You've never read the case, have you?

Opposite - I've read it closely enough to note its acknowledgment of previous narrower restrictions.

And - more significantly, and incorrectly - that this fact made their production properly subject to federal regulation.

Incorrectly? Sorry. There was Supreme Court precedent for intrastate regulations. We just discussed the Shreveport Rate Cases.

"Okay, I had to look up anechoic tiles. [grumble]"

The "sub silentio" didn't give you enough? Thought it would. Sorry.

I've read it closely enough

In other words, you haven't read it. I thought so.

Roscoe filed suit because he wanted a federal marketing card guaranteeing limited liability for liens on the wheat sold to his buyers. The federal government told him if he wanted to join the subsidy program for protection against the prevailing "ruinously low prices resulting from excess supply" he would have to abide by the rules. No tickee, no washee.

"Opposite - I've read it closely enough to note its acknowledgment of previous narrower restrictions."

So if the next interstate case involves cabbages, Wickard v Filburn wouldn't apply?

We just discussed the Shreveport Rate Cases.

Add I showed in posts 137, 140, and 143 that the Shreveport ruling was less broad than the Wickard ruling pretended.

Roscoe filed suit because he wanted a federal marketing card guaranteeing limited liability for liens on the wheat sold to his buyers. The federal government told him if he wanted to join the subsidy program for protection against the prevailing "ruinously low prices resulting from excess supply" he would have to abide by the rules.

In the course of so ruling the Court made statements that it worded broadly and that many subsequent rulings have interpreted broadly - notably, "even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.'"

1. The Shreveport Rate Cases ruling asserts the authority of Congress only with specific reference to shipping rates

2. Add I showed in posts 137, 140, and 143 that the Shreveport ruling was less broad

So Wickard was broader and more restrictive, limiting a wider range of Congressional controls. By your "reasoning."

Surprise!

Opposite - I've read it closely enough to note its acknowledgment of previous narrower restrictions.

So if the next interstate case involves cabbages, Wickard v Filburn wouldn't apply?

Since that's a howling non sequitur as it stands, I'll try to move the conversation forward by guessing what you're really asking - feel free to clarify your meaning. Was the Wickard ruling broad? Yes, it was - much broader than the Shreveport ruling on which it pretended to (at least in part) be based.

So Wickard was broader and more restrictive, limiting a wider range of Congressional controls. By your "reasoning."

No, that in no way follows from anything I've posted - but thanks for the fascinating albeit disturbing insight into what passes for "reasoning" in your fevered mind.

The appellee was suing to join the regulatory program.

Bully for him - what would you have us conclude from that?

Bully for him

Enter an agreement, abide by its rules.

So does he prefer Wickard or the Shreveport Rate Cases? It's hard to tell with all his wild thrashing about.

If you want to know what I think, ask me, coward. Wickard was an appalling farce - Shreveport much more defensible. And I'm confident that you and maybe misswhite are the only ones willing to pretend I haven't already made that view crystal clear.

I am surprised that you are trying to piss up a rope. The guy is an incoherent ass.

I'm only in a formal sense addressing him - my real audience is anyone who might mistake his posts as in any way valid.

Shreveport much more defensible.

Even though it restricted a very narrow range of Congressional authority, at least according to you. So by your "reasoning," virtually all Congressional regulation of commerce should go unrestricted.

Logic ain't your long suit.

my real audience

Is the imaginary cheering throngs in your head.

Even though it restricted a very narrow range of Congressional authority, at least according to you. So by your "reasoning," virtually all Congressional regulation of commerce should go unrestricted.

Not at all - for the Court to say that Congressional regulation of intrastate shipping rates is subject to certain limitations is not per se for it to say anything at all about other Congressional regulation. Wickard, by contrast, loosened limitations on Congressional authority and did so with broad language.

for the Court to say that Congressional regulation of intrastate shipping rates is subject to certain limitations is not per se for it to say anything at all about other Congressional regulation.

IOW, no restrictions.

I almost feel sorry for ya.

I am surprised that you are trying to piss up a rope. The guy is an incoherent ass.

I'm only in a formal sense addressing him - my real audience is anyone who might mistake his posts as in any way valid.

I can't imagine that anyone is interested in what the asshole has to say, even if on the surface he agrees with them for the moment. He reinforces the notion that there is no limit to the number and type of strawmen a moron can conjure. He is a master weasel. He is the poster boy for the Dunning Kruger effect.

Dunning Kruger

Dunning-Kruger

for the Court to say that Congressional regulation of intrastate shipping rates is subject to certain limitations is not per se for it to say anything at all about other Congressional regulation.

IOW, no restrictions.

No, silence does not imply no restrictions. Who here do you think is stupid enough to be fooled by your hamhanded nonsense?

No, silence does not imply no restrictions.

Yes, silence imposes no restrictions.

The silence of the Court does not muzzle the Constitution.

Zero signal to noise ratio.

"which does impose restrictions." [Edit addition]

Quote.

"Yes, silence imposes no restrictions."

Correct. The natural state of commerce is free and open. Any regulation of that commerce is a restriction.

The powers not delegated

Commerce clause

Commerce clause

The power to regulate commerce among the several states is delegated - while the power to regulate that which is not commerce among the several states, but substantially affects commerce among the several states, is not.

Have you ever read it?

Necessary and proper

Relevant only upon establishing that regulating that which is not commerce among the several states, but substantially affects commerce among the several states, is both necessary and proper for regulating commerce among the several states.

Feel free to so establish.

Relevant only upon establishing that regulating that which is not commerce among the several states, but substantially affects commerce among the several states, is both necessary and proper

Backwards. Until proven otherwise. The power was explicitly given to Congress to make those decisions.

The power was explicitly given to Congress to make those decisions.

Quote.

The idea that the Constitution gives Congress the authority to determine the limits on Congress' authority is ludicrous even for you - and that's saying something.

Quote.

"To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;"

"To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."

Now you quote the provision requiring Congress to "establish" an exercise of those explicit powers to your satisfaction.

At least try.

"To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."

A swing and a miss by you. The authority to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper does not include nor imply the power to declare whether a given law is necessary and proper.

The authority to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper does not include nor imply the power to declare whether a given law is necessary and proper.

Of course it does.

"Congress is empowered to regulate -- that is, to provide the law for the government of interstate commerce; to enact "all appropriate legislation" for its "protection and advancement..." Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States 234 U.S. 342 (1914)

Now you quote the provision requiring Congress to "establish" an exercise of those explicit powers to your satisfaction.

At least try. Don't be such a coward.

The natural state of commerce is free and open.

"PIRACY, n. Commerce without its folly-swaddles, just as God made it." --Ambrose Bierce

ConservingFreedom (#203) ---- The authority to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper does not include nor imply the power to declare whether a given law is necessary and proper.

Of course it does.-- roscoe

The authority to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper does not include nor imply the power to declare whether a given law is necessary,proper, and/or CONSTITUTIONAL.

As usual, roscoe doesn't have a clue...

"Congress is empowered to regulate -- that is, to provide the law for the government of interstate commerce; to enact "all appropriate legislation" for its "protection and advancement..." Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States 234 U.S. 342 (1914)

No help for you there - it wasn't ruled that Congress had the power to declare whether a given law is appropriate for the protection and advancement of interstate commerce, either.

Here's just one example of the Court rejecting a government claim of power under the clause: "The Government's first argument is that the individual mandate is a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. [...] the individual mandate cannot be sustained under the Necessary and Proper Clause as an essential component of the insurance reforms." NFIB v Sebelius

requiring Congress to "establish" an exercise of those explicit powers to your satisfaction.

Yet another of your straw men - I never said a word about "to my satisfaction."

it wasn't ruled that Congress had the power to declare whether a given law is appropriate

to enact "all appropriate legislation"

"to my satisfaction."

You have failed to identify any other party.

[CF:] Here's just one example of the Court rejecting a government claim of power under the clause: "The Government's first argument is that the individual mandate is a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. [...] the individual mandate cannot be sustained under the Necessary and Proper Clause as an essential component of the insurance reforms." NFIB v Sebelius

Which, to chew your food for you, disproves your claim that "The power was explicitly given to Congress to make those decisions" as to what was necessary and proper.

disproves your claim that "The power was explicitly given to Congress to make those decisions"

"To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;"

"To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."

Poor you.

ConservingFreedom (#207 --- it wasn't ruled that Congress had the power to declare whether a given law is appropriate

to enact "all appropriate legislation" --- Roscoe

To enact 'all constitutionally appropriate legislation'.