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Title: Trump Administration Set to Announce Pointless, Legally Dubious Bump Stock Ban
Source:
Reason
URL Source: https://reason.com/blog/2018/11/29/ ... nistration-set-to-announce-poi
Published: Nov 29, 2018
Author: Joe Setyon
Post Date: 2018-11-30 06:57:57 by Deckard
Keywords: None
Views: 7440
Comments: 67
Bump stocks are modifications that can be attached to a rifle to increase the rate of fire, often at the expense of accuracy. Nine months after President Donald Trump endorsed a ban on the devices, the administration appears to be on the verge of banning them. CNN was the first to report the news yesterday evening, citing "officials familiar with the matter." An administration official confirmed to The New York Times that the rule would be unveiled "in the coming days to weeks." Under Trump's new regulation, a source tells CNN, bump stock owners would have 90 days to get rid of the devices on their own or turn them over to authorities. The issue first rose (temporarily) to the forefront of the national conversation after the October 2017 Las Vegas shooting, where a gunman used such devices as he killed 58 people. In February 2018, another mass shooting occurred, this one at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida. Though the shooter did not use a bump stock, Trump announced in the aftermath of the tragedy that he would be banning the accessories, directing then–Attorney General Jeff Sessions "to propose regulations that ban all devices that turn legal weapons into machine guns." In the following months, Trump continued signaling his intention to make bump stocks illegal. "So we're knocking out bump stocks," the president said in October. "And we are in the final couple of weeks." The administration probably doesn't have the legal authority to do this. Under federal law, a machine gun is defined as "any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger." But a gun equipped with a bump stock is still able only to fire just one round per trigger pull. "Instead of squeezing the trigger, the shooter holds his trigger finger steady while pushing the barrel forward with his other hand, thereby firing a round," Reason's Jacob Sullum explains. "The recoil repositions the trigger, and continuing to exert forward pressure on the barrel makes the rifle fire repeatedly." As Reason's Christian Britschgi explained in March, this is probably why the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) has said multiple times that federal restrictions on machine guns do not cover bump stocks. The Obama administration affirmed the legality of bump stocks on three different occasions: once in 2010, again in 2012, and once more in 2013. As Sen. Diane Feinstein (D–Calif.) said in a February statement: The ATF "currently lacks authority under the law to ban bump stocks." In addition to being legally questionable, a bump stock ban probably wouldn't do very much. No mass shooters before or after Las Vegas have used bump stocks to carry out their massacres. Even in Las Vegas, the death toll wasn't necessarily higher because the shooter used one. Most gun enthusiasts have little need for bump stocks. So they're a relatively easy target for those who want more gun control, and a relatively easy sacrifice for gun rights advocates. Hence the reportedly pending ban. As Britschgi argued in October 2017: "Banning bump stocks is something that can be done without pissing too many people off, placating the crowd that after every shooting in America screams for somebody to do something."
Even the Obama administration recognized it didn't have the authority to ban bump stocks.
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#4. To: nolu chan (#3)
There are a number of YouTube videos which illustrate how you can get the same effect using your belt loop. Now what? Ban belt loops? Pretty soon it will dawn on liberals that the only solution is to ban all semi-autos.
I am pretty sure that is the main goal of most, if not all liberals. I am just worried what they will offer Trump to get that. Any more, I trust Trump with the 2nd Amendment, about like I trust Chucky Schmucky Schumer !!
Si vis pacem, para bellum Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God. Never Pick A Fight With An Old Man He Will Just Shoot You He Can't Afford To Get Hurt "If there are no dogs in Heaven, then when I die I want to go where they went." (Will Rogers) "No one ever rescues an old dog. They lay in a cage until they die. PLEASE save one. None of us wants to die cold and alone... --Dennis Olson " AMERICA! Designed by geniuses. Now run by idiots.
More left wing lunacy from the NYC progressive, Donnell the libtard. Additional fuel for the articles of impeachment. President Donald Trump meets with students, parents and teachers affected by mass shootings in Parkland, Fla., Newtown, Conn., and Columbine, Colo., at the White House
Ban the possession or use of any weapon which has been modified to permit it to operate in the manner of a fully automatic weapon. Ban the manufacture or sale of parts intended to be used to modify a legal firearm to operate in the manner of a fully automatic weapon. Or people can just ignore the (prospective) rule if and when it becomes a rule, and hope their trial and/or appellate court finds the ban to be unlawful or unconstitutional. Defendants can always argue that rules of the Obama administration are binding on the Trump administration and cannot be changed. Reason thinks that is an argument.
That's my point. There is no modification to the semi-automatic weapon itself. Hook your finger in your belt loop and you end up with a full-auto effect. Watch a video.
Your point is limited to the semantics of how the government may prohibit bump stocks or anything enabling fire more rapid than the original design. Let's try, "Any person, enabling or using a firearm to achieve or emulate the rapid fire mode of a fully automatic firearm, shall be imprisoned for not less than 10 years." Definition: "Rapid fire shall be firing at a higher rate than the original design specifications." There is no constitutional right to keep and bear bump stocks. Government agencies are created by Congress and empowered to create regulations having the force of law. If the government chooses to regulate bump stocks, it can issue a regulation to do so. If Congress does not like the regulation, it can enact a statute to override it. A regulation can be challenged in court. It may be difficult to get a majority of any court to find a right to bump stocks, or anything enabling full-auto effect.
I did not buy a bump stock, so no problem with me. I will say I enjoyed using full auto in the military, and would enjoy having one of my own to play with. If I were to win the lottery, and have an abundance of disposable cash, I might go through the process and acquire same. My "tools" of choice would be either a Thompson, or a BAR. Hell, if I won the lottery, might as well get one of each. But in the meantime, I will not have them. Maybe rent one at Knob Creek.
Si vis pacem, para bellum Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God. Never Pick A Fight With An Old Man He Will Just Shoot You He Can't Afford To Get Hurt "If there are no dogs in Heaven, then when I die I want to go where they went." (Will Rogers) "No one ever rescues an old dog. They lay in a cage until they die. PLEASE save one. None of us wants to die cold and alone... --Dennis Olson " AMERICA! Designed by geniuses. Now run by idiots.
Should the Fed govt choose to pass a regulation against it, the video might be retitled How to earn oneself 10 years in prison. What is the point? There is no protection provided by the Constitution. The ability to aim is doubtful. Finding majority support in Congress or in a court is greatly doubtful. While one may claim a God-given right, getting God to honor a witness subpoena is problematic, and getting Him to so testify would be even more problematic. The RKBA of the Constitution is very clearly descended from the English Common Law right held by the colonists, and so held by the U.S. Supreme Court. One may ignore Heller if one chooses, but that does not make this precedent setting SCOTUS opinion disappear. It remains in full force. Heller at 620: Heller at 624-25: We conclude that nothing in our precedents forecloses our adoption of the original understanding of the Second Amendment. Heller at 626: Heller at 627-28: Heller at 593-95: And, of course, what the Stuarts had tried to do to their political enemies, George III had tried to do to the colonists. In the tumultuous decades of the 1760’s and 1770’s, the Crown began to disarm the inhabitants of the most rebellious areas. That provoked polemical reactions by Americans invoking their rights as Englishmen to keep arms. A New York article of April 1769 said that “[i]t is a natural right which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed by the Bill of Rights, to keep arms for their own defence.” A Journal of the Times: Mar. 17, New York Journal, Supp. 1, Apr. 13, 1769, in Boston Under Military Rule 79 (O. Dickerson ed. 1936); see also, e.g., Shippen, Boston Gazette, Jan. 30, 1769, in 1 The Writings of Samuel Adams 299 (H. Cushing ed. 1968). They understood the right to enable individuals to defend themselves. As the most important early American edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries (by the law professor and former Antifederalist St. George Tucker) made clear in the notes to the description of the arms right, Americans understood the “right of self-preservation” as permitting a citizen to “repe[l] force by force” when “the intervention of society in his behalf, may be too late to prevent an injury.” 1 Blackstone’s Commentaries 145–146, n. 42 (1803) (hereinafter Tucker’s Blackstone). See also W. Duer, Outlines of the Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States 31–32 (1833). There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms. Of course the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of free speech was not, see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. ___ (2008). Thus, we do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose. Before turning to limitations upon the individual right, however, we must determine whether the prefatory clause of the Second Amendment comports with our interpretation of the operative clause. Heller at 626-28: We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” 307 U. S., at 179. We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.” See 4 Blackstone 148–149 (1769); 3 B. Wilson, Works of the Honourable James Wilson 79 (1804); J. Dunlap, The New-York Justice 8 (1815); C. Humphreys, A Compendium of the Common Law in Force in Kentucky 482 (1822); 1 W. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Indictable Misdemeanors 271–272 (1831); H. Stephen, Summary of the Criminal Law 48 (1840); E. Lewis, An Abridgment of the Criminal Law of the United States 64 (1847); F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States 726 (1852). See also State v. Langford, 10 N. C. 381, 383–384 (1824); O’Neill v. State, 16 Ala. 65, 67 (1849); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1871); State v. Lanier, 71 N. C. 288, 289 (1874). It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service—M–16 rifles and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause. But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification was the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty. It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large. Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers and tanks. But the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.
Exactly. Why ban bump stocks when you can get the same effect with a belt loop? What the ban is saying is that you can't pull the trigger real fast. What a silly law.
Not really. The court has no idea what they're talking about. If they had a weapon at home it was likely a rifle -- virtually useless for volley fire on the battlefield. For that, a smooth-bore musket was required. But a musket was useless for hunting because it wasn't that accurate. So citizens would have to purchase one if they were in the state militia. Interpreting the second amendment correctly would protect the right of "the body of all citizens capable of military service" to keep and bear the weapon of the average soldier -- a full-auto M4 carbine.
As I said, they can rewrite the regulation to apply to any miscreant doing anything to make a firearm shoot at a more rapid rate, and back it with a 10-year minimum sentence. What seems silly is someone hooking up his rifle to his belt to achieve rapid fire and making believe he retains aim ability. Even if alone, he should be prosecuted for reckless endangerment of the woods. A certain part of me yearns to hear a defendant argue that this is a constitutional right.
It is not necessary to persuade you that the court knew what it was talking about. It is only necessary to document what they said in establishing precedent now binding on every lower court, State and Federal, in the land. While you are entitled to your contrary opinion, it carries zero legal weight. If you get caught carrying a full-auto M4, you and your legal opinion go to prison.
That concept is a little too comprehensive for most that post here, to understand.
I'm the infidel... Allah warned you about. كافر المسلح
No one is claiming he "retains aim ability" except you. He increases his ability to hit the target, however, which is the whole point of shooting it to begin with. Ever see depictions of 1920's gangsters shooting the "Tommy Gun"? Uh-huh. Shooting from the hip. "A certain part of me yearns to hear a defendant argue that this is a constitutional right." Well, it was a constitutional right until 1934. Even after 1934 you were only required to register them. Which is why I'm saying bump stocks should be treated the same way -- legal but registered.
The court has no power or ability to find fact. That is left to Congress to be presented in a "finding". The court was simply making it up as they went along, then concluded that certain weapons were yucky and dangerous and that only government troops should have such weapons -- contrary to original intent of the Founding Fathers.
Miller also said the second amendment protects weapons which have a " a "reasonable relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia". Certainly the full-auto M4 qualifies.
You are allowed your delusions about constitutional rights in 1934. After 1934, machine guns were made unlawful without the need for a constitutional amendment. In any case, this is 2018 and you do not have a time travel machine. Bump stocks should be legal and there should be a chicken in every pot. Add ten more items and you can cover the twelve days of Christmas. Heller at 625:
As a routine matter, trial courts determine the facts of a case. Congress does not find the facts at a trial. Te ury determines the facts of a case at a jury trial. The judge determines the facts at a bench trial. The judge determines the applicable law at both. Your argument that the court was just making it up is something for you to submit to the appellate court after the trial court sentences you to prison. Your vivid imagination about the Founding Fathers does not replace actual laws or opinions of the courts. Being a curmudgeon does not overturn Heller and McDonald.
Certainly the full-auto M4 qualifies. As you well know, a full-auto M-4 qualifies for years in prison. You are still stuck on your repeated, wilfull, knowing and wrongheaded misinterpretation of Miller. Heller at 623: It is particularly wrongheaded to read Miller for more than what it said, because the case did not even purport to be a thorough examination of the Second Amendment. You may repeatedly insist on being as wrongheaded as you choose, and it will not change the controlling authority of Heller. Heller at 624-25:
Miller said that if a weapon did not have a "reasonable relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia" then it wasn't protected by the second amendment. It's right there in their ruling, for crying out loud. The Heller decision was a joke. The court started with their conclusion -- a citizen has the right to own a handgun (but no other weapon) for self-defense (and no other purpose) in the home (but nowhere else), then worked backwards to justify how the second amendment protected only that much and no more.
YES! Only weapons which have a "reasonable relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia". That's what Miller said. It's right there in the ruling.
On March 30, 1939, the Supreme Court heard the case. Attorneys for the United States argued four points: 1.The NFA is intended as a revenue-collecting measure and therefore within the authority of the Department of the Treasury. 2.The defendants transported the shotgun from Oklahoma to Arkansas, and therefore used it in interstate commerce. 3.The Second Amendment protects only the ownership of military-type weapons appropriate for use in an organized militia. 4.The "double barrel 12-gauge Stevens shotgun having a barrel less than 18 inches in length, bearing identification number 76230" was never used in any militia organization.
WHAT!!! Miller never said that or anything even close to that. It said nothing about "law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes". The Heller court simply made that up! But Miller DID say that a weapon is not protected by the second amendment UNLESS it had a "reasonable relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia". That, it said.
Machine guns were regulated, not made unlawful. Which is why a constitutional amendment was not required.
Tree-hugging gun grabber!
Government is in the last resort the employment of armed men, of policemen, gendarmes, soldiers, prison guards, and hangmen. Your hallucination that your personal brainfart overrides the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Heller is a joke. Show off your bright, shiny new full-auto machine gun and you will have time in a cell to ponder just what a joke it is. Heller permits you to be a brave and stubborn keyboard commando.
Being obstinate and obtuse does not change the holding in either Miller or Heller. For the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia went to great lengths to explain the wrongheadedness of your misbegotten interpretation and application of Miller. While Miller does not really confoict with Heller, Heller strickes down all misbegotten misreadings which could conflict with Heller. Heller at 620-25: Cite as: 554 U. S. 570 (2008) Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 (1886), held that the right to keep and bear arms was not violated by a law that forbade "bodies of men to associate together as military organizations, or to drill or parade with arms in cities and towns unless authorized by law." Id., at 264-265. This does not refute the individual-rights interpretation of the Amendment; no one supporting that interpretation has contended that States may not ban such groups. JUSTICE STEVENS Cite as: 554 U. S. 570 (2008) presses Presser into service to support his view that the right to bear arms is limited to service in the militia by joining Presser's brief discussion of the Second Amendment with a later portion of the opinion making the seemingly relevant (to the Second Amendment) point that the plaintiff was not a member of the state militia. Unfortunately for JUSTICE STEVENS' argument, that later portion deals with the Fourteenth Amendment; it was the Fourteenth Amendment to which the plaintiff's nonmembership in the militia was relevant. Thus, JUSTICE STEVENS' statement that Presser "suggested that . . . nothing in the Constitution protected the use of arms outside the context of a militia," post, at 674-675, is simply wrong. Presser said nothing about the Second Amendment's meaning or scope, beyond the fact that it does not prevent the prohibition of private paramilitary organizations. JUSTICE STEVENS places overwhelming reliance upon this Court's decision in Miller, 307 U. S. 174. "[H]undreds of judges," we are told, "have relied on the view of the Amendment we endorsed there," post, at 638, and "[e]ven if the textual and historical arguments on both sides of the issue were evenly balanced, respect for the well-settled views of all of our predecessors on this Court, and for the rule of law itself . . . would prevent most jurists from endorsing such a dramatic upheaval in the law," post, at 639. And what is, according to JUSTICE STEVENS, the holding of Miller that demands such obeisance? That the Second Amendment "protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes, but that it does not curtail the Legislature's power to regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons." Post, at 637. Nothing so clearly demonstrates the weakness of JUSTICE STEVENS' case. Miller did not hold that and cannot possibly be read to have held that. The judgment in the case upheld against a Second Amendment challenge two men's federal indictment for transporting an unregistered short-barreled 622 shotgun in interstate commerce, in violation of the National Firearms Act, 48 Stat. 1236. It is entirely clear that the Court's basis for saying that the Second Amendment did not apply was not that the defendants were "bear[ing] arms" not "for . . . military purposes" but for "nonmilitary use," post, at 637. Rather, it was that the type of weapon at issue was not eligible for Second Amendment protection: "In the absence of any evidence tending to show that the possession or use of a [short-barreled shotgun] at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument." 307 U. S., at 178 (emphasis added). "Certainly," the Court continued, "it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense." Ibid. Beyond that, the opinion provided no explanation of the content of the right. This holding is not only consistent with, but positively suggests, that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms (though only arms that "have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia"). Had the Court believed that the Second Amendment protects only those serving in the militia, it would have been odd to examine the character of the weapon rather than simply note that the two crooks were not militiamen. JUSTICE STEVENS can say again and again that Miller did not "turn on the difference between muskets and sawed-off shotguns; it turned, rather, on the basic difference between the military and nonmilitary use and possession of guns," post, at 677, but the words of the opinion prove otherwise. The most JUSTICE STEVENS can plausibly claim for Miller is that it declined to decide the nature of the Second Amendment right, despite the Solicitor General's argument (made in the alternative) that the right was collective, see Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, Cite as: 554 U. S. 570 (2008) No. 696, pp. 4-5. Miller stands only for the proposition that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons. It is particularly wrongheaded to read Miller for more than what it said, because the case did not even purport to be a thorough examination of the Second Amendment. JUSTICE STEVENS claims, post, at 676-677, that the opinion reached its conclusion "[a]fter reviewing many of the same sources that are discussed at greater length by the Court today." Not many, which was not entirely the Court's fault. The defendants made no appearance in the case, neither filing a brief nor appearing at oral argument; the Court heard from no one but the Government (reason enough, one would think, not to make that case the beginning and the end of this Court's consideration of the Second Amendment). See Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3N. Y. U. J. L. & Liberty 48, 65-68 (2008). The Government's brief spent two pages discussing English legal sources, concluding "that at least the carrying of weapons without lawful occasion or excuse was always a crime" and that (because of the class-based restrictions and the prohibition on terrorizing people with dangerous or unusual weapons) "the early English law did not guarantee an unrestricted right to bear arms." Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, No. 696, at 9-11. It then went on to rely primarily on the discussion of the English right to bear arms in Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154, for the proposition that the only uses of arms protected by the Second Amendment are those that relate to the militia, not self-defense. See Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, No. 696, at 12-18. The final section of the brief recognized that "some courts have said that the right to bear arms includes the right of the individual to have them for the protection of his person and property," and launched an alternative argument that "weapons which are commonly used by criminals," such as sawed-off shotguns, are not protected. See id., at 18-21. The Government's Miller brief thus provided 624 scant discussion of the history of the Second Amendment—and the Court was presented with no counterdiscussion. As for the text of the Court's opinion itself, that discusses none of the history of the Second Amendment. It assumes from the prologue that the Amendment was designed to preserve the militia, 307 U. S., at 178 (which we do not dispute), and then reviews some historical materials dealing with the nature of the militia, and in particular with the nature of the arms their members were expected to possess, id., at 178-182. Not a word (not a word) about the history of the Second Amendment. This is the mighty rock upon which the dissent rests its case. We may as well consider at this point (for we will have to consider eventually) what types of weapons Miller permits. Read in isolation, Miller's phrase "part of ordinary military equipment" could mean that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected. That would be a startling reading of the opinion, since it would mean that the National Firearms Act's restrictions on machineguns (not challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional, machineguns being useful in warfare in 1939. We think that Miller's "ordinary military equipment" language must be read in tandem with what comes after: "[O]rdinarily when called for [militia] service [able-bodied] men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time." 307 U. S., at 179. The traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms "in common use at the time" for lawful purposes like self-defense. "In the colonial Cite as: 554 U. S. 570 (2008) and revolutionary war era, [small-arms] weapons used by militiamen and weapons used in defense of person and home were one and the same." State v. Kessler, 289 Ore. 359, 368, 614 P. 2d 94, 98 (1980) (citing G. Neumann, Swords and Blades of the American Revolution 6-15, 252-254 (1973)). Indeed, that is precisely the way in which the Second Amendment's operative clause furthers the purpose announced in its preface. We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. That accords with the historical understanding of the scope of the right, see Part III, infra. We conclude that nothing in our precedents forecloses our adoption of the original understanding of the Second Amendment.
3.The Second Amendment protects only the ownership of military-type weapons appropriate for use in an organized militia. What matters is what the Court decided, not what anybody argued. What really matters is the most recent holding the the U.S. Supreme Court which is on point. See Heller and McDonald. Heller at 625: - - - - - - - - - -
Your opinion is noted. The majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald establish that your opinion is wrong and irrelevant. Heller at 625:
Machine gun prohibition without a constitutional amendment in sight. Illegal possession or transfer of a machine gun lands one in prison, pursuant to federal law. In my experience, valued items requested by inmates are lawbooks. Once inside, they forget about imaginary law. https://law.justia.com/codes/us/2016/title-18/part-i/chapter-44/sec.-922/ (2) This subsection does not apply with respect to— (A) a transfer to or by, or possession by or under the authority of, the United States or any department or agency thereof or a State, or a department, agency, or political subdivision thereof; or (B) any lawful transfer or lawful possession of a machinegun that was lawfully possessed before the date this subsection takes effect. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-100/pdf/STATUTE-100-Pg449.pdf Public Law 99-308, 100 Stat. 451 (29 May 1986) Section 110. Effective Date. [...] Approved May 19, 1986.
Are you going to prison to show the gun grabbers that they cannot take your full-auto machine gun away? Be brave, get caught, show how you can do 10 years no bother. Show em you know the law better than the stupid courts.
Come and get it you tree hugging libtard Hogg Bro!
Try and stay on topic, spam-boy. You really think anyone is going to turn in their bump-stocks? Tell us all how much you support government goons going door-to-door confiscating them.
Government is in the last resort the employment of armed men, of policemen, gendarmes, soldiers, prison guards, and hangmen. As it should. So I suggest you fill out the proper paperwork.
They read wrong. The Miller court itself said the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not having a "reasonable relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia". Miller said nothing about weapons possessed by "law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes". The Heller court made it up.
Correct. Attorneys for the United States argued that the Second Amendment protects only the ownership of military-type weapons appropriate for use in an organized militia. And the Miller court agreed.
What you call "misbegotten misreadings" I call U.S. Supreme Court precedent.
Miller did NOT say that. I'll quote exactly what they said: "And further, that ordinarily, when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time." Period. "... for lawful purposes like self-defense" was added by the Heller court. And I'll say it again, citizens were expected to appear bearing muskets -- a military, volley-fire weapon -- not rifles. This was codified in the Militia Act of 1792. Meaning, citizens were expected to show up with military weapons. In today's world, that would be a full-auto M4.
[misterwhite #40 quoting nolu chan #32] What matters is what the Court decided, not what anybody argued. You left off half of it. [nolu chan actual #32] What really matters is the most recent holding [of] the U.S. Supreme Court which is on point. See Heller and McDonald. [misterwhite #40] Correct. Attorneys for the United States argued that the Second Amendment protects only the ownership of military-type weapons appropriate for use in an organized militia. What the attorneys may, or may not, have argued does not make a shit. Nothing the attorneys argue is even evidence, much less an opinion of the court based upon evidence. Even if your "wrong headed" interpretation of Miller were not just legally ignorant, the 2008 and 2010 holdings of Heller and McDonald are current precedent and strike down anything in the 1939 Miller opinion which is in conflict with the more recent precedents. Your observation in #39 that "The Heller court made it up," is just your typical bullshit, and changes nothing. Heller and McDonald are the law, and your rejected and "wrong headed" reading of Miller is not.
[misterwhite #39] Miller said nothing about weapons possessed by "law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes". The Heller court made it up. [misterwhite #40] What matters is what the Court decided, not what anybody argued. [misterwhite #41] What you call "misbegotten misreadings" I call U.S. Supreme Court precedent. [misterwhite #42] Miller did NOT say that. I'll quote exactly what they said: [misterwhite #42] Meaning, citizens were expected to show up with military weapons. In today's world, that would be a full-auto M4. What the Heller court matters; your legally ignorant rants in defiance of the prevailing holding of the U.S. Supreme Court do not. Your legally ingorant interpretation of Miller has been explicitly been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court and termed "wrong-headed." Being obstinate and obtuse does not change the holding in either Miller or Heller. For the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia went to great lengths to explain the wrongheadedness of your misbegotten interpretation and application of Miller. While Miller does not really conflict with Heller, Heller strikes down all misbegotten misreadings which could conflict with Heller. Heller at 620-25: Cite as: 554 U. S. 570 (2008) Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 (1886), held that the right to keep and bear arms was not violated by a law that forbade "bodies of men to associate together as military organizations, or to drill or parade with arms in cities and towns unless authorized by law." Id., at 264-265. This does not refute the individual-rights interpretation of the Amendment; no one supporting that interpretation has contended that States may not ban such groups. JUSTICE STEVENS Cite as: 554 U. S. 570 (2008) presses Presser into service to support his view that the right to bear arms is limited to service in the militia by joining Presser's brief discussion of the Second Amendment with a later portion of the opinion making the seemingly relevant (to the Second Amendment) point that the plaintiff was not a member of the state militia. Unfortunately for JUSTICE STEVENS' argument, that later portion deals with the Fourteenth Amendment; it was the Fourteenth Amendment to which the plaintiff's nonmembership in the militia was relevant. Thus, JUSTICE STEVENS' statement that Presser "suggested that . . . nothing in the Constitution protected the use of arms outside the context of a militia," post, at 674-675, is simply wrong. Presser said nothing about the Second Amendment's meaning or scope, beyond the fact that it does not prevent the prohibition of private paramilitary organizations. JUSTICE STEVENS places overwhelming reliance upon this Court's decision in Miller, 307 U. S. 174. "[H]undreds of judges," we are told, "have relied on the view of the Amendment we endorsed there," post, at 638, and "[e]ven if the textual and historical arguments on both sides of the issue were evenly balanced, respect for the well-settled views of all of our predecessors on this Court, and for the rule of law itself . . . would prevent most jurists from endorsing such a dramatic upheaval in the law," post, at 639. And what is, according to JUSTICE STEVENS, the holding of Miller that demands such obeisance? That the Second Amendment "protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes, but that it does not curtail the Legislature's power to regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons." Post, at 637. Nothing so clearly demonstrates the weakness of JUSTICE STEVENS' case. Miller did not hold that and cannot possibly be read to have held that. The judgment in the case upheld against a Second Amendment challenge two men's federal indictment for transporting an unregistered short-barreled 622 shotgun in interstate commerce, in violation of the National Firearms Act, 48 Stat. 1236. It is entirely clear that the Court's basis for saying that the Second Amendment did not apply was not that the defendants were "bear[ing] arms" not "for . . . military purposes" but for "nonmilitary use," post, at 637. Rather, it was that the type of weapon at issue was not eligible for Second Amendment protection: "In the absence of any evidence tending to show that the possession or use of a [short-barreled shotgun] at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument." 307 U. S., at 178 (emphasis added). "Certainly," the Court continued, "it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense." Ibid. Beyond that, the opinion provided no explanation of the content of the right. This holding is not only consistent with, but positively suggests, that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms (though only arms that "have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia"). Had the Court believed that the Second Amendment protects only those serving in the militia, it would have been odd to examine the character of the weapon rather than simply note that the two crooks were not militiamen. JUSTICE STEVENS can say again and again that Miller did not "turn on the difference between muskets and sawed-off shotguns; it turned, rather, on the basic difference between the military and nonmilitary use and possession of guns," post, at 677, but the words of the opinion prove otherwise. The most JUSTICE STEVENS can plausibly claim for Miller is that it declined to decide the nature of the Second Amendment right, despite the Solicitor General's argument (made in the alternative) that the right was collective, see Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, Cite as: 554 U. S. 570 (2008) No. 696, pp. 4-5. Miller stands only for the proposition that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons. It is particularly wrongheaded to read Miller for more than what it said, because the case did not even purport to be a thorough examination of the Second Amendment. JUSTICE STEVENS claims, post, at 676-677, that the opinion reached its conclusion "[a]fter reviewing many of the same sources that are discussed at greater length by the Court today." Not many, which was not entirely the Court's fault. The defendants made no appearance in the case, neither filing a brief nor appearing at oral argument; the Court heard from no one but the Government (reason enough, one would think, not to make that case the beginning and the end of this Court's consideration of the Second Amendment). See Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3N. Y. U. J. L. & Liberty 48, 65-68 (2008). The Government's brief spent two pages discussing English legal sources, concluding "that at least the carrying of weapons without lawful occasion or excuse was always a crime" and that (because of the class-based restrictions and the prohibition on terrorizing people with dangerous or unusual weapons) "the early English law did not guarantee an unrestricted right to bear arms." Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, No. 696, at 9-11. It then went on to rely primarily on the discussion of the English right to bear arms in Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154, for the proposition that the only uses of arms protected by the Second Amendment are those that relate to the militia, not self-defense. See Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, No. 696, at 12-18. The final section of the brief recognized that "some courts have said that the right to bear arms includes the right of the individual to have them for the protection of his person and property," and launched an alternative argument that "weapons which are commonly used by criminals," such as sawed-off shotguns, are not protected. See id., at 18-21. The Government's Miller brief thus provided 624 scant discussion of the history of the Second Amendment—and the Court was presented with no counterdiscussion. As for the text of the Court's opinion itself, that discusses none of the history of the Second Amendment. It assumes from the prologue that the Amendment was designed to preserve the militia, 307 U. S., at 178 (which we do not dispute), and then reviews some historical materials dealing with the nature of the militia, and in particular with the nature of the arms their members were expected to possess, id., at 178-182. Not a word (not a word) about the history of the Second Amendment. This is the mighty rock upon which the dissent rests its case. We may as well consider at this point (for we will have to consider eventually) what types of weapons Miller permits. Read in isolation, Miller's phrase "part of ordinary military equipment" could mean that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected. That would be a startling reading of the opinion, since it would mean that the National Firearms Act's restrictions on machineguns (not challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional, machineguns being useful in warfare in 1939. We think that Miller's "ordinary military equipment" language must be read in tandem with what comes after: "[O]rdinarily when called for [militia] service [able-bodied] men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time." 307 U. S., at 179. The traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms "in common use at the time" for lawful purposes like self-defense. "In the colonial Cite as: 554 U. S. 570 (2008) and revolutionary war era, [small-arms] weapons used by militiamen and weapons used in defense of person and home were one and the same." State v. Kessler, 289 Ore. 359, 368, 614 P. 2d 94, 98 (1980) (citing G. Neumann, Swords and Blades of the American Revolution 6-15, 252-254 (1973)). Indeed, that is precisely the way in which the Second Amendment's operative clause furthers the purpose announced in its preface. We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. That accords with the historical understanding of the scope of the right, see Part III, infra. 25 We conclude that nothing in our precedents forecloses our adoption of the original understanding of the Second Amendment. [...] 25 Miller was briefly mentioned in our decision in Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55 (1980), an appeal from a conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The challenge was based on the contention that the prior felony conviction had been unconstitutional. No Second Amendment claim was raised or briefed by any party. In the course of rejecting the asserted challenge, the Court commented gratuitously, in a footnote, that "[t]hese legislative restrictions on the use of firearms are neither based upon constitutionally suspect criteria, nor do they trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties. See United States v. Miller . . . (the Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have 'some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia')." Id., at 65-66, n. 8. The footnote then cites several Court of Appeals cases to the same effect. It is inconceivable that we would rest our interpretation of the basic meaning of any guarantee of the Bill of Rights upon such a footnoted dictum in a case where the point was not at issue and was not argued.
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#5. To: misterwhite (#4)
" Pretty soon it will dawn on liberals that the only solution is to ban all semi-autos. "
#6. To: Deckard, Hogg Bro Trump (#0)
Hogg Bro pep rally 
#7. To: misterwhite (#4)
There are a number of YouTube videos which illustrate how you can get the same effect using your belt loop. Now what? Ban belt loops?
#8. To: nolu chan (#7)
Ban the manufacture or sale of parts intended to be used to modify a legal firearm to operate in the manner of a fully automatic weapon.
#9. To: misterwhite (#8)
That's my point. There is no modification to the semi-automatic weapon itself. Hook your finger in your belt loop and you end up with a full-auto effect. Watch a video.
#10. To: misterwhite (#8)
#11. To: nolu chan (#9)
(Edited)
#12. To: misterwhite (#11)
How to bump firea semi-automatic rifle.
We described the right protected by the Second Amendment as “ ‘bearing arms for a lawful purpose’ ”
“In the colonial and revolutionary war era, [small-arms] weapons used by militiamen and weapons used in defense of person and home were one and the same.” State v. Kessler, 289 Ore. 359, 368, 614 P. 2d 94, 98 (1980) (citing G. Neumann, Swords and Blades of the American Revolution 6–15, 252–254 (1973)). Indeed, that is precisely the way in which the Second Amendment’s operative clause furthers the purpose announced in its preface. We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. That accords with the historical understanding of the scope of the right, see Part III, infra.
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. See, e.g., Sheldon, in 5 Blume 346; Rawle 123; Pomeroy 152–153; Abbott 333. For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues. See, e.g., State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann., at 489–490; Nunn v. State, 1 Ga., at 251; see generally 2 Kent *340, n. 2; The American Students’ Blackstone 84, n. 11 (G. Chase ed. 1884).
It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service—M-16 rifles and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause. But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification was the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty. It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large. Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers and tanks. But the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.
By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had become fundamental for English subjects. See Malcolm 122–134. Blackstone, whose works, we have said, “constituted the preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation,” Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 715 (1999), cited the arms provision of the Bill of Rights as one of the fundamental rights of Englishmen. See 1 Blackstone 136, 139–140 (1765). His description of it cannot possibly be thought to tie it to militia or military service. It was, he said, “the natural right of resistance and self-preservation,” id., at 139, and “the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and defence,” id., at 140; see also 3 id., at 2–4 (1768). Other contemporary authorities concurred. See G. Sharp, Tracts, Concerning the Ancient and Only True Legal Means of National Defence, by a Free Militia 17–18, 27 (3d ed. 1782); 2 J. de Lolme, The Rise and Progress of the English Constitution 886–887 (1784) (A. Stephens ed. 1838); W. Blizard, Desultory Reflections on Police 59–60 (1785). Thus, the right secured in 1689 as a result of the Stuarts’ abuses was by the time of the founding understood to be an individual right protecting against both public and private violence.
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. See, e. g., Sheldon, in 5 Blume 346; Rawle 123; Pomeroy 152–153; Abbott 333. For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues. See, e. g., State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann., at 489–490; Nunn v. State, 1 Ga., at 251; see generally 2 Kent *340, n. 2; The American Students’ Blackstone 84, n. 11 (G. Chase ed. 1884). Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.
#13. To: nolu chan (#12)
What is the point?
#14. To: nolu chan (#12)
But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification was the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty.
#15. To: misterwhite (#13)
Why ban bump stocks when you can get the same effect with a belt loop? What the ban is saying is that you can't pull the trigger real fast. What a silly law.
#16. To: misterwhite (#14)
Not really. The court has no idea what they're talking about.
#17. To: nolu chan (#16)
you and your legal opinion go to prison.
#18. To: nolu chan (#15)
What seems silly is someone hooking up his rifle to his belt to achieve rapid fire and making believe he retains aim ability.
#19. To: nolu chan (#16)
It is only necessary to document what they said in establishing precedent now binding on every lower court, State and Federal, in the land.
#20. To: nolu chan (#12)
We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.”
#21. To: misterwhite (#18)
Well, it was a constitutional right until 1934. Even after 1934 you were only required to register them. Which is why I'm saying bump stocks should be treated the same way -- legal but registered.
We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. That accords with the historical understanding of the scope of the right, see Part III, infra.
#22. To: misterwhite (#19)
The court has no power or ability to find fact. That is left to Congress to be presented in a "finding".
The court was simply making it up as they went along, then concluded that certain weapons were yucky and dangerous and that only government troops should have such weapons -- contrary to original intent of the Founding Fathers.
#23. To: misterwhite (#20)
Miller also said the second amendment protects weapons which have a " a "reasonable relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia".
Miller stands only for the proposition that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons.
We may as well consider at this point (for we will have to consider eventually) what types of weapons Miller permits. Read in isolation, Miller’s phrase “part of ordinary military equipment” could mean that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected. That would be a startling reading of the opinion, since it would mean that the National Firearms Act’s restrictions on machineguns (not challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional, machineguns being useful in warfare in 1939. We think that Miller’s “ordinary military equipment” language must be read in tandem with what comes after: “[O]rdinarily when called for [militia] service [able-bodied] men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.” 307 U. S., at 179. The traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms “in common use at the time” for lawful purposes like self-defense. “In the colonial and revolutionary war era, [small-arms] weapons used by militiamen and weapons used in defense of person and home were one and the same.” State v. Kessler, 289 Ore. 359, 368, 614 P. 2d 94, 98 (1980) (citing G. Neumann, Swords and Blades of the American Revolution 6–15, 252–254 (1973)). Indeed, that is precisely the way in which the Second Amendment’s operative clause furthers the purpose announced in its preface. We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. That accords with the historical understanding of the scope of the right, see Part III, infra.
#24. To: nolu chan (#23)
It is particularly wrongheaded to read Miller for more than what it said,
#25. To: nolu chan (#23)
Miller stands only for the proposition that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons.
#26. To: nolu chan (#23)
#27. To: nolu chan (#23)
We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.
#28. To: nolu chan (#21)
After 1934, machine guns were made unlawful without the need for a constitutional amendment.
#29. To: nolu chan (#15)
Even if alone, he should be prosecuted for reckless endangerment of the woods.
“Truth is treason in the empire of lies.” - Ron Paul
The essential feature of government is the enforcement of its decrees by beating, killing, and imprisoning.
Those who are asking for more government interference are asking ultimately for more compulsion and less freedom.
#30. To: misterwhite (#24)
The Heller decision was a joke.
#31. To: misterwhite (#25)
Only weapons which have a "reasonable relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia". That's what Miller said. It's right there in the ruling.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
620
Opinion of the Court
621
Opinion of the Court
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
623
Opinion of the Court
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
625
Opinion of the Court
#32. To: misterwhite (#26)
On March 30, 1939, the Supreme Court heard the case. Attorneys for the United States argued four points: ...
We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.
#33. To: misterwhite (#27)
Miller never said that or anything even close to that.
We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.
#34. To: misterwhite (#28)
Machine guns were regulated, not made unlawful. Which is why a constitutional amendment was not required.
(o)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun.
(c) MACHINEGUN PROHIBITION.—Section 102(9) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
#35. To: Deckard (#29)
#36. To: nolu chan, Deckard (#35)
#37. To: nolu chan (#35)
Are you going to prison to show the gun grabbers that they cannot take your full-auto machine gun away?
“Truth is treason in the empire of lies.” - Ron Paul
The essential feature of government is the enforcement of its decrees by beating, killing, and imprisoning.
Those who are asking for more government interference are asking ultimately for more compulsion and less freedom.
#38. To: nolu chan (#34)
Illegal possession or transfer of a machine gun lands one in prison
#39. To: nolu chan (#33)
We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.
#40. To: nolu chan (#32)
What matters is what the Court decided, not what anybody argued.
#41. To: nolu chan (#31)
Heller strickes down all misbegotten misreadings
#42. To: nolu chan (#31)
(Edited)
The traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing ar arms "in common use at the time" for lawful purposes like self-defense.
#43. To: misterwhite (#40)
What matters is what the Court decided, not what anybody argued.
#44. To: misterwhite (#39)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
620
Opinion of the Court
621
Opinion of the Court
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
623
Opinion of the Court
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
625
Opinion of the Court
.
.
.
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