Title: Taxpayers to Be Held Liable After Cops Steal Man’s Phone, Film Themselves Conspiring to Frame Him Source:
Free Thought Project URL Source:https://thefreethoughtproject.com/t ... tand-trial-frame-innocent-man/ Published:Sep 29, 2019 Author:Matt Agorist Post Date:2019-09-29 10:58:38 by Deckard Keywords:None Views:21901 Comments:130
Hartford, CT — On September 11, 2015, journalist and police accountability activist, Michael Picard was illegally detained for lawfully open carrying and filming police on public property. During the illegal detainment, Connecticut state troopers confiscated his gun and his camera. However, the trooper who took the phone went on to make a critical mistake — he left the camera rolling while conspiring with fellow officers to falsely charge Picard. In 2017, it was revealed by the department that they investigated themselves and found they did nothing wrong when they conspired to frame an innocent man.
“They were exonerated,” police union attorney Mark Dumas said. “The troopers didn’t do anything wrong. They were doing their jobs, and they do an excellent job.”
Apparently this “excellent job” consisted of trampling the rights of an innocent person and conspiring to have them kidnapped and locked in a cage. Sure thing, Dumas.
Now, because the system failed to hold the officers accountable, the case is now a civil matter and the troopers involved have been ordered to stand trial in the civil suit brought on by the ACLU of Connecticut. The taxpayers, not the officers will be the ones to pay for the crimes.
The Free Thought Project spoke to the ACLU via email this week, who issued the following statement on the case.
“The Constitution is clear: people have a right to protest the police, and people have a right against police taking their property from them without a warrant,” said ACLU of Connecticut legal director Dan Barrett, who is representing Picard in the lawsuit. “The evidence, including video, will show that these police employees were more concerned with covering up their bad behavior, undermining free speech, and retaliating against a protester than with upholding the law. We look forward to getting justice for Michael in front of the jury.”
We agree. TFTP also spoke to Picard, who told us the following.
“People have the right to protest, including the right to protest police, without ticketing or retaliation against them. I am deeply disappointed that these police ignored my rights, and I am hopeful that the court will hold them accountable so that no one else has to experience what I did,” said Picard.
As TFTP reported at the time, on that September night, Picard and a friend were on public property and warning drivers of a DUI checkpoint ahead. They were several hundred yards from the checkpoint and not interfering at all when troopers drove up, without lights on, and against the flow of traffic, to begin harassing the two gentlemen.
Trooper First Class John Barone, Sergeant John Jacobi, and Trooper Jeff Jalbert falsely claimed that Picard was waving his gun around and pointing it at people. However, Picard was holding a sign the entire time and did not touch his gun. Also, as you will see below, the officers admit that they were lying.
“Police should be focused on public safety, not punishing protesters and those who film public employees working on a public street,” said ACLU-CT legal director Dan Barrett, who is representing Picard in the lawsuit. “As the video shows, these police officers were more concerned with thwarting Mr. Picard’s free speech and covering their tracks than upholding the law.”
Had Picard actually been waving a gun, these troopers would have approached the situation in an entirely different manner, with guns drawn and possible SWAT backup. However, they did no such thing, because there was clearly no threat from the activists.
The fact that there was no threat did not stop the subsequent assault, however.
Two troopers approached Picard while forcefully removing his gun and then grabbing his camera, falsely claiming it is illegal to film. When Picard informs the officer can legally film here, the officer ignorantly asserts that “It’s illegal to take my picture. Personally, it is illegal.”
“Did you get any documentation that I am allowing you to take my picture”? asks the cop.
When Picard attempts to explain to the aggressive officer that he doesn’t need a permit because he is on public property, the trooper then makes the asinine declaration that, “No I’m not (on public property). I’m on state property. I’m on state property.”
State-owned roadways and right of ways are public property. The trooper’s assertion that it is illegal to film on his ‘state property’ was entirely false and in violation of Connecticut Bill No. 245, which “protects the right of an individual to photograph or video record peace officers in the performance of their duties.”
All this aggressive and unlawful behavior of these troopers, however, was about to come back to haunt them. After illegally confiscating the camera — the trooper forgot to stop it from recording.
What happened next was a behind the scenes glimpse of what it looks and sounds like when cops lie to charge innocent people with crimes.
The corruption starts as an unidentified trooper begins to search for anything that these gentlemen may have done to make up charges against them. However, they were clean. At this point, Trooper first class Barone chimes in describing how they now have to charge these men with something to justify their harassment and subsequent detainment.
“Want me to punch a number on this? Gotta cover our ass,” explains the trooper as they begin conspiring.
“Let’s give him something,” says an unidentified trooper, pondering the ways they can lie about this innocent man.
“What are they going to do? Are they going to do anything?” says Sergeant Jacobi, noting that they are entirely innocent.
“It’s legal to do it,” he continues,describing how the actions of the two activists are completely legal, before going on to make up charges on them.
“I think we do simple trespass, we do reckless use of the highway and creating a public disturbance,” Jacobi says as he makes up these false charges against innocent people. “All three are tickets.”
Once they figure out the false charges to raise, the officers then brainstorm a story of lies to back them up.
“And then we claim that, um, in backup, we had multiple, um,” the unidentified trooper stutters as he makes up his fake story. “Um, they (the non-existent complainants) didn’t want to stay and give us a statement, so we took our own course of action.”
The corrupt cops had then solved their fake case, lied about a cover story, and were set to charge an innocent man with three crimes — all in a day’s work.
But there was just one more thing…. “Oh s**t!” blurts out the cop as he realizes their entire scandalous corrupt conversation was just recorded. Apparently, however, the officer felt that it must not have recorded their conversation as the phone was returned.
The cops then gave the innocent man back his weapon, and it’s back to the DUI checkpoint for them — to harass and detain more innocent people.
Picard explained that all of the troopers involved in his unlawful situation were never disciplined and allowed to progress through the ranks, with some of them retiring. Picard explains:
Trooper First Class John Barone, the trooper who said it was illegal for me to record him, seized my camera and recorded himself saying, “We gotta cover our ass,” is now retired and collecting a pension thanks to the taxpayers.
Sergeant John Jacobi is now retired and collecting a pension thanks to the taxpayers.
Master Sergeant Patrick Torneo, the trooper who said “let’s give him something,” and then helped fabricate a story to charge me, was demoted for reportedly driving drunk, but is now a lieutenant.
Lieutenant Stavros Mellekas, who conducted the internal affairs “investigation” and found that the troopers did nothing wrong, was magically promoted four ranks, and is now second in command of the Connecticut State Police.
All troopers are being represented by the attorney general’s office and their defense is being paid for by the taxpayers.
[Matt Agorist] The taxpayers, not the officers will be the ones to pay for the crimes.
One must wonder why the taxpayer will pay if no governmental entity is a party to this lawsuit.
The COMPLAINT at 2, paragraphs 10-13, identifies the Defendants:
10. Defendant John Barone was and is, at all time relevant to this suit, employed by the Division of State Police within the Connecticut Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, with the job title of trooper first class.
11. Defendant Patrick Torneo was and is, at all time relevant to this suit, employed by the Division of State Police within the Connecticut Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, with the job title of master sergeant.
12. Defendant John Jacobi was and is, at all time relevant to this suit, employed by the Division of State Police within the Connecticut Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, with the job title of sergeant.
13. At all times relevant to this action, the defendants were on duty for their employer, and were wearing Connecticut State Police uniforms, badges, and pistols.
No government entity is party to the lawsuit. The three officers are sued in their individual capacity. Just curious, but what is your legal theory of government liability.
Do you infer that the court may order the government to pay, even though they are not party to the lawsuit?
If you have no legal theory, you may have to start riding the short bus again.
[nolu chan #74] No government entity is party to the lawsuit. The three officers are sued in their individual capacity. Just curious, but what is your legal theory of government liability.
[nolu chan #74] Do you infer that the court may order the government to pay, even though they are not party to the lawsuit?
Regarding a legal theory, it appears the legal theory is *c*r*i*c*k*e*t*s*.
[A K A Stone] The free thought project article in question contained no lies. The tax payers will pay.
Why? What is your legal theory? Do you expect the court to order the taxpayers to pay?
Perhaps a U.S. Supreme Court opinion will help rouse y'all from your stupor.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974)
At 675-677:
But it has not heretofore
415 U. S. 676
been suggested that § 1983 was intended to create a waiver of a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity merely because an action could be brought under that
415 U. S. 677
section against state officers, rather than against the State itself. Though a § 1983 action may be instituted by public aid recipients such as respondent, a federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, Ex parte Young, supra, and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury, Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, supra.
Just asking, trying to clarify what y'all are saying. Do you expect judgment for the plaintiff and against the government?
Deckard, where are you? Bring me some fine whine. I await your legal theory of how the taxpayers are liable. In the meantime, while you hide in silence...
With a view toward your CLE, here is another U.S. Supreme Court opinion.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 US 800 (24 Jun 1982) [footnotes omitted]
At 801:
Henceforth, government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate "clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Pp. 815-819.
At 815-19:
B
Qualified or “good faith” immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U. S. 635 (1980). Decisions of this Court have established that the “good faith” defense has both an “objective” and a “subjective” aspect. The objective element involves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for “basic, unquestioned constitutional rights.” Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 322 (1975). The subjective component refers to “permissible intentions.” Ibid. Characteristically the Court has defined these elements by identifying the circumstances in which qualified immunity would not be available. Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if an official “knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury . . . .” Ibid, (emphasis added).
The subjective element of the good-faith defense frequently has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that disputed questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for summary judgment. And an official’s subjective good faith has been considered to be a question of fact that some courts have regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a jury.
In the context of Butz’ attempted balancing of competing values, it now is clear that substantial costs attend the litigation of the subjective good faith of government officials. Not only are there the general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial—distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public service. There are special costs to “subjective” inquiries of this kind. Immunity generally is available only to officials performing discretionary functions. In contrast with the thought processes accompanying “ministerial” tasks, the judgments surrounding discretionary action almost inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker’s experiences, values, and emotions. These variables explain in part why questions of subjective intent so rarely can be decided by summary judgment. Yet they also frame a background in which there often is no clear end to the relevant evidence. Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation therefore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including an official’s professional colleagues. Inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government.
Consistently with the balance at which we aimed in Butz, we conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S., at 322.
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law, should avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment. On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred. If the law at that time was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to “know” that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful. Until this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed. If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct. Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard, the defense should be sustained. But again, the defense would turn primarily on objective factors.
By defining the limits of qualified immunity essentially in objective terms, we provide no license to lawless conduct. The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in compensation of victims remains protected by a test that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an official’s acts. Where an official could be expected to know that certain conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate; and a person who suffers injury caused by such conduct may have a cause of action. But where an official’s duties legitimately require action in which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better served by action taken “with independence and without fear of consequences.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554 (1967).
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate "clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
[government officials performing discretionary functions] generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate "clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
Key word generally. Not always.
I have added the context back in for you.
Do you allege the officers in Picard were merely performing discretionary functions? If not, your cited matter is irrelevant.
In any case, that is a disscussion of the application of qualified immunity.
Do you find qualified immunity applies to the officers? If so, any associated charge is dismissed on summary judgment and nobody pays.
Do you find the officers do not qualify for qualified immunity? Why not?
If you find the officers' acts or omissions were wanton, reckless or malicious, and thereby voided their claim to qualified immunity, the Court will assess any damages against the officers as individuals. Under what law do you hold that Connecticut is liable to pay the officers, who acted within the discharge of their duties, for damages assessed for acts which were wanton, reckless or malicious?
