Title: Does the Fourteenth Amendment Require Birthright Citizenship? Source:
[None] URL Source:[None] Published:Nov 2, 2018 Author:Heritage Foundation Post Date:2018-11-02 08:57:03 by A K A Stone Keywords:None Views:1959 Comments:7
Poster Comment:
No doubt birthright citizenship is NOT required by the fourteenth amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment states that “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” Many believe that this means being born on U.S. soil is sufficient to confer citizenship. Some scholars, however, argue that the Constitution does not confer citizenship on children born in the United States to parents who are illegal aliens because they owe allegiance to another government. Others maintain that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to restore the common law doctrine of jus soli—right of the soil—which had been abrogated by the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision and that subsequent Supreme Court decisions support this interpretation. Does the Citizenship Clause mandate birthright citizenship? Legal experts John Eastman and James Ho will explore this hotly debated question that has important legal and political consequences.
It is obvious to me that anyone denying birthright citizenship in the United States gets his ass smoked by the United States Supreme Court where what they say really counts.
Jim Ho.
John Eastman.
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United States Supreme Court opinions are not overturned or reversed by a Youtube video of Jim Ho and John Eastman.
It is obvious to me that anyone who denies birthright citizenship in the United States is smoked by the United States Supreme Court, where the opinions really count.
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 US 649, 687-88 (1898)
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Opinion of the Court (6-2)
The words " in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," in the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, must be presumed to have been understood and intended by the Congress which proposed the Amendment, and by the legislatures which adopted it, in the same sense in which the like words had been used by Chief Justice Marshall in the well known case of The Exchange; and as the equivalent of the words "within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States," and the converse of the words, " out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States," as habitually used in the naturalization acts. This presumption is confirmed by the use of the word "jurisdiction" in the last clause of the same section of the Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids any State to " deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." It is impossible to construe the words "subject to the jurisdiction thereof," in the opening sentence, as less comprehensive than the words "within its jurisdiction," in the concluding sentence of the same section; or to hold that persons "within the jurisdiction" of one of the States of the Union are not "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."
These considerations confirm the view, already expressed in this opinion, that the opening sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment is throughout affirmative and declaratory, intended to allay doubts and to settle controversies which had arisen, and not to impose any new restrictions upon citizenship.
By the Civil Rights Act of 1866, "all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed," were declared to be citizens of the United States. In the light of the law as previously established, and of the history of the times, it can hardly be doubted that the words of that act, "not subject to any foreign power," were not intended to exclude any children born in this country from the citizenship which would theretofore have been their birthright; or, for instance, for the first time in our history, to deny the right of citizenship to native-born children of foreign white parents not in the diplomatic service of their own country, nor in hostile occupation of part of our territory. But any possible doubt in this regard was removed when the negative words of the Civil Rights Act, "not subject to any foreign power," gave way, in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, to the affirmative words, "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." This sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment is declaratory of existing rights, and affirmative of existing law, as to each of the qualifications therein expressed—"born in the United States," "naturalized in the United States," and "subject to the jurisdiction thereof "—in short, as to everything relating to the acquisition of citizenship by facts occurring within the limits of the United States. But it has not touched the acquisition of citizenship by being born abroad of American parents; and has left that subject to be regulated, as it had always been, by Congress, in the exercise of the power conferred by the Constitution to establish an uniform rule of naturalization.
The effect of the enactments conferring citizenship on foreign-born children of American parents has been defined, and the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the dominion of the United States, notwithstanding alienage of parents, has been affirmed, in well considered opinions of the executive departments of the Government, since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
There is century plus stream of Federal court opinions affirming birthright citizenship. There are 200 plus cases demonstrating the futility of Birther arguments.
Once Trump has won tomorrow night, and the Mueller investigation draws to a close, I would like to see Trump launch a complete and thorough investigation of Obama's birth record, and show the public. If Trump declares, based on that, that Obama really was born in Hawaii, I'll believe it. Otherwise there's too much corruption and brutal political power played out by the other side for me to accept a verdict that looks to me was arrived at through brute force.
By the Civil Rights Act of 1866, "all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed," were declared to be citizens of the United States.
notice the phrase, "and not subject to any foreign power..."
How can a citizen of another country, that pledges allegiances to their country, expect to be considered a citizen of the U.S. where they serve no allegiance? The US has no jurisdiction over these people at all. This is why it is easy enough to deport those who enter here illegal.
notice the phrase, "and not subject to any foreign power..."
The U.S. Supreme Court noticed that phrase, and quoted it in 1898, and ruled that the native-born children of aliens were natural born citizens.
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 683-88 (1898)
In the great case of The Exchange, (1812), 7 Cranch, 116, the grounds upon which foreign ministers are, and other aliens are not, exempt from the jurisdiction of this country were set forth by Chief Justice Marshall in a clear and powerful train of reasoning, of which it will be sufficient, for our present purpose, to give little more than the outlines. The opinion did not touch upon the anomalous casts of the Indian tribes, the true relation of which to the United States was not directly brought before this court until some years afterwards in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831), 5 Pet. 1; nor upon the case of a suspension of the sovereignty of the United States over part of their territory by reason of a hostile occupation, such as was also afterwards presented in United States v. Rice, above cited. But, in all other respects, it covered the whole question of what persons within the territory of the United States are subject to the jurisdiction thereof.
The Chief Justice first laid down the general principle: "The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source. This consent may be either express or implied. In the latter case, it is less determinate, exposed more to the uncertainties of construction; but, if understood, not less obligatory." 7 Cranch 11 U. S. 136.
He then stated, and supported by argument and illustration, the propositions that "this full and absolute territorial jurisdiction, being alike the attribute of every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extraterritorial power," has "given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation" -- the first of which is the exemption from arrest or detention of the person of a foreign sovereign entering its territory with its license, because "a foreign sovereign is not understood as intending to subject himself to a jurisdiction incompatible with his dignity and the dignity of his nation; . . . a second case, standing on the same principles with the first, is the immunity which all civilized nations allow to foreign ministers; . . . a third case, in which a sovereign is understood to cede a portion of his territorial jurisdiction, is where he allows the troops of a foreign prince to pass through his dominions;" and, in conclusion, that "a public armed ship, in the service of a foreign sovereign with whom the Government of the United States is at peace and having entered an American port open for her reception, on the terms on which ships of war are generally permitted to enter the ports of a friendly power, must be considered as having come into the American territory under an implied promise that, while necessarily within it, and demeaning herself in a friendly manner, she should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the country." 7 Cranch 11 U. S. 137-139.
As to the immunity of a foreign minister, he said: "Whatever may be the principle on which this immunity is established, whether we consider him as in the place of the sovereign he represents or, by a political fiction, suppose him to be extraterritorial, and therefore, in point of law, not within the jurisdiction of the sovereign at whose court he resides, still the immunity itself is granted by the governing power of the nation to which the minister is deputed. This fiction of exterritoriality could not be erected and supported against the will of the sovereign of the territory. He is supposed to assent to it." "The assent of the sovereign to the very important and extensive exemptions from territorial jurisdiction which are admitted to attach to foreign ministers is implied from the considerations that, without such exemption, every sovereign would hazard his own dignity by employing a public minister abroad. His minister would owe temporary and local allegiance to a foreign prince, and would be less competent to the objects of his mission. A sovereign committing the interests of his nation with a foreign power to the care of a person whom he has selected for that purpose, cannot intend to subject his minister in any degree to that power; and therefore, a consent to receive him implies a consent that he shall possess those privileges which his principal intended he should retain — privileges which are essential to the dignity of his sovereign and to the duties he is bound to perform." 7 Cranch 11 U. S. 138, 11 U. S. 139.
The reasons for not allowing to other aliens exemption "from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found" were stated as follows: "When private individuals of one nation spread themselves through another as business or caprice may direct, mingling indiscriminately with the inhabitants of that other, or when merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. Nor can the foreign sovereign have any motive for wishing such exemption. His subjects thus passing into foreign counties are not employed by him, nor are they engaged in national pursuits. Consequently there are powerful motives for not exempting persons of this description from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found, and no one motive for requiring it. The implied license, therefore, under which they enter can never be construed to grant such exemption." 7 Cranch 11 U. S. 144.
In short, the judgment in the case of The Exchange declared, as incontrovertible principles, that the jurisdiction of every nation within its own territory is exclusive and absolute, and is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by the nation itself; that all exceptions to its full and absolute territorial jurisdiction must be traced up to its own consent, express or implied; that, upon its consent to cede, or to waive the exercise of, a part of its territorial jurisdiction rest the exemptions from that jurisdiction of foreign sovereigns or their armies entering its territory with its permission, and of their foreign ministers and public ships of war, and that the implied license under which private individuals of another nation enter the territory and mingle indiscriminately with its inhabitants for purposes of business or pleasure can never be construed to grant to them an exemption from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found. See also Carlisle v. United States (1872), 16 Wall. 147, 155; Radich v. Hutchins (1877) 95 U.S. 210; Wildenhus' Case (1887) 120 U.S. 1; Chae Chan Ping v. United States (1889), 130 U.S. 581, 130 U.S. 603, 130 U. S. 604.
From the first organization of the National Government under the Constitution, the naturalization acts of the United States, in providing for the admission of aliens to citizenship by judicial proceedings, uniformly required every applicant to have resided for a certain time "within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States," and thus applied the words "under the jurisdiction of the United States" to aliens residing here before they had taken an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, or had renounced allegiance to a foreign government. Acts of March 26, 1790, c. 3; January 29, 1795, c. 20, § 1; June 18, 1798, c. 54, §§ 1, 6; 1 Stat. 103, 414, 566, 568; April 14, 1802, c. 28, § 1, 2 Stat. 153; March 22, 1816, c. 32, § 1; 3 Stat. 258; May 24, 1828, c. 116, § 2; 4 Stat. 310; Rev.Stat. § 2165. And, from 1795, the provisions of those acts which granted citizenship to foreign-born children of American parents described such children as "born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States." Acts of January 29, 1795, c. 20, § 3; 1 Stat. 415; April 14, 180, c. 28, § 4; 2 Stat. 155; February 10, 1855, c. 71; 10 Stat. 604; Rev.Stat. §§ 1993, 2172. Thus, Congress, when dealing with the question of citizenship in that aspect, treated aliens residing in this country as "under the jurisdiction of the United States," and American parents residing abroad as "out of the jurisdiction of the United States."
The words "in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" in the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution must be presumed to have been understood and intended by the Congress which proposed the Amendment, and by the legislatures which adopted it, in the same sense in which the like words had been used by Chief Justice Marshall in the well known case of The Exchange and as the equivalent of the words "within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States," and the converse of the words "out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States" as habitually used in the naturalization acts. This presumption is confirmed by the use of the word "jurisdiction" in the last clause of the same section of the Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids any State to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." It is impossible to construe the words "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" in the opening sentence, as less comprehensive than the words "within its jurisdiction" in the concluding sentence of the same section; or to hold that persons "within the jurisdiction" of one of the States of the Union are not "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."
These considerations confirm the view, already expressed in this opinion, that the opening sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment is throughout affirmative and declaratory, intended to allay doubts and to settle controversies which had arisen, and not to impose any new restrictions upon citizenship.
By the Civil Rights Act of 1866, "all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed," were declared to be citizens of the United States. In the light of the law as previously established, and of the history of the times, it can hardly be doubted that the words of that act, "not subject to any foreign power," were not intended to exclude any children born in this country from the citizenship which would theretofore have been their birthright, or, for instance, for the first time in our history, to deny the right of citizenship to native-born children of foreign white parents not in the diplomatic service of their own country nor in hostile occupation of part of our territory. But any possible doubt in this regard was removed when the negative words of the Civil Rights Act, "not subject to any foreign power," gave way, in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, to the affirmative words, "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."
This sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment is declaratory of existing rights and affirmative of existing law as to each of the qualifications therein expressed -- "born in the United States," "naturalized in the United States," and "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" -- in short, as to everything relating to the acquisition of citizenship by facts occurring within the limits of the United States. But it has not touched the acquisition of citizenship by being born abroad of American parents, and has left that subject to be regulated, as it had always been, by Congress in the exercise of the power conferred by the Constitution to establish an uniform rule of naturalization.
The effect of the enactments conferring citizenship on foreign-born children of American parents has been defined, and the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the dominion of the United States, notwithstanding alienage of parents, has been affirmed, in well considered opinions of the executive departments of the Government since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
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How can a citizen of another country, that pledges allegiances to their country, expect to be considered a citizen of the U.S. where they serve no allegiance? The US has no jurisdiction over these people at all.
It is impossible for an infant child, born the the United States, to have pledged allegiance to another country at the time of birth.
Only the status of the newborn child matters when determining the citizenship of the newborn child.
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This is why it is easy enough to deport those who enter here illegal.
It is physically impossible for a child to be born in the United States and to have entered the country illegally at the time of birth.
U.S. citizenship is determined at the time of birth for those born in the United States.
"The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself." Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 683 and 686.
I would like to see Trump launch a complete and thorough investigation of Obama's birth record, and show the public.
As long as the state of Hawaii attests, in the proper form, that the birth certificate is authentic, I do not see any legal recourse. I'm not opposed, but I don't see what body can be empowered to investigate or report contrary to the official record as authenticated by the state of Hawaii.
CHAP XI. — An Act to Prescribe the Mode in Which the Public Acts, Records and Judicial Proceedings in Each State, Shall Be Authenticated So As to Take Effect in Every Other State
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the acts of the legislatures of the several states shall be authenticated by having the seal of their respective states affixed thereto: That the records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any state, shall be proved or admitted in any other court within the United States, by the attestation of the clerk, and the seal of the court annexed, if there be a seal, together with a certificate of the judge, chief justice, or presiding magistrate, as the case may be, that the said attestation is in due form. And the said records and judicial proceedings authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken.(a)
Approved, May 26, 1790.
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(a) Art. 4, sec. 1, Constitution of the United States.—The decisions of the conrts of the United States upon this statute, and on the introduction in evidence of the "acts, records, and judicial proceedings of the States," have been:
Under the fourth article and 1st section of the constitution of the United States, and the act of 26th May, 1790, if a judgment has the effect of record evidence in the court of the State from which it is taken, it has the same effect in the courts of every other State; and the plea of nil debet it not a good plea to an action brought upon such judgment in a court of another State. Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 483; 2 Cond. Rep. 578. See Leland v. Wilkinson, 6 Peters, 317. United States v. Johns, 4 Dall. 412. Ferguson v. Harwood, 7 Cranch 408; 2 Cond. Rep. 548. Drummond's adm'rs v. Magruder's trustees, 9 Cranch, 122; 3 Cond. Rep. 303.
Under the act of May 26, 1790, "prescribing the mode in which the public records in each State shall be authenticated, so as to take effect in every other State, copies of the legislative acts of the several States, authenticated by having the seal of the State affixed thereto, are conclusive evidence of such acts in every other State. No other formality is required, than the annexation of the seal, and in the absence of all contrary proof, it must he presumed to have been done by an officer having the custody thereof, and competent authority to do the act. United States v. Amedy, 11 Wheat. 392; 6 Cond. Rep. S62.
The record of a judgment in one State is conclusive in another, although it appears that the suit in which it was rendered was commenced by an attachment of property, the defendant having afterward appeared and taken defence. Mayhew v. Thatcher, 6 Wheat. 129; 5 Cond. Rep. 34.
In an action upon a judgment, in another State, the defendant cannot plead any fact in bar which contradicts the record on which the suit is brought. Field v. Gibbs, Peters' C.C.R. 155. See Green v. Sarmiento, Peters' C.C.R. 74. Blount v. Darrah, 4 Wash. C.C.R. 657. Turner v. Waddington, 3 Wash. C.C.R. 126.
If a Trump-controlled formal investigation, manned by investigators who are as partisan Republican as the Mueller probe investigators are partisan Democrat, examine the East African birth certificate that was purported to be Obama's, and specifically pronounce that the baby footprints on that certificate do not match the actual footprints of Barack Obama, then I will accept that the East Africa Birth Certificate is not Obama's. I reject the screaming denuciations of the time. I will only accept the verdict if rendered by hard partisan Republican forensic investigators. If they, who have an incentive to find a match, find no match, I will accept that the birth certificate was a fraud.
I will then expect the investigation to vigorously pursue identifying the source of that fraud and exposing that source to the public, to destroy that source's credibility going forward.
Knock out that birth certificate, and forensically examine (with the same partisan investigators) the purported Obama certificate, taking note of each of the objections raised regarding it, and pronouncing definitively on each of those claims, then I will believe that the Hawaii certificate is authentic. Professional, partisan forensic investigators hve to review both documents and the custody chain and facts and circumstances. I will believe that partisan Republican investigators, working under a Republican President and a Republican Attorney- General (as opposed to the circumstance when Obama was supervising the investigations into himself), if they pronounce the East African document as not being that of Obama, and the Hawaii document valid, will have proven to my satisfaction that Obama was, in fact, born in Hawaii as indicated, and I will want those who knowingly manufactured the evidence that he had not been and disseminated it to be exposed by name and thereby delegitimied for the remainder of their lives.
Somebody is lying. The East African certificate has footprints. They don't change. If they're Obama's, he was born in East Africa and we were lied to. If they're not, the purveyors of the documents and those who launched the drumbeat are liars. Somebody lied to us. I want it investigated and exposed, one way or the other.
