Title: Innocent Family Sues After Police Tried to Kill Their Dog, But Shot Their 10 yo Son Instead Source:
Free Thought Project URL Source:http://thefreethoughtproject.com/fa ... n-instead/#mIC1ZjyGbzu8gvip.99 Published:Oct 9, 2016 Author:Matt Agorist Post Date:2016-10-10 10:13:01 by Deckard Keywords:None Views:997 Comments:14
Coffee County, GA — The family of an innocent 10-year-old boy has recently filed a $4 million lawsuit on behalf of their son after he was shot by a trigger happy Georgia cop. The boy, Dakota Corbitt was shot in the back of his leg while officer Michael Vickers was attempting to kill his dog.
Dakota Corbitt and the rest of his family had done nothing wrong when they were swarmed by cops who held them at gunpoint before shooting the child.
The incident happened in July of 2014 when officers were looking for the suspect of an armed robbery and police shooting. The suspect, 19-year-old Christopher Barnett had fled to the woods near Corbitt’s home.
During Barnett’s apprehension, all hell broke loose as this innocent family had their rights violated at the hands of public servants.
According to the lawsuit, the defendants, Coffee County, Sheriff Doyle Wooten and deputy Michael Vickers, “jointly and severely deprived the plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ minor children of their rights secured by the 4th and 14th Amendments of the United States and as a direct and proximate result of said deprivation defendants’ negligence, gross negligence, and the wanton and willful indifference to the rights of the plaintiffs individually and the rights of the plaintiffs’ minor children, caused the physical pain, suffering, mental anguish and ultimately the permanent restriction of one minor’s right leg.
“On that date, Vickers, along with other officers of the Coffee County Sheriff’s Department and GBI agents, participated in an operation to apprehend a criminal suspect, Barnett. The defendants and fellow officers entered the plaintiff’s property at 145 Burton Road and demanded all persons in the area, including the children, to get down on the ground. Other than the suspect, one adult citizen, Damion Stewart, was on the property outside the residence with two children. While complying with the officers’ demands, Stewart was brutally handcuffed in the presence of his children and the barrel of a gun was placed in his back. Others located on the property included Jerry Rich, who was a minor at the time, Amy Corbitt’s minor child, Elizabeth Bowen’s minor child, and Tonya Johnson’s minor child. Corbitt was inside the home.
“The remaining minors were held at gunpoint, each having an officer forcefully shove the barrel of a loaded gun into their backs. These children feared for their lives and have been stripped of their confidence in the justice system.
“While the children were lying on the ground obeying the orders of Defendant Vickers, said Defendant unreasonably, maliciously, negligently and without necessity or any immediate threat of cause, discharged his firearm at the family pet twice. The first shot missed the animal, which retreated under the residence. At no time during the interim did Vickers ask someone to restrain the animal and at no time did any other agent attempt to restrain or subdue the animal. Approximately eight to ten seconds elapsed since the first shot and Vickers then discharged his weapon a second time as it was approaching the pet’s owners. He again missed the animal and struck Corbitt’s son in the back of the right knee.”
“I ran out the house with one of my kids and saw my little brother on the porch pouring blood,” Janelle Rich, Corbitt’s sister said after the shooting.
According to the lawsuit, Vickers is no stranger to excessive and unnecessary force. This trigger happy dog killing cop was an apparent ticking time bomb and Corbitt just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.
“Defendant Vickers has an extensive history of using unnecessary, excessive force of which Defendant Wooten is and was at the time of the subject matter incident aware of,” reads the lawsuit. “Vickers’ extensive prior excessive force record includes approximately 10 separate occurrences in the immediate three years prior to the incident, the most recent of which was when Vickers shot and killed a dog during the execution of a search warrant about a month before the incident.”
Corbitt is still required to receive therapy for the wound, now two years later. He’s also left emotionally traumatized and has little faith left in the system that led to him being shot.
The lawsuit seeks a total of $4 million, with $2 million of that for Corbitt and the shooting victim to cover past and future medical expenses, recovery for pain and suffering, emotional distress, permanent disfigurement, and punitive damages.
Unfortunately, cops shooting children while trying to kill their dog is not isolated.
After interviewing the victim of a hit-and-run incident on June 19, 2015, Officer Jonathan Thomas was returning to his patrol car when he heard a woman from another house calling for help. Andrea Ellis had cut her arm on a piece of broken glass, and her sister, Brandie Kelly, called 911 to request an ambulance. While Kelly was on the phone with a 911 dispatcher, she noticed Officer Thomas outside and called out to him for medical assistance.
Arriving at Ellis’ front door, Thomas suddenly pulled out his gun when he noticed the family dog approaching him. Although the pet did not attack Thomas, the officer abruptly opened fire and missed.
Instead of gunning down the dog, Thomas had mistakenly shot Ellis’ 4-year-old daughter, Ava Ellis, in the thigh.
Last month, Ellis’ family was awarded $780,000 for the incompetent actions of officer Thomas.
Instead of firing Thomas or arresting him for negligently shooting an innocent child, police supervisors merely recommended a three-day suspension and retraining.
Officer Vickers received similar treatment from his department. He never received so much as a slap on the wrist for putting a bullet in an innocent boy. And so the vicious cycle of police negligence and their taxpayer supported unaccountable nature continues.
The article is by Matt Agorist, hack fiction writer at The Free Thought Project, publisher of yellow shit.
The incident occurred over two years ago.
There is no likelihood of proving the officer intentionally shot the child. He did not shoot the dog. See Brown v. Muhleberg TP, cited and linked below, for the difficulties in bringing this direct to Federal court.
Deputy who shot 10-year-old identified; more charges on suspects
Posted: Jul 14, 2014 11:17 AM CST Updated: Jul 19, 2014 11:30 AM CST By Christian McKinney
[excerpt]
The situation of how the child was shot remains unclear. Sheriff Wooten said Vickers was approaching the property when a dog ran up to him. The deputy's gun fired one shot, missing the dog and hitting the child.
The Georgia Bureau of Investigation in Eastman was called to investigate the shooting. They said no charges were filed against Deputy Vickers. Officials said he was on a pre-approved vacation Monday, and will be on administrative duty after he returns.
"I want to make sure that he's ready before he goes back out, because he's really upset about this. I can not explain to you how upset he is about it," said Wooten.
The shooting happened during the arrest of Christopher Barnett. Barnett is believed to be the person who shot a Douglas Police Officer early on July 10th. He is also believed to have been involved in an Armed Robbery that happened at a Flash Foods in Douglas before the officer was shot. That officer was later identified as Larry Carter.
Barnett has been charged with robbery, aggravated assault with a gun, two counts of possession of a firearm while committing a crime, and aggravated assault on a police officer.
$4 Million Lawsuit Filed Against County, Sheriff, & Deputy For 2014 Shooting
Fri, 09/30/2016 - 4:39pm
Douglas Vickers Accidentally Shot Juvenile By: Luke Roberts Enterprise Staff Writer news@douglasenterprise.net
The family of a boy that was shot in July 2014 while local police were arresting a man accused of shooting a Douglas police officer has filed a $4 million lawsuit, and the defendants are Coffee County, Sheriff Doyle Wooten and deputy Michael Vickers. The lawsuit was filed in the United States Southern District Court of Georgia Waycross Division and was obtained by The Enterprise on Friday, September 30.
The 20-page lawsuit stems from an incident that occurred in 2014 when Vickers responded to the home of the Corbitt family in the Bethel community after a man suspected of shooting Douglas Police Officer Larry Carter was located in the area. While apprehending the suspect, Christopher Barnett, a dog is alleged to have advanced at Vickers and he fired two shots, one of which hit a 10-year old boy in the right leg. One of the suit’s plaintiffs is the juvenile victim’s mother, Amy Corbitt. The other plaintiffs are Jerry Rich, Elizabeth Bowen, Tonya Johnson, and Damion Stewart.
The lawsuit, states, “This is a civil action seeking damages against Defendant Coffee County, Defendant Doyle Wooten, the Sheriff of Coffee County, and Defendant Michael Vickers, a deputy of Coffee County.”
The family is suing Wooten and Vickers both “individually and in their official capacities” with the county.
The suit states the defendants “jointly and severely deprived the plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ minor children of their rights secured by the 4th and 14th Amendments of the United States and as a direct and proximate result of said deprivation defendants’ negligence, gross negligence, and the wanton and willful indifference to the rights of the plaintiffs individually and the rights of the plaintiffs’ minor children, caused the physical pain, suffering, mental anguish and ultimately the permanent restriction of one minor’s right leg.”
[snip]
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Nobody will be prosecuted pursuant to this lawsuit. It is a civil rights lawsuit filed in Federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Corbitt v Coffee County, DCGA Southern Waycross Division, 5-2016-cv-00051 (filed 1 July 2016)
2014 US Code Title 42 - The Public Health and Welfare (Sections 1 - 18445) Chapter 21 - Civil Rights (Sections 1981 - 2000h-6) Subchapter I - Generally (Sections 1981 - 1996b) Sec. 1983 - Civil action for deprivation of rights
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2014)
§1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
(R.S. §1979; Pub. L. 96–170, §1, Dec. 29, 1979, 93 Stat. 1284; Pub. L. 104–317, title III, §309(c), Oct. 19, 1996, 110 Stat. 3853.)
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At page 18, paragraph 50:
Defendant Wooten and Defendant Vickers had an affirmative duty to prevent, or aid in preventing, the commission of such wrongs and instead, knowingly, recklessly, or with deliberate indifference and callous disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights and the rights of the Coffee County citizens, these defendants failed and refused to do so resulting in the shooting of a minor. A reasonable officer would have understood that it was unlawful for him to destroy a citizen's personal property in the absence of a substantial public interest that would be served by the destruction. Brown v. Muhleberg TP, 269 F.3d 205, 211 (3d Cir. 2001).
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The cited case is from the Third Circuit in Pennsylvania. Georgia is in the Eleventh Circuit.
Brown v. Muhleberg TP, 269 F.3d 205, 211 (3d Cir. 2001)
The case citation contains a typo and should refer to Muhlenberg.
There is no likelihood of proving the officer intentionally shot the child.
No one claimed it was intentional.
He did not shoot the dog.
He shot AT the dog, you boot-licking freak.
Defendant Wooten and Defendant Vickers had an affirmative duty to prevent, or aid in preventing, the commission of such wrongs and instead, knowingly, recklessly, or with deliberate indifference and callous disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights and the rights of the Coffee County citizens, these defendants failed and refused to do so resulting in the shooting of a minor. A reasonable officer would have understood that it was unlawful for him to destroy a citizen's personal property in the absence of a substantial public interest that would be served by the destruction. Brown v. Muhleberg TP, 269 F.3d 205, 211 (3d Cir. 2001).
Your long-winded spam post would indicate that the original article is factual, not "yellow journalism" like you claimed.
Your long-winded spam post would indicate that the original article is factual, not "yellow journalism" like you claimed.
Your ignorant bullshit overlooks that your article is about a FEDERAL lawsuit with a CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM.
A shot at your dog in Georgia by Georgia law enforcement is not a Federal civil rights violation by the county, the first named defendant, and the one with deep pockets.
You, of course, ignore the cited case of Brown v. Muhleberg TP, 269 F.3d 205, 211 (3d Cir. 2001), because in your idiot world, ignorance is bliss. The proof needed to prevail in a Federal Civil Rights action is described in Brown.
Your legal ramblings aside, the point is you pompous arrogant prick is that the cop was trying to shoot a non-threatening dog and hit a child.
No, you absurd, ridiculous ignorant asshole, the point is the article is bullshit and the litigation Complaint is about the same. The article from The Free Thought Project is the bullshit that is typical of that execrable sourse.
Get it through yourt impenetrable drugged into incoherence skull that the lawsuit alleges a violation of CONSTITUTIONAL rights. Deputy Michael Vickers was never charged with any crime.
Doc 1-1, Attachment Exhibit A of the Complaint, dated June 30, 2015 is addressed to Sheriff Wooten and Deputy Vickers and states,
While we are still in the process of investigating this case, we believe Dakota Corbitt and his family have suffered damages in excess of one million dollars. If we are unable to settle this matter without litigation, we intend to bring suit for the foregoing causes of action at the earliest date allowable.
We look forward to hearing from you.
It appears the letter of the attorney (Ben Mills, Jr.) met with an unfavorable response.
In Georgia, punitive damages are limited to a maximum of $250K for the case, excepting product liability or being under the influence of alcohol/drugs. And 75% of punitive damages (less a proportionate part of the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney's fees), as determined by the trial judge, shall be paid into the treasury of the state.
Punitive damages are solely to punish, penalize, or deter a defendant, not to compensate a plaintiff. In Georgia, if one desires to see a tortfeasor punished with punative damages, the money goes to the costs of litigation and to the government of Georgia. Proof is by clear and convincing evidence.
This may help explain why the case is not filed in the courts of Georgia, but an attempt is made to assert a Federal tort case of violation of the Constitution.
(a) As used in this Code section, the term "punitive damages" is synonymous with the terms "vindictive damages," "exemplary damages," and other descriptions of additional damages awarded because of aggravating circumstances in order to penalize, punish, or deter a defendant.
(b) Punitive damages may be awarded only in such tort actions in which it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.
(c) Punitive damages shall be awarded not as compensation to a plaintiff but solely to punish, penalize, or deter a defendant.
(d) (1) An award of punitive damages must be specifically prayed for in a complaint. In any case in which punitive damages are claimed, the trier of fact shall first resolve from the evidence produced at trial whether an award of punitive damages shall be made. This finding shall be made specially through an appropriate form of verdict, along with the other required findings.
(2) If it is found that punitive damages are to be awarded, the trial shall immediately be recommenced in order to receive such evidence as is relevant to a decision regarding what amount of damages will be sufficient to deter, penalize, or punish the defendant in light of the circumstances of the case. It shall then be the duty of the trier of fact to set the amount to be awarded according to subsection (e), (f), or (g) of this Code section, as applicable.
(e) (1) In a tort case in which the cause of action arises from product liability, there shall be no limitation regarding the amount which may be awarded as punitive damages. Only one award of punitive damages may be recovered in a court in this state from a defendant for any act or omission if the cause of action arises from product liability, regardless of the number of causes of action which may arise from such act or omission.
(2) Seventy-five percent of any amounts awarded under this subsection as punitive damages, less a proportionate part of the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney's fees, all as determined by the trial judge, shall be paid into the treasury of the state through the Office of the State Treasurer. Upon issuance of judgment in such a case, the state shall have all rights due a judgment creditor until such judgment is satisfied and shall stand on equal footing with the plaintiff of the original case in securing a recovery after payment to the plaintiff of damages awarded other than as punitive damages. A judgment debtor may remit the state's proportional share of punitive damages to the clerk of the court in which the judgment was rendered. It shall be the duty of the clerk to pay over such amounts to the Office of the State Treasurer within 60 days of receipt from the judgment debtor. This paragraph shall not be construed as making the state a party at interest and the sole right of the state is to the proceeds as provided in this paragraph.
(f) In a tort case in which the cause of action does not arise from product liability, if it is found that the defendant acted, or failed to act, with the specific intent to cause harm, or that the defendant acted or failed to act while under the influence of alcohol, drugs other than lawfully prescribed drugs administered in accordance with prescription, or any intentionally consumed glue, aerosol, or other toxic vapor to that degree that his or her judgment is substantially impaired, there shall be no limitation regarding the amount which may be awarded as punitive damages against an active tort-feasor but such damages shall not be the liability of any defendant other than an active tort-feasor.
(g) For any tort action not provided for by subsection (e) or (f) of this Code section in which the trier of fact has determined that punitive damages are to be awarded, the amount which may be awarded in the case shall be limited to a maximum of $250,000.00.
(h) This Code section shall apply only to causes of action arising on or after April 14, 1997.
