The Establishments war on Donald Trump
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Title: Holt faces criticism over how he moderated debate
Source:
FoxNews
URL Source: http://www.foxnews.com/politics/201 ... first-presidential-debate.html
Published: Sep 27, 2016
Author: FoxNews/AP
Post Date: 2016-09-27 10:34:44 by misterwhite
Keywords: None
Views: 4168
Comments: 34
Republicans and some celebrities weren’t pleased with NBC’s Lester Holt after the first presidential debate Monday, accusing him of letting Hillary Clinton off the hook, while pressing Donald Trump. The Trump campaign wasn’t particularly happy with Holt after the debate, tweeting that he didn’t ask Clinton questions on Benghazi, her Foundation or her private email server. Brent Bozell, president of the conservative media watchdogs Media Research Center, tweeted his displeasure with Holt. "Lester Holt clearly heard cries of his colleagues in the liberal media to be tough on Trump and ease up on Hillary loud and clear," Bozell said. Holt also received some additional negative reviews on Twitter about letting Trump and Clinton go punch-for-punch. One media observer, columnist Nicholas Kristof of The New York Times, tweeted that "Lester Holt has done a fine job as moderator. Not too intrusive, moving things along, fact-checking when necessary." Despite his campaign’s frustrations, Trump said he thought Holt "did a really good job. I thought it was great." He said he thought a lot of good and important topics were brought up. Holt let the conversation between Trump and Clinton flow at first, but as the debate wore on he would remind the candidates constantly to stick to the time limits. Holt let a 20-second Trump point go on for 55 seconds before Holt interjected with another question. Later, Holt attempted to fact check Trump, raising Trump’s ire in the process. Fact-checking had been a major issue in the debate with Clinton’s side arguing that the fact-checking should be left to the moderator and the Trump campaign saying it should be left to the candidates. The issue of the Iraq war and whether Trump opposed it came up again. Trump said it was “wrong” that he initially supported the war. "I was against the war in Iraq," Trump said. Replied Holt: "The record shows otherwise." "The record shows that I'm right," Trump argued. When Trump advocated for the "stop-and-frisk" police policy, Holt told him that it was declared unconstitutional in New York largely because it singled out black and Latino young men. "No, you're wrong," Trump said, adding that he believed the court decision would have been overturned on appeal. Holt later brought up the issue of Trump's questioning whether President Barack Obama had been born in the United States, and asked him what made him conclude this month that Obama was indeed a legitimate citizen. Trump twice did not address the question, and cut Holt off when he tried a third approach. "What do you say to American people of color..." Holt started asking. "I say nothing," Trump replied. Former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani said that Holt should be “ashamed of himself,” after his fact-check attempt of Trump on New York City’s stop-and-frisk law and whether Trump opposed the Iraq war. Giuliani said that if he was Trump he’d skip the next debates, according to Politico. “If I were Donald Trump I wouldn’t participate in another debate unless I was promised that the journalist would act like a journalist and not an incorrect, ignorant fact checker,” Giuliani said. “The moderator would have to promise that there would be a moderator and not a fact checker and in two particular cases an enormously ignorant, completely misinformed fact checker. If you wonder why Donald Trump thinks that the press is a left-wing basically oriented group, Lester Holt proved it tonight." Holt will now hand the debate moderation over to CNN’s Anderson Cooper and ABC News’ Martha Raddatz. Fox News’ Chris Wallace will moderate the third debate.
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Begin Trace Mode for Comment # 19.
#12. To: misterwhite (#0)
When Trump advocated for the "stop-and-frisk" police policy, Holt told him that it was declared unconstitutional in New York largely because it singled out black and Latino young men. "No, you're wrong," Trump said, adding that he believed the court decision would have been overturned on appeal. [misterwhite #1] Trump was right. A District Court judge ruled it unconstitutional but the 2nd Circuit threw the judge off the case and overturned the decision. But they didn't stay the lower court's order. So the case is still pending. To be absolutely clear, the transcript shows that Lester Holt said that "stop and frisk was ruled unconstitutional in New York." "Stop and frisk" was NOT declared unconstitutional. TRUMP: No, you're wrong. It went before a judge, who was a very against-police judge. It was taken away from her. And our mayor, our new mayor, refused to go forward with the case. They would have won an appeal. If you look at it, throughout the country, there are many places where it's allowed. HOLT: The argument is that it's a form of racial profiling. TRUMP: No, the argument is that we have to take the guns away from these people that have them and they are bad people that shouldn't have them. These are felons. These are people that are bad people that shouldn't be — when you have 3,000 shootings in Chicago from January 1st, when you have 4,000 people killed in Chicago by guns, from the beginning of the presidency of Barack Obama, his hometown, you have to have stop-and-frisk. If he was going to bring up stop and frisk, Donald Trump should have been better prepared on this topic and he could have stuffed it down Lester Holt's throat. "Stop and frisk" was NOT ruled unconstitutional in New York or elsewhere. "Stop and frisk" was ruled constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967). Judge Shira Scheindlin, sitting in the District Court in Manhattan, cannot overturn a U.S. Supreme Court opinion. There is an Opinion and Order of August 12, 2013 by Judge Scheindlin in the combined case of Floyd et al. v. City of New York, 08 Civ. 1034 (SAS) and Ligon et al. v. City of New York, et al., 12 Civ. 2274 (SAS), issued in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York. At page 2, emphasis as in original: At page 4, emphasis as in original: It would be strange for an Opinion holding "stop and frisk" to be unconstitutional, to state: To be very clear: I am not ordering an end to the practice of stop and frisk. The ruling pertained to actions incident to "stop and frisk" as carried out by the NYPD, not to stop and frisk itself. Racial profiling was held to be constitutionally objectionable: Floyd v City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d (S.D.N.Y. 12 Aug 2013) At 180: At 181-182: 1. Policy of Indirect Racial Profiling Throughout this litigation the City has acknowledged and defended the NYPD’s policy of conducting stops based in part on criminal suspect data, of which race is a primary factor. The NYPD implements this policy by emphasizing to officers the importance of stopping “the right people.” In practice, officers are directed, sometimes expressly, to target certain racially defined groups for stops. “The Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.” The Second Circuit has admonished that courts should “not 753 condone racially motivated police behavior” and must “take seriously an allegation of racial profiling.” Racial profiling constitutes intentional discrimination in violation of the Equal 754 Protection Clause if it involves any of the following: an express classification based on race that does not survive strict scrutiny; the application of facially neutral criminal laws or law 755 enforcement policies “in an intentionally discriminatory manner;” or a facially neutral policy 756 that has an adverse effect and was motivated by discriminatory animus. The City’s policy of 757 targeting “the right people” for stops clearly violates the Equal Protection Clause under the second method of proof, and, insofar as the use of race is explicit, the first. As for the removal of Judge Scheindlin from the case, the 2nd Circuit found that "her disqualification [wa]s required.] In re Reassignment of Cases: Ligon; Floyd et al. v. City of New York, et al. 13-3123; 13-3088 (2nd Cir., 31 Oct 2013), ORDER at 2-3: It is hereby ORDERED that the District Court’s January 8, 2013 “Opinion and Order,” as well as the August 12, 2013 “Liability Opinion” and “Remedies Opinion,” each of which may or will have the effect of causing actions to be taken by defendants or designees of the District Court, or causing restraints against actions that otherwise would be taken by defendants, are STAYED pending the disposition of these appeals. The appeal by defendants in both (consolidated) actions shall continue in the normal course, under the following schedule: Defendants shall perfect their appeals by January 24, 2014. Plaintiffs shall file by February 28, 2014. Defendants shall reply by March 14, 2014. Oral argument shall be heard on a date after March 14, 2014, to be set by the Court in due course. The cause is REMANDED to the District Court for the sole purpose of implementation of this Order, and the mandate shall otherwise remain with this Court until the completion of the appeals process. Upon review of the record in these cases, we conclude that the District Judge ran afoul of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 2 (“A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.”); see also Canon 3(C)(1) (“A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . .”), and that the appearance of impartiality surrounding this litigation was compromised by the District Judge’s improper application of the Court’s “related case rule,” see Transfer of Related Cases, S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. Local Rule 13(a),[1] and by a series of media __________ [1] In a proceeding on December 21, 2007 involving the parties in Daniels v. City of New York, No. 99 Civ. 1695 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 8, 1999), the District Judge stated, “[I]f you got proof of inappropriate racial profiling in a good constitutional case, why don’t you bring a lawsuit? You can certainly mark it as related.” She also stated, “[W]hat I am trying to say, I am sure I am going to get in trouble for saying it, for $65 you can bring that lawsuit.” She concluded the proceeding by noting, “And as I said before, I would accept it as a related case, which the plaintiff has the power to designate.” Two of the attorney groups working on behalf of plaintiffs in Daniels, a case - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - interviews and public statements purporting to respond publicly to criticism of the District Court.[2] Accordingly, we conclude that, in the interest , and appearance , of fair and impartial administration of justice , UPON REMAND , these cases shall be assigned to a different District Judge, chosen randomly under the established practices of the District Court for th e Southern District of New York. This newly-designated District Judge shall implement this Court’s mandate staying all proceedings and otherwise await further action by the Court of Appeals on the merits of the ongoing appeals. In taking these actions, we intimate no view on the substance or merits of the pending appeals, which have yet to be fully briefed and argued. The mandate shall ISSUE FORTHWITH for the sole purpose of implementation of this Order and shall otherwise remain in this Court. In the interest of judicial economy, any question, application, or further appeal regarding the scope of this Order or its implementation shall be directed to this panel, which will hear the case on the merits in due course. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk __________ challenging the New York Police Department’s stop-and-frisk practices, helped file Floyd the next month. See generally Joseph Goldstein, A Court Rule Directs Cases Over Friskings to One Judge, N.Y. Times, May 5, 2013. 2 See, e.g., Mark Hamblett, Stop-and-Frisk Judge Relishes her Independence, N.Y. Law Journal, May 5, 2013; Larry Neumeister, NY “Frisk” Judge Calls Criticism “Below-the-Belt,” The Associated Press, May 19, 2013; Jeffrey Toobin, A Judge Takes on Stop-and-Frisk, The New Yorker, May 27, 2013. In re Reassignment of Cases: Ligon; Floyd et al. v. City of New York, et al. 13-3123; 13-3088 (2nd Cir., 13 Nov 2013), at 2: (footnotes omitted, boldface added, italics in original) These cases, motions of which were argued in tandem, deal with an issue of great significance: the constitutional boundaries of practices by the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) that subject citizens to being stopped and frisked. On August 12, 2013, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin, a long-serving and distinguished jurist of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, held that the City of New York (“the City”) had violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and ordered the City to engage in a variety of remedial measures and activities. On August 27, 2013, the City moved in the district court to stay those remedies, pending an appeal on the merits of the district court’s decision. Judge Scheindlin denied the motions. On September 23, 2013, the City moved in this Court to stay the imposition of the district court’s remedies. By order dated October 31, 2013, we both granted that stay and, because the appearance of impartiality had been compromised by certain statements made by Judge Scheindlin during proceedings in the district court and in media interviews, we reassigned the cases to a different district judge, to be chosen randomly. We now explain the basis for that order, which is superseded by this opinion. At 6-7: A. The appearance of partiality stems in the first instance from comments made by Judge Scheindlin that a reasonable observer could interpret as intimating her views on the merits of a case that had yet to be filed, and as seeking to have that case filed and to preside over it after it was filed. These comments were made in the earlier case of Daniels v. City of New York, No. 99-cv-1695, in which the City entered into a settlement agreement requiring it, inter alia, to establish policies that prohibited racial profiling. Ten days before Judge Scheindlin’s supervisory authority under the settlement agreement was set to expire, she heard argument on a motion brought by the Daniels plaintiffs to extend the settlement period.16 The transcript of the hearing indicates that the City had substantially complied with the relief required by the settlement and that the plaintiffs were seeking information from the City beyond that required to be furnished by the settlement agreement. Observing that the settlement agreement did not entitle the plaintiffs to the relief they sought, Judge Scheindlin counseled: THE COURT: [. . .] why don’t you file a lawsuit Ligon; Floyd et al. v. City of New York, et al. (2nd Cir., 31 Oct 2014), footnote at 1: At 27-30, footnotes omitted, underline added Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b) provides that "[a]n appeal may be dismissed on the appellant's motion on terms agreed to by the parties or fixed by the court." Although we have affirmed Judge Torres's denial of the unions' motion to intervene, the merits of the underlying Liability and Remedial Orders are complex and controversial, and they indisputably implicate serious questions of broad constitutional importance, as well as difficult evidentiary questions concerning the use of statistical evidence. However, because the City has decided to exercise its right to settle these cases on the basis of an agreement to comply with the Remedial Order, we have no occasion to review the merits of either Judge Scheindlin's liability determination and challenges to the nature of plaintiffs' proof, or the remedies she thereafter ordered. The liability determinations are not part of the settlement and the Remedial Order has been accepted solely as the basis for the parties' settlement. Thus, nothing in this opinion should be construed as accepting or rejecting any part of the Liability and Remedial Orders issued by Judge Scheindlin. While the parties' settlement may not be formally designated a "consent decree" because it finds its basis in a post-trial judicial order, we understand it — and the parties confirmed this understanding at oral argument — to operate as such. We emphasize, therefore, that "[a] continuing decree of injunction directed to events to come is subject always to adaptation as events may shape the need." Injunctions in so-called institutional reform litigation "often remain in force for many years, and the passage of time frequently brings about changed circumstances — changes in the nature of the underlying problem, changes in governing law or its interpretation by the courts, and new policy insights — that warrant reexamination of the original judgment." As the Supreme Court has observed, "[i]f a federal consent decree is not limited to reasonable and necessary implementations of federal law, it may improperly deprive future officials of their designated legislative and executive powers." As the parties agreed at oral argument and have stated in their joint memorandum of law pertaining to the settlement, the Remedial Order adopted by the City in settlement of these cases is projected to expire in five years upon a showing of substantial compliance by the City, and the monitor's oversight will end in three years upon the same showing. Moreover, the District Court remains open to entertain proposed modifications to the presently agreed-upon settlement. In the particular circumstances presented here, the City's motion for voluntary dismissal of the appeals, with prejudice, must be granted. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Judge Torresfs July 30, 2014 decision is AFFIRMED as being an appropriate exercise of her discretion, the police unions' motions to intervene in the appeals are DENIED, the City's motion for voluntary dismissal of the appeals with prejudice is GRANTED, and the causes are REMANDED for such further proceedings before Judge Torres as may be appropriate in the circumstances. The mandate shall issue seven days from the date of the filing of this opinion. Nothing that we have written here, or that the parties have suggested, should foreclose any reliance by the unions on collective bargaining rights afforded to them under the Labor Management Relations Act and state and local law. Moreover, in view of the possible relevance of the unions' perspectives in any ongoing District Court proceedings, nothing in this opinion should be construed to inhibit the District Court from considering the interests of the unions, either as amici curiae, or on such other terms as the District Court may deem appropriate.
Pundits say that scream cost Howard Dean the primary. Maybe, maybe not. But he responded by saying, "the media did a bad thing" by exaggerating his rallying cry. I see. But it's just fine for him to exaggerate and speculate on Trump's sniffle?
Wasn't Hillary supposed to collapse and die during the debate according to all the speculation?
Given her past behavior, people questioned among themselves whether she'd be able to stand at a podium under the hot lights for 90 minutes. I'm not aware of anyone going on MSNBC and saying they expected Hillary to collapse and die.
There are no replies to Comment # 19. End Trace Mode for Comment # 19.
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HOLT: Your two — your two minutes expired, but I do want to follow up. Stop-and-frisk was ruled unconstitutional in New York, because it largely singled out black and Hispanic young men.
The purpose of this Opinion (the “Remedies Opinion”) is to determine what remedies are appropriate in these cases. I address both cases in one Opinion because the remedies necessarily overlap. Each requires that the NYPD reform practices and policies related to stop and frisk to conform with the requirements of the United States Constitution. I stress, at the outset, that the remedies imposed in this Opinion are as narrow and targeted as possible. To be very clear: I am not ordering an end to the practice of stop and frisk. The purpose of the remedies addressed in this Opinion is to ensure that the practice is carried out in a manner that protects the rights and liberties of all New Yorkers, while still providing much needed police protection.
With regard to the public interest, the City has expressed concern that interference in the NYPD’s stop and frisk practices may have a detrimental effect on crime control. However, as previously noted, I am not ordering an end to stop and frisk.
The NYPD’s practice of making stops that lack 751 individualized reasonable suspicion has been so pervasive and persistent as to become not only a part of the NYPD’s standard operating procedure, but a fact of daily life in some New York City neighborhoods.
B. The City Is Liable for Violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Rights Plaintiffs have established the City’s liability for the NYPD’s violation of plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights under two theories, either of which is adequate under Monell. First, plaintiffs showed that the City, through the NYPD, has a policy of indirect racial profiling based on local criminal suspect data. Second, plaintiffs showed that senior officials in the City and at the NYPD have been deliberately indifferent to the intentionally discriminatory application of stop and frisk at the managerial and officer levels.
Pending before the Court is a motion filed by Appellants City of New York et al. seeking a stay of the District Court’s August 12, 2013 remedial order and preliminary injunction (“Remedies Opinion”).
PER CURIAM
We emphasize at the outset that we make no findings of misconduct, actual bias, or actual partiality on the part of Judge Scheindlin. Following our review of the record, however, we conclude that her conduct while on the bench, which appears to have resulted in these lawsuits being filed and directed to her, in conjunction with her statements to the media and the resulting stories published while a decision on the merits was pending and while public interest in the outcome of the litigation was high, might cause a reasonable observer to question her impartiality. For this reason, her disqualification is required by section 455(a).
By stipulation, dated March 8, 2013, the parties withdrew all claims with prejudice against the individual defendants in Floyd v. City of New York. Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the official captions in Nos. 13-3088, 14-2829, and 14?2848 to conform with the caption above.
II.
#13. To: nolu chan, Dr. Cocaine, Howard Dean (#12)
(Edited)
#17. To: hondo68 (#13)
#18. To: misterwhite (#17)
exaggerate and speculate
#19. To: hondo68 (#18)
"Wasn't Hillary supposed to collapse and die during the debate according to all the speculation?"
Replies to Comment # 19.
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