"When Trump advocated for the "stop-and-frisk" police policy, Holt told him that it was declared unconstitutional ..."

What good is it to have moderators fact-check when they fact-check incorrectly?

Trump was right. A District Court judge ruled it unconstitutional but the 2nd Circuit threw the judge off the case and overturned the decision. But they didn't stay the lower court's order. So the case is still pending.

"The Trump campaign wasn’t particularly happy with Holt after the debate, tweeting that he didn’t ask Clinton questions on Benghazi, her Foundation or her private email server."

Holt said he came up with all the questions. There are only three debates with a limited amount of time, so every question is important. Yet Holt thought it was of national importance to bring up:

-- The birther issue
-- Trump's Iraq "support" 14 years ago
-- Hillary and her Presidential "look".
-- Trump releasing his taxes
-- Trump's support of "unconstitutional" stop-and- frisk

Trump was right. A District Court judge ruled it unconstitutional but the 2nd Circuit threw the judge off the case and overturned the decision. But they didn't stay the lower court's order. So the case is still pending.

and since NYC has a commie mayor ,the City will not persue the appeal.

Yet Holt thought it was of national importance to bring up:

-- The birther issue
-- Trump's Iraq "support" 14 years ago
-- Hillary and her Presidential "look".
-- Trump releasing his taxes
-- Trump's support of "unconstitutional" stop-and- frisk

Good points and true enough.

Hillary voted for the Iraq war as Senator as well.

Trump could have handled, and can handle the birther issue much better though. Could have pointed out that Obama spent 2-3 years and a huge amount in legal fees to keep his birth cert concealed and asked why it was so. Could have asked Lester if presidential candidates should be trusted when they make claims about things, while alluded to Hillary's emails and Hillary's issue of trust.

Trump could have & should have brought up the Clinton foundation, as Lester should have as well given he grilled Trump on his weak points.

Overall it was a depressing thing to watch & listen to, as I imagine the next two will be.

"Overall it was a depressing thing to watch & listen to ..."

Given the kind of questions asked by Holt, I'm not surprised. Then Hillary woke up and joined in with her irrelevant cheap shots.

This wasn't a "Presidential Debate". It was "Let's Air All of Trump's Dirty Laundry".

This wasn't a "Presidential Debate". It was "Let's Air All of Trump's Dirty Laundry".

whitey, I must agree with you.

Trump got attacked by the moderator and his colostomy bag opponent, and he got sucked into the vortex by responding in detail.

Ticked me off that 2/3d of the debate was about issues that don't affect the future of this country.

" Overall it was a depressing thing to watch & listen to, as I imagine the next two will be. "

I suspect that trump will learn from this, and will prepare for the next two.

I think Trump was over confident for this one, and did not prepare properly.

I suspect that trump will learn from this, and will prepare for the next two.

I'm thinking the exact same thing. Trump is a smart guy. Has he ever been in a debate before in his life? He may not.

I think Trump was over confident for this one, and did not prepare properly.

It's not his style to prepare, which Hillary certainly did. Her opening statement was a well rehearsed speech, and many of her soundbites certainly sounded scripted to me. Trump prefers to be himself, and he was himself by not practicing. In that sense he came to the stage in a quite honest fashion. But lack of preparation does come with a cost, and between that and the relatively hostile questions put to him made him not look good.

I say he didn't do lousy, but it was short of the performance I was hoping to see out of him.

Bad, bad moderator.

I suspect that trump will learn from this, and will prepare for the next two.

That might not help him one damned bit if reports we hear are true.

CLINTON RECEIVED DEBATE QUESTIONS WEEK BEFORE DEBATE, ACCORDING TO SOURCES

The first presidential debate was held and Hillary Clinton was proclaimed the winner by the media. Indeed Clinton was able to turn in a strong debate performance, but did she do so fairly? Multiple reports and leaked information from inside the Clinton camp claim that the Clinton campaign was given the entire set of debate questions an entire week before the actual debate.

Earlier last week an NBC intern was seen hand delivering a package to Clinton’s campaign headquarters, according to sources. The package was not given to secretarial staff, as would normally happen, but the intern was instead ushered into the personal office of Clinton campaign manager Robert Mook. Members of the Clinton press corps from several media organizations were in attendance at the time, and a reporter from Fox News recognized the intern, but said he was initially confused because the NBC intern was dressed like a Fed Ex employee.

The reporter from Fox questioned campaign staff about the intern, but campaign staff at first claimed ignorance and then claimed that it was just a Fed Ex employee who had already left. No reporters present who had seen the intern dressed as a Fed Ex employee go into Mook’s office saw him leave by the same front entrance. The Fox reporter who recognized the intern also immediately looked outside of the campaign headquarters and noted that there were no Fed Ex vehicles parked outside.

Clinton seemed to have scripted responses ready for every question she was asked at the first debate. She had facts and numbers memorized for specific questions that it is very doubtful she would have had without being furnished the questions beforehand. The entire mainstream media has specifically been trying to portray Trump as a racist and a poor candidate. By furnishing Clinton with the debate questions NBC certainly hoped to make Clinton appear much more knowledgeable and competent than Trump. And though it is unlikely that anyone will be able to conclusively prove that Clinton was given the debate questions, it seems both logical and likely.

[emphasis added]

baltimoregazette.com/clin...te-questions-week-debate/

My advise to The Donald, lay off of the Cocaine, and you won't sniffle so much.

Donald Trump Did Some Very Classy Favors in the ’80s for a Three-Time Felon and Cocaine Trafficker

[Article]

When Trump advocated for the "stop-and-frisk" police policy, Holt told him that it was declared unconstitutional in New York largely because it singled out black and Latino young men.

"No, you're wrong," Trump said, adding that he believed the court decision would have been overturned on appeal.

[misterwhite #1] Trump was right. A District Court judge ruled it unconstitutional but the 2nd Circuit threw the judge off the case and overturned the decision. But they didn't stay the lower court's order. So the case is still pending.

To be absolutely clear, the transcript shows that Lester Holt said that "stop and frisk was ruled unconstitutional in New York."

"Stop and frisk" was NOT declared unconstitutional.

HOLT: Your two — your two minutes expired, but I do want to follow up. Stop-and-frisk was ruled unconstitutional in New York, because it largely singled out black and Hispanic young men.

TRUMP: No, you're wrong. It went before a judge, who was a very against-police judge. It was taken away from her. And our mayor, our new mayor, refused to go forward with the case. They would have won an appeal. If you look at it, throughout the country, there are many places where it's allowed.

HOLT: The argument is that it's a form of racial profiling.

TRUMP: No, the argument is that we have to take the guns away from these people that have them and they are bad people that shouldn't have them.

These are felons. These are people that are bad people that shouldn't be — when you have 3,000 shootings in Chicago from January 1st, when you have 4,000 people killed in Chicago by guns, from the beginning of the presidency of Barack Obama, his hometown, you have to have stop-and-frisk.

If he was going to bring up stop and frisk, Donald Trump should have been better prepared on this topic and he could have stuffed it down Lester Holt's throat.

"Stop and frisk" was NOT ruled unconstitutional in New York or elsewhere. "Stop and frisk" was ruled constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967). Judge Shira Scheindlin, sitting in the District Court in Manhattan, cannot overturn a U.S. Supreme Court opinion.

There is an Opinion and Order of August 12, 2013 by Judge Scheindlin in the combined case of Floyd et al. v. City of New York, 08 Civ. 1034 (SAS) and Ligon et al. v. City of New York, et al., 12 Civ. 2274 (SAS), issued in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York.

At page 2, emphasis as in original:

The purpose of this Opinion (the “Remedies Opinion”) is to determine what remedies are appropriate in these cases. I address both cases in one Opinion because the remedies necessarily overlap. Each requires that the NYPD reform practices and policies related to stop and frisk to conform with the requirements of the United States Constitution. I stress, at the outset, that the remedies imposed in this Opinion are as narrow and targeted as possible. To be very clear: I am not ordering an end to the practice of stop and frisk. The purpose of the remedies addressed in this Opinion is to ensure that the practice is carried out in a manner that protects the rights and liberties of all New Yorkers, while still providing much needed police protection.

At page 4, emphasis as in original:

With regard to the public interest, the City has expressed concern that interference in the NYPD’s stop and frisk practices may have a detrimental effect on crime control. However, as previously noted, I am not ordering an end to stop and frisk.

It would be strange for an Opinion holding "stop and frisk" to be unconstitutional, to state: To be very clear: I am not ordering an end to the practice of stop and frisk.

The ruling pertained to actions incident to "stop and frisk" as carried out by the NYPD, not to stop and frisk itself.

Racial profiling was held to be constitutionally objectionable:

Floyd v City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d (S.D.N.Y. 12 Aug 2013)

At 180:

The NYPD’s practice of making stops that lack 751 individualized reasonable suspicion has been so pervasive and persistent as to become not only a part of the NYPD’s standard operating procedure, but a fact of daily life in some New York City neighborhoods.

At 181-182:

B. The City Is Liable for Violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Rights Plaintiffs have established the City’s liability for the NYPD’s violation of plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights under two theories, either of which is adequate under Monell. First, plaintiffs showed that the City, through the NYPD, has a policy of indirect racial profiling based on local criminal suspect data. Second, plaintiffs showed that senior officials in the City and at the NYPD have been deliberately indifferent to the intentionally discriminatory application of stop and frisk at the managerial and officer levels.

1. Policy of Indirect Racial Profiling Throughout this litigation the City has acknowledged and defended the NYPD’s policy of conducting stops based in part on criminal suspect data, of which race is a primary factor. The NYPD implements this policy by emphasizing to officers the importance of stopping “the right people.” In practice, officers are directed, sometimes expressly, to target certain racially defined groups for stops. “The Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.” The Second Circuit has admonished that courts should “not 753 condone racially motivated police behavior” and must “take seriously an allegation of racial profiling.” Racial profiling constitutes intentional discrimination in violation of the Equal 754 Protection Clause if it involves any of the following: an express classification based on race that does not survive strict scrutiny; the application of facially neutral criminal laws or law 755 enforcement policies “in an intentionally discriminatory manner;” or a facially neutral policy 756 that has an adverse effect and was motivated by discriminatory animus. The City’s policy of 757 targeting “the right people” for stops clearly violates the Equal Protection Clause under the second method of proof, and, insofar as the use of race is explicit, the first.

As for the removal of Judge Scheindlin from the case, the 2nd Circuit found that "her disqualification [wa]s required.]

In re Reassignment of Cases: Ligon; Floyd et al. v. City of New York, et al. 13-3123; 13-3088 (2nd Cir., 31 Oct 2013), ORDER at 2-3:

Pending before the Court is a motion filed by Appellants City of New York et al. seeking a stay of the District Court’s August 12, 2013 remedial order and preliminary injunction (“Remedies Opinion”).

It is hereby ORDERED that the District Court’s January 8, 2013 “Opinion and Order,” as well as the August 12, 2013 “Liability Opinion” and “Remedies Opinion,” each of which may or will have the effect of causing actions to be taken by defendants or designees of the District Court, or causing restraints against actions that otherwise would be taken by defendants, are STAYED pending the disposition of these appeals.

The appeal by defendants in both (consolidated) actions shall continue in the normal course, under the following schedule:

Defendants shall perfect their appeals by January 24, 2014.

Plaintiffs shall file by February 28, 2014.

Defendants shall reply by March 14, 2014.

Oral argument shall be heard on a date after March 14, 2014, to be set by the Court in due course.

The cause is REMANDED to the District Court for the sole purpose of implementation of this Order, and the mandate shall otherwise remain with this Court until the completion of the appeals process.

Upon review of the record in these cases, we conclude that the District Judge ran afoul of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 2 (“A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.”); see also Canon 3(C)(1) (“A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . .”), and that the appearance of impartiality surrounding this litigation was compromised by the District Judge’s improper application of the Court’s “related case rule,” see Transfer of Related Cases, S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. Local Rule 13(a),[1] and by a series of media

__________

[1] In a proceeding on December 21, 2007 involving the parties in Daniels v. City of New York, No. 99 Civ. 1695 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 8, 1999), the District Judge stated, “[I]f you got proof of inappropriate racial profiling in a good constitutional case, why don’t you bring a lawsuit? You can certainly mark it as related.” She also stated,

“[W]hat I am trying to say, I am sure I am going to get in trouble for saying it, for $65 you can bring that lawsuit.”

She concluded the proceeding by noting, “And as I said before, I would accept it as a related case, which the plaintiff has the power to designate.” Two of the attorney groups working on behalf of plaintiffs in Daniels, a case

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

interviews and public statements purporting to respond publicly to criticism of the District Court.[2]

Accordingly, we conclude that, in the interest , and appearance , of fair and impartial administration of justice , UPON REMAND , these cases shall be assigned to a different District Judge, chosen randomly under the established practices of the District Court for th e Southern District of New York. This newly-designated District Judge shall implement this Court’s mandate staying all proceedings and otherwise await further action by the Court of Appeals on the merits of the ongoing appeals. In taking these actions, we intimate no view on the substance or merits of the pending appeals, which have yet to be fully briefed and argued.

The mandate shall ISSUE FORTHWITH for the sole purpose of implementation of this Order and shall otherwise remain in this Court.

In the interest of judicial economy, any question, application, or further appeal regarding the scope of this Order or its implementation shall be directed to this panel, which will hear the case on the merits in due course.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

__________

challenging the New York Police Department’s stop-and-frisk practices, helped file Floyd the next month. See generally Joseph Goldstein, A Court Rule Directs Cases Over Friskings to One Judge, N.Y. Times, May 5, 2013.

2 See, e.g., Mark Hamblett, Stop-and-Frisk Judge Relishes her Independence, N.Y. Law Journal, May 5, 2013; Larry Neumeister, NY “Frisk” Judge Calls Criticism “Below-the-Belt,” The Associated Press, May 19, 2013; Jeffrey Toobin, A Judge Takes on Stop-and-Frisk, The New Yorker, May 27, 2013.

In re Reassignment of Cases: Ligon; Floyd et al. v. City of New York, et al. 13-3123; 13-3088 (2nd Cir., 13 Nov 2013), at 2: (footnotes omitted, boldface added, italics in original)

PER CURIAM

These cases, motions of which were argued in tandem, deal with an issue of great significance: the constitutional boundaries of practices by the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) that subject citizens to being stopped and frisked. On August 12, 2013, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin, a long-serving and distinguished jurist of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, held that the City of New York (“the City”) had violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and ordered the City to engage in a variety of remedial measures and activities.

On August 27, 2013, the City moved in the district court to stay those remedies, pending an appeal on the merits of the district court’s decision. Judge Scheindlin denied the motions. On September 23, 2013, the City moved in this Court to stay the imposition of the district court’s remedies. By order dated October 31, 2013, we both granted that stay and, because the appearance of impartiality had been compromised by certain statements made by Judge Scheindlin during proceedings in the district court and in media interviews, we reassigned the cases to a different district judge, to be chosen randomly. We now explain the basis for that order, which is superseded by this opinion.

At 6-7:

We emphasize at the outset that we make no findings of misconduct, actual bias, or actual partiality on the part of Judge Scheindlin. Following our review of the record, however, we conclude that her conduct while on the bench, which appears to have resulted in these lawsuits being filed and directed to her, in conjunction with her statements to the media and the resulting stories published while a decision on the merits was pending and while public interest in the outcome of the litigation was high, might cause a reasonable observer to question her impartiality. For this reason, her disqualification is required by section 455(a).

A.

The appearance of partiality stems in the first instance from comments made by Judge Scheindlin that a reasonable observer could interpret as intimating her views on the merits of a case that had yet to be filed, and as seeking to have that case filed and to preside over it after it was filed. These comments were made in the earlier case of Daniels v. City of New York, No. 99-cv-1695, in which the City entered into a settlement agreement requiring it, inter alia, to establish policies that prohibited racial profiling. Ten days before Judge Scheindlin’s supervisory authority under the settlement agreement was set to expire, she heard argument on a motion brought by the Daniels plaintiffs to extend the settlement period.16 The transcript of the hearing indicates that the City had substantially complied with the relief required by the settlement and that the plaintiffs were seeking information from the City beyond that required to be furnished by the settlement agreement.

Observing that the settlement agreement did not entitle the plaintiffs to the relief they sought, Judge Scheindlin counseled:

THE COURT: [. . .] why don’t you file a lawsuit

Ligon; Floyd et al. v. City of New York, et al. (2nd Cir., 31 Oct 2014), footnote at 1:

By stipulation, dated March 8, 2013, the parties withdrew all claims with prejudice against the individual defendants in Floyd v. City of New York. Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the official captions in Nos. 13-3088, 14-2829, and 14?2848 to conform with the caption above.

At 27-30, footnotes omitted, underline added

II.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b) provides that "[a]n appeal may be dismissed on the appellant's motion on terms agreed to by the parties or fixed by the court."

Although we have affirmed Judge Torres's denial of the unions' motion to intervene, the merits of the underlying Liability and Remedial Orders are complex and controversial, and they indisputably implicate serious questions of broad constitutional importance, as well as difficult evidentiary questions concerning the use of statistical evidence.

However, because the City has decided to exercise its right to settle these cases on the basis of an agreement to comply with the Remedial Order, we have no occasion to review the merits of either Judge Scheindlin's liability determination and challenges to the nature of plaintiffs' proof, or the remedies she thereafter ordered. The liability determinations are not part of the settlement and the Remedial Order has been accepted solely as the basis for the parties' settlement. Thus, nothing in this opinion should be construed as accepting or rejecting any part of the Liability and Remedial Orders issued by Judge Scheindlin.

While the parties' settlement may not be formally designated a "consent decree" because it finds its basis in a post-trial judicial order, we understand it — and the parties confirmed this understanding at oral argument — to operate as such. We emphasize, therefore, that "[a] continuing decree of injunction directed to events to come is subject always to adaptation as events may shape the need." Injunctions in so-called institutional reform litigation "often remain in force for many years, and the passage of time frequently brings about changed circumstances — changes in the nature of the underlying problem, changes in governing law or its interpretation by the courts, and new policy insights — that warrant reexamination of the original judgment." As the Supreme Court has observed, "[i]f a federal consent decree is not limited to reasonable and necessary implementations of federal law, it may improperly deprive future officials of their designated legislative and executive powers." As the parties agreed at oral argument and have stated in their joint memorandum of law pertaining to the settlement, the Remedial Order adopted by the City in settlement of these cases is projected to expire in five years upon a showing of substantial compliance by the City, and the monitor's oversight will end in three years upon the same showing. Moreover, the District Court remains open to entertain proposed modifications to the presently agreed-upon settlement.

In the particular circumstances presented here, the City's motion for voluntary dismissal of the appeals, with prejudice, must be granted.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Judge Torresfs July 30, 2014 decision is AFFIRMED as being an appropriate exercise of her discretion, the police unions' motions to intervene in the appeals are DENIED, the City's motion for voluntary dismissal of the appeals with prejudice is GRANTED, and the causes are REMANDED for such further proceedings before Judge Torres as may be appropriate in the circumstances. The mandate shall issue seven days from the date of the filing of this opinion.

Nothing that we have written here, or that the parties have suggested, should foreclose any reliance by the unions on collective bargaining rights afforded to them under the Labor Management Relations Act and state and local law. Moreover, in view of the possible relevance of the unions' perspectives in any ongoing District Court proceedings, nothing in this opinion should be construed to inhibit the District Court from considering the interests of the unions, either as amici curiae, or on such other terms as the District Court may deem appropriate.

But why?

Pundits say that scream cost Howard Dean the primary. Maybe, maybe not. But he responded by saying, "the media did a bad thing" by exaggerating his rallying cry.

I see. But it's just fine for him to exaggerate and speculate on Trump's sniffle?

exaggerate and speculate

Wasn't Hillary supposed to collapse and die during the debate according to all the speculation?

"Wasn't Hillary supposed to collapse and die during the debate according to all the speculation?"

Given her past behavior, people questioned among themselves whether she'd be able to stand at a podium under the hot lights for 90 minutes.

I'm not aware of anyone going on MSNBC and saying they expected Hillary to collapse and die.

Oh geez, you're shilling for hillary is now way worse then you did in 2008, not as bad as your shilling for obama in 2012 but very close.

Hondo the Cuck is servicing Gay's Johnson, his great hope is that Gay's Johnson might siphon off enough votes to hand the election to Hillary. He's cucked to a cuck!

I see. But it's just fine for him to exaggerate and speculate on Trump's sniffle?

But there is no need to speculate on where Gay's Johnson stands on open borders. He went into a full blown SJW triggering at the word "illegal."

If he was going to bring up stop and frisk, Donald Trump should have been better prepared on this topic and he could have stuffed it down Lester Holt's throat.

"Stop and frisk" was NOT ruled unconstitutional in New York or elsewhere. "Stop and frisk" was ruled constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967). Judge Shira Scheindlin, sitting in the District Court in Manhattan, cannot overturn a U.S. Supreme Court opinion. --- opinion posted by nolu sham

Neither the SCOTUS, sitting in Washigton DC, nor Judge Shira Scheindlin, sitting in the District Court in Manhattan, can overturn a principle of our Constitution; Wherin the 10th reserves the police power to the States, allowing them to stop and frisk suspected criminals.

How is it the fault of police when they perform stop and frisk in a high crime area and 90% of those they stop are minorities? 90% of the people in these high crime areas ARE minorities! --- misterwhite

Y'ALL --- Notice there is no reply from nolu, confirming he is a sham...

Hondo the Cuck is servicing Gay's Johnson, his great hope is that Gay's Johnson might siphon off enough votes to hand the election to Hillary. He's cucked to a cuck!

He's never posted an article attacking democrat but is always bad mouthing the repubs.

Hmmmm, If you look like a cuck, talk like a cuck you must be a hondo for hillary 2016.

[misterwhite #16] How is it the fault of police when they perform stop and frisk in a high crime area and 90% of those they stop are minorities? 90% of the people in these high crime areas ARE minorities!

[tpaine #23] Y'ALL --- Notice there is no reply from nolu, confirming he is a sham...

They can be at fault if they perform suspicionless stops based on race. Stop and frisk is not unconstitutional per se, but a particular stop and frisk action may be unconstitutional if performed improperly or for the wrong reason.

- - - - - - - - - -

Judge Scheindlin's analysis is contained in her 198-page Liability Opinion.

http://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/Floyd-Liability-Opinion-8-12-13.pdf

The Floyd Liability Decision by Judge Scheindlin (198 pp.)

At 7-8:

With respect to plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim, I reject the testimony of the City’s experts that the race of crime suspects is the appropriate benchmark for measuring racial bias in stops. The City and its highest officials believe that blacks and Hispanics should be stopped at the same rate as their proportion of the local criminal suspect population. But this reasoning is flawed because the stopped population is overwhelmingly innocent — not criminal. There is no basis for assuming that an innocent population shares the same characteristics as the criminal suspect population in the same area. Instead, I conclude that the benchmark used by plaintiffs’ expert — a combination of local population demographics and local crime rates (to account for police deployment) is the most sensible.

Based on the expert testimony I find the following: (1) The NYPD carries out more stops where there are more black and Hispanic residents, even when other relevant variables are held constant. The racial composition of a precinct or census tract predicts the stop rate above and beyond the crime rate. (2) Blacks and Hispanics are more likely than whites to be stopped within precincts and census tracts, even after controlling for other relevant variables. This is so even in areas with low crime rates, racially heterogenous populations, or predominately white populations. (3) For the period 2004 through 2009, when any law enforcement action was taken following a stop, blacks were 30% more likely to be arrested (as opposed to receiving a summons) than whites, for the same suspected crime. (4) For the period 2004 through 2009, after controlling for suspected crime and precinct characteristics, blacks who were stopped were about 14% more likely — and Hispanics 9% more likely — than whites to be subjected to the use of force. (5) For the period 2004 through 2009, all else being equal, the odds of a stop resulting in any further enforcement action were 8% lower if the person stopped was black than if the person stopped was white. In addition, the greater the black population in a precinct, the less likely that a stop would result in a sanction. Together, these results show that blacks are likely targeted for stops based on a lesser degree of objectively founded suspicion than whites.

http://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/Floyd-Remedy-Opinion-8-12-13.pdf

The Floyd Remedy Decision by Judge Scheindlin (39 pp.)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Opinion and Orders of Replacement Judge Analisa Torres

http://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/Floyd%20v%20City%20of%20New%20York%20Order%20on%20Modification%20July%2030%202014.pdf

Floyd v. City of New York, Order Modifying Remedial Order, July 30 2014 (2 pp.)

http://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/Floyd%20v%20City%20of%20New%20York%20-%20July%2030%202014%20Opinion%20and%20Order.pdf

Floyd v. City of New York, Opinion and Order, July 30 2014 (108 pp.)

ANALISA TORRES, District Judge:

At 3-4:

BACKGROUND

Nearly fifty years have passed since the Supreme Court of the United States endorsed the practice that became known as “stop-and-frisk.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968). There, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated when a police officer stops, questions, and frisks a suspect without probable cause if the officer has reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity may be afoot” or a reasonable belief that the person “may be armed and presently dangerous.” Id. at 30. In the decades since, the contours of Terry’s exception to probable cause have been vigorously litigated in the courts.

In this current iteration, two sets of plaintiffs challenge the legality of the New York City Police Department’s (the “NYPD”) stop-and-frisk tactics. In Ligon, after a seven-day evidentiary hearing, on January 8, 2013, the Court issued a preliminary injunction against the City, finding that plaintiffs would likely succeed in proving that the City has a policy of stopping, frisking, and arresting persons for trespass based primarily on their presence in or near Bronx apartment buildings enrolled in the Trespass Affidavit Program (“TAP”)—which permits the NYPD to patrol private buildings with their owners’ consent—in violation of the Fourth Amendment (the “Injunction Order”). Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 486 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2013), amending and superseding, Ligon v. City of New York, 12 Civ. 2274,

2013 WL 71800 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2013). In Floyd, after years of litigation culminating in a nine-week trial, on August 12, 2013, the Court issued an opinion holding that the City had a policy of conducting race-based stops-and-frisks that ran afoul of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (the “Liability Order”). Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Because of the similarities in the City’s constitutional violations in Floyd and Ligon, the Court issued a second opinion on August 12, 2013, which ordered certain remedial measures to cure the constitutional infirmities identified in both cases (the “Remedial Order”). Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

Initially, the City appealed the Injunction, Liability, and Remedial Orders. Several weeks later, the Unions moved to intervene and also filed notices of appeal. Then, in January 2014, newly-elected Mayor Bill de Blasio announced the City’s intention to withdraw the appeals and settle the cases. The Unions, nevertheless, still seek intervention to prosecute the appeals the City no longer wants to pursue. The Injunction, Liability, and Remedial Orders are the product of fifteen years of litigation, against the backdrop of decades of public discourse on the issue of stop-and-frisk. Thus, because a full account of these cases would fill libraries, the Court chronicles only those facts that aid in addressing the Unions’ motions to intervene.

At 10-11:

II. The Liability Order and the Remedial Order

On August 12, 2013, the Court issued the Liability Order in Floyd, finding that the NYPD’s practice of conducting suspicionless stops-and-frisks was widespread, that the City was deliberately indifferent to the NYPD’s practice, and that the practice was therefore attributable to the City as an official policy. 959 F. Supp. 2d. at 562. The Court held that this policy violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. The Court also found that the City had adopted a race-based policy of disproportionately targeting blacks and Hispanics for stops and held that this policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. In so doing, the Court made findings of fact and conclusions of law that evaluated, credited, and discredited the documentary and testimonial evidence presented at trial, including the testimony of numerous civilians who were stopped and the testimony of numerous NYPD officers, many of whom were involved in those stops. Id. at 572-658.

The Court issued the Remedial Order, also on August 12, 2013, directing the City—the sole remaining defendant—to remedy the violations identified in Floyd and Ligon. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668. The Remedial Order mandates immediate and ongoing equitable relief. Id. With respect to Floyd, the Remedial Order directs the court-appointed monitor to “develop, in consultation with the parties, . . . ‘Immediate Reforms’ . . . as soon as practicable,” including changes to “the NYPD’s policies, training, supervision, monitoring and discipline” regarding stop-and-frisk. Id. at 678-84. The proposed Immediate Reforms are to be submitted to the Court and implemented upon approval. Id. at 677. The Remedial Order also requires the City to conduct a one-year pilot project in which officers in one precinct per borough will wear body cameras on patrol. Id. at 685. In addition, the City and Plaintiffs must engage in a six to nine month “Joint Remedial Process,” guided by a court-appointed facilitator, to develop “Joint Process Reforms” in consultation with the monitor and based on input from a variety of stakeholders, including “NYPD personnel and representatives of police organizations.” Id. at 684-88. The proposed Joint Process Reforms must be submitted to the Court for approval. Id. at 688. With respect to Ligon, the Remedial Order adopts the approach proposed in the Injunction Order, which requires the NYPD to adopt a court-provided written policy on the legal standard for trespass stops around TAP buildings, to make changes to supervision and training regarding such stops, and, in conjunction with the monitor, to create a system for monitoring the constitutionality of stops and ensuring that all stops are documented on UF-250s. Id. at 688-90.

Misterwhite #16] How is it the fault of police when they perform stop and frisk in a high crime area and 90% of those they stop are minorities? 90% of the people in these high crime areas ARE minorities!

[tpaine #23] Y'ALL --- Notice there is no reply from nolu, confirming he is a sham...

nolu --- They can be at fault if they perform suspicionless stops based on race. Stop and frisk is not unconstitutional per se, but a particular stop and frisk action may be unconstitutional if performed improperly or for the wrong reason. - - - - - - - - - -

BACKGROUND:

Nolu sham only answered because he was ashamed into it...

Nolu sham only answered because he was ashamed into it...

Keep sitting in your corner, thinking off.

"thinking off"

Is that like jerking off?

Your masturbatory tendencies are evident with every over indulgent epic you post.

Is that like jerking off?

They don't call you needledick the bugfucker for nothing.

needledick the bugfucker

Juvenile creep.

" CLINTON RECEIVED DEBATE QUESTIONS WEEK BEFORE DEBATE, ACCORDING TO SOURCES "

I think Clinton wrote the questions, and gave them to Holt.

"There are only three debates with a limited amount of time, so every question is important. " So, why did Holt waste so much time on bull shit?

Sure would be a shame if Holt gets mugged, and gets both of his legs & his jaw broke wouldn't it?