Title: Taxpayers to Be Held Liable After Cops Steal Man’s Phone, Film Themselves Conspiring to Frame Him Source:
Free Thought Project URL Source:https://thefreethoughtproject.com/t ... tand-trial-frame-innocent-man/ Published:Sep 29, 2019 Author:Matt Agorist Post Date:2019-09-29 10:58:38 by Deckard Keywords:None Views:21749 Comments:130
Hartford, CT — On September 11, 2015, journalist and police accountability activist, Michael Picard was illegally detained for lawfully open carrying and filming police on public property. During the illegal detainment, Connecticut state troopers confiscated his gun and his camera. However, the trooper who took the phone went on to make a critical mistake — he left the camera rolling while conspiring with fellow officers to falsely charge Picard. In 2017, it was revealed by the department that they investigated themselves and found they did nothing wrong when they conspired to frame an innocent man.
“They were exonerated,” police union attorney Mark Dumas said. “The troopers didn’t do anything wrong. They were doing their jobs, and they do an excellent job.”
Apparently this “excellent job” consisted of trampling the rights of an innocent person and conspiring to have them kidnapped and locked in a cage. Sure thing, Dumas.
Now, because the system failed to hold the officers accountable, the case is now a civil matter and the troopers involved have been ordered to stand trial in the civil suit brought on by the ACLU of Connecticut. The taxpayers, not the officers will be the ones to pay for the crimes.
The Free Thought Project spoke to the ACLU via email this week, who issued the following statement on the case.
“The Constitution is clear: people have a right to protest the police, and people have a right against police taking their property from them without a warrant,” said ACLU of Connecticut legal director Dan Barrett, who is representing Picard in the lawsuit. “The evidence, including video, will show that these police employees were more concerned with covering up their bad behavior, undermining free speech, and retaliating against a protester than with upholding the law. We look forward to getting justice for Michael in front of the jury.”
We agree. TFTP also spoke to Picard, who told us the following.
“People have the right to protest, including the right to protest police, without ticketing or retaliation against them. I am deeply disappointed that these police ignored my rights, and I am hopeful that the court will hold them accountable so that no one else has to experience what I did,” said Picard.
As TFTP reported at the time, on that September night, Picard and a friend were on public property and warning drivers of a DUI checkpoint ahead. They were several hundred yards from the checkpoint and not interfering at all when troopers drove up, without lights on, and against the flow of traffic, to begin harassing the two gentlemen.
Trooper First Class John Barone, Sergeant John Jacobi, and Trooper Jeff Jalbert falsely claimed that Picard was waving his gun around and pointing it at people. However, Picard was holding a sign the entire time and did not touch his gun. Also, as you will see below, the officers admit that they were lying.
“Police should be focused on public safety, not punishing protesters and those who film public employees working on a public street,” said ACLU-CT legal director Dan Barrett, who is representing Picard in the lawsuit. “As the video shows, these police officers were more concerned with thwarting Mr. Picard’s free speech and covering their tracks than upholding the law.”
Had Picard actually been waving a gun, these troopers would have approached the situation in an entirely different manner, with guns drawn and possible SWAT backup. However, they did no such thing, because there was clearly no threat from the activists.
The fact that there was no threat did not stop the subsequent assault, however.
Two troopers approached Picard while forcefully removing his gun and then grabbing his camera, falsely claiming it is illegal to film. When Picard informs the officer can legally film here, the officer ignorantly asserts that “It’s illegal to take my picture. Personally, it is illegal.”
“Did you get any documentation that I am allowing you to take my picture”? asks the cop.
When Picard attempts to explain to the aggressive officer that he doesn’t need a permit because he is on public property, the trooper then makes the asinine declaration that, “No I’m not (on public property). I’m on state property. I’m on state property.”
State-owned roadways and right of ways are public property. The trooper’s assertion that it is illegal to film on his ‘state property’ was entirely false and in violation of Connecticut Bill No. 245, which “protects the right of an individual to photograph or video record peace officers in the performance of their duties.”
All this aggressive and unlawful behavior of these troopers, however, was about to come back to haunt them. After illegally confiscating the camera — the trooper forgot to stop it from recording.
What happened next was a behind the scenes glimpse of what it looks and sounds like when cops lie to charge innocent people with crimes.
The corruption starts as an unidentified trooper begins to search for anything that these gentlemen may have done to make up charges against them. However, they were clean. At this point, Trooper first class Barone chimes in describing how they now have to charge these men with something to justify their harassment and subsequent detainment.
“Want me to punch a number on this? Gotta cover our ass,” explains the trooper as they begin conspiring.
“Let’s give him something,” says an unidentified trooper, pondering the ways they can lie about this innocent man.
“What are they going to do? Are they going to do anything?” says Sergeant Jacobi, noting that they are entirely innocent.
“It’s legal to do it,” he continues,describing how the actions of the two activists are completely legal, before going on to make up charges on them.
“I think we do simple trespass, we do reckless use of the highway and creating a public disturbance,” Jacobi says as he makes up these false charges against innocent people. “All three are tickets.”
Once they figure out the false charges to raise, the officers then brainstorm a story of lies to back them up.
“And then we claim that, um, in backup, we had multiple, um,” the unidentified trooper stutters as he makes up his fake story. “Um, they (the non-existent complainants) didn’t want to stay and give us a statement, so we took our own course of action.”
The corrupt cops had then solved their fake case, lied about a cover story, and were set to charge an innocent man with three crimes — all in a day’s work.
But there was just one more thing…. “Oh s**t!” blurts out the cop as he realizes their entire scandalous corrupt conversation was just recorded. Apparently, however, the officer felt that it must not have recorded their conversation as the phone was returned.
The cops then gave the innocent man back his weapon, and it’s back to the DUI checkpoint for them — to harass and detain more innocent people.
Picard explained that all of the troopers involved in his unlawful situation were never disciplined and allowed to progress through the ranks, with some of them retiring. Picard explains:
Trooper First Class John Barone, the trooper who said it was illegal for me to record him, seized my camera and recorded himself saying, “We gotta cover our ass,” is now retired and collecting a pension thanks to the taxpayers.
Sergeant John Jacobi is now retired and collecting a pension thanks to the taxpayers.
Master Sergeant Patrick Torneo, the trooper who said “let’s give him something,” and then helped fabricate a story to charge me, was demoted for reportedly driving drunk, but is now a lieutenant.
Lieutenant Stavros Mellekas, who conducted the internal affairs “investigation” and found that the troopers did nothing wrong, was magically promoted four ranks, and is now second in command of the Connecticut State Police.
All troopers are being represented by the attorney general’s office and their defense is being paid for by the taxpayers.
[Matt Agorist] The taxpayers, not the officers will be the ones to pay for the crimes.
One must wonder why the taxpayer will pay if no governmental entity is a party to this lawsuit.
The COMPLAINT at 2, paragraphs 10-13, identifies the Defendants:
10. Defendant John Barone was and is, at all time relevant to this suit, employed by the Division of State Police within the Connecticut Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, with the job title of trooper first class.
11. Defendant Patrick Torneo was and is, at all time relevant to this suit, employed by the Division of State Police within the Connecticut Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, with the job title of master sergeant.
12. Defendant John Jacobi was and is, at all time relevant to this suit, employed by the Division of State Police within the Connecticut Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, with the job title of sergeant.
13. At all times relevant to this action, the defendants were on duty for their employer, and were wearing Connecticut State Police uniforms, badges, and pistols.
No government entity is party to the lawsuit. The three officers are sued in their individual capacity. Just curious, but what is your legal theory of government liability.
Do you infer that the court may order the government to pay, even though they are not party to the lawsuit?
If you have no legal theory, you may have to start riding the short bus again.
[nolu chan #74] No government entity is party to the lawsuit. The three officers are sued in their individual capacity. Just curious, but what is your legal theory of government liability.
[nolu chan #74] Do you infer that the court may order the government to pay, even though they are not party to the lawsuit?
Regarding a legal theory, it appears the legal theory is *c*r*i*c*k*e*t*s*.
[A K A Stone] The free thought project article in question contained no lies. The tax payers will pay.
Why? What is your legal theory? Do you expect the court to order the taxpayers to pay?
Perhaps a U.S. Supreme Court opinion will help rouse y'all from your stupor.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974)
At 675-677:
But it has not heretofore
415 U. S. 676
been suggested that § 1983 was intended to create a waiver of a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity merely because an action could be brought under that
415 U. S. 677
section against state officers, rather than against the State itself. Though a § 1983 action may be instituted by public aid recipients such as respondent, a federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, Ex parte Young, supra, and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury, Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, supra.
Just asking, trying to clarify what y'all are saying. Do you expect judgment for the plaintiff and against the government?
Deckard, where are you? Stand tall and be counted. Hiding in a corner, squatting in your own puddle of warm piss is no way to go through life. I await your legal theory of how the taxpayers are liable. In the meantime, while you hide in silence...
With a view toward your CLE, here is another U.S. Supreme Court opinion.
Anderson v. Creighton et al, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) qualified immunity
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 85-1520. Argued February 23, 1987—Decided June 25, 1987
Petitioner, a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent, participated with other law enforcement officers in a warrantless search of respondents’ home. The search was conducted because petitioner believed that one Dixon, who was suspected of a bank robbery committed earlier that day, might be found there, but he was not. Respondents filed a state-court action against petitioner, asserting a claim for damages under the Fourth Amendment. Petitioner removed the suit to Federal District Court and then filed a motion for dismissal or summary judgment, arguing that the Fourth Amendment claim was barred by his qualified immunity from civil damages liability. Before any discovery occurred, the court granted summary judgment on the ground that the search was lawful. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the search’s lawfulness could not be determined on summary judgment, because factual disputes precluded deciding as a matter of law that the search was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. The court also held that petitioner was not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, since the right he allegedly violated—the right of persons to be protected from warrantless searches of their homes unless the searching officers have probable cause and there are exigent circumstances—was clearly established.
Held:
1. Petitioner is entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds if he can establish as a matter of law that a reasonable officer could have believed that the search comported with the Fourth Amendment even though it actually did not. Whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the “objective legal reasonableness” of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were “clearly established” at the time the action was taken.Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800. In order to conclude that the right which the official allegedly violated is “clearly established,” the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. The Court of Appeals—which apparently considered only the fact that the right to be free from warrantless searches of one’s home unless the searching officers have probable cause and there are exigent circumstances was clearly established—erred by refusing to consider the argument that it was not clearly established that the circumstances with which petitioner was confronted did not constitute probable cause and exigent circumstances. The relevant question here is the objective question whether a reasonable officer could have believed petitioner’s warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed. Petitioner’s subjective beliefs about the search are irrelevant. Pp. 638-641.
2. There is no merit to respondents’ argument that it is inappropriate to give officials alleged to have violated the Fourth Amendment—and thus necessarily to have unreasonably searched or seized—the protection of a qualified immunity intended only to protect reasonable official action. Such argument is foreclosed by the fact that this Court has previously extended qualified immunity to officials who were alleged to have violated the Fourth Amendment. Also without merit is respondents’ suggestion that Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, be overruled by holding that qualified immunity may never be extended to officials who conduct unlawful warrantless searches.Nor is there any merit to respondents’ contention that no immunity should be provided to police officers who conduct unlawful warrantless searches of innocent third parties’ homes in search of fugitives. Pp. 642-646.
The state, faced with the expected testimony of child-protection experts and a social worker’s troubling case notes, has reached a $4.97 million settlement with the father of Athena Angeles, the 3-year-old Windham girl who was beaten to death in 2011 by her mother’s live-in boyfriend despite her bearing the black eyes and bruises of previous abuse and the warning calls of the staff at her pre-school.
The Department of Children and Families, one of the targets of the father’s $20 million wrongful death and malpractice claim, had never removed Athena or her younger sister from the home or interviewed the mother’s boyfriend in the weeks before Athena’s death. The case had repercussions across the state because Athena had been taken to Windham Hospital only hours before her death with head injuries from abuse, but was released after treatment without a mandated report to authorities. She would return to the hospital a short time later, but would not survive her fresh injuries.
There is a different case in connecictut and they settled and payed taxpayer money. So they do pay out and were held liable.
In the end I suspect Connecticut will pay out in the case we are discussing too. If I am wrong I don't care. It is just my opinion of what will happen.
There is a different case in connecictut and they settled and payed taxpayer money. So they do pay out and were held liable.
In the end I suspect Connecticut will pay out in the case we are discussing too. If I am wrong I don't care. It is just my opinion of what will happen.
States pay out all the time.
Yes there is a DIFFERENT case in Connecticut. It is so different that it is in STATE court and not in FEDERAL COURT. Cases may be brought in State court if the state permits them. When an individual brings a case in Federal court, the State may not be named as a defendant. The Federal government cannot award damages against a State.
#102. To: nolu chan, A K A Stone, GrandIsland, Deckard (#101)
When an individual brings a case in Federal court, the State may not be named as a defendant. The Federal government cannot award damages against a State.
This whole case is irrelevant.
Au contraire. The Supremes on a number of occasions have explicitly upheld the abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Which punches big holes in all your posts about how federal courts can never ever do such things to state governments (or sovereign municipalities). Not only can the courts throw away any restraints on state sovereignty, the courts have ruled that Congress is empowered to do exactly the same thing. So Congress and federal courts all can (and have) violated your alleged state sovereignty immunity ideas.
Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity in connection to its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
Facts
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 includes the states as covered employers. Current and retired male employees of the state of Connecticut sued the state in federal court on the grounds that its statutory retirement plan violated the Civil Rights Act by discriminating against them based on their gender. While the federal district court ruled in part for the employees, it held that the Eleventh Amendment prevented them from receiving back pay. On appeal, the court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment may not be enforced through a private action for retroactive damages.
Opinions
Majority
William Hubbs Rehnquist (Author)
Warren Earl Burger
Potter Stewart
Byron Raymond White
Thurgood Marshall
Harry Andrew Blackmun
Lewis Franklin Powell, Jr.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a Congressional grant of authority for the federal court system to award money damages to private individuals who have been subjected to employment discrimination by a state government. These provisions limit the sovereign immunity provided to states by the Eleventh Amendment, especially since the Fourteenth Amendment imposes substantive limitations on state authority. Congressional action under Section 5 is particularly authoritative because it is derived not only from its own legislative authority but also from a Constitutional text that is designed to limit state authority. Certain types of actions thus may be permissible in this context that otherwise would be barred by state sovereign immunity.
Concurrence
William Joseph Brennan, Jr. (Author)
Concurrence
John Paul Stevens (Author)
Case Commentary
The modern Supreme Court has shown an expanding view of the Eleventh Amendment, giving Congress broader authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity when it chooses.
Just because it doesn't happen often doesn't mean that it never happens. We don't have a solar eclipse every day but that does not mean there is no such thing as a solar eclipse.
I think you owe Stone an apology. Apologize now. Thank you.
#108. To: Tooconservative, A K A Stone, GrandIsland (#102)
[Tooconservative #102] I think you owe Stone an apology. Apologize now. Thank you.
[Tooconservative #105] Don't try to obfuscate or change the subject by throwing lots of irrelevant text at us.
You owe Stone an apology. Apologize now. Thank you.
I am sorry, but you, sir, owe everyone an apology for wasting their time and misleading them.
Your case at the Justia link does not support your fantastic conclusions.
Your quote in your pretty shaded box does NOT come from the opinion of the Court. That Congress can abrogate state sovereignty in connection to its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment provides no evidence whatsoever that it did, in fact, abrogate state sovereignty in the case of Picard.
In your selected irrelevant case, "Current and retired male employees of the state of Connecticut sued the state in federal court...." In the Picard case, state employees were sued in their individual capacity. by a non-state employee. In Picard, no government entity is even named as a defendant.
Fitzgerald states its threshhold "of congressional authorization" for a citizen to sue his state employer, which was absent in Edelman."
Held:
1. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar a backpay award to petitioners in No. 75-251, since that Amendment and the principle of state sovereignty that it embodies are limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants Congress authority to enforce "by appropriate
Page 427 U. S. 446
legislation" the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves embody significant limitations on state authority. Congress, in determining what legislation is appropriate for enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, may, as it has done in Title VII, provide for suits against States that are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts. The "threshold fact of congressional authorization" for a citizen to sue his state employer, which was absent in Edelman, supra, is thus present here. Pp. 427 U. S. 451-456.
Fitzgerald is an entirely different context than Picard.
First, I note that the case you refer to as Fitzgerald v. Bitzer abbreviates the actual caption which shows it is against a government entity, the State Employees' Retirement Pension.
Fitzpatrick et al. v. Bitzer, Chairman State Employees' Retirement Commission et al., 427 US 445 (1976)
Abbreviating the state entity out of the caption does not change the fact that the named defendent in the caption is a government entity. It is quite clear at the official source., as shown below.
Justia contains a disclaimer: "Disclaimer: Official Supreme Court case law is only found in the print version of the United States Reports. Justia case law is provided for general informational purposes only, and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or information linked to from this site. Please check official sources."
Fitzpatrick does not carve out any exception to Edelman's application to Picard.
Fitzpatrick at 447:
Opinion of the Court
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court
In the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress, acting under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, authorized federal courts to award money damages in favor of a private individual against a state government found to have subjected that person to employment discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” The principal question presented by these cases is whether, as against the shield of sovereign immunity afforded the State by the Eleventh Amendment, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), Congress has the power to authorize federal courts to enter such an award against the State as a means of enforcing the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the effect of our decision in Edelman was to foreclose Congress’ power. We granted certiorari to resolve this important constitutional question. 423 U. S. 1031 (1975). We reverse.
Do you seriously allege that Picard is about the State of Connecticut having subjected Picard to employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin?
Do you seriously allege that Picard was an employee of the State of Connecticut?
At 451:
We concluded that none of the statutes relied upon by plaintiffs in Edelman contained any authorization by Congress to join a State as defendant. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, had been held in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 187-191 (1961), to exclude cities and other municipal corporations from its ambit; that being the case, it could not have been intended to include States as parties defendant. The provisions of the Social Security Act relied upon by plaintiffs were held by their terms not to “authorize suit against anyone,” 415 U. S., at 674, and they, too, were incapable of supplying the predicate for a claim of waiver on the part of the State.
All parties in the instant litigation agree with the Court of Appeals that the suit for retroactive benefits by the petitioners is in fact indistinguishable from that sought to be maintained in Edelman, since what is sought here is a damages award payable to a private party from the state treasury.
In Fitzpatrick et al v Bitzer, Chairman State Employees' Retirement Commission et al, 427 US 445 (1976) alleged state liability is self-evident in that a government entity is named as the sole defendant. Ditto for Edelman.
In Picard, it is obvious that no government is named as a defendant, and all defendants are sued in ther individual capacity.
You have found an exception the the 11th Amendment requirement when employees of a state sue their own state for a violation of Federal employment discrimination law, with the government having acted in its official capacity.
In Picard you have employees who may have acted outside the scope of their employment, having been wanton, reckless or malicious.
In the Picard case, as a matter of legal fact which you attempt to ignore, no legal governmental entity is a defendant. The government is not represented and does not appear in court.
If the employee defendants in Picard are to be reimbursed for any damages assessed against them, they must obtain that from the State. Instead of you you ass pickers busying yourselves with irrelevant bullshit, try the applicable state law which has seemingly eluded you.
Conn - Indemnification of state officers and employees
Indemnification of state officers and employees. Duties of Attorney General. Legal fees and costs. Enforcement action. Exceptions
(a) The state shall save harmless and indemnify any state officer or employee, as defined in section 4-141 , and any member of the Public Defender Services Commission from financial loss and expense arising out of any claim, demand, suit or judgment by reason of his alleged negligence or alleged deprivation of any person's civil rights or other act or omission resulting in damage or injury, if the officer, employee or member is found to have been acting in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employmentand such act or omission is found not to have been wanton, reckless or malicious.
(b) The state, through the Attorney General, shall provide for the defense of any such state officer, employee or member in any civil action or proceeding in any state or federal court arising out of any alleged act, omission or deprivation which occurred or is alleged to have occurred while the officer, employee or member was acting in the discharge of his duties or in the scope of his employment, except that the state shall not be required to provide for such a defense whenever the Attorney General, based on his investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case, determines that it would be inappropriate to do so and he so notifies the officer, employee or member in writing.
(c) Legal fees and costs incurred as a result of the retention by any such officer, employee or member of an attorney to defend his interests in any such civil action or proceeding shall be borne by the state only in those cases where (1) the Attorney General has stated in writing to the officer, employee or member, pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, that the state will not provide an attorney to defend the interests of the officer, employee or member, and (2) the officer, employee or member is thereafter found to have acted in the discharge of his duties or in the scope of his employment, and not to have acted wantonly, recklessly or maliciously. Such legal fees and costs incurred by such officer, employee or member shall be paid to such officer, employee or member only after the final disposition of the suit, claim or demand and only in such amounts as shall be determined by the Attorney General to be reasonable. In determining whether such amounts are reasonable, the Attorney General may consider whether it was appropriate for a group of officers, employees or members to be represented by the same counsel.
(d) Such officer, employee or member may bring an action in the Superior Court against the state to enforce the provisions of this section.
(e) The provisions of this section shall not be applicable to any such officer, employee or member to the extent he has a right to indemnification under any other section of the general statutes.
I do not apologize for your fuckup in misinterpreting the legal effect of Fitzpatrick v . Bitzer. As SCOTUS puts it, you can stop tilting at windmills. Google can only do so much. It can help you find something. Apparently, it did not help you understand it. I will let SCOTUS help with that.
SCOTUS IN Quern eviscerates Tooconservative interpretation of Fitzpatrick v Bitzer
Quern, Director, Department of Public Aid of Illinois v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979)
At 332:
1. Neither Monell v. New York City Dept, of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, the legislative history cited in that decision, nor this Court’s Eleventh Amendment cases subsequent to Edelman cast any doubt on Edelman’s holding that § 1983 does not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States.
At 337:
In Edelman we reaffirmed the rule that had evolved in our earlier cases that a suit in federal court by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 415 U. S., at 663; see Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 327 U. S. 573 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459 (1945); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47 (1944). We rejected the notion that simply because the lower court’s grant of retroactive benefits had been styled “equitable restitution” it was permissible under the Eleventh Amendment. But we also pointed out that under the landmark decision in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), a federal court, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, may enjoin state officials to conform their future conduct to the requirements of federal law, even though such an injunction may have an ancillary effect on the state treasury. 415 U. S., at 667-668; see Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 289 (1977); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974).
At 338:
And just as petitioner insists on tilting at windmills by attacking the District Court’s decision, respondent suggests that our decision in Edelman has been eviscerated by later decisions such as Monell v. New York City Dept, of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978). Brief for Respondent 55 n. 37. See also Aldridge v. Turlington, No. TCA-78-830 (ND Fla., Nov. 17, 1978); but see Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 590 F. 2d 470 (CA3 1978). As we have noted above, we held in Edelman that in “a [42 U. S. C.] § 1983 action ... a federal court’s remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, Ex parte Young, supra, and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury, Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, supra.” 415 U. S., at 677. We disagree with respondent’s suggestion. This Court’s holding in Monell was “limited to local government units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes,” 436 U. S., at 690 n. 54, and our Eleventh Amendment decisions subsequent to Edelman and to Monell have cast no doubt on our holding in Edelman. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978); Milliken v. Bradley, supra;Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra.
While the separate opinions in Hutto v. Finney, supra debated the continuing soundness of Edelman after our decision in Monell, any doubt on that score was largely dispelled by Alabama v. Pugh, supra, decided just 10 days after Hutto.In Pugh the Court held, over three dissents, that the State of Alabama could not be joined as a defendant without violating the Eleventh Amendment, even though the complaint was based on 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and the claim was a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments similar to that made in Hutto. The Court said:
“There can be no doubt, however, that suit against the State and its Board of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, unless Alabama has consented to the filing of such a suit.Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459 (1945); Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292 (1937).” 438 U. S., at 782.
The decision in Pugh was consistent both with Monell, which was limited to “local government units,” 436 U. S., at 690 n. 54, and with Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra.In the latter case we found that “ ‘threshold fact of congressional authorization,’ ” which had been lacking in Edelman, to be present in the express language of the congressional amendment making Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applicable to state and local governments. 427 U. S., at 452, quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 672.
Just in case anyone missed it, Picard v. Torneo is most assuredly a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
