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Title: Donald Trump: I Would Not Order Military to Violate Laws, Treaties with Torture
Source:
Breitbart
URL Source: http://www.breitbart.com/national-s ... te-laws-treaties-with-torture/
Published: Mar 4, 2016
Author: Breitbart News
Post Date: 2016-03-04 17:41:12 by cranky
Keywords: None
Views: 4692
Comments: 33
From the Wall Street Journal: Leading GOP presidential candidate Donald Trump said Friday he wouldn’t order the U.S. military to break international laws, addressing criticism from military and legal experts that his policies regarding torture and killing the family members of terrorists would violate the Geneva Convention. Mr. Trump, in a statement to The Wall Street Journal, said he would “use every legal power that I have to stop these terrorist enemies. I do, however, understand that the United States is bound by laws and treaties and I will not order our military or other officials to violate those laws and will seek their advice on such matters. I will not order a military officer to disobey the law. It is clear that as president I will be bound by laws just like all Americans and I will meet those responsibilities.” This appears to be a reversal from Thursday night’s GOP debate in Detroit, when Mr. Trump stood by earlier proposals to do things that were a “hell of a lot worse” than waterboarding terrorist suspects and also authorize the military to kill family members of terrorists. “I’ve always been a leader,” he said Thursday night. “I’ve never had any problem leading people. If I say do it, they’re going to do it. That’s what leadership is all about.” Read the rest of the story here.
Donald Trump backs off from his statement on torture and the military from Thursday night’s Republican presidential debate.
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Begin Trace Mode for Comment # 31.
#1. To: cranky (#0)
That could be turned into a mantra or a tagline. If he doesn't drop out soon he's going to be having to say that a lot.
Do we have any treaties with Moslem terrorists?
Why, no. But they're bound by the Geneva Convention just as we are. Well, aside from the beheadings, mass executions of civilians, suicide bombings, throwing people off high buildings and drowning people in cages.
Actually, the Geneva Conventions only apply to international war between two or more high contracting parties to the conventions. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld at 67: Violations of customary International Humanitarian Law may be the subject of lawful reprisal in kind, for the purpose of coercing the transgressor to comply with customary IHL. It is not accurate that terrorists may chop off heads and drown people in cages, and that they remain entitled to all protections under international law. https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule145 Customary International Humanitarian Law Rule 145. Where not prohibited by international law, belligerent reprisals are subject to stringent conditions. [...] Conditions Five conditions must be met in order for belligerent reprisals against permitted categories of persons and objects not to be unlawful. Most of these conditions are laid down in military manuals and are supported by official statements. These conditions are: (i) Purpose of reprisals. Reprisals may only be taken in reaction to a prior serious violation of international humanitarian law, and only for the purpose of inducing the adversary to comply with the law. This condition is set forth in numerous military manuals, as well as in the legislation of some States.[12] It is also confirmed in national case-law.[13] Because reprisals are a reaction to a prior serious violation of international humanitarian law, “anticipatory” reprisals or “counter-reprisals” are not permissible, nor can belligerent reprisals be a reaction to a violation of another type of law. In addition, as reprisals are aimed at inducing the adversary to comply with the law, they may not be carried out for the purpose of revenge or punishment. There is limited practice allowing reprisals against allies of the violating State but it dates back to the arbitration in the Cysne case in 1930 and to the Second World War.[14] Practice since then appears to indicate that resort to such reprisals is no longer valid. According to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, countermeasures are legitimate only “against a State which is responsible for an internationally wrongful act”.[15] This element of responsibility is also reflected in some military manuals.[16] However, whereas most military manuals remain silent on the question of reprisals against allies of the violating State, Italy’s IHL Manual expressly states that a reprisal can, “as a general rule, only be directed against the belligerent that violated the laws of war”.[17] Other military manuals explain that reprisals are used against another State in order to induce that State to stop the violation of international law.[18] Some military manuals specify that in the light of their specific purpose, reprisals must be announced as such and publicized so that the adversary is aware of its obligation to comply with the law.[19] (ii) Measure of last resort. Reprisals may only be carried out as a measure of last resort, when no other lawful measures are available to induce the adversary to respect the law. This condition is set forth in many military manuals.[20] It is confirmed by national case-law.[21] It is also repeated in the statements and proposals made by States at the Diplomatic Conference leading to the adoption of the Additional Protocols, before the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons case and on other occasions, when it was sometimes mentioned that prior warning must be given and/or that other measures must have failed before resorting to reprisals.[22] In its reservation concerning reprisals made upon ratification of Additional Protocol I, the United Kingdom reserved the right to take reprisal action “only after formal warning to the adverse party requiring cessation of the violations has been disregarded”.[23] According to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, before taking countermeasures an injured State must call on the responsible State to fulfil its obligations, notify the responsible State of any decision to take countermeasures and offer to negotiate with that State.[24] In its judgment in the Kupreškic case in 2000, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia confirmed what had already been stated by the Special Arbitral Tribunal in the Naulilaa case in 1928, namely that reprisals may only be carried out after a warning to the adverse party requiring cessation of the violations has remained unheeded.[25] (iii) Proportionality. Reprisal action must be proportionate to the violation it aims to stop. This condition was already laid down in 1880 in the Oxford Manual and was recently reaffirmed in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility.[26] It is also contained in many military manuals.[27] Furthermore, there is case-law concerning violations committed in the Second World War in which the accused’s claims that their acts had been committed as lawful reprisals were rejected because, inter alia, they were found to be disproportionate to the original violation.[28] The requirement that reprisal measures be proportionate to the original wrong is repeated in various statements and proposals made by States at the Diplomatic Conference leading to the adoption of the Additional Protocols, before the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons case and on other occasions.[29] In its reservation concerning reprisals made upon ratification of Additional Protocol I, the United Kingdom stated that “any measures thus taken by the United Kingdom will not be disproportionate to the violations giving rise thereto”.[30] The International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1996 and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in its judgment in the Kupreškic case in 2000 confirmed what the Special Arbitral Tribunal had already stated in the Naulilaa case in 1928, namely that belligerent reprisals are subject to the principle of proportionality.[31] Most of the practice collected requires that acts taken in reprisal be proportionate to the original violation. Only a few pieces of practice specify that proportionality must be observed with regard to the damage suffered.[32] (iv) Decision at the highest level of government. The decision to resort to reprisals must be taken at the highest level of government. Whereas the Oxford Manual states that only a commander in chief is entitled to authorize reprisals,[33] more recent practice indicates that such a decision must be taken at the highest political level.[34] State practice confirming this condition is found in military manuals, as well as in some national legislation and official statements.[35] In its reservation concerning reprisals made upon ratification of Additional Protocol I, the United Kingdom stated that reprisals would be taken “only after a decision taken at the highest level of government”.[36] In its judgment in the Kupreškic case in 2000, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia held that the decision to resort to a reprisal must be taken at the highest political or military level and may not be decided by local commanders.[37] (v) Termination. Reprisal action must cease as soon as the adversary complies with the law. This condition, formulated as a formal prohibition in the event that the original wrong had been repaired, was already laid down in 1880 in the Oxford Manual and was recently restated in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility.[38] It is also contained in several military manuals, official statements and reported practice.[39] In its reservation concerning reprisals made upon ratification of Additional Protocol I, the United Kingdom stated that reprisals would not be continued “after the violations have ceased”.[40] In its judgment in the Kupreškic case in 2000, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia confirmed that reprisal action must stop as soon as the unlawful act has been discontinued.[41]
#33. To: nolu chan (#31)
Than you for your response. But I thought my sarcasm was obvious.
Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/LatestDonald Trump backs off from his statement
#5. To: sneakypete (#1)
#7. To: Roscoe (#5)
"Do we have any treaties with Moslem terrorists?"
#31. To: misterwhite, Roscoe, Vicomte13, cranky (#7)
But they're bound by the Geneva Convention just as we are. Well, aside from the beheadings, mass executions of civilians, suicide bombings, throwing people off high buildings and drowning people in cages.
The Court of Appeals thought, and the Government asserts, that Common Article 3 does not apply to Hamdan because the conflict with al Qaeda, being "'international in scope'," does not qualify as a "'conflict not of an international character'." 415 F. 3d, at 41. That reasoning is erroneous. The term "conflict not of an international character" is used here in contradistinction to a conflict between nations. So much is demonstrated by the "fundamental logic [of] the Convention's provisions on its application." Id., at 44 (Williams, J., concurring). Common Article 2 provides that ìthe present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties." 6 U. S. T., at 3318 (Art. 2, ¶1). High Contracting Parties (signatories) also must abide by all terms of the Conventions vis-a-vis one another even if one party to the conflict is a nonsignatory "Power," and must so abide vis-a-vis the nonsignatory if "the latter accepts and applies" those terms. Ibid. (Art. 2, ¶3). Common Article 3, by contrast, affords some minimal protection, falling short of full protection under the Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a signatory nor even a nonsignatory "Power" who are involved in a conflict "in the territory of" a signatory. The latter kind of conflict is distinguishable from the conflict described in Common Article 2 chiefly because it does not involve a clash between nations (whether signatories or not). In context, then, the phrase "not of an international character" bears its literal meaning.
Rule 145. Reprisals
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