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Title: North Korea says tested hydrogen nuclear device
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Aol Reuters
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Published: Jan 6, 2016
Author: Gopalakrishnan
Post Date: 2016-01-06 00:44:22 by rlk
Keywords: None
Views: 1492
Comments: 34
North Korea says tested hydrogen nuclear device Jan 5th 2016 10:46PM South Korean Military Report Indicates North Korea May Be Preparing for Fourth Nuclear Test UPDATE: SEOUL, Jan 6 (Reuters) - North Korea said it had successfully conducted a test of a miniaturized hydrogen nuclear device on Wednesday morning. The announcement on North Korean state TV followed detection of a 5.1 magnitude earthquake near its known nuclear test site earlier on Wednesday. The nuclear test is the fourth by the isolated country, which is under U.S. and UN sanctions for its nuclear and missile programs. EARLIER: SEOUL, Jan 6 (Reuters) - North Korea is "likely" to have conducted a nuclear test on Wednesday that caused an earthquake near a known testing site in the isolated country, the South Korean and Japanese governments said. The United States Geological Survey reported a 5.1 magnitude quake that South Korea said was 49 km (30 miles) from the Punggye-ri site where the North has conducted nuclear tests in the past. "We suspect a man-made earthquake and are analyzing the scale and epicenter of the quake," a Korea Meteorological Administration official told Reuters by phone. North Korea plans a major announcement at 0330 GMT, South Korean media said. South Korea's presidential office convened an emergency security meeting while Japan's chief government spokesman said the earthquake was likely caused by a nuclear test. The U.S. Defense Department is "looking into reports of a possible seismic event near North Korea's nuclear facilities," a U.S. official said. While the USGS put the depth of the earthquake at 10 km, the South Korean agency said it was near the surface. The earthquake was detected just after 10 a.m. Seoul time (0100 GMT). North Korea, under U.N. sanctions for its nuclear and missile programs, has so far conducted three nuclear tests - in 2006, 2009 and 2013 - all at Punggye-ri, near where the earthquake took place. The 2013 test registered at 5.1 on the USGS scale. It is not yet known if North Korea has successfully miniaturized a nuclear device small enough to be used as a warhead on a ballistic missile, but the likelihood of the isolated country successfully miniaturizing a device increases with each test. South Korean stocks and the won currency fell slightly after reports of the likely test on Wednesday, and foreign exchange authorities were suspected by dealers to have intervened. (Reporting by Seoul bureau; Editing by Raju Gopalakrishnan) Poster's note: The kid running things over there is nuts and dangerous.
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#1. To: rlk (#0)
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no doubt about it he intends to hold the world to ransom They should never do any Bond movies about North Korea it gives them ideas when they watch reruns
If they even have a nuke. No evidence is ever produced. The earlier three "tests" were all equally consistent with a big explosion of conventional explosives. It isn't like we have any kind of intel to prove these are nukes. And now we have a "miniaturized hydrogen bomb" which is, if you know anything about them, a rather strange way to describe it. And yet we have only a "likely" nuclear detonation. I don't consider NKorea a nuclear power. If they had a real nuke, we'd see a demonstration. They love to demonstrate every other weapon they have but they act like they're hiding some shameful secret when it comes to these supposed nuclear tests.
"Appear weak when you are strong, and strong when you are weak. Do they appear to you strong or weak? The United States was caught by surprise because, within political and military leadership circles in Washington, the perception existed that only the Soviets could order an invasion by a “client state” and that such an act would be a prelude to a world war. Washington was confident that the Soviets were not ready to take such a step, and, therefore, that no invasion would occur. This perception, and indeed its broad acceptance within the Washington policy community, is clearly stated in a 19 June CIA paper on DRPK military capabilities.[10] The paper said that “The DPRK is a firmly controlled Soviet satellite that exercises no independent initiative and depends entirely on the support of the USSR for existence.” The report noted that while the DPRK could take control of parts of the South, it probably did not have the capability to destroy the South Korean government without Soviet or Chinese assistance. This assistance would not be forthcoming because the Soviets did not want general war. The Department of State and the military intelligence organizations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force concurred. Washington’s strategic theme also played well in Tokyo, where General MacArthur and his staff refused to believe that any Asians would risk facing certain defeat by threatening American interests. This belief caused them to ignore warnings of the DPRK military buildup and mobilization near the border, clearly the “force protection” intelligence that should have been most alerting to military minds. It was a strong and perhaps arrogantly held belief, which did not weaken even in the face of DPRK military successes against US troops in the summer of 1950. It grew even stronger within military circles in Tokyo as American and UN forces pushed back the DPRK troops in the fall of 1950. By then, it had become an article of faith within the FEC, personally testified to by MacArthur,that no Asian troops could stand up to American military might without being annihilated. This attitude, considered a “fact” within the FEC and constantly repeated to the Washington political and military leadership, resulted in the second strategic blunder—the surprise Chinese intervention in the war. [...] On 28 July, the CIA Weekly Summary stated that 40,000 to 50,000 ethnic Korean soldiers from PLA units might soon reinforce DPRK forces. The article concluded, however, that there were no indications that the Soviets were prepared to use Chinese reinforcements. This blending of tactical warnings about possible Chinese units—first composed of ethnic Korean soldiers and then of Chinese “volunteers”—and strategic analysis that no indications existed of Soviet intentions to have the Chinese intervene, became the preferred art form for most Agency reporting through late November. It continued to be based on the perception that Soviet priorities and objectives would direct any Chinese actions. [...] Discounting the Chinese Threat In the face of these warnings, the JCS instructed MacArthur to continue his advance north to destroy the DPRK armed forces as long as there was no threat of a major Chinese or Soviet intervention. These instructions were based upon a National Security Council decision made before the Inchon landing.[26] The Secretary of State also disregarded these warnings, telling the press that Chinese intervention would be “sheer madness.” By the end of the month, the US Ambassador in Moscow reported that Soviet and Chinese contacts told both the British and Dutch Ambassadors that if foreign troops cross the 38th parallel, China would intervene.[27] This specific warning was also repeated to various journalists, and on 29 September, the Associated Press in Moscow reported that both China and the Soviet Union would take a “grave view” of US forces crossing the 38th parallel.[28] Finally, at the end of the month, in a major public policy address celebrating the first anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, Zhou En-lai branded the United States as China’s worst enemy and stated that China will not allow a neighbor to be invaded.[29] Once again, these warnings were ignored, and US-UN forces continued to push the DRPK forces northward. On 2 October, Mao cabled Stalin advising that China would intervene and asked for Soviet military assistance.[30] Three days later, the CCP Central Committee officially decided to intervene.[31] US intelligence, however, continued its reporting theme that while Chinese capability was present, Chinese intent was lacking. On 6 October, the US Joint Intelligence Indications Committee stated that the Chinese capability to intervene had grown, but the Chinese threat to do so was questionable.[32] That same day, the CIA Weekly Summary advised that the possibility of Soviet or Chinese intervention continued to diminish. It also restated the belief that Soviet requirements would drive any such decision. Two days later, the Soviet position was delivered to the Chinese. Stalin advised Mao that the USSR could not provide the military supplies and air cover over Manchuria that Mao had requested. [...] https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/fall_winter_2001/article06.html
I thInk they can devastate Seoul with artillery, possibly overrun all of SKorea. They can launch low-quality missiles at Japan. They have managed to crash a bad ICBM on the shores of Alaska. And they can use the same launchers to (barely) reach orbit. So they aren't helpless. But they aren't exactly strong. They do seem to demonstrate every weapon they have, even crappy marginal ones they can barely put in the field. But we have to take their word for it that they have nukes. No other nuclear power is called "likely". As Dr. Strangelove taught us, it is futile or even lethally counterproductive to have secret WMDs. You have to demonstrate that you have the WMD to achieve any deterrence.
From The Economist:
If you want to pretend it's still 1950, have at it. I know you are fond of reasoning from cheesy slogans but, as I pointed out, NKorea goes out of its way to try to demonstrate that it is a major military power, even a superpower in internal propaganda. So your slogan is kinda worthless. I think you can provide few, if any, examples from history of countries deliberately following a policy of projecting weakness to their foes.
You project weakness when you are convinced that your enemy will attack you or you decided to attack him You project strength when you believe that you can scare him off or if you want him to become demoralized before your attack. "In his 52 BC conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar successfully used tactical deception to achieve a crossing of the Allier river. His opponent, Vercingetorix, shadowed Caesar's force from the opposite bank, contesting any attempted crossing. Caesar camped overnight in a wood; when departing the following day he left a third of his force behind, splitting down the remainder to appear as his full strength. Once the coast was clear, the hidden forces rebuilt a smashed crossing and established a bridgehead." Mongol armies also used the feigned withdrawal; the mangudai were a suicide vanguard unit that would charge the enemy, break and retreat to try and draw the enemy into more favourable ground. Mongol warlords also made use of disinformation tactics, spreading (or encouraging) rumours about the size and effectiveness of their forces. They even made use of visual deception; cavalry often kept numerous reserve horses, and these were mounted with straw dummies. On the battlefield the Mongols used many tactical deceptions, from lighting fires as a smokescreen to luring opponents into traps." "Maskirovka [masking] was put into practice on a large scale in the Battle of Kursk, especially on the Steppe Front commanded by Ivan Konev. The result was that the Germans attacked Russian forces four times stronger than they were expecting. The German general Friedrich von Mellenthin wrote "The horrible counter-attacks, in which huge masses of manpower and equipment took part, were an unpleasant surprise for us... The most clever camouflage of the Russians should be emphasized again. We did not .. detect even one minefield or anti-tank area until .. the first tank was blown up by a mine or the first Russian anti-tank guns opened fire". " Vietnam The American involvement in Vietnam saw little improvement with regard to implementing deception at the operational or strategic level. Although some American units did, in fact, execute rudimentary deception at the tactical level, Americans once again relied instead on superior firepower and technology to win its battles.74 The North Vietnamese, by contrast, used deception to devastating effect at the tactical and operational level. At the tactical level, a common practice of the North Vietnamese was to ambush a small South Vietnamese or U.S. unit in order to lure larger relief forces into a bigger ambush. This technique proved highly successful initially for the enemy." " Another example of large-scale Soviet deception occurred in the preparation of the Manchurian Campaign in 1945, which allowed the Soviets to achieve strategic surprise over the Japanese. Stalin had promised at the February 1945 Yalta Conference to assist the Allies in the war against Japan within three months of the surrender of Germany, but in fact, had intended to attack into Manchuria in late summer-early autumn 1945 to clear the Japanese from the area prior to the onset of winter.94 However, Stalin’s hand was forced due to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on 6 August and as a consequence, the Soviets crossed the Manchurian border on 9 August, achieving total surprise over the Japanese.95 Preparations for the campaign actually began in late 1944, and from December 1944 through July 1945, the Soviets shipped two military fronts, two field armies, one tank army and supporting war material from Europe via the Trans-Siberian railroad to the Manchurian border.96 By August, the Soviets established a Far East Command complete with 1.6 million personnel, 27,000 guns and mortars, 1,200 multiple rocket launchers, 5,600 tanks, and self-propelled guns, 3,700 aircraft and 86,000 vehicles along a 5,000-kilometer front against the Japanese.97 The Soviets were also able to conceal supplies provided by the U.S. that crossed the Pacific. The Kwantung Army was taken completely by surprise. Although it occupied good defensive positions it had not expected to fight and was not fully manned. Many of its best troops had been transferred to other theaters, all but six of its remaining divisions were manned with newer troops and some of its units were down to fifteen percent.98 The Soviets ability to integrate deception and subsequently achieve virtually total surprise over the Japanese had a lasting effect on the potential for deception for Russian military theorist and planners."
So the theory goes we are being deceived into believing the NK could successfully repell an invasion we don't intend to make, but they are paranoid about the 1950 outcome. On the other hand we are being decieved into believing NK could successfully mount an attack on Alaska, further south is beyond their current capability. Such an attack would be very embarrassing to their chinese ally who has much more to lose today than in 1950. In the meantime we are decieving ourselves that 50,000 american troops with SK allies could repulse an NK attack. I think nuclear deterrence means a great deal to them otherwise they woudl have done it already
What the US is doing right now is about the only case I can think of offhand.
Honestly I do not know what is going on over there. My point is that there is a lot of deception. Study game of Go (Wei-Chi in Chinese): "In its July 2002 report to Congress, the China Security Review Commission states, “Chinese strategic thinking and military planning differ markedly from our own, underscoring the need to study such differences more carefully.” The report also warns “the possibilities of miscalculation, miscommunication, and misunderstanding are high, given the substantial differences in each country‟s thinking and planning, and require far more attention from U.S. policymakers and the Congress.”1 Coincidentally the Department of Defense (DoD) also released its annual report on Chinese military power in July 2002. The Pentagon report calls attention to several knowledge gaps in the U.S. understanding of China‟s strategic thinking. Particularly, it mentions a concept, shi, putatively a strategy China uses to exploit the “strategic configuration of power” to its advantage and maximize its ability to preserve its national independence and develop its comprehensive national power. The Pentagon report notes: There is no Western equivalent to the concept of “shi.” Chinese linguists explain it as “the alignment of forces,” the “propensity of things,” or the “potential born of disposition,” that only a skilled strategist can exploit to ensure victory over a superior force. Similarly, only a sophisticated assessment by an adversary can recognize the potential exploitation of “shi.”2 Indeed, shi is such an important concept that Sun Tzu, the Chinese grand master of military strategy, uses it for the title of a chapter in his Art of War, the world‟s oldest military treasure.3 In this chapter, Sun Tzu has discussed four key aspects of shi. First, it is the idea of qi and zheng. Zheng is the regular way of doing things, or in military terms, the regular order of battle. A commander deploys troops in regular (zheng) ways. However, the commander must mobilize his troops to engage the enemy in extraordinary (qi) ways. Zheng is, in essence, a given. It is open knowledge to friends and foes. Yet qi is a variable and its variation inexhaustible. Thesecond aspect of shi is about creating an overwhelming force with irresistible unleashing power (a grindstone against eggs, and the strike of a hawk at its prey). The third aspect of shi is about developing a favorable situation with great potential to achieve the political objectives. Finally, shi is about taking and maintaining the initiative. As Sun Tzu puts it, “those skilled at making the enemy move do so by creating a situation to which he must conform.” These aspects of shi are also found in Sun Tzu‟s discussion of other key concepts in the Art of War such as deception, stratagem, intelligence, deterrence, and so on. Sun Tzu maintains that these key concepts are vital to victory; one must study and master them during peacetime; and it will be too late to consult experts (books or specialists) when grave occasions arise. In essence, Sun Tzu suggests that national leaders, political and military alike, make strategic thinking and employment of tactical skills part of their second nature. How does one nurture this second nature? Learning and practice are the ways to go. The author offers a new approach to learn and practice Sun Tzu‟s strategic and operational ideas—through learning the game of go.4 Go is of Chinese origin and is the world‟s oldest board game, yet still remarkably popular and viable. It is probably the most sophisticated game as well. This game bears striking resemblance to the Chinese way of war and diplomacy. Its concepts and tactics are living reflections of Chinese philosophy, strategic thinking, stratagems, and tactical interactions. This game, in turn, influences the way Chinese think and act. This work brings to light another important feature of this game—its connection to the Chinese military classics. The four key aspects of shi in Sun Tzu‟s Art of War are also guiding principles of go. In the American culture, many liken the American way of war and diplomacy to the games of chess (power-based fight), poker (bluffing and risk-taking), boxing (force on force), and American football (in many ways, resembles the American war machine). The game of go is different from chess, poker, boxing, and American football in many key aspects. While the American way of war has its strengths, a little knowledge and experience of the game of go will be a valuable addition to the American political and military wisdom; and it will take U.S. political and military leaders a long way in understanding the Chinese way of war and diplomacy. CHINESE WAY OF WAR AND DIPLOMACY A popular saying in the Chinese diplomatic and defense communities is about the Chinese way of war and diplomacy and its difference to that of the West: Chinese place heavy emphasis on strategy and stratagems whereas the West relies more on overwhelming force and advanced capability. By many accounts, this is an accurate characterization. The Chinese even go so far to call China the birthplace of stratagems. After all, China has the world‟s first comprehensive military classic, the Art of War, and the largest number of ancient military writings. While these military writings address many aspects of military affairs, they all emphasize strategy and stratagems. Among these military classics, Sun Tzu‟s Art of War is undoubtedly the epitome of the Chinese way of war and diplomacy. In this work, Sun Tzu expounds on many key thoughts on warfare and the conduct of war. Three of them are of great significance: a broad conception of the art of war, an emphasis on strategy and stratagem, and a dialectic view on the way to fight. In the Art of War, Sun Tzu treats the political, diplomatic, and logistical preparation for war, war fighting, and the handling of the aftermath of war as integral parts of the art of war. In this broad framework, the art of war is, in essence, the process of diplomacy; war fighting is only diplomacy by other means. Sun Tzu‟s emphasis on strategy and stratagems follows from his prudent view on war—it is a vital matter of the state, survival or ruin. Sun Tzu is especially cautious on the cost of war—while waging war can advance a state‟s interest, it can bring a state disaster as well. As an old Chinese saying goes, when you kill 10,000 enemy soldiers, you are likely to lose 3,000 lives as well. Hence, as Sun Tzu puts it, a farsighted ruler thinks about warfare carefully; a good commander exploits the art of war fully; if there is no benefit, advantage, or real danger, a state must not set the war machine in motion. “Thus those unable to understand the dangers inherent in employing troops are equally unable to understand the advantageous ways of doing so.” Preserving the vital interest of a state without the use of force therefore is the first principle in Sun Tzu‟s Art of War. To achieve this goal, Sun Tzu places great emphasis on strategy and stratagems. Thus in the Art of War, Sun Tzu treats warfare, from its preparation to execution and termination as first and foremost a contest of wisdom. Use of force is secondary. From Sun Tzu‟s perspective, a winning side uses force to consolidate assured victory, whereas a losing side uses force only to make a gamble or a desperate attempt for survival, neither of which is a good strategy of war. Adding complexity to the battle of wits is Sun Tzu‟s remarkably sophisticated dialectic view on nature, warfare, strategy, and stratagem. The Art of War is full of observations about the dialectic nature of strategic concepts such as weak vs. strong, more vs. few, defense vs. offense, regular vs. extraordinary (qi and zheng), direct vs. indirect, division vs. unity, laboring vs. resting, advance vs. retreat, far vs. near, and the relativity and mutual transformation of these strategic situations. Sun Tzu‟s teaching is to exploit the opposite of the enemy‟s strategy and action. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong, avoid him. Anger his general and confuse him. Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance. Keep him under stress and wear him down. When he is united, divide him. Attack when he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you. Sun Tzu‟s dialectic views are in complete harmony with the philosophies of Yin and Yang and Daoism. Sun Tzu and Lao Tzu, the intellect of the Daoist School of thought, particularly liken the character of the military and the way of war and diplomacy to the flow of water. Water is perhaps the best example of the dialectic nature of things. It has no constant shape. There is nothing softer and weaker than water, yet nothing is more penetrating and capable of attacking the hard and strong. The flow of water, carrying with it the shi, can wash away anything standing in its way. With over 2,000 years of influence from Sun Tzu‟s teaching, along with the influence of other significant philosophical and military writings, the Chinese are particularly comfortable with viewing war and diplomacy in comprehensive and dialectic ways and acting accordingly. Indeed, many of these observations have become proverbial components of the Chinese way of war and diplomacy. The most notable ones are bing yi zha li (war is based on deception), shang-bing fa-mou (supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy‟s strategy), qi-zheng xiang-sheng (mutual reproduction of regular and extraordinary forces and tactics), chu-qi zhi-sheng (win through unexpected moves), yin-di zhi-sheng (gain victory by varying one‟s strategy and tactics according to the enemy‟s situation), yi-rou ke-gang (use the soft and gentle to overcome the hard and strong), bishi ji-xu (stay clear of the enemy‟s main force and strike at his weak point), yi-yu wei-zhi (to make the devious route the most direct), hou-fa zhi-ren (fight back and gain the upper hand only after the enemy has initiated fighting), sheng-dong ji-xi (make a feint to the east but attack in the west), and so on. All of these special Chinese four-character proverbs are strategic and dialectic in nature. All bear some character of flowing water. This Chinese way of war and diplomacy is in striking difference to the Western way of war from ancient Greece to the United States today. In the Western tradition, there is a heavy emphasis on the use of force; the art of war is largely limited to the battlefields; and the way to fight is force on force. As one observer puts it, “the Greeks developed what has been called the Western way of war―a collision of soldiers on an open plain in a magnificent display of courage, skill, physical prowess, honor, and fair play, and a concomitant repugnance for decoy, ambush, sneak attacks, and the involvement of noncombatants.” With respect to stratagem, Alexander the Great said, when he was advised to launch a surprise night attack against the Persians: The policy which you are suggesting is one of bandits and thieves, the only purpose of which is deception. I cannot allow my glory always to be diminished by Darius‟ absence, or by narrow terrain, or by tricks of night. I am resolved to attack openly and by daylight. I choose to regret my good fortune rather than be ashamed of my victory.5 The Western way of war finds its comprehensive theoretical expressions in the Western military classics of Carl von Clausewitz and Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini. It has also made its impressive footprints in battlefields throughout the ages and across the globe. Today, the American way of war has become a more popular term for the Western way of war. As described by military historian Russell F. Weigley, the American way of war uses massive power, excels in advanced technology, and pursues total victory.6 Backed by U.S. mighty military power, the American way of war has put on impressive shows in wars in Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan. In the most recent war on Iraq, the 2003 Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the United States used a “leaner force” (smaller in number as compared to the massive buildup against Iraq in 1991), yet faster in maneuver, armed with sharper precision firepower, and advanced with surprise attacks. Some observers call this revolution in the Western way of war.7 However, one can see that the fundamentals of the Western way of war remain unaltered. The revolution has only made it more powerful. Comparing the Chinese and Western ways of war and diplomacy, one cannot but wonder which one is better. The Chinese believe their strategic traditions are superior to those of the West, both ethically and effectively. Chinese strategists tend to stress the significance of culture and end up stereotyping U.S. and Western ways of war.8 While a good answer to this question is difficult to qualify, one has to see that the West has dominated world politics with its superior comprehensive power over several centuries. The Chinese are aware of this fact. They also understand that without solid and credible capability, the play of strategy is empty. That is why the Chinese are so determined to develop China‟s comprehensive national power. That said, one must see that while the Chinese are doing their homework (developing their capabilities), the West should spend some time learning about Chinese strategic thought and stratagem skills. As Sun Tzu puts it, “know your opponent and know yourself, in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.” LESSONS FROM THE GAME OF GO In many ways, the game of go resembles the Chinese way of war and diplomacy. This game has its origin in China about 4,000 years ago and is the oldest board game in the world. The original Chinese name of this game is called weiqi (pronounced wei ch‟i); literally, encircling territory, an essential component of a nation state. Two players compete for territories. The one who acquires more wins. The game board is conceived to be the earth (back in ancient times, people believed the earth was flat and square). The board is square, representing stability (See Figure 1). The four corners represent the four seasons, indicating the cyclical change of time. The game pieces, the stones, are round, hence mobile. The spread of stones on the board reflect activities on earth. The shape of the stone engagements on the board is like the flow of water, an echo in Sun Tzu‟s view that the positioning of troops be likened to water: “as water varies its flow according to the fall of the land, a military varies its method of gaining victory according to the enemy situations.” Sun Tzu also uses stones to describe military affairs: rolling boulders create shi. The two players take turns to place black and white stones on the intersections (but not the open squares) of a 19 x 19 line matrix, one piece at a time. The black and white stones engage with one another in the game, exemplifying the concept of yin and yang and penetrating each other‟s territories as the flow of water. The stones have equal physical power (there is no almighty queen or little pawn as in chess), resembling the relatively equal physical size of individuals. Yet the importance and potential of the stones in the game are beyond imagination, resembling the boundless creativity of human individuals. Even a super computer today cannot map out their alternatives. Of note here is that in 1997, the IBM super computer Deep Blue finally defeated the chess grand master Garry Kasparov. Yet at the celebration ceremony, the designers of Deep Blue also admitted that they could not write a program to beat even a mediocre go player, not any time soon. [...]
Russia appeared weaker before her intervention in Syria.
As I said, you cannot provide instances where any nation, including in ancient times, adopted a position of apparent weakness as a deliberate policy to mask their intent to conduct aggressive warfare. Citing instances of deception tactics isn't even remotely comparable.
Only if you weren't paying attention. Russia is less powerful than the USSR was but its military has recovered considerably from its post-Soviet collapse. The Russian navy and nuclear arsenal are particularly notable.
As I said, you cannot provide instances where any nation, including in ancient times, adopted a position of apparent weakness as a deliberate policy to mask their intent to conduct aggressive warfare. Oh, you want example of an entire nation as an actor? Or of a government? As opposed to the military itself? What is exactly your point? I do not get it.
To be comparable, you'd have a nation, not at war, who deliberately feigned weakness as a prelude to launching an aggressive war against a foe(s) of much greater apparent strength.
Btw, let's recall that North Korea declared their discovery of unicorns only 3 years ago. I am far from the only skeptic on this hydrogen bomb claim. Strangely, it caused the same seismic wave as their (supposed) last fission bomb test.
OK. So what would this prove or disprove?
A situation comparable to the idiocy you started out with about NKorea feigning weakness as a massive deception prior to launching a war. Perhaps the stupidity of your own post has confused you.
OK. So what would this prove or disprove? "most Greek citizens, most notably those residing within Athens, viewed Macedonians with disdain (despite their claim to be direct descendants of the God Heracles). Once more we turn to Demosthenes who, in a speech of 341 BC, describes Philip as ‘a miserable Macedonian, from a land from which previously you could not even buy a decent slave’. The notion, therefore, that Athens or indeed any other Greek city-state should suddenly adopt the military tactics of a people seen as racially inferior would never have been considered, for theirs was seen to be the purer, more honourable way of warfare. Philip can certainly be seen to have played on this misconception throughout his reign, feigning weakness when in fact only growing in strength; presenting himself to the Greeks as an-ever humble servant"
I neither said nor meant that. Probably you got confused by me stating general regularities with a specific application of them that came from your imagination.
Okay, so you were blathering about some fictional situation that had absolutely nothing to do with NKorea and their supposed H-bomb test. Fine.
No evidence is ever produced. The earlier three "tests" were all equally consistent with a big explosion of conventional explosives. It isn't like we have any kind of intel to prove these are nukes. And now we have a "miniaturized hydrogen bomb" which is, if you know anything about them, a rather strange way to describe it. And yet we have only a "likely" nuclear detonation. I don't consider NKorea a nuclear power. If they had a real nuke, we'd see a demonstration. They love to demonstrate every other weapon they have but they act like they're hiding some shameful secret when it comes to these supposed nuclear tests. I think the Iranians pay them big time to be their R&D facility . I haven't seen the details of this latest test ;but Iranians have been on hand for every nuke test and missile test the NORKs have done in the past . Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
I see reporting that this new test had the same seismic signature as their last test. Many experts around the world are saying that they could not make a real H-bomb with such a small explosion. Many experts believe they have not mastered the plutonium bomb (if they even have one). It isn't that hard to make a fission fizzle. It takes alot of expertise to make a real nuke that is more than a fizzling dirty bomb that blows itself apart before producing the full explosion it should. And making a true H-bomb is harder yet.
I notice on FNC that a top nuke expert, Jim Walsh of MIT, has gone on record saying it was not an H-bomb but may have been a standard plutonium bomb with a few enhancer elements. We produced a lot of these ourselves back in the Forties and Fifties to make better A-bombs before we built our first H-bombs.
I have been to Seoul in the past decade. I can assure you that there are still signs of the devastation the 1950s war hailed on that city. I can also assure you that Seoul has much more to lose today than then and is perhaps even more vulnerable to N. Korea attack. N. Korea may also be able to wreak havoc on Japan. It appears that China has lost some sway with N. Korea but as been noted, there is an awful lot of deception being employed by all concerned parties. S. Koreans are not like what West Germans were. They do not seek reunification with N. Korea but rather fear it. потому что Бог хочет это тот путь
There are no indication Kim is far sighted or that his moves are carefully calculated, we can dig around in oriential thinking but realise Kim was educated in the west. He would hope to intimidate the reunification of Korea on his terms but for the moment he is looking for attention
He is Korean and certainly he plays Go. Making a degree in another country does not erase your mindset or culture.
You can see why. The Norks are nuts.
You can see why. The Norks are nuts. More like NK is an economic disaster and would be an incredible drain on the SK economy and economic well-being of average SK Kim and Park if there was reunification. потому что Бог хочет это тот путь
I'm not sure that is why the Sorks don't want the Norks. I think they are literally afraid of them. Like they would fear a zombie invasion. The Norks are seriously crazy and willing to kill.
The NK are a decieved and oppressed people just like the East Germans were. Those who can escape do. Obviously, the ruling class are seriously dangerous and thie military is dangerous, but the ordinary people are just a pool of cheap labour like the east germans were. You could not have the NK flooding over the border in a reunification but the SK are sufficiently business savvy to establish industries and raise NK agriculture. Think of NK as a new China if their energies are turned to manufacture rather than useless displays
Non auro, sed ferro, recuperando est patria
Thanks for the empty white screen as your reply.
It's a YouTube video, here's the url to the video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=33D3NOl0-ag Non auro, sed ferro, recuperando est patria
#2. To: rlk (#0)
North Korea, under U.N. sanctions for its nuclear and missile programs, has so far conducted three nuclear tests - in 2006, 2009 and 2013 - all at Punggye-ri, near where the earthquake took place.
#3. To: TooConservative (#2)
(Edited)
I don't consider NKorea a nuclear power. If they had a real nuke, we'd see a demonstration. They love to demonstrate every other weapon they have but they act like they're hiding some shameful secret when it comes to these supposed nuclear tests.
Faulty Perception:
#4. To: A Pole (#3)
Do they appear to you strong or weak?
#5. To: TooConservative (#4)
#6. To: A Pole (#3)
"Appear weak when you are strong, and strong when you are weak.
#7. To: TooConservative (#6)
(Edited)
think you can provide few, if any, examples from history of countries deliberately following a policy of projecting weakness to their foes.
#8. To: A Pole (#7)
(Edited)
#9. To: TooConservative (#6)
I think you can provide few, if any, examples from history of countries deliberately following a policy of projecting weakness to their foes.
#10. To: paraclete (#8)
#11. To: Vicomte13 (#9)
What the US is doing right now is about the only case I can think of offhand.
#12. To: A Pole (#7)
"In his 52 BC conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar successfully used tactical deception blah blah blah...
#13. To: A Pole, Pericles (#11)
Russia appeared weaker before her intervention in Syria.
#14. To: TooConservative (#12)
(Edited)
"In his 52 BC conquest of Gaul, Julius Caesar successfully used tactical deception blah blah blah... "
#15. To: A Pole (#14)
Oh, you want example of an entire nation as an actor? Or of a government? As opposed to the military itself?
#16. To: A Pole (#14)
#17. To: TooConservative (#15)
To be comparable, you'd have a nation, not at war, who deliberately feigned weakness as a prelude to launching an aggressive war against a foe(s) of much greater apparent strength.
#18. To: A Pole (#17)
#19. To: TooConservative (#17)
#20. To: TooConservative (#18)
(Edited)
A situation comparable to the idiocy you started out with about NKorea feigning weakness as a massive deception prior to launching a war.
#21. To: A Pole (#20)
#22. To: TooConservative (#2)
If they even have a nuke.
#23. To: tomder55 (#22)
#24. To: tomder55, A Pole, All (#22)
#25. To: A Pole, TooConservative, paraclete, All (#10)
#26. To: A Pole (#10)
Hence, as Sun Tzu puts it, a farsighted ruler thinks about warfare carefully
#27. To: paraclete (#26)
There are no indication Kim is far sighted or that his moves are carefully calculated, we can dig around in oriential thinking but realise Kim was educated in the west.
#28. To: SOSO (#25)
S. Koreans are not like what West Germans were. They do not seek reunification with N. Korea but rather fear it.
#29. To: TooConservative (#28)
S. Koreans are not like what West Germans were. They do not seek reunification with N. Korea but rather fear it.
#30. To: SOSO (#29)
#31. To: TooConservative (#30)
The Norks are seriously crazy and willing to kill.
#32. To: rlk (#0)
#33. To: nativist nationalist (#32)
#34. To: rlk (#33)
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