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Title: Florida Woman Found Not Guilty of Marijuana Cultivation (Jury Nullification)
Source:
Marijuana.com
URL Source: http://www.marijuana.com/blog/news/ ... ilty-of-marijuana-cultivation/
Published: Sep 17, 2016
Author: Monterey Bud
Post Date: 2016-09-17 21:06:32 by Hondo68
Keywords: Not Guilty, legal, Maine to Florida
Views: 11599
Comments: 53
Bridget Kirouac, a medical marijuana patient who relocated from Maine to Florida, and who suffers from debilitating bone spurs, was found not guilty of cultivating medical marijuana in her Martin County home. BREAKING: Bridget Kirouac found NOT GUILTY of cultivation and possession of cannabis. More tonight on @WPTVpic.twitter.com/KTNuuRqXd7 — Jason Hackett (@JHackettWPTV) September 16, 2016 Informing the sympathetic jury, “I’m not a criminal, I’m a patient,” Kirouac told the attentive courtroom. “All I’m trying to do is survive.” Kirouac used marijuana Kirouac explained to the courtroom that she was an MMJ patient in the state of Maine with a valid recommendation for medical marijuana before relocating to the Sunshine State for its warmer climate. She held back tears while explaining her struggle with pain. “When you get to that point, and you tried as many of the options that are available to you as I have…dying becomes a very attractive prospect,” she said. The prosecution focused on the fact that medical marijuana was not legal at the time of her offense. They were ultimately handed a historical defeat with the jury’s not guilty verdict for Bridget Kirouac. Poster Comment: A jury of your peers has determined that growing weed is legal. THE END 
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Begin Trace Mode for Comment # 45.
#3. To: hondo68 (#0)
Hallelujah!! This was the second medical marijuana case that Michael Minardi has won in Florida. The first was the case of Jesse Teplicki. If you are ever charged with marijuana possession in Florida, be sure to cite the binding precedent of Florida v. Bridget Kirouac, opinion of the jury. That judge is a spoilsport.
You're really kind of an asshole, taking delight in the pain and suffering of others. Not just this thread either - it's pretty much the same on any post you make about medical marijuana users. Let's get one thing straight - the government does not own our bodies and as such has no business telling anyone what they may or may not use to medicate themselves.
Not just this thread either - it's pretty much the same on any post you make about medical marijuana users. Not taking delight, just not taking your blathering bullshit. Marijuana is illegal. Marijuana is not medicine. That is the law, like it or not. Jury nullification is just fine. It does not change any law. It does not say marijuana is legal. It says the jury, based on the fasts of the case, found rendering a guilty verdict in the case before them would be an injustice. They are empowered and free to render a not guilty verdict. They do not change the law. Each future defendant will have to roll the dice on a verdict, knowing that they have violated the law. And arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited.
Really? I did find the following, which falls short of "prohibited": "Most [not all - CF] judges also will prohibit attorneys from using their closing arguments to directly appeal to jurors to nullify the law. "Recently, several courts have indicated that judges also have the right, when it is brought to their attention by other jurors, to remove (prior to a verdict, of course) from juries any juror who makes clear his or her intention to vote to nullify the law. " - law2.umkc.edu/faculty/pro...zenger/nullification.html
For one example, see: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/417/1002/190492/ U.S. v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969) Argued June 10, 1969 William M. Kunstler, New York City, (Harold Buchman, Fred Weisgal, Baltimore, Md., Robert R. Drinan, William C. Cunningham, Harrop A. Freeman on brief), for appellants. Barnet D. Skolnik, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Stephen H. Sachs, U. S. Atty., on brief), for appellee. Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and SOBELOFF and WINTER, Circuit Judges. SOBELOFF, Circuit Judge: [...] II Appellants' second contention is that the trial judge should have informed the jury, as requested, that it had the power to acquit even if appellants were clearly guilty of the charged offenses. They maintain that the judge should have told the jury this or permitted their counsel to argue it to the jury in the face of the judge's instruction on the law. Appellants reason that since the jury has "the power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and facts," [5] then the jury should be told that it has this power. Furthermore, the argument runs, the jury's power to acquit where the law may dictate otherwise is a fundamental necessity of a democratic system. Only in this way, it is said, can a man's actions be judged fairly by society speaking through the jury, or a law which is considered too harsh be mitigated. [...] We recognize, as appellants urge, the undisputed power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given by the judge and contrary to the evidence. This is a power that must exist as long as we adhere to the general verdict in criminal cases, for the courts cannot search the minds of the jurors to find the basis upon which they judge. If the jury feels that the law under which the defendant is accused is unjust, or that exigent circumstances justified the actions of the accused, or for any reason which appeals to their logic or passion, the jury has the power to acquit, and the courts must abide by that decision. Concededly, this power of the jury is not always contrary to the interests of justice. For example, freedom of the press was immeasurably strengthened by the jury's acquittal of John Peter Zenger of seditious libel, a violation of which, under the law as it then existed and the facts, he was clearly guilty. In that case Andrew Hamilton was allowed to urge the jury, in the face of the judge's charge, "to see with their own eyes, to hear with their own ears, and to make use of their consciences and understanding in judging of the lives, liberties, or estates of their fellow subjects."[11] No less an authority than Dean Pound has expressed the opinion that "Jury lawlessness is the great corrective of law in its actual administration."[12] However, this is not to say that the jury should be encouraged in their "lawlessness," and by clearly stating to the jury that they may disregard the law, telling them that they may decide according to their prejudices or consciences (for there is no check to insure that the judgment is based upon conscience rather than prejudice), we would indeed be negating the rule of law in favor of the rule of lawlessness. This should not be allowed. The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 15 S. Ct. 273, 39 L. Ed. 343 (1895), affirmed the right and duty of the judge to instruct on the law, and since that case the issue has been settled for three-quarters of a century. Justice Harlan's scholarly opinion traced the history of the rights of juries in criminal cases. He distinguished Brailsford as a civil case and therefore not controlling in criminal trials. Justice Harlan further deprecated that decision, going to the extreme of questioning whether it was in fact reported properly, since he doubted that Chief Justice Jay could ever have held such an opinion even in a civil case. The Justice concluded finally that Public and private safety alike would be in peril if the principle be established that juries in criminal cases may, of right, disregard the law as expounded to them by the court, and become a law unto themselves. Under such a system, the principal function of the judge would be to preside and keep order while jurymen, untrained in the law, would determine questions affecting life, liberty, or property according to such legal principles as, in their judgment, were applicable to the particular case being tried. * * * But upon principle, where the matter is not controlled by express constitutional or statutory provisions, it cannot be regarded as the right of counsel to dispute before the jury the law as declared by the court. * * * We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court, and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence.[13] There was a powerful dissent by Justice Grey joined by Justice Shiras. As in the majority decision, Justice Grey historically traced the authorities and the classic arguments to support his conclusion that the jury should decide both the law and the facts.[14] The Harlan majority opinion, however, has carried the day. Since the Sparf case, the lower federal courts — even in the occasional cases in which they may have ventured to question its wisdom[15] — have adhered to the doctrine it affirmed.[16] Furthermore, among the states, only two still allow the jury to be told that they can disregard the law as given them by the court.[17] The recent case of United States v. Spock et al., 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969), heavily stressed by the appellants in their supplemental memorandum, does not reach a different conclusion. That case was concerned with the question arising from submission of special interrogatories to the jury. The First Circuit, speaking through Chief Judge Aldrich, concluded that By a progression of questions each of which seems to require an answer unfavorable to the defendant, a reluctant juror may be led to vote for a conviction which, in the large, he would have resisted. The result may be accomplished by a majority of the jury, but the course has been initiated by the judge, and directed by him through the frame of the questions.[18] Nowhere does the court intimate that the judge should not instruct the jury on the law, and nowhere does it hold, as appellants here contend, that the jury should be instructed that it may disregard the law as declared by the judge.
Are you claiming that any part of your lengthy copy-and-paste supports your claim that "arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited" - and if so, which one? It certainly isn't this:
No, the U.S. Supreme Court set the precedent in 1895. See #25. The standing precedent is Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895). Once you persuade the courts that over a century of standing settled precedent should be overturned, you will be making progress. Until then, you are just spewing doper bullshit.
No, the U.S. Supreme Court set the precedent in 1895. See #25. Nothing there about ARGUING nullification - it says juries have an unenforceable moral duty to to receive the law from the court.
Your absurd interpretation of Sparf is pure bullshit pulled out of your ass. Here is a Federal court interpretation of that Opinion which covers 156 U.S. 51 through 107. http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/417/1002/190492/ U.S. v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969)
Which in no way implies your claim that "arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited". As a logician you're a great copy-and-paster.
United States v. Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Mass. 2008) And your are a master weasel-word bullshitter, but have no substance to your bullshit. You just pull it out of yor ass. Thank you, sir! May I have another? Yes, you may. United States v. Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Mass. 2008) Courts have long recognized that defendants have no right to an instruction on jury nullification. See United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 1969). A court may "block defense attorneys' attempts to serenade a jury with the siren song of nullification ... and ... may instruct the jury on the dimensions of their duty to the exclusion of jury nullification." United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1190 (1st Cir.1993). Just as defendants have no right to an instruction on nullification, jurors have no right to nullify. As a D.C. Circuit panel comprised of Chief Judge Spottswood W. Robinson, III, Judge George E. MacKinnon, and then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained: United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C.Cir.1983) (per curiam) (emphasis in original). ii. If Taken Seriously, Jury Nullification Threatens to Undermine the Democratic Process and the Rule of Law If it were taken seriously by mainstream Americans, jury nullification would threaten to unravel the fabric of our democracy. The impropriety of nullification emanates from the notion that ours is "a government of laws and not of men." See Mass. Const. Part I, art. XXX.[8] This means simply that no citizen is above the law, and none is free to make his own law. As Thomas Paine stated in Common Sense, "For as in absolute governments the king is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king; and there ought to be no other." Thomas *121 Paine, Common Sense (1776), available at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/paine.htm.
Nice job of proving what I already stipulated, dolt: that some judges - presumably including Judge Young (United States District Court, D. Massachusetts) - will prohibit attorneys from using their closing arguments to directly appeal to jurors to nullify the law. Thanks for proving my point: As a logician you're a great copy-and-paster.
Thanks for proving my point: As a logician you're a great copy-and-paster. Thank you for proving my point that you are nothing but a bloviating asshole. NOT JUST SOME JUDGES, the BAR ASSOCIATIONS do it as well as the judges. Your attorney will not directly argue nullification as the judge will quickly admonish him to quit if he goes near it. If he continues, he will be stopped. If necessary, the judge can declare that the closing argument is finished. Then the judge can refer him for Rule 11 sanctions to include suspension or disbarment, plus a hefty fine. Your lawyer will not go there because it can be expensive and may cost his license. If you are representing yourself, the judge does not have to take your shit. He will warn you, and if necessary, tell you to sit down and be quiet. He may hold you in contempt. If needed, you may be taken to another room, restrained in a chair, and watch the rest of the proceeding on closed-circuit television. Directly arguing jury nullification is prohibited in Federal courts and in 48 states. The two exceptions are Maryland and Indiana, and even there, "the jury instructions typically admonish the jury not to arbitrarily and willfully disregard the law or substitute their own judgment for what they think the law should be in a particular case." See, e.g., D.C. Bar, Ethics Opinion 320, Jury Nullification Arguments by Criminal Defense Counsel [...] In these early periods of American history, the power of the jury to nullify the law was explicit and affirmatively approved. With the turn of the 20th century, however, the law has developed a more strict separation between the domain of the court (to say what the law is) and the domain of the jury (to determine the facts). Jurors today are routinely instructed that they must accept the law as given to them by the court in its instructions. E.g., Sparf & Hanson v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).[1] Thus, under contemporary substantive legal standards, a suggestion by a lawyer to a jury that it should ignore the law as stated by the judge may be tantamount to an explicit invitation to the jury to ignore the judge’s instructions. [...] Thus, at a minimum defense counsel must necessarily conform their conduct to the substantive law of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is appearing. See D.C. Rule 8.5(a); see also Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 105 (2000) (“a lawyer must comply with applicable law, including rules of procedure and evidence and specific tribunal rulings”). In this jurisdiction, such substantive law appears to preclude express advocacy of the jury nullification power. The District of Columbia has no rule or statute authorizing jury nullification. Both the local courts and the federal courts have rejected assertions that juries are entitled to an instruction apprising them of their “right” to nullify the law. See United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (fact that juries can abuse their power and return verdicts contrary to the law does not mean that courts must give such instruction); Reale v. United States, 573 A.2d 13 (D.C. 1990) (trial court not required to instruct jurors about their power of jury nullification). [...] Moreover, the standard jury instruction given in District of Columbia courts contains this express admonition to the jury: “You may not ignore any instruction, or question the wisdom of any rule of law.” Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, Instr. 2.01 (Bar Assn. of D.C. 4th ed. 1993). Within this jurisdiction express exhortations to ignore the law are, therefore, likely to be deemed prohibited by law and may, therefore, result in violations of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct by lawyers who advocate such a course. See D.C. Rule 8.4. [...] 1. Two states, Indiana and Maryland, retain state constitutional provisions that enshrine a jury’s authority to determine the law as well as the facts. See Ind. Const. art. I, § 19; Md. Decl. of Rights, art. 23. But even in those states the jury instructions typically admonish the jury not to arbitrarily and willfully disregard the law or substitute their own judgment for what they think the law should be in a particular case. See. e.g.. Indiana Jury Instruction (quoted in Kourlis, “Not Jury Nullification; Not a Call for Ethical Reform; But Rather a Case for Judicial Control,” 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1109, 1111 (1996)).
Fine, make that "some judges and some bar associations" - still doesn't add up to a universal prohibition, particularly since a defendant has the option of representing himself and if doing so could give a shit what any bar association says.
#46. To: ConservingFreedom, Willie Green, sneakypete, Vicomte13, TooConservative (#45)
This is a good point. If a law is badly written, and a person is obviously innocent by the moral standards, why to pay lawyers? Present your cause to the jury directly and if jurors are not heartless morons you will be vindicated. BTW, if represent yourself, can you participate in jury selection?
Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest A jury of your peers has determined that growing weed is legal.
“It’s been extraordinarily stressful…emotionally draining” Kirouac says but the judge says her acquittal doesn’t mean she is free to use medical marijuana.
#4. To: nolu chan (#3)
(Edited)
#9. To: Deckard (#4)
You're really kind of an asshole, taking delight in the pain and suffering of others.
#15. To: nolu chan (#9)
And arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited.
#17. To: ConservingFreedom, TPAINE (#15)
I did find the following, which falls short of "prohibited": "Most [not all - CF] judges also will prohibit attorneys from using their closing arguments to directly appeal to jurors to nullify the law.
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Decided October 15, 1969
#24. To: nolu chan (#17)
We recognize, as appellants urge, the undisputed power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given by the judge and contrary to the evidence. This is a power that must exist as long as we adhere to the general verdict in criminal cases, for the courts cannot search the minds of the jurors to find the basis upon which they judge. If the jury feels that the law under which the defendant is accused is unjust, or that exigent circumstances justified the actions of the accused, or for any reason which appeals to their logic or passion, the jury has the power to acquit, and the courts must abide by that decision.
#27. To: ConservingFreedom (#24)
Are you claiming that any part of your lengthy copy-and-paste supports your claim that "arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited" - and if so, which one?
#28. To: nolu chan (#27)
'Are you claiming that any part of your lengthy copy-and-paste supports your claim that "arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited" - and if so, which one?'
#29. To: ConservingFreedom (#28)
Nothing there about ARGUING nullification - it says juries have an unenforceable moral duty to to receive the law from the court.
The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 15 S. Ct. 273, 39 L. Ed. 343 (1895), affirmed the right and duty of the judge to instruct on the law, and since that case the issue has been settled for three-quarters of a century.
#31. To: nolu chan (#29)
the right and duty of the judge to instruct on the law
#32. To: ConservingFreedom (#31)
Which in no way implies your claim that "arguing nullification to the jury is prohibited". As a logician you're a great copy-and-paster.
i. Juries Do Not Have a Right to Disregard the Judge's Instructions on the Law
A jury has no more "right" to find a "guilty" defendant "not guilty" than it has to find a "not guilty" defendant "guilty," and the fact that the former cannot be corrected by a court, while the latter can be, does not create a right out of the power to misapply the law. Such verdicts are lawless, a denial of due process and constitute an exercise of erroneously seized power.
#35. To: nolu chan (#32)
United States v. Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Mass. 2008)
#40. To: ConservingFreedom (#35)
Nice job of proving what I already stipulated, dolt: that some judges - presumably including Judge Young (United States District Court, D. Massachusetts) - will prohibit attorneys from using their closing arguments to directly appeal to jurors to nullify the law.
A lawyer defending a criminal case may zealously advocate for the acquittal of his client using any evidentiary argument for which he has a reasonable good faith basis. Current legal standards strongly disfavor jury nullification and prohibit express exhortations that a jury nullify the law. Accordingly, a lawyer may not, consistent with the rules of professional conduct, expressly urge a jury to disregard the law. Nor may a lawyer disregard a ruling of the tribunal limiting the scope of permissible argument.
#45. To: nolu chan (#40)
NOT JUST SOME JUDGES, the BAR ASSOCIATIONS do it
Replies to Comment # 45. Fine, make that "some judges and some bar associations" - still doesn't add up to a universal prohibition, particularly since a defendant has the option of representing himself and if doing so could give a shit what any bar association says.
End Trace Mode for Comment # 45.
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