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United States News Title: SCOTUS — No, Puerto Rico Cannot Restructure It's Debt SCOTUS — No, Puerto Rico Cannot Restructure It's Debt Puerto Rico v Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 15-233, 579 U. S. ____ (2016) (13 Jun 2016) [...] Syllabus Held: Section 903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code pre-empts Puerto Rico's Recovery Act. P. 5-15. [...] Thomas, J. delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C.J., and Kennedy, Breyer, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined. Alito, J. took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. [...] [Opinion of the Court] The plain text of the Bankruptcy Code begins and ends our analysis. Resolving whether Puerto Rico is a “State” for purposes of the pre-emption provision begins “with the language of the statute itself,” and that “is also where the inquiry should end,” for “the statute’s language is plain.” United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 241 (1989). And because the statute “contains an express pre-emption clause,” we do not invoke any presumption against pre-emption but instead “focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting, 563 U. S. 582, 594 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 577 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 12). The amended definition of “State” excludes Puerto Rico for the single “purpose of defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title.” §101(52) (emphasis added). That exception unmistakably refers to the gateway provision in §109, titled “who may be a debtor.” Section 109(c) begins, “An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title if and only if . . . .” §109(c). We interpret Congress’ use of the “who may be a debtor” language in the amended definition of “State” to mean that Congress intended to exclude Puerto Rico from this gateway provision delineating who may be a debtor under Chapter 9. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U. S. 478, 484 (1990) (reading same term used in different parts of the same Act to have the same meaning); see also Northcross v. Board of Ed. of Memphis City Schools, 412 U. S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam) (“[S]imilarity of language . . . is . . . a strong indication that the two statutes should be interpreted pari passu”). Puerto Rico, therefore, is not a “State” for purposes of the gateway provision, so it cannot perform the single function of the “State[s]” under that provision: to “specifically authoriz[e]” municipalities to seek Chapter 9 relief. §109(c). As a result, Puerto Rico’s municipalities cannot satisfy the requirements of Chapter 9’s gateway provision until Congress intervenes. The amended definition’s use of the term “defining” also confirms our conclusion that the amended definition excludes Puerto Rico as a “State” for purposes of the gateway provision. The definition specifies that Puerto Rico is not a “‘State . . . for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor under Chapter 9.” §101(52) (emphasis added). To “define” is “to decide upon,” 4 Oxford English Dictionary 383 (2d ed. 1989), or “to settle” or “to establish or prescribe authoritatively,” Black’s Law Dictionary 380 (5th ed. 1979). As discussed, a State’s role under the gateway provision is to do just that: The State must define (or “decide upon”) which entities may seek Chapter 9 relief. Barring Puerto Rico from “defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9” is tantamount to barring Puerto Rico from “specifically authorizing” which municipalities may file Chapter 9 petitions under the gateway provision. The amended definition of “State” unequivocally excludes Puerto Rico as a “State” for purposes of the gateway provision. The text of the definition extends no further. The exception excludes Puerto Rico only for purposes of the gateway provision. Puerto Rico is no less a “State” for purposes of the pre-emption provision than it was before Congress amended the definition. The Code’s pre-emption provision has prohibited States and Territories defined as “States” from enacting their own municipal bankruptcy schemes for 70 years. See 60 Stat. 415 (overturning Faitoute, 316 U. S., at 507–509). Had Congress intended to “alter th[is] fundamental detai[l]” of municipal bankruptcy, we would expect the text of the amended definition to say so. Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 468 (2001). Congress “does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.” Ibid. Post Comment Private Reply Ignore Thread Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest
#1. To: nolu chan (#0)
So, Congress will proceed with statehood sanctions, which has been unfolding for several decades. The USA will then adopt another "3,598,357 (July 2015 est. via CIA web page)" poor people for the US taxpayer to support with direct unapportioned federal taxes. Wow, what a fuckedupped USA we have today.
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