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Title: State Proposes Bold Law to Treat Pot Like Tobacco And Expunge All Records of Marijuana “Crimes”
Source:
Activist Post
URL Source: http://www.activistpost.com/2016/09 ... -records-marijuana-crimes.html
Published: Sep 27, 2016
Author: Claire Bernish
Post Date: 2016-09-28 07:51:26 by Deckard
Keywords: None
Views: 30984
Comments: 181
Bold legislation introduced in New Jersey last week would not only treat cannabis like tobacco — legalizing it — but would expunge records for individuals previously convicted of certain marijuana-related ‘crimes.’ Should the bill, A4193, pass, convenience stores would be permitted to sell cannabis alongside cigarettes — available to anyone aged 19 and older. “This bill would legalize marijuana by removing all criminal liability associated with marijuana from the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice … as well as its regulation as a controlled dangerous substance under the New Jersey Controlled Dangerous Substances Act,” the proposed law states. Sponsored by Assemblyman Michael Patrick Carroll — once deemed the state Legislature’s “Most Conservative” member, as the Newark Patch pointed out — the legislation “[l]egalizes marijuana and provides for records expungement for certain past marijuana offenses; treats marijuana products similar to tobacco products, including the use of civil penalties for providing marijuana to persons under 19 years of age.” Carroll’s bill audacious thumbs its nose at the DEA’s vehemently criticized decision this year not to reschedule cannabis from its current inexplicable designation as a dangerous substance of no medical value, akin to heroin or cocaine. “To me it’s just not a big deal,” Carroll told Politico. “It’s already ubiquitous. Anybody who thinks this is somehow going to increase the availability of marijuana has never been 19. If that’s the case, then what’s the big deal about having it available at the local 7-Eleven?” Alcohol, after all, is a standard fixture at convenience stores and gas stations, with store owners facing fines and other civil penalties for underage distribution. “The whole point here is to get the government out of the business of treating at least marijuana use as a crime and treat it instead as a social problem,” Carroll continued, adding he’s never tried cannabis, personally. “You’re talking to the world’s most boring, straightest guy,” he said. “I’ve never popped a pill, never smoked a joint, nothing. I’ve never quite understood the all the allure of this stuff.” Apparently, though, he doesn’t feel his personal views concerning substances should override contrary opinions and choices. On the surface, the right-wing lawmaker would seem the last person sponsoring legislation taking such a radical departure from federal law — but on issues of personal freedom, his stances align most closely with libertarian philosophy. Carroll not only co-sponsored New Jersey’s medical cannabis legislation, in April he proposed lowering the state’s drinking age to 18, saying, according to the Patch, If you’re old enough to make the determination you want to enlist in the Marines, you’re old enough to determine if you want to have a beer. Despite an overwhelming public perception cannabis should at least be decriminalized and growing national disillusionment with the failed drug war — with the resultant largest prison population in the world, gang violence, strengthening of Mexican cartels, epidemic-level police violence, and inability of those in need to get life-saving medical cannabis treatment — the Drug Enforcement Agency opted to maintain marijuana prohibition this year. Should the proposed law indeed pass, New Jersey would join Alaska, Colorado, Washington, and Oregon in legal, recreational weed. In fact, degrees of decriminalization and legalization — mostly for medical use — exist in half the states in the nation. November’s election will likely expand those numbers. Ballot measures could potentially legalize recreational use in varying degrees in California, Nevada, Massachusetts, Arizona, and Nevada — and although they aren’t all expected to pass, the segment of the population arguing against legalization shrinks seemingly by the month. New Jersey lawmakers are attempting a multi-pronged approach to legalizing weed. Another bill, A2068, filed in January by Assemblyman Reed Gusciora — ironically, one of the most liberal members of the state Legislature — and State Sen. Nicholas Scutari would legalize cannabis and treat it akin to alcohol. A third is expected after several legislators, including Gusciora and Scutari, return from an information-gathering field trip examining legalization in Colorado in October. New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie — whom Carroll refers to as “the Fat Man” — will almost certainly veto any legislation concerning cannabis. But his tenure in office draws to a close just over a year from now. “We would like to get the ball rolling, even with this governor and even if he vetoes it, the choice then could be made to put it on the ballot through the Legislature or set the groundwork for the next administration,” Gusciora told Politico. “I think it’s only a matter of time.” Claire Bernish writes for TheFreeThoughtProject.com, where this article first appeared.
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Begin Trace Mode for Comment # 118.
#71. To: Deckard (#0)
According to the link, the measures are leading everywhere but Arizona. And Trump and Clinton each say it's an issue for the states.
If so, then who's responsible for keeping marijuana in the states?
If so, then who's responsible for keeping marijuana in the states? Why, primarily the states that don't want it - just as responsibility for keeping alcohol out of dry jurisdictions lies primarily with those jurisdictions. Congress has the authority if it so chooses to act against such interstate movement, though not against intrastate commerce. Glad I could clear that up for you.
Did that work with alcohol? I seem to recall that it didn't, and the "dry" states pressured Congress to pass the Webb-Kenyon Act, making it a federal crime. Naturally, that didn't work either, leading to Prohibition. Now you come along saying that it will work with recreational drugs. Or are you saying you know it won't work, but since the U.S. Constitution is a suicide pact, we have to do it?
>>Did that work with alcohol? I seem to recall that it didn't, and the "dry" states pressured Congress Somebody always wants somebody else to pick up the check for their own preferences. According to President Nixon's National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, "The lack of federal enforcement rendered the statute [the Webb-Kenyon Act] virtually meaningless." It wasn't tried and found wanting - it wasn't seriously tried.
You mean the federal government found it impossible to control 50,000 miles of borders surrounding the 25 "dry" states? But they could if we legalized drugs, huh?
You mean the federal government found it impossible Opposite - they never tried.
But they would if it were drugs. You're delusional.
But they would if it were drugs. Why would they work any less vigorously against federally illegal interstate drug transactions than they do now against federally illegal intrastate drug transactions? And suppose they chose not to: how does that amount to a "suicide pact"?
If they only have authority over interstate transactions, they'd have to be there the moment the drug crossed the border. Either side of the state border is out-of-bounds. "how does that amount to a "suicide pact"?" We both know it wouldn't work. Congress published findings saying it wouldn't work. So to say we should do it anyways is a suicide pact.
Not so - a car with Colorado plates parked in Oklahoma, with a trunk full of marijuana, has broken Oklahoma law, for starters - and has established probable cause to retrace the driver's steps and determine whether a Colorado seller sold him the pot Suicide pacts involve the death of all parties. "Congress published findings" - BFD.
We were discussing federal enforcement of interstate commerce. At least, I thought we were. Are you saying the DEA has the power to enforce Oklahoma law? Doesn't that go against your argument that this should be a state issue? Marijuana is fungible. You can't look at it and say. "That's Colorado pot!" The driver would say to the DEA that it's Oklahoma pot being transported intrastate -- which is beyond their jurisdiction. Can Oklahoma law enforcement arrest this guy for possession? Yes. But again, that's not what we're discussing.
Are you saying the DEA has the power to enforce Oklahoma law? The DEA has the power to turn him over to the state authorities and thereby facilitate the initiation of a federal investigation. Beat that straw man. So have you dropped this "suicide pact" tomfoolery?
If you insist on taking it literally rather than for the expression it is, yeah.
If you insist on taking it literally rather than for the expression it is It's an applicable expression only if outcomes of gravity comparable to that of suicide are in the balance - otherwise it's misleading.
"The Constitution is not a suicide pact" is a common expression and does not mean everyone dies. Get a f**king grip.
"The Constitution is not a suicide pact" is a common expression and does not mean everyone dies. Get a f**king grip. I said "outcomes of gravity comparable". Get some f**king honesty. '"The Constitution is not a suicide pact" is a phrase in American political and legal discourse. The phrase expresses the belief that constitutional restrictions on governmental power must be balanced against the need for survival of the state and its people.' (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Constitution_is_not_a_suicide_pact, emphasis added) Get some f**king facts.
That was your definition -- which I don't accept. From the same link: In the 1949 case Terminiello v. City of Chicago, the majority opinion by Justice William O. Douglas overturned the disorderly conduct conviction of a priest whose rantings at a rally had incited a riot. The Court held that Chicago's breach of the peace ordinance violated the First Amendment. Associate Justice Robert Jackson wrote a twenty-four page dissent in response to the Court's four page decision, which concluded: "The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with order and anarchy without either. There is danger that, if the court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact." That was simply a free speech issue.
In the 1949 case Terminiello v. City of Chicago, the majority opinion by Justice William O. Douglas overturned the disorderly conduct conviction of a priest whose rantings at a rally had incited a riot. The Court held that Chicago's breach of the peace ordinance violated the First Amendment. At the link is a lame article from Wikipedia that is clearly wrong on Terminiello. The Court did not find the ordinance violated the First Amendment. It did not even reach that question. It was decided on a faulty charge to the jury by the trial court. The Court: The Court found that "The statute, as construed in the charge to the jury, was passed on by the Illinois courts and sustained by them over the objection that, as so read, it violated the Fourteenth Amendment." It was the instructions to the jury that wandered astray. There was a general verdict which did not identify the precise reasoning for the guilty verdict. As the Court explained, "For all anyone knows, he was convicted under the parts of the ordinance (as construed) which, for example, make it an offense merely to invite dispute or to bring about a condition of unrest." - - - - - - - - - - Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (16 May 1949) free speech Petitioner after jury trial was found guilty of disorderly conduct in violation of a city ordinance of Chicago, * and fined. The case grew out of an address he delivered in an auditorium in Chicago under the auspices of the 337 U. S. 3 Christian Veterans of America. The meeting commanded considerable public attention. The auditorium was filled to capacity, with over eight hundred persons present. Others were turned away. Outside of the auditorium, a crowd of about one thousand persons gathered to protest against the meeting. A cordon of policemen was assigned to the meeting to maintain order, but they were not able to prevent several disturbances. The crowd outside was angry and turbulent. Petitioner, in his speech, condemned the conduct of the crowd outside and vigorously, if not viciously, criticized various political and racial groups whose activities he denounced as inimical to the nation's welfare. The trial court charged that "breach of the peace" consists of any "misbehavior which violates the public peace and decorum", and that the "misbehavior may constitute a breach of the peace if it stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or if it molests the inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing alarm." Petitioner did not take exception to that instruction. But he maintained at all times that the ordinance, as applied to his conduct, violated his right of free speech under the Federal Constitution. The Judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court (332 Ill.App. 17, 74 N.E.2d 45) and by the Illinois Supreme Court. 396 Ill. 41, 71 N.E.2d 2; 400 Ill. 23, 79 N.E.2d 39. The case is here on a petition for certiorari, which we granted because of the importance of the question presented. The argument here has been focused on the issue of whether the content of petitioner's speech was composed of derisive, fighting words, which carried it outside the scope of the constitutional guarantees. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 U. S. 310. We do not reach that question, for there is a preliminary question that is dispositive of the case. 337 U. S. 4 As we have noted, the statutory words "breach of the peace" were defined in instructions to the jury to include speech which "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance. . . ." That construction of the ordinance is a ruling on a question of state law that is as binding on us as though the precise words had been written into the ordinance. See Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 272 U. S. 317; Winters v. New York, U. S. 507, 333 U. S. 514. The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discussion. As Chief Justice Hughes wrote in Jonge v. Oregon, U. S. 353, 299 U. S. 365, it is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected. The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes. Accordingly, a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, pp. 315 U. S. 571-572, is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. See Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 314 U. S. 262; Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, 331 U. S. 373. There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas 337 U. S. 5 either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups. The ordinance as construed by the trial court seriously invaded this province. It permitted conviction of petitioner if his speech stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest. A conviction resting on any of those grounds may not stand. The fact that petitioner took no exception to the instruction is immaterial. No exception to the instructions was taken in Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359. But a judgment of conviction based on a general verdict under a state statute was set aside in that case because one part of the statute was unconstitutional. The statute had been challenged as unconstitutional, and the instruction was framed in its language. The Court held that the attack on the statute as a whole was equally an attack on each of its individual parts. Since the verdict was a general one, and did not specify the ground upon which it rested, it could not be sustained. For one part of the statute was unconstitutional, and it could not be determined that the defendant was not convicted under that part. The principle of that case controls this one. As we have said, the gloss which Illinois placed on the ordinance gives it a meaning and application which are conclusive on us. We need not consider whether as construed it is defective in its entirety. As construed and applied, it at least contains parts that are unconstitutional. The verdict was a general one, and we do not know on this record but what it may rest on the invalid clauses. The statute, as construed in the charge to the jury, was passed on by the Illinois courts and sustained by them over the objection that, as so read, it violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The fact that the parties did not dispute its construction makes the adjudication no less 337 U. S. 6 ripe for our review, as the Stromberg decision indicates. We can only take the statute as the state courts read it. From our point of view, it is immaterial whether the state law question as to its meaning was controverted or accepted. The pinch of the statute is in its application. It is that question which the petitioner has brought here. To say, therefore, that the question on this phase of the case is whether the trial judge gave a wrong charge is wholly to misconceive the issue. But it is said that, throughout the appellate proceedings, the Illinois courts assumed that the only conduct punishable and punished under the ordinance was conduct constituting "fighting words." That emphasizes, however, the importance of the rule of the Stromberg case. Petitioner was not convicted under a statute so narrowly construed. For all anyone knows, he was convicted under the parts of the ordinance (as construed) which, for example, make it an offense merely to invite dispute or to bring about a condition of unrest. We cannot avoid that issue by saying that all Illinois did was to measure petitioner's conduct, not the ordinance, against the Constitution. Petitioner raised both points -- that his speech was protected by the Constitution; that the inclusion of his speech within the ordinance was a violation of the Constitution. We would, therefore, strain at technicalities to conclude that the constitutionality of the ordinance, as construed and applied to petitioner, was not before the Illinois courts. The record makes clear that petitioner at all times challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance as construed and applied to him. Reversed. * "All persons who shall make, aid, countenance, or assist in making any improper noise, riot, disturbance, breach of the peace, or diversion tending to a breach of the peace, within the limits of the city . . . shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct, and upon conviction thereof, shall be severally fined not less than one dollar nor more than two hundred dollars for each offense." Municipal Code of Chicago, 1939, § 193-1.
There are no replies to Comment # 118. End Trace Mode for Comment # 118.
Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/LatestBallot measures could potentially legalize recreational use in varying degrees in California, Nevada, Massachusetts, Arizona, and Nevada — and although they aren’t all expected to pass, the segment of the population arguing against legalization shrinks seemingly by the month.
#73. To: ConservingFreedom (#71)
"it's an issue for the states."
#77. To: misterwhite (#73)
"Trump and Clinton each say it's an issue for the states."
#79. To: ConservingFreedom (#77)
"Why, primarily the states that don't want it - just as responsibility for keeping alcohol out of dry jurisdictions lies primarily with those jurisdictions."
#84. To: misterwhite (#79)
>>"Why, primarily the states that don't want it - just as responsibility for keeping alcohol out of dry jurisdictions lies primarily with those jurisdictions."
to pass the Webb-Kenyon Act, making it a federal crime. Naturally, that didn't work either
#86. To: ConservingFreedom (#84)
"The lack of federal enforcement rendered the statute [the Webb-Kenyon Act] virtually meaningless."
#88. To: misterwhite (#86)
'According to President Nixon's National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, "The lack of federal enforcement rendered the statute [the Webb-Kenyon Act] virtually meaningless."'
#89. To: ConservingFreedom (#88)
"Opposite - they never tried."
#90. To: misterwhite (#89)
"Opposite - they never tried."
#91. To: ConservingFreedom (#90)
"Why would they work any less vigorously against federally illegal interstate drug transactions than they do now against federally illegal intrastate drug transactions?"
#92. To: misterwhite (#91)
If they only have authority over interstate transactions, they'd have to be there the moment the drug crossed the border. Either side of the state border is out-of-bounds.
"how does that amount to a "suicide pact"?"
We both know it wouldn't work. Congress published findings saying it wouldn't work.
So to say we should do it anyways is a suicide pact.
#93. To: ConservingFreedom (#92)
(Edited)
"with a trunk full of marijuana, has broken Oklahoma law, for starters"
#96. To: misterwhite (#93)
"with a trunk full of marijuana, has broken Oklahoma law, for starters [DECEPTIVELY OMITTED BY MISTERWHITE:] - and has established probable cause to retrace the driver's steps and determine whether a Colorado seller sold him the pot"
look at it and say. "That's Colorado pot!"
"how does that amount to a "suicide pact"?"
We both know it wouldn't work. Congress published findings saying it wouldn't work.
So to say we should do it anyways is a suicide pact.
"Suicide pacts involve the death of all parties."
[crickets]
#100. To: ConservingFreedom (#96)
"So have you dropped this "suicide pact" tomfoolery?"
#105. To: misterwhite (#100)
"So have you dropped this "suicide pact" tomfoolery?"
#108. To: ConservingFreedom (#105)
"It's an applicable expression only if outcomes of gravity comparable to that of suicide are in the balance - otherwise it's misleading."
#112. To: misterwhite (#108)
"It's an applicable expression only if outcomes of gravity comparable to that of suicide are in the balance - otherwise it's misleading."
#116. To: ConservingFreedom (#112)
"I said "outcomes of gravity comparable".
#118. To: misterwhite, ConservingFreedom (#116)
From the same link:
The argument here has been focused on the issue of whether the content of petitioner's speech was composed of derisive, fighting words, which carried it outside the scope of the constitutional guarantees. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 U. S. 310. We do not reach that question, for there is a preliminary question that is dispositive of the case.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Replies to Comment # 118.
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