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Title: State Proposes Bold Law to Treat Pot Like Tobacco And Expunge All Records of Marijuana “Crimes”
Source:
Activist Post
URL Source: http://www.activistpost.com/2016/09 ... -records-marijuana-crimes.html
Published: Sep 27, 2016
Author: Claire Bernish
Post Date: 2016-09-28 07:51:26 by Deckard
Keywords: None
Views: 31134
Comments: 181
Bold legislation introduced in New Jersey last week would not only treat cannabis like tobacco — legalizing it — but would expunge records for individuals previously convicted of certain marijuana-related ‘crimes.’ Should the bill, A4193, pass, convenience stores would be permitted to sell cannabis alongside cigarettes — available to anyone aged 19 and older. “This bill would legalize marijuana by removing all criminal liability associated with marijuana from the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice … as well as its regulation as a controlled dangerous substance under the New Jersey Controlled Dangerous Substances Act,” the proposed law states. Sponsored by Assemblyman Michael Patrick Carroll — once deemed the state Legislature’s “Most Conservative” member, as the Newark Patch pointed out — the legislation “[l]egalizes marijuana and provides for records expungement for certain past marijuana offenses; treats marijuana products similar to tobacco products, including the use of civil penalties for providing marijuana to persons under 19 years of age.” Carroll’s bill audacious thumbs its nose at the DEA’s vehemently criticized decision this year not to reschedule cannabis from its current inexplicable designation as a dangerous substance of no medical value, akin to heroin or cocaine. “To me it’s just not a big deal,” Carroll told Politico. “It’s already ubiquitous. Anybody who thinks this is somehow going to increase the availability of marijuana has never been 19. If that’s the case, then what’s the big deal about having it available at the local 7-Eleven?” Alcohol, after all, is a standard fixture at convenience stores and gas stations, with store owners facing fines and other civil penalties for underage distribution. “The whole point here is to get the government out of the business of treating at least marijuana use as a crime and treat it instead as a social problem,” Carroll continued, adding he’s never tried cannabis, personally. “You’re talking to the world’s most boring, straightest guy,” he said. “I’ve never popped a pill, never smoked a joint, nothing. I’ve never quite understood the all the allure of this stuff.” Apparently, though, he doesn’t feel his personal views concerning substances should override contrary opinions and choices. On the surface, the right-wing lawmaker would seem the last person sponsoring legislation taking such a radical departure from federal law — but on issues of personal freedom, his stances align most closely with libertarian philosophy. Carroll not only co-sponsored New Jersey’s medical cannabis legislation, in April he proposed lowering the state’s drinking age to 18, saying, according to the Patch, If you’re old enough to make the determination you want to enlist in the Marines, you’re old enough to determine if you want to have a beer. Despite an overwhelming public perception cannabis should at least be decriminalized and growing national disillusionment with the failed drug war — with the resultant largest prison population in the world, gang violence, strengthening of Mexican cartels, epidemic-level police violence, and inability of those in need to get life-saving medical cannabis treatment — the Drug Enforcement Agency opted to maintain marijuana prohibition this year. Should the proposed law indeed pass, New Jersey would join Alaska, Colorado, Washington, and Oregon in legal, recreational weed. In fact, degrees of decriminalization and legalization — mostly for medical use — exist in half the states in the nation. November’s election will likely expand those numbers. Ballot measures could potentially legalize recreational use in varying degrees in California, Nevada, Massachusetts, Arizona, and Nevada — and although they aren’t all expected to pass, the segment of the population arguing against legalization shrinks seemingly by the month. New Jersey lawmakers are attempting a multi-pronged approach to legalizing weed. Another bill, A2068, filed in January by Assemblyman Reed Gusciora — ironically, one of the most liberal members of the state Legislature — and State Sen. Nicholas Scutari would legalize cannabis and treat it akin to alcohol. A third is expected after several legislators, including Gusciora and Scutari, return from an information-gathering field trip examining legalization in Colorado in October. New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie — whom Carroll refers to as “the Fat Man” — will almost certainly veto any legislation concerning cannabis. But his tenure in office draws to a close just over a year from now. “We would like to get the ball rolling, even with this governor and even if he vetoes it, the choice then could be made to put it on the ballot through the Legislature or set the groundwork for the next administration,” Gusciora told Politico. “I think it’s only a matter of time.” Claire Bernish writes for TheFreeThoughtProject.com, where this article first appeared.
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Begin Trace Mode for Comment # 181.
#71. To: Deckard (#0)
According to the link, the measures are leading everywhere but Arizona. And Trump and Clinton each say it's an issue for the states.
If so, then who's responsible for keeping marijuana in the states?
If so, then who's responsible for keeping marijuana in the states? Why, primarily the states that don't want it - just as responsibility for keeping alcohol out of dry jurisdictions lies primarily with those jurisdictions. Congress has the authority if it so chooses to act against such interstate movement, though not against intrastate commerce. Glad I could clear that up for you.
Did that work with alcohol? I seem to recall that it didn't, and the "dry" states pressured Congress to pass the Webb-Kenyon Act, making it a federal crime. Naturally, that didn't work either, leading to Prohibition. Now you come along saying that it will work with recreational drugs. Or are you saying you know it won't work, but since the U.S. Constitution is a suicide pact, we have to do it?
>>Did that work with alcohol? I seem to recall that it didn't, and the "dry" states pressured Congress Somebody always wants somebody else to pick up the check for their own preferences. According to President Nixon's National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, "The lack of federal enforcement rendered the statute [the Webb-Kenyon Act] virtually meaningless." It wasn't tried and found wanting - it wasn't seriously tried.
You mean the federal government found it impossible to control 50,000 miles of borders surrounding the 25 "dry" states? But they could if we legalized drugs, huh?
You mean the federal government found it impossible Opposite - they never tried.
But they would if it were drugs. You're delusional.
But they would if it were drugs. Why would they work any less vigorously against federally illegal interstate drug transactions than they do now against federally illegal intrastate drug transactions? And suppose they chose not to: how does that amount to a "suicide pact"?
If they only have authority over interstate transactions, they'd have to be there the moment the drug crossed the border. Either side of the state border is out-of-bounds. "how does that amount to a "suicide pact"?" We both know it wouldn't work. Congress published findings saying it wouldn't work. So to say we should do it anyways is a suicide pact.
Not so - a car with Colorado plates parked in Oklahoma, with a trunk full of marijuana, has broken Oklahoma law, for starters - and has established probable cause to retrace the driver's steps and determine whether a Colorado seller sold him the pot Suicide pacts involve the death of all parties. "Congress published findings" - BFD.
We were discussing federal enforcement of interstate commerce. At least, I thought we were. Are you saying the DEA has the power to enforce Oklahoma law? Doesn't that go against your argument that this should be a state issue? Marijuana is fungible. You can't look at it and say. "That's Colorado pot!" The driver would say to the DEA that it's Oklahoma pot being transported intrastate -- which is beyond their jurisdiction. Can Oklahoma law enforcement arrest this guy for possession? Yes. But again, that's not what we're discussing.
Are you saying the DEA has the power to enforce Oklahoma law? The DEA has the power to turn him over to the state authorities and thereby facilitate the initiation of a federal investigation. Beat that straw man. So have you dropped this "suicide pact" tomfoolery?
If you insist on taking it literally rather than for the expression it is, yeah.
If you insist on taking it literally rather than for the expression it is It's an applicable expression only if outcomes of gravity comparable to that of suicide are in the balance - otherwise it's misleading.
"The Constitution is not a suicide pact" is a common expression and does not mean everyone dies. Get a f**king grip.
Regarding the Constitution, the parties are States. Carrying out a suicide pact would result in dissolution of the Union. There was no threat of anarchy and Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion was shot down by the majority who wrote for the Court. It is rhetoric not adopted by the Court. The majority opinion in Terminiello has been reaffirmed many times. It was not an entirely new idea of Justice Jackson. It was more of contemporary rhetorical flourish of an idea expressed by Abraham Lincoln in his July 4, 1861 Special Address to Congress, 4 Collected Works at 429-431. When reading Lincoln, it should be noted where he refers to "the Commanding General," that was not Lincoln (the C-in-C) but the Commanding General of the Army. The CG was authorized to suspend the privilege of the right of habeas corpus at his discretion, or to delegate said power down the chain of command, which he did. In the famous case of John Merryman (Ex parte Merryman) the privilege of the writ was suspended in Maryland by General Keim who was in Pennsylvania. Lincoln's word salad obfuscating the suspension of the privilege of the writ in the Union states by military officers, rather than Congress, claimed some exception based lest "the government itself go to pieces." That exception to law is the same type of "suicide" asserted by Justice Jackson, which was denied by the majority of the Court.
They didn't shoot down his dissent because he misused the phrase "suicide pact". They shot it down because the Chicago ordinance was overly broad. My only point in bringing it up was that he used the phrase as an expression to describe a situation where a literal interpretation of the Bill of Rights (free speech) results in harm to the citizens -- even though it may not include death or involve everyone. "The majority opinion in Terminiello has been reaffirmed many times." Selectively. Burning the American flag is protected speech. But waving the Confederate flag is not. What's next? The "knockout game" is protected speech? Riots are nothing more than freedom of expression?
They shot down his dissent. History has proven, beyond all doubt, that no suicide resulted. Selectively. Burning the American flag is protected speech. But waving the Confederate flag is not. Your argument is bogus. Waving the Confederate flag is not prohibited. Flying it on government property can be prohibited. A state government can choose whether or not it will allow the Confederate flag to be flown on state property. The standard has not changed. Terminiello, as I have mentioned previously, did not reach that question. The Court in Terminiello: Subsequent decisions: See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), citing Terminiello. Held: Absent a more particularized and compelling reason for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple public display of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense. Pp. 22-26. 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, reversed. See also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) The prima facie evidence provision, as interpreted by the jury instruction, renders the statute unconstitutional. Because this jury instruction is the Model Jury Instruction, and because the Supreme Court of Virginia had the opportunity to expressly disavow the jury instruction, the jury instruction's construction of the prima facie provision "is a ruling on a question of state law that is as binding on us as though the precise words had been written into" the statute. E.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (striking down an ambiguous statute on facial grounds based upon the instruction given to the jury); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768, n. 21 (1982) (noting that Terminiello involved a facial challenge to the statute); Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 965, n. 13 (1984); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 844, 845-846, n. 8 (1970); Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 10-12; Blakey Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the Federal Criminal Law, 2002 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 829, 883, n. 133. As construed by the jury instruction, the prima facie provision strips away the very reason why a State may ban cross burning with the intent to intimidate. The prima facie evidence provision permits a jury to convict in every cross-burning case in which defendants exercise their constitutional right not to put on a defense. And even where a defendant like Black presents a defense, the prima facie evidence provision makes it more likely that the jury will find an intent to intimidate regardless of the particular facts of the case. The provision permits the Commonwealth to arrest, prosecute, and convict a person based solely on the fact of cross burning itself. It is apparent that the provision as so interpreted "`would create an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas.'" Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., supra, at 965, n. 13 (quoting Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 797 (1984)). The act of burning a cross may mean that a person is engaging in constitutionally proscribable intimidation. But that same act may mean only that the person is engaged in core political speech. The prima facie evidence provision in this statute blurs the line between these two meanings of a burning cross. As interpreted by the jury instruction, the provision chills constitutionally protected political speech because of the possibility that the Commonwealth will prosecute — and potentially convict — somebody engaging only in lawful political speech at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect. See also City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461-63 (1987), citing Terminiello. "Speech is often provocative and challenging. . . . [But it] is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 4 (1949). In Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U. S. 130 (1974), for example, the appellant was found to have yelled obscenities and threats at an officer who had asked appellant's husband to produce his driver's license. Appellant was convicted under a municipal ordinance that made it a crime Id. at 415 U. S. 132 (citation omitted). We vacated the conviction and invalidated the ordinance as facially overbroad. Critical to our decision was the fact that the ordinance "punishe[d] only spoken words," and was not limited in scope to fighting words that, "by their very utterance, inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.'" Id. at 415 U. S. 133, quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 405 U. S. 525 (1972); see also ibid. (Georgia breach-of-peace statute not limited to fighting words held facially invalid). Moreover, in a concurring opinion in Lewis, JUSTICE POWELL suggested that even the "fighting words" exception recognized in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942), might require a narrower application in cases involving words addressed to a police officer, because The Houston ordinance is much more sweeping than the municipal ordinance struck down in Lewis. It is not limited to fighting words nor even to obscene or opprobrious language, but prohibits speech that "in any manner . . . interrupt[s]" an officer. The Constitution does not allow such speech to be made a crime. The freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state.
Wave it at a Black Lives Matter protest and then tell me you wouldn't be arrested. No different than burning the American flag in front of patriots.
Wave it at a Black Lives Matter protest and then tell me you wouldn't be arrested. Waving the Confederate flag is not unlawful per se. Inciting to riot is unlawful. Breaching the peace or communicating fighting words is unlawful. Going to a BLM gathering and giving them all the finger might get you arrested. Giving the finger where you do not incite to riot would not be a crime. If your behavior is likely to incite to riot, it is not protected free speech. If you do it at a BLM gathering, you would probably be lucky to have a nearby police officer arrest you.
Yet burning the American flag in front of patriotic citizens is protected.
There are no replies to Comment # 181. End Trace Mode for Comment # 181.
Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/LatestBallot measures could potentially legalize recreational use in varying degrees in California, Nevada, Massachusetts, Arizona, and Nevada — and although they aren’t all expected to pass, the segment of the population arguing against legalization shrinks seemingly by the month.
#73. To: ConservingFreedom (#71)
"it's an issue for the states."
#77. To: misterwhite (#73)
"Trump and Clinton each say it's an issue for the states."
#79. To: ConservingFreedom (#77)
"Why, primarily the states that don't want it - just as responsibility for keeping alcohol out of dry jurisdictions lies primarily with those jurisdictions."
#84. To: misterwhite (#79)
>>"Why, primarily the states that don't want it - just as responsibility for keeping alcohol out of dry jurisdictions lies primarily with those jurisdictions."
to pass the Webb-Kenyon Act, making it a federal crime. Naturally, that didn't work either
#86. To: ConservingFreedom (#84)
"The lack of federal enforcement rendered the statute [the Webb-Kenyon Act] virtually meaningless."
#88. To: misterwhite (#86)
'According to President Nixon's National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, "The lack of federal enforcement rendered the statute [the Webb-Kenyon Act] virtually meaningless."'
#89. To: ConservingFreedom (#88)
"Opposite - they never tried."
#90. To: misterwhite (#89)
"Opposite - they never tried."
#91. To: ConservingFreedom (#90)
"Why would they work any less vigorously against federally illegal interstate drug transactions than they do now against federally illegal intrastate drug transactions?"
#92. To: misterwhite (#91)
If they only have authority over interstate transactions, they'd have to be there the moment the drug crossed the border. Either side of the state border is out-of-bounds.
"how does that amount to a "suicide pact"?"
We both know it wouldn't work. Congress published findings saying it wouldn't work.
So to say we should do it anyways is a suicide pact.
#93. To: ConservingFreedom (#92)
(Edited)
"with a trunk full of marijuana, has broken Oklahoma law, for starters"
#96. To: misterwhite (#93)
"with a trunk full of marijuana, has broken Oklahoma law, for starters [DECEPTIVELY OMITTED BY MISTERWHITE:] - and has established probable cause to retrace the driver's steps and determine whether a Colorado seller sold him the pot"
look at it and say. "That's Colorado pot!"
"how does that amount to a "suicide pact"?"
We both know it wouldn't work. Congress published findings saying it wouldn't work.
So to say we should do it anyways is a suicide pact.
"Suicide pacts involve the death of all parties."
[crickets]
#100. To: ConservingFreedom (#96)
"So have you dropped this "suicide pact" tomfoolery?"
#105. To: misterwhite (#100)
"So have you dropped this "suicide pact" tomfoolery?"
#108. To: ConservingFreedom (#105)
"It's an applicable expression only if outcomes of gravity comparable to that of suicide are in the balance - otherwise it's misleading."
#168. To: misterwhite, ConservingFreedom (#108)
"The Constitution is not a suicide pact" is a common expression and does not mean everyone dies. Get a f**king grip.
Soon after the first call for militia, it was considered a duty to authorize the Commanding General, in proper cases, according to his discretion, to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; or, in other words, to arrest, and detain, without resort to the ordinary processes and forms of law, such individuals as he might deem dangerous to the public safety. This authority has purposely been exercised but very sparingly. Nevertheless, the legality and propriety of what has been done under it, are questioned; and the attention of the country has been called to the proposition that one who is sworn to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed,'' should not himself violate them. Of course some consideration was given to the questions of power, and propriety, before this matter was acted upon. The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed, were being resisted, and failing of execution, in nearly one-third of the States. Must they be allowed to finally fail of execution, even had it been perfectly clear, that by the use of the means necessary to their execution, some single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty, that practically, it relieves more of the guilty, than of the innocent, should, to a very limited extent, be violated? To state the question more directly, are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated? Even in such a case, would not the official oath be broken, if the government should be overthrown, when it was believed that disregarding the single law, would tend to preserve it? But it was not believed that this question was presented. It was not believed that any law was violated. The provision of the Constitution that "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it,'' is equivalent to a provision — is a provision — that such privilege may be suspended when, in cases of rebellion, or invasion, the public safety does require it. It was decided that we have a case of rebellion, and that the public safety does require the qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ which was authorized to be made. Now it is insisted that Congress, and not the Executive, is vested with this power. But the Constitution itself, is silent as to which, or who, is to exercise the power; and as the provision was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed the framers of the instrument intended, that in every case, the danger should run its course, until Congress could be called together; the very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by the rebellion.
#170. To: nolu chan (#168)
"There was no threat of anarchy and Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion was shot down by the majority who wrote for the Court."
#173. To: misterwhite (#170)
They didn't shoot down his dissent because he misused the phrase "suicide pact".
The majority opinion in Terminiello has been reaffirmed many times."
What's next? The "knockout game" is protected speech? Riots are nothing more than freedom of expression?
The argument here has been focused on the issue of whether the content of petitioner's speech was composed of derisive, fighting words, which carried it outside the scope of the constitutional guarantees. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 U. S. 310. We do not reach that question, for there is a preliminary question that is dispositive of the case.
Appellant was convicted of violating that part of Cal. Penal Code 415 which prohibits “maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . . . by . . . offensive conduct,” for wearing a jacket bearing the words “Fuck the Draft” in a corridor of the Los Angeles Courthouse. The Court of Appeal held that “offensive conduct” means “behavior which has a tendency to provoke others to acts of violence or to in turn disturb the peace,” and affirmed the conviction.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has not ruled on the meaning of the prima facie evidence provision. It has, however, stated that "the act of burning a cross alone, with no evidence of intent to intimidate, will nonetheless suffice for arrest and prosecution and will insulate the Commonwealth from a motion to strike the evidence at the end of its case-in-chief." 262 Va., at 778, 553 S.E. 2d, at 746. The jury in the case of Richard Elliott did not receive any instruction on the prima facie evidence provision, and the provision was not an issue in the case of Jonathan O'Mara because he pleaded guilty. The court in Barry Black's case, however, instructed the jury that the provision means: "The burning of a cross, by itself, is sufficient evidence from which you may infer the required intent." App. 196. This jury instruction is the same as the Model Jury Instruction in the Commonwealth of Virginia. See Virginia Model Jury Instructions, Criminal, Instruction No. 10.250 (1998 and Supp. 2001).
Second, contrary to the city's contention, the First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers.
"'for any person wantonly to curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city police while in the actual performance of his duty.'"
"a properly trained officer may reasonably be expected to 'exercise a higher degree of restraint' than the average citizen, and thus be less likely to respond belligerently to 'fighting words.'"
#174. To: nolu chan (#173)
"Waving the Confederate flag is not prohibited."
#179. To: misterwhite (#174)
"Waving the Confederate flag is not prohibited."
#181. To: nolu chan (#179)
"If your behavior is likely to incite to riot, it is not protected free speech."
Replies to Comment # 181.
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