"have been shown to produce false positives in tests of Mucinex, chocolate, aspirin, chocolate, and oregano"

And chocolate. But no false positives on Krispy Kreme donuts.

"After being kidnapped and caged because of the incompetence of police officers"

They ran two separate drug tests and both were positive. How were they incompetent?

They ran two separate drug tests and both were positive. How were they incompetent?

The tests are faulty, yet cops continue to use them.

It's either incompetence or they are knowingly arresting innocent citizens.

"The tests are faulty, yet cops continue to use them."

IF (and that's a big IF) the tests are faulty, that's not the cop's fault. Sue the maker of the testing kit.

You're too f**king quick to always blame the cops.

IF (and that's a big IF) the tests are faulty, that's not the cop's fault. Sue the maker of the testing kit.

You're too f**king quick to always blame the cops.

Some blame also goes to whoever chose those test kits for police use; it's not improbable that this person(s) is in the employ of the police department.

“I recognized through my eleven years of training and experience as a law enforcement officer the substance to be some sort of narcotic,” she wrote.

Since - as the Orlando Sentinel link reports (but this article omits), "A state crime lab, however, did another test several weeks later and cleared him" - this officer's "eleven years of training and experience as a law enforcement officer" are worth crap.

On the plus side, I guess we can conclude she doesn't eat many doughnuts.

"it's not improbable that this person(s) is in the employ of the police department."

Or this person(s) lives next door to someone who knows somebody in the police department. So there's your connection.

"it's not improbable that this person(s) is in the employ of the police department."

Or this person(s) lives next door to someone who knows somebody in the police department.

Do you really want to go on record as claiming these are comparably probable?

You're too f**king quick to always blame the cops.

It's
always
an
evil
conspiracy

normalize
criminals

weirdos

drug
addicts

glamorize
them

is
what
liberals
do

Make
America
sober
great
again

love
boris

"Do you really want to go on record as claiming these are comparably probable?"

Oh, no. Mine is much more likely. Moot point. I didn't post that with the intent of making it comparably probable.

Some blame also goes to whoever chose those test kits for police use; it's not improbable that this person(s) is in the employ of the police department.

Or this person(s) lives next door to someone who knows somebody in the police department. So there's your connection.

Do you really want to go on record as claiming these are comparably probable?

I didn't post that with the intent of making it comparably probable.

Just the intent of muddying the waters.

"Just the intent of muddying the waters."

Me? You're the one trying to turn this into a conspiracy. So what if the buyer works for the police department? The kits were defective.

You're the one trying to turn this into a conspiracy.

You're full of shit as usual.

So what if the buyer works for the police department? The kits were defective.

As was the selection and thus the selecter.

"As was the selection and thus the selecter."

So the selecter(sic) knew they were defective and should therefore be blamed.

That's called a conspiracy and you have zero proof of that.

" Cops Mistake Krispy Kreme Donuts for Meth, Throw Innocent 64-yo Man in Jail, Strip Search Him "

They were just pissed, because he bought the last box of 12.

So the selecter(sic) knew they were defective

Another addition to your platoon of straw men. More likely failed to exercise due care.

and should therefore be blamed.

Yup.

" Cops Mistake Krispy Kreme Donuts for Meth, Throw Innocent 64-yo Man in Jail, Strip Search Him "

They were just pissed, because he bought the last box of 12.

ROTFL!

"More likely failed to exercise due care ... and should therefore be blamed."
"Yup."

Sure. Just as you, as the driver, would accept the blame when driving a car with a manufacturer's defect in the brakes.

What world do you live in?

Just as you, as the driver, would accept the blame when driving a car with a manufacturer's defect in the brakes.

If knowledge of that defect was available to me, yes.

So what if the buyer works for the police department? The kits were defective.

Presumptive test kits are not intended to test positive only on the target substance. It will test positive for a limited number of substances. This is not proof that the kits are defective. A positive result provides probable suspicion that the target substance in present and justifies a definitive test being run.

People keep saying police, police, police, so I will add that if it is your friendly customs inspector doing a routine inspection of your bags and he encounters what he suspects to be contraband, and a presumptive field test cannot rule out said contraband, it serves to have him dig in and perform an examination of your bags, rather more intrusive than an inspection. A drug dog may join in as well.

Presumptive test kits are not intended to test positive only on the target substance. It will test positive for a limited number of substances. This is not proof that the kits are defective. A positive result provides probable suspicion that the target substance in present and justifies a definitive test being run.

Probable cause exists only if the substances that cause positive results are meaningfully "limited". Given the prevalence of sugar, it's far from clear that a test result of meth-or-sugar is probable cause for an arrest as happened in the case in question.

[Article by Matt Agorist]

“I recognized through my eleven years of training and experience as a law enforcement officer the substance to be some sort of narcotic,” she wrote.

Rushing, who is a concealed carry permit holder told the officer that there was a weapon in the car. Luckily he was not shot. However, he was asked to step out of the car and then the officer asked to search his vehicle.

[From Orlando Sentinel]

http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-cop-mistook-doughnut-glaze-for-meth-20160727-story.html

When Rushing opened his wallet, she saw that he had a concealed weapons permit, she wrote. He told her that he had a gun, and she asked him to step out of his car, a small Chevy.

That is not the way one wants a cop to find out that you are carrying.

As for Agorist, it is difficult for a sentient being to take his yellow "journalism" seriously.

[nolu chan #19 Presumptive test kits are not intended to test positive only on the target substance. It will test positive for a limited number of substances. This is not proof that the kits are defective. A positive result provides probable suspicion that the target substance in present and justifies a definitive test being run.

[ConservingFreedom #20] Probable cause exists only if the substances that cause positive results are meaningfully "limited". Given the prevalence of sugar, it's far from clear that a test result of meth-or-sugar is probable cause for an arrest as happened in the case in question.

[From Orlando Sentinel]

http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-cop-mistook-doughnut-glaze-for-meth-20160727-story.html

According to FDLE, an analyst in its Orlando crime lab did not try to identify what police found in his car. She only checked to determine whether it was an illegal drug and confirmed that it was not.

The lab only tested to confirm or deny the presence of illegal drugs. There is no result saying that the substance was sugar.

Your claim that "probable cause exists only if the substances that cause positive results are meaningfully 'limited,'" is contrary to a few decades of established law.

An experienced officer who finds what he believes is contraband has probable cause to arrest. She does not need a presumptive drug test to have probable cause, but in this case she had that too.

As it transpired, she did not have enough for a prosecution or conviction.

See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 US 366 (2003)

It is uncontested in the present case that the officer, upon recovering the five plastic glassine baggies containing suspected cocaine, had probable cause to believe a felony had been committed.

Just finding suspected cocaine is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed.

And the court concluded,

We hold that the officer had probable cause to believe that Pringle had committed the crime of possession of a controlled substance. Pringle’s arrest therefore did not contravene the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

In footnote 2, the court stated,

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 175–176 (1949) (“Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within their [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed”).

State v. Jackson, 161 Wis.2d 527 (Wis. 1991) was a case involving a presumptive positive result without a confirming test result. It found insufficient evidence for the proof required at trial, but probable cause for the initial arrest.

(Dismissing petition to review 157 Wis.2d 264, 459 N.W.2d 260 (Ct.App. 1990).)

STEINMETZ, J.

When the court accepted this petition for review by the state of Wisconsin subsequent to an unpublished court of appeals decision, the court believed two issues existed pursuant to sec. 809.62, Stats., which sets forth the criteria for accepting petitions. On review, it is obvious that the only question presented pertains to the sufficiency of the evidence. We now determine the petition for review was improvidently granted.

In accepting the petition for review, the court believed it would be presented with evidence that the particular field test for cocaine used by the police, a version of the cobalt thiocyanate test, offered improved reliability and accuracy over other field tests such that the positive result from the test might in itself be sufficient to support a conviction for possession of the drug. No such evidence was presented; in fact, the state now concedes that the cobalt thiocyanate test is nonspecific and at most raises a presumption of the presence of cocaine.

In addition, the nonspecific character of cobalt thiocyanate test results notwithstanding, the court believed it would be presented with circumstantial evidence which, combined with the positive field test result, might have been sufficient to meet the state's burden of proof. See State v. Wind , 60 Wis.2d 267, 208 N.W.2d 357 (1973). The circumstantial evidence the court received, however, did not in any way support a determination as to the nature of the substance in question.

The evidence presented by the state may have been sufficient for a finding of probable cause. However, it does little to prove beyond a reasonable doubt an element of a crime which would be necessary for a valid conviction, i.e., that the substance recovered was cocaine.

By the Court. — The petition for review is dismissed.

There is no result saying that the substance was sugar.

Which further weighs against the test kit being meaningfully "limited".

An experienced officer who finds what he believes is contraband has probable cause to arrest. She does not need a presumptive drug test to have probable cause

We were discussing whether test kits provided probable cause; you: "A positive result provides probable suspicion".

Which further weighs against the test kit being meaningfully "limited".

That make-believe bullshit falls to the court opinions in #22 which you are evading.

the court opinions in #22 which you are evading are irrelevant to the original topic.

Fixed it. We were discussing whether test kits provided probable cause; you: "A positive result provides probable suspicion".

Fixed it. We were discussing whether test kits provided probable cause; you: "A positive result provides probable suspicion".

Bullshitting does not take away the court opinions cited in my #21 which clearly hold to the contrary of your nonsense which is cited to no authority at all. apparently you feel your unsupported and unsupportable opinion overrules that of the U.S. Supreme Court.

See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 US 366 (2003)

It is uncontested in the present case that the officer, upon recovering the five plastic glassine baggies containing suspected cocaine, had probable cause to believe a felony had been committed.

Just finding suspected cocaine is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed.

And the court concluded,

We hold that the officer had probable cause to believe that Pringle had committed the crime of possession of a controlled substance. Pringle’s arrest therefore did not contravene the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

In footnote 2, the court stated,

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 175–176 (1949) (“Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within their [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed”).

The officer needs only a reasnable belief that an offense has been or is being committed. A presumptive test is nice but not even necessary. Probable casue was found for many, many years before presumptive tests existed.

State v. Jackson, 161 Wis.2d 527 (Wis. 1991) was a case involving a presumptive positive result without a confirming test result. It found insufficient evidence for the proof required at trial, but probable cause for the initial arrest.

(Dismissing petition to review 157 Wis.2d 264, 459 N.W.2d 260 (Ct.App. 1990).)

STEINMETZ, J.

When the court accepted this petition for review by the state of Wisconsin subsequent to an unpublished court of appeals decision, the court believed two issues existed pursuant to sec. 809.62, Stats., which sets forth the criteria for accepting petitions. On review, it is obvious that the only question presented pertains to the sufficiency of the evidence. We now determine the petition for review was improvidently granted.

In accepting the petition for review, the court believed it would be presented with evidence that the particular field test for cocaine used by the police, a version of the cobalt thiocyanate test, offered improved reliability and accuracy over other field tests such that the positive result from the test might in itself be sufficient to support a conviction for possession of the drug. No such evidence was presented; in fact, the state now concedes that the cobalt thiocyanate test is nonspecific and at most raises a presumption of the presence of cocaine.

In addition, the nonspecific character of cobalt thiocyanate test results notwithstanding, the court believed it would be presented with circumstantial evidence which, combined with the positive field test result, might have been sufficient to meet the state's burden of proof. See State v. Wind , 60 Wis.2d 267, 208 N.W.2d 357 (1973). The circumstantial evidence the court received, however, did not in any way support a determination as to the nature of the substance in question.

The evidence presented by the state may have been sufficient for a finding of probable cause. However, it does little to prove beyond a reasonable doubt an element of a crime which would be necessary for a valid conviction, i.e., that the substance recovered was cocaine.

By the Court. — The petition for review is dismissed.

I guess when you are stuck, you make believe you did not say something really, really stupid. Probable cause exists even if the field test does not occur. Even where the sample later is proven to be sugar. Your statement is just bullshit you made up.

Have some more court opinions on probable cause.

In Russell, "The clear plastic package seized from the glove compartment, however, contained only lactose." Big whoop. The court explicitly held that a field test was not required. The officer had a reasonable belief that it was heroin. That was probable cause to search the car without a warrant. Russell was convicted for what all else they found in a warrantless search based on probable cause.

United States v. Russell 655 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1981)

Russell argues first that the police lacked probable cause to search the car. This contention lacks merit. The absence of a license plate justified the initial stop of the car. After Russell opened the glove compartment, Officer Goddard saw in plain view two packets that, to his trained eye, signaled the presence of heroin and marijuana. Russell attempted to close the glove compartment lid on Goddard's hand, heightening the officers' suspicion that the packages contained contraband. Together, these circumstances gave the officers probable cause to believe that drugs were in the car and, therefore, to search the car without a warrant. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1981, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970).

Russell urges that, before the police searched the automobile, they should have field tested the white substance found in the glove compartment. If they had done so, they would have discovered that the glassine package contained sugar, not heroin. They might then have lacked probable cause to search further. Probable cause, however, rests on a "reasonable probability" that a crime has been committed, not on certainty that illegal activity is afoot. United States v. Brown, 463 F.2d 949, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1972). We would unduly retard legitimate law enforcement methods if we held that on the facts before us a stop to field test was obligatory. Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949).

Probable cause only required the officer tp have a reasonable belief that the suspect has committed a crime.

Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 US 31 (1979)

At 37:

This Court repeatedly has explained that "probable cause" to justify an arrest means facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense. See Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, at 111; Adams v. Williams, supra, at 148; Beck v. Ohio, supra, at 91; Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307, 313 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 175-176; Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 162 (1925).

At 37-38:

A prudent officer, in the course of determining whether respondent had committed an offense under all the circumstances shown by this record, should not have been required to anticipate that a court would later hold the ordinance unconstitutional.

Police are charged to enforce laws until and unless they are declared unconstitutional. The enactment of a law forecloses speculation by enforcement officers concerning its constitutionality—with the possible exception of a law so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws. Society would be ill-served if its police officers took it upon themselves to determine which laws are and which are not constitutionally entitled to enforcement.

The officer's belief need not be correct or even more likely true than false.

United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501 (6th Cir. 1988)

At 1508:

A warrantless arrest is justified if, at the time of the defendant's arrest, police officers have probable cause to believe that an offense has been, is being, or will be committed. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S. Ct. 223, 225, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964). Probable cause exists where the "facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense." Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 2632, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1979) (and cases cited therein). The probable cause requirement does "not demand any showing that such a belief is correct or more likely true than false." Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983).

Covelli's problems started when he was search on reasonable belief that he had conterfeit money. It turned out to be real. But the swag they found was hot jewelry. The reasonable belief that the money was counterfeit made for probable cause to arrest and search.

United States v. Covelli, 738 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1984)

While at the Seattle Airport Robert Covelli went into a store and purchased some clothing with three $100 bills. The store clerk suspected that one of the bills was counterfeit and called the police. Covelli approached one of the officers investigating the alleged counterfeit currency and asked the officer for directions. Since Covelli matched the description given by the store clerk, the officer asked Covelli about an event that occurred in the clothing store. Covelli responded "What's wrong? Was the money bad?" even though the officer had not mentioned money. At that point Covelli was taken into custody, strip-searched, and placed in a cell. Covelli consented to a search of his luggage and, in the course of the search, the officers observed coins, rolls of coins, and a large amount of jewelry. In addition, $4200.00 in $100 bills and other jewelry matching items stolen from PAG were found on his person. Before the search of the luggage was completed, however, the officers were notified by the Secret Service that the bill in question was not counterfeit. The officers then returned Covelli's possessions and released him. Thereafter, the Covellis flew to Pasco, Washington and went to David Frederick's residence.

[...]

Search and Seizure. Covelli contends that certain evidence, specifically the observations made by the arresting officers during the consent search at the Seattle Airport as well as Covelli's post-arrest statements, should have been suppressed. He alleges that his consent to search the luggage was vitiated by the illegal warrantless arrest. He concedes that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that he was involved with counterfeit currency, but that the detention involved here went beyond a limited "Terry stop" and hence the detention was illegal unless the officers possessed probable cause. He further alleges that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him and that the evidence must therefore be suppressed.

[...]

The police have probable cause to arrest an individual where "the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they [have] reasonable trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S. Ct. 223, 225, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964); United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 479, 486 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S. Ct. 2453, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1333 (1983). "[P]robable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity." Illinois v. Gates, --- U.S. ----, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2335 n. 13, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). The determination of whether probable cause exists in a given situation involves "the factual, practical considerations of everyday life upon which reasonable, prudent [persons], not legal technicians act." United States v. Watson, 587 F.2d 365, 368 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, Davis v. United States, 439 U.S. 1132, 99 S. Ct. 1055, 59 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1979).

In Hill, the police arrested Miller in the reasonable belief that he was Hill. The belief was totally incorrect, but made for probable cause for the arrest and the search of Hill's apartment.

Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971)

At 802-805:

Based on our own examination of the record, we find no reason to disturb either the findings of the California courts that the police had probable cause to arrest Hill and that the arresting officers had a reasonable, good faith belief that the arrestee Miller was in fact, Hill, or the conclusion that,

"[w]hen the police have probable cause to arrest one party, and when they reasonably mistake a second party for the first party, then the arrest of the second party is a valid arrest."

69 Cal.2d at 553, 446 P.2d at 523. The police unquestionably had probable cause to arrest Hill; they also had his address and a verified description. The mailbox at the indicated address listed Hill as the occupant of the apartment. Upon gaining entry to the apartment, they were confronted with one who fit the description of Hill received from various sources. That person claimed he was Miller, not Hill. But aliases and false identifications are not uncommon. Moreover, there was a lock on the door, and Miller's explanation for his mode of entry was not convincing. He also denied knowledge of firearms in the apartment although a pistol and loaded ammunition clip were in plain view in the room. The upshot was that the officers in good faith believed Miller was Hill and arrested him. They were quite wrong, as it turned out, and subjective good faith belief would not, in itself, justify either the arrest or the subsequent search. But sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, and, on the record before us, the officers' mistake was understandable and the arrest a reasonable response to the situation facing them at the time.

Nor can we agree with petitioner that, however valid the arrest of Miller, the subsequent search violated the Fourth Amendment. It is true that Miller was not Hill; nor did Miller have authority or control over the premises, although, at the very least, he was Hill's guest. But the question is not what evidence would have been admissible against Hill (or against Miller, for that matter) if the police, with probable cause to arrest Miller, had arrested him in Hill's apartment and then carried out the search at issue. Here, there was probable cause to arrest Hill, and the police arrested Miller in Hill's apartment, reasonably believing him to be Hill. In these circumstances, the police were entitled to do what the law would have allowed them to do if Miller had in fact, been Hill, that is, to search incident to arrest and to seize evidence of the crime the police had probable cause to believe Hill had committed. When judged in accordance with "the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act," Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 338 U. S. 175 (1949), the arrest and subsequent search were reasonable and valid under the Fourth Amendment.

In Bobo, the police arrested Richard Bobo believing he was Marvin Bobo. As they had probable cause to arrest Marvin, Richard's arrest on mistaken identity was valid. The search of the car was valid. The gun found in the car was admissible against Richard as evidence of a felon being in possession of a firearm.

United States v. Bobo, 994 F.2d 524 (8th Cir. 1993)

Richard Bobo contends that the St. Paul police did not have probable cause to arrest Marvin Bobo, and therefore that Richard's arrest, under the mistaken belief on the part of the police that he was Marvin, was unlawful. We disagree. Initially, we note that if the police had probable cause to arrest Marvin, and they reasonably believed that the man driving the green Cadillac was Marvin, then Richard's arrest was a valid arrest. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 1110, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971). Based on the testimony that the brothers resemble each other, and the fact that Richard was driving Marvin's green Cadillac, we find it was reasonable for Officer Pavlak to have assumed that the driver of the car was Marvin. Thus our sole inquiry is whether the police had probable cause to arrest Marvin.

We review a district court's determination of probable cause under the clearly erroneous standard and will affirm the court's decision unless it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on an erroneous conception of applicable law, or if, after we consider the entire record, we are left with the firm and definite conviction that a mistake was made. United States v. Wallraff, 705 F.2d 980, 987 (8th Cir.1983). Probable cause exists if the "facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense." Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 2632, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979). A determination of probable cause rests on a view of the totality of the circumstances and "requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2335 n. 13, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

The government contends that the "cumulative effect of the facts in the totality of the circumstances" supports the District Court's finding of probable cause to arrest Marvin Bobo. Warren v. City of Lincoln, Neb., 864 F.2d 1436, 1440 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1091, 109 S.Ct. 2431, 104 L.Ed.2d 988 (1989) (quoting United States v. Archer, 840 F.2d 567, 573 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 941, 109 S.Ct. 365, 102 L.Ed.2d 354 (1988)). We agree.

Probable cause exists even if the field test does not occur.

Field tests were the topic. I wonder why you won't stay on it.

No, I don't really wonder.

Field tests were the topic. I wonder why you won't stay on it.

No, I don't really wonder.

Are you too lazy to read, or unable to comprehend? A field test is not required and your nonsense is irrelevant. A negative field test may indicate the absence of specific substances at near 100% accuracy, but positive tests do not provide confirmation of their presence. Even when a confirmatory test later shows the actual substance is sugar, it does not affect the lawfulness of a probable cause arrest or search.

I will repeat a couple of cases and spell it out real simple.

In Russell, "The clear plastic package seized from the glove compartment, however, contained only lactose." Big whoop. The court explicitly held that a field test was not required. The officer had a reasonable belief that it was heroin. That was probable cause to search the car without a warrant. Russell was convicted for what all else they found in a warrantless search based on probable cause.

Russell argues first that the police lacked probable cause to search the car. This contention lacks merit. The absence of a license plate justified the initial stop of the car. After Russell opened the glove compartment, Officer Goddard saw in plain view two packets that, to his trained eye, signaled the presence of heroin and marijuana. Russell attempted to close the glove compartment lid on Goddard's hand, heightening the officers' suspicion that the packages contained contraband. Together, these circumstances gave the officers probable cause to believe that drugs were in the car and, therefore, to search the car without a warrant. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1981, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970).

Russell urges that, before the police searched the automobile, they should have field tested the white substance found in the glove compartment. If they had done so, they would have discovered that the glassine package contained sugar, not heroin. They might then have lacked probable cause to search further. Probable cause, however, rests on a "reasonable probability" that a crime has been committed, not on certainty that illegal activity is afoot. United States v. Brown, 463 F.2d 949, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1972). We would unduly retard legitimate law enforcement methods if we held that on the facts before us a stop to field test was obligatory. Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949).

Probable cause only required the officer to have a reasonable belief that the suspect has committed a crime.

The officer's belief need not be correct or even more likely true than false.

United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501 (6th Cir. 1988)

At 1508:

A warrantless arrest is justified if, at the time of the defendant's arrest, police officers have probable cause to believe that an offense has been, is being, or will be committed. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S. Ct. 223, 225, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964). Probable cause exists where the "facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense." Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 2632, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1979) (and cases cited therein). The probable cause requirement does "not demand any showing that such a belief is correct or more likely true than false." Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983).

A positive field test result would certainly provide probable cause for arrest and search. A reasonable belief that the substance is heroin, even if it is later confirmed as sugar, provides reasonable cause for arrest and search.

[ConservingFreeedom #20] Probable cause exists only if the substances that cause positive results are meaningfully "limited". Given the prevalence of sugar, it's far from clear that a test result of meth-or-sugar is probable cause for an arrest as happened in the case in question.

Your claim is utter fiction. Probable cause exists if the officer reasonably believes the evidence is an illegal drug, even if it later proves to be sugar.

Cite a case where any probable cause finding was struck down because the test kit was not meaningfully limited.

Are you too lazy to read, or unable to comprehend?

***snicker***

Another poster after you for not reading or being able to properly comprehend, ConservingFreedom.

You haven't been having a good couple of days....have you?

A field test is not required

Are you too lazy to read, or unable to comprehend? I never said a field test is required.

Another poster after you for not reading or being able to properly comprehend

Projection is a problem around here.

I never said a field test is required.

Can you read and comprehend what you did say?

[ConservingFreeedom #20] Probable cause exists only if the substances that cause positive results are meaningfully "limited". Given the prevalence of sugar, it's far from clear that a test result of meth-or-sugar is probable cause for an arrest as happened in the case in question.

Your claim is utter fiction. Probable cause exists if the officer reasonably believes the evidence is an illegal drug. This is true even if the sample later proves to be sugar. United States v. Russell 655 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1981) and United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501 (6th Cir. 1988) quoted at #28.

Cite your source for your fictional claim.

Cite a case where any probable cause finding was struck down because the test kit was not meaningfully limited.

[ConservingFreeedom #20] Probable cause exists only if the substances that cause positive results are meaningfully "limited". Given the prevalence of sugar, it's far from clear that a test result of meth-or-sugar is probable cause for an arrest as happened in the case in question.

Can you read and comprehend? Context is everything.

You, in the post to which I replied: "Presumptive test kits are not intended to test positive only on the target substance. It will test positive for a limited number of substances. This is not proof that the kits are defective. A positive result provides probable suspicion"

The conversation was about test kits, not the broader subject you now claim it was.

Can you read and comprehend? Context is everything.

Here is your fictional context:

[ConservingFreeedom #20] Probable cause exists only if the substances that cause positive results are meaningfully "limited". Given the prevalence of sugar, it's far from clear that a test result of meth-or-sugar is probable cause for an arrest as happened in the case in question.

Your claim is utter fiction. Probable cause exists if the officer reasonably believes the evidence is an illegal drug. This is true even if the sample later proves to be sugar. United States v. Russell, 655 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1981) and United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501 (6th Cir. 1988) quoted at #28.

Probable cause depends on the reasonable belief of the officer, not your bullshit.

Cite your source for your fictional claim Thus far you have be unable or unwilling.

Cite a case where any probable cause finding was struck down because the test kit was not meaningfully limited. Thus far you have been unable or unwilling.

Whether the test kit was "meaningfully limited" (a fictional requirement) is not determinative of probable cause for an arrest as happened in the case in question. As long as the officer had a reasonable belief that the the suspect committed a crime, he had probable cause. His belief need only be reasonable, and does not need to meet a more likely than not standard. The positive field test provided added reason to form and maintain a reasonable belief that the suspect had committed a crime.

"Given the prevalence of sugar, it's far from clear that a test result of meth-or-sugar is probable cause for an arrest as happened in the case in question."

Probable cause exists if the officer reasonably believes the evidence is an illegal drug.

And if the substances that cause positive results are not meaningfully "limited" then the belief is not reasonable.

Cite a case

Case law says the Constitution protects the 'right' to abortion - doesn't make iot so.

And if the substances that cause positive results are not meaningfully "limited" then the belief is not reasonable.

Cite a case

Case law says the Constitution protects the 'right' to abortion - doesn't make iot so.

There ya go. Every court decision in recorded history is against you and that's why you can't cite one.

SCOTUS interprets the Constitution to protect a woman's right to abortion. That makes it so in all 50 states. All state laws to the contrary are struck down. That's reality. Deal with it.

Your imaginary requirements such as your make-believe meaningfully limited standard have no legal merit. As the standard does not exist, and no court has ever recognized it, it is just bullshit.

The officer wouldn't know, or be required to know, the scientific foundation for the test. He needs to know how to appropriately perform the test and interpret the results.

In this case there were four officers. In their collective knowledge, they found a reasonable belief that the substance found was contraband, and had reasonable cause to arrest the driver. They performed two positive field tests adding to their reasonable belief that the substance was contraband.

Their belief need not be more likely than not, only reasonable.

Your opinion is self-generated blather. It is an argument for innocence to be presented at trial, but not for lack of probable cause to arrest or search.

As long as the collective knowledge of the officers yields a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, and the suspect committed it, there is probable cause to arrest and search. When you find evidence that the officers did not believe they had probable cause, you may have something.

Ellis v. Grams, 05-cv-1121 (E.D. Wis. Aug 10, 2006)

Ellis also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence at the preliminary hearing. Ellis claims that the evidence at the preliminary hearing was insufficient to bind Ellis over for trial. Because Ellis did not file a petition for leave to appeal the trial court's bind-over decision, he procedurally defaulted a direct attack on that decision. However, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reviewed Ellis' sufficiency claim under the standard enunciated in State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 393, 359 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Wis. 1984): "A defendant may be bound over for trial when the evidence at the preliminary hearing is sufficient to establish probable cause that a felony has been committed and that the defendant probably committed it." The Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, which included the testimony of two Milwaukee Police Officers, and determined that challenging the bind-over decision would lack merit.

Ellis contends that it was insufficient for the state to rely on the results of a cobalt thiocyanate test to prove for purposes of the preliminary hearing that the substance in Ellis' possession was cocaine. In support of this position, Ellis cites to State v. Jackson, 161 Wis. 2d 527, 468 N.W.2d 431 (Wis. 1991) (holding that a cobalt thiocyanate test is nonspecific and at most raises a presumption of the presence of cocaine). However, the state in Jackson relied on the results of a cobalt thiocyanate test to support a conviction. Id. Here, the trial court relied on the test results to support a bind-over. Thus, the evidence needed only to establish probable cause, and as the Jackson court held, the results from a cobalt thiocyanate test "may have been sufficient for a finding of probable cause." Id. at 529, 468 N.W.2d at 431. Moreover, at the preliminary hearing, the state presented more than just the results of the cobalt thiocyanate test. The state also presented testimony that the substance was packaged into 59 corner cuts that Ellis had concealed in his underwear. (Resp't Answer Ex. J, 4-5.) Coupled with the positive results from the cobalt thiocyanate test, the evidence of packaging and concealment was sufficient to establish probable cause that a felony had been committed and that Ellis probably committed it.

In light of the foregoing, the court concludes that Ellis fails to show that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals acted unreasonably when it determined that sufficient evidence supported the trial court's decision to bind Ellis over for trial, and that Ellis' trial counsel was not ineffective under Strickland in failing to challenge the bind-over.

"Case law says the Constitution protects the 'right' to abortion - doesn't make it so."

There ya go. Every court decision in recorded history is against you

I'm proud to be on the opposite side of baby-killing court decisions - perhaps you feel differently.

[CF #37] And if the substances that cause positive results are not meaningfully "limited" then the belief is not reasonable.

[nc #38] Cite a case.

[CF #37] "Case law says the Constitution protects the 'right' to abortion - doesn't make it so."

[nc #38] There ya go. Every court decision in recorded history is against you

[CF #39] I'm proud to be on the opposite side of baby-killing court decisions - perhaps you feel differently.

I've consistently argued against the decision in Roe v. Wade, and I've actually read it.

I do not argue that Supreme Court opinions have no effect. If that were true, you would lack any reason to bitch about them.

Court opinions do have effect. In the case of field tests, they have the effect of obliterating your self-created nonsense that a positive field test is not reasonable unless it meets your undefined "meaningfully limited" standard which exists only in your vivid imagination. A field test is acceptable for probable cause, not proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Ellis v. Grams, 05-cv-1121 (E.D. Wis. Aug 10, 2006)

Ellis also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence at the preliminary hearing. Ellis claims that the evidence at the preliminary hearing was insufficient to bind Ellis over for trial. Because Ellis did not file a petition for leave to appeal the trial court's bind-over decision, he procedurally defaulted a direct attack on that decision. However, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reviewed Ellis' sufficiency claim under the standard enunciated in State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 393, 359 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Wis. 1984): "A defendant may be bound over for trial when the evidence at the preliminary hearing is sufficient to establish probable cause that a felony has been committed and that the defendant probably committed it." The Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, which included the testimony of two Milwaukee Police Officers, and determined that challenging the bind-over decision would lack merit.

Ellis contends that it was insufficient for the state to rely on the results of a cobalt thiocyanate test to prove for purposes of the preliminary hearing that the substance in Ellis' possession was cocaine. In support of this position, Ellis cites to State v. Jackson, 161 Wis. 2d 527, 468 N.W.2d 431 (Wis. 1991) (holding that a cobalt thiocyanate test is nonspecific and at most raises a presumption of the presence of cocaine). However, the state in Jackson relied on the results of a cobalt thiocyanate test to support a conviction. Id. Here, the trial court relied on the test results to support a bind-over. Thus, the evidence needed only to establish probable cause, and as the Jackson court held, the results from a cobalt thiocyanate test "may have been sufficient for a finding of probable cause." Id. at 529, 468 N.W.2d at 431. Moreover, at the preliminary hearing, the state presented more than just the results of the cobalt thiocyanate test. The state also presented testimony that the substance was packaged into 59 corner cuts that Ellis had concealed in his underwear. (Resp't Answer Ex. J, 4-5.) Coupled with the positive results from the cobalt thiocyanate test, the evidence of packaging and concealment was sufficient to establish probable cause that a felony had been committed and that Ellis probably committed it.

In light of the foregoing, the court concludes that Ellis fails to show that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals acted unreasonably when it determined that sufficient evidence supported the trial court's decision to bind Ellis over for trial, and that Ellis' trial counsel was not ineffective under Strickland in failing to challenge the bind-over.

I do not argue that Supreme Court opinions have no effect.

Nor I.