Title: Disturbing Video Shows a Cop Brutally Beat a Child for Riding Her Bike, Charges HER with Assualt Source:
Free Thought Project URL Source:http://thefreethoughtproject.com/co ... -riding-bike-mall-parking-lot/ Published:May 14, 2016 Author:Matt Agorist Post Date:2016-05-14 12:42:40 by Deckard Keywords:None Views:29420 Comments:194
Tacoma, WA — On May 24, 2014, 15-year-old Monique Tillman and her brother were riding their bikes when they were stopped and this young girl brutally assaulted by Tacoma Police Officer Jared Williams.
Tillman and her brother had done nothing wrong, and were merely targetted by this ‘public servant’ because they had the unfortunate luck to have crossed paths with him.
As the duo travelled home, they cut through a mall parking lot, as they had done countless times before. However, this time, Officer Williams was in that parking lot, in his full Tacoma Police department uniform, yet off-duty, working as mall security. As the teens travelled through the lot, Williams began pursuit of these hardened criminals and accused them of trespassing.
Knowing they’d done nothing wrong, Monique attempted to explain to the officer that they cut through the parking lot all the time on their way home. However, this tyrant was having nothing of it.
As the duo attempted to ride away from a man whose intentions were clearly unscrupulous, Williams attacked. A recently released surveillance video shows the disturbing scene that unfolded next.
This heroic officer ripped the girl from her bike and slammed her up against a parked car with his hand around her neck. As the child struggled to breathe, this abusive tyrant grabbed her by the hair and flung her around like a rag doll.
Clearly overpowering the small child, half his size, the officer wasn’t satisfied with the damage he’d inflicted so far. So, for good measure, Williams pulled out his taser and sent 50,000 volts into this poor girl.
“He was choking me, grabbed me by my hair and tried to slam my face into the concrete. The next thing I know, I’m on the ground being tased,” Tillman said.
Now face down, tasered, handcuffed and brutalized, Williams stood over his victim like a hunter and his kill. He had protected society from the likes of a dangerous brother and sister riding their bicycles.
Williams then arrested Monique and charged her with resisting arrest and, get this, assault on an officer.
After viewing the surveillance video of the incident, however, all of the charges were thrown out.
Vito de la Cruz, Tillman’s attorney, has filed a lawsuit seeking damages from Officer Williams, the Simon Property Group who owns the Tacoma Mall and Universal Protection Services, the private security company in charge of Tacoma Mall security.
“A child riding a bike should not have to worry that a police officer will stop her without legal cause and brutalize her,” said de la Cruz. “Our communities are weary of another African American child being hurt by unwarranted and excessive police force.”
The Free Thought Project reached out the Tacoma PD to inquire about Williams’ current status and if any disciplinary action had been taken. However, our requests for comment were not returned.
Below is what policing in modern day America has become.
Ok,just watched the video and need to point out two things. The girl CLEARLY was trying to ride away on her bicycle when he first grabbed her,and she was CLEARLY resisting arrest when he started tossing her around,choking her,and tasing her.
The most important thing to point out is that HE HAD NO AUTHORITY TO STOP HER TO START WITH. A shopping center parking lot is by definition public property,and he has no legal or moral authority to stop anyone from entering it at any time of the day or night.
Which nullifies the first point about her resisting arrest. He had no right to stop or try to arrest her,so she can't be charged with resisting an illegal arrest.
Officer Cartman was just having one of those "You WILL respect my authoritay!" moments. SOB should be fired and sued by both the city and the girls parents.
The girl CLEARLY was trying to ride away on her bicycle
Trying - maybe.
She got about a foot away before the "hero" sprung into action, saving the day from these hardened criminals.
HE HAD NO AUTHORITY TO STOP HER TO START WITH. A shopping center parking lot is by definition public property
That is my understanding as well, and since the kids had apparently done this on a number of occasions, it seems like the cop saw a opportunity to flex his authority on a couple of innocent kids.
What, you don't expect him to actually go after real criminals, do you?
The girl CLEARLY was trying to ride away on her bicycle
Trying - maybe.
She got about a foot away before the "hero" sprung into action, saving the day from these hardened criminals.
And there you are in all your glory,admitting against your will that she WAS trying to get away.
The "she was only a foot away......" excuse is lame beyond belief. How far away would she have to be before you would admit she was tying to avoid arrest,a half block?
Not that the cop had any authority at all to stop her. He didn't.
Private security guards work for the private business that they are hired by. If your employer can search your stuff at work (part of terms of employment, company policy, or contract deal etc.), then the hired security guard can do so. Fourth amendment protection only applies to governmental intrusion. Security guards are not agents of the government.
Private security guards work for the private business that they are hired by. If your employer can search your stuff at work (part of terms of employment, company policy, or contract deal etc.), then the hired security guard can do so. Fourth amendment protection only applies to governmental intrusion. Security guards are not agents of the government.
Where is this proven incorrect?
I know you have a limited attention span,so I will just point out that the kids riding through the parking lot were NOT employees of the corporation that owns the mall,and that bozo was wearing his city police uniform,not a security guard uniform. Which means he was representing the city to the public,not representing the mall corporation.
and that bozo was wearing his city police uniform,not a security guard uniform. Which means he was representing the city to the public,not representing the mall corporation.
But the police are not being sued. So apparently, he was wearing the police uniform inappropriately because he was not acting in the capacity of a city police officer, but only in the capacity of a mall security guard.
So apparently, he was wearing the police uniform inappropriately because he was not acting in the capacity of a city police officer, but only in the capacity of a mall security guard.
Inappropriately? Maybe yes … maybe no.
There are a number of cities that have a formal program that allow their police officers to be serve as private security while they are in uniform. LA and NYC are but two of those cities. I don’t know the Tacoma police policy on this.
But the police are not being sued. So apparently, he was wearing the police uniform inappropriately because he was not acting in the capacity of a city police officer, but only in the capacity of a mall security guard.
Oddly enough,the Tacoma PD is backing him up and claiming he was on duty the instant he hit the siren to pull them over.
Makes no sense at all,but that is what they are doing.
But the police are not being sued. So apparently, he was wearing the police uniform inappropriately because he was not acting in the capacity of a city police officer, but only in the capacity of a mall security guard.
This appears to be just wrong and without any legal merit.
At #35:
Of the officer, [Tacoma Police Department Public Information Officer Loretta] Cool said, "His presence at the Tacoma Mall, even though off duty and paid by mall, he's a police officer and he's acting as a police officer."
He had his car, his uniform, and his Taser. Cool said the second he was called on to order the teens off the private property and turned his lights on, the officer was working on the city's payroll, not the mall's.
In charging the officer, the charging party must overcome a claim that Officer Williams was a state actor acting under color of state law, and that he is covered by qualified immunity from civil liability.
In Swiecicki v Delgado, 6th Cir 05-4036 (15 Sep 2006), the court addressed the subject of when an off-duty police officer, in uniform acting as a security officer, is a state actor acting under color of state law.
RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. While attending a Cleveland Indians baseball game, Jeffrey Swiecicki, along with several of his friends, loudly cheered for some players and heckled others. Officer Jose Delgado, an off-duty police officer for the City of Cleveland, was in full uniform and working for the ballpark as a security guard. He allegedly heard Swiecicki using profane language. Delgado asked Swiecicki to halt his behavior or leave the stadium. When Swiecicki did not respond, Delgado placed Swiecicki in the “escort position” and began leading him out of the bleachers. In the course of leaving the stadium, Delgado arrested Swiecicki and wrestled him to the ground.
At 2:
At all relevant times, Delgado, a City of Cleveland police officer, was working as a security guard and was stationed at a tunnel near the bleachers where Swiecicki and his friends were seated. Delgado was officially off-duty, but he was wearing his police uniform with his badge and was carrying the weapons issued by the police department.
At 6-7:
C. Delgado’s status as a state actor.
The district court also held that Delgado was not acting under color of state law until he actually placed Swiecicki under arrest. Swiecicki, on the other hand, argues that Delgado was acting under color of state law during the entire incident, and that the district court erroneously relied on disputed material facts in making its decision.
“To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff . . . must show that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Redding v. St. Eward, 241 F.3d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 2001). Delgado, to be liable under § 1983, must have exercised power made possible “only because [he was] clothed with the authority of state law.” Id. at 533 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Whether a police officer like Delgado was acting under the color of state law poses a difficult question that depends on “the nature of the act performed, not the clothing of the actor or even the status of being on duty . . . .” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Relevant considerations include whether the officer flashed a badge, identified himself as an officer, or arrested (or threatened to arrest) someone. Parks v. City of Columbus, 395 F.3d 643, 652 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that an off-duty police officer acted under color of state law when he threatened a citizen with arrest at a local festival).
The parties agree that Delgado was off-duty at the time of the incident, even though he was wearing his police uniform and carrying his official weapons. As indicated by Redding, however, the nature of the act, rather than Delgado’s clothing, informs the state-actor analysis. Redding, 241 F.3d at 533. We must therefore consider Delgado’s behavior during the course of the incident, making sure to view the facts in the light most favorable to Swiecicki at this stage of the case. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
Swiecicki alleges that Delgado used police procedures and was therefore a state actor during the entire incident. According to Swiecicki and several witnesses, Delgado grabbed Swiecicki by the shirt and arm to escort him, and Delgado himself admits that he put Swiecicki in the “escort position” before forcibly removing him from the bleachers. The district court failed to acknowledge Swiecicki’s version of the facts, holding that “[a]lthough Officer Delgado may have been acting as a private actor when he began escorting Jeffrey Swiecicki out of the stadium pursuant to the rules and regulations of Jacobs Field, he asserted his official state power when he placed Jeffrey Swiecicki under arrest.” Despite this broad pronouncement, the district court never articulated why it concluded that Delgado was not a state actor when he first escorted Swiecicki out of the stands.
Here, we believe the record establishes that Delgado was a state actor from the beginning of the incident in question because he “presented himself as a police officer.” Parks, 395 F.3d at 652. Our conclusion is based not only on Delgado’s attire, badge, and weapons, but also on the fact that Delgado told Swiecicki that “[w]e can either do this the easy way or the hard way.” We recognize that these words, standing alone, would not necessarily rise to the level of a threatened arrest. After all, if a private citizen like Labrie, or a fellow Indians fan, had warned Swiecicki in a similar manner, no threat of arrest would have been present. And if Delgado had simply asked Swiecicki to calm down or risk being ejected from the game, we would be unable to conclude that Delgado acted under color of state law. See Watkins v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 183 F.2d 440, 443 (8th Cir. 1950) (holding that an off-duty deputy sheriff who worked as a security guard at a race track was not acting under color of state law when he ejected a patron because the deputy sheriff acted in the same manner that a civilian employee of the track would have acted).
But we are required to consider all of the relevant circumstances. See Parks, 395 F.3d at 652 (“[A]ll of these factors combined create the presumption of state action.”). Rather than calmly asking Swiecicki to leave the stadium, Delgado, while wearing his uniform and carrying his official weapons, threatened Swiecicki and forcibly removed him from the bleachers. This evidence, combined with the fact that Delgado was hired by Jacobs Field to intervene “in cases requiring police action” suggests that his warning to Swiecicki amounted to a threat of arrest. Delgado apparently believed, moreover, that the incident was one requiring “police action” because he approached Swiecicki before Labrie had a chance to further investigate. In sum, this was more than a case in which a civilian employed by the Indians peaceably ejected an unruly fan from a baseball game—a procedure clearly contemplated by the rules and regulations of Jacobs Field. Delgado, in full police uniform, forcibly removed Swiecicki in the escort position.
All of this evidence, when considered together, indicates that Delgado was acting under color of state law at the time he removed Swiecicki from the bleachers. See id. at 652 (holding that the off-duty police officer was a state actor because he was in uniform, identified himself as an officer, and threatened arrest); see also Villegas v. City of Gilroy, 363 F. Supp.2d 1207, 1213 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (holding that an off-duty police officer who ejected citizens from a festival held at a public park acted under color of state law because her presence was intended to give “some air of authority as a police officer” and because she had “an active hand assisting in enforcing [the] dress code policy by intimidating Plaintiffs into leaving the festival.”) (quotation marks omitted). But see Herrera v. Chisox Corp., No. 93 C 4279, 1995 WL 599065, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 1995) (unpublished) (holding that off-duty deputy sheriffs did not act under color of state law when they allegedly arrested Herrera at a Chicago Whitesox game because the deputy sheriffs were not wearing their uniforms, did not carry official weapons, filed a Whitesox incident report rather than an arrest report, and did not accompany officers of the Chicago Police Department who took Herrera to the police station).
Delgado’s status as a state actor continued as he escorted Swiecicki through the tunnel. After removing Swiecicki from the bleachers, Delgado formally placed Swiecicki under arrest, wrestled him to the ground using the arm-bar technique, and attempted to handcuff him. Such actions were clearly carried out “with the authority of state law.” Redding, 241 F.3d at 533. We therefore hold that Delgado was a state actor for the duration of the incident. See Layne v. Sampley, 627 F.2d 12, 13 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that the question of whether someone acted under the color of state law may be determined as a matter of law unless there remain unanswered questions of fact for the jury to decide).
