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Title: Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document
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Published: Jun 28, 2016
Author: Mike Lee
Post Date: 2016-06-28 07:12:57 by tpaine
Keywords: None
Views: 22847
Comments: 124
Our Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document Mike Lee The still-unfolding story of America’s Constitution is a history of heroes and villains—the flawed visionaries who inspired and crafted liberty’s safeguards, and the shortsighted opportunists who defied them. Those stories are known by few today. In Our Lost Constitution, Senator Mike Lee tells the dramatic, little-known stories behind six of the Constitution’s most indispensible provisions. He shows their rise. He shows their fall. And he makes vividly clear how nearly every abuse of federal power today is rooted in neglect of this Lost Constitution. For example: • The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. • The Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable searches and seizures, but the NSA now collects our private data without a warrant. • The Legislative Powers Clause means that only Congress can pass laws, but unelected agencies now produce ninety-nine out of every one hundred pages of legal rules imposed on the American people. Lee’s cast of characters includes a former Ku Klux Klansman, who hijacked the Establishment Clause to strangle Catholic schools; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who called the Second Amendment a fraud; and the revered president who began his first of four terms by threating to shatter the balance of power between Congress and the president, and who began his second term by vowing to do the same to the Supreme Court. Fortunately, the Constitution has always had its defenders. Senator Lee tells the story of how Andrew Jackson, noted for his courage in duels and politics, stood firm against the unconstitutional expansion of federal powers. He brings to life Ben Franklin’s genius for compromise at a deeply divided constitutional convention. And he tells how in 2008, a couple of unlikely challengers persuaded the Supreme Court to rediscover the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms. Sections of the Constitution may have been forgotten, but it’s not too late to bring them back—if only we remember why we once demanded them and how we later lost them. Drawing on his experience working in all three branches of government, Senator Lee makes a bold case for resurrecting the Lost Constitution to restore and defend our fundamental liberties. View this title on Amazon.com
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#17. To: nolu chan (#14)
Deckard and tpaine outed themselves as constitutional idiots long ago. ---- nolu chan Poor nolu, reduced to playing neener, neener games with the truth about gatlin. Are you some relative too? (Harrowup made that claim) Is that why you defend his nonexistent honor?
I'm sure he doesn't literally claim that - so what are you actually saying about his views? A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them. Will you, can you debate constitutional issues? So you won't. Making you a chickenshit anti-constitutionalist. Thanks.. But you'll waste unlimited time on petty replies, as long as you don't have to debate. As I've said, you're a phony chickenshit.
I'm sure he doesn't literally claim that - so what are you actually saying about his views? --- ConservingFreedom All these canaries are the same. ---- Big mouths on generalities, no hat on specifics.
That they're dogmatic & narrow-minded.
I thought they supposedly hated each other at first before they eventually fell in love? Vegetarians eat vegetables. Beware of humanitarians!
Nolu, are you some relative of gatlin, too? (Harrowup made that claim) Could be, but gat & h'rup ended as kissen cousins.
What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. The US government is corrupt.
Wow! -- You sure tell it like it is...
It wouldn't be so bad, but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office. The corrupt D&R party supports a corrupt US government.
Relax. Trump will save us all.
If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University.
Relax. Trump will save us all. My GED was issued by Trump U. I was in the same class as nolu chan and gatlin. I graduated with honors, while they were ranked hind tit.
no comment, tpaine ... you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out!
See if you can find a sense of humor.
You mean like our founding fathers set the election process as? lol Well, you're in luck in 2016, asshole. This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP. You can write him in if you like. The (D)'s and the (R)'s hate him... and the libtard Paultards REALLY hate him. He's your two party hatred dream come true. lol I'm the infidel... Allah warned you about. كافر المسلح
More bullshit from a dumb elementary school crosswalk guard. Trump is just another pigment colour but underneath he is 0bama. Kinda like you ...
Is that what you pathetic Paultards have resorted too... claiming Trump is a closet Obunghole? LMFAO. You drug addict agenda posting tool bags have been screaming 2 party= 1 party hate since LP or LF was formed... and now a VIABLE candidate is running that's hated by BOTH parties... and you assholes hate him more. F' off. You're a joke. I'm the infidel... Allah warned you about. كافر المسلح
[Mike Lee, posted by tpaine] The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare. [buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. I understand tpaine and buckeroo were valedictorian and salutatorian at the tpaine School for the Gifted. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives.
If you read it, the Constitution is actually quite clear - there is no wiggle room in, for example, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." A government strong enough to impose your standards is strong enough to ban them. Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Nolu puts himself forward as some sort of legal expert. --- He must have failed logic at any sort of law school he may have attended.
Amusing post, because obviously, buck answered it before nolu asked.. Well, it is obvious tpaine cannot or will not answer the question, what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Will either of the two graduates of the tpaine School for the Gifted make the attempt?
Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -- Get it yet nolu?
Get it yet nolu? Yes, I get it. You are just full of shit and do not know what you are blathering about. Your evasive answer is the equivalent of Because Benghazi! My question was: You have failed to state what, if anything, the ACA has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution. You have failed to state that you do, or do not, claim that the ACA violated the Origination Clause, or what it was that you may claim constituted such violation. You say that Chief Justice DECREED that Obamacase is just another tax, and that it ignored the congressional house of origin, but you have failed to identify which house you claim the ACA originated in, and why that was somehow improper. And you fail to state why or how the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, written by Chief Justice Roberts, involves or runs afoul of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, you should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause.
Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu.
- Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. I get it. tpaine is just full of shit. So sayeth the courts, over and over and over. Of course, this time is no exception. Yes, you may have another. As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, The word "for" applies to the purpose of a "Bill," not to any single provision of it. The grammatical reading of the text of the Origination Clause is that it only reaches bills that have raising revenue as their purpose or object. Too bad, so sad, you showed your incompetence again. Here, see the whole opinion in Twin City. After 119 years, it is still good precedent. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) 167 U.S. 196 ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Syllabus Section 41 of the National Banking Act imposing certain taxes upon the average amount of the notes in circulation of a banking association, now found in the Revised Statutes, is not a revenue bill within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills." Whether in determining such a question the courts may refer to the journals of the two Houses of Congress for the purpose of ascertaining whether the act originated in the one House or the other is not decided. The case is stated in the opinion. 167 U. S. 197 MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court. This was an action by the plaintiff in error to recover from the defendant in error the sum of $73.08 alleged to have been paid by the former under protest to the latter, who was at the time Treasurer of the United States, in order to procure the release of certain bonds, the property of the bank, which bonds, the declaration alleged, were illegally and wrongfully withheld from the plaintiff by the defendant. The plaintiff went into liquidation in the manner provided by law on the 23d of June, 1891, and on the 25th of August, 1891, deposited in the Treasury of the United States lawful money to redeem its outstanding notes, as required by § 5222 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. After making such deposit, the bank demanded the bonds which had been deposited by it to secure its circulating notes, and of which defendant had possession as Treasurer of the United States. The defendant refused to deliver them unless the bank would make a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1, 1891, to the date when the deposit of money was made, viz., the 25th of August, 1891, and pay a tax thereon. The bank then made a return of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from January 1 to June 30, 1891, and paid to the defendant $56.25, protesting that he had no authority to demand the tax, and delivered to him a protest in writing, setting forth that, in making the return and in paying the tax, it did not admit the validity of the tax, or defendant's authority to exact or collect it, but made the return and payment solely for the purpose of procuring the possession of the United States bonds belonging to it, which defendant had refused to release until such return and payment were made, and further protesting that it was not liable to the tax, or any part of it. The bank's agent then made another demand upon defendant for the bonds, but he refused to deliver them until a return should be made of the average amount of its notes in circulation for the period from July 1 to August 25, 1891, and a tax paid 167 U. S. 198 thereon. Its agent then delivered such return to defendant, and paid him $16.83, at the same time delivering a written protest in the same form as the one above mentioned. These transactions were with the defendant himself, and the money was paid to him in person. The journals of the House of Representatives and Senate of the United States for the first session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress were put in evidence by plaintiff. The bank claims that these journals show that the National Bank Act originated as a bill in the House of Representatives; that when it passed the house, it contained no provision for a tax upon the national banks, or upon any corporation, or upon any individual, or upon any property, nor any provisions whatever for raising revenue, and that all the provisions that appear to authorize the Treasurer of the United States to collect any tax on the circulating notes of national banks originated in the Senate, by way of amendment to the house bill. A witness on behalf of the defendant testified, against the objection of plaintiff, that the money paid by it to him was covered into the Treasury and applied to the payment of the semiannual duty or tax due from the bank. But it did not appear whether this was done before or after the present action was brought. At the close of the evidence, counsel for the bank moved the court to direct the jury to return a verdict in its favor, which motion the court overruled, and counsel for the bank excepted. On motion of the defendant, the court instructed the jury to return a verdict for him. To that ruling of the court counsel for plaintiff excepted. Such is the case which the bank insists is made by the record. The taxing provisions contained in the National Bank Act are found in its forty-first section. That § is as follows: "The plates and special dies to be procured by the Comptroller of the Currency for the printing of such circulating notes shall remain under his control and direction, and the expenses necessarily incurred in executing the provisions of this act respecting the procuring of such notes, and all other 167 U. S. 199 expenses of the bureau shall be paid out of the proceeds of the taxes or duties now or hereafter to be assessed on the circulation, and collected from associations organized under this act. And in lieu of all existing taxes, every association shall pay to the Treasurer of the United States, in the months of January and July, a duty of one-half of one percentum each half year from and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, upon the average amount of its notes in circulation, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year upon the average amount of its deposits, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half year, as aforesaid, on the average amount of its capital stock beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, and in case of default in the payment thereof by any association, the duties aforesaid may be collected in the manner provided for the collection of United States duties of other corporations, or the treasurer may reserve the amount of said duties out of the interest, as it may become due, on the bonds deposited with him by such defaulting association. And it shall be the duty of each association, within ten days from the first days of January and July of each year, to make a return, under the oath of its President or cashier, to the Treasurer of the United States, in such form as he may prescribe, of the average amount of its notes in circulation, and of the average amount of its deposits, and of the average amount of its capital stock, beyond the amount invested in United States bonds, for the six months next preceding said first days of January and July as aforesaid, and in default of such return, and for each default thereof, each defaulting association shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of two hundred dollars, to be collected either out of the interest as it may become due such association on the bonds deposited with the treasurer, or, at his option, in the manner in which penalties are to be collected of other corporations under the laws of the United States, and in case of such default the amount of the duties to be paid to such association shall be assessed upon the amount of notes delivered to such association by the Comptroller of the Currency, and upon the highest amount of its deposits and capital 167 U. S. 200 stock, to be ascertained in such other manner as the treasurer may deem best, provided that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of the said associations, held by any person or body corporate, from being included in the valuation of the personal property of such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed by or under state authority at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state; provided further that the tax so imposed under the laws of any state upon the shares of any of the associations authorized by this act shall not exceed the rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under authority of the state where such association is located; provided also that nothing in this act shall exempt the real estate of associations from either state, county or municipal taxes to the same extent, according to its value, as other real estate is taxed." 13 Stat. 99, 111, c. 106. The provision relating to taxation, which, it is alleged, was inserted by way of amendment in the Senate, appears as section 5214 of the Revised Statutes. Other provisions of the act of 1864 are reproduced in sections 5217 and 5218 of the Revised Statutes. By section 5222 of the Revised Statutes. it is provided: "Within six months from the date of the vote to go into liquidation, the association shall deposit with the Treasurer of the United States lawful money of the United States sufficient to redeem all its outstanding circulation. The Treasurer shall execute duplicate receipts for money thus deposited, and deliver one to the association and the other to the Comptroller of the Currency, stating the amount received by him, and the purpose for which it has been received, and the money shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States and placed to the credit of such association upon redemption account." In Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 143 U. S. 672, in which the constitutionality of the Act of Congress of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567, c. 1244, was questioned upon the ground that a 167 U. S. 201 certain provision which was in it upon its final passage was omitted when the bill was signed by the speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, this Court said: "The signing by the speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill thus attested has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill thus attested receives his approval and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States carries on its face a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to co-equal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the act so authenticated is in conformity with the Constitution." Referring to the above case, it was said in Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U. S. 547, 162 U. S. 560, that if the principle announced in Field v. Clark involves any danger to the public, it was competent for Congress to meet it by declaring under what circumstances, or by what kind of evidence, an enrolled act of Congress or of a territorial legislature, authenticated as required by law, and in the hands of the officer or department to whose custody it was committed by statute, may be shown 167 U. S. 202 not to be in the form in which it was when passed by Congress or by the territorial legislature. The contention in this case is that the section of the Act of June 3, 1864, providing a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and for the circulation and redemption thereof, so far as it imposed a tax upon the average amount of the notes of a national banking association in circulation, was a revenue bill within the clause of the Constitution declaring that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills," Art. I, § 7; that it appeared from the official journals of the two houses of Congress that while the act of 1864 originated in the House of Representatives, the provision imposing this tax was not in the bill as it passed that body, but originated in the Senate by amendment, and, being accepted by the house, became a part of the statute; that such tax was therefore unconstitutional and void, and that consequently the statute did not justify the action of the defendant. The case is not one that requires either an extended examination of precedents or a full discussion as to the meaning of the words in the Constitution "bills for raising revenue." What bills belong to that class is a question of such magnitude and importance that it is the part of wisdom not to attempt by any general statement to cover every possible phase of the subject. It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. 167 U. S. 203 1 Story on Const. § 880. The main purpose that Congress had in view was to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds, and to that end it was deemed wise to impose the tax in question. The tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency that would rest primarily upon the honor of the United States, and be available in every part of the country. There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government. This interpretation of the statute renders it unnecessary to consider whether, for the decision of the question before us, the journals of the two houses of Congress can be referred to for the purpose of determining whether an act duly attested by the official signatures of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President, and which is of record in the State Department as an act passed by Congress, originated in the one body or the other. And, for the reasons stated, it is not necessary to inquire whether, in any view of the case, the defendant would have been personally liable for the tax collected by him pursuant to the act of Congress, and subsequently covered into the Treasury. Judgment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurs in the result.
Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: - - Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin. Get it yet nolu? Thank you. All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu. You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. Poor, demented nolu, driven to prove a non important point, his own infallibility..
You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full of shit. I understand perfectly that two half-wits trying to discuss law only provoke laughter at their efforts. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) is a case where a bill originated in the House with no tax provision, but which had a tax provision added by amendment in the Senate. The contention in the case was that it was therefore unconstitutional and void. As the Court stated, It did not matter whether it originated in the House or the Senate. Apparently the tpaine School for the Gifted does not teach how read and comprehend the Constitution or legal opinions. Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1 provides, Having made clear that Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, is Supreme Court precedent destroying the blather of the Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, I now continue with his remedial education on the precedents applicable to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Yes, you may have another. The case of United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. At 495 U.S. 386-87: 495 U. S. 387 and Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429, that a statute that creates, and raises revenue to support, a particular governmental program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue." The provision was passed as part of, and to provide money for, the Crime Victims Fund. Although any excess was to go to the Treasury, there is no evidence that Congress contemplated the possibility of a substantial excess, nor did such an excess in fact materialize. Any revenue for the general Treasury that § 3013 creates is thus incidental to that provision's primary purpose. The fact that the bill was not designed to benefit the persons from whom the funds were collected is not relevant to a determination whether the bill is a revenue bill. Since § 3013 is not a revenue bill, there is no need to consider whether the Clause would require its invalidation if it were one. Pp. 495 U. S. 397-401.
You admitted that you misunderstood bucks original comment, yet you continue to spam the issue. You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help.
No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City to further doucment that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless idiot. Continuing from United States v. Munoz-Flores, at 397, Both parties agree that "revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, 167 U. S. 202 (1897) (citing 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 880, pp. 610-611 (3d ed. 1858)). The Court has interpreted this Page 495 U. S. 398 general rule to mean that a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. For example, the Court in Nebeker rejected an Origination Clause challenge to what the statute denominated a "tax" on the circulating notes of banking associations. Despite its label, "[t]he tax was a means for effectually accomplishing the great object of giving to the people a currency. . . . There was no purpose by the act or by any of its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the Government." Nebeker, supra, at 167 U. S. 203. The Court reiterated the point in Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429 (1906), where it upheld a statute that levied property taxes in the District of Columbia to support railroad projects. The Court rejected an Origination Clause claim, concluding that "[w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act." Id. at 200 U. S. 437. This case falls squarely within the holdings in Nebeker and Millard.
You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help.
No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897) to further document that Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law tpaine is a clueless twit. The remedial education of tpaine continues with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906) so that he may have a basic understanding of the precedents regarding what I am about to present in the next lesson. This is a bill in equity to enjoin Ellis H. Roberts, as Treasurer of the United States, from paying to any person any moneys of the District of Columbia, under certain acts of Congress. [...] And the bill also alleges that the acts of Congress are "acts which provide for raising revenue, and are repugnant to Article I, § 7, clause 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and are therefore null and void ab initio, and to their entire extent, because they and each and every one of them originated in the Senate, and not in the House of Representatives." Certain volumes of the Congressional Record are referred to and made part of the bill. 202 U. S. 436 In other allegations of the bill are expressed the limitations upon the power of the United States and the District of Columbia as to taxation; that the acts of Congress complained of are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; that public funds are appropriated for private use, and that exorbitant taxes will be required to meet the legitimate expenses of the District of Columbia, and appellant will thereby be oppressed and deprived of his property without due process of law. The first contention of appellant is that the acts of Congress are revenue measures, and therefore should have originated in the House of Representatives, and not in the Senate, and, to sustain the contention, appellant submits an elaborate argument. In answer to the contention, the case of Twin City Nat. Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S. 196, need only be cited. It was observed there that it was a part of wisdom not to attempt to cover by a general statement what bills shall be said to be "bills for raising revenue" within the meaning of those words in the Constitution, but it was said, quoting Mr. Justice Story, "that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue." 1 Story on Constitution § 880.
You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit. This teapot tempest is NOT about me, it has embarrassed YOU, and true to form, you can't handle it. Go upstairs and complain to your mom. -- It might help. Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. And your latest reply, spewing out even more, -- is proof positive that you are near a loss of control, poor fella. Perhaps you should medicate yourself.
No, dumbshit, court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost. Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity. The lesson continues on why you, tpaine, as Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). In addition to a Commerce Clause challenge, Sissel presented tpaine's brainfart Origination Clause challenge to the PPACA in federal court. Let's see how it did in the D.C. District Court. 951 F.Supp.2d 160 Oh, that's got to hurt. The Court found that tpaine's bullshit failed to state a claim because the PPACA was not a Bill for raising Revenue, it was not subject to the Origination Clause, and it did not originate outside the House of Representatives. It only gets better, but I'm sure that's all the poor twit can take for now.
I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin.
I realize that you only have two brain cells, one to inhale and the other to exhale. That leaves none for thinking. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and your are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. The first clause of Article I, section 7 of the Constitution states: "All Bills for [951 F.Supp.2d 167] raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This clause is commonly known as the "Origination Clause." See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990). The plaintiff in this action claims that the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act violates the Origination Clause because it is a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that did not "originate in the House of Representatives." See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-41. To state a claim under the Origination Clause, the plaintiff must at least satisfy both elements of the constitutional text. In other words, the statute in question must (1) be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" that (2) did not "originate in the House of Representatives." The plaintiff's allegations, however, do not satisfy either requirement. 1. The Individual Mandate Is Not a "Bill for raising Revenue." First, to be subject to the Origination Clause, a statute must be a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The plaintiff contends that the Origination Clause separates bills into two categories: (1) "those that raise revenue and are subject to the Origination Clause," and (2) "those that are `bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue.'" Pl.'s Opp'n at 14 (quoting Twin City Nat'l Bank of New Brighton v. Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196, 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, 42 L.Ed. 134 (1897)). From this premise, the plaintiff argues categorically that "where a tax is imposed only as an exercise of the tax clause, and not as an adjunct to a regulation of commerce, or the exercise of some other enumerated power, then it is a tax for raising revenue subject to the Origination Clause." Id. at 15. To support this broad contention, the plaintiff cites six cases, five of which held that the statutes under review were not subject to the Origination Clause because they were not "Bills for raising Revenue." See id. (citing South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir.1983), Mulroy v. Block, 569 F.Supp. 256, 262 (N.D.N.Y.1983), Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766, United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 23 L.Ed. 454 (1875), Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 26 S.Ct. 674, 50 L.Ed. 1090 (1906), and Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964).10 The plaintiff also quotes extensively from a seventy-year-old decision from the Sixth Circuit, which stated in pertinent part that "[t]axation is a congressional power specifically mentioned and described in the Constitution, but always in connection with the subject of the revenue for the support of the government generally." See Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 995 (6th Cir.1943). Although the plaintiff's argument may be superficially appealing, it cannot withstand even a cursory review of previous interpretations of the Origination Clause. The Supreme Court has long held that "the practical construction of the constitution and the history of the origin of the [Origination Clause] prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue." Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. 766 (emphasis added) (citing 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 880 (1833)). Hence, when any revenues raised [951 F.Supp.2d 168] by a bill are "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose," the bill is not one "for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause. See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964; accord Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766 (concluding that provision under review was not revenue-raising where its "main purpose" was "to provide a national currency"); see also United States v. King, 891 F.2d 780, 781 (10th Cir.1989) ("Where the main purpose of the act is other than raising revenue, it is not subject to challenge under the origination clause."); United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that Supreme Court precedents "instruct us to consider the overarching purpose of an Act when one of its provisions is subject to an Origination Clause challenge"). The text of the Clause itself confirms this purposive approach. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (applying only to "Bills for raising Revenue." (emphasis added)). A purposive analysis is therefore necessary to discern whether a provision is "for raising Revenue." Following this purposive approach, the Supreme Court has held that "a statute that creates a particular governmental program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to support Government generally, is not a 'Bill for raising Revenue' within the meaning of the Origination Clause." Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, when revenues raised by a provision support a "particular governmental program," id., it is clear that the primary purpose of that provision is not "to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government," see Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. The earmarking of revenues for a particular government program, however, is but one way for a court to discern that the revenues raised by a provision are merely "'incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. The court may also analyze more generally whether the provision in question "was a means for effectually accomplishing" an end other than "meeting the expenses or obligations of the government." See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. Under the Supreme Court's precedents — sparse as they may be on this subject — so long as the primary purpose of the provision is something other than raising revenue, the provision is not subject to the Origination Clause. There is no dispute that the individual mandate will raises revenues through the "shared responsibility payments" required under § 5000A. There is also no dispute that those revenues are "paid into the Treasury by taxpayers when they file their tax returns." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2594 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)). Just because the revenues collected from the individual mandate do not support a "particular governmental program," however, does not mean that those revenues are raised for the purpose of "support[ing] Government generally." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Both the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have concluded that the individual mandate (and its associated shared responsibility [951 F.Supp.2d 169] payment) are "plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage" even though they "will raise considerable revenue." See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596; accord Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6 (observing that "congressional findings never suggested that Congress's purpose was to raise revenue," but rather "congressional findings emphasize that the aim of the shared responsibility payment is to encourage everyone to purchase insurance; the goal is universal coverage, not revenues from penalties"). It is unavoidable, in light of this clear congressional purpose, that any revenue created by the individual mandate is merely incidental. Every shared responsibility payment, though it may grow the government coffers, symbolizes the government's failure to attain its stated "goal [of] universal coverage." See Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6. In other words, Congress's preference would be for the individual mandate to raise zero revenues, and thus the provision cannot fairly be characterized as a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." See Def.'s Mem. at 10 ("[B]y encouraging the purchase of health insurance, the provision will operate most successfully by generating even less revenue."). From the perspective of the Origination Clause, the instant case is analogous to the Supreme Court's decision in Nebecker. There, like here, "[t]he tax [was] a means for effectually accomplishing [a] great object" of government. See Nebecker, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S.Ct. 766. In Nebecker, that "great object" was "to provide a national currency," id., while in the instant case that object is "to expand health insurance coverage," NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2596. Here, as in Nebecker, any revenue raised by the tax will be merely "`incidental' to that provision's primary purpose." See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 399, 110 S.Ct. 1964. Hence, under the Supreme Court's precedents, the individual mandate challenged in this case is not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the Origination Clause and therefore it need not have "originate[d] in the House of Representatives."
Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help. Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you..
In the tpaine Court of the Demented, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else. Ditto for Obergefell. Say it another thousand times and it still ain't so. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013) to continue. Even if the individual mandate could arguably be interpreted as a "Bill[] for [951 F.Supp.2d 170] raising Revenue," the plaintiff's Origination Clause would still fail as a matter of law because the bill that later became the Affordable Care Act originated in the House of Representatives. The plaintiff alleges that the Affordable Care Act "originated in the Senate, not the House." Am. Compl. ¶ 40. Although the plaintiff appears to concede that H.R. 3590 — the bill that was later enacted as the Affordable Care Act — was first passed by the House in September 2009, see id., the plaintiff nevertheless contends that the particular provision at issue, § 5000A "originated in the Senate when the Senate struck the entire text of H.R. 3590, a House-passed bill that was not for raising revenue, and replaced it entirely with the text that ultimately became the PPACA," Pl.'s Opp'n at 9 (emphasis omitted). The plaintiff argues that this so-called "gut-and-amend" procedure "is not 'origination' as the Origination Clause contemplates." Id. According to the plaintiff, "[a] bill originates in the House when it is initiated there — i.e., when its substance is submitted for deliberation and enactment in the House in the first instance." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y.1915)).13 The defendants contend that the plaintiff "misunderstands the requirements of the Origination Clause" because that Clause "does not require that each individual provision of a 'Bill for raising Revenue' originate in the House, but rather that the 'Bill' originate in the House." Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. ("Defs.' Reply") at 7-8 ECF No. 49. Contrary to the plaintiff's view, the defendants argue, "[t]he Clause does not preclude the Senate from inserting new provisions, or even from substituting out the entire text of the House bill." Id. at 8. The defendants characterize "gut-and-amend" as a "commonplace procedure," and thus the defendants warn that the plaintiff's "test for compliance [with the Origination Clause] would lead courts to set aside Congressional enactments as a matter of routine." Id. at 7-8. [...] Even if germaneness were a limit on the Senate's Origination Clause amendment power, the Supreme Court's statement that "it is not for this court to determine whether the amendment was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill," Rainey, 232 U.S. at 317, 34 S.Ct. 429, strongly suggests that it is for Congress, not the courts, to decide whether an amendment is properly germane in any given case. [...] The fact that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is not cabined by a justiciable germaneness requirement is further confirmed by the text of the Origination Clause itself. The second half of the Origination Clause makes clear that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is "as on other Bills." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This language indicates that the Senate's power to amend revenue bills is no different than its ability to amend non-revenue bills. That more general power to amend legislation, however, likely falls within Congress's exclusive power to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, and thus compliance with the more general amendment power is arguably a non justiciable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).17 Indeed, the second clause of Article I, section 5 is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department" if ever there was one, and having courts scrutinize parliamentary procedure relating to the required relevance of a legislative amendment would "express[] lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government." See id. [...] On this point, the plaintiff asserts, without citation, that "it is undisputed that H.R. 3590 was not originally a bill for raising revenue," see Pl.'s Opp'n at 10 (emphasis omitted), but this statement is both incorrect and self-defeating. [...] The Court concludes for the foregoing reasons that, even assuming the individual mandate was a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," that bill "originate[d] in the House of Representatives" as H.R. 3590 and was later duly amended by the Senate in a manner consistent with the Origination Clause. If one looks at the congressional record, only the feeble minded can conclude thatr the PPACA originated in the Senate. The Legislative branch proclaimed that House Resolution (H.R.) 3590 was adopted as law. That is an official proclamation that it originated in the House. It started as a HOUSE revenue bill on a different topic. The Senate offered an amendment to the HOUSE bill changing the title and changing the text to the PPACA. The HOUSE adopted the bill as amended in the Senate. A motion for cloture prevailed in the Senate on 23 Dec 2009 by a vote of 60-39-1. as compiled through Senate LIS by the Senate Bill Clerk under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate Vote Summary Question: On the Cloture Motion (Motion to Invoke Cloture on H.R. 3590 ) http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR03590:@@@R MAJOR ACTIONS: 9/17/2009 -- Introduced in House 10/8/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 416 - 0 (Roll no. 768). 12/24/2009 -- Passed/agreed to in Senate: Passed Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title by Yea-Nay Vote. 60 - 39. Record Vote Number: 396. 3/21/2010 -- Resolving differences -- House actions: On motion that the House agree to the Senate amendments Agreed to by recorded vote: 219 - 212 (Roll no. 165). 3/21/2010 -- Cleared for White House. 3/22/2010 -- Presented to President. 3/23/2010 -- Signed by President. 3/23/2010 -- Became Public Law No: 111-148
Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved. -- They do NOT CHANGE our Constitution Your opinions about our Constitution are warped by the leftist, socialistic education you've swallowed, poor thing. Most here pity you. -- I laugh at you.. Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is..
[tpaine #55] Roe was accepted by a large portion of our population and all levels of governments. -- Many others still appeal, quite rightly. Roe is the law of the land and that is why all legislation prohibiting abortion is struck down as unconstitutional. After Obergefell, all law prohibiting gay marriage was struck down as unconstitutional. The Court's interpretation of the Constitution applied to more than just Roe and Obergefell. Roe struck down all then-existing laws in 1973 prohibiting abortion, and further prohibited all prospective legislation since 1973 that prohibited abortion, causing all such legislation to be struck down as unconstitutional. This debate on the issue continues. Roe continues to be the controlling legal authority in all 52 jurisdictions. Obergefell has the same effect with regard to same-sex marriage. Your posts demonstrate that you are demented and full of shit. Fortunately for you, help is on the way. Just because you are an asshole does not mean I will not work tirelessly to educate you. There are over a hundred years of federal court precedent saying that your opinion on the origination clause is brain dead. Their opinions count and yours are just uninformed bullshit. There are many court rulings. Those about the origination clause, including Sissel specifically regarding the PPACA, say you have no idea what you are talking about. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) [9-0] reinforced the opinion in Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196 (1897). Remedial education continued with Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906). Now it is time for the last lesson from Sissel v. DHHS, 951 F.Supp.2d 159 (2013). In sum, the Court first holds that the plaintiff's Commerce Clause challenge to the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate is foreclosed as a matter of law by the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB, and thus the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Commerce Clause. The Court further holds that the individual mandate was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," and thus the plaintiff's Origination Clause challenge likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In any event, even if the individual mandate were a "Bill[] for raising Revenue," the Court holds that it was nevertheless an amendment to a bill that "originated in the House of Representatives" and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. Hmmmm.... An appropriate Order. Do Orders count in the tpaine Court of the Demented? Geez, that CONCLUSION must cause a bad case of butthurt. The PPACA (Obamacare Bill, H.R. 3590) individual mandate was not a Bill for Raising Revenue. The PPACA originated in the House of Representatives and thus was enacted in compliance with the Origination Clause. Damn, if they did not say you are just wrong. But do not give up hope. There was an appeal. The next lesson will come from Sissel v DHHS, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Because I care about your state of ignorance and wish to help.
Comments (57 - 124) not displayed.
Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/LatestDeckard, ---- The "Major" outed himself as a cowardly enemy of the Constitution long ago, back on Liberty Post.
#18. To: Willie Green (#1)
claiming the Constitution is Holy Scripture
#19. To: Gatlin (#15)
With someone who has enough intelligence … of course. --- That lets you out.
I will not waste my valuable time or utilize my vast knowledge on you,
#20. To: ConservingFreedom, y'all canaries (#18)
Willie Green (#1) --- (Lee) claiming the Constitution is Holy Scripture.
#21. To: ConservingFreedom (#18)
so what are you actually saying about his views?
#22. To: tpaine (#17)
Are you some relative too? (Harrowup made that claim)
#23. To: CZ82 ----- and all (#22)
It thought they supposedly hated each other at first before they eventually fell in love.
#24. To: tpaine (#0)
The Origination Clause says that all bills to raise taxes must originate in the House of Representatives, but contempt for the clause ensured the passage of Obamacare.
#25. To: buckeroo (#24)
The US government is corrupt.
#26. To: tpaine (#25)
#27. To: buckeroo (#26)
#28. To: tpaine (#27)
#29. To: buckeroo (#28)
If you believe that crap, you graduated from Trump University.
#30. To: tpaine (#29)
#31. To: buckeroo (#30)
you need to edit that post quickly as tyme is running out
#32. To: buckeroo (#26)
(Edited)
but most everybody keeps voting the same PIGS into government office.
#33. To: GrandIsland (#32)
This year a NON (D) or (R) is viable. His name is TRUMP.
#34. To: buckeroo (#33)
#35. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#24)
#36. To: Willie Green (#1)
claiming the Constitution is Holy Scripture, and should be only be interpreted the way HE says it should be.
#37. To: nolu chan, buckeroo, y'all (#35)
buckeroo] What's even more contempt is that Chief Justice Roberts agrees that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin.
#38. To: tpaine, buckeroo (#37)
Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific! ---- The house of origin for all federal revenue bills is the House of Representatives. --- nolu
#39. To: nolu chan, Y'ALL (#38)
Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin.
#40. To: tpaine (#39)
Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: --
Chief Justice Roberts DECREED that 0bamakare is just another tax, totally ignoring the congressional house of origin.
Can you two can explain what the hell Obamacare, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has to do with the Origination Clause of the Constitution? Be specific!
#41. To: nolu chan (#40)
(Edited)
Yes, I get it.
#42. To: tpaine (#41)
Slightly changing bucks comment should give you your answer: -
Yes, I get it.
It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue.
All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills.
U.S. Supreme Court
#43. To: nolu chan (#42)
Yes, I get it.
#44. To: tpaine (#43)
All the rest of your reply is mere quibbling, -- by poor, poor frustrated nolu.
As Marilyn Mosby Professor of Law at the tpaine School for the Gifted, tpaine should know that the PPACA did not come within the scope of the Origination Clause of the Constitution. Had it come within the scope of the Origination Clause, the PPACA originated in the House and would have thereby complied with the Origination Clause.
It is sufficient in the present case to say that an act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposed a tax on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under the statute is clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construction of the Constitution and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question prove that revenue bills are those that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue.
All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills.
2. The special assessment statute is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" and, thus, its passage does not violate the Origination Clause. This case falls squarely within the holdings of Twin City Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196,
#45. To: nolu chan continues his hissy fit. (#44)
No, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent documented that you are full --
#46. To: tpaine (#45)
You misunderstood bucks comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit.
III
#47. To: nolu chan (#46)
No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost.
#48. To: tpaine (#47)
[tpaine #47] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit.
202 U.S. 434
#49. To: nolu chan (#48)
No, --- court opinions demonstrate that you and buck are equally lost.
#50. To: tpaine (#49)
[tpaine #49] You misunderstood bucks [sic] comment, and when I explained your confusion, --You had a hissy fit.
[tpaine #49] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help.
The defendants also argue that the plaintiff's Origination Clause allegations fail to state a claim because the individual mandate is neither a "Bill[] for raising Revenue" subject to the Origination Clause, nor a bill that originated outside the House of Representatives. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the defendants' motion.
#51. To: nolu chan (#50)
#52. To: buckeroo, tpaine (#51)
[buckeroo #51] I want you to know there are many "court rulings" ... and 'presidential decrees' and many members of Congress that are just as STUPID as you. I recoginise you are not responsible for your own actions; it isn't merely a suck ass as yukon was about. Oh! Now we got sum legal scholar from yukon's log cabin.
B. The Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under the Origination Clause.
#53. To: nolu chan (#52)
Your obsessive belief that your demented opinions count, and those of the courts do not, is indicative of your mental incapacity.
#54. To: tpaine (#53)
[tpaine #52] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved.
[tpaine #52] Your obsession with court opinions demonstrate that you are demented. -- Get help.
2. The Individual Mandate Was an Amendment to a Bill That Originated in the House of Representatives.
U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress - 1st Session
H.R. 3590
Latest Title: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Sponsor: Rep Rangel, Charles B. [NY-15] (introduced 9/17/2009) Cosponsors (40)
Related Bills: H.CON.RES.254, H.RES.1203, H.R.362, H.R.2358, H.R.3688, H.R.3780, H.R.4204, H.R.4872,
S.1239, S.1423, S.1728, S.1790, S.1857, S.1959, S.2964
Latest Major Action: Became Public Law No: 111-148 [GPO: Text, PDF]
Note: H.R.4872 makes a number of health-related financing and revenue changes to this bill. Read together, this bill and the health care-related provisions of H.R.4872 are commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act (ACA).
#55. To: nolu chan (#54)
In the tpaine Court ---, Roe v. Wade only applied to Jane Roe and nobody else.
#56. To: tpaine (#55)
[tpaine #55] Court opinions count, to the case they apply to, (subject to appeal) and to the people involved.
[tpaine #55] The abortion issue is far from settled. And only an idiot like you would contend it is.
IV. CONCLUSION
.
.
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