LF: “Official Notice of Dispute” Filed with New Hampshire Attorney General on Four Presidential Candidates’ Eligibility (Rubio, Cruz, Jindal, Santorum)

Title: “Official Notice of Dispute” Filed with New Hampshire Attorney General on Four Presidential Candidates’ Eligibility (Rubio, Cruz, Jindal, Santorum)
Source: The Post & Email
URL Source: http://www.thepostemail.com/2015/11 ... ential-candidates-eligibility/
Published: Nov 14, 2015
Author: Robert Laity
Post Date: 2015-11-14 17:57:34 by Hondo68
Keywords: Party of non Americans, globalists, America-last
Views: 5937
Comments: 26

New Hampshire Attorney General Joseph Foster took office in May 2013. New Hampshire’s attorney general is appointed by the governor rather than elected by the people.

(Nov. 13, 2015) — [Editor's Note: The following email was sent to Attorney General Joseph Foster on November 13, 2015.]

Joseph Foster
Attorney General
State of New Hampshire

OFFICIAL NOTICE OF DISPUTE AS TO THE
NON BONA FIDES OF FOUR REPUBLICAN
CANDIDATES FOR PRESIDENT

Dear Attorney General Foster,

I wish to NOTIFY you that the bona-fides of four Republican Candidates to be President is hereby DISPUTED. It is claimed that the following persons do NOT meet the United States Constitutional requirement that one be a “Natural-Born Citizen” in order to be President under Article II,Sec.1. The U.S. Supreme Court in Minor v Happersett,U.S.Supreme Court 88 U.S. 162 (1875) ruled that:

“The Constitution does not,in words, say who shall be natural born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that….It was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents [Emphasis added] who are citizens became themselves,upon their birth, citizens also….these were natural born citizens”

The court went on to make reference to the citizenship status of those citizens who derived their citizenship from parents who were not citizens themselves, saying “as to this class there have been doubts”.

I am disputing the bona-fides of:

Marco Rubio-NOT an NBC. He was born in the U.S. However his Parents were un-naturalized “Permanent resident” Cuban citizens when he was born

Ted Cruz-NOT an NBC. He was born in Canada to a Cuban Father and American Mother who may have naturalized as a Canadian.

Bobby Jindal- NOT an NBC. He was born in the U.S. to Parents who were un-naturalized Citizens of India at the time of Bob Jindal’s birth.

Rick Santorum-NOT an NBC. He was born in the U.S. to a Father who was an Italian citizen not naturalized at the time of Rick’s birth.
This is a repeat of what Barack Obama did in 2008 and 2012 and John McCain did in 2008. Both of them are ineligible.

See: There is NO “President” Obama:

http://www.thepostemail.com/09/17//2010/there-is-no-president-obama/

Submitted,

Robert C. Laity
Founder and President
Society for the Preservation of
our American Republic
43 Mosher Drive
Tonawanda, NY 14150

I understand that State of New Hampshire law provides that this complaint be addressed within (90) days. Date of Complaint is 11/13/2015.

Let the record show that the GOP is pushing a record number of ineligable candidates this time, 4 citizens of the world, America last globalist bankster puppets. (1 image)

Page 7 of the Transcript of Record for Minor v. Happersett shows the "Cause Submitted on agreed statement."

The Agreed statement begins on page 8 of the Transcript of Record, and on page 9 documents that both sides agreed:

The matter of Ms. Minor's citizenship was not at issue. As submitted, the only question at issue was whether a woman could be disenfranchised due to not being male. Therefore, the Court actually ruled that,

And, therefore, the Minor court, while expressing some doubts existed in 1875, did not have jurisdiction to decide those doubts, and did not resolve those doubts. As a legal citation upon the issue, it is pure bullshit.

And such doubts were extinguished by a series of Federal cases culminating in the great case of Wong Kim Ark.

As for the purposes of Minor, it was not necessary to resolve the issue of the citizenship of children born within the jurisdiction of foreign parents, the Court went right ahead and did not decide it.

That is not to say that the U.S. Supreme Court did not decide it. It did and it is very well known, The case is Wong Kim Ark.

Fortuately, I just happen to have a complete copy of the Transcript of Record in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).

For anyone who is still confused regarding what the issue before the court was, counsel for Appellant, who brought the appeal, made it explicitly clear.

Of course, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against his argument and there is over a century of precedent that what has been recycled as birther blather is nonsense.

Indeed for any who didn't get it at page 2, Collins summarized in his final paragraph at 39:

The Appellant explicitly, albeit unsuccessfully, argued that the District Court erred in ruling "that the respondent is a natural-born citizen." The Supreme Court affirmed that ruling of the District Court.

Extracts from Brief on Behalf of Respondent (Appellee Won Kim Ark)

The single question presented upon this appeal is this: Are the children born in this country of alien residents not connected with the diplomatic service citizens of the United States?

Before proceeding to any independent discussion of this subject it will perhaps be useful to refer to the main points upon which the Government relies in support of its contention that Wong Kim Ark was not at the time of his birth "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States.

It is substantially conceded that the Fourteenth Amendment is but declaratory of the law as it previously existed, and it is practically admitted that, sinch the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, every judicial decision directly upon the question in controversy has been adverse to the Government's present position.

It is, however, urged most earnestly by the Solicitor General and by Mr. Collins, the amicus curiae, that this long-standing interpretation of who was a citizen of the United States is wrong, and has been wrong from the very beginning, in that the Courts have resorted to the common law to aid them in their decisions, while the question was really one of the law of nations. Further than that, the Government seriously presses the point that there is no common law in the United States, and that, therefore, in ascertaining the meaning of words used in the Constitution, but not there defined, it is not permissible to inquire how they were commonly understood by lawyers at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, or in other words what their meaning was at common law.

The two fundamental theories, therefore, now advanced by the Government, and upon which its entire argument stands or falls are:

Second. That the question of citizenship in a nation is to be determined by the rules of international law.

(a) Perhaps we do not fully understand the argument of the Government that there is no common law in the United States, but as we read the authorities which have been cited by the Solicitor General, the Court has simply held that "there are no common law offenses against the United States" (United States vs. Britton, 108 U. S. 199-206).

This proposition is too well established to admit of dispute, but it is not clear how it can affect the present discussion. The question whether a man is "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States is not, we take it, to be determined by the common law, but by the principles of common law, which is a very different matter.

In other words, it has often been decided by this Court that, in determining the meaning of the words used in the Constitution and the statutes of the United States and not therein defined, it is both proper and necessary to seek in the common law, as the source and origin of our jurisprudence, there true definition; and the question fairly raised here is not whether there is a common law in the United States, but whether it is admissible, in construing and defining words used in the Constitution, to refer to the common law.

The case of Smith vs. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, is referred to upon the brief of the Solicitor General in support of the proposition that there is no common law in the United States.

If the counsel for the Government had read this case through he would have found on page 478 the following statement:

(b) The second theory of the appellant is that the question of citizenship in the United States is to be determined by the law of nations and not by the law of the United States.

We should have supposed it difficult to find a question more widely separated from the domain of international law than the status of a citizen in any country. It would seem as if the right of citizenship was for each country to determine for itself, and that any nation would guard with jealous interest the right to decide who should be its members. That is to say, it is a matter of local and national law, as distinguished from international law, and the United States would be the last to surrender the privilege of determining, by its own law, who were or were not its citizens.

This proposition of this government has, we think, arisen from a mistaken notion as to the true character of the question in this case, and it seems comewhat remarkable that the Solicitor General should take the position that the Government of the United States is to be administered, not in accordance with the laws of the United States, but in accordance with the law of nations, and that the vital question of who compose the great body of their citizens is to be determined, not by the law of the United States, but by the rules of international law.

In the case of Scott v. Sandford, 19 How., 399, 451; Chief Justice Taney used the following language:

Mr. Stanberry, then Attorney-General, said in Warren's Case, 12 Opin. Atty.-Gen., 319, 325:

It is not at all certain that this principle of International law, as it is called, which is supposed to declare that a child born to aliens while residing in a foreign country takes the nationality of his father, is anything more than a name. As a matter of fact, no nation, so far as we have been been able to ascertain, decides or pretends to decide the status of its citizens by any other law than its own.

It is true that different nations have different laws upon this subject, and the laws of some of these nations are more or less in accord, but there is no great unanimity among them.

England now holds to the rule that birth within its dominions makes a man a subject of the Queen, unless, if born of aliens, he elects the nationality of his parents (33 Vict., Chap 14).

In Denmark, Portugal and Holland the law is apparently the same as that of France, as Lord Cockburn in his work on Nationality says, at pages 14 and 15, that birth within their dominions confers citizenship on the offspring of alien parents, subject to the right of the individual concerned to reject it at majority.

Another rule is adopted by Belgium, Spain, Italy, Greece, the Grand Duchy of Baden, Russia, Russia-Poland and the Ottoman Empire, where birth within their dominions confers citizenship on the offspring of alien parents on the right being claimed on certain specified conditions (Cockburn on Nationality, 14 and 15).

It is clear, therefore, that each country has enacted its own law as to who is or who is not its citizen, and has never fallen back upon any principle of international law for the decision of the question.

All that can possibly be argued from the state of the law of citizenship in the different countries of Europe is that it might be advisable for the people of the United States to pass a law or amend their constitution, if they saw fit, so as to conform with the laws of the majority of these countries, but we fail to see how the counsel for the government have shown that the status of a citizen was or ever can be determined in the Courts of a country be the law of nations or by any other law than its own. It other words, the question before this honorable Court is not what is the proper policy for the United States to adopt, but what is the meaning of an amendment of their constitution, and the constitution must be interpreted, as we think, by the light of the principles of our own law and not by the law of other countries or the law of nations. "The laws of the United States determine what persons shall be regarded as citizens, irrespective of such persons' pleasure or tthe laws or pleasure of any other government" (State vs. Adams, 45 Iowa, 99, 101).

"The term 'citizen' as understood in our law is precisely analagous to the term subject in the common law, and the change of phrase has entirely resulted from the change of government. The sovereignty has been transferred from one man to the collective body of the people, and he who before as a 'subject of the King' is now 'a citizen of the State'" (State vs. Manuel, 3 Dev. & Battle's N. C. R., 26).

In the first section of the act of Congress approved March 26, 1790 (1 Stat. at Large, 103), it is enacted:

We take it that no difference in meaning can be assigned to the clause "under the jurisdiction of the United States," found the the naturalization act, and the words of the Fourteenth Amendment, "subject to the jurisdiction thereof."

It is a little difficult to see what distinction can be drawn between the two cases. It an alien who resides in the territory of this country is "under the jurisdiction of the United States" for the purpose of naturalization, it would seem to follow that a man born here and always residing here must be "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" for the purpose of naturalization, it would seem to follow that a man born here and always residing here must be "subject to the jurisdiction thereof," and must have been so at his birth.

We do not see what substantial distinction can be drawn between the words of the Civil Rights Bill and the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the once case the condition of citizenship is birth "not subject to any foreign power," and in the other it is birth "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States.

The Civil Rights bill was vetoed by President Johnson, and his interpretation of these words perhaps goes as far to show what they were supposed to mean at the time they were used as any other. It was very clear to him that a man in the position of Wong Kim Ark was not subject to the jurisdiction of any foreign power, and was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, for he says in his veto message (Congr. Globe, 39th Congress, p. 1679):

In United States vs. Rhodes, 1 Abb. U.S. Rep., 28, the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Bill came up for decision in a Federal Court, apparently, for the first time. Mr. Justice Swayne in his opinion said at pages 38, 40 and 41:

We now come to the construction of this amendment by the lower Courts, and the most important case is that of In re Look Tin Sing, 10 Sawy., 353 [21 Fed. Rep. 905], decided by Mr. Justice Field. The same question was presented in this case in precisely the same way in which it arises here, and it was the held that a Chinaman born in the United States of parents not engaged in any diplomatic capacity was a citizen thereof. The opinion of Mr. Justice Field was concurred in by Judges Sawyer, Sabin and Hoffman. At page 359 the Court said:

This is the idea which we have before sought to convey, viz.: that this country could not permit another nation to claim jurisdiction of a man born here. It, is, perhaps, conceivable that this Government might in the future by some law permit the individual himself to elect, when of age, what nation he chose for his country, but it is out of the question for our Government to allow another government to say what country a person born within our territory belongs.

Perhaps the latest case on this subject is Benny vs. O'Brien, 32 Atlantic Reporter, 696. The question before the Supreme Court of New Jersey was "whether a person born in this country of alien parents who, prior to his birth, had their domicile here, is a citizen of the United States," and in a very well considered opinion it was held that he was, the Court saying, at page 697:

Whenever international law conflicts with the local law of a particular country, "the law of nations, as to particular matters, may be, as for such particular countries, either expanded or contracted by local legislation" (Secretary Bayard, supra). This principle our government would be the first to adopt should any foreign country send its emissaries to our shores for the purpose of compelling those of its subjects who had emigrated to the United States and had not become naturalized or their children born on our soil, to return to the country of their origin. Even enmity to the Chinese race would not permit the creation of any such dangerous precedent.

If this case should be decided in favor of the Government, and it should be held that children born in this country to an alien resident are not "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" and are "subject to a foreign power," what reply can the Secretary of State make to the Government of Russia or Germany or England in the case suggested? Must he say:

I admit that the highest tribunal of my country has decided that the men you are taking away by force to join your armies are not 'subject to the jurisdiction' of my government, and are subject to the jurisdiction of yours, but that decision does not mean that they are subject to the jurisdiction of your government in the sense that obedience can be compelled to that government and its laws, or that they are 'not subject to the jurisdiction' of my government in the sense that the protection of the Constitution and the laws of this country is withheld from them, and these men, born in this country of subjects of your governemtn, who have been seized by your officers, must be released or the friendly relations between our two governments must cease.

So, in the case at bar, the people of the United States have not denied to the children born in this country of alien parents the right of citizenship therein, nor have they passed any law declaring them to be the citizens or subjects of the country of their parents, and the question whether they might have done so does not arise in this case.

Our position is that any such discussion is foreign to the issue here, which is what is meant by the words "subject to the jurisdiction thereof," and we respectfully submit that the people of this country intended that these words should be construed in accordance with the principles of law of which they and their fathers before them had knowledge, and not in accordance with the Roman law or the law of any European country with which they were unfamiliar. In other words, they intended that the status of citizenship in the United States should be determined in accordance with the law of the United States and not upon the principles of the Roman law.

In the Lynch case, therefore, the identical question was argued and decided which is presented here, viz.: Is the child born in the United States to an alien resident a citizen thereof?

The only difference between the two cases is that the appellee in the present case has always lived in the United States, whereas Julia Lynch was taken out of the country when still an infant in arms and did not return until she was fifteen years old.

It was urged in behalf of the complainant Lynch, as it is argued here, that there was no common law in the United States. The Chancellor fully and carefully considered the question from this point of view. He quoted with approval from the speech of Mr. Bayard in the House of Representatives in 1802, in which he said: "The Judges of the United States have held generally that the Constitution of the United States was predicated upon an existing common law. * * * The Constitution is unintelligible without reference to the common law. * * * Without this law the Constitution becomes a dead letter" (p. 654), and expressed himself in the following language at page 652:

After a most careful analysis of all the authorities on the subject, it was decided that Julia Lynch was a native-born citizen of the United States, and the Chancellor said at page 663:

Brief on Behalf of Appellant (United States Government)

Extracts from Brief on Behalf of Respondent (Appellee Won Kim Ark)