Title: Ohio Supreme Court Strikes Down Law Banning Cops from Having Sex with Minors Source:
From The Trenches URL Source:http://www.fromthetrenchesworldrepo ... -having-sex-with-minors/167351 Published:Aug 2, 2016 Author:Ben Keller Post Date:2016-08-02 10:21:48 by Deckard Keywords:None Views:1190 Comments:8
An Ohio cop narrowly avoided being sent back to prison for having sex with a 14-year-old boy after the state supreme court ruled in his favor last week, stating that a law barring cops from having sex with minors was unconstitutional.
In the 4-3 decision, the Ohio Supreme Court determined the law violated the states Equal Protection Clause of both the U.S. Constitution and the Ohio Constitution because it imposed a higher standard on cops than it did for the general public.
The Ohio sexual battery law includes provisions that make it illegal for people with established authoritarian relationships to have sex with minors, including teachers, coaches, administrators, scout leader, clerics and police officers.
However, the court determined that police officers should not be included with the others because there is no occupation-based relationship between the officer and the victim.
In other words, the Ohio Supreme Court does not find it possible that a police officer would use his badge to coerce sex out of a minor.
In this case, Matthew Mole was a 35-year-old Waite Hill police officer when he met the 14-year-old boy online in 2011, who told him he was 18.
Even when Mole snuck into the boys house around 3 a.m. on December 11, 2011 and discovered the boy was shorter and lighter than he had described, not to mention he wore braces and had yet to begin shaving, he still believed the boy to be 18.
The two undressed and were performing oral sex on each other in an unlit sunroom in the back of the house when the boys mother walked in on them.
It was then that Mole learned the boy was only 14.
In July 2012, the boy testified that he had lied to Mole about his age and that the sex was consensual, so a jury returned with a hung verdict on the former charge because they could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the cop knew the boy was younger than 16, which is the legal age of consent in Ohio.
Matthew T. Mole was arrested in 2011 after the mother of the 14-year-old boy he molested found him in her house during the night. Mole was 35 at the time.
However, the following week, a judge found him guilty of the sexual battery charge because of the provision in the law that states, No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another, not the spouse of the offender, when any of the following apply: The other person is a minor, the offender is a peace officer, and the offender is more than two years older than the other person.
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Judge Nancy McDonnell sentenced Mole to two years in prison in August 2012 and ordered him to register as a sex offender upon his release.
He remained in prison until July 2013 when he had the conviction reversed upon appeal.
We agree with Mole that ones occupation as a peace officer alone, without more, does not provide a person with an unconscionable advantage over a minor, wrote Judge Larry A. Jone of the Eighth Appellate District Court of Ohio in the reversal decision.
But Cuyahoga County prosecutors appealed the decision to the state supreme court.
On Thursday, the Ohio Supreme Court returned with its decision, which you can read here, affirming the appellate courts decision in that the 2007 law was unconstitutional because it singled out cops, whose jobs, unlike teachers, administrators, coaches and clerics does not afford offenders access to children.
That doesnt mean that police may engage in such acts without fear of prosecution. Other laws barring adults, including peace officers, from having sexual conduct with minors remain in place.
Writing for the court, Chief Justice Maureen OConnor noted that provisions in the sexual battery statute that apply to a teacher or a minister or a mental health provider are different in that they require an occupational relationship with the minor. The ban for officers, according to OConnor, required no such relationship and as such was an arbitrarily disparate treatment of peace officers.
The key passages are below:
{¶ 2} R.C. 2907.03 is generally a valid scheme insofar as it imposes strict liability for sexual conduct between various classes of offenders who exploit their victims through established authoritarian relationships. But subdivision (A)(13) irrationally imposes that same strict liability on peace officers even when there is no occupation-based relationship between the officer and the victim. We therefore conclude that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) is an arbitrarily disparate treatment of peace officers that violates equal protection under the Ohio Constitution and the United States Constitution. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Eighth District Court of Appeals declaring R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) facially unconstitutional.
{¶ 68} The differential treatment of peace officers in this statutory scheme is based on an irrational classification. The statute not only fails to include any relationship or other element that justifies the omission of a scienter requirement, but also disparately affects peace officers in a way that bears no rational relationship to the governments interest in protecting minors from sexual coercion by people in positions of authority who use that authority to compel submission. Having carefully considered the compelling interests at play here, the constitutional protections afforded our citizens, and the strong presumption of constitutionality that can only be overcome by a showing that the statute clearly and unequivocally violates the Constitution, we are compelled to conclude that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio and United States Constitutions.
We do not condone the conduct of appellee. Nor do we easily reach our conclusion that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) represents a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855.
{¶ 70} Although the government has a compelling interest in protecting minors from sexual coercion and an interest in prohibiting peace officers from abusing their authority in order to sexually exploit minors, the government cannot punish a class of professionals without making a connection between the classification and the prohibited act. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, declaring R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) to be unconstitutional on its face.
One of the dissenters is a former cop, Justice Sharon Kennedy, who believed police officer should be held to a higher standard than the general population.
Criminalizing sexual conduct between a peace officer and a minor is rationally related to a legitimate state interest because it punishes peace officers for conduct that if discovered would diminish them in the eyes of the community. If a peace officer discovered after the fact that the person with whom he engaged in sexual conduct was a minor, he would have a strong incentive to do whatever is necessary to ensure that his employer never found out, even to the point of compromising his integrity. Moreover, there is the potential for blackmail, which could lead to corrupt behavior or worse. These considerations demonstrate how the statute is rationally related to a legitimate government interest of protecting the public trust in peace officers by criminalizing conduct that is not only immoral but is fraught with the potential for corruption and exploitation.
Kennedy also argued that the courts majority decision was wrong by citing Ohio law that in order for a statute to be facially unconstitutional, it must be unconstitutional in all applications.
So just because Mole did not have an occupational relationship with the 14-year-old boy does not mean other officers will not have established authoritarian relationships with minors, which would allow them to use that position to sexually abuse children, no different than teachers, coaches or clerics, whom the court believes have special access to children.
All we have to do is look at Police Explorer programs throughout the country in which boys and girls interested in careers in law enforcement are allowed to work with their local law enforcement agencies once they turn 14, going on ride-alongs and learning hands-on aspects of the job, which has resulted in hundreds of reportedcases of sex abuse over the years.
So its obvious that Kennedy, as a former cop, is much more aware of what takes place within police departments than the four judges who struck the law down as unconstitutional in the false belief that cops have no more power over children than the average citizen.
PINAC Publisher Carlos Miler contributed to this article
" Ohio Supreme Court Strikes Down Law Banning Cops from Having Sex with Minors "
Sounds like Buckeye land needs to change some judges, Pronto !!
Si vis pacem, para bellum
Those who beat their swords into plowshares will plow for those who don't
Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God.
if you look around, we have gone so far down the the rat hole, the almighty is going to have to apologize to Sodom and Gomorrah, if we don't have a judgement come down on us.
President Obama is the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people. --Clint Eastwood
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In other words, the Ohio Supreme Court does not find it possible that a police officer would use his badge to coerce sex out of a minor.
The ruling doesn't mean that police may engage in such acts without fear of prosecution. Other laws barring adults, including peace officers, from having sexual conduct with minors remain in place. And in its opinion the court was clear that it was not condoning the officer's behavior.
The state said a provision of the state's sexual battery statute, which bars sexual conduct with a minor when the officer is more than two years older than the minor, violated the equal protection clauses in the U.S. Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.
Writing for the court, Chief Justice Maureen O'Connor noted that provisions in the sexual battery statute that apply to a teacher or a minister or a mental health provider are different in that they require an occupational relationship with the minor. The ban for officers, though, required no such relationship and as such was an "arbitrarily disparate treatment of peace officers."
The cop never revealed to the youth that he was a cop. And even if he had, The OSC actually found that a stupid judge used tje wrong law in this case and applied it improperly after a hung jury could not decide the case.
If the judge had not fucked up, then the bastard would be on his was to the hoosegaw where he deserves to be.
Gawd .I HATE Yellow Journalism with a passion !!!
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The Ohio sexual battery law includes provisions that make it illegal for people with established authoritarian relationships to have sex with minors, including teachers, coaches, administrators, scout leader, clerics and police officers.
However, the court determined that police officers should not be included with the others because there is no occupation-based relationship between the officer and the victim.
As long as there is a law on the books requiring citizens to obey any lawful order issued by a police officer, I'd say this "established authoritarian relationship" certainly does exist.
The SC in this case is basically saying that citizens are legally responsible, to the point of risking either being the subject of an unlawful sexual act OR risking a criminal violation for refusing to obey a lawful order, to understand whether a particular instruction by a police officer is lawful or not. And must do so on the spot without any opportunity to consult a lawyer. This is not the case with any of the other professions listed in the statute, where disobeying ANY instruction is never a criminal matter.
Predatory persons on the police force, knowing this, can use it to their extreme advantage.
I would expect the legislature would be able to craft a new law that addresses this ruling such that police are criminally penalized for using their badges to coerce someone into a sexual encounter.
I would expect the legislature would be able to craft a new law that addresses this ruling such that police are criminally penalized for using their badges to coerce someone into a sexual encounter.
A new law? Is there a need for yet ANOTHER new law .or is there a need to properly enforce the humongous amount of laws already on the books?
This law referenced in the article is okay as it is written, that was not the problem. The problem here was that the judge used the wrong law to sentence after a hung jury could not decide on a verdict. He could have easily sent the cop to jail using a different law.
There are a number of Ohio laws that already criminally penalized cops for improperly using their badges, not just to coerce someone into a sexual encounter. Here is but one: 4501:2-6-02 Performance of duty and conduct.
BTW, the Yellow Journalism article on this thread did not state that the cop never revealed to the kid the he was a cop. This was pointed out in other articles. Ergo, there was no misuse of a badge to coerce anyone here. This does not justify or excuse the cop's improper and unlawful conduct.
Ohio Revised Code » Title [29] XXIX CRIMES - PROCEDURE » Chapter 2907: SEX OFFENSES
2907.03 Sexual battery.
(A) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another, not the spouse of the offender, when any of the following apply:
[...]
(13) The other person is a minor, the offender is a peace officer, and the offender is more than two years older than the other person.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of sexual battery. Except as otherwise provided in this division, sexual battery is a felony of the third degree. If the other person is less than thirteen years of age, sexual battery is a felony of the second degree, and the court shall impose upon the offender a mandatory prison term equal to one of the prison terms prescribed in section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for a felony of the second degree.
As phrased, this code is screwed up. It does not say a peace officer acting in the performance of his duties, uses a very broad definition of peace officer, and has no mens rea requirement.
So, a cop (or a forest officer, a preserve officer, a wildlife officer, a park officer or a state watercraft officer) is celebrating his 20th birthday, off duty in civilian clothing, and meets a girl just before she will turn 18. She is in a club and presents as an adult. She has the hots for him and they later leave and have sex.
Is the young cop (or a forest officer, a preserve officer, a wildlife officer, a park officer or a state watercraft officer) guilty of a felony under the code?
Is the law constitutional?
From opinion:
{¶3} The charges stemmed from a single sexual encounter that 36-year-old Mole, who was a police officer for the city of Waite Hill, had with 14-year-old J.S. Mole met J.S. in an online chat room; J.S. told Mole he was in high school but 18 years of age. J.S. did not know Mole was a police officer.
Mole was charged with unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, and also one count of sexual battery at issue before the court. The charge for unlawful sexual conduct was not at issue.
A jury trial on the charge of unlawful sexual conduct resulted in a mistrial when the jury could not reach a verdict.
A separate bench trial was held on the sexual battery charge, resulting in conviction and a two year sentence.
From opinion:
{¶17} Because a police officer may be held to a higher standard of conduct than an ordinary citizen, even when the police officer is off duty, prohibiting sexual relationships between police officers and minors may therefore rationally advance a legitimate state interest, we think, especially if the police officer uses his or her occupation to influence the minor into the relationship.
{¶18} But R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) broadly classifies the offender as a peace officer. Under Ohio law, a peace officer includes traditional police officer categories: a sheriff, deputy sheriff, marshal, deputy marshal, municipal police officer, metropolitan housing authority police officer, regional transit authority police officer, state university law enforcement officer, enforcement agent of the department of public safety, veterans home police officer, port authority police officer, township police constable or officer, and airport police officer. R.C. 2935.01(B). The definition also includes: a department of taxation investigator, a natural resources law enforcement staff officer, a forest officer, a preserve officer, a wildlife officer, a park officer, or a state watercraft officer; the house of representatives sergeant-at-arms if the house of representatives sergeant-at- arms has arrest authority, assistant house of representatives sergeant-at-arms, the senate sergeant-at-arms, and the assistant senate sergeant-at-arms. Id.
{¶19} Thus, while the state may have a valid interest in creating a law prohibiting sexual conduct between traditionally-defined police officers and minors because police officers are held to a higher standard than ordinary citizens, we question whether the same should be said for each classification of peace officer.
From Opinion:
{¶21} Unlike the other subsections of the sexual battery statute, R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) is unique in that it: (1) has no mens rea requirement and (2) contains no relationship or occupational requirement between the offender and victim.
As written, the statute does not require that the offender knew the victim was two years younger. It does not matter if his job is not even known to the victim and has nothing to do with the offense.
From Opinion:
{¶26} R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) is different. This subsection prohibits a peace officer from having sexual conduct with a minor more than two years younger than the officer, without consideration given to whether (1) the peace officer used his or her position to facilitate the offense or the victim was in the custody, control, or under the supervision or influence of the peace officer; (2) the victim knew that the offender was a peace officer; or (3) the peace officer knew or should have known the victim was a minor. Moreover, not only does this statute punish relationships such as the one in this case where the age difference was great, but it also punishes relationships between a 17-year-old minor and a 19-year-old peace officer, so long as there is more than a two year age difference.
{¶27} The state argues that the legislatures intent was to protect minors from exposure to certain types of sexual conduct and in order to achieve that interest, it was necessary to hold peace officers to a higher standard by expanding the statute to encompass situations where there is even the possibility of influence over a child with no requirement that the relationship arise while the peace officer was performing official duties.
From Opinion:
{¶34} Likewise, in this case, the state might have a legitimate interest in protecting minors from police officers who use their profession to pursue inappropriate sexual relationships. But there exists no occupational connection or relationship requirement in R.C. 2907.03(A)(13). We agree with Mole that ones occupation as a peace officer alone, without more, does not provide a person with an unconscionable advantage over a minor.
{¶35} Consequently, because the states method or means of achieving its interest is not rational, R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) fails the second prong of the rational-basis test.
{¶36} In sum, while the state may have a legitimate interest in protecting minors from those who might use their undue influence over them in order to pursue sexual relationships, Mole has been able to show that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) bears no rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.
{¶37} Therefore, we find that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States constitutions. The trial court erred in denying Moles motion to dismiss.
The victim testified he had sex with Mole on Dec. 19, 2011, after meeting him on a gay dating smartphone app called Grindr. The boys mother called police after catching Mole at her home after the act.
Defense attorney Richard J. Perez argued the alleged victim was the aggressor because he instigated the computer chat, showed Mole a nude photo of himself and invited Mole to his home to have sex even though he knew he was 35.
Mole claimed he thought the boy was 18. The boy lied about his age on Grindr, saying he was 18 on his profile, and also lied about his height and weight to appear older.
Prosecutors argued the boy looked even younger than his age in person. Mole said their sexual encounter was in a dark room.
Mr. Mole never told (the boy) he was a police officer and brought nothing into the home that would have identified himself as a police officer, Perez and appellate attorney John Fatica wrote in court documents. No evidence was presented at trial to contradict the fact the (boy) never knew Mr. Mole was a police officer until after the arrest.