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Title: You have NO IDEA what’s coming: Virginia Dems to unleash martial law attack on 2A counties using roadblocks to confiscate firearms and spark a shooting war
Source:
Government Slaves/Natural News
URL Source: https://governmentslaves.news/2019/ ... arms-and-spark-a-shooting-war/
Published: Dec 19, 2019
Author: Mike Adams
Post Date: 2019-12-21 11:10:14 by Deckard
Keywords: None
Views: 33540
Comments: 171
After passing extremely restrictive anti-gun legislation in early 2020, Virginia has a plan to deploy roadblocks at both the county and state levels to confiscate firearms from law-abiding citizens (at gunpoint, of course) as part of a deliberate effort to spark a shooting war with citizens, sources are now telling Natural News. Some might choose to dismiss such claims as speculation, but these sources now say that Virginia has been chosen as the deliberate flashpoint to ignite the civil war that’s being engineered by globalists. Their end game is to unleash a sufficient amount of violence to call for UN occupation of America and the overthrow of President Trump and the republic. Such action will, of course, also result in the attempted nationwide confiscation of all firearms from private citizens, since all gun owners will be labeled “domestic terrorists” if they resist. Such language is already being used by Democrat legislators in the state of Virginia. The Democrat-run impeachment of President Trump is a necessary component for this plan, since the scheme requires Trump supporters to be painted as “enraged domestic terrorists” who are seeking revenge for the impeachment. This is how the media will spin the stories when armed Virginians stand their ground and refuse to have their legal firearms confiscated by police state goons running Fourth Amendment violating roadblocks on Virginia roads. Roadblocks will be set up in two types of locations, sources tell Natural News: 1) On roads entering the state of Virginia from neighboring states that have very high gun ownership, such as Kentucky, Tennessee and North Carolina, and 2) Main roads (highways and interstates) that enter the pro-2A counties which have declared themselves to be Second Amendment sanctuaries. With over 90 counties now recognizing some sort of pro-2A sanctuary status, virtually the entire State of Virginia will be considered “enemy territory” by the tyrants in Richmond who are trying to pull off this insidious scheme. As the map shows below, every green county has passed a pro-2A resolution of one kind or another. As you can see, nearly the entire state is pro-2A, completely surrounding the Democrat tyrants who run the capitol of Richmond. The purpose of the roadblocks, to repeat, has nothing to do with public safety or enforcing any law. It’s all being set up to spark a violent uprising against the Virginia Democrats and whatever law enforcement goons are willing to go along with their unconstitutional demands to violate the fundamental civil rights of Virginian citizens. Over 90 Virginian counties, cities and municipalities have so far declared themselves to be pro-2A regions, meaning they will not comply with the gun confiscation tyranny of Gov. Northam and his Democrat lackeys. Democrats in Virginia have threatened to activate the National Guard to attack pro-2A “terrorists,” and a recent statement from the Guard unit in Virginia confirms that the Guard has no intention to resist Gov. Northam’s outrageous orders, even if they are illegal or unconstitutional. One county in Virginia — Tazewell — has already activated its own militia in response. As reported by FirearmsNews.com: In addition to passing their Second Amendment Sanctuary Resolution, the county also passed a Militia Resolution. This resolution formalizes the creation, and maintenance of a defacto civilian militia in the county of Tazewell. And to get a better understanding why the council members passed this resolution, Firearms News reached out to one of its members, Thomas Lester. Mr. Lester is a member of the council, as well as a professor of American History and Political Science. Firearms News: Councilman Lester, what are the reasons behind passing this new resolution, and what does it mean for the people of Tazewell County? Tom Lester: … the purpose of the militia is not just to protect the county from domestic danger, but also protect the county from any sort of tyrannical actions from the Federal government. Our constitution is designed to allow them to use an armed militia as needed. If the (Federal) government takes those arms away, it prevents the county from fulfilling their constitutional duties. The situation is escalating rapidly in Virginia, which is precisely what Democrats and globalists are seeking. As All News Pipeline reports: With many Virginia citizens angry with the threat of tyranny exploding there, ANP was recently forwarded an email written by a very concerned Virginia citizen who warned that Democratic leadership is pushing Virginia there towards another ‘shot heard around the world’ with Virginia absolutely the satanic globalists new testing ground for disarming all of America in a similar fashion should they be successful there. And while we’ll continue to pray for peace in America, it’s long been argued that it’s better to go down fighting than to be a slave to tyranny for the rest of one’s life. And with gun registration seemingly always preceding disarmament and disarmament historically leading to genocide, everybody’s eyes should be on what’s happening now in Virginia. With the mainstream media clearly the enemy of the American people and now President Trump confirming they are ‘partners in crime’ with the ‘deep state’ that has been attempting an illegal coup upon President Trump ever since he got into office, how can outlets such as CNN, MSNBC, the NY Times, Washington Post and all of the others continuously pushing the globalists satanic propaganda be held accountable and responsible for the outright madness they are unleashing upon America? Where is all this really headed? The bottom line goal of the enemies of America is to transform the country into a UN-occupied war zone, where UN troops go door to door, confiscating weapons from the American people. President Trump will be declared an “illegitimate dictator” and accused of war crimes, since Democrats and the media have already proven they can dream up any crime imaginable and accuse the President of that crime, without any basis in fact. And as we know with the Dems, if they can’t rule America, they will seek to destroy it. Causing total chaos is their next best option to resisting Trump’s efforts to drain the swamp, since the Dems know they can’t defeat Trump in an honest election. Expect Virginia to be the ignition point for all this. Even the undercover cops who work there are now warning about what’s coming. Via WesternJournal.com: Virginia’s Democratic politicians appear to be ready to drive the state into a period of massive civil unrest with no regard for citizens’ wishes, but conservatives in the commonwealth will not be stripped of their rights without a fight. In the face of expected wide-reaching bans on so-called assault weapons, high-capacity magazines, and other arms protected under the 2nd Amendment, Virginians are standing up to Democratic tyranny. A major in the Marine Corps reserves took an opportunity during a Dec. 3 meeting to warn the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County about trouble on the horizon. Ben Joseph Woods spoke about his time in the military, his federal law enforcement career and his fears about where politicians are taking Virginia. “I work plainclothes law enforcement,” Woods said. “I walk around without a uniform, people don’t see my badge, people don’t see my gun, and I can tell you: People are angry.” Woods said that the situation in Virginia is becoming so dangerous that he is close to moving his own wife and unborn child out of the state. The reason is because my fellow law enforcement officers I’ve heard on more than one occasion tell me they would not enforce these bills regardless of whether they believe in them ideologically,” Woods said, “because they believe that there are so many people angry — in gun shops, gun shows, at bars we’ve heard it now — people talking about tarring and feathering politicians in a less-than-joking manner.” As Woods mentioned politicians themselves could very well be in danger because of their decisions, several rebel yells broke out as the crowd cheered him on. Stay informed. Things are about to happen over the next 10 months that you would have never imagined just five years ago. And to all those who mocked our warnings about the coming civil war, you are about to find yourself in one. Sure hope you know how to run an AR platform and build a water filter. Things won’t go well for the unprepared, especially in the cities. And, by the way, Richmond is surrounded by patriots. At what point will the citizens of Virginia decide to arrest and incarcerate all the lawless, treasonous tyrants in Richmond who tried to pull this stunt? I have a feeling there’s about to be a real shortage of rope across Virginia…
The gun confiscation roadblocks are almost sure to start a shooting war
The enemies of America want to turn the entire country into a UN-occupied war zone and declare President Trump to be an “illegitimate dictator”
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https://pluralist.com/tazewell-militia-resolution/ By Pluralist | Dec 16, 2019 One southwestern Virginia county is fiercely pushing back against proposed restrictions on gun rights in the state. Earlier this month, the Tazewell County Board of Supervisors passed two resolutions aimed at opposing potential restrictions on gun possession and ownership. One made Tazewell County a “Second Amendment sanctuary.” The other authorized funding for the formation of a well-regulated militia, WJHL reported. Both resolutions were unanimously passed on Dec. 3 to loud cheers from a standing room-only crowd at the Board of Supervisors meeting, according to the Bristol Herald Courier. “Our position is that Article I, Section 13, of the Constitution of Virginia reserves the right to ‘order’ militia to the localities,” County Administrator Eric Young, who helped draft the ordinances, told the Herald Courier. “Therefore, counties, not the state, determine what types of arms may be carried in their territory and by whom. So, we are ‘ordering’ the militia by making sure everyone can own a weapon.” Southern District Supervisor Mike Hymes said people in Tazewell County “feel the need to have a gun to protect themselves and their property.” “We live in an area where the nearest deputy might be 45 minutes away,” Hymes told the Herald Courier. Tazewell County Sheriff Brian Hieatt told NBC affiliate WWVA the militia resolution “gives us some teeth to be able to act and do something if a law comes out dealing with firearms that we see is illegal.” According to Tazewell County Board of Supervisors Chairman Travis Hackman, the ordinance is aimed at sending a message to the state’s legislators in Richmond. Virginia Democrats, who in November seized control of both houses of the state’s legislature for the first time in more than two decades, made gun control laws a focus of their campaigns. Democrats’ electoral triumph has sparked fears of increased restrictions on firearms possession, which the state’s pro-gun advocates say infringe on their Second Amendment rights. Last week, Democrats announced they were amending a pending ban on “assault weapons” in the face of political pressure. An early draft of the bill would have made it a felony to possess any firearm defined as an “assault weapon.” Gun rights groups were particularly concerned by the lack of an exception for those who already possess such weapons. The ban is backed by Democratic Gov. Ralph Northam, whose spokeswoman, Alena Yarmosky, told the Virginia Mercury that “the governor’s assault weapons ban will include a grandfather clause for individuals who already own assault weapons, with the requirement they register their weapons before the end of a designated grace period.” The move to confiscate guns faced immense grassroots opposition in the state, which has seen a majority of its counties declare themselves “Second Amendment sanctuaries.” A portion of the funds allocated by the militia resolution will go to programs such as the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts, and weapons training courses, according to WJHL. Cover image: New Virginia Militia. (Facebook) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - It is clear that the Tazewell County Board of Supervisors has passed not just one, but two resolutions, and they have sent a message. Yes, civil war is coming and they are prepared, with a militia having been formed, see picture above. When the 82nd Airborne arrives, as surely it will, the Tazewell Board of Supervisors will issue a third resolution, informing the 82nd Airborne that the militia has them surrounded, that there is no escape, and demand their surrender. The 82nd Airborne will surely surrender, knowing as they must, that one does not fuck with a superhero, and the Tazewell Militia has not one, but ten superheroes. The Fantastic Four were fabulous but the Tazewell Ten are terrifying. Following the surrender of the U.S. Armed Forces, the Tazewell County Board of Supervisors will issue a fourth resolution, establishing the sovereign nation of Tazewell.
Jim Talbert TAZEWELL, Va. — Tazewell County joined the ranks of “Second Amendment Sanctuary” counties on Tuesday — and took it one step further. Before a crowd of more than 200, the Board of Supervisors unanimously passed two resolutions during their meeting on Tuesday night. The Second Amendment Sanctuary resolution and a resolution promoting the order of militia within Tazewell County both passed to loud cheers from a crowd that overflowed the 189-seat board room. Board Chairman Travis Hackworth announced at the beginning of the meeting that both resolutions would be unanimously passed. The militia resolution was approved on a poll earlier this month, but county residents via Facebook and other means kept asking for the sanctuary resolution as well. Hackworth said board members started getting messages from state legislators following the Nov. 5 election, which saw Democrats take control of both the House of Delegates and the state Senate for the first time in 25 years. He said elected officials expressed concern that legislation might pass that would chip away at Second Amendment rights. Southern District Supervisor Mike Hymes contacted Interim County Attorney Chase Collins and had him get a copy of the sanctuary county legislation passed in Carroll County, one of the first counties in the state to pass a resolution protecting gun rights, and similar resolutions from other localities. “We went through them with three attorneys. It was not our intent to water anything down. We wanted something with teeth in it. Something we could use to file injunctions and defend in court,” Hackworth said. County Administrator Eric Young, one of the attorneys, along with Collins and Eric Whitesell, who helped draft the ordinances, said the resolutions allow the county to take action in the event that state or federal laws are passed violating the Second Amendment. Board member Charlie Stacy, also an attorney, praised the citizens for their knowledge of upcoming bills in the state Legislature. “This board is blessed with three lawyers, and they designed a strategy to win in a court of law,” Stacy said. He said the ordinances approved by the board allow the county to challenge any resolution in state or federal court. “The resolution is truly designed to allow us to hire lawyers to see that laws infringing on the Second Amendment never last any longer than it takes a court to remove them,” he said. Both resolutions call for the elimination of funding to any enforcement of laws that infringe upon the rights of law-abiding citizens to keep and bear arms. Stacy and other board members said a concern that state leaders might cut off funding to the county or remove elected officials who refuse to enforce state law prompted them to pass the militia ordinance. “Our position is that Article I, Section 13, of the Constitution of Virginia reserves the right to ‘order’ militia to the localities,” Young said. “Therefore, counties, not the state, determine what types of arms may be carried in their territory and by whom. So, we are ‘ordering’ the militia by making sure everyone can own a weapon.” The sanctuary resolution cites the Second Amendment to the Constitution, which states “the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” Hymes said he knew what his constituents wanted and asked for the amendment last month. “We live in an area where the nearest deputy might be 45 minutes away. People feel the need to have a gun to protect themselves and their property,” he said. In addition to allowing the county to order a militia, the ordinance calls for concealed weapons training for all residents of the county who are eligible to own a gun and the teaching of firearms safety in public schools. Sheriff Brian Hieatt and newly elected Commonwealth’s Attorney Chris Plaster both expressed their support for the resolutions and belief that the Constitution of the United States supersedes state laws.
Jade Burks TAZEWELL COUNTY (WVVA) -- More than 30 counties across the Commonwealth have passed 'Second Amendment Sanctuary' resolutions -- including Tazewell County. But what does that really mean? "What the Second Amendment sanctuary resolution is designed to do, primarily, is to demonstrate to the Virginia General Assembly the vast amount of people in the Commonwealth of Virginia that are fundamentally opposed to the proposed regulations that are there being submitted for the 2020 General Assembly that are significantly restricted on the Second Amendment rights to possess or operate firearms," says Eastern District Representative of the Tazewell County Board of Supervisors, Charles Stacy. But what protection does that provide to the residents of "sanctuary counties?" Officials say the resolutions are more like a 'symbol of opposition.' "It's almost more of a proclamation of what the boards are prepared to do," Stacy says. "It's a strong message to our legislators let them know that we don't want to see any changes in our gun laws," says Tazewell County Sheriff Brian Hieatt. "So we're seeing county after county doing the same thing and passing similar resolutions, to say that we do not want to infringe on our rights to have our weapons." Therefore, the resolutions don't provide a legal defense. "You can't simply present this in a court and say, 'Your Honor, I'm not guilty of possessing a firearm that the General Assembly has deemed illegal, because my home county passed a second amendment sanctuary resolution,'" Stacy explained. "What the resolutions are designed to do is prevent that legislation from even coming out of the Virginia General Assembly, by giving the proclamation of the localities to the General Assembly before they vote." But a second resolution is providing the residents of Tazewell County with more protection. "Tazewell County also passed a militia resolution, which gives us some teeth to be able to act and do something if a law comes out dealing with firearms that we see is illegal," Sheriff Hieatt explained. That resolution actually gives Tazewell County the opportunity to challenge any law it feels violates the Second Amendment rights of its citizens. "The stronger legal arguments are the ones that we are preparing in the second resolution to allow us a constitutional challenge," Stacy said. "If the Virginia General Assembly passes these laws as they are written, and the governor signs them; we have the immediate ability to challenge those in both the Virginia and the United States Courts to challenge the constitutionality of those laws." If the laws do pass, Tazewell County is willing to do just that. "Right now we're all just hoping that the public outpouring all across the Commonwealth is enough to maybe inform the General Assembly that on these particular issues, their proposed legislation has gone too far," Stacy said. "And if the people deem it to be a violation of their constitutional rights, they're not going to just sit back and take that. They're going to advocate, they're going to fight that as hard as they can. So hopefully that'll be heard in Richmond, and the General Assembly will modify what's been proposed to make it a little bit more constitutional, but also a little bit more along the wishes of what the people of the Commonwealth really want."
You cannot vote away a Right to keep and bear arms. ANY law restricting the Right is unconstitutional and SHOULD BE MET with any force the citizens protecting their rights choose. Death to Tyrants, not jail.
True, as long as you understand what the Right to Keep and Bear Arms (RKBA) consists of. The 2nd Amendment says "the right ... shall not be infringed." What that connotes depends on what "the right" was defined as; what is it that cannot be infringed. The U.S. Supreme Court has not accepted the edicts of wacko dingbats on the internet that includes the right to keep any weapon, or that there can be no regulations or restrictions. The "right to keep and bear arms" existed in the colonies, was brought forth into the states before the union, and was protected by the 2nd Amendment from Federal infringement. The right which existed in the colonies came from the English common law. The Framers saw no need to explain to themselves what that right to keep and bear arms was. It had been in the colonies since before they were born. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk1ch1.asp Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England Book the First - Chapter the First: Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals (1765) It has never meant a right to carry any and all weapons for any purpose. It does not mean that today. http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/07-290.html Certiorari to The United States Court Of Appeals for the District Of Columbia Circuit No. 07-290.Argued March 18, 2008--Decided June 26, 2008 District of Columbia law bans handgun possession by making it a crime to carry an unregistered firearm and prohibiting the registration of handguns; provides separately that no person may carry an unlicensed handgun, but authorizes the police chief to issue 1-year licenses; and requires residents to keep lawfully owned firearms unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device. Respondent Heller, a D. C. special policeman, applied to register a handgun he wished to keep at home, but the District refused. He filed this suit seeking, on Second Amendment grounds, to enjoin the city from enforcing the bar on handgun registration, the licensing requirement insofar as it prohibits carrying an unlicensed firearm in the home, and the trigger-lock requirement insofar as it prohibits the use of functional firearms in the home. The District Court dismissed the suit, but the D. C. Circuit reversed, holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to possess firearms and that the city's total ban on handguns, as well as its requirement that firearms in the home be kept nonfunctional even when necessary for self-defense, violated that right. Held: 1. The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. Pp. 2-53. (a) The Amendment's prefatory clause announces a purpose, but does not limit or expand the scope of the second part, the operative clause. The operative clause's text and history demonstrate that it connotes an individual right to keep and bear arms. Pp. 2-22. (b) The prefatory clause comports with the Court's interpretation of the operative clause. The "militia" comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. The Antifederalists feared that the Federal Government would disarm the people in order to disable this citizens' militia, enabling a politicized standing army or a select militia to rule. The response was to deny Congress power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and bear arms, so that the ideal of a citizens' militia would be preserved. Pp. 22-28. (c) The Court's interpretation is confirmed by analogous arms-bearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and immediately followed the Second Amendment. Pp. 28-30. (d) The Second Amendment's drafting history, while of dubious interpretive worth, reveals three state Second Amendment proposals that unequivocally referred to an individual right to bear arms. Pp. 30-32. (e) Interpretation of the Second Amendment by scholars, courts and legislators, from immediately after its ratification through the late 19th century also supports the Court's conclusion. Pp. 32-47. (f) None of the Court's precedents forecloses the Court's interpretation. Neither United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 553, nor Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 264-265, refutes the individual-rights interpretation. United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, does not limit the right to keep and bear arms to militia purposes, but rather limits the type of weapon to which the right applies to those used by the militia, i.e., those in common use for lawful purposes. Pp. 47-54. 2. Like most rights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited. It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose: For example, concealed weapons prohibitions have been upheld under the Amendment or state analogues. The Court's opinion should not be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. Miller's holding that the sorts of weapons protected are those "in common use at the time" finds support in the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons. Pp. 54-56. 3. The handgun ban and the trigger-lock requirement (as applied to self-defense) violate the Second Amendment. The District's total ban on handgun possession in the home amounts to a prohibition on an entire class of "arms" that Americans overwhelmingly choose for the lawful purpose of self-defense. Under any of the standards of scrutiny the Court has applied to enumerated constitutional rights, this prohibition—in the place where the importance of the lawful defense of self, family, and property is most acute—would fail constitutional muster. Similarly, the requirement that any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock makes it impossible for citizens to use arms for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence unconstitutional. Because Heller conceded at oral argument that the D. C. licensing law is permissible if it is not enforced arbitrarily and capriciously, the Court assumes that a license will satisfy his prayer for relief and does not address the licensing requirement. Assuming he is not disqualified from exercising Second Amendment rights, the District must permit Heller to register his handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home. Pp. 56-64. 478 F. 3d 370, affirmed. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., PETITIONERS On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals [June 26, 2008] Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
Correct. According to Miller, the weapon had to have "some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia”. Weapons of war were protected by the second amendment.
Update to where you can say according to Heller and McDonald.
Heller cited Miller so why can't I?
[misterwhite #28] Heller cited Miller so why can't I? [misterwhite #29] The second amendment protected the right of "the people" as part of a State militia to keep and bear militia-type weapons from federal infringement. While Miller does not really conflict with Heller, Heller, as the more recent interpretation of the Constitution, strikes down all prior interpretations which conflict with Heller. Heller applied to the District of Columbia. McDonald extended the application of Heller to the States. They are binding precedent, whether you agree with them or not. Miller, does not conflict with Heller, as Heller interprets Miller. You may cite Miller as in agreement with Heller. Any of your misbegotten fanciful interpretations of Miller are non-starters as being in conflict with Heller. Any holding of constitutional interpretation in Miller which actually conflicted with Heller would be struck down by Heller. To cite Miller to interpret the Constitution in a fashion in conflict with Heller is an act of futility and a waste of time. The law of the United States, as expressed in Heller: SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C.J. and Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. District of Columbia v. Heller 554 U.S. 570 (2008) at 620-28: Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 (1886), held that the right to keep and bear arms was not violated by a law that forbade "bodies of men to associate together as military organizations, or to drill or parade with arms in cities and towns unless authorized by law." Id., at 264-265. This does not refute the individual-rights interpretation of the Amendment; no one supporting that interpretation has contended that States may not ban such groups. JUSTICE STEVENS [621] presses Presser into service to support his view that the right to bear arms is limited to service in the militia by joining Presser's brief discussion of the Second Amendment with a later portion of the opinion making the seemingly relevant (to the Second Amendment) point that the plaintiff was not a member of the state militia. Unfortunately for JUSTICE STEVENS' argument, that later portion deals with the Fourteenth Amendment; it was the Fourteenth Amendment to which the plaintiff's nonmembership in the militia was relevant. Thus, JUSTICE STEVENS' statement that Presser "suggested that . . . nothing in the Constitution protected the use of arms outside the context of a militia," post, at 674-675, is simply wrong. Presser said nothing about the Second Amendment's meaning or scope, beyond the fact that it does not prevent the prohibition of private paramilitary organizations. JUSTICE STEVENS places overwhelming reliance upon this Court's decision in Miller, 307 U. S. 174. "[H]undreds of judges," we are told, "have relied on the view of the Amendment we endorsed there," post, at 638, and "[e]ven if the textual and historical arguments on both sides of the issue were evenly balanced, respect for the well-settled views of all of our predecessors on this Court, and for the rule of law itself . . . would prevent most jurists from endorsing such a dramatic upheaval in the law," post, at 639. And what is, according to JUSTICE STEVENS, the holding of Miller that demands such obeisance? That the Second Amendment "protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes, but that it does not curtail the Legislature's power to regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons." Post, at 637. Nothing so clearly demonstrates the weakness of JUSTICE STEVENS' case. Miller did not hold that and cannot possibly be read to have held that. The judgment in the case upheld against a Second Amendment challenge two men's federal indictment for transporting an unregistered short-barreled [622] shotgun in interstate commerce, in violation of the National Firearms Act, 48 Stat. 1236. It is entirely clear that the Court's basis for saying that the Second Amendment did not apply was not that the defendants were "bear[ing] arms" not "for . . . military purposes" but for "nonmilitary use," post, at 637. Rather, it was that the type of weapon at issue was not eligible for Second Amendment protection: "In the absence of any evidence tending to show that the possession or use of a [short-barreled shotgun] at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument." 307 U. S., at 178 (emphasis added). "Certainly," the Court continued, "it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense." Ibid. Beyond that, the opinion provided no explanation of the content of the right. This holding is not only consistent with, but positively suggests, that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms (though only arms that "have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia"). Had the Court believed that the Second Amendment protects only those serving in the militia, it would have been odd to examine the character of the weapon rather than simply note that the two crooks were not militiamen. JUSTICE STEVENS can say again and again that Miller did not "turn on the difference between muskets and sawed-off shotguns; it turned, rather, on the basic difference between the military and nonmilitary use and possession of guns," post, at 677, but the words of the opinion prove otherwise. The most JUSTICE STEVENS can plausibly claim for Miller is that it declined to decide the nature of the Second Amendment right, despite the Solicitor General's argument (made in the alternative) that the right was collective, see Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, [623] No. 696, pp. 4-5. Miller stands only for the proposition that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons. It is particularly wrongheaded to read Miller for more than what it said, because the case did not even purport to be a thorough examination of the Second Amendment. JUSTICE STEVENS claims, post, at 676-677, that the opinion reached its conclusion "[a]fter reviewing many of the same sources that are discussed at greater length by the Court today." Not many, which was not entirely the Court's fault. The defendants made no appearance in the case, neither filing a brief nor appearing at oral argument; the Court heard from no one but the Government (reason enough, one would think, not to make that case the beginning and the end of this Court's consideration of the Second Amendment). See Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3N. Y. U. J. L. & Liberty 48, 65-68 (2008). The Government's brief spent two pages discussing English legal sources, concluding "that at least the carrying of weapons without lawful occasion or excuse was always a crime" and that (because of the class-based restrictions and the prohibition on terrorizing people with dangerous or unusual weapons) "the early English law did not guarantee an unrestricted right to bear arms." Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, No. 696, at 9-11. It then went on to rely primarily on the discussion of the English right to bear arms in Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154, for the proposition that the only uses of arms protected by the Second Amendment are those that relate to the militia, not self-defense. See Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, No. 696, at 12-18. The final section of the brief recognized that "some courts have said that the right to bear arms includes the right of the individual to have them for the protection of his person and property," and launched an alternative argument that "weapons which are commonly used by criminals," such as sawed-off shotguns, are not protected. See id., at 18-21. The Government's Miller brief thus provided [624] scant discussion of the history of the Second Amendment—and the Court was presented with no counterdiscussion. As for the text of the Court's opinion itself, that discusses none of the history of the Second Amendment. It assumes from the prologue that the Amendment was designed to preserve the militia, 307 U. S., at 178 (which we do not dispute), and then reviews some historical materials dealing with the nature of the militia, and in particular with the nature of the arms their members were expected to possess, id., at 178-182. Not a word (not a word) about the history of the Second Amendment. This is the mighty rock upon which the dissent rests its case. We may as well consider at this point (for we will have to consider eventually) what types of weapons Miller permits. Read in isolation, Miller's phrase "part of ordinary military equipment" could mean that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected. That would be a startling reading of the opinion, since it would mean that the National Firearms Act's restrictions on machineguns (not challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional, machineguns being useful in warfare in 1939. We think that Miller's "ordinary military equipment" language must be read in tandem with what comes after: "[O]rdinarily when called for [militia] service [able-bodied] men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time." 307 U. S., at 179. The traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms "in common use at the time" for lawful purposes like self-defense. "In the colonial [625] and revolutionary war era, [small-arms] weapons used by militiamen and weapons used in defense of person and home were one and the same." State v. Kessler, 289 Ore. 359, 368, 614 P. 2d 94, 98 (1980) (citing G. Neumann, Swords and Blades of the American Revolution 6-15, 252-254 (1973)). Indeed, that is precisely the way in which the Second Amendment's operative clause furthers the purpose announced in its preface. We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. That accords with the historical understanding of the scope of the right, see Part III, infra. 25 We conclude that nothing in our precedents forecloses our adoption of the original understanding of the Second Amendment. [...] [626] III Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. See, e.g., Sheldon, in 5 Blume 346; Rawle 123; Pomeroy 152-153; Abbott 333. For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues. See, e.g., State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann., at 489-490; Nunn v. State, 1 Ga., at 251; see generally 2 Kent *340, n. 2; The American Students' Blackstone 84, n. 11 (G. Chase ed. 1884). Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws impos- [627] ing conditions and qualfications on the commercial sale of arms. We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those "in common use at the time." 307 U. S., at 179. We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of "dangerous and unusual weapons." See 4 Blackstone 148-149 (1769); 3 B. Wilson, Works of the Honourable James Wilson 79 (1804); J. Dunlap, The New York Justice 8 (1815); C. Humphreys, A Compendium of the Common Law in Force in Kentucky 482 (1822); 1 W. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Indictable Misdemeanors 271-272 (1831); H. Stephen, Summary of the Criminal Law 48 (1840); E. Lewis, An Abridgment of the Criminal Law of the United States 64 (1847); F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States 726 (1852). See also State v. Langford, 10 N. C. 381, 383-384 (1824); O'Neill v. State, 16 Ala. 65, 67 (1849); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1871); State v. Lanier, 71 N. C. 288, 289 (1874). It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service—M-16 rifles and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause. But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment's ratiication was the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty. It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large. Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers and tanks. But the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of it between the prefatory clause [628] and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.
Might be unconstitutional? The National Firearms Act's restrictions on machineguns ARE unconstitutional. And without those restrictions, machine guns WOULD be "in common use" today.
Anywhere that you project that Miller interpreted the Constitution differently than Heller, Miller is superseded by Heller. Your attempts to invoke Miller are futile and a waste of time. On any particular point, a more recent holding supersedes any prior holding. If you wish to continue your misinterpretation of Miller you are free to do so. Heller said there was no conflict. If there were a conflict, Heller would supercede Miller or any prior precedent you may choose to drag up or misinterpret.
Stare decisis be damned!
See #41 and stop being a jerk.
Me being a jerk? You lecture me on stare decisis while ignoring Cruikshank, Presser and Miller? Then you have the balls to say that, well, if there is a conflict with Heller, too bad. Heller is now the new precedent and I must ignore all prior rulings ... because stare decisis. You want to give this power to the Supreme Court? The power, for example, to define the type of arms protected and have that definition apply nationwide? Already they've limited the definition to "in common use" for self-defense in the home. Yeah, that's what the second amendment means. You're so eager to look to the U.S. Supreme Court to protect this right from state laws that you ignore the potential for abuse by some future, liberal-dominated court which now has the power to destroy the real meaning.
Then you have the balls to say that, well, if there is a conflict with Heller, too bad. Heller is now the new precedent and I must ignore all prior rulings ... because stare decisis. Yes, that's how it works. When Brown v. Topeka Board of Education struck down Plessey v. Ferguson, neither Plessey nor anything else could be cited as making separate but equal lawful. Repeating your bullshit endlessly does not polish those turds of thought into pearls of wisdom. Heller and McDonald superseded all prior interpretations which conflicted with them. Heller states it did not conflict earlier precedents. Heller disagrees with your personal and very fanciful, but wrong, reading of those precedents. Your personal, but wrong, reading of those precedents does not strike down Heller. Deal with it. Heller does not conflict with earlier precedent. If there were an earlier precedent in conflict, Heller would supersede it. As for the actual law, can you go out and lawfully purchase a newly manufactured machine gun, or can't you?
Accurate. You accurately portray the legal system as it is, and particularly the system of precedent as it applies under the Common Law. I've practiced both American law (common law) and French Civil Law. The systems get to about the same conclusions, but the pathways are different. That they arrive at the same place is testimony to the bedrock of COMMON SENSE that underlies law. Law is not an exercise in abstract philosophy. It is, in the final analysis, a TOOL of governance, where the rubber meets the road between actual citizens in real disputes with each other and/or with the state. Nutty notions that some subject matter is, somehow, "above the law" just don't work in a world in which there are REAL disputes, with REAL economic and physical consequences. The reason we developed courts at all - whether Common Law or Civil Law - is precisely because if such places of official adjudication DON'T exist and DON'T have orderly rules and procedures that can be predicted and relied upon, people will resort to "self-help", which is a nice way of saying dueling, blood feud, vendetta, and private war. Civil Law, originally Roman Law, fell into disrepair after the fall of Rome, and with it, the Roman Peace evaporated. Feudal Europe was a pretty bloody and terrible place to live. Common Law grew up in places as a bulwark against the craziness of blood feud. Granted, Christianity (specifically Catholic Canon Law, which was the only game in town in the 1000s (crazies' assertions to the contrary notwithstanding), very heavily inflected the civil and common law courts, by providing an overarching set of lofty (and often unachieved) standards. Still, courts evolved through experience and common sense. People having the "God-given right" to carry around unregistered machine guns, set up AA missile batteries in their yards on short final to JFK airport, and keeping a stock of mustard gas and a nuke in their basement, "just in case" cannot be what the Second Amendment means. The Constitution is not a suicide pact!
Oh? The system that says if you don't like precedent you can change it? Then once you have the new "precedent" you're happy with, that precedent cannot be changed because shut up.
Then once you have the new "precedent" you're happy with, that precedent cannot be changed because shut up. Yes, precedent can be changed. Were SCOTUS to issue an opinion that abortion was infanticide, and not a constitutionally protected right, Roe could no longer be cited to the effect that abortion is a constitutional right. The more recent precedent would prevail. A prevailing precedent can be changed by amending the constitution. Opinions in Scott v. Sandford were not judicially overturned, but were overturned by post-war amendments which changed the law. As an historical note, SCOTUS found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, that the lower court also lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, and SCOTUS remanded the case to the lower court with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Minor v. Happersett in 1875 held unanimously that women did not have a constitutional right to vote for President. Moreover, neither did anyone else, and they still don't. But the 19th Amendment came along and said, "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex." Women may not be denied the right to vote because of their sex. Where men are allowed to vote, women must be allowed to vote on an equal basis. Minor was correctly decided according to the law then in existence, so the law was changed. A new abortion precedent could be changed by having the issue revisited by the Court yet again, and changing its interpretation of the Constitution. Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896 held that seperate but equal was constitutional. Brown v. Topeka Board of Education in 1954 revisited the issue and held that seperate but equal was inherently unequal and was unconstitutional. One cannot go to court and argue Plessy as precedent to overturn Brown. What cannot be done is to cite a perceived conflict between Miller (1939)and Heller/McDonald (2008/2010) and claim Miller supersedes the more recent interpretation of the Constitution in Heller/McDonald. The precedent set by Heller/McDonald can be overturned by a subsequent, more recent interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court. Should the Court issue a holding in misterwhite v United States, (2020) saying that the 2nd Amendment protects the right to own a newly manufactured machine gun, you would have a new precedent and could buy all the new machine guns you want. Until the Constitution is amended, or the Supreme Court revisits the issue, you are out of luck.
I'm not saying Miller supercedes anything. I'm citing the doctrine of precedent -- stare decisis -- which Heller totally ignored. Miller concluded the only arms protected by the second amendment were militia-type arms. That was ignored by Heller because it didn't fit their in-common-use-for-self-defense-in-the-home made-up interpretation.
Miller concluded the only arms protected by the second amendment were militia-type arms. That was ignored by Heller because it didn't fit their in-common-use-for-self-defense-in-the-home made-up interpretation. You are full of crap, so there's that. Heller did a thorough review of existing precedents. It found none inconsistent with its own ruling. It did not ignore precedent as you claim. Heller demolishes your wrongheaded misreading of those precedents. Notably, Heller finds that, It is particularly wrongheaded to read Miller for more than what it said, because the case did not even purport to be a thorough examination of the Second Amendment. Your wrongheaded reading of Miller affects nothing.
OK. And what weapons would those be? According to Miller.
Those typically lawfully possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. Those weapons in common use at the time. Heller at 624-25: We conclude that nothing in our precedents forecloses our adoption of the original understanding of the Second Amendment. Heller at 627-28: It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service—M–16 rifles and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause. But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification was the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty. It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large. Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers and tanks. But the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.
You cited Heller. In your post #70, you said, "Miller stands only for the proposition that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons." I asked what "certain types of weapons" Miller stood for. Not Heller.
In your post #70, you said, "Miller stands only for the proposition that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons." I asked what "certain types of weapons" Miller stood for. Not Heller. Heller is currently the definitive legal interpretation of what Miller says. Miller involved one (1) unlawful to possess weapon involved in interstate commerce for non-militia purposes, and opined it enjoyed no 2A protection.
Had Miller transported a machine gun across state lines, would that have been protected by the second amendment (per the Miller court)?
Had Miller transported a machine gun across state lines, would that have been protected by the second amendment (per the Miller court)? That was not before the Court in Miller and could not have been decided by Miller. The Court does not decide issues not presented. The National Firearms Act, as applied to one indicted for transporting in interstate commerce a 12-gauge shotgun with a barrel less than 18 inches long without having registered it and without having in his possession a stamp-affixed written order for it, as required by the Act, held: 1. Not unconstitutional as an invasion of the reserved powers of the States. Citing Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U. S. 506, and Narcotic Act cases. P. 307 U. S. 177. 2. Not violative of the Second Amendment of the Federal Constitution. P. 307 U. S. 178. The Court cannot take judicial notice that a shotgun having a barrel less than 18 inches long has today any reasonable relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, and therefore cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees to the citizen the right to keep and bear such a weapon. 26 F.Supp. 1002, reversed. Heller at 554 U.S. 623: It is particularly wrongheaded to read Miller for more than what it said, because the case did not even purport to be a thorough examination of the Second Amendment. Miller decided upon only one weapon being transported by Miller in interstate commerce, "a 12-gauge shotgun with a barrel less than 18 inches long without having registered it and without having in his possession a stamp-affixed written order for it, as required by the Act." I will not entertain your fantasies about Miller, yet again. Whatever you imagine it says or decided cannot supersede anything in Heller/McDonald.
I didn't ask the court. I asked you, coward. Answer: They would have thrown out the case since machine guns are suitable for use by a well- regulated militia and protected by the second amendment. Which makes the Heller definition an invented joke.
I didn't ask the court. I asked you, coward. You asked, I answered. You just don't like the answer. Here is what you asked: The Miller court held that transporting an unregistered shotgun in interstate commerce for non-militia purposes enjoyed no 2A protection. If you imagine that it decided some other issue, that is your personal problem. Heller stated, "We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessby by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns." What Miller noted about machine guns was: "That for the purposes of this Act --" "(a) The term 'firearm' means a shotgun or rifle having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length, or any other weapon, except a pistol or revolver, from which a shot is discharged by an explosive if such weapon is capable of being concealed on the person, or a machine gun, and includes a muffler or silencer for any firearm whether or not such firearm is included within the foregoing definition [The Act of April 10, 1936, c. 169, 49 Stat. 1192 added the words], but does not include any rifle which is within the foregoing provisions solely by reason of the length of its barrel if the caliber of such rifle is .22 or smaller and if its barrel is sixteen inches or more in length." "Sec. 3. (a) There shall be levied, collected, and paid upon firearms transferred in the continental United States a tax at the rate of $200 for each firearm, such tax to be paid by the transferor, and to be represented by appropriate stamps to be provided by the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, and the stamps herein provided shall be affixed to the order for such firearm, hereinafter provided for. The tax imposed by this section shall be in addition to any import duty imposed on such firearm." "Sec. 4. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person to transfer a firearm except in pursuance of a written order from the person seeking to obtain such article, on an application form issued in blank in duplicate for that purpose by the Commissioner. Such order shall identify the applicant by such means of identification as may be prescribed by regulations under this Act: Provided, That, if the applicant is an individual, such identification shall include fingerprints and a photograph thereof." "(c) Every person so transferring a firearm shall set forth in each copy of such order the manufacturer's number or other mark identifying such firearm, and shall forward a copy of such order to the Commissioner. The original thereof, with stamps affixed, shall be returned to the applicant." "(d) No person shall transfer a firearm which has previously been transferred on or after the effective date of this Act, unless such person, in addition to complying with subsection (c), transfers therewith the stamp-affixed order provided for in this section for each such prior transfer, in compliance with such regulations as may be prescribed under this Act for proof of payment of all taxes on such firearms." "Sec. 5. (a) Within sixty days after the effective date of this Act every person possessing a firearm shall register, with the collector of the district in which he resides, the number or other mark identifying such firearm, together with his name, address, place where such firearm is usually kept, and place of business or employment, and, if such person is other than a natural person, the name and home address of an executive officer thereof: Provided, That no person shall be required to register under this section with respect to any firearm acquired after the effective date of, and in conformity with the provisions of, this Act." "Sec. 6. It shall be unlawful for any person to receive or possess any firearm which has at any time been transferred in violation of section 3 or 4 of this Act." "Sec. 11. It shall be unlawful for any person who is required to register as provided in section 5 hereof and who shall not have so registered, or any other person who has not in his possession a stamp-affixed order as provided in section 4 hereof, to ship, carry, or deliver any firearm in interstate commerce." "Sec. 12. The Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, shall prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary for carrying the provisions of this Act into effect." "Sec. 14. Any person who violates or fails to comply with any of the requirements of this Act shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $2,000 or be imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, in the discretion of the court." "Sec. 16. If any provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act, and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby." "Sec. 18. This Act may be cited as the 'National Firearms Act.'" Had the Miller firearm been a machine gun, it would have fallen within the 1934 Act and it would have been seized for the multiple violations of the Act. The Heller court found no conflict with Miller in stating that "M-16 rifles and the like — may be banned...." No joke. I understand you prefer your imaginary bullshit better. Heller supercedes Miller where there is any conflict of holdings. In dicta, Miller opined that "And further, that ordinarily, when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time." A machine gun in not the type of weapon in common use at this time.
Where did you get "for non-militia purposes"? You're just making shit up. The court didn't even get that far. They couldn't say it was a weapon suitable for use by a militia. They remanded back to the lower court to get that resolved before they would even hear the case.
As you have apparently never bothered to read Miller, all further stupid comments about it will be ignored. [Miller Syllabus] "The Court cannot take judicial notice that a shotgun having a barrel less than 18 inches long has today any reasonable relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, and therefore cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees to the citizen the right to keep and bear such a weapon." [Miller Opinion of the Court at 178] "In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. " [Lewis v. United States, 445 US 55, 65-6 (1980)]
The Miller court was ruling on the type of weapon protected by the second amendment. They described the type of weapon as that suitable for use by a militia. They NEVER limited the use of those weapons to "militia purposes". Just the opposite. They expected militia members to bring the same weapons used for "non-militia purposes".
They NEVER limited the use of those weapons to "militia purposes". Just the opposite. They expected militia members to bring the same weapons used for "non-militia purposes". misterwhite, victim of dictum. Heller at 625:
I would hope not. Yes, it's true that United States v. Miller was mentioned in Footnote #8 in Lewis v. United States -- a 1980 case involving a firearm possessed by a felon. Why would the Heller court even mention this case, much less consider it? Probably because if they looked at the Miller case directly -- not footnoted dictum -- they would see that the Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have ‘some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia’.
Why would the Heller court even mention this case, much less consider it? Probably because if they looked at the Miller case directly -- not footnoted dictum -- they would see that the Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have ‘some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia’. Lewis in 1980 quoted from Miller. Lewis was fully argued before SCOTUS. At 445 U.S. 56: Andrew J. Levander argued the cause pro hac vice for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Heymann, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, Jerome M. Feit, and Joel M. Gershowitz It was Miller that was not fully argued before the Supreme Court. A dictum from Miller is no less a dictum because it is described as such by the Supreme Court in a footnote of a subsequent opinion. While the appearance of attorneys and argument for both sides in Lewis is clearly documented, in Miller it is clearly documented that there was "No appearance for appellees." 307 U.S. 175 As we also know, Miller's corpse did not appear for argument or the reading of the Opinion. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Clayton E. Cramer, For the Defense of Themselves and the State, The Original Intent and Judicial Interpretation of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, Praeger Publishers, 1994, page 189: The Court did not say that a short-barreled shotgun was unprotected—just that no evidence had been presented to demonstrate such a weapon was "any part of the ordinary military equipment" or that it could "contribute to the common defense." - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Brian L. Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, NYU Journal of Law and Liberty, Vol 3:48 at 50: At 57: Gutensohn was attorney for Miller. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Heller at 626-28: We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” 307 U. S., at 179. We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.” See 4 Blackstone 148–149 (1769); 3 B. Wilson, Works of the Honourable James Wilson 79 (1804); J. Dunlap, The New-York Justice 8 (1815); C. Humphreys, A Compendium of the Common Law in Force in Kentucky 482 (1822); 1 W. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Indictable Misdemeanors 271–272 (1831); H. Stephen, Summary of the Criminal Law 48 (1840); E. Lewis, An Abridgment of the Criminal Law of the United States 64 (1847); F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States 726 (1852). See also State v. Langford, 10 N. C. 381, 383–384 (1824); O’Neill v. State, 16 Ala. 65, 67 (1849); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1871); State v. Lanier, 71 N. C. 288, 289 (1874). It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service—M–16 rifles and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause. But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification was the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty. It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large. Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers and tanks. But the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.
Correct. So what are we to deduce from that statement by the U.S. Supreme Court?
Correct. So what are we to deduce from that statement by the U.S. Supreme Court? We are to deduce that Miller filed a demurrer, filed no brief, and made no appearance in the court, personally or through attorney. A demurrer is an assertion, made without disputing the facts, that the opponent's pleading is insufficient as a matter of law. We are to deduce that the Court, in the absolute and complete absence of any evidence presented which could even tend to show that the weapon had any reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, could not make believe there was such evidence. The Court did not find that such evidence did not exist, just that none had been presented. Lacking evidence upon which to form an opinion, the Court went on to relate the matter upon which it could not form an opinion. Because no relevant evidence whatever had been presented, the Court could not say that the weapon was any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense. That is what the Court could not say, due to a complete absence of evidence. The Court then cited as authority, Aymette v State, 2 Humphrey's (Tenn.) 154, 158.
Ah. So their decision was to be based on whether or not the weapon had any reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia. I agree and that's the only point I was making. Because Heller ignored that important point.
Ah. So their decision was to be based on whether or not the weapon had any reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia. You evidently have a reading comprehension problem. If the weapon had not relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, 2A did not apply. If the weapon did have some relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, then the court had to consider if it was protected by 2A. The court overruled an unexplained grant of a demurrer and remanded the case to the District Court. Further proceedings did not occur because Miller disappeared.
What?? The court never said, nor implied, that. You're just making shit up. The ONLY 2A criteria set by the court was whether or not the weapon was suitable for use by a militia OR could contribute to the common defense. "With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such (militia) forces, the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It must be interpreted and applied with that end in view."
Again, it demonstrates the reasoning of the Miller court -- only militia-type weapons are protected. https://www.lclark.edu/live/files/771 Nelson Lund, Heller and Second Amendment Precedent, 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 335, 336-39 (2009) [excerpt at 337-39, footnotes omitted] A duly interposed demurrer alleged: The National Firearms Act is not a revenue measure but an attempt to usurp police power reserved to the States, and is therefore unconstitutional. Also, it offends the inhibition of the Second Amendment to the Constitution—“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” The District Court held that section eleven of the Act violates the Second Amendment. It accordingly sustained the demurrer and quashed the indictment. The cause is here by direct appeal. Besides the fact that the Supreme Court was reviewing a bare and unexplained judgment sustaining a demurrer, the criminal defendants failed to appear in the Supreme Court—as the Court was careful to report. Thus, neither the court below nor the criminal defendants offered the Supreme Court any argument in support of the challenged judgment, and the Justices heard arguments only from the government. After such a stunted adversarial process, and with no Supreme Court precedents to guide the Court’s interpretation, one would expect a narrow and even tentative decision. That is just what the Court delivered. After quickly disposing of the federalism issue (which the trial court had not addressed), the Miller Court stated its conclusion about the Second Amendment as follows: This passage states the holding in the case. Note that the Court does not hold that short-barreled shotguns are outside the coverage of the Second Amendment. The Court says only that it has seen no evidence that these weapons have certain militia-related characteristics—which is no surprise given the procedural posture of the case—and that the Court could not take judicial notice of certain facts about the military utility of these weapons. After this statement, one would expect the case to be remanded to give the defendants an opportunity to offer the kind of evidence called for in the Court’s holding. Sure enough, Miller concludes as follows: “We are unable to accept the conclusion of the court below and the challenged judgment must be reversed. The cause will be remanded for further proceedings.” The legal test that the trial court would have been required to employ on remand is that there is a right to keep and bear a particular weapon only if, at a minimum, the weapon “has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia” which could be shown, for example, by evidence that the weapon is “part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.” Given the procedural posture of the case, the Supreme Court’s language could not possibly be read to mean that short-barreled shotguns are outside the protection of the Second Amendment, or that the provisions of the National Firearms Act regulating these weapons had been found to be constitutionally valid. The implications of Miller would be very different if the Court had upheld a conviction for violating the statute rather than what it in fact did, namely to reverse the trial court’s unexplained decision to sustain a demurrer. If a conviction had been upheld, it would have meant that there is no Second Amendment bar to the statutory requirements that the defendants were charged with violating. Depending on how the Court had explained such a conclusion, it might also have meant that short-barreled shotguns are unprotected by Second Amendment protection. In fact, however, there is no basis for either of these conclusions in the Miller opinion.
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Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/LatestVirginia County Forms Militia in Response to Dems’ Gun Control Laws
#5. To: All (#4)
Tazewell County becomes Second Amendment Sanctuary, adds militia ordinance during widely attended meeting
The News & Press
Dec 3, 2019
#6. To: All (#5)
‘Militia’ Resolution provides extra protection for Tazewell County residents
WVVA
December 9, 2019
#10. To: nolu chan (#6)
So hopefully that'll be heard in Richmond, and the General Assembly will modify what's been proposed to make it a little bit more constitutional, but also a little bit more along the wishes of what the people of the Commonwealth really want.
#11. To: jeremiad (#10)
You cannot vote away a Right to keep and bear arms. ANY law restricting the Right is unconstitutional...
5. THE fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present mention, is that of having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law. Which is also declared by the same statute 1 W. & M. ft. 2. c. 2. and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al. v. HELLER
v.
DICK ANTHONY HELLER
for the District Of Columbia Circuit
#20. To: nolu chan (#11)
It has never meant a right to carry any and all weapons for any purpose.
#24. To: misterwhite (#20)
According to Miller
#28. To: nolu chan (#24)
Update to where you can say according to Heller and McDonald.
#30. To: misterwhite (#28)
[misterwhite #27] Heller and McDonald are flawed rulings.
[620]
#33. To: nolu chan (#30)
Read in isolation, Miller's phrase "part of ordinary military equipment" could mean that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected. That would be a startling reading of the opinion, since it would mean that the National Firearms Act's restrictions on machineguns (not challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional, machineguns being useful in warfare in 1939.
#35. To: misterwhite (#33)
Might be unconstitutional? The National Firearms Act's restrictions on machineguns ARE unconstitutional.
#40. To: nolu chan (#35)
If there were a conflict, Heller would supercede Miller or any prior precedent you may choose to drag up or misinterpret.
#42. To: misterwhite (#40)
Stare decisis be damned!
#43. To: nolu chan (#42)
#44. To: misterwhite (#43)
Me being a jerk? You lecture me on stare decisis while ignoring Cruikshank, Presser and Miller?
#50. To: nolu chan (#44)
#52. To: Vicomte13 (#50)
You accurately portray the legal system as it is, and particularly the system of precedent as it applies under the Common Law.
#57. To: misterwhite, Vicomte13 (#52)
Oh? The system that says if you don't like precedent you can change it?
#59. To: nolu chan (#57)
What cannot be done is to cite a perceived conflict between Miller (1939)and Heller/McDonald (2008/2010) and claim Miller supersedes the more recent interpretation of the Constitution in Heller/McDonald.
#70. To: misterwhite (#59)
I'm not saying Miller supercedes anything. I'm citing the doctrine of precedent -- stare decisis -- which Heller totally ignored.
Miller stands only for the proposition that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons.
#72. To: nolu chan (#70)
Miller stands only for the proposition that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons.
#75. To: misterwhite (#72)
OK. And what weapons would those be? According to Miller.
“In the colonial and revolutionary war era, [small-arms] weapons used by militiamen and weapons used in defense of person and home were one and the same.” State v. Kessler, 289 Ore. 359, 368, 614 P. 2d 94, 98 (1980) (citing G. Neumann, Swords and Blades of the American Revolution 6–15, 252–254 (1973)). Indeed, that is precisely the way in which the Second Amendment’s operative clause furthers the purpose announced in its preface. We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. That accords with the historical understanding of the scope of the right, see Part III, infra.
We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” 307 U. S., at 179. We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.” See 4 Blackstone 148–149 (1769); 3 B. Wilson, Works of the Honourable James Wilson 79 (1804); J. Dunlap, The New-York Justice 8 (1815); C. Humphreys, A Compendium of the Common Law in Force in Kentucky 482 (1822); 1 W. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Indictable Misdemeanors 271–272 (1831); H. Stephen, Summary of the Criminal Law 48 (1840); E. Lewis, An Abridgment of the Criminal Law of the United States 64 (1847); F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States 726 (1852). See also State v. Langford, 10 N. C. 381, 383–384 (1824); O’Neill v. State, 16 Ala. 65, 67 (1849); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1871); State v. Lanier, 71 N. C. 288, 289 (1874).
#76. To: nolu chan (#75)
Those typically lawfully possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. Those weapons in common use at the time.
#83. To: misterwhite (#76)
You cited Heller.
#90. To: nolu chan (#83)
Miller involved one (1) unlawful to possess weapon involved in interstate commerce for non-militia purposes, and opined it enjoyed no 2A protection.
#94. To: misterwhite (#90)
(Edited)
Miller involved one (1) unlawful to possess weapon involved in interstate commerce for non-militia purposes, and opined it enjoyed no 2A protection.
Syllabus
Miller stands only for the proposition that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons.
#96. To: nolu chan (#94)
That was not before the Court in Miller and could not have been decided by Miller. The Court does not decide issues not presented.
#99. To: misterwhite (#96)
That was not before the Court in Miller and could not have been decided by Miller. The Court does not decide issues not presented.
Had Miller transported a machine gun across state lines, would that have been protected by the second amendment (per the Miller court)?
Act of June 26, 1934, c. 757, 48 Stat. 1236-1240, 26 U.S.C. § 1132.
Answer: They would have thrown out the case since machine guns are suitable for use by a well- regulated militia and protected by the second amendment. Which makes the Heller definition an invented joke.
#102. To: nolu chan (#99)
The Miller court held that transporting an unregistered shotgun in interstate commerce for non-militia purposes enjoyed no 2A protection.
#110. To: misterwhite (#102)
Where did you get "for non-militia purposes"? You're just making shit up.
These legislative restrictions on the use of firearms are neither based upon constitutionally suspect criteria, nor do they trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties. See United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, 178 (1939) (the Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have "some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia"); United States v.Three Winchester 30-30 Caliber Lever Action Carbines, 504 F. 2d 1288,1290, n. 5 (CA7 1974); United States v. Johnson, 497 F. 2d 548 (CA41974); Cody v. United States, 460 F. 2d 34 (CA8), cert. denied, 409 U. S.1010 (1972) (the latter three cases holding, respectively, that § 1202 (a) (1),§ 922 (g), and § 922 (a) (6) do not violate the Second Amendment).
#115. To: nolu chan (#110)
Where did you get "for non-militia purposes"? You're just making shit up.
As you have apparently never bothered to read Miller
#120. To: misterwhite (#115)
The Miller court was ruling on the type of weapon protected by the second amendment. They described the type of weapon as that suitable for use by a militia.
Miller was briefly mentioned in our decision in Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55 (1980), an appeal from a conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The challenge was based on the contention that the prior felony conviction had been unconstitutional. No Second Amendment claim was raised or briefed by any party. In the course of rejecting the asserted challenge, the Court commented gratuitously, in a footnote, that “[t]hese legislative restrictions on the use of firearms are neither based upon constitutionally suspect criteria, nor do they trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties. See United States v. Miller . . . (the Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have ‘some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia’).” Id., at 65–66, n. 8. The footnote then cites several Court of Appeals cases to the same effect. It is inconceivable that we would rest our interpretation of the basic meaning of any guarantee of the Bill of Rights upon such a footnoted dictum in a case where the point was not at issue and was not argued.
#125. To: nolu chan (#120)
It is inconceivable that we would rest our interpretation of the basic meaning of any guarantee of the Bill of Rights upon such a footnoted dictum in a case where the point was not at issue and was not argued.
#128. To: misterwhite (#125)
Yes, it's true that United States v. Miller was mentioned in Footnote #8 in Lewis v. United States -- a 1980 case involving a firearm possessed by a felon.
Andrew W. Wood argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Neal P. Rutledge.
In some of the most convoluted language the Court has used to justify a position, the majority decided:
"In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a 'shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length' at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense."
This essay concludes that Miller is coherent, but largely irrelevant to the contemporary debate over the meaning of the Second Amendment. Miller was a Second Amendment test case, teed up with a nominal defendant by a district judge sympathetic to New Deal gun control measures. But the Supreme Court issued a surprisingly narrow decision. Essentially, it held that the Second Amendment permits Congress to tax firearms used by criminals. While dicta suggest the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to possess and use a weapon suitable for militia service, dicta are not precedent.7 In other words, Miller did not adopt a theory of the Second Amendment guarantee, because it did not need one.
On March 30, 1939, seven justices of the Supreme Court heard oral argument in United States v. Miller. Chief Justice Hughes was ill, and the newly appointed Justice Douglas was not confirmed until April 4. Gordon Dean represented the United States and no one represented Miller or Layton. Two days later, Gutensohn finally received four copies of the government’s brief.
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. See, e. g., Sheldon, in 5 Blume 346; Rawle 123; Pomeroy 152–153; Abbott 333. For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues. See, e. g., State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann., at 489–490; Nunn v. State, 1 Ga., at 251; see generally 2 Kent *340, n. 2; The American Students’ Blackstone 84, n. 11 (G. Chase ed. 1884). Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.
#130. To: nolu chan (#128)
The Court did not say that a short-barreled shotgun was unprotected—just that no evidence had been presented to demonstrate such a weapon was "any part of the ordinary military equipment" or that it could "contribute to the common defense."
#132. To: misterwhite (#130)
The Court did not say that a short-barreled shotgun was unprotected—just that no evidence had been presented to demonstrate such a weapon was "any part of the ordinary military equipment" or that it could "contribute to the common defense."
#134. To: nolu chan (#132)
We are to deduce that the Court, in the absolute and complete absence of any evidence presented which could even tend to show that the weapon had any reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia
#135. To: misterwhite (#134)
We are to deduce that the Court, in the absolute and complete absence of any evidence presented which could even tend to show that the weapon had any reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia
#143. To: nolu chan (#135)
If the weapon did have some relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, then the court had to consider if it was protected by 2A.
#152. To: misterwhite (#143)
The Opinion of the Court at page 178 reads:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment, or that its use could contribute to the common defense.
Miller described the procedural posture of the case as follows:
An indictment in the District Court Western District Arkansas, charged that Jack Miller and Frank Layton [violated the National Firearms Act]. . . .
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a “shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length” at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.
Replies to Comment # 152.
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