You waste your stoner loving time.

"Baseless self-serving "findings" have no evidentiary weight in the forum of reasoned debate."

What? The findings justify the law! Plenty to debate there.

"ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself"

Ah. Now noble! How profound! And who, pray tell, will interpret the Constitution? Who is the final arbiter of the meaning of "to regulate"?

You?

If the DEA is limited to only enforcing interstate commerce, what are they doing in this guy's trunk to begin with? He's parked in Oklahoma. He's not crossing any interstate border.

He's got Colorado plates so he did cross a border.

How can they prove he crossed the border with the pot? They can't. How do they know it's Colorado pot? They don't.

Sez you - the requirement for successful prosecution is proof beyond REASONABLE doubt not ANY CONCEIVABLE doubt.

"So have you dropped this "suicide pact" tomfoolery?"

If you insist on taking it literally rather than for the expression it is

It's an applicable expression only if outcomes of gravity comparable to that of suicide are in the balance - otherwise it's misleading.

"Baseless self-serving "findings" have no evidentiary weight in the forum of reasoned debate."

What? The findings justify the law!

Which makes it worth noting that they're baseless and self-serving - it doesn't provide a basis for treating them as if they were otherwise.

"ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself"

Ah. Now noble! How profound! And who, pray tell, will interpret the Constitution? Who is the final arbiter of the meaning of "to regulate"?

You?

That's not the question until we've agreed that a USSC-approved federal action is unconstitutional and then passed on to the followup question, "What is to be done?"

"Which makes it worth noting that they're baseless and self-serving"

Because you say so.

"a USSC-approved federal action is unconstitutional"

Again, who says that a federal law, ruled constitutional by the USSC, is unconstituional? You?

"It's an applicable expression only if outcomes of gravity comparable to that of suicide are in the balance - otherwise it's misleading."

"The Constitution is not a suicide pact" is a common expression and does not mean everyone dies. Get a f**king grip.

"He's got Colorado plates so he did cross a border."

That's not against the law.

"Sez you - the requirement for successful prosecution is proof beyond REASONABLE doubt not ANY CONCEIVABLE doubt."

What proof? Where's your proof he crossed the border with the pot? Where's your proof that the pot is even from Colorado? If you're prosecuting an interstate commerce case, aren't those facts important?

It's no surprise the federal government didn't even try to enforce the law against the interstate commerce of alcohol. It's unenforceable. As it would be against pot. And you know it.

If so, then who's responsible for keeping marijuana in the states?
Why, primarily the states that don't want it

There's a big unfunded mandate. You expect the states to enforce federal commerce clause law? Do you expect Congress to be satisfied with that arrangement?

"Which makes it worth noting that they're baseless and self-serving"

Because you say so.

No basis was offered, hence baseless; that a governmental assertion of authority is self-serving, is self-evident.

"That's not the question until we've agreed that a USSC-approved federal action is unconstitutional and then passed on to the followup question, 'What is to be done?'"

Again, who says that a federal law, ruled constitutional by the USSC, is unconstituional? You?

Honest and unprejudiced readers of the Constitution - in other words, conservatives.

"It's an applicable expression only if outcomes of gravity comparable to that of suicide are in the balance - otherwise it's misleading."

"The Constitution is not a suicide pact" is a common expression and does not mean everyone dies. Get a f**king grip.

I said "outcomes of gravity comparable". Get some f**king honesty.

'"The Constitution is not a suicide pact" is a phrase in American political and legal discourse. The phrase expresses the belief that constitutional restrictions on governmental power must be balanced against the need for survival of the state and its people.' (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Constitution_is_not_a_suicide_pact, emphasis added) Get some f**king facts.

"He's got Colorado plates so he did cross a border."

That's not against the law.

Nobody said it was, strawbeater.

"Sez you - the requirement for successful prosecution is proof beyond REASONABLE doubt not ANY CONCEIVABLE doubt."

What proof? Where's your proof he crossed the border with the pot? Where's your proof that the pot is even from Colorado?

The Colorado seller testifies.

If so, then who's responsible for keeping marijuana in the states?

"Why, primarily the states that don't want it - just as responsibility for keeping alcohol out of dry jurisdictions lies primarily with those jurisdictions."

There's a big unfunded mandate. You expect the states to enforce federal commerce clause law?

No mandate - a state is free to take no action against pot entering it.

"No mandate - a state is free to take no action against pot entering it."

Fine. Let the courts decide.

"I said "outcomes of gravity comparable".

That was your definition -- which I don't accept.

From the same link:

In the 1949 case Terminiello v. City of Chicago, the majority opinion by Justice William O. Douglas overturned the disorderly conduct conviction of a priest whose rantings at a rally had incited a riot. The Court held that Chicago's breach of the peace ordinance violated the First Amendment.

Associate Justice Robert Jackson wrote a twenty-four page dissent in response to the Court's four page decision, which concluded: "The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with order and anarchy without either. There is danger that, if the court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact."

That was simply a free speech issue.

Associate Justice Robert Jackson wrote a twenty-four page dissent in response to the Court's four page decision, which concluded: "The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with order and anarchy without either. There is danger that, if the court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact."

That was simply a free speech issue.

It was a free speech (allegedly) leading to anarchy issue.

From the same link:

In the 1949 case Terminiello v. City of Chicago, the majority opinion by Justice William O. Douglas overturned the disorderly conduct conviction of a priest whose rantings at a rally had incited a riot. The Court held that Chicago's breach of the peace ordinance violated the First Amendment.

At the link is a lame article from Wikipedia that is clearly wrong on Terminiello.

The Court did not find the ordinance violated the First Amendment. It did not even reach that question. It was decided on a faulty charge to the jury by the trial court.

The Court:

The argument here has been focused on the issue of whether the content of petitioner's speech was composed of derisive, fighting words, which carried it outside the scope of the constitutional guarantees. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 U. S. 310. We do not reach that question, for there is a preliminary question that is dispositive of the case.

The Court found that "The statute, as construed in the charge to the jury, was passed on by the Illinois courts and sustained by them over the objection that, as so read, it violated the Fourteenth Amendment."

It was the instructions to the jury that wandered astray. There was a general verdict which did not identify the precise reasoning for the guilty verdict. As the Court explained, "For all anyone knows, he was convicted under the parts of the ordinance (as construed) which, for example, make it an offense merely to invite dispute or to bring about a condition of unrest."

- - - - - - - - - -

Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (16 May 1949) free speech

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner after jury trial was found guilty of disorderly conduct in violation of a city ordinance of Chicago, * and fined. The case grew out of an address he delivered in an auditorium in Chicago under the auspices of the

337 U. S. 3

Christian Veterans of America. The meeting commanded considerable public attention. The auditorium was filled to capacity, with over eight hundred persons present. Others were turned away. Outside of the auditorium, a crowd of about one thousand persons gathered to protest against the meeting. A cordon of policemen was assigned to the meeting to maintain order, but they were not able to prevent several disturbances. The crowd outside was angry and turbulent.

Petitioner, in his speech, condemned the conduct of the crowd outside and vigorously, if not viciously, criticized various political and racial groups whose activities he denounced as inimical to the nation's welfare.

The trial court charged that "breach of the peace" consists of any "misbehavior which violates the public peace and decorum", and that the

"misbehavior may constitute a breach of the peace if it stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or if it molests the inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing alarm."

Petitioner did not take exception to that instruction. But he maintained at all times that the ordinance, as applied to his conduct, violated his right of free speech under the Federal Constitution. The Judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court (332 Ill.App. 17, 74 N.E.2d 45) and by the Illinois Supreme Court. 396 Ill. 41, 71 N.E.2d 2; 400 Ill. 23, 79 N.E.2d 39. The case is here on a petition for certiorari, which we granted because of the importance of the question presented.

The argument here has been focused on the issue of whether the content of petitioner's speech was composed of derisive, fighting words, which carried it outside the scope of the constitutional guarantees. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 U. S. 310. We do not reach that question, for there is a preliminary question that is dispositive of the case.

337 U. S. 4

As we have noted, the statutory words "breach of the peace" were defined in instructions to the jury to include speech which "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance. . . ." That construction of the ordinance is a ruling on a question of state law that is as binding on us as though the precise words had been written into the ordinance. See Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 272 U. S. 317; Winters v. New York, U. S. 507, 333 U. S. 514.

The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discussion. As Chief Justice Hughes wrote in Jonge v. Oregon, U. S. 353, 299 U. S. 365, it is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected. The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.

Accordingly, a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, pp. 315 U. S. 571-572, is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. See Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 314 U. S. 262; Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, 331 U. S. 373. There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas

337 U. S. 5

either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups.

The ordinance as construed by the trial court seriously invaded this province. It permitted conviction of petitioner if his speech stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest. A conviction resting on any of those grounds may not stand.

The fact that petitioner took no exception to the instruction is immaterial. No exception to the instructions was taken in Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359. But a judgment of conviction based on a general verdict under a state statute was set aside in that case because one part of the statute was unconstitutional. The statute had been challenged as unconstitutional, and the instruction was framed in its language. The Court held that the attack on the statute as a whole was equally an attack on each of its individual parts. Since the verdict was a general one, and did not specify the ground upon which it rested, it could not be sustained. For one part of the statute was unconstitutional, and it could not be determined that the defendant was not convicted under that part.

The principle of that case controls this one. As we have said, the gloss which Illinois placed on the ordinance gives it a meaning and application which are conclusive on us. We need not consider whether as construed it is defective in its entirety. As construed and applied, it at least contains parts that are unconstitutional. The verdict was a general one, and we do not know on this record but what it may rest on the invalid clauses.

The statute, as construed in the charge to the jury, was passed on by the Illinois courts and sustained by them over the objection that, as so read, it violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The fact that the parties did not dispute its construction makes the adjudication no less

337 U. S. 6

ripe for our review, as the Stromberg decision indicates. We can only take the statute as the state courts read it. From our point of view, it is immaterial whether the state law question as to its meaning was controverted or accepted. The pinch of the statute is in its application. It is that question which the petitioner has brought here. To say, therefore, that the question on this phase of the case is whether the trial judge gave a wrong charge is wholly to misconceive the issue.

But it is said that, throughout the appellate proceedings, the Illinois courts assumed that the only conduct punishable and punished under the ordinance was conduct constituting "fighting words." That emphasizes, however, the importance of the rule of the Stromberg case. Petitioner was not convicted under a statute so narrowly construed. For all anyone knows, he was convicted under the parts of the ordinance (as construed) which, for example, make it an offense merely to invite dispute or to bring about a condition of unrest. We cannot avoid that issue by saying that all Illinois did was to measure petitioner's conduct, not the ordinance, against the Constitution. Petitioner raised both points -- that his speech was protected by the Constitution; that the inclusion of his speech within the ordinance was a violation of the Constitution. We would, therefore, strain at technicalities to conclude that the constitutionality of the ordinance, as construed and applied to petitioner, was not before the Illinois courts. The record makes clear that petitioner at all times challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance as construed and applied to him.

Reversed.

*

"All persons who shall make, aid, countenance, or assist in making any improper noise, riot, disturbance, breach of the peace, or diversion tending to a breach of the peace, within the limits of the city . . . shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct, and upon conviction thereof, shall be severally fined not less than one dollar nor more than two hundred dollars for each offense."

Municipal Code of Chicago, 1939, § 193-1.

"It was a free speech (allegedly) leading to anarchy issue."

Leading to the death of everyone in the US. Got it.

the death of everyone in the US

Still beating your straw men. Pathetic - but not surprising.

"the death of everyone in the US"
"Still beating your straw men."

Suicide pacts involve the death of all parties.
-- ConservingFreedom

Strawbeater.

Then why bring up anarchy? Why not simply say the judge made a misleading statement since the free speech in this case would not lead to outcomes of gravity comparable to that of suicide?

Because anarchy, unlike pot legalization, WOULD lead to a great many deaths (though not of "everyone in the US") - so the judge's use of the term "suicide pact" was, unlike yours, appropriate.

As always, glad I could clear that up for you.

"WOULD lead to a great many deaths (though not of "everyone in the US")

Thank you for the clarification. Here I thought that when you said "Suicide pacts involve the death of all parties" you meant ... all parties.

Strawbeater.

"Applying the phrase to pot legalization is neither literally nor metaphorically accurate ..."

I agree. It's an accurate idiomatic expression.

It's an applicable expression only if outcomes of gravity comparable to that of suicide are in the balance

Only if you take it literally.

No, also if you take it metaphorically or idiomatically.

By definition, an idiom is an expression not interpreted literally.

Poor you.

Only if you take it literally.

"No, also if you take it metaphorically or idiomatically."

By definition, an idiom is an expression not interpreted literally.

Hence my "also".

Dimwit.

Don't give me this we weaselly weaselly "also" crap.

Pfffft! You don't know what you think.

You assume a fact not in evidence. It thinks?

"You assume a fact not in evidence. It thinks?"

Very rarely the two neurons floating around in his head accidentally bump into each other and exchange a small amount of information. This is what passes for thought.

If you "also" took suicide pact idiomatically, you wouldn't be comparing it to suicide. Because an idiom is not taken literally.

Your first sentence doesn't follow from your second; that an idiom is not literal does NOT mean it is completely unrelated to the literal meaning. If Joe and Jim each agree to eat a forkful of rutabaga if the other does, only in a purely humorous sense ought one call that a "suicide pact."

"that an idiom is not literal does NOT mean it is completely unrelated to the literal meaning."

So if I said "Killing two birds with one stone" I must be referring to a murder, a bird or a stone?

'that an idiom is not literal does NOT mean it is completely unrelated to the literal meaning. If Joe and Jim each agree to eat a forkful of rutabaga if the other does, only in a purely humorous sense ought one call that a "suicide pact."'

So if I said "Killing two birds with one stone" I must be referring to a murder, a bird or a stone?

You must be referring to multiple objectives accomplished. How is "suicide pact" nonhumorously applicable even idiomatically to anything whose outcome is orders of magnitude less serious than death? Can you supply examples (not from you or your **** buddy Roscoe) in support of your apparent position that it is so used idiomatically?

"He's got Colorado plates so he did cross a border."

[misterwhite:] That's not against the law.

"Nobody said it was, strawbeater."

[crickets]

"Sez you - the requirement for successful prosecution is proof beyond REASONABLE doubt not ANY CONCEIVABLE doubt."

What proof? Where's your proof he crossed the border with the pot? Where's your proof that the pot is even from Colorado?

"The Colorado seller testifies."

[crickets]

For those keeping score at home.

"Can you supply examples (not from you or your **** buddy Roscoe) in support of your apparent position that it is so used idiomatically?"

Sure. That's a piece of cake. See? I did it again.

I already gave you an example in my post #116. And he's referring to people making a pact with a document, not other people.

So the phrase, "The U.S. Constitution is not a suicide pact" must be taken as an idiomatic expression.

"Which makes it worth noting that they're baseless and self-serving"

[misterwhite:] Because you say so.

"No basis was offered, hence baseless; that a governmental assertion of authority is self-serving, is self-evident."

[crickets]

"That's not the question until we've agreed that a USSC-approved federal action is unconstitutional and then passed on to the followup question, 'What is to be done?'"

Again, who says that a federal law, ruled constitutional by the USSC, is unconstituional? You?

"Honest and unprejudiced readers of the Constitution - in other words, conservatives."

[crickets]

For those keeping score at home.

"The Colorado seller testifies."

You mean he confesses to the crime. That's how the states are going to stop interstate transportation. Those who do so will confess.

Well, OK. If you say so. Now give the computer back to the adult.

I already gave you an example in my post #116.

To which I already replied: 'anarchy, unlike pot legalization, WOULD lead to a great many deaths (though not of "everyone in the US") - so the judge's use of the term "suicide pact" was, unlike yours, appropriate.'

So the phrase, "The U.S. Constitution is not a suicide pact" must be taken as an idiomatic expression.

I think he likes taking beatings.

"The Colorado seller testifies."

You mean he confesses to the crime.

Who says he committed a crime? He didn't take any pot across the Colorado border.

"No basis was offered, hence baseless"

No basis was offered, hence no basis was offered. It doesn't mean it's baseless.

"that a governmental assertion of authority is self-serving, is self-evident."

The governmental assertion of authority is predicated on the findings. Whether or not that authority is self-serving is moot.

"Again, who says that a federal law, ruled constitutional by the USSC, is unconstitutional? You?"
"Honest and unprejudiced readers of the Constitution - in other words, conservatives."

Sure. If we can tear them away from watching Family Feud or listening to the Sean Hannity show, perhaps we can get them to memorize obscure legal cases and to compose clearly reasoned opinions about ERISA pre-emption, the doctrine of equivalents in patent law, limitation of liability in admiralty, and supplemental jurisdiction under Section 1367.

We don't need the courts to do that!