I would say OJ's blood at the crime scene, victim's blood in the Bronco, the gloves with victim's blood, OJ's shoe print at the murder scene, the fact that OJ can't produce the shoes or gloves, hair and fibers matching.

Now, you can argue that each one individually proves nothing. But taken together, there's only one explanation.

You made your point. I'll ask again, OJ couldn't produce those gloves. Where did they go?

Objection, your honor. The burden of proof is on the state to prove the case against my client. He has invoked the 5th Amendment and cannot be compelled to testify.

Blah, blah, blah. There's this and there's that. Technicality here, technicality there.

Correct. Our legal system is a game. The winner plays the game the best. It's a hard game, so if one has a great deal at stake, one hires the best gladiators to fight on one's behalf.

I was in law school at the time and watched quite a bit of the trial. I agree with your assessment. The prosecution really did not put on a persuasive case. They spent oceans of time giving a mini- course on DNA evidence that was excessive.

And when they demanded that OJ Simpson put on the glove, they blew themselves up. Whether it didn't fit because he scrunched up his fingers, or it didn't fit because he was wearing a latex glove to preserve evidence, the bottom line is that it didn't fit, and OJ got to hold up his hand and say "It doesn't fit."

I got to watch it all in real time, except for one day. Except for that day, I also had it all on videotape, long since discarded. However, I have a full transcript.

After watching what happened during the day, watching the fake news at night was like entering the twilight zone.

They quickly brought charges. Simpson quickly invoked a California speedy trial provision. The prosecution was forced to begin months before they had the RFLP DNA results back. They spent months with repetitive and nonsense testimony, just stalling.

The mess started to go south at a pretrial procedure where the autopsy doctor was destroyed. Dr. Golden, who performed the autopsy, testified at a pre-trial procedure, and he was utterly destroyed. He was so bad that when the trial came about, the prosecution kept him off the stand and had the Chief Medical Examiner, Dr. Lakshmanan (aka Dr. Lucky) testify about the autopsy. Dr. Lakshmanan was not at the autopsy. He never examined the victims other than by looking at photographs after the bodies had been released.

Prosecutor Brian Kelberg wasted 8 days on direct examination. Defense Counsel Robert Shapiro ripped it to shreds in a few hours. This monumental waste of time was an object lesson in how to lose a sequestered jury. Remember, this jury was sequestered as the trial dragged on and on and on. That was just the prosecution case.

Long before the glove fiasco, who can forget Barry Scheck, time after time, showing pictures demonstrating that the testimony of criminalist Dennis Fung was in error, punctuated with, "What about that, Mr. Fung?"

A likely answer as to why the glove did not fit was that it got wet. Get leather wet and it shrinks. The case was in dire straights by then and the glove stunt was a desperation move.

AS Prosecutor Kelberg made up one ridiculous hypothetical after another, the direct testimony of Dr. Lakshmanan seemed like it would never end.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

[11504]

MR. KELBERG: Doctor, I want you to assume that there were bloody shoeprints found along the walkway leading from the bodies to the back of the Bundy location and that I want you to assume hypothetically that there will be testimony that those bloody shoeprints are consistent with a person who has a size 12 shoe, and I want you to further assume hypothetically that people who wear size 12 shoes tend to be six feet to six feet four based upon studies conducted by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the FBI. Doctor, would that type of evidence, assuming it is true, serve to confirm your opinion that a single killer of a height greater than Mr. Goldman in a swift and violent assault on both of these human beings is the perpetrator?

MR. SHAPIRO: Objection. May we approach?

THE COURT: No. Overruled.

DR. LAKSHMANAN: I already said it could--it could be such a kind of perpetrator.

MR. KELBERG: And Mr. Shapiro asked you would you stake your reputation to a reasonable medical certainty. Remember that question?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: Yes.

MR. KELBERG: Doctor, would you stake your reputation that based upon the forensic pathology evidence you reviewed, that all of that evidence is in fact consistent with one killer, six foot two, 210 pounds, athletically built with the element of surprise with a 6-inch long single-edged knife killing Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman? Would you risk your reputation, stake your reputation on that?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: I said that one person could have done all the injuries, yes, I did say that.

MR. KELBERG: And will you stake your reputation that all of the evidence is consistent with that?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: Yes.

To see what horsecrap that was, we can visit what else was brought out.

That was from transcript page 11504. The below excerpts are in chronological order, starting on page 11392.

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[11392]

06/14/1995, Cross Examination by Robert Shapiro

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SHAPIRO

MR. SHAPIRO: Good afternoon, Dr. Lakshmanan.

DR. LAKSHMANAN: Good afternoon.

MR. SHAPIRO: Dr. Lakshmanan, you've been on the witness stand for approximately eight days?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: Yes, sir.

MR. SHAPIRO: And as I understand your testimony, you can tell us with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that both Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman were victims of a homicide?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: Yes.

MR. SHAPIRO: And you can also tell us within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that both of these victims died as a result of stab wounds?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: Yes. Sharp force injuries.

MR. SHAPIRO: And you can also tell us within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that both of these individuals bled to death?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: Yes.

MR. SHAPIRO: You cannot tell us within a reasonable degree of medical certainty what time they died?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: That is correct.

MR. SHAPIRO: In fact, all of your expertise lends you to the opinion that a layperson could give, that they were last seen alive at 9:00, that they were found dead at 12:15, and that is the range of death; isn't that correct?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: Well, that's what I opined also, between 9:00 and 12:30.

MR. SHAPIRO: And with all of your training, experience, education, reading all these books, you cannot tell us with a reasonable degree of medical certainty how many people were responsible for the deaths of these two people?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: I--I said that one person could have done it with one single-edged knife in my testimony.

MR. SHAPIRO: Can you tell us with a reasonable degree of medical certainty how many people are responsible for these homicides?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: No.

MR. SHAPIRO: Can you tell us within a reasonable degree of medical certainty how many different weapons were used to accomplish these homicides?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: I already opined saying that a single-edged knife could have caused all the injuries, but with reasonable medical certainty, I cannot exclude a second knife.

MR. SHAPIRO: Can you exclude other types of sharp instruments within a reasonable medical certainty?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: Could you expand on what you mean by "Other types of sharp instruments" before I--

MR. SHAPIRO: In your range of this vast experience, are there any other types of sharp instruments that you can tell us within a reasonable degree of medical certainty could or could not have caused these injuries?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: I would like you to be specific, what type of sharp instruments because I want to know what type of instrument you are talking about. I don't have experience like you do with these sharp instruments.

MR. SHAPIRO: Are there any sharp instruments that you are aware of that you can tell us within a reasonable degree of medical certainly could have caused these injuries?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: The main sharp instruments which I think could have caused these injuries is a--could have caused all the injuries was a single-edged knife. I already opined that.

MR. SHAPIRO: Can you tell us within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that a double-edged knife could not have caused most of these injuries?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: I said that most--some of the injuries could have been caused by a double-edged knife, but a double-edged knife could not have caused all the injuries.

MR. SHAPIRO: Could two single-edged knives have caused all the injuries?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: That's a possibility.

MR. SHAPIRO: Could three single-edged knives have caused all the injuries?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: Possibility.

MR. SHAPIRO: Could three single-edged knives and a double-edged knife have caused all the injuries?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: That's also a possibility.

MR. SHAPIRO: Could three single-edged knives and two double-edged knives have caused all the injuries?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: That is also a possibility.

MR. SHAPIRO: Could three single-edged knives, two double-edged knives and a broken piece of glass have caused all the injuries?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: I don't see--there's no evidence of any glass pieces on the bodies which I could see or--and also, the wounds look more like a more sharp instrument like a knife.

MR. SHAPIRO: Are you saying a sharp broken piece of glass could not have caused any of these injuries?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: It's a possibility in some of the wounds.

MR. SHAPIRO: Could a razor blade have caused some of these injuries?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: On incised wounds, it's a possibility.

MR. SHAPIRO: So after eight days, there's only about four facts that you can tell us within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that can help this jury in reaching an opinion?

MR. KELBERG: Objection, your Honor. Argumentative.

THE COURT: Sustained. Rephrase the question.

MR. SHAPIRO: Isn't it true, doctor, after eight days on the stand, there's only four facts you can testify to within a reasonable degree of medical certainly based on your education, background, experience as to how these two people died?

MR. KELBERG: That's argumentative, assumes facts not in evidence and it's vague.

THE COURT: Overruled.

DR. LAKSHMANAN: I've already discussed the findings. I've discussed my opinion that they were significant stab wounds to both the victims. I opined that the significant wounds on the body were caused by a single-edged knife. I think that's an important opinion which I have given. I have said that some of the other incised wounds could have been caused by a single-edged or double-edged knife which you cannot exclude with medical certainty. So I think I've been very clear that at least in most of the significant stab wounds, there's clear evidence that it was a single-edged knife. But your questions were more general wherein I indicated some of the wounds or most of the wounds, incised wounds, it was difficult to tell what type of weapon it was, wherein the stab wounds--the wounds we see on--some of the significant stab wounds on Miss Simpson and also on Mr. Ron Goldman, it was definitely a single-edged knife; and with reference to some of the incised wounds also, it would favor a single-edged knife rather then a double-edged knife, even though I cannot totally exclude it, especially the neck wound on Miss Simpson, it would favor a single-edged knife because of the bridge of tissue on the left side which I have discussed a few days ago. So I think I have given some direction. I won't say totally, but I think I have clearly established the cause of death in these two decedents. I also think I have given evidence which supports my opinion on the single-edged knife theory. And it seems medically, I can't exclude a doubleedged blade. I think it seems illogical that you have all the significant wounds caused by a single-edged blade, and you bring up the theory of a double-edged blade causing some of the not so significant wounds. So I don't think my eight days of testimony has been wasted. But if that's your position, I can't change it.

MR. SHAPIRO: Well, you came to us because you have expertise above and beyond an average person in a specific field of medicine and science; isn't that correct?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: Yes.

MR. SHAPIRO: My question to you was a simple one. Can you tell us with that expertise within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that one single-edged knife caused all the injuries to both victims?

MR. KELBERG: Your Honor, excuse me. Misstates the testimony.

THE COURT: Sustained. Rephrase the question.

MR. SHAPIRO: That one single-edged knife caused all the injuries to both of the victims.

DR. LAKSHMANAN: That is my opinion. I said it could have caused--

MR. SHAPIRO: No. My question--I want you to listen to this question very carefully. Can you tell us as a doctor, as a scientist and as the Chief Medical Examiner of one of the largest counties in the United States that within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, you will put your reputation on the line that one single-edged weapon was responsible for all the injuries to both victims in this case?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: I can't say that.

MR. SHAPIRO: Is Dr. Golden sick?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: No. He's still working in the Coroner's office.

MR. SHAPIRO: Is he on vacation?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: No, he's not on vacation. I told you he's working every day in the Coroner's office.

MR. SHAPIRO: When did you find out he was not going to be called as a witness and you were?

MR. KELBERG: Objection. Irrelevant.

THE COURT: Sustained.

MR. KELBERG: Compound as well.

THE COURT: Sustained.

MR. SHAPIRO: When did you find out he wasn't going to be called as a witness?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: The same time when Mr. Kelberg announced that he's not going to call him as a witness because Monday at 9:30, I thought they were meeting with him because that was the morning I was giving a lecture in Ventura. So that's the same time when you knew--I knew he was not testifying.

MR. SHAPIRO: You would expect, as the person who is in charge of this medical office, that a doctor who performed the autopsy who is not sick, not on vacation, not doing other things that would prevent him from coming to court, would in fact be a witness; would you not?

MR. KELBERG: Objection. Argumentative and irrelevant.

THE COURT: It's argumentative.

MR. SHAPIRO: Is that your practice; that the doctor who does the autopsy, if available, testifies?

MR. KELBERG: Excuse me, your Honor. Objection. It's not within the province of the Coroner's office to determine who testifies and who does not.

THE COURT: Overruled.

DR. LAKSHMANAN: Could you repeat the question again?

MR. SHAPIRO: Is it the practice of the Coroner's office that you supervise that the doctor who performed the autopsy, when otherwise available, testifies?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: That is correct.

MR. SHAPIRO: And what is the reason that you have been told that Dr. Golden is not going to be called to testify?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: Well, the same reason which was outlined here. They felt that I presented evidence in a manner which the jury can understand, and they didn't want to repeat the testimony again. This is my understanding from what was told in court right in front of all of us because I was not aware he was not going to testify until Monday morning when it was announced in court, and that's the truth.

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[11404]

MR. SHAPIRO: And when mistakes are made, don't you have a responsibility to do an intensive review immediately to correct those mistakes?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: We did do that.

MR. SHAPIRO: Don't you also have an obligation to somebody who is accused to make sure that asgood a job as is medically possible be done?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: Yes.

MR. SHAPIRO: And don't you have an obligation to correct mistakes immediately and look for errors?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: We do that as soon as I ever find out about a mistake and it is a mistake, and I'm the first person to accept it and I always direct my doctors to correct it. And if there's a change of cause of death, we call the family and tell them that. At least all the cases--I'm aware of whenever there's a mistake, as I told this Court and this jury, we have to identify any mistake first to accept it.

MR. SHAPIRO: Have you filed a report in this case?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: A report in the sense--what kind of report do you mean?

MR. SHAPIRO: Have you filed any reports in this case?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: I've not filed any reports except for the knife report I made, which I examined four knives presented to me by LAPD, and the other report which has been put in evidence as this chart, which I played a role in developing.

MR. SHAPIRO: Have you filed any supplemental report to correct all the errors that you have found in this autopsy?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: No.

MR. SHAPIRO: Do you intend to do that?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: We could do that, but I thought we already presented the evidence in court. And we can do that.

MR. SHAPIRO: Do you intend to do that?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: I can and I--

MR. SHAPIRO: The question is, do you intend to?

MR. KELBERG: Excuse me. I don't think the witness finished the answer.

THE COURT: Yes. Finish the answer, doctor.

DR. LAKSHMANAN: I don't plan to do it because I was testifying here and the whole proceeding being televised and we have the--my charts which I introduced in evidence. But I could do it.

MR. SHAPIRO: So you don't believe you have an obligation to the victims in this case to file a report that correctly reflects the autopsy in this case?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: We have issued an addendum already. I met my obligation correcting the first mistakes we were aware of. These other smaller mistakes we just talked about, for example, in Goldman's, these abrasions, were not described in the addendum, and several other mistakes, we have notissued an addendum as yet. And as I said, it can be done, but--and I'll be happy to do it.

MR. SHAPIRO: Are you going to do it?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: Yes.

MR. SHAPIRO: When are you going to do it?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: After the trial, after the testimony is over.

MR. SHAPIRO: You think that's proper, a year later, to file a report after the case is over?

MR. KELBERG: Objection, your Honor. Irrelevant, argumentative.

THE COURT: It's argumentative. You want to rephrase the question?

MR. SHAPIRO: I'll just go on. Thank you, your Honor.

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[11434]

MR. SHAPIRO: Are you certain as to whether the assailant--as to whether there was one or more assailants regarding Nicole Brown Simpson?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: I'm not certain.

MR. SHAPIRO: Are you certain as to whether the assailant or assailants were right or left-handed?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: I've already opined on that, I think.

MR. SHAPIRO: I'm asking you are you certain?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: I'm not certain.

MR. SHAPIRO: And again, that is because you weren't there and there are no eyewitnesses to this; isn't that correct?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: That is correct, but what I gave was what are the possibilities and based on the wounds. For example, the last wound on Nicole Brown Simpson had to be right-hand person because the wound travels, in my opinion, from left to right and it has to be done from the back based on the blood.

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[11504]

06/15/95 Lakshmanan Day Nine, Direct Examination by Kelberg.

MR. KELBERG: Doctor, would you stake your reputation that based upon the forensic pathology evidence you reviewed, that all of that evidence is in fact consistent with one killer, six foot two, 210 pounds, athletically built with the element of surprise with a 6-inch long single-edged knife killing Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman? Would you risk your reputation, stake your reputation on that?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: I said that one person could have done all the injuries, yes, I did say that.

MR. KELBERG: And will you stake your reputation that all of the evidence is consistent with that?

DR. LAKSHMANAN: Yes.

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16506

MR. SHAPIRO: Can you, as an expert medical examiner to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, tell the height of the assailant or assailants in this case?

DR. BADEN: No.

MR. SHAPIRO: Can you, as an expert medical examiner within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, tell the weight of the perpetrator or perpetrators?

DR. BADEN: No.

MR. SHAPIRO: Can you, as an expert medical examiner, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, tell the physique of the perpetrator or perpetrators?

DR. BADEN: No.

MR. SHAPIRO: Would you say you would have as much chance as determining whether or not somebody had a mustache from observing ashes in a cremation as you could of coming up with whether -- what the size, weight and height was of the perpetrators in this case?

MR. KELBERG: Objection, your Honor, argumentative.

THE COURT: Overruled. I would like to hear the answer to this one.

[16507]

DR. BADEN: Yes.

MR. SHAPIRO: Regarding the timing of injuries, can this be based on the appearance of injuries in a photograph?

DR. BADEN: Very dangerous to do it that way.

MR. SHAPIRO: Why?

DR. BADEN: Because part of the--of the timing of injuries, how long an injury has been present, is based on color changes, and that is very dependent on the color film, the speed, the flash and how it is developed. The naked eye direct visualization is very helpful and looking at the tissue under the microscope is the best means of determining how long an injury has been present in general.

MR. SHAPIRO: And so that I understand you correctly, and the jury does, that when we are talking about timing of injuries, we are talking about whether it occurred before death, at the time of death or after death?

DR. BADEN: Okay. That--I was going--how long before death an injury occurs and also the same applies for distinguishing whether--or trying to distinguish whether an injury occurred after death or before death, but that also is very difficult and often impossible.

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[16559]

MR. KELBERG: So, doctor, is it your use of the term "Possibility" to relate to doctors who talk in terms of "Consistent with" or "Inconsistent with" when questions are posed?

DR. BADEN: What I said is that the witness, me in the blue chair, Dr. Lakshmanan in the blue chair here, can only answer the questions that the lawyers put to us, and I think we try to answer the questions the best we can. But if all we say is it's possible that it happened by a bushy-haired stranger whose righthanded from behind, yes, but it's also equally consistent with a bald-headed midget from the front who is left-handed. It's all -- it depends on what kind of information I want to give across as an expert, but I don't have control over your questions or Mr. Shapiro's questions.

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"Objection, your honor. The burden of proof is on the state to prove the case against my client. He has invoked the 5th Amendment and cannot be compelled to testify."

Correct. OJ cannot be compelled to testify. He could present his shoes and gloves, however.

The prosecution will simply leave it out there that OJ's rare and expensive shoes and gloves, evidence of which was found at a murder scene, cannot be produced by the defendant.

Could a Martian have done this? Could he have used a scalpel? Will you stake your reputation on your answer?

Here is the fact. Marbury has stood as good law for over two centuries.

Except that is isn't a law it is a judicial decision.

It sounds like you think legislating from the bench is a good thing.

You know that is what they did that is why you called it a "law".

If it is good or bad is irrelevant to the fact that it was a usurption of power never ever granted by congress or signed by any President.

I have never read so many hypotheticals in a cross-examination based on zero evidence to the contrary.

I agree with White on this one. It was legal mumbo jumbo meant to trip up dumb people.

Yes, that is correct. However, it is violating one's oath to do so, and if one states his intent to do so, e.g., to other jurors, it is grounds to be kicked off the jury.

I would argue that the prosecutor is the one who "broke their oath" when they acted contrary to the constitution and interfere with the rights of the jury as John Jay made very clear.

This is John Jay in a unique case. It is the only jury trial ever held at SCOTUS. However, it was not a jury of one's peers, but of specially selected experts in the subject matter of the case. It is an anomaly, not applicable to any other case.

I disagree. All we both have is our opinions.