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Opinions/Editorials Title: Fake News With George Stephanopoulos — The Detention Issue Fake News With George Stephanopoulos — The Detention Issue By nolu chan https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/week-transcript-24-18-tom-bossert-sen-jeff/story?id=56118783 By ABC News Jun 24, 2018, 9:00 AM ET A rush transcript of “This Week with George Stephanopoulos” airing on Sunday, June 24, 2018 on ABC News is below. This copy may not be in its final form and may be updated. For previous show transcripts, visit the “This Week” transcript archive. [...] BOSSERT: So, where we ran into our second problem this week, this executive order the president put out to try to fix this problem is going to run headlong into the 9th Circuit judge that decided in 2015 that even detaining with parents is inhumane. She called President Obama's policy of detaining children and parents together inhumane. There is no way this executive order survives first contact, because her view of President Trump will be harsher. STEPHANOPOULOS: Let's dig into that. That circuit court decision back in 2015 said 20 days is the longest you keep any child. The president's order says, no, keep the families together while you're going through this whole process. And you're certain, pretty certain, that the judge is going to strike this down? BOSSERT: Well, if she maintains the same decision making theory that she maintained in 2015, there's no way, unless she completely changes her philosophy, that this one stands up to her scrutiny. So, she didn't just say 21 days, she said release the parents and the children. It's inhumane to keep them together, and release them with all due haste. She later interpreted all due haste because it wasn't clear, as three weeks and 21 days. But that's the outside. She would like them released sooner. So, really, the reality of the president's messaging this week that was spot on is that this country has no choice under current law as interpreted by a judge but to catch and release. Bossert AND Stephanopoulos attribute this fantastic account to a 9th Circuit Court opinion in 2015. But then Bossert repeatedly refers to the judge as she. First of all, almost all Circuit Court opinions are issued either by a three-judge panel, or en banc, by a panel of all the judges sitting on that Circuit. The relevant proceedings were held before Circuit Judges Ronald M. Gould, Michael J. Melloy [Senior Circuit Judge for the 8th Circuit, sitting by designation], and Andrew D. Hurwitz. The 9th Circuit opinion was issued by Circuit Judge Andrew D. Hurwitz on July 6, 2016. Note that is 2016, not 2015, and all the judges are male. The 9th Circuit Court was considering an “Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding.” Dolly M. Gee, the female District Judge, on July 24, 2015 issued an In Chambers* “ORDER RE PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT OF CLASS ACTION AND DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO AMEND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.” The term of art, as used here, connotes that Judge Dolly M. Gee took judicial action while the Court was out of session. Her in chambers ORDER contains opinions of Judge Dolly M. Gee, but is not an Opinion of the Court, sitting in session on a matter before the Court. The government filed a brief which Judge Dolly M. Gee construed as a motion for reconsideration. On August 21, 2015, Judge Gee issued an “ORDER RE RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE,” aka “Remedy Order,” and therein DENIED the government motion for reconsideration. In the ORDER of July 24, 2015 Judge Gee stated, CONCLUSION [...] 2. Unless otherwise required by the Agreement, Defendants shall comply with Paragraph 14A of the Agreement by releasing class members without unnecessary delay in first order of preference to a parent, including a parent who either was apprehended with a class member or presented herself or himself with a class member. Class members not released pursuant to Paragraph 14 of the Agreement will be processed in accordance with the Agreement, including, as applicable, Paragraphs 6, 9, 21, 22, and 23. [...] 4. To comply with Paragraph 14A of the Agreement and as contemplated in Paragraph 15, a class member’s accompanying parent shall be released with the class member in a non-discriminatory manner in accordance with applicable laws and regulations unless after an individualized custody determination the parent is determined to pose a significant flight risk, or a threat to others or the national security, and the flight risk or threat cannot be mitigated by an appropriate bond or conditions of release. [...] IT IS SO ORDERED. In the ORDER of August 21, 2015 Judge Gee stated, CONCLUSION Based on the record in this case, the findings in the Court’s July 24, 2015 Order, and the Court’s review of the parties’ responses to the OSC, the July 24, 2015 Order stands, with some clarifying modifications to the remedial portion of the Order as reflected below. The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for reconsideration. The Court orders Defendants to implement the following remedies by no later than October 23, 2015: 1. As required by Paragraph 18 of the Agreement, Defendants, upon taking an accompanied class member into custody, shall make and record prompt and continuous efforts toward family reunification and the release of the minor pursuant to Paragraph 14 of the Agreement. 2. Unless otherwise required by the Agreement or the law, Defendants shall comply with Paragraph 14A of the Agreement by releasing class members without unnecessary delay in first order of preference to a parent, including a parent who either was apprehended with a class member or presented herself or himself with a class member. Class members not released pursuant to Paragraph 14 of the Agreement will be processed in accordance with the Agreement, including, as applicable, Paragraphs 6, 9, 21, 22, and 23. 3. Subject to Paragraph 12A of the Agreement, accompanied class members shall not be detained by Defendants in unlicensed or secure facilities that do not meet the requirements of Paragraph 6 of the Settlement or, in appropriate cases, as set forth in the Agreement, in facilities that do not meet the requirements of Paragraphs 12A, 21, and 23. Defendants shall not selectively apply the “influx” provision of Paragraph 12C of the Agreement to house class members apprehended with a parent in facilities that do not comply with the Agreement. 4. To comply with Paragraph 14A of the Agreement and as contemplated in Paragraph 15, a class member’s accompanying parent shall be released with the class member in accordance with applicable laws and regulations unless the parent is subject to mandatory detention under applicable law or after an individualized custody determination the parent is determined to pose a significant flight risk, or a threat to others or the national security, and the flight risk or threat cannot be mitigated by an appropriate bond or conditions of release. [...] IT IS SO ORDERED. - - - - - - - - - - You may be wondering where somebody, anybody, said 20 or 21 days for release of minors. I’ll get back to that. For now, it is clear that female Judge Dolly M. Gee ordered that the accompanying parent be released with the minor child, as specified above. So, you say I am nitpicking and they only mistook which judge in which court said it. Very well, let us see what the cited 9th Circuit Court actually said. Flores’ motion to enforce argued that ICE’s purported no-release policy, which allegedly denied accompanying parents “any chance for release,” frustrated the minor class members’ right to preferential release to a parent, and that to safeguard that right, ICE was required to give parents individualized custody determinations. After the district court tentatively agreed, Flores went further, proposing an order providing that “Defendants shall comply with the Settlement ¶ 14(a) by releasing class members without unnecessary delay in first order of preference to a parent, including a parent subject to release who presented her or himself or was apprehended by Defendants accompanied by a class member.” While acknowledging that “the Agreement does not contain any provision that explicitly addresses adult rights and treatment in detention,” the district court nonetheless reasoned that “ICE’s blanket no-release policy with respect to mothers cannot be reconciled with the Agreement’s grant to class members of a right to preferential release to a parent.” The court also found that the regulation upheld in Flores, 507 U.S. at 315, supported the release of an accompanying relative. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(3)(ii) (“If a relative who is not in detention cannot be located to sponsor the minor, the minor may be released with an accompanying relative who is in detention.”). It also found support for that conclusion in ICE’s practice, until June 2014, of generally releasing parents who were not flight or safety risks. The district court therefore concluded that the government “must release an accompanying parent as long as doing so would not create a flight risk or a safety risk,” and it ordered: The district court erred in interpreting the Settlement to provide release rights to adults. The Settlement does not explicitly provide any rights to adults. Bunikyte, 2007 WL 1074070 at *16. The fact that the Settlement grants class members a right to preferential release to a parent over others does not mean that the government must also make a parent available; it simply means that, if available, a parent is the first choice. Because “the plain language of [the] consent decree is clear, we need not evaluate any extrinsic evidence to ascertain the true intent of the parties.” See Nehmer v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 494 F.3d 846, 861 (9th Cir. 2007). In any case, the extrinsic evidence does not show that the parties intended to grant release rights to parents. “In fact, the context of the Flores Settlement argues against this result: the Settlement was the product of litigation in which unaccompanied minors argued that release to adults other than their parents was preferable to remaining in custody until their parents could come get them.” Bunikyte, 2007 WL 1074070 at *16. The regulation the district court relied upon at most shows that the parties might have thought about releasing adults when executing the Settlement, not that they agreed to do so in that document. And, there is no evidence that ICE once released most children and parents because of the Settlement, rather than for other reasons. Flores suggests that we construe the district court’s order narrowly, arguing that it only requires, as she initially requested, that the government grant accompanying parents individualized custody determinations “in accordance with applicable laws and regulations,” just as it would single adults. But, the district court plainly went further. A noncriminal alien detained during removal proceedings generally bears the burden of establishing “that he or she does not present a danger to persons or property, is not a threat to the national security, and does not pose a risk of flight.” In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 38 (BIA 2006). But, the district court placed the burden on the government, requiring it to release an accompanying parent “unless the parent is subject to mandatory detention under applicable law or after an individualized custody determination the parent is determined to pose a significant flight risk, or a threat to others or the national security.” In addition, the order requires a “significant flight risk” to justify detention, while the usual standard is merely “a risk of flight.” Id. More importantly, parents were not plaintiffs in the Flores action, nor are they members of the certified classes. The Settlement therefore provides no affirmative release rights for parents, and the district court erred in creating such rights in the context of a motion to enforce that agreement. Oops. District Judge Gee was overruled. The 9th Circuit Court opinion concluded, We hold that the Settlement applies to accompanied minors but does not require the release of accompanying parents. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each party shall bear its own costs. We hold that the Settlement ... does not require the release of accompanying parents. Well, it seems clear that Stephanopoulos and Bossert misrepresented the content of District Judge Dolly M. Gee’s 2015 in chambers Orders as coming from a 9th Circuit Opinion of that court. Judge Gee ordered that the parents must be released with the accompanying minor child. The 9th Circuit reversed Judge Gee on that point. Stephanopoulos and Bossert took Judge Gee's reversed Order and presented it as FAKE NEWS. You may still be wondering where somebody, anybody, said 20 or 21 days for release of minors. https://www.sfbar.org/forms/lawyerreferrals/immigration/unaccompanied-alien-children-an-overview.pdf The above link goes to a Congressional Research Service report of January 18, 2017 by William A. Kandel, Analyst in Immigration Policy, entitled "Unaccompanied Alien Children: An Overview." Surely, this authoritative report from 2017 must at least reference the 20-day requirement. The subject matter expert author must give the reader some idea of where it originated. It is the usual excellent factual report from the Congressional Research Service. It says not a word about the 20-day requirement, but there is a good reason for that. On January 18, 2017, it did not yet exist. On January 20, 2017 (inauguration day), Judge Gee issued another in chambers "ORDER RE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ENFORCE," concluding, CONCLUSION In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants are in breach of the Flores Agreement by denying unaccompanied immigrant children the right to a bond hearing. Plaintiffs’ motion to enforce Paragraph 24A of the Flores Agreement is GRANTED. Defendant Office of Refugee Resettlement of the Department of Health and Human Services shall forthwith comply with Paragraph 24A of the Flores Agreement. IT IS SO ORDERED. Nothing about a 20-day order to see there. Move along to Judge Dolly M. Gee's June 27, 2017 in chambers "ORDER RE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ENFORCE AND APPOINT A SPECIAL MONITOR," and sure enough, still less than a year old, there it is: CONCLUSION A. Findings Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the Flores Agreement as follows: [...] 3. Efforts to Release Class Members: Plaintiffs’ motion to enforce Paragraphs 14, 18, 19, and 23 of the Agreement on the issue of whether Defendants are making and recording continuous efforts to release class members or place them in nonsecure, licensed facilities in accordance with the Agreement is GRANTED; 4. 20-Day Detention Period: Plaintiffs’ motion to enforce Paragraphs 12A and 14 of the Agreement on the length-of-detention issue is GRANTED; [...] IT IS SO ORDERED. There is the infamous 20-Day Detention Period at paragraph 4. It is sourced to 12A and 14 of the Agreement. What are 12A and 14 of the Agreement? The COMPLAINT in Flores v. Meese, was filed on July 11, 1985. The captions of this case continue with the name of the Attorney General changing until it gets to Jefferson B. Sessions. In Reno, Attorney General, et al. v. Flores et al., the case went to the U.S. Supreme Court, and was decided on March 23, 1993. The Syllabus reads, Held: 1. Because this is a facial challenge to the regulation, respondents must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the regulation would be valid. United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745. Pp. 300-301. 2. Regulation 242.24, on its face, does not violate the Due Process Clause. Pp. 301-309. (a) The regulation does not deprive respondents of "substantive due process." The substantive right asserted by respondents is properly described as the right of a child who has no available parent, close relative, or legal guardian, and for whom the government is responsible, to be placed in the custody of a private custodian rather than of a government-operated or government-selected child-care institution. That novel claim cannot be considered "'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."' United States v. Salerno, supra, at 751. It is therefore sufficient that the regulation is rationally connected to the government's interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of detained juveniles, and is not punitive since it is not excessive in relation to that valid purpose. Nor does each unaccompanied juvenile have a substantive right to an individualized hearing on whether private placement would be in his "best interests." Governmental custody must meet minimum standards, as the consent decree indicates it does here, but the decision to exceed those standards is a policy judgment, not a constitutional imperative. Any remaining constitutional doubts are eliminated by the fact that almost all respondents are aliens suspected of being deportable, a class that can be detained, and over which Congress has granted the Attorney General broad discretion regarding detention. 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(1). Pp. 301-306. (b) Existing INS procedures provide alien juveniles with "procedural due process." Respondents' demand for an individualized custody hearing for each detained alien juvenile is merely the "substantive due process" argument recast in procedural terms. Nor are the procedures faulty because they do not require automatic review by an immigration judge of initial deportability and custody determinations. In the context of this facial challenge, providing the right to review suffices. It has not been shown that all of the juveniles detained are too young or ignorant to exercise that right; any waiver of a hearing is revocable; and there is no evidence of excessive delay in holding hearings when requested. Pp. 306-309. 3. The regulation does not exceed the scope of the Attorney General's discretion to continue custody over arrested aliens under 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(1). It rationally pursues a purpose that is lawful for the INS to seek, striking a balance between the INS's concern that the juveniles' welfare will not permit their release to just any adult and the INS's assessment that it has neither the expertise nor the resources to conduct home studies for individualized placements. The list of approved custodians reflects the traditional view that parents and close relatives are competent custodians, and otherwise defers to the States' proficiency in the field of child custody. The regulation is not motivated by administrative convenience; its use of presumptions and generic rules is reasonable; and the period of detention that may result is limited by the pending deportation hearing, which must be concluded with reasonable dispatch to avoid habeas corpus. Pp. 309-315. 942 F. 2d 1352, reversed and remanded. SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SOUTER, J., joined, post, p. 315. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 320. The Opinion of the Court: Over the past decade, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS or Service) has arrested increasing numbers of alien juveniles who are not accompanied by their parents or other related adults. Respondents, a class of alien juveniles so arrested and held in INS custody pending their deportation hearings, contend that the Constitution and immigration laws require them to be released into the custody of "responsible adults." [...] Finally, respondents claim that the regulation is an abuse of discretion because it permits the INS, once having determined that an alien juvenile lacks an available relative or legal guardian, to hold the juvenile in detention indefinitely. That is not so. The period of custody is inherently limited by the pending deportation hearing, which must be concluded with "reasonable dispatch" to avoid habeas corpus. 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(1); cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S., at 747 (noting time limits placed on pretrial detention by the Speedy Trial Act). It is expected that alien juveniles will remain in INS custody an average of only 30 days. See Juvenile Care Agreement 178a. There is no evidence that alien juveniles are being held for undue periods pursuant to regulation 242.24, or that habeas corpus is insufficient to remedy particular abuses. And the reasonableness of the Service's negative assessment of putative custodians who fail to obtain legal guardianship would seem, if anything, to increase as time goes by. We think the INS policy now in place is a reasonable response to the difficult problems presented when the Service arrests unaccompanied alien juveniles. It may well be that other policies would be even better, but "we are [not] a legislature charged with formulating public policy." Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S., at 281. On its face, INS regulation 242.24 accords with both the Constitution and the relevant statute. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered Well, that seems settled. It was (1) a class of unaccompanied juveniles, (2) the period of custody is inherently limited by the pending deportation hearing, which must be concluded with "reasonable dispatch" to avoid habeas corpus, and (3) it was expected that alien juveniles will remain in INS custody an average of only 30 days. However, on January 17, 1997 the government entered into a "Stipulated Settlement Agreement." That is the Agreement and 12A and 14 are paragraphs of that Agreement. There you may find the 20-Day Detention Period that was cited by District Judge Dolly M. Gee and ordered to be enforced . Settlement Agreement, of January 17, 1997, paragraph 12A: PROCEDURES AND TEMPORARY PLACEMENT FOLLOWING ARREST 12.A. Whenever the INS takes a minor into custody, it shall expeditiously process the minor and shall provide the minor with a notice of rights, including the right to a bond redetermination hearing if applicable. Following arrest, the INS shall hold minors in facilities that are safe and sanitary and that are consistent with the INS's concern for the particular vulnerability of minors. Facilities will provide access to toilets and sinks, drinking water and food as appropriate, medical assistance if the minor is in need of emergency services, adequate temperature control and ventilation, adequate supervision to protect minors from others, and contact with family members who were arrested with the minor. The INS will segregate unaccompanied minors from unrelated adults. Where such segregation is not immediately possible, an unaccompanied minor will not be detained with an unrelated adult for more than 24 hours. If there is no one to whom the INS may release the minor pursuant to Paragraph 14, and no appropriate licensed program is immediately available for placement pursuant to Paragraph 19, the minor may be placed in an INS detention facility, or other INS-contracted facility, having separate accommodations for minors, or a State or county juvenile detention facility. However, minors shall be separated from delinquent offenders. Every effort must be taken to ensure that the safety and well-being of the minors detained in these facilities are satisfactorily provided for by the staff. The INS will transfer a minor from a placement under this paragraph to a placement under Paragraph 19, (i) within three (3) days, if the minor was apprehended in an INS district in which a licensed program is located and has space available; or (ii) within five (5) days in all other cases; except: 2. as otherwise required by any court decree or court-approved settlement; 3. in the event of an emergency or influx of minors into the United States, in which case the INS shall place all minors pursuant to Paragraph 19 as expeditiously as possible; or 4. where individuals must be transported from remote areas for processing or speak unusual languages such that the INS must locate interpreters in order to complete processing, in which case the INS shall place all such minors pursuant to Paragraph 19 within five (5) business days. Settlement Agreement, paragraph 14: GENERAL POLICY FAVORING RELEASE 14. Where the INS determines that the detention of the minor is not required either to secure his or her timely appearance before the INS or the immigration court, or to ensure the minor's safety or that of others, the INS shall release a minor from its custody without unnecessary delay, in the following order of preference, to: B. a legal guardian; C. an adult relative (brother, sister, aunt, uncle, or grandparent); D. an adult individual or entity designated by the parent or legal guardian as capable and willing to care for the minor's well-being in (i) a declaration signed under penalty of perjury before an immigration or consular officer or (ii) such other document(s) that establish(es) to the satisfaction of the INS, in its discretion, the affiant's paternity or guardianship; E. a licensed program willing to accept legal custody; or F. an adult individual or entity seeking custody, in the discretion of the INS, when it appears that there is no other likely alternative to long term detention and family reunification does not appear to be a reasonable possibility. You may find that the Clinton administration entered into a settlement agreement to do a bunch of things the Supreme Court had previously ruled were not mandated by laws and regulations that were constitutional. You may find whatever you are looking for, as long as it isn't the 20-day Detention Period requirement which Judge Dolly M. Gee found and ordered to be enforced. That 20-Day Detention Period is attributable solely to a judge on a mission, Judge Dolly M. Gee of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, in her in chambers Order of June 27, 2017. No, that is not where the 20-Day limit came from. Judge Gee took something from the Declaration of John Gerule (3 June 2016) and the Declaration of Philip T. Miller (16 Dec 2016 update), both employed by ICE. They provided "length of stay" statistics. A statistic was lifted and judicially converted into a mandatory requirement. The achievement of 96% within 20 days (Gerule) and the achievement of 95% within 20 days (Miller), became the mandatory achievement of 100% within 20 days (Judge Dolly M. Gee). Declaration of John Gerule (3 June 2016) 14. A small percentage of individuals do remain in ICE family residential centers for longer periods of time. This is because these individuals generally fall into one of three categories: (1) individuals who are in mandatory detention because they have not yet been found to have a credible fear, are still seeking to establisb a claim to credible fear through requests for re-interview or reconsideration, and have sought and received stays of removal; (2) individuals who have been denied a finding of credible fear and are awaiting removal and subject to mandatory detention; or (3) individuals in family units with final orders where the parent has been determined to constitute a flight risk. (See Exh. 9, Chart). Declaration of Philip T. Miller (16 Dec 2016) 5. ICE currently operates three Family Residential Centers (FRC): the Karnes County Residential Center (KCRC); the South Texas Family Residential Center (STFRC); and the Berks Family Residential Center (BFRC). ICE has continued to work diligently to process and release individuals from the FRCs, as appropriate. ICE's commitment to this process is clearly demonstrated by the statistical data concerning the residents' average length of stay at the FRCs. For the 48,940 residents initially booked into KCRC, STFRC or BFRC from October 23, 2015 to November 19, 2016, and subsequently released or removed as of November 19, 2016, the average length of stay was 12.6 days. Of these 48,940 residents, 34% were released or removed in 10 days or less, 95% in 20 days or less, and 99% in 30 days or less. Of those detained as of November 19, 2016, the average length of stay is 14.1 days. Of the 1,950 detained as of November 19, 2016, 80% have been detained 10 days or less; 95%, 20 days or less, and 96%, 30 days or less. Post Comment Private Reply Ignore Thread Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest
#1. To: nolu chan (#0)
Little Stephanie is going to promote the party line,even though he is still in the closet and pretending to be heterosexual.
In the entire history of the world,the only nations that had to build walls to keep their own citizens from leaving were those with leftist governments.
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