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U.S. Constitution
See other U.S. Constitution Articles

Title: SCOTUS ruling on Janus is about to change the American political landscape [involuntary union dues]
Source: HotAir
URL Source: https://hotair.com/archives/2018/06 ... -american-political-landscape/
Published: Jun 27, 2018
Author: Jazz Shaw
Post Date: 2018-06-27 11:45:13 by Tooconservative
Keywords: None
Views: 5403
Comments: 44

Justice Alito wrote the decision and it followed along with the expectations of those who watched the case play out before the court. Also as expected, this was a 5-4 decision, split along partisan lines. At the heart of Janus was the question of whether or not unions can forcibly extract dues from workers’ paychecks without the worker proactively volunteering to contribute. In parallel to that, the court had to determine whether or not those extracted fees, being put toward lobbying efforts, constituted involuntary political speech on the part of the worker. The ruling answers both questions definitively.

You can read the full decision here but I’ve extracted a couple of the key points from the syllabus. First is the issue of whether the previous ruling in Abood (which went in the unions’ favor) erred in allowing the forcible extraction of dues. Alito leaves no room for doubt.
The State’s extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public sector employees violates the First Amendment. Abood erred in concluding otherwise, and stare decisis cannot support it. Abood is therefore overruled.

The second question was the one about subsidizing the speech of others when it runs contrary to your personal beliefs. Again, Alito is definitive.
Forcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable raises serious First Amendment concerns. E.g., West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 633. That includes compelling a person to subsidize the speech of other private speakers.

A union official, Paul Shearon, the IFPTE Secretary-Treasurer, put out an immediate statement saying that this was based on, “a bogus free speech argument.” He went on to say that the justices voting in the majority “are little better than political hacks.” That was followed up by a threat to take it to the streets.
In the short run, the Janus decision may hurt some unions financially, but in the long run it will serve to make unions and their members more militant and force a stronger culture of internal organizing. The recent statewide teacher strikes demonstrate that when public sector workers face limitations on their bargaining rights they take their case to the streets.

This is going to send shockwaves through not just the unions, but the Democratic Party at large. The amount of money that the unions flush into Democratic coffers every year is likely more than most of you imagine. This was a point being driven home in advance of the decision by Hugh Hewitt this morning. He was reminding everyone precisely what this decision was going to mean to the unions if it went against them.
Now 3 hours. Very few political reporters seem to understand the stakes here but it is hundreds of millions of dollars of coerced contributions to Democrats and initiatives that dries up instantly if Janus prevails. https://t.co/IigA0isQC3

— Hugh Hewitt (@hughhewitt) June 27, 2018

How important is the Janus v AFSMCE decision today? Take a look at this chart: https://t.co/oh35fCuRbS Most of that money for Democrats and liberal causes dries up, overnight, if Janus prevails.

— Hugh Hewitt (@hughhewitt) June 27, 2018

Liberals have been bracing for this result for a while now. Back in February, the WaPo seemed to see the writing on the wall here and tried suggesting a “compromise” where the unions could collect a smaller amount of money for a more “focused purpose.” This is a silly suggestion, of course, since money is fungible. Even if the collected dues are narrowly applied to a different purpose, that simply frees up funds to be moved over to political activism. (Which is the majority of the business the unions engage in to begin with.)

Democrats were predicting a “fiscal crisis” if Janus prevailed. (Of course, it’s primarily just a fiscal crisis for the unions.) How serious that crisis becomes won’t be known for some time. But the important point is that a new precedent has been set and workers are still free to join unions or make voluntary, proactive payments to them if they feel it’s a worthy cause. But the unions will no longer be able to reach into their pockets without permission.

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Begin Trace Mode for Comment # 9.

#8. To: Tooconservative (#0)

Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 585 U.S. ___ (2018)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-1466_2b3j.pdf

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2017 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

JANUS v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 31, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-1466. Argued February 26, 2018—Decided June 27, 2018

Illinois law permits public employees to unionize. If a majority of the employees in a bargaining unit vote to be represented by a union, that union is designated as the exclusive representative of all the employees, even those who do not join. Only the union may engage in collective bargaining; individual employees may not be represented by another agent or negotiate directly with their employer. Non-members are required to pay what is generally called an "agency fee," i.e., a percentage of the full union dues. Under Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209, 235-236, this fee may cover union expenditures attributable to those activities "germane" to the union's collective-bargaining activities (chargeable expenditures), but may not cover the union's political and ideological projects (nonchargeable expendi­tures). The union sets the agency fee annually and then sends non-members a notice explaining the basis for the fee and the breakdown of expenditures. Here it was 78.06% of full union dues.

Petitioner Mark Janus is a state employee whose unit is represent­ed by a public-sector union (Union), one of the respondents. He re­fused to join the Union because he opposes many of its positions, in­cluding those taken in collective bargaining. Illinois' Governor, similarly opposed to many of these positions, filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the state law authorizing agency fees. The state attorney general, another respondent, intervened to defend the law, while Janus moved to intervene on the Governor's side. The District Court dismissed the Governor's challenge for lack of stand­ing, but it simultaneously allowed Janus to file his own complaint challenging the constitutionality of agency fees. The District Court

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2
Syllabus

granted respondents' motion to dismiss on the ground that the claim was foreclosed by Abood. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Held:

1. The District Court had jurisdiction over petitioner's suit. Peti­tioner was undisputedly injured in fact by Illinois' agency-fee scheme and his injuries can be redressed by a favorable court decision. For jurisdictional purposes, the court permissibly treated his amended complaint in intervention as the operative complaint in a new law­suit. United States ex rel. Texas Portland Cement Co. v. McCord, 233 U. S. 157, distinguished. Pp. 6-7.

2. The State's extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-sector employees violates the First Amendment. Abood erred in con­cluding otherwise, and stare decisis cannot support it. Abood is therefore overruled. Pp. 7-47.

(a) Abood's holding is inconsistent with standard First Amendment principles. Pp. 7-18.

(1) Forcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable raises serious First Amendment concerns. E.g. , West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 633. That in­cludes compelling a person to subsidize the speech of other private speakers. E.g. , Knox v. Service Employees, 567 U. S. 298, 309. In Knox and Harris v. Quinn, 573 U. S._, the Court applied an "exact­ing" scrutiny standard in judging the constitutionality of agency fees rather than the more traditional strict scrutiny. Even under the more permissive standard, Illinois' scheme cannot survive. Pp. 7-11.

(2) Neither of Abood's two justifications for agency fees passes mus­ter under this standard. First, agency fees cannot be upheld on the ground that they promote an interest in "labor peace." The Abood Court's fears of conflict and disruption if employees were represented by more than one union have proved to be unfounded: Exclusive rep­resentation of all the employees in a unit and the exaction of agency fees are not inextricably linked. To the contrary, in the Federal Gov­ernment and the 28 States with laws prohibiting agency fees, mil­lions of public employees are represented by unions that effectively serve as the exclusive representatives of all the employees. Whatever may have been the case 41 years ago when Abood was decided, it is thus now undeniable that "labor peace" can readily be achieved through less restrictive means than the assessment of agency fees.

Second, avoiding "the risk of 'free riders,'" Abood, supra, at 224, is not a compelling state interest. Free-rider "arguments . . . are gener­ally insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections," Knox, su­pra, at 311, and the statutory requirement that unions represent members and nonmembers alike does not justify different treatment. As is evident in non-agency-fee jurisdictions, unions are quite willing

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3
Syllabus

to represent nonmembers in the absence of agency fees. And their duty of fair representation is a necessary concomitant of the authori­ty that a union seeks when it chooses to be the exclusive representa­tive. In any event, States can avoid free riders through less restric­tive means than the imposition of agency fees. Pp. 11-18.

(b) Respondents' alternative justifications for Abood are similarly unavailing. Pp. 18-26.

(1) The Union claims that Abood is supported by the First Amend­ment's original meaning. But neither founding-era evidence nor dic­tum in Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 143, supports the view that the First Amendment was originally understood to allow States to force public employees to subsidize a private third party. If anything, the opposite is true. Pp. 18-22.

(2) Nor does Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, provide a basis for Abood. Abood was not based on Pickering, and for good reasons. First, Pickering's framework was developed for use in cases involving "one employee's speech and its impact on that employee's public responsibilities," United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U. S. 454, 467, while Abood and other agency-fee cases involve a blanket requirement that all employees subsidize private speech with which they may not agree. Second, Pickering's framework was designed to determine whether a public employee's speech interferes with the effective operation of a government office, not what happens when the government compels speech or speech subsidies in support of third parties. Third, the cat­egorization schemes of Pickering and Abood do not line up. For ex­ample, under Abood, nonmembers cannot be charged for speech that concerns political or ideological issues; but under Pickering, an em­ployee's free speech interests on such issues could be overcome if outweighed by the employer's interests. Pp. 22-26.

(c) Even under some form of Pickering, Illinois' agency-fee ar­rangement would not survive. Pp. 26-33.

(1) Respondents compare union speech in collective bargaining and grievance proceedings to speech "pursuant to [an employee's] official duties," Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, 421, which the State may require of its employees. But in those situations, the employee's words are really the words of the employer, whereas here the union is speaking on behalf of the employees. Garcetti therefore does not ap­ply. Pp. 26-27.

(2) Nor does the union speech at issue cover only matters of private concern, which the State may also generally regulate under Picker­ing. To the contrary, union speech covers critically important and public matters such as the State's budget crisis, taxes, and collective bargaining issues related to education, child welfare, healthcare, and

- - - - - - - - - -

4
Syllabus

minority rights. Pp. 27-31.

(3) The government's proffered interests must therefore justify the heavy burden of agency fees on nonmembers' First Amendment in­terests. They do not. The state interests asserted in Abood— promoting "labor peace" and avoiding free riders—clearly do not, as explained earlier. And the new interests asserted in Harris and here—bargaining with an adequately funded agent and improving the efficiency of the work force—do not suffice either. Experience shows that unions can be effective even without agency fees. Pp. 31­33.

(d) Stare decisis does not require retention of Abood. An analy­sis of several important factors that should be taken into account in deciding whether to overrule a past decision supports this conclusion. Pp. 33-47.

(1) Abood was poorly reasoned, and those arguing for retaining it have recast its reasoning, which further undermines its stare decisis effect, e.g., Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U. S. 310, 363. Abood relied on Railway Employes v. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225, and Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740, both of which involved private-sector collective-bargaining agreements where the govern­ment merely authorized agency fees. Abood did not appreciate the very different First Amendment question that arises when a State requires its employees to pay agency fees. Abood also judged the con­stitutionality of public-sector agency fees using Hanson's deferential standard, which is inappropriate in deciding free speech issues. Nor did Abood take into account the difference between the effects of agency fees in public- and private-sector collective bargaining, antici­pate administrative problems with classifying union expenses as chargeable or nonchargeable, foresee practical problems faced by nonmembers wishing to challenge those decisions, or understand the inherently political nature of public-sector bargaining. Pp. 35-38.

(2) Abood's lack of workability also weighs against it. Its line be­tween chargeable and nonchargeable expenditures has proved to be impossible to draw with precision, as even respondents recognize. See, e.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U. S. 507, 519. What is more, a nonmember objecting to union chargeability determinations will have much trouble determining the accuracy of the union's re­ported expenditures, which are often expressed in extremely broad and vague terms. Pp. 38-41.

(3) Developments since Abood, both factual and legal, have "erod­ed" the decision's "underpinnings" and left it an outlier among the Court's First Amendment cases. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 521. Abood relied on an assumption that "the principle of exclu­sive representation in the public sector is dependent on a union or

- - - - - - - - - -

5
Syllabus

agency shop," Harris, 573 U. S., at — , but experience has shown otherwise. It was also decided when public-sector unionism was a relatively new phenomenon. Today, however, public-sector union membership has surpassed that in the private sector, and that as­cendency corresponds with a parallel increase in public spending. Abood is also an anomaly in the Court's First Amendment jurispru­dence, where exacting scrutiny, if not a more demanding standard, generally applies. Overruling Abood will also end the oddity of allow­ing public employers to compel union support (which is not supported by any tradition) but not to compel party support (which is supported by tradition), see, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347. Pp. 42-44.

(4) Reliance on Abood does not carry decisive weight. The uncer­tain status of Abood, known to unions for years; the lack of clarity it provides; the short-term nature of collective-bargaining agreements; and the ability of unions to protect themselves if an agency-fee provi­sion was crucial to its bargain undermine the force of reliance. Pp. 44-47.

3. For these reasons, States and public-sector unions may no longer extract agency fees from nonconsenting employees. The First Amendment is violated when money is taken from nonconsenting employees for a public-sector union; employees must choose to sup­port the union before anything is taken from them. Accordingly, nei­ther an agency fee nor any other form of payment to a public-sector union may be deducted from an employee, nor may any other attempt be made to collect such a payment, unless the employee affirmatively consents to pay. Pp. 48-49.

851 F. 3d 746, reversed and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and, GORSUCH, JJ., joined.

SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion. KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.

- - - - - - - - - -

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 16-1466

MARK JANUS, PETITIONER v. AMERICAN FEDER­ATION OF STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 31, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[June 27, 2018]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under Illinois law, public employees are forced to subsi­dize a union, even if they choose not to join and strongly object to the positions the union takes in collective bar­gaining and related activities. We conclude that this arrangement violates the free speech rights of nonmembers by compelling them to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern.

[...]

nolu chan  posted on  2018-06-27   13:37:30 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


#9. To: nolu chan (#8)

I don't recall Alito getting to write any other major cases like this. Perhaps he has and I just didn't notice.

It's a very major ruling that affects decades of labor law. I think this is the major decision of the current SCOTUS session. The only thing that would be bigger would be Kennedy retiring sometime this week.

Tooconservative  posted on  2018-06-27   13:41:34 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


Replies to Comment # 9.

#22. To: Tooconservative (#9)

I don't recall Alito getting to write any other major cases like this. Perhaps he has and I just didn't notice.

Some Alito opinions.

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 2010. Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms fully applied to the states.

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 2014. Corporations with religious objections can be exempt from a federal law requiring employers to include free coverage of contraceptives in health insurance policies.

Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 2007.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ledbetter_v._Goodyear_Tire_%26_Rubber_Co.

Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), is an employment discrimination decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. Employers cannot be sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 over race or gender pay discrimination if the claims are based on decisions made by the employer 180 days ago or more. Justice Alito held for the five-justice majority that each paycheck received did not constitute a discrete discriminatory act, even if affected by a prior decision outside the time limit. Ledbetter's claim of the “paycheck accrual rule” was rejected. The decision did not prevent plaintiffs from suing under other laws, like the Equal Pay Act, which has a three-year deadline for most sex discrimination claims, or 42 U.S.C. 1981, which has a four-year deadline for suing over race discrimination.

This was a case of statutory rather than constitutional interpretation, explaining the meaning of a law, not its constitutionality. The plaintiff in this case, Lilly Ledbetter, characterized her situation as one where "disparate pay is received during the statutory limitations period, but is the result of intentionally discriminatory pay decisions that occurred outside the limitations period." In rejecting Ledbetter's appeal, the Supreme Court said that "she could have, and should have, sued" when the pay decisions were made, instead of waiting beyond the 180-day statutory charging period. The Court did leave open the possibility that a plaintiff could sue beyond the 180-day period if she did not, and could not, have discovered the discrimination earlier. The effect of the Court's holding was reversed by the passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act in 2009.

nolu chan  posted on  2018-06-28 02:17:03 ET  Reply   Untrace   Trace   Private Reply  


End Trace Mode for Comment # 9.

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