Most states have laws that require you to identify yourself in certain situations.

She provided the required documents.

She's not required to vocalize her identity or engage in conversation with a cop.

"While you're looking for that, do you know why you're being pulled over tonight?" the trooper asked her, according to the tape. She claims she provided the documents but didn't respond.

I got pulled over for not wearing a seatbelt a few years back and when the female officer asked me that same question I replied : "I think that you are supposed to tell me why"

She wasn't bothered at all by my answer and I later explained that I didn't want to incriminate myself if she was pulling me over for something else.

Most states have laws that require you to identify yourself in certain situations. You can remain silent, but then you're going to jail until they can figure out who you are.

The woman in this case did ID herself. She handed her papers over to the police. They arrested her for not being conversational. If the facts are as mentioned above, she should win and the cops should get big time reprimanded.

Most states have laws that require you to identify yourself in certain situations. You can remain silent, but then you're going to jail until they can figure out who you are

The traffic stop is special in regard to that because everyone driving is required to have and be able to provide a valid drivers license and registration.

From the story as written above its obvious he had no valid reason to arrest her.

"Do you know why I pulled you over?" is a rhetorical question, not a serious one.

I know its a standard question.

She wasn't bothered at all by my answer and I later explained that I didn't want to incriminate myself if she was pulling me over for something else.

That's exactly why they ask that. They want the driver to incriminate themselves. It goes into their report and gets mentioned to the traffic judge as a confession of wrongdoing. Or at least it can be. I'm sure it's standard training for cops when they do routine traffic stops.

Yes, the burden of proof is on the cop. Let them say why you were stopped, and don't affirm or deny anything they say you were doing. Even by denying it, you may inadvertently admit you were at the location where he thinks you did something wrong, and he may not even be sure he's got the right car.

Unless you want to try to sweet talk your way into a warning, which, if you happen to be a hot blond bombshell, could have merit. But legally, there's no requirement to discuss anything.

"Miranda rights were created by the government."

The rights always existed, but most people were unaware of them. As a result of the court case by the same name, law enforcement is now required to tell you about these rights after your arrest and before they question you. You can then claim those rights or waive them.

"From the story as written above its obvious he had no valid reason to arrest her."

That's way it turned out, yes.

But her refusal to talk was suspicious. The cop thought so. So he played it safe and took her in.

I don't understand the people who want to fuck with the cops. When they end up getting arrested, I'm sorry, they had it coming. No sympathy for them, even if they were in the right.

But her refusal to talk was suspicious. The cop thought so.

Seriously?

What is "suspicious" about not wishing to have a conversation with a cop?

I don't understand the people who want to fuck with the cops.

Yet in this case, the woman was not "fucking with the cops".

She did exactly what was legally required.

No more - no less.

"What is "suspicious" about not wishing to have a conversation with a cop?"

Seriously?

By the way, no one is talking about a "conversation" except you and your strawman buddy. She wouldn't say anything. That's odd. Especially when cooperation and being polite may get you out of a ticket.

When they end up getting arrested, I'm sorry, they had it coming. No sympathy for them, even if they were in the right.

Well, thank you for this refreshing blast of honesty.

She wouldn't say anything. That's odd. Especially when cooperation and being polite may get you out of a ticket.

The fact is, a cop's "hunch" is not and never has been recognized as legit probable cause to arrest people.

Those cops who rely on the law for such decisions fair much better with community relations than do cops who consider themselves to be the law.

She wouldn't say anything. That's odd.

There's nothing "odd" about that.

She identified herself - there is no requirement to talk to a cop.

The rights always existed, but most people were unaware of them.

The Miranda Rule had no existence until the Supreme Court created it in Miranda v. Arizona. It is one example of the vast body of court made law.

It operates as a sanction against government authorities rendering any information gained during an interrogation absent a warning in compliance with specific guidelines stated for the first time in the Miranda opinion, inadmissable against the accused.

It created a rule of criminal procedure regarding admissibility which did not previously exist.

Prior to the announcement of the rule in Miranda, no such rule existed.

Under your interpretation, the right to Miranda warnings always existed, and could have been used to overturn every conviction wrongfully obtained through the use of statements obtained without a Miranda warning which nobody had ever heard of.

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/384/436/

U.S. Supreme Court

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

At 445:

The constitutional issue we decide in each of these cases is the admissibility of statements obtained from a defendant questioned while in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. In each, the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. In none of these cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all the cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions, and in three of them, signed statements as well which were admitted at their trials. They all thus share salient features -- incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.

At 478-79:

To summarize, we hold that, when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege, and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that, if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.

At 481:

In announcing these principles, we are not unmindful of the burdens which law enforcement officials must bear, often under trying circumstances. We also fully recognize the obligation of all citizens to aid in enforcing the criminal laws. This Court, while protecting individual rights, has always given ample latitude to law enforcement agencies in the legitimate exercise of their duties. The limits we have placed on the interrogation process should not constitute an undue interference with a proper system of law enforcement. As we have noted, our decision does not in any way preclude police from carrying out their traditional investigatory functions. Although confessions may play an important role in some convictions, the cases before us present graphic examples of the overstatement of the "need" for confessions. In each case, authorities conducted interrogations ranging up to five days in duration despite the presence, through standard investigating practices, of considerable evidence against each defendant.

The Miranda Rule had no existence until the Supreme Court created it in Miranda v. Arizona.

You didn't read the decision, SFB.

"The standard warning long given by Special Agents of the FBI to both suspects and persons under arrest is that the person has a right to say nothing and a right to counsel, and that any statement he does make may be used against him in court. Examples of this warning are to be found in the Westover case at 342 F.2d 684 (1965), and Jackson v. U.S., 337 F.2d 136 (1964), cert. den., 380 U.S. 935."

But her refusal to talk was suspicious.

She should have said, "Oink, oink" and be done with it.

She wasn't bothered at all by my answer and I later explained that I didn't want to incriminate myself if she was pulling me over for something else.

That's exactly why pointed questions are asked "do you know why I stopped you"? For oral admissions.

It's Vehicle & Traffic Stop 101

She should have said, "Oink, oink" and be done with it.

Put her in the patrol car with the heavy duty suspension.

Now there's one who can say "Oink, oink" and get away with it.

Fred's looking for his hand lotion.

Put her in the patrol car with the heavy duty suspension.

Typical moronic response.

She's overweight so she must be guilty of something, right?

She was under no obligation to speak with the cop.

She showed the pertinent information and clammed up.

Which is what anyone should do.

Typical moronic response.

Fred blurted out "Oink, oink" as a matter of reflex. Don't be so hard on him.

You didn't read the decision, SFB.

"The standard warning long given by Special Agents of the FBI to both suspects and persons under arrest is that the person has a right to say nothing and a right to counsel, and that any statement he does make may be used against him in court. Examples of this warning are to be found in the Westover case at 342 F.2d 684 (1965), and Jackson v. U.S., 337 F.2d 136 (1964), cert. den., 380 U.S. 935."

I did read the opinion, SFB. You are too stupid to understand what you read. Also, you did not read the preceding circuit court opinions which you cite. In both cases, the FBI gave a non-Miranda compliant warning in accordance with what was then FBI policy. The evidence was upheld as lawfully obtained and the court in Westover noted that "as the law now stands, there is no automatic rule of exclusion which will bar use of such a confession...."

Miranda created an automatic rule of exclusion which had not previously existed. It created specific minimum mandatory guidelines for a mandatory warning, with compliance failure resulting in exclusion of the obtained evidence.

That the FBI voluntarily issued some form of warning (not meeting the Miranda standard) does not require all (or any) of law enforcement to issue any warning, nor does it make the FBI abbreviated warning compliant with the Miranda standard. Miranda cites the FBI warning only to show that a form of warning already existed, and was being used, within one element of the law enforcement community.

Jackson and Westover noted the then-standard FBI warnings voluntarily given by the FBI agents to comply with FBI policy, but did not make such warnings, much less Miranda warnings, compulsory upon anybody, and imposed no automatic sanction against the government if said warning was omitted.

http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/337/136/227932/

Jackson v. U.S., 337 F.2d 136 (1964)

Danaher, Circuit Judge

On September 8, 1961, the United States Commissioner issued a warrant for the arrest of the appellant on a felony-murder charge. On September 15, 1961, at 3:20 A.M., an agent of the F.B.I. arrested the appellant at Staten Island, New York. The F.B.I. agent immediately advised the appellant "that he did not have to make any statement, that any statement he did make would be used against him in a court of law, and that he was entitled to an attorney."

[...]

We conclude that no rule of law required the exclusion of this appellant's confession, voluntarily made, after he had been warned by the F.B.I., the police and the United States Commissioner acting pursuant to Rule 40(b). He had not requested that counsel be appointed; he had retained no lawyer; that one was not then appointed for him denied him no right; and as the law now stands, there is no automatic rule of exclusion which will bar use of such a confession by an accused who has no lawyer, under circumstances such as appear on the record before us.

As noted in this pre-Miranda case, there was no applicable automatic rule of exclusion.

Fahy, Circuit Judge, dissenting

Upon their arrival at the Detention Headquarters they asked if they could speak to appellant, and were taken to a small room off the prisoners' corridor. A few minutes later appellant was brought to this room. We have no record of what occurred, but the officers testified that they identified themselves, told appellant they were investigating the death of Tony Philip Lee with which he was charged, and that he did not have to talk to them if he did not wish to do so. According to their further testimony appellant "sat there for a few moments and then he said he would like to tell us about it," and made his detailed confession.

http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/342/684/248369/

Westover v U.S., 342 .F2d 684 (9th Cir. 1965)

At about 11:30 a. m. on March 21, the F.B.I. agents were told that the appellant was available, in a room in the city jail. He had been interrogated, during the forenoon, by the police with regard to the local robberies. Three F.B.I. agents conducted the F.B.I. interview. No Kansas City policeman was present at the interview. The F.B.I. agents advised the appellant that he did not have to make a statement; that any statement that he made could be used against him in a court of law; that he had the right to consult an attorney. The agents made no threats or promises to the appellant. The appellant made detailed statements as to how he had committed the two Sacramento robberies for which he was later indicted and tried. His statements were written down in long-hand by one of the agents, as they were made, a separate statement being made for each of the robberies for convenience of filing.

[...]

The statements above discussed were offered and received in evidence at the appellant's trial. He now urges that they should have been excluded, sua sponte by the court, even though appellant's counsel at the trial did not object to their admission. He says that the doctrines of the cases of McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819; Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 69 S. Ct. 170, 93 L. Ed. 100; Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S. Ct. 1356, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1479; and Ginoza v. United States, CA 9, 279 F.2d 616, and Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require the exclusion of the appellant's confessions.

The precedents cited by the appellant have no direct application to the facts of this case, since the appellant had not been arrested by federal officers and was not in their custody at the time he made the statements, nor, as we shall see, until eleven days thereafter. The appellant, however, urges that, even if a prisoner is in state custody, the McNabb exclusionary rule may exclude a confession made to federal agents if there is between the state and federal agents a cooperative "working arrangement" of a kind which makes the federal agents responsible for illegal detention by the state agents.

The court found no abuses in the admission into evidence of the confession.

I did read the opinion

Then you're simply a liar, stumbling over yourself in full retreat.

The standard warning long given by Special Agents of the FBI to both suspects and persons under arrest is that the person has a right to say nothing and a right to counsel, and that any statement he does make may be used against him in court. Examples of this warning are to be found in the Westover case at 342 F.2d 684 (1965), and Jackson v. U.S., 337 F.2d 136 (1964), cert. den., 380 U.S. 935.

Then you're simply a liar, stumbling over yourself in full retreat.

I am sorry you are too stupid and ignorant to read and comprehend Miranda v. Arizona. Miranda is the precedent setting case, and Westover and Jackson are not, for the obvious reasons stated. Obvious to those who read and comprehend.

The Miranda Rule had no existence until the Supreme Court created it in Miranda v. Arizona.

"The standard warning long given by Special Agents of the FBI to both suspects and persons under arrest is that the person has a right to say nothing and a right to counsel, and that any statement he does make may be used against him in court. Examples of this warning are to be found in the Westover case at 342 F.2d 684 (1965), and Jackson v. U.S., 337 F.2d 136 (1964), cert. den., 380 U.S. 935."

SFB

"The standard warning long given by Special Agents of the FBI to both suspects and persons under arrest is that the person has a right to say nothing and a right to counsel, and that any statement he does make may be used against him in court. Examples of this warning are to be found in the Westover case at 342 F.2d 684 (1965), and Jackson v. U.S., 337 F.2d 136 (1964), cert. den., 380 U.S. 935."

I am sorry you are too stupid and ignorant to read and comprehend Miranda v. Arizona. Miranda is the precedent setting case, and Westover and Jackson are not, for the obvious reasons stated. Obvious to those who read and comprehend.

1. The Miranda Rule had no existence until the Supreme Court created it in Miranda v. Arizona.

2. Miranda is the precedent setting case

"The standard warning long given by Special Agents of the FBI to both suspects and persons under arrest is that the person has a right to say nothing and a right to counsel, and that any statement he does make may be used against him in court. Examples of this warning are to be found in the Westover case at 342 F.2d 684 (1965), and Jackson v. U.S., 337 F.2d 136 (1964), cert. den., 380 U.S. 935."

Furtively trying to move the goalpost, SFB.

"The standard warning long given by Special Agents of the FBI to both suspects and persons under arrest is that the person has a right to say nothing and a right to counsel, and that any statement he does make may be used against him in court. Examples of this warning are to be found in the Westover case at 342 F.2d 684 (1965), and Jackson v. U.S., 337 F.2d 136 (1964), cert. den., 380 U.S. 935."

I am sorry you are too stupid and ignorant to read and comprehend Miranda v. Arizona. Miranda is the precedent setting case, and Westover and Jackson are not, for the obvious reasons stated. Obvious to those who read and comprehend.

Time for more dishonest spam, SFB?

"It created a rule of criminal procedure regarding admissibility which did not previously exist."

That was the penalty for not advising the suspect of his rights.

As I said before, those rights already existed. Miranda simply required law enforcement to remind the suspect of those rights. Miranda did not create any rights.

That was the penalty for not advising the suspect of his rights.

As I said before, those rights already existed.

The right to remain silent existed. The mandatory warning or advisory of rights (Miranda rights) did not exist, and the automatic exclusion of evidence absent such Miranda warning did not exist.

Prior to Miranda, the right to a warning did not exist. Failure to provide a warning invoked no penalty.

The FBI policy was voluntary, did not include all the advisories required by Miranda, and was a voluntary FBI policy not applicable outside the FBI.

Quite obviously, I never said that Miranda created the right to remain silent.

"The right to remain silent existed."

As did the right to consult an attorney. As did the right to have an attorney present during questioning. As did the right to have an attorney appointed to you if you cannot afford one. As did the right to stop answering questions at any time until you talk to an attorney.

The mandatory warning or advisory of rights (Miranda rights) did not exist

As surely as a dog returns to its sick, SFB returns to his lies.

"The standard warning long given by Special Agents of the FBI to both suspects and persons under arrest is that the person has a right to say nothing and a right to counsel, and that any statement he does make may be used against him in court. Examples of this warning are to be found in the Westover case at 342 F.2d 684 (1965), and Jackson v. U.S., 337 F.2d 136 (1964), cert. den., 380 U.S. 935." -Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966)

"The agents of the F.B.I., the United States Commissioner, and finally, the Metropolitan Police, had advised the appellant of his rights in language substantially as set forth in Rule 5 as incorporated into Rule 40(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." -Jackson v. U.S., 337 F.2d 136 (1964)

As did the right to consult an attorney. As did the right to have an attorney present during questioning. As did the right to have an attorney appointed to you if you cannot afford one.

Bullshit.

Look at the FBI advisory. It says nothing of appointing an attorney if you cannot afford one.

http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/337/136/227932/

Jackson v. U.S., 337 F.2d 136 (1964)

Danaher, Circuit Judge

On September 8, 1961, the United States Commissioner issued a warrant for the arrest of the appellant on a felony-murder charge. On September 15, 1961, at 3:20 A.M., an agent of the F.B.I. arrested the appellant at Staten Island, New York. The F.B.I. agent immediately advised the appellant "that he did not have to make any statement, that any statement he did make would be used against him in a court of law, and that he was entitled to an attorney."

[...]

We conclude that no rule of law required the exclusion of this appellant's confession, voluntarily made, after he had been warned by the F.B.I., the police and the United States Commissioner acting pursuant to Rule 40(b). He had not requested that counsel be appointed; he had retained no lawyer; that one was not then appointed for him denied him no right; and as the law now stands, there is no automatic rule of exclusion which will bar use of such a confession by an accused who has no lawyer, under circumstances such as appear on the record before us.

[...]

Appellant argues that the police officers may not testify to a voluntary confession given by one in lawful custody without an attorney, although the accused had been advised of his rights. The agents of the F.B.I., the United States Commissioner, and finally, the Metropolitan Police, had advised the appellant of his rights in language substantially as set forth in Rule 5 as incorporated into Rule 40(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This court has expressly held that the Sixth Amendment does not require that counsel be appointed at the preliminary hearing.2

2 Council v. Clemmer, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 74, 177 F.2d 22, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 880, 70 S. Ct. 150, 94 L. Ed. 540 (1949); and such is the general rule, Price v. Johnston, 144 F.2d 260 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 789, 65 S. Ct. 312, 89 L. Ed. 629 (1944), rehearing denied, 323 U.S. 819, 65 S. Ct. 558, 89 L. Ed. 650 (1945)

http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4352

The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: I

George H. Dession
Yale Law School
1-1-1946

Yale Law School
Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship Series Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship

At 702:

Quite recently, for example, the Supreme Court has had before it such unresolved basic questions as that of the limits on the detention and interrogation of arrested persons prior to arraignment,25 of the meaning and scope of the right to counsel,26 and of the power of courts to correct various types of errors after the time within which a motion for new trial may be made has elapsed.27

__________

25. McNabb v. U. S., 318 U. S. 332 (1943).
26. Adams v. U. S. ex. rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 (1943).
27. Wells v. U. S., 318 U. S. 257 (1943).

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Lester B. Orfield

California Law Review
Volume 33 | Issue 4 Article 4
December 1945

At 546-47:

Proceedings before the Commissioner. Rule 5 deals with procedure immediately following apprehension of the defendant. A person arresting, whether with or without warrant, "shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States."15

The time within which a prisoner must be brought before a committing magistrate is defined differently in different statutes. The rule supersedes all statutory provisions and fixes a single standard, namely, "without unnecessary delay." What constitutes "unnecessary delay" will have to be determined in the light of all the facts and circumstances of the case.

The commissioner is to inform the defendant of the complaint against him, of his right to retain counsel, of his right to a preliminary examination, and that he is not required to make a statement and that any statement made by him may be used against him.16 He shall allow the defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel and shall admit the defendant to bail as provided in those rules.

__________

15. Rule 5(a). The First Preliminary Draft had provided an effective sanction in its Rule 5(b): "No statement made by a defendant in response to interrogation by an officer or agent of the government shall be admissible in evidence against him if the interrogation occurs while the defendant is held in custody in violation of this rule". Much criticism from the bench and the bar resulted in the deletion of this rule in all subsequent drafts. But see A STATEMENT BY THE COMMITTEE ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ON H.R. 3690 (1944).

16 Rule 5 (b).

http://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2761&context=lalrev

Arraignment In Federal Criminal Procedure

Lester B. Orfield

Louisiana Law Review
Volume 20 | Number 1
December 1959

At 20-22

Right to Counsel

In 1938 the Supreme Court took the position that failure to comply with the provision in the Sixth Amendment guaranteeing the right to counsel meant that the district court lost jurisdiction over the case.74 Following this decision, a court of appeals with one judge disagreeing was willing to concede arguendo that an arraignment was void when a defendant pleading not guilty was unable to obtain counsel and had not intelligently waived his right to counsel.75 But the court could proceed after the defendant obtained counsel, withdrew his plea of not guilty, and entered a plea of guilty. Habeas corpus would not lie. But Circuit Judge Sibley was not willing to concede even for the sake of argument "that a court cannot arraign one not represented by counsel without an express waiver of counsel." Defendant had a right to counsel at arraignment only if he provided himself counsel,76 and at common law he did not even have the right to retain counsel.

Another court of appeals held a short time later that when a defendant is arraigned and forced to plead to an indictment

__________

72. Garland v. State of Washington, 232 U.S. 642 (1914). Rearraignment was required in a homicide case after reversal on appeal and a second prosecution in Corbett v. State, 91 So.2d 509 (Ala. 1959), noted 31 TUL. L. Rev. 682 (1957).

73. Muncy v. United States, 289 Fed. 780, 781 (4th Cir. 1923).

74. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).

75. Saylor v. Sanford, 99 F.2d 605, 606 (5th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 630 (1939).

76. Until 1938 the right to counsel was generally understood as meaning merely the right of the defendant to be represented by counsel retained by him. Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sizth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 1, 7 (1944).

- - - - - - - - -

without counsel, there is no denial of due process and no right to habeas corpus where the defendant pleaded not guilty and was thereafter represented by an attorney on the trial."77 The defendant is not prejudiced when he pleads not guilty. Even where without counsel the defendant pleads guilty and the court appoints counsel immediately after arraignment, and the defendant elected with advice of counsel to stand on his plea of guilty, which was subject to change, the constitutional rights of the defendant were not violated and he was not prejudiced.78 Habeas corpus would not lie. The Supreme Court laid down a similar rule in a state court case.79 As Professor Fellman points out: "It has been held that an accused is entitled to the assistance of a lawyer upon arraignment whether he pleads guilty or not, but the weight of opinion seems to be otherwise."80

But one case has said that the right to counsel accrues as soon as the grand jury returns an indictment into court.81 And a leading case has said that there is a right even at the preliminary examination.82

At his arraignment the district court should advise the defendant of his right to counsel and of his right, if indigent, to have counsel appointed for him.83 This is true even though the defendant pleads guilty.84 "The constitutional guarantee makes no distinction between the arraignment and other stages of crim-

__________

77. DeMaurez v. Swope, 104 F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir. 1939). See in accord Thompson v. King, 107 F.2d 307, 308 (8th Cir. 1939) ; Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945) ; Wilfong v. Johnston, 156 F.2d 507, 508 (9th Cir. 1946).

78. MeJordan v. Huff, 133 F.2d 408, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1943), Justice Edgerton dissenting; Alexander v. United States, 136 F.2d 783, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1943).79. Can'izio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82, 85 (1946). Justices Murphy and Rutledge dissented. This case was followed as to a federal criminal defendant in Hiatt v. Gann, 170 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1948).

80. Fellman, The Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Courts, 30 NEB. L. Rev. 599, 588 (1951).

81. Gilmore v. United States, 129 F.2d 199, 203 (10th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 631 (1942).

82. Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 271, 141 A.L.R. 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1942). But the great weight of authority is contrary. Orfield, Proceedings Before the Commissioner in Federal Criminal Procedure, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 489, 527-528 (1958). "A federal right to assigned counsel does not exist prior to arraignment in the trial court." MORELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 177 (1959).

83. Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; McJordan v. Huff, 133 F.2d 408, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Michener v. Johnston, 141 F.2d 171, 174 (9th Cir. 1944); Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 1, 10, 14 (1944). This practice was followed in United States v. Gibert, 25 Fed. Cas. 1287, 1303, Case No. 15,204 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834). 84. Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 1, 11-13 (1944).

- - - - - - - - - -

inal proceedings in respect of the application of the guarantee."85 The "right to the assistance of counsel exists at the time of arraignment as well as at the trial."86 On the whole the federal cases have been in conflict as to whether the defendant has been deprived of his constitutional rights if he was unadvised at the time of arraignment."87

One court has pointed out that the time from arraignment up to trial is "the most critical period of the proceedings" as "investigation and preparation" are vitally important and the defendant should have counsel during that period.88

Delay Between Arraignment and Trial

What about delay between arraignment and trial? In a case coming up from the Philippine Islands, Justice Lamar in a dissenting opinion objected to a trial commencing eleven months after arraignment.89

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miranda_warning

The Miranda warning, which can also be referred to as the Miranda rights, is a right to silence warning given by police in the United States to criminal suspects in police custody (or in a custodial interrogation) before they are interrogated to preserve the admissibility of their statements against them in criminal proceedings.

The Miranda warning is part of a preventive criminal procedure rule that law enforcement are required to administer to protect an individual who is in custody and subject to direct questioning or its functional equivalent from a violation of his or her Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. In Miranda v. Arizona (1966), the Supreme Court held that the admission of an elicited incriminating statement by a suspect not informed of these rights violates the Fifth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, through the incorporation of these rights into state law.[Note 1] Thus, if law enforcement officials decline to offer a Miranda warning to an individual in their custody, they may interrogate that person and act upon the knowledge gained, but may not use that person's statements as evidence against him or her in a criminal trial.

It is not the interrogation that was held to be a violation of rights, but the admission into evidence of the information gained thereby to be used against the subject of the interrogation in a criminal proceeding. The information may be used against others.

"The standard warning long given by Special Agents of the FBI to both suspects and persons under arrest is that the person has a right to say nothing and a right to counsel, and that any statement he does make may be used against him in court. Examples of this warning are to be found in the Westover case at 342 F.2d 684 (1965), and Jackson v. U.S., 337 F.2d 136 (1964), cert. den., 380 U.S. 935." -Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966)

"The agents of the F.B.I., the United States Commissioner, and finally, the Metropolitan Police, had advised the appellant of his rights in language substantially as set forth in Rule 5 as incorporated into Rule 40(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." -Jackson v. U.S., 337 F.2d 136 (1964)

I am sorry you are too stupid and ignorant to read and comprehend Miranda v. Arizona. Miranda is the precedent setting case, and Westover and Jackson are not, for the obvious reasons stated. Obvious to those who read and comprehend.

1964 is before 1966

I am sorry you are too stupid and ignorant to read and comprehend Miranda v. Arizona. Miranda is the precedent setting case, and Westover and Jackson are not, for the obvious reasons stated. Obvious to those who read and comprehend.

1964 is before 1966 and nobody gives a shit, especially a court. You are too stupid to comprehend what you are reading.

1964 is before 1966 and nobody gives a shit,

Where nolu chan (aka SFB) = nobody.

Were you weeping as you once again tried to move the goalposts?

"It says nothing of appointing an attorney if you cannot afford one."

So if I'm arrested by the FBI I have no right to an attorney if I cannot afford one?

[nolu chan #57]

Look at the FBI advisory. [<—] It says nothing of appointing an attorney if you cannot afford one.

[misterwhite #62]

It says nothing of appointing an attorney if you cannot afford one."

So if I'm arrested by the FBI I have no right to an attorney if I cannot afford one?

Deliberately removing the context that it refers to the FBI advisory which predated Miranda does not help your cause. Further, as an FBI policy, the policy applied to nobody but FBI agents. When interrogated by anyone but an FBI agent, it had no applicability.

While agencies are not required to make rules which exceed the minimum required by law, if they do adopt such a policy, as the FBI did, then that agency is required to comply with their own policy as long as it exists. It becomes part of due process.

The voluntary FBI advisory said nothing of any then non-existent right to have an attorney appointed to you at no cost. It advised one had a right to consult with counsel.

Look at note 76 to Arraignment In Federal Criminal Procedure, Lester B. Orfield, Louisiana Law Review, Volume 20 | Number 1, December 1959, quoted supra:

76. Until 1938 the right to counsel was generally understood as meaning merely the right of the defendant to be represented by counsel retained by him. Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 1, 7 (1944).

The context for the above was for an arraignment in court. For an interrogation, there was no "right" to an attorney.

https://leb.fbi.gov/2011/february/the-public-safety-exception-to-miranda

After 44 years, the Miranda decision stands as a monolith in police procedure.1 Its requirements are so well known that the Supreme Court remarked, “Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture.”2 And, although the Supreme Court has clarified and refined Miranda over the years, its central requirements are clear.3 Whenever the prosecution seeks in its direct case to introduce a statement made by a suspect while in custody and in response to interrogation, it must prove that the subject was warned of specific rights and voluntarily waived those rights.4 The penalty imposed on the prosecution for failing to prove that the Miranda procedures were properly followed is harsh. While some secondary and limited uses of statements obtained in violation of Miranda are permitted, such statements are presumed to be coerced and cannot be introduced by the prosecution in its direct case.5

The strength of the Miranda decision is its clarity in its nearly unwavering protection of a suspect’s Fifth Amendment protection against self incrimination. The commitment to this rule is so strong that the Supreme Court has recognized only one exception to the Miranda rule—the “public safety” exception—which permits law enforcement to engage in a limited and focused unwarned interrogation and allows the government to introduce the statement as direct evidence.

http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/the-public-safety-exception-miranda.html

Public Safety Wins Out

In the seminal case of New York v. Quarles, the Supreme Court said that an officer’s concern for public safety can justify a failure to give Miranda warnings. (467 U.S. 649 (1984).) In that case, a woman told police a man with a gun had just raped her. She also said the man entered a nearby store.

An officer spotted a man in the store matching the description the victim gave and ran after him. The officer caught him, noticed he was wearing an empty gun holster, and handcuffed him. Moments later, other officers arrived. The officer then asked the man where the gun was. The man nodded in a certain direction and said, “The gun is over there.” The officer then retrieved it.

Miranda applied to this situation—the officer interrogated the man while he was in handcuffs and surrounded by four officers. (See Miranda: The Meaning of Custodial Interrogation.) But no one read the man his rights until after his statement.

So, when the defendant faced charges for illegal weapon possession, lower courts decided that the gun, and the man’s statements about it, were inadmissible. But the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, creating a public safety exception to the Miranda rule. The Court decided that Miranda doesn’t apply to a situation where officers ask questions legitimately designed to protect their safety or that of the public.

So, your Miranda "rights" go out the window when a valid public safety argument is advanced.

This is not all that difficult to understand when one understands what Miranda does, and does not, do.

Miranda announces a court-made rule of criminal procedure. It holds that the specified advisory/warning must be given or any attempt to enter the obtained statement as evidence will be considered a violation of rights and disallowed.

Under the public safety exception, the statement may be allowed into evidence to be used against the person questioned.

Supposing you were part of a criminal conspiracy, and gave a statement without being Mirandized, and the statement was inculpatory with reference to your conspirators, the Miranda rule extends to you but not to your fellow conspirators. The Miranda rule excludes the statement from use against you, only.

The Miranda rule speaks to whether the obtained statement may be admitted into evidence or not. It is a court-made rule of criminal procedure.

Were you weeping as you once again tried to move the goalposts?

No, I was laughing at your public display of ignorance and stupidity. You cannot read and understand legal writings, and you display a public unwillingness to learn. Your assertion is irrelevant and felony stupid.

No, I was laughing

Sure you were, SFB.

So if I'm arrested by the FBI I have no right to an attorney if I cannot afford one?

You're talking to someone who can't tell the difference between a statute, a court decision, and an administrative rule.

You're talking to someone who can't tell the difference between a statute, a court decision, and an administrative rule.

You are a blithering idiot who can't tell the difference between a statute, a court opinion, an administrative rule, and an FBI rule restraining FBI agents.

I simply asked if I had the right to an attorney if I can't afford one. I say I've always had that right.

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Another decision prior to Miranda.