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Title: Constitution Doesn’t Mandate Birthright Citizenship
Source:
Breitbart
URL Source: http://www.breitbart.com/big-govern ... andate-birthright-citizenship/
Published: Aug 18, 2015
Author: Ken Klukowski
Post Date: 2015-08-18 15:04:10 by cranky
Keywords: None
Views: 17537
Comments: 115
The Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment does not confer citizenship on the children of foreigners, whether legal or illegal. Media commentators have gotten this issue dead wrong. Fox News’s Judge Andrew Napolitano says the Fourteenth Amendment is “very clear” that its Citizenship Clause commands that any child born in America is automatically an American citizen. That’s not the law. It has never been the law. Under current immigration law—found at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)—a baby born on American soil to a (1) foreign ambassador, (2) head of state, or (3) foreign military prisoner is not an American citizen. How is that possible? This is from the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 (INA), as it has been amended over the years. Is this federal law unconstitutional? No. The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” Today’s debate turns on the six words, “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” As captured in the movie Lincoln, the Thirteenth Amendment—which ended slavery—barely passed Congress because many Democrats supported slavery, and it was only through the political genius and resolve of Republican President Abraham Lincoln that the proposed amendment passed Congress in 1865, sending it to the states for ratification. In 1866, Congress passed a Civil Rights Act to guarantee black Americans their constitutional rights as citizens, claiming that the Constitution’s Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress the power to pass such laws. But many voted against the Civil Rights Act because they thought it exceeded Congress’s powers, and even many of its supporters doubted its legality. The Civil Rights Act included a definition for national citizenship, to guarantee that former slaves would forever be free of the infamous Dred Scott decision which declared black people were not American citizens. That provision read, “All persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States.” That was the original meaning of the jurisdiction language in the Fourteenth Amendment. A person who is “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States is a person who is “not subject to any foreign power”—that is, a person who was entirely native to the United States, not the citizen or subject of any foreign government. The same members of Congress who voted for the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865 then voted to define citizenship for freed slaves in a federal law in 1866, then voted again months later in 1866—using only slightly different language—to put that definition of citizenship in the Constitution, language that was ultimately ratified by the states in 1868 as the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1884, the Supreme Court in Elk v. Wilkins noted that the language of the Civil Rights Act was condensed and rephrased in the Fourteenth Amendment and that courts can therefore look to the Civil Rights Act to understand better the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that if a person is a foreign citizen, then their children are likewise not constitutionally under the jurisdiction of the United States, and therefore not entitled to citizenship. In fact, the Court specifically then added that this rule is why the children of foreign ambassadors are not American citizens. That is why Congress can specify that the children of foreign diplomats and foreign soldiers are not Americans by birth. They’re not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States. Congress’s INA does not grant them citizenship; federal law never has. So why is a child born on American soil to foreign parents an American citizen by birth? Because the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause is a floor, not a ceiling. Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution, Congress has absolute power to make laws for immigration and for granting citizenship to foreigners. Congress’s current INA is far more generous than the Constitution requires. Congress could expand it to grant citizenship to every human being on earth, or narrow it to its constitutional minimum. Media confusion on this issue is puzzling, because the greatest legal minds in this country have discussed the issue. (Just none of them were put on camera to explain it.) Scholars including Dr. John Eastman of Chapman University, and even Attorney General Edwin Meese—the godfather of constitutional conservatism in the law—reject the myth of birthright citizenship. Nor is rejection of birthright citizenship limited to conservatives. Judge Richard Posner—a prolific scholar who, despite being appointed by Ronald Reagan, is a liberal judicial activist—wrote in 2003 in Ofoji v. Ashcroft: We should not be encouraging foreigners to come to the United States solely to enable them to confer U.S. citizenship on their future children. But the way to stop that abuse of hospitality is to remove the incentive by changing the rule on citizenship…. A constitutional amendment may be required to change the rule whereby birth in this country automatically confers U.S. citizenship, but I doubt it…. The purpose of the rule was to grant citizenship to the recently freed slaves, and the exception for children of foreign diplomats and heads of state shows that Congress did not read the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment literally. Congress would not be flouting the Constitution if it amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to put an end to the nonsense. It is another question as to whether Congress could strip citizenship from the children of illegals who already have it. If Congress could do that, then it could also strip citizenship from the many millions of foreigners who came to the United States legally and went through the lawful process to become Americans. There is no court precedent for that, and the congressional and ratification debates from the Fourteenth Amendment do not reveal a clear answer. Trump could rescind President Barack Obama’s executive amnesty, but that executive order did not grant anyone citizenship, and it would be a steep uphill climb in court to try to take someone’s citizenship away. And if the children already here are American citizens, then they could never be deported. Some other parts of Trump’s plan face even longer odds. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Bill of Rights applies to all “persons,” not just citizens. And the courts have always held that due process requires any foreigner to be given a “meaningful hearing” in court before being deported. That would certainly impact the pace of deportation. Donald Trump’s position on immigration has changed drastically from his previous positions, just like his past support for socialized healthcare and abortion. He has not yet explained why he changed his position on immigration, and some voters do not trust that he sincerely holds to his current campaign positions. But none of that changes the legality of his immigration proposal. While parts of it may face legal challenges, denying citizenship to the children of illegal aliens is fully consistent with the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment. Ken Klukowski is legal editor of Breitbart News and a practicing constitutional attorney, and explains birthright citizenship in Chapter 12 of Resurgent: How Constitutional Conservatism Can Save America. Follow him on Twitter @kenklukowski.
Parts of Donald Trump’s immigration plan may raise serious constitutional questions, but the part that launched a media firestorm—ending birthright citizenship for the children of illegal aliens—does not.
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Begin Trace Mode for Comment # 12.
#9. To: cranky, A K A Stone, misterwhite (#0)
(Edited)
This is birther bullcrap. It is directly contrary to Supreme Court precedent. It is a steaming pantsload. The whole argument is discredited and failed birther nonsense. Prior to July 4, 1776, the colonials got British birthright citizenship. After July 4, 1776, they got American state birthright citizenship. (Britain dates the change from the signing of the Parris Peace Treaty.) How is that possible? This is from the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 (INA), as it has been amended over the years. Is this federal law unconstitutional? The immunity of a diplomat inheres to the child at birth. The child is not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The Civil Rights Act included a definition for national citizenship, to guarantee that former slaves would forever be free of the infamous Dred Scott decision which declared black people were not American citizens. That provision read, “All persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States.” That was the original meaning of the jurisdiction language in the Fourteenth Amendment. A person who is “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States is a person who is “not subject to any foreign power”—that is, a person who was entirely native to the United States, not the citizen or subject of any foreign government. This unforgivable, deliberately deceiving bullshit. The Civil Rights Act language and drafters were different, and a comment made by one congressman who did not draft the citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment cannot define the intent of the drafter of that clause, or somehow nullify the debate preceding passage of that clause. When Bingham spoke in the House about the CRA, he was attacking it as unconstitutional. Congressman Bingham's draft of the 14th Amendment contained no citizenship clause. The citizenship clause was added in the Senate by its drafter, Senator Jacob Howard. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=073/llcg073.db&recNum=11 Congressional Globe, Senate, 39th Congress, 1st Session, May 30, 1866, page 1290, column 2, Senator Jacob Howard speaking: Mr. HOWARD. I now move to take up House joint resolution No. 127. The motion was agreed to; and the Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (H. R. No. 127) proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on the amendments proposed by the Senator from Michigan, [Mr. HOWARD.] Mr. HOWARD. The first amendment is to section one, declaring that "all persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside." I do not propose to say anything on that subject except that the question of citizenship has been so fully discussed in this body as not to need any further elucidation, in my opinion. This amendment which I have offered is simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already, that every person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law and national law a citizen of the United States. This will not, of course, include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, who belong to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers accredited to the Government of the United States, but will include every other class of persons. It settles the great question of citizenship and removes all doubt as to what persons are or are not citizens of the United States. This has long been a great desideratum in the jurisprudence and legislation of this country. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The first amendment proposed by the Senator from Michigan will be read. The Secretary read the amendment, which was in line nine, after the words "section one," to insert: All persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside. So that the section will read: No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction tho equal protection of the laws. Mr. DOOLITTLE. I presume the honorable Senator from Michigan does not intend by this amendment to include the Indians. I move, therefore, to amend the amendment -- I presume he will have no objection to it -- by inserting after the word "thereof" the words "excluding Indians not taxed." The amendment would then read: Mr. HOWARD. I hope that amendment to the amendment will not be adopted. Indians born within the limits of the United States, and who maintain their tribal relations, are not, in the sense of this amendment, born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. They are regarded, and always have been in our legislation and jurisprudence, as being quasi foreign nations. The motion was agreed to; and the Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the "consideration of the joint resolution (H. R. No. 127) proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=073/llcg073.db&recNum=14 At page 2893, column 1, Senator Lyman Trumbull speaking: At page 2893, column 2, Senator Johnson speaking: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=073/llcg073.db&recNum=15 At page 2894, column 1-2, Senator Trumbull to Senator Johnson, The object of "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" was the same as "Indians not taxed," with that phrase indicating a class of people belonging to the quasi-nation of an Indian tribe, under tribal law. It was not meant to apply to Chinese, Mongolians, or any other classification of people. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=073/llcg073.db&recNum=15 At page 2894, column 3, Senator Trumbull: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=073/llcg073.db&recNum=16 At page 2895, column 2, Senator Howard: I concur entirely with the honorable Senator from Illinois, in holding that the word “jurisdiction,” as here employed, ought to be construed so as to imply a full and complete jurisdiction on the part of the United States, coextensive in all respects with the constitutional power of the United States, whether exercised by Congress, by the executive, or by the judicial department; that is to say, the same jurisdiction in extent and quality as applies to every citizen of the United States now. Certainly, gentlemen cannot contend that an Indian belonging to a tribe, although born within the limits of a State, is subject to this full and complete jurisdiction. That question has long since been adjudicated, so far as the usage of the Government is concerned. The Government of the United States have always regarded and treated the Indian tribes within our limits as foreign Powers, so far as the treaty-making power is concerned, and so far especially as the commercial power is concerned, for in the very Constitution itself there is a provision that Congress shall have power to regulate commerce, not only with foreign nations and among the States, but also with the Indian tribes. That clause, in my judgment, presents a full and complete recognition of the national character of the Indian tribes, the same character in which they have been recognized ever since the discovery of the continent and its occupation by civilized men; the same light in which the Indians were viewed and treated by Great Britain from the earliest commencement of the settlement of the continent. They have always been regarded, even in our ante-revolutionary history, as being independent nations, with whom the other nations of the earth have held treaties, and in no case, I believe, has either the Government of Great Britain or of the United States recognized the right of an individual Indian to transfer or convey lands. Why? If he was a citizen, in other words, if he was not a subject of a foreign Power, if he did not belong to a tribe whose common law is that land as well as almost every other description of property shall be held in common among the members of the tribe, subject to a chief, why is it that the reservation has been imposed and always observed upon the act of conveyance on the part of the Indian? http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=073/llcg073.db&recNum=17 At page 2896, column 3, Senator Howard: At page 2897, column 1-2, Senator Williams: If there be any doubt about the meaning of that paragraph, I think that doubt is entirely removed by the second section, for by the second section of this constitutional amendment Indians not taxed are not counted at all in the basis of representation. The words in the second section are as follows: They are not to be regarded as persons to be counted under any circumstances. Indians not taxed are not even entitled to be counted as persons in the basis of representation under any circumstances; and then the section provides -- Now, can any reasonable man conclude that the word “citizens” there applies to Indians not taxed, or includes Indians not taxed, when they are expressly excluded from the basis of representation and cannot even be taken into the enumeration of persons upon whom representation is to be based? I think it is perfectly clear, when you put the first and second sections together, that Indians not taxed are excluded from the term “citizens;” because it cannot be supposed for one moment that the term “citizens,” as employed in these two sections, is intended to apply to Indians who arc not oven counted under any circumstances as a part of the basis of representation. I therefore think that the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin is clearly unnecessary. I do not believe that “Indians not taxed” are included, and I understand that to be a description of Indians who maintain their tribal relations and who are not in all respects subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. In one sense, all persons born within the geographical limits of the United States are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, but they are not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in every sense. Take the child of an ambassador. In one sense, that child born in the United States is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, because if that child commits the crime of murder, or commits any other crime against the laws of the country, to a certain extent he is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, but not in every respect; and so with these Indians. All persons living within a judicial district may be said, in one sense, to be subject to the jurisdiction of the court in that district, but they are not in every sense subject to the jurisdiction of the court until they are brought, by proper process, within the reach of the power of the court. I understand the words here, “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” to mean fully and completely subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. If there was any doubt as to the meaning of those words, I think that doubt is entirely removed and explained by the words in the subsequent section; and believing that, in any court or by any intelligent person, these two sections would be construed not to include Indians not taxed, I do not think the amendment is necessary. - - - - - - - - - - That is why Congress can specify that the children of foreign diplomats and foreign soldiers are not Americans by birth. They’re not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States. Congress’s INA does not grant them citizenship; federal law never has. http://supreme.justia.com/us/112/94/case.html Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884) At 99: Elk was born a member of an Indian nation. Leaving the tribe decades later did not make him a citizen at birth. At 101-102: Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States, members of and owing immediate allegiance to one of the Indian tribes (an alien though dependent power), although in a geographical sense born in the United States, are no more "born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," within the meaning of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, than the children of subjects of any foreign government born within the domain of that government, or the children born within the United States of ambassadors or other public ministers of foreign nations. http://loc.heinonline.org/loc/Page?handle=hein.usreports/usrep169&id=686#686 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 664-668 (1898) The same doctrine was repeatedly affirmed in the executive departments, as, for instance, by Mr. Marcy, secretary of state, in 1854 ( 2 Whart. Int. Dig. [2d Ed.] p. 394); by Attorney General Black in 1859 (9 Ops. Attys. Gen. 373); and by Attorney General Bates in 1862 (10 Ops. Attys. Gen. 328, 382, 394, 396). Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries, speaking of the 'general division of the inhabitants of every country, under the comprehensive title of 'Aliens' and 'Natives," says: 'Natives are all persons born within the jurisdiction and allegiance of the United States. This is the rule of the common law, without any regard or reference to the political condition or allegiance of their parents, with the exception of the children of ambassadors, who are, in theory, born within the allegiance of the foreign power they represent.' 'To create allegiance by birth, the party must be born, not only within the territory, but within the ligeance of the government. If a portion of the country be taken and held by conquest in war, the conqueror acquires the rights of the conquered as to its dominion and government, and children born in the armies of a state, while [169 U.S. 649, 665] abroad, and occupying a foreign country, are deemed to be born in the allegiance of the sovereign to whom the army belongs. It is equally the doctrine of the English common law that during such hostile occupation of a territory, and the parents be adhering to the enemy as subjects de facto, their children, born under such a temporary dominion, are not born under the ligeance of the conquered.' 2 Kent, Comm. (6th Ed.) 39, 42. And he elsewhere says: 'And if, at common law, all human beings born within the ligeance of the king, and under the king's obedience, were natural-born subjects, and not aliens, I do not perceive why this doctrine does not apply to these United States in all cases in which there is no express constitutional or statute declaration to the contrary.' "Subject' and 'citizen' are, in a degree, convertible terms as applied to natives; and though the term 'citizen' seems to be appropriate to republican freemen, yet we are, equally with the inhabitants of all other countries, 'subjects,' for we are equally bound by allegiance and subjection to the government and law of the land.' Id. 258, note. Mr. Binney in the second edition of a paper on the Alienigenae of the United States, printed in pamphlet at Philadelphia, with a preface bearing his signature and the date of December 1, 1853, said: 'The common- law principle of allegiance was the law of all the states at the time of the Revolution and at the adoption of the constitution; and by that principle the citizens of the United States are, with the exceptions before mentioned [namely, foreign-born children of citizens, under statutes to be presently referred to], such only as are either born or made so, born within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States, or naturalized by the authority of law, either in one of the states before the constitution, or, since that time, by virtue of an act of the congress of the United States.' Page 20. 'The right of citizenship never descends in the legal sense, either by the common law, or under the common naturalization acts. It is incident to birth in the country, or it is given personally by statute. The child of an alien, if born in the country, is as much a citizen as the natural-born child of a citizen, and by operation of the same principle.' [169 U.S. 649, 666] Page 22, note. This paper, without Mr. Binney's name, and with the note in a less complete form, and not containing the passage last cited, was published (perhaps from the first edition) in the American Law Register for February, 1854. 2 Am. Law Reg. 193, 203, 204. IV. It was contended by one of the learned counsel for the United States that the rule of the Roman law, by which the citizenship of the child followed that of the parent, was the true rule of international law as now recognized in most civilized countries, and had superseded the rule of the common law, depending on birth within the realm, originally founded on feudal considerations. But at the time of the adoption of the constitution of the United States in 1789, and long before, it would seem to have been the rule in Europe generally, as it certainly was in France, that, as said by Pothier, 'citizens, true and native-born citizens, are those who are born within the extent of the dominion of France,' and 'mere birth within the realm gives the rights of a native-born citizen, independently of the origin of the father or mother, and of their domicile'; and children born in a foreign country, of a French father who had not established his domicile there, nor given up the intention of returning, were also deemed Frenchmen, as Laurent says, by 'a favor, a sort of fiction,' and Calvo, 'by a sort of fiction of exterritoriality, considered as born in France, and therefore invested with French nationality.' Poth. Trait e des Personnes, pt. 1, tit. 2, 1, Nos. 43, 45; Walsh-Serrant v. Walsh-Serrant (1802) 3 Journal du Palais, 384, 8 Merlin, Jurisprudence, 'Domicile' (5th Ed.) 13; Pr efet du Nord v. Lebeau (1862) Journal du Palais 1863, 312, and note; 1 Laurent, Droit Civil, No. 321; 2 Calvo, Droit International (5th Ed.) 542; Cockb. Nat. 13, 14; Hall, Int. Law (4th Ed.) 68. The general principle of citizenship by birth within French territory prevailed until after the French Revolution, and was affirmed in successive constitutions from the one adopted by the constituent assembly in 1791 to that of the French republic in 1799. Constitutions et Chartes (Ed. 1830) pp. 100, 136, 148, 186. [169 U.S. 649, 667] The Code Napoleon of 1807 changed the law of France, and adopted, instead of the rule of country of birth, jus soli, the rule of descent or blood, jus sanguinis, as the leading principle; but an eminent commentator has observed that the framers of that code 'appear not to have wholly freed themselves from the ancient rule of France, or rather, indeed, ancient rule of Europe,-'De la vieille regle francaise, ou plutot meme de la vieille regle europ eenne,'-according to which nationality had always been, in former times, determined by the place of birth.' 1 Demolombe, Cours de Code Napoleon (4th Ed.) No. 146. The later modifications of the rule in Europe res upon the constitutions, laws, or ordinances of the various countries, and have no important bearing upon the interpretation and effect of the constitution of the United States. The English naturalization act of 33 Vict. (1870) c. 14, and the commissioners' report of 1869, out of which it grew, both bear date since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution; and, as observed by Mr. Dicey, that act has not affected the principle by which any person who, whatever the nationality of his parents, is born within the British dominions, acquires British nationality at birth, and is a natural-born British subject. Dicey, Confl. Laws, 741. At the time of the passage of that act, although the tendency on the continent of Europe was to make parentage, rather than birthplace, the criterion of nationality, and citizenship was denied to the native-born children of foreign parents in Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, and Norway, yet it appears still to have been conferred upon such children in Holland, Denmark, and Portugal, and, when claimed under certain specified conditions, in France, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Russia. Cockb. Nat. 14-21. There is, therefore, little ground for the theory that at the time of the adoption of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States there was any settled and definite rule of international law generally recognized by civilized nations, inconsistent with the ancient rule of citizenship by birth within the dominion. [169 U.S. 649, 668] Nor can it be doubted that it is the inherent right of every independent nation to determine for itself, and according to its own constitution and laws, what classes of persons shall be entitled to its citizenship.
That settles it then.
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Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest The Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment does not confer citizenship on the children of foreigners, whether legal or illegal.
Under current immigration law—found at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)—a baby born on American soil to a (1) foreign ambassador, (2) head of state, or (3) foreign military prisoner is not an American citizen.
In 1866, Congress passed a Civil Rights Act to guarantee black Americans their constitutional rights as citizens, claiming that the Constitution’s Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress the power to pass such laws. But many voted against the Civil Rights Act because they thought it exceeded Congress’s powers, and even many of its supporters doubted its legality.
RECONSTRUCTION.
SEC. 1. All persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside.
All persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, excluding Indians not taxed, are citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside.
The provision is, that “all persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens.” That means “subject to the complete jurisdiction thereof.” Now, does the Senator from Wisconsin pretend to say that the Navajoe Indians are subject to the complete jurisdiction of the United Slates? What do we mean by “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States?” Not owing allegiance to anybody else. That is, what it means. Can you sue a Navajoe Indian in court? Are they in any sense subject to the complete jurisdiction of the United States? By no means. We make treaties with them, and therefore they are not subject to our jurisdiction. If they were, we would not make treaties with them.
If there are to be citizens of the United States entitled everywhere to the character of citizens of the United States there should be some certain definition of what citizenship is, what has created the character of citizen as between himself and the United States, and the amendment says that citizenship may depend upon birth, and I know of no better way to give rise to citizenship than the fact of birth within the territory of the United States, born of parents who at the time were subject to the authority of the United States.
But the Senator wants to insert the words, “excluding Indians not taxed.” I am not willing to make citizenship in this country depend on taxation. I am not willing, if the Senator from Wisconsin is, that the rich Indian residing in the State of New York shall be a citizen and the poor Indian residing in the State of New York shall not be a citizen. If you put in those words in regard to citizenship, what do you do? You make a distinction in that respect, if you put it on the ground of taxation. We had a discussion on the civil rights bill as to the meaning of these words, “excluding Indians not taxed.” The Senator from Maryland, [Mr. Johnson,] I think, on that occasion gave this definition to the phrase “excluding Indians not taxed,” that it did not allude to the fact of taxation simply but it meant to describe a class of persons; that is, civilized Indians. I was inclined to fall into that view. I was inclined to adopt the suggestion of the Senator from Maryland, that the words “excluding Indians not taxed” did not mean literally excluding those upon whom a tax was not assessed and collected, but rather meant to define a class of persons, meaning civilized Indians; and I think I gave that answer to the Senator from Indiana, [Mr. Hendricks,] who was disposed to give it the technical meaning that “Indians not taxed” meant simply those upon whom no tax was laid. If it does mean that, then it would be very objectionable to insert those words here, because it would make of a wealthy Indian a citizen and would not make a citizen of one not possessed of wealth under the same circumstances. This is the uncertainty in regard to the meaning of those words. The Senator from Maryland and myself, perhaps, would understand them alike as embracing all Indians who were not civilized; and yet, if you insert that language, “Indians not taxed,” other persons may not understand them that way; and I remember that the Senator from Indiana was disposed to understand them differently when we had the discussion upon the civil rights bill. Therefore I think it better to avoid these words and that the language proposed in this constitutional amendment is better than the language in the civil rights bill. The object to be arrived at is the same.
Mr. TRUMBULL. I think there are decisions that treat them as subjects in some respects. In some sense they are regarded as within the territorial boundaries of the United States, but I do not think they are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in any legitimate sense; certainly not in the sense that the language is used here. The language seems to me to be better chosen than it was in the other bill. There is a difficulty about the words, “Indians not taxed.” Perhaps one of the reasons why I think so is because of the persistency with which the Senator from Indiana himself insisted that the phrase “excluding Indians not taxed,” the very words which the Senator from Wisconsin wishes to insert here, would exclude everybody that did not pay a tax; that that was the meaning of it; we must take it literally. The Senator from Maryland did not agree to that, nor did I; but if the Senator from Indiana was right, it would receive a construction which I am sure the Senator from Wisconsin would not be for; for if these Indians come within our limits and within our jurisdiction and are civilized, he would just as soon make a citizen of a poor Indian as of the rich Indian.
I think the language as it stands is sufficiently certain and exact. It is that “all persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”
Mr. HOWARD. ... We desired to put this question of citizenship and the rights of citizens and freedmen under the civil rights bill beyond the legislative power of such gentlemen as the Senator from Wisconsin, who would pull the whole system up by the roots and destroy it, and expose the freedmen again to tho oppressions of their old masters.
Mr. WILLIAMS. I would not agree to this proposed constitutional amendment if I supposed it made Indians not taxed citizens of the United States. But I am satisfied that, giving to the amendment a fair and reasonable construction, it does not include Indians not taxed. The first and second sections of this proposed amendment are to be taken together, are to be construed together, and the meaning of the word “citizens,” as employed in both sections, is to be determined from the manner in which that word is used in both of those sections. Section one provides that --
All persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within the Union, according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.
But whenever, in any State, the elective franchise shall be denied to any portion of its male inhabitants, being citizens of the United States, &c.
In 1884, the Supreme Court in Elk v. Wilkins noted that the language of the Civil Rights Act was condensed and rephrased in the Fourteenth Amendment and that courts can therefore look to the Civil Rights Act to understand better the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that if a person is a foreign citizen, then their children are likewise not constitutionally under the jurisdiction of the United States, and therefore not entitled to citizenship. In fact, the Court specifically then added that this rule is why the children of foreign ambassadors are not American citizens.
The question, then, is whether an Indian, born a member of one of the Indian tribes within the United States, is, merely by reason of his birth within the United States and of his afterwards voluntarily separating himself from his tribe and taking up his residence among white citizens, a citizen of the United States within the meaning of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
This section contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two sources only: birth and naturalization. The persons declared to be citizens are "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof." The evident meaning of these last words is not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction and owing them direct and immediate allegiance. And the words relate to the time of birth in the one case, as they do to the time of naturalization in the other. Persons not thus subject to the jurisdiction of the United States at the time of birth cannot become so afterwards except by being naturalized, either individually, as by proceedings under the naturalization acts, or collectively, as by the force of a treaty by which foreign territory is acquired.
So why is a child born on American soil to foreign parents an American citizen by birth? Because the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause is a floor, not a ceiling. Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution, Congress has absolute power to make laws for immigration and for granting citizenship to foreigners. Congress’s current INA is far more generous than the Constitution requires. Congress could expand it to grant citizenship to every human being on earth, or narrow it to its constitutional minimum.
That all children, born within the dominion of the United States, of foreign parents holding no diplomatic office, became citizens at the time of their birth, does not appear to have been contested or doubted until more than 50 years after the adoption of the constitution, when the matter was elaborately argued in the court of chancery of New York, and decided upon full consideration by Vice Chancellor Sandford in favor of their citizenship. Lynch v. Clarke (1844) 1 Sandf. Ch. 583.
#12. To: nolu chan (#9)
This is birther bullcrap.
Replies to Comment # 12.
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