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Title: MARCO RUBIO IS AN ANCHOR BABY AND NOT ELIGIBLE TO RUN FOR PRESIDENT!
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URL Source: https://themarshallreport.wordpress ... eligible-to-run-for-president/
Published: Nov 4, 2015
Author: dianne marshall
Post Date: 2015-11-04 07:33:51 by A K A Stone
Keywords: None
Views: 5903
Comments: 42
Yes you heard that right. At the time Marco Rubio was born in the United States neither of his parents were United States Citizens. Rubio was born in Miami, Florida on May 28, 1971, the second son and third child of Mario Rubio and Oria Garcia. His parents were Cubans who had immigrated to the United States in 1956 and were naturalized as U.S. citizens in 1975!. That makes little Marco an anchor baby. Don’t expect him to think like the average American. He has now both said and shown us he doesn’t respect the office of the senate, and is not to be trusted to the office of President! The question that remains is: DOES MARCO RUBIO MEET THE QUALIFICATIONS TO RUN FOR PRESIDENT? The descriptive clause in the Constitution says this: “Only native-born U.S. citizens (or those born abroad, but only to parents at least one of whom was a U.S. citizen at the time) may serve president of the United States.” (see link below) When Marco Rubio announced he was running, for president, Orly Taitz, and Mario Apuzzo (who both filed multiple lawsuits challenging Obama’s eligibility) asserted that Mario Rubio was not eligible to run because he was born to parents who were not U.S. citizens at the time of his respective birth. They both publically asserted that Marco Rubio is not eligible. To me it appears that the answer is NO, Rubio is not qualified. Why is the news silent on this one? Oh and by the way, Rubio’s sob story for the campaign that his parents were Cuban refugees and fled to the US to escape the abusive power of Castro? He forgot to tell you that his family arrived in the US in 1956 and Castro did not rise to power until 1959. Another lie. Poster Comment: Oh and by the way, Rubio’s sob story for the campaign that his parents were Cuban refugees and fled to the US to escape the abusive power of Castro? He forgot to tell you that his family arrived in the US in 1956 and Castro did not rise to power until 1959. Another lie.
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#2. To: A K A Stone, NATURAL Born Citizen (#0)
“Only native-born U.S. citizens (or those born abroad, but only to parents at least one of whom was a U.S. citizen at the time) may serve president of the United States.” (see link below) Unknown what the author is quoting, but it's NOT the US Constitution! "native-born" is not in there. No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States. A lot of people miss this. It spells out that the Founders anticipated that a natural-born American citizens might live up to age 21 overseas and still be eligible to run as president. Rubio is considered natural-born since that is how we have defined the 14th Amendment. We have legislatively altered the definition slightly several times because the Constitution simply says natural-born but does not exhaustively define the term. I always like how the Founders, themselves British subjects, grandfathered themselves into eligibility with this modest phrase.
The fault lies with the Republicans who still cling to the birther nonsense about the emperor . Now we are going to have to listen to this stuff about every 1st generation candidate . Rubio ,Jindal ,Cruz ,the list goes on.
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
I'm sorry to tell you, however that part that states at least one parent must be an American citizen refers to children born overseas. Native born children, i.e. born in the States, are good to go.
Psalm 37
Who is we? Nancy Pelosi certified that Barry Obama is qualified and a natural born citizen. The courts have never ruled on "natural born Citizen". The 14th doesn't specifically address natural born. Ted Cruz was born in Canada, a Dual Citizen at birth. How can this be "natural born", most people are born with only one citizenship. Not so natural to the vast majority of people. Most people don't have two foreign citizen parents like Marco Rubio, either. Rubio and Cruz's parents eventually became citizens, and Teddy dropped his Canadian citizenship a couple of years ago, but that doesn't make either of them natural born. Of course they have. There are a number of key cases. If you've followed the Birther threads, you should recall them. They have never comprehensively defined natural-born. However, they have excluded and included certain classes of person or individuals based on the current statutes governing natural-born status.
The Congressional Research Service reaffirmed the early 2009 opinion in 2011 . https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42097.pdf Cittizenship at Birth: Case Law and Interpretations: The overwhelming evidence of historical intent, general understandings, and common law principles underlying American jurisprudence thus indicate that the most reasonable interpretation of “natural born” citizens would include those who are considered U.S. citizens “at birth” or “by birth,” either by the operation of the strict “common law” of jus soli derived from English common law (physically born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction, without reference to parentage or lineage), or under existing federal statutory law incorporating longstanding concepts of jus sanguinis, the law of descent, including those born abroad of U.S. citizen-parents. This general historical understanding and interpretation is supported, as well, by specific federal case law in the United States, and in official legal opinions of U.S. officers. Although the Supreme Court has not needed to rule specifically on the presidential eligibility clause, as discussed in more detail below, numerous federal cases, as well as state cases, for more than a century have used the term “natural born citizen” to describe a person born in this country and under its jurisdiction, even to parents who were aliens in the U.S.114 Additionally, several Supreme Court cases, as well as numerous constitutional scholars, have used the term “native born” citizen to indicate all of those children physically born in the country (and subject to its jurisdiction), without reference to parentage or lineage, and employed such term in reference to those citizens eligible to be President under the “natural born” citizenship clause, as opposed to “naturalized” citizens, who are not.115 In no currently controlling legal opinion in American jurisprudence has the citizenship or nationality of one’s parents or forebears been considered a determining factor in the eligibility of a native born U.S. citizen to be President, and no holding in any case in federal court has ever established a “two citizen-parent” requirement, or other requirement of lineage or bloodline, for a native born U.S. citizen to be eligible for the Presidency. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
There is ONE and only one circumstance where natural born Citizen is important, the office of US president. All other cases and rulings are irrelevant since they don't address the issue. The courts refuse to rule on the presidential eligibility question. Cuban student Rafael Cruz (center) in a pro-Castro parade at the University of Texas Austin in 1959. In 2005 he finally renounced his allegiance to Fidel and became a US citizen. If Cruz's parents and Cruz are all non-citizens, or were when Cruz was born, there shouldn't be much of a problem regarding citizenship. However, Obama trashed that law with the help of his "law abiding" leftist friends when he was elected president.
Psalm 37
not that I'd put it past them ,but I see no basis for the courts to decide the question of 'natural born ' since there is no definition in the constitution. It has been left for Congress to decide .
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
Which, of course, is absolutely irrelevant. The birther attempts to sell this crap to courts has lost several hundred times, with no case surviving the pre-trial stage. Rubio was born within the territory of the United States. Check. Rubio was born within the jurisdiction of the United States. Check. Rubio is a natural born citizen of the United States. Check. 14th Amendment: “Only native-born U.S. citizens (or those born abroad, but only to parents at least one of whom was a U.S. citizen at the time) may serve president of the United States.” (see link below) That is utter bullshit. The crap in quotation marks does not appear in the Constitution. It is make believe nonsense. The operative content of the actual Constitution states, at Article 2, Section 1, Clause 5: https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii Now, let us look at that "link below" from the original article: http://blogs.ocweekly.com/navelgazing/2011/10/orly_taitz_birther_marco_rubio.php Orly Taitz And Fellow Birthers Go After Florida's Marco Rubio and Succeed (But Not How They'd Hoped) By Ted B. Kissell Ever since Barack Obama produced his really-real-for-realsies birth certificate--punctuated by that actually quite funny turn at the White House Correspondents' Dinner--the birther movement has lacked focus. Laguna Niguel dentist/attorney/weekly purchaser of entire Costco pallets of mascara Orly Taitz, along with her many birther frenemies, have been looking around for a new, nationally prominent figure of dubious provenance. But who? It had to be someone aspiring to the presidency or vice-presidency ... foreign-ish ... accent would be a plus ... medium complexion ... last name ends in a vowel.... Hey, what about that Marco Rubio character, the Republican senator from Florida? Did I say from Florida? That's what he wants you to think! According to the St. Petersburg Times, birther lawyer litigant Charles Kerchner got his hands on the naturalization petitions by Rubio's parents, who had emigrated to Miami from Cuba in 1956. They didn't become citizens until 1975. Now, that doesn't matter here in the real world. Rubio was born in the U.S., and is eligible for the presidency--or, as many in Republican circles had been hoping, the vice-presidency first, and sooner rather than later. Of course, in the xenophobic whackadoodle realm of Birtherstan, the term natural-born is up for debate. Our own Orly told the St. Pete Times, "We need the court to finally adjudicate this issue, who is a natural-born citizen." Her position is, since his parents weren't citizens, Rubio is ineligible for the presidency. [snip] The article explicitly states "Rubio was born in the U.S., and is eligible for the presidency." The article cites the "xenophobic whackadoodle realm of Birtherstan" and quotes Birtherstan denizen Dr. Orly Taitz saying, "We need the court to finally adjudicate this issue, who is a natural-born citizen," and citing the 2011 opinion of whackadoodle Dr. Orly Taitz that Marco Rubio is not eligible. A Dr. Orly blast from the past: Rhodes - ORDER Order Imposing Sanctions (10/13/2009 - #28) by Jack Ryan HIGHLIGHTS: At 10: "finding that due process requires notice and an opportunity to respond prior to imposition of Rule 11 sanctions but that a hearing is not necessary and may be a “waste of judicial resources” where the attorney fails to present support for her claims despite opportunities to do so)." At 13: "The Court finds that counsel’s purported affidavit–the “certificate of good faith”—is neither sufficient nor timely. First, § 144 applies to “parties” to the proceeding. The party in this case was Captain Connie Rhodes. Captain Rhodes makes no claim that the undersigned has a personal bias against her. In fact, she has discharged Ms. Taitz and stated she has no interest in pursuing the matter further. (See Letter from Rhodes to Ct., Sept. 18, 2009, Doc. 18.) In response to Captain Rhodes’s termination of her services, counsel sought to withdraw from representation of Captain Rhodes, which the Court permitted. (See Mot. to Withdraw, Sept. 28, 2009, Doc. 20 & Order Granting Mot. to Withdraw, Sept. 28, 2009, Doc. 21.) Thus, no affidavit has been executed and filed by the party in this action alleging personal bias against the party to the action." At 16: "The undersigned has never talked to or met with the Attorney General." At 17: "What the Court can say is that no reasonable attorney would rely upon this affidavit in support of a legal argument in a court of law." At 17: "Counsel’s contention that the undersigned has a financial interest in this case is perhaps more preposterous than the phantom visit with the Attorney General." At 18: "The Court must nevertheless remind counsel that she has been fired by her former client, who has made it clear that she no longer wishes to pursue the matter. Therefore, counsel cannot possibly succeed on her main claim that she maintains would topple Microsoft and Comcast because she has no means to appeal the Court’s dismissal of that claim." At 20: "The Court makes no apology for the tone of its previous orders. They were direct and strong but apparently not strong enough. They certainly do not demonstrate personal bias. They do demonstrate a lack of tolerance for frivolous legal claims asserted by lawyers who should know better." At 23: "Her motion to recuse and motion for enlargement of time have no merit and are accordingly denied as frivolous." At 25: "Counsel’s grievance in this case is that the President has failed to produce satisfactory proof of his place of birth. That general grievance is beyond the reach of the federal judiciary." At 26: "Our founders provided opportunities for a President’s qualifications to be tested, but they do not include direct involvement by the judiciary." At 28: "Contrary to counsel’s suggestion, the courts do not refrain from entering political debates because of bias or personal disinterest. They do so because the Constitution, within which counsel attempts to wrap herself, prevents their encroachment into the political sphere. That does not mean that judicial decisions do not often have political consequences, nor does it mean that the judiciary cannot rule upon issues that may overturn actions by the political branches when they are contrary to the Constitution. But it is clear that the Constitution does not contemplate that the judiciary will participate in the selection or removal of the President, unless an individual can clearly demonstrate that his individual constitutional rights are somehow violated by the process. A generalized claim that the President is unqualified does not fall within this narrow exception and is best addressed to the First branch of government, not the Third." At 32: "The Court finds that counsel’s conduct was willful and not merely negligent. It demonstrates bad faith on her part. As an attorney, she is deemed to have known better. She owed a duty to follow the rules and to respect the Court. Counsel’s pattern of conduct conclusively establishes that she did not mistakenly violate a provision of law. She knowingly violated Rule 11. Her response to the Court’s show cause order is breathtaking in its arrogance and borders on delusional." At 35: The Clerk’s Office was burdened by Ms. Taitz’s inability to follow the Court’s rules regarding pro hac vice admission and the Court’s rules for electronic filing. On five separate occasions in a short period, the Clerk’s Office personnel error-noticed counsel for her failure to follow simple rules. At the hearing, counsel failed to make coherent legal arguments but instead wasted the Court’s time with press conference sound bites and speeches." At 36: "The Court also finds that counsel’s response to the Court’s show cause order demonstrates that the originally contemplated monetary sanction of $10,000.00 is not sufficient to deter counsel’s misconduct. In response to this threatened sanction, counsel scoffed and resumed similar sanctionable conduct." At 37: "Under the circumstances in this case and based upon the factors considered above, the Court finds that the Court’s previously contemplated financial sanction of $10,000.00 is not adequate to deter future misconduct and that a monetary penalty of $20,000.00 is the minimum amount necessary to deter counsel’s misconduct." At 42: "Counsel Orly Taitz is hereby ordered to pay $20,000.00 to the United States, through the Middle District of Georgia Clerk’s Office, within thirty days of the date of this Order as a sanction for her misconduct in violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
It is equally applicable to the Vice President. Cruz is a natural born U.S. citizen pursuant to Federal law in effect at the time of his birth.
He's not a natural born anything. He was born in Canada, but neither parent is Canadian. He's a hybrid, Cuban, Canadian, American. There can't be too many of those. He might be popular at the UN as an unidentified citizen of the world. I never heard whether she actually paid the fine. I suppose she hit up her fanbois for donations. Recall that doctor, a colonel maybe, who refused to deploy when ordered to (by his superiors at the Pentagon). He pretended he had been ordered directly by Obama to deploy when he was actually being deployed under Bush's deployment orders so he lost his courtmartial. Larkin? He served a couple of years in the stockade and was run out of the service without benefits, I think. I recall how all the Birthers were totally 1,000% behind him. Until he lost his case and suddenly none of them wanted to talk Birthery stuff for a while. Orly and her cult ruined his life and career. I bet she didn't hold any fundraisers for him or his family.
Ted Cruz is a natural born U.S. citizen, pursuant to Federal law in effect at the time of his birth. Ted Cruz was born in Calgary, Alberta, on Dec. 22, 1970. His mother was a United States citizen significantly before and when he was born. The law in effect at the time of birth of Ted Cruz was the Immigation and Nationality Act of 1952 (first amended 1978). Amendment history may be viewed at 8 U.S.C. 1401. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-66/content-detail.html http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-66/pdf/STATUTE-66.pdf P.L. 414, June 25, 1952 66 Stat 163 (to 282), Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act. AN ACT To revise the laws relating to immigration, naturalization, and nationality ; and for other purposes. 66 Stat. 235, 236: CHAPTER 1-NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND BY COLLECTIVE NATURALIZATION NATIONALS AND CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES AT BIRTH SEC. 301 . (a) The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: [...] (7) a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years: Provided, That any periods of honorable service in the Armed Forces of the United States by such citizen parent may be included in computing the physical presence requirements of this paragraph. - - - - - - - - - - http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/03/on-the-meaning-of-natural-born-citizen Harvard Law Review Forum On the Meaning of “Natural Born Citizen” Commentary by Neal Katyal & Paul Clement Mar 11, 2015 128 Harv. L. Rev. F. 161 All the sources routinely used to interpret the Constitution confirm that the phrase “natural born Citizen” has a specific meaning: namely, someone who was a U.S. citizen at birth with no need to go through a naturalization proceeding at some later time. And Congress has made equally clear from the time of the framing of the Constitution to the current day that, subject to certain residency requirements on the parents, someone born to a U.S. citizen parent generally becomes a U.S. citizen without regard to whether the birth takes place in Canada, the Canal Zone, or the continental United States. [2] - - - - - 1. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 2. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2012); Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 303, 66 Stat. 163, 236–37; Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-250, 48 Stat. 797. [...] While the field of candidates for the next presidential election is still taking shape, at least one potential candidate, Senator Ted Cruz, was born in a Canadian hospital to a U.S. citizen mother. [15] Despite the happenstance of a birth across the border, there is no question that Senator Cruz has been a citizen from birth and is thus a “natural born Citizen” within the meaning of the Constitution. Indeed, because his father had also been resident in the United States, Senator Cruz would have been a “natural born Citizen” even under the Naturalization Act of 1790. - - - - - 15. See Monica Langley, Ted Cruz, Invoking Reagan, Angers GOP Colleagues But Wins Fans Elsewhere, Wall St. J. (Apr. 18, 2014, 11:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303873604579494001552603692.
And every other citizen of the U.S. at that time. Don't be so cynical. потому что Бог хочет это тот путь
Historical Attorney General opinions prior to the 14th Amendment. https://books.google.com/books?id=mF0LAAAAYAAJ Official Opinions of the Attorney Generals of the United States, Volume 9, Washington, D.C. (1866) Opinion of Attorney General Black, July 18, 1859; 9 Op. Attys. Gen. 373 A free white person born in this country, of foreign parents, is a citizen of the United States. Attorney General's Office, Sir : In reply to your letter of the 7th, I have to say that a free white person born in this country, of foreign parents, is a citizen of the United States. (Lynch vs. Clarke et al., 1. Sandford Ch. R., p. 583.) I expressed a similar opinion in my letter to you of September 8, 1858. Yours, very respectfully, J. S. BLACK https://books.google.com/books?id=mF0LAAAAYAAJ Official Opinions of the Attorney Generals of the United States, Volume 10, Washington, D.C. (1868) Opinion of Attorney General Bates, November 29, 1862; 10 Op. Atty. Gen. 382 The full opinion spans pages 382-413. [...] CITIZENSHIP. [...] TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 389 Citizenship. [...] We have natural-born citizens, (Constitution, article 2, sec. 5,) not made by law or otherwise, but born. And this class is the large majority; in fact, the mass of our citizens, for all others are exceptions specially provided for by law. As they became citizens in the natural way, by birth, so they remain citizens during their natural lives, unless, by their own voluntary act, they expatriate themselves, and become citizens or subjects of another nation. For we have no law, (as the French have,) to decitizenize a citizen who has become such either by the natural process of birth, or by the legal process of adoption. And in this connection the Constitution says not one word, and furnishes not one hint, in relation to the color, or to the ancestral race, of the "natural-born citizen." Whatever may have been said, in the opinion of judges and lawyers, and in State statutes, about negroes, mulattoes, and persons of color, the Constitution is wholly silent upon that subject. The Constitution itself does not make the citizens; it is, in fact, made by them. It only intends and recognizes such of them as are natural—home-born; and provfdes for the naturalization of such of them as were alien—foreign-born; making the latter, as far as nature will allow, like the former. And I am not aware of any provision in our laws to warrant us in presuming the existence in this country of a class of persons intermediate between citizens and aliens. In England there is such a class clearly defined by law, and called denizens. "A denizen, (says Sir William Blackstone,) is an alien born, but who has obtained, ex donatione regis, letters patent to make him an English subject—a 390 HON EDWARD BATES high and incommunicable branch of the royal prerogative. A denizen is in a kind of middle state between an alien and a natural-born subject, and partakes of both of them." (1 Sharswood's Bl. Com., 374.) In this country, I know of but one legal authority tending to show the existence of such a class among us. One of my learned predecessors, Mr. Legare, (4 Opin, 147,) supposes that there may be such a class, and that free colored persons may be ranked in it. Yet, in that same opinion, he declares that a "free man of color, a native of this country, may be admitted to the privileges of a pre-emptioner under the 10th section of the act of September 4,1841." And that act declares that a pre-emptioner must be either a citizen of the United States or a person who had declared his intention to become a citizen, as required by the naturalization laws. Of course, the "colored man" must have been a citizen, or he could not have entered the land under that act of Congress. If not a citizen, then, by virtue of his native birth, he never could become one by force of law. For our laws extend the privileges of naturalization to such persons only as are "aliens, being free white persons," and he was neither; not alien, because natural-born in the country; and not a free white person, because, though free, confessedly "a man of color." [...] 394 HON. EDWARD BATES [...] As far as I know, Mr. Secretary, you and I have no better title to the citizenship which we enjoy than the "accident of birth"—the fact that we happened to be born in the United States. And our Constitution, in speaking of natural-born citizens, uses no affirmative language to make them such, but only recognizes and reaffirms the universal principle, common to all nations, and as old as political society, that the people born in a country do constitute the nation, and, as individuals, are natural members of the body politic. If this be a true principle, and I do not doubt it, it follows that every person born in the country is, at the moment of birth, prima facie a citizen; and he who would deny it must take upon himself the burden of proving some great disfranchisement strong enough to override the "natural-born" right as recognized by the Constitution in terms the most simple and comprehensive, and without any reference to race or color, or any other accidental circumstance. That nativity furnishes the rule, both of duty and of right as between the individual and the government, is a historical and political truth so old and so universally accepted that it is needless to prove it by authority. Nevertheless, for the satisfaction of those who may have doubts upon the subject, I note a few books, which, I think, cannot fail to remove all such doubts: Kent's Com., vol. 2, part 4, section 25; Bl. Com., book 1, chapter 10, p. 365; 7 Co. Rep., Calvin's case; 4 Term Rep., p. 300, Doe vs. Jones; 3 Pet. Rep., p. 246; Shanks vs. Dupont; and see a very TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 395 learned treatise, attributed to Mr. Binney, in 2 Am. Law Reporter, 193. In every civilized country the individual is born to duties and rights, the duty of allegiance and the right to protection; and these are correlative obligations, the one the price of the other, and they constitute the all-sufficient bond of union between the individual and his country; and the country he is born in is, prima facie, his country. In most countries the old law was broadly laid down that this natural connection between the individual and his native country was perpetual; at least, that the tie was indissoluble by the act of the subject alone. (See Bl. Com. supra; 3 Pet. Rep. supra.) [...] 396 HON. EDWARD BATES [...] And so strongly was Congress impressed with the great legal fact that the child takes its political status in the nation where it is born, that it was found necessary to pass a law to prevent the alienage of children of our known fellow-citizens who happen to be born in foreign countries. The act of February 10, 1852, (10 Stats., 604,) provides that "persons," (not white persons,) "persons heretofore born, or hereafter to be born, out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were, or shall be, at the time of their birth, citizens of the United States, shall be deemed and considered, and are hereby declared to be, citizens of the United States: Provided, however, That the rights of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers never resided in the United States. "Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That any woman who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, married, or who shall be married to a citizen of the United States, shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen." But for that act, children of our citizens who happen to be born at London, Paris, or Rome, while their parents are there on a private visit of pleasure or business, might be brought to the native home of their parents, only to find that they themselves were aliens in their father's country, incapable of inheriting their father's land, and with no right to demand the protection of their father's government. That is the law of birth at the common law of England, clear and unqualified; and now, both in England and America, modified only by statutes, made from time to time, to meet emergencies as they arise. I have said that, prima facie, every person in this country is born a citizen; and that he who denies it in individual cases assumes the burden of stating the exception to the TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 397 general rule, and proving the fact which works the disfranchisement. There are but a few exceptions commonly made and urged as disqualifying facts. I lay no stress upon the small and admitted class of the natural-born composed of the children of foreign ministers and the like; .... [...]
Lt. Col. Terrence L. (Terry) Lakin. He was sentenced to 6 months and dismissal from the service. I believe he was released after 5 months at Leavenworth (U.S. Disciplinary Barracks or USDB). Dismissal is the officer equivalent of an enlisted dishonorable discharge. On November 21, 2011, The Kansas Board of Healing Arts took final action [PDF] to deny Lakin a license to practice medicine. 13. Denial of Applicant's application for licensure is warranted due to the egregiousness of Applicant's conduct. There were also Reserve Major Stefan F. Cook and Captain Connie Rhodes. Cook lost his civilian job which depended on his security clearance/access authorization. Rhodes fired Dr. Orly and reported as assigned. Orly ate a $20K sanction, the government placed a lien on all her real property, and I believe she paid. She married money and drove a Tesla. She has a "distance learning" law degree which qualifies for bar admission in California.
Official Opinions of the Attorney Generals of the United States, Volume 10, Washington, D.C. (1868) Opinion of Attorney General Bates, November 29, 1862; 10 Op. Atty. Gen. 382 The link should be:
Underscore in the handwritten Jay original letter. Say "natural born citizen" with a strong emphasis on the word born, and much of the confusion goes away.
Rubio was born by C Section. He is not natural born.
Rubio isn't white.
What you posted has to be wrong. There are so many websites and blogs 'proving' you wrong. /s
"Seek ye the Lord while he may be found, call ye upon him while he is near"---Isaiah 55:6
Who is a Natural Born Citizen of the United States of America It has not been defined in the Constitution nor in any later statutes, because it had been self evident in the time when the Constitution was written, codified in the then contemporary encyclopedia "The Law of Nations" (1758) by Emerich de Vattel. (As a legal source "Law of Nations" is mentioned in Article I, Section 8, #10 of the Constitution in respect to the authority of the US Congress to enforce the law of nations, in particular - against piracies and felonies on high seas). Another indication to the meaning of the term may be found in the Supreme Court's side definition of "natural born citizen" as "all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens" (Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 1875). After the Framers, all the presidential contenders (up to Sen. McCain in 2008 but not Obama) did officially satisfy this definition, demonstrating continuity of the meaning "Natural born citizenship" consistent with that of Vattel . (In the past only one President Chester Arthur 1881-1885 violated it, hiding and destroying the traces of the British citizenship of his father, discovered only after his death. The carefully hidden violation of Chester Arthur in fact is an additional argument that the Vattel's definition was valid and he was aware of it). Not only did the continuity and understanding of the Vattel meaning of the "Natural born citizenship" take place well up to 2008: It was clearly disliked and stood on the way of some planers long before emergence of Obama. Since 2002 some members of the US Congress had made various attempts to rid of the concept Natural Born Citizen, which all have failed (here, here, here, and here - the research of J.B. Williams). Here are the list of those attempts: ................... The birthers were onto the C-Section angle in 2008. In a filing by Joshua D. Hess, Attorney for Defendants Senator John McCain and the Republican National Committee, in Robinson v. Bowen et al, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on page 4, footnote 2, it states: http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/california/candce/3:2008cv03836/206145/27/0.pdf Note: Alan Keyes was not a plaintiff in this case.
[TooConservative #7] Of course they have. There are a number of key cases. If you've followed the Birther threads, you should recall them. The correct birther claim is that the U.S. Supreme Court has not issued a holding on the point of the definition of natural born citizen. This should not be too surprising as the only cases that can require a judicial determination of such definition would involve a President or Vice-President and history is not kind to whackadoodle definitions. Standing to bring a relevant case is a formidable obstacle to successfully invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts. As a result, no such case has ever prevailed in any lower court or been granted cert by the U.S. Supreme Court. In the hundreds of birther cases brought in recent years, none has overcome pre-trial opposition. However, both State and Federal courts have spoken to the definition of the term natural born citizen. STATE COURT New York Legal Observer, Volume III, 1845, pp. 236-260 at 246. From Lynch v. Clark Before the Hon. LEWIS H. SANDFORD, Assistant Vice Chancellor of the First Circuit. Bernard Lynch v. John Clarke And Julia Lynch. Heard, July 6, 7, 8,10, and 12,1843 ; and upon briefs as to the question of alienage, May 6, July 19, and September 17, 1844. Decided, November 5, 1844. ALIENAGE CITIZENSHIP BY BIRTH IN THE UNITED STATES, THOUGH OF ALIEN PARENTS TEMPORARILY RESIDING HERE. FEDERAL COURT http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc36356/ Link goes to Federal Cases, Volume 27 (original series) UNITED STATES v RHODES, 27 F. Cas 785 (1866) Case No. 16,151 Circuit Court, D. Kentucky 27 F. Cas. 785; 1866 U.S. App. LEXIS 330; 1 Abb. 28; 1 Am. Law T. Rep. U.S. Cts. 22 Year: 1866 OPINION BY: [**1] SWAYNE The definitions given by other English lexicographers are substantially the same. In Jacob’s Law Dictionary (Ed. 1783), the only definition given is as follows: “Citizens (cives) of London are either freemen or such as reside and keep a family in the city, etc.; and some are citizens and freemen, and some are not, who have not so great privileges as others. The citizens of London may prescribe against a statute, because their liberties are reinforced by statute.” 1 Rolle, 105. Blackstone and Tomlin contain nothing upon the subject. “The word ‘civis,’ taken [**16] in the strictest sense, extends only to him that is entitled to the privileges of a city of which he is a member, and in that sense there is a distinction between a citizen and an inhabitant within the same city, for every inhabitant there is not a citizen.” Scot v. Schwartz, Comyn, 677. “A citizen is a freeman who has kept a family in a city.” Roy v. Hanger, 1 Rolle, 138, 149. “The term ‘citizen,’ as understood in our law, is precisely analogous to the term subject, in the common law; and the change of phrases has entirely resulted from the change of government. The sovereignty has been changed from one man to the collective body of the people, and he who before was a subject of [*789] the king is now a citizen of the state.” State v. Manuel, 4 Dev. & B. 26. In Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. [28 U.S.] 247, the supreme court of the United States said: “During the war each party claimed the allegiance of the natives of the colonies as due exclusively to itself. The Americans insisted upon the allegiance of all born within the states, respectively; and Great Britain asserted an equally exclusive claim. The treaty of 1783 acted upon the state of things as it existed at that period. [**17] It took the actual state of things as its basis. All those, whether natives or otherwise, who then adhered to the American states, were virtually absolved from their allegiance to the British crown, and those who then adhered to the British crown, were deemed and held subjects of that crown. The treaty of peace was a treaty operating between the states on each side, and the inhabitants thereof; in the language of the seventh article, it was a ‘firm and perpetual peace between his Britannic majesty and the said states, and between the subjects of one and the citizens of the other.’ Who then were subjects or citizens was to be decided by the state of facts. If they were originally subjects of Great Britain and then adhered to her and were claimed by her as subject, the treaty deemed them such; if they were originally British subjects, but then adhering to the states, the treaty deemed them citizens.” All persons born in the allegiance of the king are natural born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well [**18] as of England. There are two exceptions, and only two, to the universality of its application. The children of ambassadors are in theory born in the allegiance of the powers the ambassadors represent, and slaves, in legal contemplation, are property, and not persons. 2 Kent, Comm. 1; Calvin’s Case, 7 Coke, 1; 1 Bl. Comm. 366; Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583.
It has not been defined in the Constitution nor in any later statutes, because it had been self evident in the time when the Constitution was written, codified in the then contemporary encyclopedia "The Law of Nations" (1758) by Emerich de Vattel. (As a legal source "Law of Nations" is mentioned in Article I, Section 8, #10 of the Constitution in respect to the authority of the US Congress to enforce the law of nations, in particular - against piracies and felonies on high seas). According to Chapter 19, §212 of "Law of Nations", "The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country of parents who are citizens". The concept "Natural born citizen" is a twofold criterion meaning that: Both parents must be the citizens of, and the birth must take place in the concerned country, assuming that the citizenship inherited by this child and the loyalty are never changed ever after. [...] It has not been defined in the Constitution nor in any later statutes, because it had been self evident in the time when the Constitution was written, codified in the then contemporary encyclopedia "The Law of Nations" (1758) by Emerich de Vattel. (As a legal source "Law of Nations" is mentioned in Article I, Section 8, #10 of the Constitution in respect to the authority of the US Congress to enforce the law of nations, in particular - against piracies and felonies on high seas). The Law of Nations referred to in the U.S. Constitution was not a book about the Law of Nations written in French by a Swiss philosopher who died in 1767 before there was a United States, or U.S. citizens, natural born or otherwise. It referred to the unwritten body of law that grew up by custom and usage between nations, and which Emmerich de Vattel wrote a book about. That body of law is very succinctly defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.: Law of nations is nothing more than a now-archaic term for International law. International law per Black’s is, INTERNATIONAL LAW has nothing to do with any one nation determining the status of its own citizens. It does not pertain to the internal affairs of a single sovereign. It deals with legal relations between nations. The United States recognized its application on the high seas, not within United States. Vattel, who wrote about International Law, and died while the Americas were colonies, remains irrelevant to United States determinations regarding United States citizenship status. Despite the hallucinations of some birthers, International law does not control the domestic determinations of citizenship in the United States or any other nation, and American citizenship determinations are not made in The Hague.
It's not 1859 any more and the 13th and 14th Amendments really exist.
Yeah, it almost makes me wonder why all the court decisions and law books are so wrong.
Fortunately, I just happen to have a complete copy of the Transcript of Record for Minor v. Happersett. Page 7 of the Transcript of Record for Minor v. Happersett shows the "Cause Submitted on agreed statement." The Agreed statement begins on page 8 of the Transcript of Record, and on page 9 documents that both sides agreed: [emphasis added] The matter of Ms. Minor's citizenship was not at issue. As submitted, the only question at issue was whether a woman could be disenfranchised due to not being male. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875) At 165: Additions might always be made to the citizenship of the United States in two ways: first, by birth, and second, by naturalization. This is apparent from the Constitution itself, for it provides† that "no person except a natural-born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President,"‡ and that Congress shall have power "to establish a uniform rule of naturalization." Thus new citizens may be born or they may be created by naturalization. The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their * Articles of Confederation, § 3, 1 Stat. at Large, 4. † Article 2, § 1. ‡ Article 1, § 8. - - - - - parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient for everything we have now to consider that all children born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction are themselves citizens. The words "all children" are certainly as comprehensive, when used in this connection, as "all persons," and if females are included in the last they must be in the first. That they are included in the last is not denied. In fact the whole argument of the plaintiffs proceeds upon that idea. As the Court stated, As for the purposes of Minor, it was not necessary to resolve the issue of the citizenship of children born within the jurisdiction of foreign parents, the Court went right ahead and did not decide it. That is not to say that the U.S. Supreme Court did not decide it. It did and it is very well known, The case is Wong Kim Ark. Fortuately, I just happen to have a complete copy of the Transcript of Record in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). In stating the case presented to the court, George D. Collins representing Appellant (United States) wrote at 2: For anyone who is still confused regarding what the issue before the court was, counsel for Appellant, who brought the appeal, made it explicitly clear. Of course, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against his argument and there is over a century of precedent that what has been recycled as birther blather is nonsense. Indeed for any who didn't get it at page 2, Collins summarized in his final paragraph at 39: The Appellant explicitly, albeit unsuccessfully, argued that the District Court erred in ruling "that the respondent is a natural-born citizen." The Supreme Court affirmed that ruling of the District Court. And, from the Brief of the WINNING side, Wong Kim Ark: All italics as in original, boldface added, hyperlinks added. - - - Resp. Br. at 1 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES October Term, 1895 No. 449 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellant, vs. WONG KIM ARK, Appellee - - - Resp. Br. at 4 The single question presented upon this appeal is this: Are the children born in this country of alien residents not connected with the diplomatic service citizens of the United States? - - - Resp. Br. at 6-8 Briefs of the Government Before proceeding to any independent discussion of this subject it will perhaps be useful to refer to the main points upon which the Government relies in support of its contention that Wong Kim Ark was not at the time of his birth "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States. It is substantially conceded that the Fourteenth Amendment is but declaratory of the law as it previously existed, and it is practically admitted that, sinch the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, every judicial decision directly upon the question in controversy has been adverse to the Government's present position. It is, however, urged most earnestly by the Solicitor General and by Mr. Collins, the amicus curiae, that this long-standing interpretation of who was a citizen of the United States is wrong, and has been wrong from the very beginning, in that the Courts have resorted to the common law to aid them in their decisions, while the question was really one of the law of nations. Further than that, the Government seriously presses the point that there is no common law in the United States, and that, therefore, in ascertaining the meaning of words used in the Constitution, but not there defined, it is not permissible to inquire how they were commonly understood by lawyers at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, or in other words what their meaning was at common law. The two fundamental theories, therefore, now advanced by the Government, and upon which its entire argument stands or falls are: First. That there is no common law in the United States. Second. That the question of citizenship in a nation is to be determined by the rules of international law. (a) Perhaps we do not fully understand the argument of the Government that there is no common law in the United States, but as we read the authorities which have been cited by the Solicitor General, the Court has simply held that "there are no common law offenses against the United States" (United States vs. Britton, 108 U. S. 199-206). This proposition is too well established to admit of dispute, but it is not clear how it can affect the present discussion. The question whether a man is "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States is not, we take it, to be determined by the common law, but by the principles of common law, which is a very different matter. In other words, it has often been decided by this Court that, in determining the meaning of the words used in the Constitution and the statutes of the United States and not therein defined, it is both proper and necessary to seek in the common law, as the source and origin of our jurisprudence, there true definition; and the question fairly raised here is not whether there is a common law in the United States, but whether it is admissible, in construing and defining words used in the Constitution, to refer to the common law. The case of Smith vs. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, is referred to upon the brief of the Solicitor General in support of the proposition that there is no common law in the United States. If the counsel for the Government had read this case through he would have found on page 478 the following statement: - - - Resp. Br. at 10-11: (b) The second theory of the appellant is that the question of citizenship in the United States is to be determined by the law of nations and not by the law of the United States. We should have supposed it difficult to find a question more widely separated from the domain of international law than the status of a citizen in any country. It would seem as if the right of citizenship was for each country to determine for itself, and that any nation would guard with jealous interest the right to decide who should be its members. That is to say, it is a matter of local and national law, as distinguished from international law, and the United States would be the last to surrender the privilege of determining, by its own law, who were or were not its citizens. This proposition of this government has, we think, arisen from a mistaken notion as to the true character of the question in this case, and it seems comewhat remarkable that the Solicitor General should take the position that the Government of the United States is to be administered, not in accordance with the laws of the United States, but in accordance with the law of nations, and that the vital question of who compose the great body of their citizens is to be determined, not by the law of the United States, but by the rules of international law. In the case of Scott v. Sandford, 19 How., 399, 451; Chief Justice Taney used the following language: Mr. Justice Story, in Inglis vs. Trustees of the Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Pet., 99, 162, when speaking upon the question of citizenship, said: Mr. Stanberry, then Attorney-General, said in Warren's Case, 12 Opin. Atty.-Gen., 319, 325: - - - Resp. Br. at 13-14: It is not at all certain that this principle of International law, as it is called, which is supposed to declare that a child born to aliens while residing in a foreign country takes the nationality of his father, is anything more than a name. As a matter of fact, no nation, so far as we have been been able to ascertain, decides or pretends to decide the status of its citizens by any other law than its own. It is true that different nations have different laws upon this subject, and the laws of some of these nations are more or less in accord, but there is no great unanimity among them. England now holds to the rule that birth within its dominions makes a man a subject of the Queen, unless, if born of aliens, he elects the nationality of his parents (33 Vict., Chap 14). In France, a similar doctrine prevails, and it is as follows: In Denmark, Portugal and Holland the law is apparently the same as that of France, as Lord Cockburn in his work on Nationality says, at pages 14 and 15, that birth within their dominions confers citizenship on the offspring of alien parents, subject to the right of the individual concerned to reject it at majority. Another rule is adopted by Belgium, Spain, Italy, Greece, the Grand Duchy of Baden, Russia, Russia-Poland and the Ottoman Empire, where birth within their dominions confers citizenship on the offspring of alien parents on the right being claimed on certain specified conditions (Cockburn on Nationality, 14 and 15). It is clear, therefore, that each country has enacted its own law as to who is or who is not its citizen, and has never fallen back upon any principle of international law for the decision of the question. All that can possibly be argued from the state of the law of citizenship in the different countries of Europe is that it might be advisable for the people of the United States to pass a law or amend their constitution, if they saw fit, so as to conform with the laws of the majority of these countries, but we fail to see how the counsel for the government have shown that the status of a citizen was or ever can be determined in the Courts of a country be the law of nations or by any other law than its own. It other words, the question before this honorable Court is not what is the proper policy for the United States to adopt, but what is the meaning of an amendment of their constitution, and the constitution must be interpreted, as we think, by the light of the principles of our own law and not by the law of other countries or the law of nations. "The laws of the United States determine what persons shall be regarded as citizens, irrespective of such persons' pleasure or tthe laws or pleasure of any other government" (State vs. Adams, 45 Iowa, 99, 101). - - - Resp. Br. at 28-29: In McKay vs. Campbell, 2 Sawy., 118, the syllabus is as follows: Also at 29: "The term 'citizen' as understood in our law is precisely analagous to the term subject in the common law, and the change of phrase has entirely resulted from the change of government. The sovereignty has been transferred from one man to the collective body of the people, and he who before as a 'subject of the King' is now 'a citizen of the State'" (State vs. Manuel, 3 Dev. & Battle's N. C. R., 26). - - - Resp Br. at 31: In the first section of the act of Congress approved March 26, 1790 (1 Stat. at Large, 103), it is enacted: We take it that no difference in meaning can be assigned to the clause "under the jurisdiction of the United States," found the the naturalization act, and the words of the Fourteenth Amendment, "subject to the jurisdiction thereof." - - - Resp. Br. at 32: It is a little difficult to see what distinction can be drawn between the two cases. It an alien who resides in the territory of this country is "under the jurisdiction of the United States" for the purpose of naturalization, it would seem to follow that a man born here and always residing here must be "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" for the purpose of naturalization, it would seem to follow that a man born here and always residing here must be "subject to the jurisdiction thereof," and must have been so at his birth. - - - Resp. Br. at 34-35: We do not see what substantial distinction can be drawn between the words of the Civil Rights Bill and the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the once case the condition of citizenship is birth "not subject to any foreign power," and in the other it is birth "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States. The Civil Rights bill was vetoed by President Johnson, and his interpretation of these words perhaps goes as far to show what they were supposed to mean at the time they were used as any other. It was very clear to him that a man in the position of Wong Kim Ark was not subject to the jurisdiction of any foreign power, and was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, for he says in his veto message (Congr. Globe, 39th Congress, p. 1679): In United States vs. Rhodes, 1 Abb. U.S. Rep., 28, the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Bill came up for decision in a Federal Court, apparently, for the first time. Mr. Justice Swayne in his opinion said at pages 38, 40 and 41: "'Citizens under our Constitution and laws means free inhabitants born within the United States or naturalized under the laws of Congress.' "We find no warrant for the opinion that this great principle of the common law has ever been changed in the United States. It has always obtained here with the same vigor, and subject only to the same exceptions, since as before the Revolution." - - - Resp Br. at 36-37: We now come to the construction of this amendment by the lower Courts, and the most important case is that of In re Look Tin Sing, 10 Sawy., 353 [21 Fed. Rep. 905], decided by Mr. Justice Field. The same question was presented in this case in precisely the same way in which it arises here, and it was the held that a Chinaman born in the United States of parents not engaged in any diplomatic capacity was a citizen thereof. The opinion of Mr. Justice Field was concurred in by Judges Sawyer, Sabin and Hoffman. At page 359 the Court said: This is the idea which we have before sought to convey, viz.: that this country could not permit another nation to claim jurisdiction of a man born here. It, is, perhaps, conceivable that this Government might in the future by some law permit the individual himself to elect, when of age, what nation he chose for his country, but it is out of the question for our Government to allow another government to say what country a person born within our territory belongs. - - - Resp. Br. at 39: Perhaps the latest case on this subject is Benny vs. O'Brien, 32 Atlantic Reporter, 696. The question before the Supreme Court of New Jersey was "whether a person born in this country of alien parents who, prior to his birth, had their domicile here, is a citizen of the United States," and in a very well considered opinion it was held that he was, the Court saying, at page 697: - - - Resp. Br. at 41-2 Whenever international law conflicts with the local law of a particular country, "the law of nations, as to particular matters, may be, as for such particular countries, either expanded or contracted by local legislation" (Secretary Bayard, supra). This principle our government would be the first to adopt should any foreign country send its emissaries to our shores for the purpose of compelling those of its subjects who had emigrated to the United States and had not become naturalized or their children born on our soil, to return to the country of their origin. Even enmity to the Chinese race would not permit the creation of any such dangerous precedent. If this case should be decided in favor of the Government, and it should be held that children born in this country to an alien resident are not "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" and are "subject to a foreign power," what reply can the Secretary of State make to the Government of Russia or Germany or England in the case suggested? Must he say: I admit that the highest tribunal of my country has decided that the men you are taking away by force to join your armies are not 'subject to the jurisdiction' of my government, and are subject to the jurisdiction of yours, but that decision does not mean that they are subject to the jurisdiction of your government in the sense that obedience can be compelled to that government and its laws, or that they are 'not subject to the jurisdiction' of my government in the sense that the protection of the Constitution and the laws of this country is withheld from them, and these men, born in this country of subjects of your governemtn, who have been seized by your officers, must be released or the friendly relations between our two governments must cease. - - - Resp. Br. at 48: So, in the case at bar, the people of the United States have not denied to the children born in this country of alien parents the right of citizenship therein, nor have they passed any law declaring them to be the citizens or subjects of the country of their parents, and the question whether they might have done so does not arise in this case. Our position is that any such discussion is foreign to the issue here, which is what is meant by the words "subject to the jurisdiction thereof," and we respectfully submit that the people of this country intended that these words should be construed in accordance with the principles of law of which they and their fathers before them had knowledge, and not in accordance with the Roman law or the law of any European country with which they were unfamiliar. In other words, they intended that the status of citizenship in the United States should be determined in accordance with the law of the United States and not upon the principles of the Roman law. - - - Resp. Br. at 50-51: In the Lynch case, therefore, the identical question was argued and decided which is presented here, viz.: Is the child born in the United States to an alien resident a citizen thereof? The only difference between the two cases is that the appellee in the present case has always lived in the United States, whereas Julia Lynch was taken out of the country when still an infant in arms and did not return until she was fifteen years old. It was urged in behalf of the complainant Lynch, as it is argued here, that there was no common law in the United States. The Chancellor fully and carefully considered the question from this point of view. He quoted with approval from the speech of Mr. Bayard in the House of Representatives in 1802, in which he said: "The Judges of the United States have held generally that the Constitution of the United States was predicated upon an existing common law. * * * The Constitution is unintelligible without reference to the common law. * * * Without this law the Constitution becomes a dead letter" (p. 654), and expressed himself in the following language at page 652: After a most careful analysis of all the authorities on the subject, it was decided that Julia Lynch was a native-born citizen of the United States, and the Chancellor said at page 663: In Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), the Court stated: At 702-03: "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside," contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization. Citizenship by naturalization can only be acquired by naturalization under the authority and in the forms of law. But citizenship by birth is established by the mere fact of birth under the circumstances defined in the Constitution. Every person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization. A person born out of the jurisdiction of the United States can only become a citizen by being naturalized, either by treaty, as in the case of the annexation of foreign territory, or by authority of Congress, exercised either by declaring certain classes of persons to be citizens, as in the enactments conferring citizenship upon foreign-born children of citizens, or by enabling foreigners individually to become citizens by proceedings in the judicial tribunals, as in the ordinary provisions of the naturalization acts. At 704: At 705: Order affirmed. The lower court that was affirmed, concluded at 71 Fed. Rep 392:
A masterful post. But you might need a new hobby. : ) I think you know you aren't going to convince the hardcore Birthers. They are in thrall to Queen Orly.
Oh, Moses, smell the roses.
You have a good memory. A shame how the Birthers exploited these people and then abandoned them. I hope the doctor managed to get a license in some other state. I recall Rhodes now, coming to her senses before it was too late. I don't even recall Cook's case.
I was just kidding on that one.
Again I was just kidding. I saw that quote in there so I decided play with it.
........... Wong Kim Ark is a citizen of the United States within the meaning of the citizenship clause of the fourteenth amendment A 14th Amendment citizen anchor baby, like Willard Mitt Romney. https://blogs4brownback.wordpress.com/2007/12/26/mitt-romney-anchor-baby/ Both wings of the party have a lot to hide regarding ineligible presidential candidates, so expect more disinformation and illegal rulings from the D&R courts. The Chamber of Commerce just wanted cheap Chinese labor, and the Dems wanted their votes. Same corrupt crap that we have today. I was just kidding on that one. Sorry. I knew you were kidding but thought you might not have realized that a few birthers actually did offer the opinion that natural born meant not born by C-section. I used to have a link to an audio of one of them saying it on a radio interview, but now it is a dead link.
Citizenship opinions, 1838 - 1860, prior to any 14th Amendment. https://www.scribd.com/doc/288667178/State-v-Manuel-4-Devereux-and-Battle-20-1838-Citizenship State v Manuel, 4 Devereux and Battle 20 (1838) At 24: At 25: At 26: https://www.scribd.com/doc/288667349/Lynch-v-Clark-NY-Legal-Observer-236-1844-Citizenship Lynch v Clark, NY Legal Observer 236 (1844) At 236: It was held that she was a citizen of the United States. At 246: At 250: At 256: Vattel says, the natives, of indigenes, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens. That in order t5o be of the country, it is necessary that a person be form of a father who is a citizen, for if he is born there of a stranger, it will be only the place of his birth, and not his country. (Vattel's Law of Nations, B. 1, ch, 16, § 212.) He further says, in reference to the inquiry whether children born of citizens in a foreign country, are citizens, that the laws have decided the question in several countries, and it is necessary to follow their regulations. That in England, being born in the country, naturalizes the children of a foreigner. That by the law of nature alone, children follow the condition of their fathers and enter into all their rights. But he puts forth that opinion, on the supposition, that the father has not entirely quitted his country in order to settle elsewhere. If he has fixed his abode in a foreign country, he is become a member of another society, at least as a perpetual inhabitant, and his children are so too. (Ibid § 214, 215. And see § 216.) Thus the rule of Vattel, in controlled by the intention with which the father takes up his abode in the foreign country. The Court went on to review the opinions about public law of Pufendorf, Schmeir, Domat, Burlamaqui, and Reeves. At 257: [...] With these remarks, I dismiss the argument founded on the rule of the public law, its fitness and adaption to the spirit of our institutions. At 259: http://www.nytimes.com/1862/08/12/news/liability-of-native-born-citizens-of-foreign-parentage.html Secretary of State Marcy to Joseph B. Nones, (16 Mar 1854) Department of State, Joseph B. Nones, Esq., New York City: Sir: Your letter of the 11th instant has been received. The cases which it mentions are not embraced by any law of the United States, upon the subject of Naturalization; and, it is believed, have not been decided by any Court in this country. Although, in general, it is not the duty of the Secretary of State to express opinions upon points of law, and doubts may be entertained of the expediency of making an answer to your inquiries an exception to this rule, yet I am under the impression that every person born in the United States must be considered a citizen, notwithstanding one or both of his parents may have been alien at the time of his birth. This is in conformity with the English Common Law, which law is generally acknowledged in this country; and a person born of alien parents would, it is presumed, be considered such natural born citizen, in the language of the Constitution, as to make him eligible to the Presidency. I am, Sir, respectfully, Your obedient servant, https://www.scribd.com/doc/288667349/Lynch-v-Clark-NY-Legal-Observer-236-1844-Citizenship Munroe v Merchant, 26 Barb 383 (1858) At 384: At 400: https://www.scribd.com/doc/288667548/Ludlam-v-Ludlam-NY-Supreme-Ct-31-Barb-486-1860-Citizenship Ludlam v Ludlam, NY Supreme Ct, 31 Barb 486 (1860) At 486: The universal maxim of the common law being partus sequitur patrem, it is sufficient for the application of this doctrine that the father should be a subject, lawfully and without breach of his allegiance beyond sea, no matter what may be the condition of the mother. The children of subjects thus sojourning or traveling beyond the seas were recognized as denizens, under English law, when and as fast as the occasion and instances of foreign travel and temporary residence multiplied, and the question was presented to the courts; and this was by the development and application of the doctrines of the common law, and not by mere force of statutes. The statute of Edward 3, De natus ultra mare,was not intended to abrogate, nor is it to be understood as abrogating, an existing rule of law and introducing a new rule by the will of the legislature, but was declaratory in its nature; or at least, furnishes no evidence that the rule of the common law was other than that contained in its provisions, but rather the contrary. In accorandance with the above principles. Held that the defendant, the son of an American citizen by an alien mother, born in a foreign country while his father was temporarily resident there, was a citizen of the United States, and entitled to inherit here. Lott, J. dissented. Held also, that the greater or less duration of the father's residence abroad was not material; so long as it was, in intention and in fact, temporary, and not perpetual.
https://www.scribd.com/doc/17716064/COOK-v-SIMTECH-Order-Dismissing-Cook-v-Simtech - - - - - - - - - - www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2214505/posts As a Plaintiff in this class action, I get mailing from Dr. Taitz from time to time. This is an attachment to one of those mailings. As always, have at it 1 posted on Wednesday, March 25, 2009 1:28:02 PM by roaddog727 On February 3, 2009, Maj. Cook gave his permission to be used as a plaintiff in a class action suit by Dr. Orly Taitz. [dead link] On March 25, 2009 Maj. Cook identified himself as a Plaintiff in a class action suit being brought by Dr. Orly. From December 2008 through May 2009, Maj. Cook was safe from deployment, i.e., during the period of the class action suit that he joined. On December 14, 2008 Major Cook advised Capt. Robert Harris, U.S. Navy, that he would not be deploying as planned due to health issues. Capt. Harris is the Theater Contingency Engineer Management (TCEM) Commander at Headquarters, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in Miami, Florida. He is the supervisor for Maj. Cook. On May 11, 2009, Maj. Cook advised Capt. Harris that his doctor had cleared him to deploy and submitted paperwork again for a year-long deployment to Afghanistan and a mobilization date of July 15, 2009. On June 9, 2009 his mobilization orders were issued. On July 9, 2009 legal action was filed to obtain a Temporary Restraining Order to prevent his deployment. On July 15, 2009 the government responded, Major Cook’s Application for a Temporary Restraining Order should be denied as moot. The Commanding General of SOCCENT has determined that he does not want the services of Major Cook, and has revoked his deployment orders. Defense Exhibit ("DEX" A). "A case is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief." Ethredge v. Hail, 996, F.2d 1173 (11th Cir. 1993), citing United States v. Certain Real & Personal Property, 943 F.2d 1292, 1296 (11th Cir. 1991). In his Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, Major Cook asks that the Court enjoin Defendants from deploying him on active duty until the constitutional qualifications and eligibility of the President and Commander in Chief can be established. TRO App. at 20. Major Cook’s mobilization orders have been revoked, see DEX A, therefore, he is no longer subject to deployment or active duty service. As such, there is no longer a live case or controversy upon which this Court can give meaningful relief. Accordingly, Major Cook’s Application for a Temporary Restraining Order should be dismissed. On July 22, 2009, Cook (Dr. Orly) filed an Application for TRO where Cook's tale of woe was recounted by Dr. Orly at page 8-10. The basic upshot was that not only did they not want his services in Afghanistan, they yanked his access authorization as well, and he was no longer wanted at his job for a company at SOCOM HQ at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. Retaliation began not later than July 14, 2009, against Plaintiff Stefan Frederick Cook for the July 10, 2009, exercise of his First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances, and Plaintiff Cook accordingly here seeks a prohibitory injunction against the continuance or full implementation of this official governmental retaliation. In the alternative, Plaintiff seeks a Positive Injunction, writ of mandamus, order to show cause, or rule nisi be issued to the Department of Defense commanding it to cease, cure, or remedy all retaliation against Plaintiff Cook, including all interference with, extortionate threats to, or coercive pressure applied to Defendants (Involuntary Plaintiffs?) Simtech and Grice. The circumstances are as follows: Late on Tuesday afternoon, July 14, 2009, at around about 4:30 pm, Plaintiff Stefan Frederick Cook returned a call to an unknown telephone call from (813) 828-5884 and was told that his services were no longer required in Afghanistan and that he need not report for duty. In addition Plaintiff received an e-mail with a written revocation order attached from Master Sargent Miguel Matos (Exhibit C). Once apprised of the revocation, Plaintiff Major Cook called his civilian boss, the CEO of Simtech, Inc., a closely held corporation that does DOD contracting in the general field of information technology/systems integration, at which Plaintiff Major was employed until taking a Military Leave of Absence on Friday July 10, 2009, a senior systems engineer and architect, in preparation for his deployment to Afghanistan. (Plaintiff has five Cisco Systems certifications in information technology dating from 2000 and just recertified in June 2009 for the Cisco Certified Design Expert qualification exam.) The CEO of Simtech, Inc., Larry Grice, explained to Plaintiff over a series of four conversations within the next two hours, that he had been terminated. Grice told the Plaintiff that he would no longer be welcome in his former position at SOCOM but that Grice wanted to see whether he could find something within the company (Simtech, Inc.) for Cook. The upshot was that at this time Grice did not have anything for Plaintiff to do. Grice told Plaintiff, in essence, that the situation had become "nutty and crazy", and that Plaintiff would no longer be able to work at his old position. Grice explained that he had been in touch with Defense Security Services (an agency of the Department of Defenses, with regional offices located in SOCOM Headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida), and that DSS had not yet made a determination whether Plaintiff Major Cook's clearances would be pulled, but Grice made clear to Cook that it was DSS who had compelled Cook's termination. Essentially, because of the "nutty and crazy" situation and the communications received from DSS was no longer employable by him at all. For that reason, Grice was not optimistic about getting me another job at the company. Grice also reported to Plaintiff that there was some gossip that "people were disappointed in" the Plaintiff because they thought he was manipulating his deployment orders to create a platform for political purposes. Grice then discussed Plaintiffs expectation of receiving final paychecks (including accrued leave pay) already owed, without any severance pay, and wished the Plaintiff well. http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/2832270/posts - - - - -
You have a good memory. A shame how the Birthers exploited these people and then abandoned them. I blogged and wrote articles about the birthers for several years. Here are links to a couple of articles I wrote back in 2010. by nolu chan nolu chan
I had no idea that TOS had its own Birther victim, complete with being a client of Oily Taitz.
The descriptive clause in the Constitution says this:
U.S. Constitution Article II, Section 1, Clause 5: 
"We (government) need to do a lot less, a lot sooner" ~Ron Paul
#3. To: hondo68 (#2)
(Edited)
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.
..., or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution,...
#4. To: TooConservative (#3)
#5. To: A K A Stone (#0)
#6. To: TooConservative (#3)
Rubio is considered natural-born since that is how we have defined the 14th Amendment.
"We (government) need to do a lot less, a lot sooner" ~Ron Paul
#7. To: hondo68, nolu chan (#6)
The courts have never ruled on "natural born Citizen".
#8. To: hondo68, TooConservative (#6)
Who is we? Nancy Pelosi certified that Barry Obama is qualified and a natural born citizen.
#9. To: tomder55, half assed Americans (#8)
no holding in any case in federal court has ever established a “two citizen-parent” requirement, or other requirement of lineage or bloodline, for a native born U.S. citizen to be eligible for the Presidency.
Senator Ted Cruz finally renounced his allegiance to the Queen and dropped his Canadian citizenship in 2013, in preparation for his presidential run. "We (government) need to do a lot less, a lot sooner" ~Ron Paul
#10. To: A K A Stone (#0)
#11. To: hondo68, TooConservative (#9)
#12. To: A K A Stone (#0)
At the time Marco Rubio was born in the United States neither of his parents were United States Citizens.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.
The descriptive clause in the Constitution says this:
No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty five years, and been fourteen Years a resident within the United States.
The Hilarious Haters
Orange County Weekly
Fri., Oct. 21 2011 at 11:48 AM
#13. To: hondo68 (#9)
There is ONE and only one circumstance where natural born Citizen is important, the office of US president.
#14. To: nolu chan (#13)
Cruz is a natural born U.S. citizen
"We (government) need to do a lot less, a lot sooner" ~Ron Paul
#15. To: nolu chan, A K A Stone, tomder55, redleghunter, sneakypete (#12)
(Edited)
At 42: "Counsel Orly Taitz is hereby ordered to pay $20,000.00 to the United States, through the Middle District of Georgia Clerk’s Office, within thirty days of the date of this Order as a sanction for her misconduct in violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
#16. To: hondo68 (#14)
He's not a natural born anything. He was born in Canada, but neither parent is Canadian. He's a hybrid, Cuban, Canadian, American. There can't be too many of those.
TITLE III-NATIONALITY AND NATURALIZATION
The Constitution directly addresses the minimum qualifications necessary to serve as President. In addition to requiring thirty-five years of age and fourteen years of residency, the Constitution limits the presidency to “a natural born Citizen.” [1]
#17. To: TooConservative (#3)
I always like how the Founders, themselves British subjects, grandfathered themselves into eligibility with this modest phrase.
#18. To: A K A Stone (#0)
CITIZENSHIP.
July 18, 1859. 382 HON. EDWARD BATES
Citizenship.
Citizenship,
Citizenship.
Citizenship.
Citizenship.
Citizenship.
#19. To: TooConservative (#15)
Recall that doctor, a colonel maybe, who refused to deploy when ordered to (by his superiors at the Pentagon). He pretended he had been ordered directly by Obama to deploy when he was actually being deployed under Bush's deployment orders so he lost his courtmartial. Larkin? He served a couple of years in the stockade and was run out of the service without benefits, I think.
12. Applicant's refusal to deploy to Afghanistan to provide medical services In support of Operation Enduring Freedom due to his own personal beliefs represents a disregard for his professional duties and undermines the integrity of the medical profession. Of even more significance, Applicant's actions potentially jeopardized the health, safety and welfare of the military troops for which Applicant was employed to provide medical care.
#20. To: All (#18)
https://books.google.com/books?id=mF0LAAAAYAAJ
#21. To: TooConservative, hondo68 (#3)
We have legislatively altered the definition slightly several times because the Constitution simply says natural-born but does not exhaustively define the term.
Permit me to hint, whether it would not be side & seasonable to provide a strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our national Government; and to declare expresly that the Command in chief of the american army shall not be given to, nor devolve on, any but a natural born citizen.
#22. To: nolu chan (#21)
Say "natural born citizen"
#23. To: nolu chan (#18)
CITIZENSHIP. A free white person
#24. To: nolu chan (#16)
#25. To: nolu chan, Article I, Section 8, 10, Law of Nations (#21)
A "Natural born citizen" - the most crucial concept of the moment in America - is confusing (and deliberately confused). This concept is used in the Constitution of the US (Article II, Section 1, #4) as a precondition for presidency - and only for presidency, being clearly distinguished from ordinary citizenship.
According to Chapter 19, §212 of "Law of Nations", "The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country of parents who are citizens". The concept "Natural born citizen" is a twofold criterion meaning that:
In other words, a natural born citizen means at least a second generation citizen of the country. Vattel's own note on the margin of his book refers to the Roman law: NEMO PLUS JURIS TRANSFERRE POTEST, QUAM IPSE HABET, meaning "No one can give more rights than he himself has" (by Dr. A. Altec). Except for Obama/Soetoro, the Vattel definition had been always applied, the last precedent being the US Senate resolution 511 in 2008 (also here and here) acknowledging Sen. McCain as a natural born citizen.
Indeed, the goal of the Sen. Res. 511 was not to refresh the brain dead America about the concept of the US Natural Born as defined in Law of Nations by Vattel. Its goal was merely to justify campaigning of McCain (which did not qualify because he was born in Panama rather than in the canal zone). In doing so, the authors inadvertently revealed what they knew and kept in mind - the two-fold requirement of the definition of Vattel, though not mentioning it explicitly. (See below how the US Congress had tried to rid of this Constitutional requirement to presidency years prior to emergence of Obama).
Often "Natural born citizenship" is confused with §1401 of the US Code "Nationals and citizens of United States at birth". Although the words sound similar, §1401 defines only ordinary citizenship including such shallow one as that of anchor babies (i.e. born to legal guests of the country, §1401(a), never mind illegal residents).
The Constitution clearly and explicitly excludes ordinary citizenship for presidency: ordinary citizenship was reserved only for the presidential candidates - contemporaries of the Framers (referred as the grandfather clause). Definitely the "Natural born citizenship" is not the same as ordinary citizenship, but something stronger. By not explicitly quoting the Vattel's definition, the Constitution therefore leaves some room for confusions. (Many such confusions resulted of deliberate efforts of "progressives" to erode the basic constitutional concepts inconvenient for them).
Fortunately there exists (at least) one original US document directly defining the "Natural born citizenship" according to Emerich de Vattel. This document (which does have legal binding) is the actual text of the FIRST CONGRESS in 1790 (see below).
Other arguments in favor of the definition of Vattel are the following. The Framers (in their correspondence) explicitly wished to exclude dual loyalty, and explicitly required that the US citizenship of the president be deeper than ordinary citizenship (such as that of their contemporaries). After all, any one can acquire an ordinary US citizenship in some point of one's life, so the Framers clearly excluded this kind of citizenship. On the contrary, the Natural Born Citizenship cannot be acquired: it may be only inherited.
H.J.R. 38 (1977)
H.J.R 59 (2003)
H.J.R. 67 (2003)
S.2128 (2004)
H.J.R. 104 (2004)
H.J.R. 2 (2005)
H.J.R. 15 (2005)
H.J.R. 42 (2005)
S.2678 (2008).
So finally in 2008 they simply violated the Constitutional requirement, created the precedent and therefore de-facto have changed the Constitution without any due constitutional process. It was "The Audacity of Dope", rephrasing the notorious title.
"We (government) need to do a lot less, a lot sooner" ~Ron Paul
#26. To: A K A Stone (#22)
Rubio was born by C Section. He is not natural born.
According to the plaintiff, Ambassador Keyes believes that any citizen of the United States born through natural procreative means (but not one born by caesarean section) is a “natural-born citizen” eligible to hold the Office of President.
#27. To: TooConservative, hondo68 (#7)
[hondo68 #6] The courts have never ruled on "natural born Citizen".
5. It is a necessary consequence, from what I have stated, that the law which had prevailed on this subject, in all the states, became the governing principle or common law of the United States. Those states were the constituent parts of the United States, and when the union was formed, and further state regulation on the point terminated, it follows, in the absence of a declaration to the contrary, that the principle which prevailed and was the law on such point in all the states, became immediately the governing principle and rule of law thereon in the nation formed by such union. If there had been any diversity on the subject in the state laws, it might have been difficult to ascertain which of the conflicting state rules was to become, or did become, the national principle. And if such diversity had existed, it is reasonable to believe that the framers of the constitution would have borne in mind, and enacted a uniform rule, or authorized Congress to establish one. The entire silence of the constitution in regard to it, furnishes a strong confirmation, not only that the existing law of the states was entirely uniform, but that there was no intention to abrogate or change it. The term citizen, was used in the constitution as a word, the meaning of which was already established and well understood. And the constitution itself contains a direct recognition of the subsisting common law principle, in the section which defines the qualification of the President. "No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President," &c. The only standard which then existed, of a natural born citizen, was the rule of the common law, and no different standard has been adopted since. Suppose a person should be elected President who was native born, but of alien parents, could there be any reasonable doubt that he was eligible under the constitution? I think not. The position would be decisive in his favor that by the rule of the common law, in force when the colonies and in the states, under the constitution was adopted, he is a citizen.
The act of congress confers citizenship. Who are citizens, and what are their rights? The constitution uses the words “citizen” and “natural born citizens;” but neither that instrument nor any act of congress has attempted to define their meaning. British jurisprudence, whence so much of our own is drawn, throws little light upon the subject. In Johnson’s Dictionary, “citizen” is thus defined: “(1) A freeman of a city; not a foreigner; not a slave; (2) a townsman, a man of trade; not a gentleman; (3) an inhabitant; a dweller in any place.”
#28. To: hondo68 (#25)
A "Natural born citizen" - the most crucial concept of the moment in America - is confusing (and deliberately confused). This concept is used in the Constitution of the US (Article II, Section 1, #4) as a precondition for presidency - and only for presidency, being clearly distinguished from ordinary citizenship.
Law of Nations. See International law.
Those laws governing the legal relations between nations. Rules and principles of general application dealing with the conduct of nations and of international organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether natural or juridical. Restatement, Foreign Relations (Third) § 101. Body of consensual principles which have evolved from customs and practices civilized nations utilize in regulating their relationships and such customs have great moral force. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matshushita Elec. Co., Ltd., D.C.Pa., 494 F.Supp. 1161, 1178. International customs and treaties are generally considered to be the two most important sources of international law.
#29. To: A K A Stone (#23)
Rubio isn't white.
#30. To: redleghunter (#24)
What you posted has to be wrong. There are so many websites and blogs 'proving' you wrong. /s
#31. To: hondo68 (#25)
Another indication to the meaning of the term may be found in the Supreme Court's side definition of "natural born citizen" as "all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens" (Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 1875).
It is admitted by the pleadings that the plaintiff is a native-born, free white citizen of the United States and of the State of Missouri; that the defendant is a registrar, qualified and acting as such; that the plaintiff, in proper time and in proper form, made application to him to be registered, and that the defendant refused to register the plaintiff solely for the reason that she is a female, (and that she possesses the qualifications of an elector in all respects, except as to the matter of sex, as before stated.)
The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court. The question is presented in this case, whether, since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, a woman, who is a citizen of the United States and of the State of Missouri, is a voter in that State, notwithstanding the provision of the constitution and laws of the State, which confine the right of suffrage to men alone.
Whoever, then, was one of the people of either of these States when the Constitution of the United States was adopted, became ipso facto a citizen—a member of the nation created by its adoption. He was one of the persons associating together to form the nation, and was, consequently, one of its original citizens. As to this there has never been a doubt. Disputes have arisen as to whether or not certain persons or certain classes of persons were part of the people at the time, but never as to their citizenship if they were.
As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to solve these doubts.
Brief on Behalf of Appellant (United States Government)
The question presented by this appeal may be thus stated: Is a person born within the United States of alien parents domiciled therein a citizen thereof by the fact of his birth? The appellant maintains the negative, and in that behalf assigns as error the ruling of the district court that the respondent is a natural-born citizen....
To hold that Wong Kim Ark is a natural-born citizen within the ruling now quoted, is to ignore the fact that at his birth he became a subject of China by reason of the allegiance of his parents to the Chinese Emperor.
Extracts from Brief on Behalf of Respondent (Appellee Won Kim Ark)
"There is, however, one clear exception the the statement that there is no national common law. The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law and are to be read in the light of its history. The code of constitutional and statutory construction which therefore is gradually formed by the judgments of this Court in the application of the Constitution and the laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof, has for its basis, so much of the common law as may be implied in the subject and constitutes a common law resting on national authority."
"The answer to the question, Who is a citizen? is different in different States, and depends on the laws and constitution of each." (Aristotle, Politics, Book III, c. s. 2 and 3.)
"But in considering the question before us, it must be borne in mind that there is no law of nations standing between the prople of the United States and their Government, and interfering with their relation to each other. The powers of the Government and the rights of the citizen under it, are positive and practical regulations plainly written down. * * * And no laws or usages of other nations, or reasoning of statesmen or jurists * * * can enlarge the powers of the Government or take from the citizens the rights they have reserved."
"The ground of this doctrine is that each Government had a right to decide for itself who should be admitted or deemed citizens."
"A question as the status or citizenship, if it arose in the United States, would be determined by our own law."
"The French law considers all children of foreigners born in France as French citizens, unless before coming of age they decline French citizenship. * * * Otherwise they are amenable to obligatory military service and punishment as deserters if they endeavor to evade it" (49 Alb. L. J., 20).
"By the common law a child born within the allegiance of the United States is born a subject there of, without reference to the political status or condition of the parents."
"That any alien being a free white person, who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for the term of two years, may be admitted to become a citizen thereof."
"By the first section of the bill all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indains not taxed, are declared to be citizens of the United States. This provision comprehends the Chinese of the Pacific States, Indians subject to taxation, the people called Gypsies, as well as the entire race designated as blacks, persons of color, negroes, mullatoes and persons of African blood. Every individual of those races born in the United States is, by the bill, made a citizen of the United States."
"The act of Congress confers citizenship. Who are citizens, and what are their rights? The Constitution uses the words 'citizen' and 'natural-born citizen'; but neither that instrument nor any act of Congress has attempted to define their meaning. * * * All persons born in the allegiance of the king are natural-born subjects and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country as well as of England. There are two exceptions, and ony two, to the universality of its application. The children of ambassadors are in theory born in the allegiance of the powers the ambassadors represent, and slaves in legal contemplation are property, and not persons. * * *
"The jurisdiction of the United States over him at the time of his birth was exclusive of that of any other country."
"Two facts must concur -- the person must be born here, and he must be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States according to the Fourteenth Amendment, which means, according to the Civil Rights Act, that the person born here is not subject to any foreign power. Allan Benny, whose parents were domiciled here at the time of his birth, is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and is not subject to any foreign power. * * * Therefore Allan Benny is a citizen of the United States in virtue of his birth here of alien parents, who, at the time of his birth, were domiciled in this country."
"The Constitution of the United States, like those of all the original States, * * * presupposed the existence and authority of the common law. The principles of that law were the basis of our institutions. In adopting the State and national Constitutions * * * our ancestors rejected so much of the common law as was then inapplicable to their situation, and prescribed new rules for their regulation and government. But in doing so, they did not reject the body of the common law. They founded their respective State Constitutions and the great national compact upon its existing principles, so far as they were consistent and harmonious with the provisions of those Constitutions."
"Upon principle, therefore, I can entertain no doubt, but that by the law of the United States, every person born within the dominions and allegiance of the United States, whatever were the situation of his parents, is a natural-born citizen."
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in the declaration that
The fact, therefore, that acts of Congress or treaties have not permitted Chinese persons born out of this country to become citizens by naturalization, cannot exclude Chinese persons born in this country from the operation of the broad and clear words of the Constitution, "All persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States."
The evident intention, and the necessary effect, of the submission of this case to the decision of the court upon the facts agreed by the parties were to present for determination the single question stated at the beginning of this opinion, namely, whether a child born in the United States, of parent of Chinese descent, who, at the time of his birth, are subjects of the Emperor of China, but have a permanent domicil and residence in the United States, and are there carrying on business, and are not employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China, becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States. For the reasons above stated, this court is of opinion that the question must be answered in the affirmative.
But it would be useless to incumber this already lengthy opinion with further argument and observations upon this interesting question. Arriving at the conclusion, as I do, after careful investigation and much consideration, that the supreme court has as yet announced no doctrine at variance with that contained in the Look Tin Sing decision and the other cases alluded to, I am constrained to follow the authority and law enunciated in this circuit. Counsel for the United States have argued with considerable force against the common-law rule and its recognition, as being illogical, and likely to lead to perplexing, and perhaps serious, international conflicts, if followed in all cases. But these observations are, obviously, addressed to the policy of the rule, and not to its interpretation. The doctrine of the law of nations, that the child follows the nationality of the parents, and that citizenship does not depend upon mere accidental place of birth, is undoubtedly more logical, reasonable, and satisfactory, but this consideration will not justify this court in declaring it to be the law against controlling judicial authority. It may be that the executive departments of the government are at liberty to follow this international rule in dealing with questions of citizenship which arise between this and other countries, but that fact does not establish the law for the courts in dealing with persons within our own territory. In this case the question to be determined is as to the political status and rights of Wong Kim Ark under the law in this country. No foreign power has intervened or appears to be concerned in the matter. From the law as announced and the facts as stipulated, I am of opinion that Wong Kim Ark is a citizen of the United States within the meaning of the citizenship clause of the fourteenth amendment. He has not forfeited his right to return to this country. His detention, therefore, is illegal. He should be discharged, and it is so ordered.
#32. To: nolu chan (#31)
Fortunately, I just happen to have a complete copy of the Transcript of Record for Minor v. Happersett.
#33. To: A K A Stone (#22)
Rubio was born by C Section. He is not natural born.
#34. To: nolu chan (#19)
Lt. Col. Terrence L. (Terry) Lakin.
Reserve Major Stefan F. Cook and Captain Connie Rhodes
#35. To: nolu chan, tooconservative (#26)
Rubio was born by C Section. He is not natural born. The birthers were onto the C-Section angle in 2008.
#36. To: nolu chan (#29)
Rubio isn't white. It's not 1859 any more and the 13th and 14th Amendments really exist.
#37. To: nolu chan, 14th amendment citizen, anchor baby, *Border Invasion* (#31)
The lower court that was affirmed, concluded at 71 Fed. Rep 392:
the most important case is that of In re Look Tin Sing, 10 Sawy., 353 [21 Fed. Rep. 905], decided by Mr. Justice Field. The same question was presented in this case in precisely the same way in which it arises here, and it was the held that a Chinaman born in the United States of parents not engaged in any diplomatic capacity was a citizen thereof.
They call Look Tin Sing a "Chinaman" and then say he's a US citizen. Funny stuff! "We (government) need to do a lot less, a lot sooner" ~Ron Paul
#38. To: A K A Stone (#35)
Rubio was born by C Section. He is not natural born. The birthers were onto the C-Section angle in 2008.
#39. To: hondo68 (#37)
A 14th Amendment citizen anchor baby, like Willard Mitt Romney.
According tothe laws of this State, all human beings within it who are not slaves, fall within one of two classes. Whatever distinctions may have existed in the Roman law between citizens and free inhabitants, they are unknown to our institutions. Before our Revolution all free persons born within the dominions of the king of Great Britain, whatever teir colour or complexion, were native born British subjects—those born out of his allegiance were aliens. Slavery did not exist in England, but it did exist in the British colonies. Slaves were not in legal parlance persons, but property.
Slaves manumitted here become freemen—and therefore if born within North Carolina are citizens of North Carolina—and all free persons born within the State are born citizens of the State.
The term "citizen" as understood in our law, is precisely analogos to the term subject in the common law, and the change of phrase has entirely resulted from the change of government. The sovereignty has been transferred from one man to the collective body of the people—and he who before was a "subject of the king" is now "a citizen of the State."
The defendant, Julia Lynch, was born in the City of New York in 1819, of alien parents, during their temporary sojourn in that city. She returned with them that same years, to their native country, and always resided there afterwards.
5. It is a necessary consequence, from what I have stated, that the law which had prevailed on this subject, in all the states, became the governing principle or common law of the United States. Those states were the constituent parts of the United States, and when the union was formed, and further state regulation on the point terminated, it follows, in the absence of a declaration to the contrary, that the principle which prevailed and was the law on such point in all the states, became immediately the governing principle and rule of law thereon in the nation formed by such union. If there had been any diversity on the subject in the state laws, it might have been difficult to ascertain which of the conflicting state rules was to become, or did become, the national principle. And if such diversity had existed, it is reasonable to believe that the framers of the constitution would have borne in mind, and enacted a uniform rule, or authorized Congress to establish one. The entire silence of the constitution in regard to it, furnishes a strong confirmation, not only that the existing law of the states was entirely uniform, but that there was no intention to abrogate or change it. The term citizen, was used in the constitution as a word, the meaning of which was already established and well understood. And the constitution itself contains a direct recognition of the subsisting common law principle, in the section which defines the qualification of the President. "No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President," &c. The only standard which then existed, of a natural born citizen, was the rule of the common law, and no different standard has been adopted since. Suppose a person should be elected President who was native born, but of alien parents, could there be any reasonable doubt that he was eligible under the constitution? I think not. The position would be decisive in his favor that by the rule of the common law, in force when the colonies and in the states, under the constitution was adopted, he is a citizen.
6. Upon principle, therefore, I can entertain no doubt, but that by the law of the United States, every person born within the dominions and allegiance of the United States, whatever were the situation of his parents, is a natural born citizen.
The writers on public law, are by no means agreed upon the question before me; although they were strongly imbued, by their studies and habits, with the spirit of civil law.
These references show that the rule which the complainant derives from the writers on public law is not even in theory, clearly defined or uniformly held. The most approved authorities, do ot deviate from the rule of the common law, and farther than Judge Story has suggested that it is reasonable to deviate; and to establish such a departure, would involve the whole subject, as it respects the children of foreigners, in the obscurity ever attendant upon evidence of intention, the animus manendi, upon a change of residence; an obscurity the greater in these cases, because the question generally arises after the lapse of many years. The advantages to result from a resort to such an undcertain and fluctuating rule, are mere ideal that substantial; and are complete over borne by its invonvenience, when contrasted with the simple and plain rule of the common law. The qualifications mentioned by Judge Story, and which are not universally established in the public law, are certainly unknown to the common law in England, and as established in the United States. There is no authority, and unless Mr. Dane's Abridgement be an exception, not a single work on American law, that asserts the existence of either of those qualifications.
In conclusion, I entertain no doubt but that Julia Lynch was a citizen of the United States when Thomas Lynch died. She therefore inherited the property in controversy, if Thomas Lynch had any estate therein, to the entire exclusion of the complainant, who was then an alien, and incapable of taking by descent.
Honorable William L. Marcy,
Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington City, D. C.
Washington, March 16, 1854.
W. L. MARCY. A child born in this state of alien parents, during its mother's temporary sojourn here, is a native born citizen.
It is further contented, on the part of the defendant, that the plaintiff himself is an alien. He was born in Ballston Spa, in this state, while his father was a resident of Canada, and returned to his father's domicil, with his mother, within a year after his birth. His mother was temporarily there—without any actual change of residence, either on her part or that of the father. It is argued that, at common law, a natural born subject was one whose birth was within the allegiance of the king. (Bac, Ab. tit. Alien, A. Com Dig, A. and B. 7 to 18. Bl. Com. 336, 74.) The cases of ambassadors, born abroad, and of children born on English seas were considered exceptions. Chancellor Kent, in his commentaries, defines a native born citizen to be a person born within, and alien one born out of, the jurisdiction of the United States (2 Kent's Com. 37-50.) In Lynch v. Clarke, (1 Sand. Ch. R. 583,) the question was precisely as here, whether a child born in the city of New York of alien parents, during their temporary sojourn there, was a native born citizen or an alien; and the conclusion was, that being born within the dominion and allegiance of the United States, he was a native born citizen, whatever was the situation of the parents at the time of birth.
By the common law, when a subject is traveling or sojourning abroad, either on the public business, or on lawful occasion of his own, with the express or implied license and sanction of the sovereign and with the intention of returning, as he continues under the protection of the sovereign power, so he retains the privileges and continues under the obligations, of his allegiance, and his children, though born in a foreign country, are not born under foreign allegiance, and are an exception to the rule which makes the place of birth the test of citizenship.
#40. To: TooConservative (#34)
I don't even recall Cook's case.
Well, looks like things may well be moving along.
B. Major Cook’s Request for Injunctive Relief is Moot
DOD RETALIATION AGAINST MR. COOK WAS SWIFT AND BRUTAL AND APPEARS TO BE ONGOING
Lt. Col. Stefan Cook Has Passed Away (Freeper roaddog727)
#41. To: TooConservative (#34)
Lt. Col. Terrence L. (Terry) Lakin.
Lawful Orders - Manual of Curts-Martial, And the case of Lt. Col. Terrence Lakin
April 14, 2010 An Exercise in Futility - Lakin BRIEF in Support in Support of PETITION for Writ of Mandamus
September 30, 2010
#42. To: nolu chan (#40)
Lt. Col. Stefan Cook Has Passed Away (Freeper roaddog727)
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