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Title: North Korea says tested hydrogen nuclear device
Source:
Aol Reuters
URL Source: [None]
Published: Jan 6, 2016
Author: Gopalakrishnan
Post Date: 2016-01-06 00:44:22 by rlk
Keywords: None
Views: 1806
Comments: 34
North Korea says tested hydrogen nuclear device Jan 5th 2016 10:46PM South Korean Military Report Indicates North Korea May Be Preparing for Fourth Nuclear Test UPDATE: SEOUL, Jan 6 (Reuters) - North Korea said it had successfully conducted a test of a miniaturized hydrogen nuclear device on Wednesday morning. The announcement on North Korean state TV followed detection of a 5.1 magnitude earthquake near its known nuclear test site earlier on Wednesday. The nuclear test is the fourth by the isolated country, which is under U.S. and UN sanctions for its nuclear and missile programs. EARLIER: SEOUL, Jan 6 (Reuters) - North Korea is "likely" to have conducted a nuclear test on Wednesday that caused an earthquake near a known testing site in the isolated country, the South Korean and Japanese governments said. The United States Geological Survey reported a 5.1 magnitude quake that South Korea said was 49 km (30 miles) from the Punggye-ri site where the North has conducted nuclear tests in the past. "We suspect a man-made earthquake and are analyzing the scale and epicenter of the quake," a Korea Meteorological Administration official told Reuters by phone. North Korea plans a major announcement at 0330 GMT, South Korean media said. South Korea's presidential office convened an emergency security meeting while Japan's chief government spokesman said the earthquake was likely caused by a nuclear test. The U.S. Defense Department is "looking into reports of a possible seismic event near North Korea's nuclear facilities," a U.S. official said. While the USGS put the depth of the earthquake at 10 km, the South Korean agency said it was near the surface. The earthquake was detected just after 10 a.m. Seoul time (0100 GMT). North Korea, under U.N. sanctions for its nuclear and missile programs, has so far conducted three nuclear tests - in 2006, 2009 and 2013 - all at Punggye-ri, near where the earthquake took place. The 2013 test registered at 5.1 on the USGS scale. It is not yet known if North Korea has successfully miniaturized a nuclear device small enough to be used as a warhead on a ballistic missile, but the likelihood of the isolated country successfully miniaturizing a device increases with each test. South Korean stocks and the won currency fell slightly after reports of the likely test on Wednesday, and foreign exchange authorities were suspected by dealers to have intervened. (Reporting by Seoul bureau; Editing by Raju Gopalakrishnan) Poster's note: The kid running things over there is nuts and dangerous.
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#2. To: rlk (#0)
If they even have a nuke. No evidence is ever produced. The earlier three "tests" were all equally consistent with a big explosion of conventional explosives. It isn't like we have any kind of intel to prove these are nukes. And now we have a "miniaturized hydrogen bomb" which is, if you know anything about them, a rather strange way to describe it. And yet we have only a "likely" nuclear detonation. I don't consider NKorea a nuclear power. If they had a real nuke, we'd see a demonstration. They love to demonstrate every other weapon they have but they act like they're hiding some shameful secret when it comes to these supposed nuclear tests.
"Appear weak when you are strong, and strong when you are weak. Do they appear to you strong or weak? The United States was caught by surprise because, within political and military leadership circles in Washington, the perception existed that only the Soviets could order an invasion by a “client state” and that such an act would be a prelude to a world war. Washington was confident that the Soviets were not ready to take such a step, and, therefore, that no invasion would occur. This perception, and indeed its broad acceptance within the Washington policy community, is clearly stated in a 19 June CIA paper on DRPK military capabilities.[10] The paper said that “The DPRK is a firmly controlled Soviet satellite that exercises no independent initiative and depends entirely on the support of the USSR for existence.” The report noted that while the DPRK could take control of parts of the South, it probably did not have the capability to destroy the South Korean government without Soviet or Chinese assistance. This assistance would not be forthcoming because the Soviets did not want general war. The Department of State and the military intelligence organizations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force concurred. Washington’s strategic theme also played well in Tokyo, where General MacArthur and his staff refused to believe that any Asians would risk facing certain defeat by threatening American interests. This belief caused them to ignore warnings of the DPRK military buildup and mobilization near the border, clearly the “force protection” intelligence that should have been most alerting to military minds. It was a strong and perhaps arrogantly held belief, which did not weaken even in the face of DPRK military successes against US troops in the summer of 1950. It grew even stronger within military circles in Tokyo as American and UN forces pushed back the DPRK troops in the fall of 1950. By then, it had become an article of faith within the FEC, personally testified to by MacArthur,that no Asian troops could stand up to American military might without being annihilated. This attitude, considered a “fact” within the FEC and constantly repeated to the Washington political and military leadership, resulted in the second strategic blunder—the surprise Chinese intervention in the war. [...] On 28 July, the CIA Weekly Summary stated that 40,000 to 50,000 ethnic Korean soldiers from PLA units might soon reinforce DPRK forces. The article concluded, however, that there were no indications that the Soviets were prepared to use Chinese reinforcements. This blending of tactical warnings about possible Chinese units—first composed of ethnic Korean soldiers and then of Chinese “volunteers”—and strategic analysis that no indications existed of Soviet intentions to have the Chinese intervene, became the preferred art form for most Agency reporting through late November. It continued to be based on the perception that Soviet priorities and objectives would direct any Chinese actions. [...] Discounting the Chinese Threat In the face of these warnings, the JCS instructed MacArthur to continue his advance north to destroy the DPRK armed forces as long as there was no threat of a major Chinese or Soviet intervention. These instructions were based upon a National Security Council decision made before the Inchon landing.[26] The Secretary of State also disregarded these warnings, telling the press that Chinese intervention would be “sheer madness.” By the end of the month, the US Ambassador in Moscow reported that Soviet and Chinese contacts told both the British and Dutch Ambassadors that if foreign troops cross the 38th parallel, China would intervene.[27] This specific warning was also repeated to various journalists, and on 29 September, the Associated Press in Moscow reported that both China and the Soviet Union would take a “grave view” of US forces crossing the 38th parallel.[28] Finally, at the end of the month, in a major public policy address celebrating the first anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, Zhou En-lai branded the United States as China’s worst enemy and stated that China will not allow a neighbor to be invaded.[29] Once again, these warnings were ignored, and US-UN forces continued to push the DRPK forces northward. On 2 October, Mao cabled Stalin advising that China would intervene and asked for Soviet military assistance.[30] Three days later, the CCP Central Committee officially decided to intervene.[31] US intelligence, however, continued its reporting theme that while Chinese capability was present, Chinese intent was lacking. On 6 October, the US Joint Intelligence Indications Committee stated that the Chinese capability to intervene had grown, but the Chinese threat to do so was questionable.[32] That same day, the CIA Weekly Summary advised that the possibility of Soviet or Chinese intervention continued to diminish. It also restated the belief that Soviet requirements would drive any such decision. Two days later, the Soviet position was delivered to the Chinese. Stalin advised Mao that the USSR could not provide the military supplies and air cover over Manchuria that Mao had requested. [...] https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/fall_winter_2001/article06.html
I thInk they can devastate Seoul with artillery, possibly overrun all of SKorea. They can launch low-quality missiles at Japan. They have managed to crash a bad ICBM on the shores of Alaska. And they can use the same launchers to (barely) reach orbit. So they aren't helpless. But they aren't exactly strong. They do seem to demonstrate every weapon they have, even crappy marginal ones they can barely put in the field. But we have to take their word for it that they have nukes. No other nuclear power is called "likely". As Dr. Strangelove taught us, it is futile or even lethally counterproductive to have secret WMDs. You have to demonstrate that you have the WMD to achieve any deterrence.
#5. To: TooConservative (#4)
From The Economist:
Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/LatestNorth Korea, under U.N. sanctions for its nuclear and missile programs, has so far conducted three nuclear tests - in 2006, 2009 and 2013 - all at Punggye-ri, near where the earthquake took place.
#3. To: TooConservative (#2)
(Edited)
I don't consider NKorea a nuclear power. If they had a real nuke, we'd see a demonstration. They love to demonstrate every other weapon they have but they act like they're hiding some shameful secret when it comes to these supposed nuclear tests.
Faulty Perception:
#4. To: A Pole (#3)
Do they appear to you strong or weak?
Replies to Comment # 4. 
End Trace Mode for Comment # 4.
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