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Title: The Great Marijuana Debate -- Your Life May Depend on it
Source:
Blacklisted News
URL Source: http://www.blacklistednews.com/The_ ... d_on_it/59195/0/38/38/Y/M.html
Published: Jun 17, 2017
Author: Patrick J McShay
Post Date: 2017-06-18 12:51:27 by Deckard
Keywords: None
Views: 2064
Comments: 15
"Good people don't smoke Marijuana" - *Attorney General Jeff Sessions Mr Sessions has always claimed to be a strong supporter of states rights, as has Trump. Trump said on the campaign trail that Marijuana was a states rights issue, and that as President it would remain so. Earlier this year Sessions told members of Congress that he would not be going after States with legal Cannabis. That has apparently changed. Sessions recently sent a letter to Congress, In which he urged members not to renew the 2014 Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, which prevents the Department of Justice from spending federal funds to interfere with state laws on the use, distribution, possession or cultivation of Cannabis. Despite Sessions claim as a warrior for states rights and the will of the people, he is linking Medical Cannabis to the Opioid crisis, and says Americans need to just say no, or else. Sessions says, "the department must be in a position to combat transnational drug organizations and dangerous drug traffickers who threaten American lives." I'm not sure Mr Sessions understands how states with legal medical or recreational Cannabis operate. Sessions claims he needs prosecutorial powers, because Marijuana is a horrible drug, fueling a " historic drug epidemic," and apparently he wants to save us from ourselves. After Sessions run for the Senate in 1996, it was found that RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company had sent the campaign so much money that they they had exceeded the legal limit, and had had to send some back. Sessions has also received tens of thousands of dollars from the alcohol industry over the years. The National Academy of Sciences and Medicine has rejected the notion that Marijuana is a gateway to other illicit drugs, so why does Sessions keep saying it. All of his rhetoric sounds like some post "Reefer Madness", cold war era political stooge, owned by big alcohol, big Pharma and the private prison industry. Instead the evidence shows that people are substituting Marijuana for Opioids to manage their pain, with much lower rates of overdoses in states that allow Medical Marijuana. Veterans are turning to Cannabis to treat their PTSD, and just saying no to government approved pharmaceuticals. Another Sessions talking point is crime associated with Pot. A year after legalization, crime in Colorado was down across the board. In Jeff Sessions home state of Alabama, an April, 2017 poll showed 86% of respondents are in favor of legalizing Marijuana for recreational use. 92% said they believe alcohol to be worse than Pot. As of 2016, Alabama law didn't allow initiatives or referendums. The Alabama Legislature recently voted down "Carly's Bill", that would have legalized the use of CBD Oil, that contains little or no THC. How, in this age of the internet can politicians be so out of touch? Mr Sessions doesn't believe that Marijuana has any medicinal value at all, but US Patent # 6630507 was recently granted to the Department of Health and Human Services. Attorney Sam Mendez, an intellectual property and public policy Lawyer, says it shows a certain amount of hypocrisy from a government that still maintains Cannabis has no medicinal value. If Trump wants to assure victory in 4 years he should legalize Marijuana and send Sessions back to 1950 where he belongs This must please Sessions and his pals in the private prison industry. Some of Trump and Session's biggest supporters for the Presidency were for profit prison operators. One of the few things Obama got right was ordering the Justice Department to begin phasing out private prison contracts. Recently, private prison industry giant GEO, and another private prison operator Core Civic, each gave $250K to the Trump campaign. In Sessions financial filing dated December 23, 2016, he disclosed numerous accounts with Vanguard Investments, which owns more private prison stock than any other investment management company. In ancient Egypt and India Cannabis was used to treat ailments like Rheumatism, Gout, Glaucoma, Nausea, Dysentery, joint pain and labor pains among others. Siddhartha Gautama, the founder of Buddhism, was said to have lived for 6 years on Hemp seeds alone. When Napoleon's Army left Egypt they took Cannabis with them back to Europe, and over a hundred years ago you could buy Cannabis Oil from the Sears Catalog. An early seventies Harvard Study showed that Cannabis killed Cancer Cells, but because of the ongoing demonization of Pot, further study was always discouraged. Harvard Professor, Lester Grinspoon has studied Cannabis and it's effects for 50 years, and was good friends with astrophysicist and avid Pot smoker, Carl Sagan. Grinspoon attests that Cannabis is non toxic, non addictive and does not cause psychosis or schizophrenia, as some have claimed. This is the dangerous drug Mr Sessions and his ilk are trying to save us from? She found that people were having success with Cannabis Oil for seizures, as well as Cancer treatment. Because she lives in a state where Cannabis is illegal, she and her husband planned to stay with their adult daughter in California for the 90 days of Cannabis Oil treatment. After the 90 days of treatment, she went back for her next MRI. While the larger tumor was still there, it looked smaller, and the smaller tumor was gone. Encouraged, she continued her treatment, increasing her tolerance and her dosage. After 8 months of treatment, her doctors were amazed. Her MRI was reviewed by her Oncologist, a leading Radiologist and a renowned Brain Surgeon, and it was discovered the tumor was completely gone. Today Kelly is Cancer free, and while diet and exercise were part of her treatment, Kelly credits Cannabis Oil with her recovery. When Doug's wife suggested Cannabis Oil, he rejected the idea at first, but came around when she threatened to leave him. He had a home in Colorado, and was able to obtain the oil with no problem. He was amazed at how quickly the oil began working. His COPD is in remission, and he has become an advocate for Medical Marijuana legalization. New VA Secretary David Shulkin in an interview this week said, he believes Marijuana could help veterans with PTSD. Unfortunately he must follow federal law, and Sessions is making progress in this area impossible. Trump vowed to help veterans, and instead he is doing grave damage. 22 vets a month kill themselves and many others are being arrested for treating their PTSD with Cannabis in states where it is still illegal. Look up the Rick Simpson Protocol on youtube and learn how to safely make the oil at home. We have to make it accessible to people in every state. Cannabis is a God given wonder drug that is being suppressed by imbecilic politico's in Washington. Cancer rates are on the rise and our options for survival should not be limited by ignorant politicians and fussy fundamentalists like Attorney General, Jeff Sessions 
"Mr Sessions stands against an overwhelming majority of Americans and even, sadly, against veterans and other people who we now know conclusively are helped dramatically by Medical Marijuana". - *Congressman Dana Rohrabacher
"Medical Marijuana in it's natural form is one of the safest, therapeutically active substances known to man."- *DEA Judge Francis Young- 1988
If I didn't know better, after reading Attorney General Jeff Sessions uneducated and incredibly ignorant views on the issue of Marijuana legalization, whether medical or recreational, I would have thought that he'd had a close friend or family member who had died of a Marijuana overdose. But I do know better, and so do most Americans. Does Jeff Sessions know better? Sadly, I'm not sure he does.
Eight States have legalized recreational use of Marijuana, and 29 States have some form of Medical Marijuana laws on the books. Mr Sessions, who has been a shill for big Tobacco, has argued that "Marijuana is only slightly worse than Heroin."
Mr Sessions crusade against legal Cannabis isn't just disingenuous, it is cruel and irresponsible. Sessions said recently that he is surprised that more Americans aren't embracing his stance on weed. He should know that a recent Quinnipiac poll showed 94% of respondents approve of doctor prescribed Pot. That is the highest number yet in a poll of this kind.
Lee Carroll Brooker is a 77 year old Alabama resident, and a disabled veteran. Bowman was growing weed on land owned by his son, to deal with chronic pain, and to get off of his doctor prescribed, and Jeff Sessions approved drugs . Bowman was arrested in 2014 and sentenced to a mandatory life sentence for growing weed. His son was also arrested, and received a sentence of 5 years probation. Because Bowman had prior convictions in the state decades ago, he qualified for the mandatory life sentence, even though there was no evidence he was selling the weed. In April, 2016, the Supreme Court refused to hear Bowman's appeal of this harsh sentence.
Marijuana has always been characterized as dangerous, unhealthy and destructive, despite a long history of medicinal efficacy. During the reign of Chinese Emperor Shen Nung, 5000 years ago, Marijuana was used as medicine. A 3700 year old Egyptian papyrus contained medical references to Marijuana and it's healing properties. Around 1450 BC holy anointing oil was described in the original Hebrew version of Exodus. It detailed how Cannabis oil was mixed into jars of Olive oil along with fragrant herbs and used as anointing oil. Cannabis oil was found on the mummy of King Ramses II, who died in 1213 BC.
Kelly Hauf was diagnosed in 1990 with 2 tumors, one smaller, and a larger one on the frontal lobe of her brain. Surgery was successfully performed and neither Chemotherapy nor radiation were recommended. It was decided that they would monitor her with an MRI every 3 months. The tumor did return, and her surgeon recommended 4 to 6 months of Chemotherapy. The Chemo didn't work, and another surgery would have to be scheduled. she was prescribed anti seizure medication, but because of problems with the medication, she looked for an alternative.
Doug Bench is a retired former judge from Florida. During his time as a judge, Bench sentenced 311 Marijuana offenders to jail. When he was diagnosed with Stage 4 COPD, he knew his options were limited. Modern medicine offers no hope for those with COPD. His doctor gave him 2 to 3 years to live, and told him his condition would continue to worsen.
One of the pioneers of Medical Marijuana in the state of Oregon, Dr Phil Leveque, has prescribed Cannabis for over 5000 patients. He stated, "Marijuana is one of the best bronchodilators, much better than any other class of drug. For respiratory diseases like Asthma and COPD Marijuana can be life saving." Dr Leveque also nixed the notion that smoking Marijuana was bad for the lungs, claiming Cannabinoids are beneficial to Lung Tissue, and smoking Pot can actually improve Lung function.
There are thousands of these stories out there. Cannabis Oil is helping people with a number of serious and life threatening maladies. Recent studies have shown that Cannabis Oil may slow the progression of Alzheimer's, and the oil is being used to treat Autistic children with incredible success. Michael J Fox posted a testimonial on youtube about how Cannabis Oil has helped alleviate his symptoms from Parkinson's Disease. Cannabis Oil must be made available to everyone who needs it.
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#1. To: Deckard (#0)
With all of the issues / crimes facing our nation, I would think that with a priority list for AG Sessions, I would seriously think that cannibis would be way down the list. Especially for anyone with a serious intellect!
Si vis pacem, para bellum Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God. Never Pick A Fight With An Old Man He Will Just Shoot You He Can't Afford To Get Hurt I am concerned for the security of our great nation; not so much because of any threat from without, but because of the insidious forces working from within." -- General Douglas MacArthur
You do not understand politics. Considered issues are not based on a priority list with some silly ranking stature or status. Considered issues are for the power elite to assign based on whim.
This is not from a ruling of the DEA, and court, or any Federal Article III judge. It comes from a rejected recommended ruling of an Administrative Law Judge. DEA Judge Francis Young is a deliberately misleading title. The correct term would be ALJ Francis Young, the ALJ standing for Administrative Law Judge. That he issued a recommended ruling is indicative that he lacked authority to issue the rescheduling ruling at issue. The caption is: Drug Enforcement Administration In the matter of MARIJUANA RESCHEDULING PETITION Docket No. 86-22 OPINION AND RECOMMENDED RULING, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE At 2-3, this Recommended Ruling states, A three-day hearing was held at DEA2 by Administrative Law Judge Lewis Parker in January 1975. The judge found in NORML's favor on several issues but the Acting Administrator of DEA entered a final order denying NORML's petition "in all respects." NORML again petitioned the court for review. Finding fault [3] with DEA's final order the court again remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion. NORML v. DEA. 182 U.S. App. D.C. 114. 559 F.2d 735 (1977). The Court directed the then-Acting Administrator of DEA to refer NORML's petition to the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) for findings and thereafter to comply with the rulemaking procedures outlined in the Act at 21 U.S.C. § 811 (a) and (b). On remand the Administrator of DEA referred NORML's petition to HEW for scientific and medical evaluation. On June 4, 1979 the Secretary of HEW advised the Administrator of the results of the HEW evaluation and recommended that marijuana remain in Schedule I. Without holding any further hearing the Administrator of DEA proceeded to issue a final order ten days later denying NORML's petition and declining to initiate proceedings to transfer marijuana from Schedule I. 44 Fed. Reg. 36123 (1979)~ NORML went back-to the Court of Appeals. When the case was called for oral argument there was discussion of the then-present status of the matter. DEA had moved for a partial remand. The court found that "reconsideration of all the issues in this case would be appropriate" and again remanded it to DEA, observing: "We regrettably find it necessary to remind respondents [DEA and HEW] of an agency's obligation on remand not to 'do anything which is contrary to either the letter or spirit of the mandate construed in the light of the opinion of [the] court deciding the case.'" (Citations omitted.) NORML v. DEA. et al., No. 79-1660. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, unpublished order filed October 16, 1980. DEA was directed to refer all the substances at issue to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), successor agency to HEW for scien- [4] tific and medical findings and recommendations on scheduling. DEA did so and HHS has responded. In a letter dated April 1, 1986 the then-Acting Deputy Administrator of DEA requested this administrative law judge to commence hearing procedures as to the proposed rescheduling of marijuana and its components. At 65: The Act, at 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(C), requires that marijuana be retained in Schedule I if "[t]here is a lack of accepted safety for use of [it] under medical supervision." If there is no lack of such safety, if it is accepted that this substance can be used with safety under medical supervision, then it is unreasonable to keep it in Schedule I. Again we must ask - "accepted" by whom? Well, shucks, he made believe the statute is not crystal clear and he does not know who the medical science must be accepted by. Let me help a brother out. 21 U.S.C. 811(b) states: The Attorney General shall, before initiating proceedings under subsection (a) of this section to control a drug or other substance or to remove a drug or other substance entirely from the schedules, and after gathering the necessary data, request from the Secretary a scientific and medical evaluation, and his recommendations, as to whether such drug or other substance should be so controlled or removed as a controlled substance. In making such evaluation and recommendations, the Secretary shall consider the factors listed in paragraphs (2), (3), (6), (7), and (8) of subsection (c) of this section and any scientific or medical considerations involved in paragraphs (1), (4), and (5) of such subsection. The recommendations of the Secretary shall include recommendations with respect to the appropriate schedule, if any, under which such drug or other substance should be listed. The evaluation and the recommendations of the Secretary shall be made in writing and submitted to the Attorney General within a reasonable time. The recommendations of the Secretary to the Attorney General shall be binding on the Attorney General as to such scientific and medical matters, and if the Secretary recommends that a drug or other substance not be controlled, the Attorney General shall not control the drug or other substance. If the Attorney General determines that these facts and all other relevant data constitute substantial evidence of potential for abuse such as to warrant control or substantial evidence that the drug or other substance should be removed entirely from the schedules, he shall initiate proceedings for control or removal, as the case may be, under subsection (a) of this section. The Secretary referred to is the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The ALJ wrote at pp. 3-4, [4] tific and medical findings and recommendations on scheduling. DEA did so and HHS has responded. Why did he think the DEA was directed top refer all the substances to DHHS for scientific and medical findings and recommendations? While the medical findings and recommendations are binding upon the Attorney General, and he must schedule in accordance with the recommendations of DHHS, in his 69-page epiphany, ALJ Francis Young never quite got around to mentioning whatever DHHS recommended. Rather he spends page after page reciting anecdotal tales from everybody but DHHS. Needless to say, this pile of crap went nowhere. http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/15/1131/536307/ See, e.g., Alliance for Cannabis Thearpeutics, Petitioner, v. Drug Enforcement Administration, Respondent; Physicians Association for AIDS Care and the Lymphoma Foundation of Amewrica, Intervenors; and DRUG POLICY FOUNDATION and the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, Petitioners v. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, Respondent; Nos. 92-1168, 92-1179, 15 F.3d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1994), decided Feb. 18, 1994. At 1132 - 1137: The Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") places hazardous drugs in five categories, or schedules, which impose varying restrictions on access to the drugs. See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1988). Marijuana is assigned by statute to Schedule I, the most restrictive of these. See id. Schedule I drugs may be obtained and used lawfully only by doctors who submit a detailed research protocol for approval by the Food and Drug Administration and who agree to abide by strict recordkeeping and storage rules. See 21 C.F.R. Secs. 1301.33, 1301.42. The CSA allows the Attorney General to reschedule a drug if he finds that it does not meet the criteria for the schedule to which it has been assigned. 21 U.S.C. § 811(a). The Attorney General has delegated this authority to the Administrator. See 28 C.F.R. Sec. 0.100(b). In rescheduling a drug, the Administrator must consider, inter alia, "[s]cientific evidence of [the drug's] pharmacological effect, if known," and " [t]he state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug or other substance." 21 U.S.C. § 811(c) (2), (3). A drug is placed in Schedule I if (1) it "has a high potential for abuse," (2) it has "no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States," and (3) " [t]here is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug ... under medical supervision." 21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (1) (1988) (emphasis added). The Schedule II criteria are somewhat different: (1) the drug "has a high potential for abuse," (2) it "has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States or a currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions," and (3) " [a]buse of the drug ... may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence." 21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (2) (1988) (emphasis added). Petitioners' central claim is that the Administrator misinterpreted the language italicized above. This is the latest chapter in petitioners' efforts to move marijuana into a less restrictive CSA schedule. They claim that marijuana is misclassified because it has been shown to serve various medicinal purposes. Specifically, they contend that marijuana alleviates some side effects of chemotherapy in cancer patients, aids in the treatment of glaucoma, an eye disease, and reduces muscle spasticity in patients suffering from multiple sclerosis and other maladies of the central nervous system. In support of these contentions, they introduced affidavits and testimony of a number of patients and practicing physicians who insist that, in their experience, marijuana has proven safe and effective. The petition to reschedule marijuana was first filed in 1972 and has been before this court on four prior occasions--National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Ingersoll, 497 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1974); National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 559 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1977); National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Drug Enforcement Admin. & Dep't of Health Education & Welfare, No. 79-1660 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 16, 1980); and most recently, ACT, 930 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1991). ACT is the only part of this history we need recount. In ACT, the Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics ("Alliance") and the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws ("NORML") argued that the Administrator's refusal to reschedule marijuana rested on an unreasonable interpretation of the statutory phrase, "currently accepted medical use." [304 U.S.App.D.C. 403] 930 F.2d at 939; see 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(b) (1) (B), (2) (B). In a scheduling proceeding involving another drug, the Administrator determined that " [t]he characteristics of a drug or other substance with an accepted medical use" include: (2) the toxicology and pharmacology of the substance in animals; (3) establishment of its effectiveness in humans through scientifically designed clinical trials; (4) general availability of the substance and information regarding the substance and its use; (5) recognition of its clinical use in generally accepted pharmacopeia, medical references, journals or textbooks; (6) specific indications for the treatment of recognized disorders; (7) recognition of the use of the substance by organizations or associations of physicians; and (8) recognition and use of the substance by a substantial segment of the medical practitioners in the United States. 53 Fed.Reg. 5,156, 5,157-58 (Feb. 22, 1988). Applying these criteria to the petition to reschedule marijuana, the Administrator found on December 29, 1989, that marijuana had no currently accepted medical use and thus had to remain in Schedule I. 54 Fed.Reg. 53,767, 53,768 (1989). The eight-factor test had been published in the Federal Register on February 22, 1988, 17 days after the close of the evidence but before the oral arguments to the administrative law judge in the marijuana rescheduling proceedings. On reviewing the Administrator's decision, we found the eight-factor test for determining whether a drug had a "currently accepted medical use" to be "in the main acceptable." ACT, 930 F.2d at 937. We noted the ambiguity of the phrase and the dearth of legislative history on point and deferred to the Administrator's interpretation as reasonable. Id. at 939 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-45, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2782-83, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984) (court may not substitute its own construction of ambiguous statutory provision for reasonable interpretation by agency of statute entrusted to its administration)). We were troubled, however, by three of the eight criteria and remanded the case "for an explanation as to how [these] had been utilized by the Administrator in reaching his decision." Id. at 940. In particular, we were concerned over the apparent impossibility of meeting the fourth, fifth, and eighth criteria, all of which assumed an availability of marijuana for medical purposes that was prohibited by Schedule I. On March 26, 1992, the current Administrator issued the order that is the subject of this appeal. See 57 Fed.Reg. 10,499 (Mar. 26, 1992) ("Final Order"). He concluded, on remand, that his predecessor had not in fact relied on two of the three "impossible" criteria; he explained the third; and, after applying new criteria, he again denied the petition to reschedule marijuana. Id. at 10,508. II. DISCUSSION A. Law of the Case [1] We held, in ACT, that the Administrator's interpretation of the CSA was reasonable. Under the "law of the case" doctrine, appellate courts do not reconsider matters resolved on a prior appeal in the same proceeding. 18 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure Sec. 4478 at 788 (1981). The doctrine is not a jurisdictional limitation; rather, it "merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided...." Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444, 32 S. Ct. 739, 740, 56 L. Ed. 1152 (1912). Thus, courts will reconsider previously decided questions in such exceptional cases as those in which there has been an intervening change of controlling law, or new evidence has surfaced, or the previous disposition has resulted in clear error or manifest injustice. 18 Wright & Miller, Sec. 4478 at 790. [2] Petitioners do not contend that any of these exceptions apply here. Instead, they assert that in ACT we gave only cursory attention to the statutory interpretation argument whereas, in their view, the law of the [304 U.S.App.D.C. 404] case doctrine applies only where the prior appeal has analyzed an issue at length. We disagree on both counts. First, our treatment of the statutory interpretation question was entirely adequate. Second, even summarily treated issues become the law of the case. In Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817, 108 S. Ct. 2166, 2178, 100 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1988), the Supreme Court noted: "That the Federal Circuit did not explicate its rationale is irrelevant, for the law of the case turns on whether a court previously 'decide [d] upon a rule of law'--which the Federal Circuit necessarily did--not on whether, or how well, it explained the decision." In ACT, we decided that it was not "an unreasonable application of the statutory phrase [for the Administrator] to emphasize the lack of exact scientific knowledge as to the chemical effects of the drug's elements." 930 F.2d at 939. As noted above, our only concern, in ACT, was with three of the standards adopted by the Administrator and his possible reliance on them. As a consequence, in remanding the case, we asked him to explain how his decision had been affected by those standards. In the Final Order, the present Administrator found that two of these criteria--the "general availability of the substance" and the "use of the substance by a substantial segment of ... medical practitioners"--played no role in his predecessor's decision. See 57 Fed.Reg. at 10,507. [3] Further, the Administrator found that his predecessor's conclusion that marijuana failed to meet the third of the questioned criteria--"recognition of [the drug's] clinical use in generally accepted pharmacopeia"--rested on a determination that marijuana lacked a known, reproducible chemistry. See id. We had objected to the "recognition of clinical use" standard only because it seemed to require widespread therapeutic use of the drug--an impossibility for Schedule I substances. See ACT, 930 F.2d at 940. The Administrator's interpretation of that criterion meets our objection. The Final Order discards the earlier formulation and applies a new five-part test for determining whether a drug is in "currently accepted medical use": (1) The drug's chemistry must be known and reproducible; (2) there must be adequate safety studies; (3) there must be adequate and well-controlled studies proving efficacy; (4) the drug must be accepted by qualified experts; and (5) the scientific evidence must be widely available. 57 Fed.Reg. at 10,506. None of these criteria is impossible for a Schedule I drug to meet; in fact, petitioners concede in their briefs that the new standard has corrected the flaws we identified in ACT. B. Petitioners' Other Arguments Petitioners make two additional arguments: (1) They assert that they were deprived of the opportunity to conform their evidentiary submissions to the governing legal standard because the previous Administrator had failed to publish the eight-factor test on which he relied, as required by the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1) (D), until two weeks after the close of the evidence in the rescheduling proceeding; and (2) they claim that the Administrator's ruling was not the product of reasoned decisionmaking because he was biased and ignored the record. While Alliance and NORML had apparently raised these issues in ACT, we did not expressly address them; nor did we decide them by necessary implication because our limited remand in ACT could have reflected a decision to postpone consideration of these remaining arguments. Accordingly, we conclude that ACT did not establish the law of the case as to these issues. See Bouchet v. Nat'l Urban League, 730 F.2d 799, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (" [O]nly when an issue not expressly addressed must have been decided by 'necessary implication' will the [law of the case] doctrine be applied...."). 1. The FOIA Claim [4] Section 552(a) (1) of FOIA provides in relevant part: [304 U.S.App.D.C. 405] Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register for the guidance of the public-- . . . . . (D) ... statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by the agency.... . . . . . Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof, a person may not in any manner ... be adversely affected by [ ] a matter required to be published in the Federal Register and not so published. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1) (emphasis added). This provision requires agencies to set out in advance the legal standards that will be applied so that "actions can be guided, and strategies planned." Northern Calif. Pwr. Agency v. Morton, 396 F. Supp. 1187, 1191 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub. nom. Northern Calif. Pwr. Agency v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1976). To establish a claim under the statute, however, the litigant must show that "he was adversely affected by a lack of publication or that he would have been able to pursue an alternative course of conduct" had the information been published. Zaharakis v. Heckler, 744 F.2d 711, 714 (9th Cir. 1984). [5] Petitioners argue that the Administrator violated the statute by using the eight-factor test to evaluate the evidence presented in the marijuana rescheduling petition. As the test was not published until 17 days after the close of the evidence, they contend that they were "adversely affected" by the Administrator's reliance on the test because they had no opportunity to tailor their evidence to meet its requirements. Accordingly, they ask us to remand the case to the Administrator with instructions to reopen the record for the submission of new evidence. We decline to do so because petitioners have failed to demonstrate that they have in fact been adversely affected by the lack of notice. During the nearly two years between the publication of the eight-factor test on February 22, 1988, and the Administrator's ruling on December 29, 1989, petitioners never sought to reopen the record. As parties to an important controversy, they had a responsibility to proffer any evidence that was made newly relevant by the adoption of the criteria. Their failure to do so suggests either that they were satisfied that the evidence already presented would meet the test or that they had no further evidence to offer. Thus, we have no reason to believe that petitioners would have pursued an "alternative course of conduct" had the test been published earlier. Zaharakis, 744 F.2d at 714. Furthermore, we do not agree that McLouth Steel Products v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1988), supports their position. That case is distinguishable. McLouth arose in the context of a rulemaking in which an agency failed to identify adequately a key standard in its notice of proposed rulemaking in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 553. Unlike petitioners, the McLouth challengers knew the governing legal standard by the time they were called on to submit evidence; their complaint was that they had not had a chance to challenge the standard at the time it was adopted. 838 F.2d at 1322-23. We held that the challengers were not required to demonstrate that the failure of notice had caused "specific prejudice" because "we cannot say with certainty whether petitioners' comments would have had some effect [on the adoption of the standard] if they had been considered when the issue was open." Id. at 1323-24. Here, petitioners' challenge is not to the standard but to their claimed inability to respond to it. 2. The Reasoned Decisionmaking Claim In ACT, Alliance and NORML argued that the prior Administrator had been biased and ignored the record. On this appeal, petitioners repeat these claims and accuse his successor of the same errors. We need not consider whether the previous Administrator's ruling stemmed from reasoned decisionmaking, however, because we remanded it to the agency. We thus confine our review to the current Administrator's treatment of the record in the Final Order. [6] In support of their bias claim, petitioners point to what they describe as a long history of the Drug Enforcement Administration's [304 U.S.App.D.C. 406] anti-marijuana prejudice as evidenced by this court's need to remand their petition on four occasions and what they describe as the prior Administrator's "unusually strident decision" rejecting the administrative law judge's recommendation that the drug be rescheduled. They also cite various statements by the present Administrator in the Final Order as evidence of a lack of objectivity. See, e.g., 57 Fed.Reg. at 10,502 ("The only favorable evidence that could be found by [petitioners] consists of stories by marijuana users"); id. ("[s]ick people are not objective scientific observers, especially when it comes to their own health."); id. at 10,503 ("Sick men, women and children can be fooled by these claims and experiment with the drug.... It is a cruel hoax to offer false hope to desperately ill people."). [7] We are not impressed. The need to remand a case several times is not evidence per se of agency prejudice. Nor do we think the statements cited by petitioners show that the Administrator was unfair, especially when considered in the context of a reasonable preference for rigorous scientific proof over anecdotal evidence, even when reported by respected physicians. [8] Moreover, our review of the record convinces us that the Administrator's findings are supported by substantial evidence. See 21 U.S.C. § 877 (1988) (substantial evidence standard applies to findings of fact in rescheduling proceedings). The Final Order canvasses the record at length. It recites the testimony of numerous experts that marijuana's medicinal value has never been proven in sound scientific studies. The Administrator reasonably accorded more weight to the opinions of these experts than to the anecdotal testimony of laymen and doctors on which petitioners relied. The Administrator noted that" Final Order, 57 Fed.Reg. at 10,502-03. These findings are consistent with the view that only rigorous scientific proof can satisfy the CSA's "currently accepted medical use" requirement. Id. at 10,500. For the foregoing reasons, the petitions for review are Denied.
Patent # 6630507 B1 issued 7 October 2003 is for certain CANNABINOIDS AS ANTIOXIDANTS AND NEUROPROTECTANTS, with the assignee being The United States of America as represented by the Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, D.C. This patent was for cannabidoids, not for cannibis or marijuana. You can't smoke it and it doesn't get you stoned.
Allen's Axiom: When all else fails, read the instructions. For "Authority and criteria for classification of substances," here is the statute. http://law.justia.com/codes/us/2015/title-21/chapter-13/subchapter-i/part-b/sec.-811/ 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2015) §811. Authority and criteria for classification of substances (a) Rules and regulations of Attorney General; hearing The Attorney General shall apply the provisions of this subchapter to the controlled substances listed in the schedules established by section 812 of this title and to any other drug or other substance added to such schedules under this subchapter. Except as provided in subsections (d) and (e) of this section, the Attorney General may by rule— (1) add to such a schedule or transfer between such schedules any drug or other substance if he— (A) finds that such drug or other substance has a potential for abuse, and (B) makes with respect to such drug or other substance the findings prescribed by subsection (b) of section 812 of this title for the schedule in which such drug is to be placed; or (2) remove any drug or other substance from the schedules if he finds that the drug or other substance does not meet the requirements for inclusion in any schedule. Rules of the Attorney General under this subsection shall be made on the record after opportunity for a hearing pursuant to the rulemaking procedures prescribed by subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5. Proceedings for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of such rules may be initiated by the Attorney General (1) on his own motion, (2) at the request of the Secretary, or (3) on the petition of any interested party. (b) Evaluation of drugs and other substances The Attorney General shall, before initiating proceedings under subsection (a) of this section to control a drug or other substance or to remove a drug or other substance entirely from the schedules, and after gathering the necessary data, request from the Secretary a scientific and medical evaluation, and his recommendations, as to whether such drug or other substance should be so controlled or removed as a controlled substance. In making such evaluation and recommendations, the Secretary shall consider the factors listed in paragraphs (2), (3), (6), (7), and (8) of subsection (c) of this section and any scientific or medical considerations involved in paragraphs (1), (4), and (5) of such subsection. The recommendations of the Secretary shall include recommendations with respect to the appropriate schedule, if any, under which such drug or other substance should be listed. The evaluation and the recommendations of the Secretary shall be made in writing and submitted to the Attorney General within a reasonable time. The recommendations of the Secretary to the Attorney General shall be binding on the Attorney General as to such scientific and medical matters, and if the Secretary recommends that a drug or other substance not be controlled, the Attorney General shall not control the drug or other substance. If the Attorney General determines that these facts and all other relevant data constitute substantial evidence of potential for abuse such as to warrant control or substantial evidence that the drug or other substance should be removed entirely from the schedules, he shall initiate proceedings for control or removal, as the case may be, under subsection (a) of this section. (c) Factors determinative of control or removal from schedules In making any finding under subsection (a) of this section or under subsection (b) of section 812 of this title, the Attorney General shall consider the following factors with respect to each drug or other substance proposed to be controlled or removed from the schedules: (1) Its actual or relative potential for abuse. (2) Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known. (3) The state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug or other substance. (4) Its history and current pattern of abuse. (5) The scope, duration, and significance of abuse. (6) What, if any, risk there is to the public health. (7) Its psychic or physiological dependence liability. (8) Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already controlled under this subchapter. (d) International treaties, conventions, and protocols requiring control; procedures respecting changes in drug schedules of Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1) If control is required by United States obligations under international treaties, conventions, or protocols in effect on October 27, 1970, the Attorney General shall issue an order controlling such drug under the schedule he deems most appropriate to carry out such obligations, without regard to the findings required by subsection (a) of this section or section 812(b) of this title and without regard to the procedures prescribed by subsections (a) and (b) of this section. (2)(A) Whenever the Secretary of State receives notification from the Secretary-General of the United Nations that information has been transmitted by or to the World Health Organization, pursuant to article 2 of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which may justify adding a drug or other substance to one of the schedules of the Convention, transferring a drug or substance from one schedule to another, or deleting it from the schedules, the Secretary of State shall immediately transmit the notice to the Secretary of Health and Human Services who shall publish it in the Federal Register and provide opportunity to interested persons to submit to him comments respecting the scientific and medical evaluations which he is to prepare respecting such drug or substance. The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall prepare for transmission through the Secretary of State to the World Health Organization such medical and scientific evaluations as may be appropriate regarding the possible action that could be proposed by the World Health Organization respecting the drug or substance with respect to which a notice was transmitted under this subparagraph. (B) Whenever the Secretary of State receives information that the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations proposes to decide whether to add a drug or other substance to one of the schedules of the Convention, transfer a drug or substance from one schedule to another, or delete it from the schedules, the Secretary of State shall transmit timely notice to the Secretary of Health and Human Services of such information who shall publish a summary of such information in the Federal Register and provide opportunity to interested persons to submit to him comments respecting the recommendation which he is to furnish, pursuant to this subparagraph, respecting such proposal. The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall evaluate the proposal and furnish a recommendation to the Secretary of State which shall be binding on the representative of the United States in discussions and negotiations relating to the proposal. (3) When the United States receives notification of a scheduling decision pursuant to article 2 of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances that a drug or other substance has been added or transferred to a schedule specified in the notification or receives notification (referred to in this subsection as a "schedule notice") that existing legal controls applicable under this subchapter to a drug or substance and the controls required by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.] do not meet the requirements of the schedule of the Convention in which such drug or substance has been placed, the Secretary of Health and Human Services after consultation with the Attorney General, shall first determine whether existing legal controls under this subchapter applicable to the drug or substance and the controls required by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, meet the requirements of the schedule specified in the notification or schedule notice and shall take the following action: (A) If such requirements are met by such existing controls but the Secretary of Health and Human Services nonetheless believes that more stringent controls should be applied to the drug or substance, the Secretary shall recommend to the Attorney General that he initiate proceedings for scheduling the drug or substance, pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of this section, to apply to such controls. (B) If such requirements are not met by such existing controls and the Secretary of Health and Human Services concurs in the scheduling decision or schedule notice transmitted by the notification, the Secretary shall recommend to the Attorney General that he initiate proceedings for scheduling the drug or substance under the appropriate schedule pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of this section. (C) If such requirements are not met by such existing controls and the Secretary of Health and Human Services does not concur in the scheduling decision or schedule notice transmitted by the notification, the Secretary shall— (i) if he deems that additional controls are necessary to protect the public health and safety, recommend to the Attorney General that he initiate proceedings for scheduling the drug or substance pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of this section, to apply such additional controls; (ii) request the Secretary of State to transmit a notice of qualified acceptance, within the period specified in the Convention, pursuant to paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations; (iii) request the Secretary of State to transmit a notice of qualified acceptance as prescribed in clause (ii) and request the Secretary of State to ask for a review by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, in accordance with paragraph 8 of article 2 of the Convention, of the scheduling decision; or (iv) in the case of a schedule notice, request the Secretary of State to take appropriate action under the Convention to initiate proceedings to remove the drug or substance from the schedules under the Convention or to transfer the drug or substance to a schedule under the Convention different from the one specified in the schedule notice. (4)(A) If the Attorney General determines, after consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, that proceedings initiated under recommendations made under paragraph 1 (B) or (C)(i) of paragraph (3) will not be completed within the time period required by paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention, the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary and after providing interested persons opportunity to submit comments respecting the requirements of the temporary order to be issued under this sentence, shall issue a temporary order controlling the drug or substance under schedule IV or V, whichever is most appropriate to carry out the minimum United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention. As a part of such order, the Attorney General shall, after consultation with the Secretary, except such drug or substance from the application of any provision of part C of this subchapter which he finds is not required to carry out the United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention. In the case of proceedings initiated under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3), the Attorney General, concurrently with the issuance of such order, shall request the Secretary of State to transmit a notice of qualified acceptance to the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention. A temporary order issued under this subparagraph controlling a drug or other substance subject to proceedings initiated under subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall expire upon the effective date of the application to the drug or substance of the controls resulting from such proceedings. (B) After a notice of qualified acceptance of a scheduling decision with respect to a drug or other substance is transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with clause (ii) or (iii) of paragraph (3)(C) or after a request has been made under clause (iv) of such paragraph with respect to a drug or substance described in a schedule notice, the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and after providing interested persons opportunity to submit comments respecting the requirements of the order to be issued under this sentence, shall issue an order controlling the drug or substance under schedule IV or V, whichever is most appropriate to carry out the minimum United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention in the case of a drug or substance for which a notice of qualified acceptance was transmitted or whichever the Attorney General determines is appropriate in the case of a drug or substance described in a schedule notice. As a part of such order, the Attorney General shall, after consultation with the Secretary, except such drug or substance from the application of any provision of part C of this subchapter which he finds is not required to carry out the United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention. If, as a result of a review under paragraph 8 of article 2 of the Convention of the scheduling decision with respect to which a notice of qualified acceptance was transmitted in accordance with clause (ii) or (iii) of paragraph (3)(C)— (i) the decision is reversed, and (ii) the drug or substance subject to such decision is not required to be controlled under schedule IV or V to carry out the minimum United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention, the order issued under this subparagraph with respect to such drug or substance shall expire upon receipt by the United States of the review decision. If, as a result of action taken pursuant to action initiated under a request transmitted under clause (iv) of paragraph (3)(C), the drug or substance with respect to which such action was taken is not required to be controlled under schedule IV or V, the order issued under this paragraph with respect to such drug or substance shall expire upon receipt by the United States of a notice of the action taken with respect to such drug or substance under the Convention. (C) An order issued under subparagraph (A) or (B) may be issued without regard to the findings required by subsection (a) of this section or by section 812(b) of this title and without regard to the procedures prescribed by subsection (a) or (b) of this section. (5) Nothing in the amendments made by the Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978 or the regulations or orders promulgated thereunder shall be construed to preclude requests by the Secretary of Health and Human Services or the Attorney General through the Secretary of State, pursuant to article 2 or other applicable provisions of the Convention, for review of scheduling decisions under such Convention, based on new or additional information. (e) Immediate precursors The Attorney General may, without regard to the findings required by subsection (a) of this section or section 812(b) of this title and without regard to the procedures prescribed by subsections (a) and (b) of this section, place an immediate precursor in the same schedule in which the controlled substance of which it is an immediate precursor is placed or in any other schedule with a higher numerical designation. If the Attorney General designates a substance as an immediate precursor and places it in a schedule, other substances shall not be placed in a schedule solely because they are its precursors. (f) Abuse potential If, at the time a new-drug application is submitted to the Secretary for any drug having a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system, it appears that such drug has an abuse potential, such information shall be forwarded by the Secretary to the Attorney General. (g) Exclusion of non-narcotic substances sold over the counter without a prescription; dextromethorphan; exemption of substances lacking abuse potential (1) The Attorney General shall by regulation exclude any non-narcotic drug which contains a controlled substance from the application of this subchapter and subchapter II of this chapter if such drug may, under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.], be lawfully sold over the counter without a prescription. (2) Dextromethorphan shall not be deemed to be included in any schedule by reason of enactment of this subchapter unless controlled after October 27, 1970 pursuant to the foregoing provisions of this section. (3) The Attorney General may, by regulation, exempt any compound, mixture, or preparation containing a controlled substance from the application of all or any part of this subchapter if he finds such compound, mixture, or preparation meets the requirements of one of the following categories: (A) A mixture, or preparation containing a nonnarcotic controlled substance, which mixture or preparation is approved for prescription use, and which contains one or more other active ingredients which are not listed in any schedule and which are included therein in such combinations, quantity, proportion, or concentration as to vitiate the potential for abuse. (B) A compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any controlled substance, which is not for administration to a human being or animal, and which is packaged in such form or concentration, or with adulterants or denaturants, so that as packaged it does not present any significant potential for abuse. (C) Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, a compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any anabolic steroid, which is intended for administration to a human being or an animal, and which, because of its concentration, preparation, formulation or delivery system, does not present any significant potential for abuse. (h) Temporary scheduling to avoid imminent hazards to public safety (1) If the Attorney General finds that the scheduling of a substance in schedule I on a temporary basis is necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public safety, he may, by order and without regard to the requirements of subsection (b) of this section relating to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, schedule such substance in schedule I if the substance is not listed in any other schedule in section 812 of this title or if no exemption or approval is in effect for the substance under section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21 U.S.C. 355]. Such an order may not be issued before the expiration of thirty days from— (A) the date of the publication by the Attorney General of a notice in the Federal Register of the intention to issue such order and the grounds upon which such order is to be issued, and (B) the date the Attorney General has transmitted the notice required by paragraph (4). (2) The scheduling of a substance under this subsection shall expire at the end of 2 years from the date of the issuance of the order scheduling such substance, except that the Attorney General may, during the pendency of proceedings under subsection (a)(1) of this section with respect to the substance, extend the temporary scheduling for up to 1 year. (3) When issuing an order under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall be required to consider, with respect to the finding of an imminent hazard to the public safety, only those factors set forth in paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) of subsection (c) of this section, including actual abuse, diversion from legitimate channels, and clandestine importation, manufacture, or distribution. (4) The Attorney General shall transmit notice of an order proposed to be issued under paragraph (1) to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. In issuing an order under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall take into consideration any comments submitted by the Secretary in response to a notice transmitted pursuant to this paragraph. (5) An order issued under paragraph (1) with respect to a substance shall be vacated upon the conclusion of a subsequent rulemaking proceeding initiated under subsection (a) of this section with respect to such substance. (6) An order issued under paragraph (1) is not subject to judicial review. (i) Temporary and permanent scheduling of recently emerged anabolic steroids (1) The Attorney General may issue a temporary order adding a drug or other substance to the definition of anabolic steroids if the Attorney General finds that— (A) the drug or other substance satisfies the criteria for being considered an anabolic steroid under section 802(41) of this title but is not listed in that section or by regulation of the Attorney General as being an anabolic steroid; and (B) adding such drug or other substance to the definition of anabolic steroids will assist in preventing abuse or misuse of the drug or other substance. (2) An order issued under paragraph (1) shall not take effect until 30 days after the date of the publication by the Attorney General of a notice in the Federal Register of the intention to issue such order and the grounds upon which such order is to be issued. The order shall expire not later than 24 months after the date it becomes effective, except that the Attorney General may, during the pendency of proceedings under paragraph (6), extend the temporary scheduling order for up to 6 months. (3) The Attorney General shall transmit notice of an order proposed to be issued under paragraph (1) to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. In issuing an order under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall take into consideration any comments submitted by the Secretary in response to a notice transmitted pursuant to this paragraph. (4) A temporary scheduling order issued under paragraph (1) shall be vacated upon the issuance of a permanent scheduling order under paragraph (6). (5) An order issued under paragraph (1) is not subject to judicial review. (6) The Attorney General may, by rule, issue a permanent order adding a drug or other substance to the definition of anabolic steroids if such drug or other substance satisfies the criteria for being considered an anabolic steroid under section 802(41) of this title. Such rulemaking may be commenced simultaneously with the issuance of the temporary order issued under paragraph (1). (j) Interim final rule; date of issuance; procedure for final rule (1) With respect to a drug referred to in subsection (f), if the Secretary of Health and Human Services recommends that the Attorney General control the drug in schedule II, III, IV, or V pursuant to subsections (a) and (b), the Attorney General shall, not later than 90 days after the date described in paragraph (2), issue an interim final rule controlling the drug in accordance with such subsections and section 812(b) of this title using the procedures described in paragraph (3). (2) The date described in this paragraph shall be the later of— (A) the date on which the Attorney General receives the scientific and medical evaluation and the scheduling recommendation from the Secretary of Health and Human Services in accordance with subsection (b); or (B) the date on which the Attorney General receives notification from the Secretary of Health and Human Services that the Secretary has approved an application under section 505(c), 512, or 571 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21 U.S.C. 355(c), 360b, 360ccc] or section 262(a) of title 42, or indexed a drug under section 572 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21 U.S.C. 360ccc–1], with respect to the drug described in paragraph (1). (3) A rule issued by the Attorney General under paragraph (1) shall become immediately effective as an interim final rule without requiring the Attorney General to demonstrate good cause therefor. The interim final rule shall give interested persons the opportunity to comment and to request a hearing. After the conclusion of such proceedings, the Attorney General shall issue a final rule in accordance with the scheduling criteria of subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section and section 812(b) of this title. (Pub. L. 91–513, title II, §201, Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1245; Pub. L. 95–633, title I, §102(a), Nov. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 3769; Pub. L. 96–88, title V, §509(b), Oct. 17, 1979, 93 Stat. 695; Pub. L. 98–473, title II, §§508, 509(a), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2071, 2072; Pub. L. 108–358, §2(b), Oct. 22, 2004, 118 Stat. 1663; Pub. L. 112–144, title XI, §1153, July 9, 2012, 126 Stat. 1132; Pub. L. 113–260, §2(b), Dec. 18, 2014, 128 Stat. 2930; Pub. L. 114–89, §2(b), Nov. 25, 2015, 129 Stat. 700.) REFERENCES IN TEXT This subchapter, referred to in subsecs. (a), (c)(8), (d)(3), (4)(A), (B), and (g)(2), (3), was in the original "this title", meaning title II of Pub. L. 91–513, Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1242, as amended, and is popularly known as the "Controlled Substances Act". For complete classification of title II to the Code, see second paragraph of Short Title note set out under section 801 of this title and Tables. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, referred to in subsecs. (d)(3) and (g)(1), is act June 25, 1938, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040, as amended, which is classified generally to chapter 9 (§301 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 301 of this title and Tables. Schedules I, II, III, IV, and V, referred to in subsecs. (d)(4)(A), (B), (h)(1), and (j)(1), are set out in section 812(c) of this title. The Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, referred to in subsec. (d)(5), is Pub. L. 95–633, Nov. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 3768, which enacted sections 801a, 830, and 852 of this title, amended sections 352, 802, 811, 812, 823, 827, 841 to 843, 872, 881, 952, 953, and 965 of this title and section 242a of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, repealed section 830 of this title effective Jan. 1, 1981, and enacted provisions set out as notes under sections 801, 801a, 812, and 830 of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title of 1978 Amendment note set out under section 801 of this title and Tables. This subchapter and subchapter II of this chapter, referred to in subsec. (g)(1), was in the original "titles II and III of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act", which was translated as meaning titles II and III of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91–513, Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1242, 1285, as amended, to reflect the probable intent of Congress. Title II is classified principally to this subchapter and part A of title III comprises subchapter II of this chapter. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title notes set out under section 801 of this title and Tables. AMENDMENTS 2015—Subsec. (j). Pub. L. 114–89 added subsec. (j). 2014—Subsec. (i). Pub. L. 113–260 added subsec. (i). 2012—Subsec. (h)(2). Pub. L. 112–144 substituted "2 years" for "one year" and "1 year" for "six months". 2004—Subsec. (g)(1). Pub. L. 108–358, §2(b)(1), substituted "drug which contains a controlled substance from the application of this subchapter and subchapter II of this chapter if such drug" for "substance from a schedule if such substance". Subsec. (g)(3)(C). Pub. L. 108–358, §2(b)(2), added subpar. (C). 1984—Subsec. (g)(3). Pub. L. 98–473, §509(a), added par. (3). Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 98–473, §508, added subsec. (h). 1978—Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 95–633 designated existing provisions as par. (1) and added pars. (2) to (5). CHANGE OF NAME "Secretary of Health and Human Services" substituted for "Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare" in subsec. (d)(2), (3), (4)(A), (B), (5) pursuant to section 509(b) of Pub. L. 96–88 which is classified to section 3508(b) of Title 20, Education. EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2004 AMENDMENT Amendment by Pub. L. 108–358 effective 90 days after Oct. 22, 2004, see section 2(d) of Pub. L. 108–358, set out as a note under section 802 of this title. EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1978 AMENDMENT Amendment by Pub. L. 95–633 effective on date the Convention on Psychotropic Substances enters into force in the United States [July 15, 1980], see section 112 of Pub. L. 95–633, set out as an Effective Date note under section 801a of this title.
Piss off spam-bot. You're a real tool. DEA Administrative Law Judge Francis Young. Not a real judge.
Administrative Law Judge. Not Administrative Law Clerk or Auto Repairman. Not Administrative Law Clerk or Auto Repairman. Not an Article III judge and not a member of the Judicial Branch. ALJ Young was an employee of the DEA, and acted as part of the Executive Branch. Administrative Law Judges did not always have to be attorneys. They are still governed by the Administrative Procedure Act which established their existence as Hearing Examiners in 1946. It was not until 1978 that the law was amended and they were given the exalted title of Administrative Law Judge. http://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/95/251.pdf Public Law 95-251 of 1978, boldface as in original (2) Sections 3105 and 3344 of title 5, United States Code, are each amended in the catchline by striking out "hearing examiners" and inserting "administrative law judges" in lieu thereof. And, as you digest most of your information from Wikipedia, In American administrative law, ALJs are Article I judges under the U.S. Constitution. As such, they do not exercise full judicial power, essentially, the power over life, liberty, and property. However, Article I judges and courts are not constrained to rendering opinions for only a "case or controversy" before them, and may render advisory opinions on a purely prospective basis, such as, e.g., Congressional reference cases assigned to the Court of Federal Claims. Agency ALJs do not have the power to offer such advisory opinions, as it would be in violation of the power afforded them under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §557. Unlike the agency, ALJs are not policy or rule makers. ALJs are generally considered to be part of the executive branch, not the judicial branch, but the APA is designed to guarantee the decisional independence of ALJs. [...] ALJs are limited as they have no power to sanction unless a statute provides such a power. Instead, the ALJ may refer a matter to an Article III Court to seek enforcement or sanctions. [...] ALJs cannot be recognized as members of the judicial branch of government (without first completely ejecting them from their home agencies in the executive branch), because to do so would violate the bedrock principle of separation of powers as embodied in the U.S. Constitution. In a 2013 majority opinion signed by Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, the U.S. Supreme Court explained: About 90% of ALJs are employees of the Social Security Administration. "The Office of Personnel Management shall determine, in accordance with procedures which the Office shall by regulation prescribe, the level in which each administrative-law-judge position shall be placed and the qualifications to be required for appointment to each level." Just like any civil service position, the merit system applies to new hires, including veteran's preference points. Scoring 100 on the exam does not necessarily mean you have the highest score after veterans' preference points are added. http://law.justia.com/codes/us/2015/title-5/part-iii/subpart-d/chapter-53/subchapter-vii/sec.-5372/ 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2015) §5372. Administrative law judges (a) For the purposes of this section, the term "administrative law judge" means an administrative law judge appointed under section 3105. (b)(1)(A) There shall be 3 levels of basic pay for administrative law judges (designated as AL–1, 2, and 3, respectively), and each such judge shall be paid at 1 of those levels, in accordance with the provisions of this section. (B) Within level AL–3, there shall be 6 rates of basic pay, designated as AL–3, rates A through F, respectively. Level AL–2 and level AL–1 shall each have 1 rate of basic pay. (C) The rate of basic pay for AL–3, rate A, may not be less than 65 percent of the rate of basic pay for level IV of the Executive Schedule, and the rate of basic pay for AL–1 may not exceed the rate for level IV of the Executive Schedule. (2) The Office of Personnel Management shall determine, in accordance with procedures which the Office shall by regulation prescribe, the level in which each administrative-law-judge position shall be placed and the qualifications to be required for appointment to each level. (3)(A) Upon appointment to a position in AL–3, an administrative law judge shall be paid at rate A of AL–3, and shall be advanced successively to rates B, C, and D of that level at the beginning of the next pay period following completion of 52 weeks of service in the next lower rate, and to rates E and F of that level at the beginning of the next pay period following completion of 104 weeks of service in the next lower rate. (B) The Office of Personnel Management may provide for appointment of an administrative law judge in AL–3 at an advanced rate under such circumstances as the Office may determine appropriate. (4) Subject to paragraph (1), effective at the beginning of the first applicable pay period commencing on or after the first day of the month in which an adjustment takes effect under section 5303 in the rates of basic pay under the General Schedule, each rate of basic pay for administrative law judges shall be adjusted by an amount determined by the President to be appropriate. (c) The Office of Personnel Management shall prescribe regulations necessary to administer this section. (Pub. L. 89–554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 473, §5362; Pub. L. 95–251, §2(a)(1), (b)(1), Mar. 27, 1978, 92 Stat. 183; renumbered §5372 and amended Pub. L. 95–454, title VIII, §801(a)(3)(A)(ii), title IX, §906(a)(2), Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1221, 1224; Pub. L. 101–509, title V, §529 [title I, §104(a)(1)], Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1427, 1445; Pub. L. 102–378, §2(32), Oct. 2, 1992, 106 Stat. 1350; Pub. L. 106–97, §1, Nov. 12, 1999, 113 Stat. 1322.)
Have a large helping of your spam. Search well for the legally mandatory recommendation of DHHS to changed the scheduling of marijuana. Find where DHHS ever found that marijuana has a generally accepted medical use.
Not a "judge" either. More like a moderator between two sides.
Eat a buffet of dicks spam-bot.
More spam? What a fucktard! Yes you may. 81 Fed Reg No 156 (12 Aug 2016) 53668-53766, Proposed Marijuana Rules Denial, Docket DEA-426 by nolu chan on Scribd
#2. To: Stoner (#1)
I would think that with a priority list for AG Sessions, I would seriously think that cannibis would be way down the list.
#3. To: Deckard (#0)
"Medical Marijuana in it's natural form is one of the safest, therapeutically active substances known to man."- *DEA Judge Francis Young- 1988
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
[2]
Discussion
(b) Evaluation of drugs and other substances
DEA was directed to refer all the substances at issue to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), successor agency to HEW for scien-
The Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics, the Drug Policy Foundation, and the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana [304 U.S.App.D.C. 402] Laws petition for review of a final order of the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration declining to reschedule marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act. Rescheduling to Schedule II would permit doctors to prescribe marijuana for therapeutic purposes. Petitioners' central claim is that the Administrator's order rests on an unreasonable interpretation of the statute. Because our previous disposition of this matter in Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 930 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("ACT") constitutes the law of the case, we decline to reconsider this claim. We also find that the Administrator satisfied ACT's mandate on remand and that petitioners' other claims lack merit.
(1) scientifically determined and accepted knowledge of its chemistry;
[w]ith one exception, none of [these doctors] could identify under oath the scientific studies they swore they relied on. Only one had enough knowledge to discuss the scientific technicalities involved. Eventually, each one admitted he was basing his opinion on anecdotal evidence, on stories he heard from patients, and on his impressions about the drug.
#4. To: Deckard (#0)
Mr Sessions doesn't believe that Marijuana has any medicinal value at all, but US Patent # 6630507 was recently granted to the Department of Health and Human Services. Attorney Sam Mendez, an intellectual property and public policy Lawyer, says it shows a certain amount of hypocrisy from a government that still maintains Cannabis has no medicinal value.
#5. To: Deckard (#0)
2015 US Code Title 21 - Food and Drugs (Sections 1 - 2252) Chapter 13 - Drug Abuse Prevention and Control (Sections 801 - 971) Subchapter I - Control and Enforcement (Sections 801 - 904) Part B - Authority to Control; Standards and Schedules (Sections 811 - 814) Sec. 811 - Authority and criteria for classification of substances
#6. To: nolu chan (#3)
(Edited)
DEA Judge Francis Young is a deliberately misleading title. The correct term would be ALJ Francis Young, the ALJ standing for Administrative Law Judge.
“Truth is treason in the empire of lies.” - Ron Paul
Those who most loudly denounce Fake News are typically those most aggressively disseminating it.
#7. To: Deckard (#0)
DEA Judge Francis Young
#8. To: misterwhite (#7)
Not a real judge.
“Truth is treason in the empire of lies.” - Ron Paul
Those who most loudly denounce Fake News are typically those most aggressively disseminating it.
#9. To: Deckard, misterwhite (#8)
Administrative Law Judge.
(b) (1) Sections 1305 and 5362 of title 5, United States Code, are each amended in the catchline, by striking out "Hearing examiners"and inserting "Administrative law judges" in lieu thereof.
The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) requires that federal ALJs be appointed based on scores achieved in a comprehensive testing procedure, including a four-hour written examination and an oral examination before a panel that includes an Office of Personnel Management representative, an American Bar Association representative, and a sitting federal ALJ. Federal ALJs are the only merit-based judicial corps in the United States.
“The dissent overstates when it claims that agencies exercise “legislative power” and “judicial power” ... The former is vested exclusively in Congress ... the latter in the “one supreme Court” and “such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish” ... Agencies make rules ... and conduct adjudications ... and have done so since the beginning of the Republic. These activities take “legislative” and “judicial” forms, but they are exercises of—indeed, under our constitutional structure they must be exercises of—the “executive Power.”
2015 US Code
Title 5 - Government Organization and Employees (Sections 101 - 11001)
Part III - Employees (Sections 2101 - 11001)
Subpart D - Pay and Allowances (Sections 5101 - 5949)
Chapter 53 - Pay Rates and Systems (Sections 5301 - 5392)
Subchapter VII - Miscellaneous Provisions (Sections 5371 - 5380)
Sec. 5372 - Administrative law judges
#10. To: Deckard (#6)
#11. To: Deckard (#8)
Not Administrative Law Clerk or Auto Repairman.
#12. To: nolu chan (#10)
“Truth is treason in the empire of lies.” - Ron Paul
Those who most loudly denounce Fake News are typically those most aggressively disseminating it.
#13. To: Deckard (#12)
#14. To: nolu chan (#13)
“Truth is treason in the empire of lies.” - Ron Paul
Those who most loudly denounce Fake News are typically those most aggressively disseminating it.
#15. To: Deckard (#14)
Thank you Sir! May I have another?
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