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Title: AGW SWAT “hero” Arrested in Child Porn Sting
Source:
Eric Peters Autos
URL Source: https://www.ericpetersautos.com/201 ... -arrested-in-child-porn-sting/
Published: Oct 26, 2019
Author: Eric
Post Date: 2019-10-28 11:25:27 by Deckard
Keywords: None
Views: 2445
Comments: 20
A Louisiana armed government worker and “leader” of a Hut! Hut! Hut! crew of AGWs has been arrested on multiple counts of child pornography and child rape. Dennis Perkins and Cynthia Thompson Perkins face first-degree rape charges and 60 counts of pornography production involving a juvenile under the age of 13. The Livingston Parish Sheriff’s Office, where Perkins worked as a “lieutenant” arrested him Tuesday. Sheriff Jason Ard said he fired the “lieutenant” (in air quotes to beg the question – who commissioned this creep?) after investigators made him aware of the charges. Perkins, 44, led the SWAT team and had worked for the department since 2002. Despite the heinous acts committed by the AGW, the head AGW still made an effort to defend him: “It’s a sad day for all of us, for all law enforcement officers, when you arrest one of your own,” Ard said in a statement. “We at the LPSO work hard everyday to retain the trust placed in us by our citizens. I understand this was a veteran law enforcement officer, one who had dedicated a lot of time and effort into this community, but as I have said in the past – no one is above the law.” Italics added to make the point. People like this Perkins creature (and his wife – also a government worker) are exactly the type of creature attracted to what is styled “law enforcement” these days. Which entails power to legally torment people. Psychologically normal people are repelled by the thought of swaggering around with a gun and badge, hassling people on trumped-up “charges” – and SWATTING them. But for people like Perkins, it’s a dream come true to be issued a gun and a badge by the government. The Soviet CHEKA and NKVD were well-stocked with people like this. And now, because America has its own CHEKA and NKVD, American “law enforcement” is well-stocked with people like this, too. Doubt it? Here’s another one. . . Got a question about cars, Libertarian politics – or anything else? Click on the “ask Eric” link and send ’em in!
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Begin Trace Mode for Comment # 13.
#1. To: Deckard (#0)
Deck, wonder how long it will be before the " Crew " show up to defend that POS, to tell us how much a Hero he is, and that the community owes so much to him. They are probably busy setting up a Go fund Me for the POS. You better be careful, they may try to torch your house for posting this. Watch your 6 !!!
Not much of a canary crew around these parts lately ever since GrandIsland and Gatlin went on the lam. After watching white and nolu sham defending a cop who murdered a woman in her home, nothing those two say or post would surprise me in the least. You better be careful, they may try to torch your house for posting this. Shhh...don't give them any ideas.
I have wondered if nolu sham and gatlin are not one and the same.
I don't think so. nolu wants to be perceived as some sort of whiz-bang lawyer - more likely he is a first year law student who obviously does not have a real job so he posts his "opinions" to make people think he is some kind of legal whiz. Gatlin's style of posting is different. Unless they really are the same person and is suffering from schizophrenia.
Nolu does some good legal work. I can't recall the last time he was wrong on the law itself. Of course, he has very strong political opinions on things, and when he gets angry, or motivated, on a cause he becomes a strong legal advocate for his way of looking at it. When presented is a sound LEGAL argument to the contrary, he doesn't deny the law itself, or attempt to make up law that isn't there. (Lots of people do that.) He does what a good lawyer does and advocates for his cause. Example: that woman shot in her house. He found the training procedures - the regulations by which the cops are taught. And he has a point too: if the jury is persuaded to hold him to that standard, which is not an unreasonable thing to expect, that cop may very well be acquitted. Screaming at Nolu for that fact doesn't change the fact, and it doesn't hurt Nolu's feelings because he knows that, structurally, he's right. Of course he's not going to engage on the matter of jury nullification - the truth that ultimately the jury has the power to judge both the facts AND the law (even though many judges hate that latter power). He's not going to fight about that, because he knows that's true. I think he is quite good at what he does.
I have addressed the issue of jury nullification numerous times on this site. I have done it enough times that I only need to drag out the script to do it again. It seemed pointless as I am sure you already know the issue, and the local anarcho-libertarian hive will not listen. See my post of 2019-09-24. The legal issue before the court in People v. Brandt 2019 CO 80 (23 Sep 2019) was free speech, not jury nullification. No act of jury nullification was involved; only advocacy. Of course, there is no such "right" to jury nullification. Should any juror admit that he or she believes in jury nullification, the judge has a duty to excuse or remove them for cause. With some restrictions pertaining to where and when, the right to free speech protects the distribution of legal bullshit. The alleged "right" of jury nullification is legal bullshit. In a Charge of the Court, or jury instruction, the jury is typically instructed as in the following actual instruction from a Texas case: Anarcho-libertarians chafe at such an instruction. A juror has the power (not the right) to violate his or her oath and not face liability. A juror has the power (not the right) to retire to the jury room and ignore the Court's explicit written instructions to the jury and not face liability. The juror may face dismissal from the jury. http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/116/606/611938/ Before: LUMBARD, Mc LAUGHLIN and CABRANES, Circuit Judges. JOSE A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge. We consider here the propriety of the district court's dismissal of a juror allegedly engaged in "nullification"—the intentional disregard of the law as stated by the presiding judge—during the course of deliberations. We address, in turn, (1) whether such alleged misconduct constitutes "just cause" for dismissal of a deliberating juror under Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Rule 23(b)"),1 so that a jury of only eleven persons may continue to deliberate and return a verdict, and (2) what evidentiary standard must be met to support a dismissal on this ground. The appellants are two sets of defendants convicted of violations of federal narcotics laws after two separate trials in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Thomas J. McAvoy, Chief Judge ). We have decided the appeals of defendants convicted at the first of these trials in a summary order of this date. We write here to consider only the appeals of Grady Thomas, Ramse Thomas, Jason Thomas, Tracey Thomas, and Loray Thomas, all of whom were convicted in the second trial. On appeal, they argue, chiefly, that the district court abused its discretion when it ordered the dismissal of one of the jurors pursuant to Rule 23(b) during the course of jury deliberations. The court based its decision to remove the juror, in large part, on a finding that the juror was purposefully disregarding the court's instructions on the law—in effect, that the juror intended to acquit the defendants regardless of the evidence of their guilt. We consider below whether a juror's intent to convict or acquit regardless of the evidence constitutes a basis for the juror's removal during the course of deliberations under Rule 23(b). We also consider what constitutes sufficient evidence of that intent in light of the limitations on a presiding judge's authority to investigate allegations of nullification required by the need to safeguard the secrecy of jury deliberations. We conclude, inter alia, that—as an obvious violation of a juror's oath and duty—a refusal to apply the law as set forth by the court constitutes grounds for dismissal under Rule 23(b). We also conclude that the importance of safeguarding the secrecy of the jury deliberation room, coupled with the need to protect against the dismissal of a juror based on his doubts about the guilt of a criminal defendant, require that a juror be dismissed for a refusal to apply the law as instructed only where the record is clear beyond doubt that the juror is not, in fact, simply unpersuaded by the prosecution's case. We hold that the district court erred in dismissing a juror, based largely on its finding that the juror was purposefully disregarding the court's instructions on the law, where the record evidence raised the possibility that the juror's view on the merits of the case was motivated by doubts about the defendants' guilt, rather than by an intent to nullify the law. Accordingly, we vacate the judgments of the district court and remand for a new trial. [...] The district court dismissed Juror No. 5 pursuant to FED.R.CRIM.P. 23(b), which provides, in pertinent part, that where "the court finds it necessary to excuse a juror for just cause after the jury has retired to consider its verdict, in the discretion of the court a valid verdict may be returned by the remaining 11 jurors." We review the district court's exercise of this authority for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 33 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1092, 115 S.Ct. 756, 130 L.Ed.2d 655 (1995); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1187 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081, 110 S.Ct. 1138, 107 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1990). 24 To determine whether the court erred in dismissing Juror No. 5, we must first decide whether the district court's primary basis for the dismissal—the juror's intention to disregard the applicable criminal laws—constitutes "just cause" for his removal under Rule 23(b). In holding that a presiding judge has a duty to dismiss a juror who purposefully disregards the court's instructions on the law, we briefly review the factors that courts have traditionally considered to be "just cause" for dismissal pursuant to Rule 23(b), and discuss the dangers inherent in so-called "nullification." Having concluded that a deliberating juror's intent to nullify constitutes "just cause" for dismissal, we next consider whether the district court in this case had a sufficient evidentiary basis for concluding that Juror No. 5 was purposefully disregarding the court's instructions on the law. [...] Essentially, the judge found that Juror No. 5 intended to engage in a form of "nullification," a practice whereby a juror votes in purposeful disregard of the evidence, defying the court's instructions on the law. We take this occasion to restate some basic principles regarding the character of our jury system. Nullification is, by definition, a violation of a juror's oath to apply the law as instructed by the court—in the words of the standard oath administered to jurors in the federal courts, to "render a true verdict according to the law and the evidence." FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 225 (4th ed. 1996) (emphasis supplied).8 We categorically reject the idea that, in a society committed to the rule of law, jury nullification is desirable or that courts may permit it to occur when it is within their authority to prevent. Accordingly, we conclude that a juror who intends to nullify the applicable law is no less subject to dismissal than is a juror who disregards the court's instructions due to an event or relationship that renders him biased or otherwise unable to render a fair and impartial verdict. We are mindful that the term "nullification" can cover a number of distinct, though related, phenomena, encompassing in one word conduct that takes place for a variety of different reasons; jurors may nullify, for example, because of the identity of a party, a disapprobation of the particular prosecution at issue, or a more general opposition to the applicable criminal law or laws. We recognize, too, that nullification may at times manifest itself as a form of civil disobedience that some may regard as tolerable. The case of John Peter Zenger, the publisher of the New York Weekly Journal acquitted of criminal libel in 1735, and the nineteenth-century acquittals in prosecutions under the fugitive slave laws, are perhaps our country's most renowned examples of "benevolent" nullification. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130 (D.C.Cir.1972) (Leventhal, J.); see also SHANNON C, STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 52-55 (1990) (describing Zenger trial). We are also aware of the long and complicated history of juries acting as judges of the law as well as the evidence, see, e.g., John D. Gordan III, Juries as Judges of the Law: The American Experience, 108 LAW Q. REV. 272 (1992); Mark De Wolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939), and of the theoretical underpinnings of this practice in the United States, in which legal decisions by juries were sometimes regarded as an expression of faithfulness to the law (regardless of the authority of institutions or officeholders), rather than defiance of the law or "nullification."More generally, the very institution of trial by jury in a criminal case, as Judge Learned Hand observed, "introduces a slack into the enforcement of law, tempering its rigor by the mollifying influence of current ethical conventions." U.S. ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 776 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 317 U.S. 269, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942). This is so because, as Judge Hand explained, "[t]he individual can forfeit his liberty—to say nothing of his life—only at the hands of those who, unlike any official, are in no wise accountable, directly or indirectly, for what they do, and who at once separate and melt anonymously in the community from which they came.... [S]ince if they acquit their verdict is final, no one is likely to suffer of whose conduct they do not morally disapprove...." Id. at 775-76. As courts have long recognized, several features of our jury trial system act to protect the jury's power to acquit, regardless of the evidence, when the prosecution's case meets with the jury's "moral[ ] disapprov[al]." Since the emergence of the general verdict in criminal cases and the famous opinion in Bushell's Case, 124 Eng.Rep. 1006 (C.P.1670), freeing a member of the jury arrested for voting to acquit William Penn against the weight of the evidence, nullifying jurors have been protected from being called to account for their verdicts. Moreover, and in addition to the courts' duty to safeguard the secrecy of the jury deliberation room (discussed in greater detail below), the several rules protecting the unassailability of jury verdicts of acquittal—even where these verdicts are inconsistent with other verdicts rendered by the same jury in the same case, United States v. Carbone, 378 F.2d 420, 423 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.) (recognizing link between upholding inconsistent verdicts and protecting juries' power of lenity), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 914, 88 S.Ct. 242, 19 L.Ed.2d 262 (1967)—serve to "permit[ ] juries to acquit out of compassion or compromise or because of their assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity." Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 22, 100 S.Ct. 1999, 2007, 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). But as the quotation from the Supreme Court's opinion in Standefer indicates, in language originally employed by Judge Learned Hand, the power of juries to "nullify" or exercise a power of lenity is just that—a power; it is by no means a right or something that a judge should encourage or permit if it is within his authority to prevent.
#16. To: nolu chan (#13)
Learned Hand was the greatest American judge to never sit on the Supreme Court.
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#2. To: Stoner (#1)
Deck, wonder how long it will be before the " Crew " show up to defend that POS, to tell us how much a Hero he is, and that the community owes so much to him.
#3. To: Deckard (#2)
#4. To: Stoner (#3)
I have wondered if nolu sham and gatlin are not one and the same.
#6. To: Deckard (#4)
nolu wants to be perceived as some sort of whiz-bang lawyer - more likely he is a first year law student
#13. To: Vicomte13 (#6)
Of course he's not going to engage on the matter of jury nullification - the truth that ultimately the jury has the power to judge both the facts AND the law (even though many judges hate that latter power). He's not going to fight about that, because he knows that's true.
You are the exclusive judges of the facts proved, of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to the testimony, but you are bound to receive the law from the Court which is herein given to you and be governed by that law.
U.S. v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997)
Replies to Comment # 13. the power of juries to "nullify" or exercise a power of lenity is just that—a power; it is by no means a right
End Trace Mode for Comment # 13.
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