U.S. Constitution
See other U.S. Constitution Articles
Title: nolu chan contends an amendment to repeal the 2nd Amdt could be passed
Source:
LF
URL Source: [None]
Published: Jul 9, 2015
Author: tpaine
Post Date: 2015-07-09 10:39:45 by tpaine
Keywords: None
Views: 79207
Comments: 255
The Congress proposes, and three-fourths of the states ratify the following amendment
AMENDMENT 28.
Section 1. The second article of amendment is hereby repealed.
Section 2. The individual right to keep and bear, buy, make, and use arms is limited to .22 caliber handguns only.
Section 3. All non-conforming guns must be surrendered to government authorities or destroyed within 30 days of ratification of this amendment.
Section 4. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Poster Comment:
During a discussion with Nolu Chan, he asserted that an amendment repealing the 2nd could be ratified, and become a valid part of our Constitution. I contend such an amendment would be unconstitutional. Comments?
Post Comment Private Reply Ignore Thread
Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest
#1. To: All (#0)
libertysflame.com/cgi- bin...rtNum=40620&Disp=136#C136 Link to our discussion....
Yea, since you asked... You are making more of a ass of yourself than ever seemed possible. But, it is your constitutional right to do so....I think that is in there somewhere, maybe in other words. You should listen to Chan....
Nolu Chan is legally correct. Through the amendment process the Constitution can be amended to say anything, except removing equal representation in the Senate. THAT requires unanimity of the states. The Constitution could be amended to require the sacrifice of first-born children. And if the sufficient majorities were found to vote for that, it would be "constitutional". Of course, then treason, and seeking the overthrow and destruction of the Constitution, and supporting foreign invasion and annihilation of the American government, would be the only morally correct thing to do. The Constitution does not guarantee MORAL content. The people have to do that. If the people become depraved and enact depraved laws, then "all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed". America was always depraved. First there was slavery, then there was Indian genocide and segregation. Those things ended, but now we have abortion and the glorification of buggery. Most people think that those evils - slavery, segregation, abortion, gay marriage - are "sufferable evils" and don't rebel. And that would be the case with the Second Amendment abolition also, were it to pass. (Truth is, it could not pass in the current environment). Mandatory sacrifice of firstborn children would be bad enough to justify treason, and would swiftly result in its outbreak. Traitors who win are called "Founding Fathers" of the new order they usher in.
The 18th amendment outlawed alcohol . The 21st amendment repealed the 18th . Yes it can be done.
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
Of course, then treason, and seeking the overthrow and destruction of the Constitution, and supporting foreign invasion and annihilation of the American government, would be the only morally correct thing to do. You all contend that our only recourse from a majority passing amendments that take away our basic human rights is violence? - 'Treasonous' violence? - Civil war?
True to form, you contend that by posting Nolu Chan's unconstitutional dreams, - I've somehow made an ass of myself? You and Chan should look in a mirror..
I can speak for nobody else. The only time I can envision going straight to violence myself is to protect against an immediate threat. If the country were going berserk, I'd emigrate before it got too terribly bad.
Nolu is correct. Every portion of the Constitution can be amended. Or it could be abolished entirely. What a silly clickbait vanity thread.
I contend such an amendment would be unconstitutional. Comments? Yes, I have a comment (or two.) Chan is only the bearer of bad (obvious) news. Don't kill the messenger. "Unconstitutional" is now in the eye of the beholder of nine justices of SCOTUS. We now have a "living breathing" Constitution. Just five tyrants of SCOTUS have already interpreted the Founders intent any way they want (emotionally), and changed federal law (without Congressional or State consent.) What exactly would stop SCOTUS from repealing the 2A? Congress?? "Public outrage? HA! Precedence has been set. Paine, I admire your commitment to the Fairy Tale that is the "US Constitution," but recent Presidents have ignored it; Congress has ignored it; And SCOTUS ignores it....In other words: "It's dead, Jim." that SCOTUS
Five. It's the "Rule of Five".
I didn't say "only " I provided an example where an amendment was reversed by an amendment . But to answer this new question ......possibly. Let's look at the amendments that the "progressives" don't like . Clearly they don't like the 2nd . They have proven to me beyond a shadow of doubt that they don't like the 1st amendment free exercise clause ( Wisconsin's junior Senator Tammy Baldwin said on MSNBC that the free exercise of religion extends only to religious institutions ,and not to individuals outside the church).They clearly would put restrictions of the free speech provisions (ie the movement to amend the constitution to reverse the 'Citizens United' decision ). http://freespeechforpeople.org/the-amendment/democracy-for-all-amendment/#sj- res-5-114th-congress They are trying to control the internet to limit free speech .Before that they wanted to censor talk radio . They had a 'fairness doctrine ' that required the airing of opposing views at one time. They want to outlaw so called 'hate speech'. Now if they managed to amend the Constitution to strip provisions that the founders thought were so basic that some of them did not believe it necessary to include them in the Constitution originally, then what would the recourse be ? Perhaps amending the constitution again ,or in the extreme ,"when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security. " Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
Let's flip this; What is YOUR solution to reclaiming the constitution and re-establishing the Founders' REAL intent??
The text of the Seventeenth: When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct. This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect that the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution. I see nothing requiring unanimity nor do I recall any other such unanimous requirements for amendments.
Yup. Five rogue SC justices, and VOILA! We are ALL held hostage by the whims of FIVE partisan, unqualified political HACKS. NEVER has this much power been handed to so few partisan HACKS. Tack on the unchallenged EOs of a rogue, treasonous President, and a ball-less, negligent Congress, and now we can officially consider the USA a Banana Republic.
Hasn't Roe v Wade pretty much already succeeded in amending what's "constitutional" by sanctioning the "sacrifice" of babies -- without the consent of Congress? And gee -- a "sufficient majority" WAS found in supporting abortion's constitutionality: "The Rule of Five" said so. (or was it Six in this case?) The Constitution does not guarantee MORAL content. The people have to do that. Correct of course. The Constitution now guarantees that ONLY the whims of FIVE rogue justices become the "Law of the Land." Even were 300 million citizens were to object to those FIVE. Houston, we've got a problem. A HUGE one. Even IF the 14A was eliminated.
It's in Article V: "Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate."
At the root of it all are about three garden variety sins: greed, lust and pride.
Just amend the Article. Given how the Court is just wiping its ass with the Constitution in recent years, how much difference would it make?
I did a "mirror, mirron on the wall....who is the intelligent and handsome? The mirror responded, to no surprise: You are, Gatlin. You should listen to Chan.
Well, I guess they could propose and vote on such an amendment. But I would suspect that anyone & everyone that tried to get it passed, would soon seriously regret their participation!
Si vis pacem, para bellum
Disagree wholeheartedly on the above, Vic. In the relative scheme of things, the America of yore was NOT fundamentally evil OR depraved. Its leadership and citizenry by and large WERE a moral people. Contemporary America's standards teach a moral relativity. TOTALLY unlike the days of yore -- and even as recently as 50 years ago. Immorality and depravity are now glorified and sanctioned by America's leaders and institutions -- as well as an appreciable number citizenry. The morality as in the days of yore and defined by Biblical principles are now declared the new verboten. "Always depraved"? Not by a million miles. America was founded and governed fundamentally and extraordinarily morally and ethically. You can't just cherry-pick the way you have. Its few moral shortcomings were indeed addressed eventually and relatively rapidly -- unlike ANY civilization during the 5,000 prior years of history. American became immoral and depraved since the regime of Bill Klintoon, accelerated at the speed of light under the anti-Christ, 0blabla, and his minions.
Did you want MINE? Or just tpaine's?
Of course. But then that is always man's challenge and burden. However, in certain eras the degree of "greed, lust, and pride" are moderated. Simply compare Reagan's Years to 0blabla's. People take their cues from their leaders. Reagan's humility, optimism, generosity, and righteousness were contagious; So are 0blabla's current narcissism, hate, ill-will and spite.
I originally asked for paine's solution, but yes, I'd also be interested in yours as well. Thanks.
Well, this is where traditional conservatives and I part ways. I dislike the American Founders and do not hold them in any particular esteem. Therefore, I don't care what their intent was. What I care about are the wants and needs of 21st Century Americans in 2015. The structure of government we have underperforms and both under- and over- delivers on many things. To be reasonably free, we need to get society into the sweet spot, which lies above the threshold of enough social infrastructure to provide for the needs of an urbanized society, and below the threshold of overregulation and overcontrol. Going back to the 1700s will not achieve that. We need sewers, and that means eminent domain, taxation, and greater government imposition on private property than the Founders would have accepted. Traditional conservatives are 20% of the electorate. There are not enough of you to win. You need allies. Pragmatic libertarians and pragmatic modern religious moralists - people like me - are the natural allies, and we need allies too. But there have to be terms of agreement. Alliance has to be rooted in the present, without an a priori acceptance of either the Founders' desires, or Christianity or Judaism. A respect for human life and the desire to be as free as is reasonably possible, to not be ruled over and bullied, has to suffice.
None. There aren't enough fingers and toes in China to plug up this dike. This statist/liberal ideological war of attrition has been won. UNLESS conservatives have yet to unleash their ideological version of the 'Samson Option'.
Why bother? Just do as you please and have your judges on the Federal Circuit refuse to hear the case as a political question, and the Supremes refuse to grant cert, then VOILA!, you have the authority to do as you please. Judicial ratification is not required. Mere judicial abdication suffices.
Nicely done... Your allusion to Eden with the use of 'garden variety' with regards to sins, greed, lust and pride. A classical education pays off now and then:) Good analogies. I hope 'our' Samson 'option' is not the same as what Israel (modern) has in mind:) When the executive is feckless and the courts and Congress tolerate (or encourage) a lawless executive, nothing written in law or Constitution provides any real guarantee. The Constitution becomes pointless. Amend it, don't amend it. No difference.
The mirror responded, to no surprise: You are, Gatlin. " Riiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiight. And it was right after you had consumed massive amount of hallucinogenics. LOL! Si vis pacem, para bellum
Here was your question: "What is YOUR solution to reclaiming the constitution and re-establishing the Founders' REAL intent??" I've already said that I don't care about their intent. I am not aiming to get to some constitutional answer. What I am aiming at is getting to the RIGHT answer, and then having the Constitution interpreted, or amended, to support that right answer. The logic of the right answer should pervade the system, and be taught through the schools. In other words, the Progressives, Liberals and Communists are not wrong in their APPROACH, of seeking to structure society using control of institutions and education, to achieve a better society. What they are wrong about are the goals themselves. They seek maximalist solutions that govern all aspects of human life, and THAT rapidly becomes an oppressive corset, because it intrudes on everything. I recognize the truth: in modern urban society, unlike in old rural society, there is a fundamental need for universal public education, universal public health care, a universal public system for unemployment, poverty and disability relief, and a universal public pension system. These things are structural necessities. Without them, people will be illiterate, destitute, and literally dying in the street, as they do in parts of India. Without public sewers, there were outbreaks of cholera in all of the major cities of the 19th Century, and there will be again. We need sewers to sustain life, and sustaining life is more important, by far, than abstract philosophical ideas about property rights and the right to not be taxed. Arguing from legalism is not the answer, and that is what any argument from the Constitution, or the Bible, or the Koran, or the Talmud, descends into: legalism. Legalism leads to jail time for a woman who was late in paying a $10 dog licensing fee. And that's dumb. It's upholding the "dignity" of a legal system at the expense of rational common sense, and at the expense of financial prudence. (All you do in such a case is simply levy her bank account and take the money for the license, through a simplified procedure. If she has no bank account, you garnish her wages. Currently, the process of putting a person in jail is actually simpler than taking some of their money to pay a fine, and that is precisely backwards. Physical liberty is more important than the respect for petty rules or petty pocket change. The Saudis would cut off a hand over a stolen dollar. A civilized society takes $4 back for the stolen dollar (restitution plus treble damages), and does it in a simple, automated way that is easy to do, and easy to appeal. We make law hard, because it is in the interest of lawyers and those who control the legal system to do so. We need to chop that away.) Instead, we have to find common principles upon which people in a pluralistic society, Christian and secular, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Shinto and Wiccan, male and female, gay and straight, introverted and extroverted, can agree. I think the alpha thing to sort out is this: When is it acceptable to kill other people or physically harm them? Under what circumstances. This goes to the question of coercion and when force may be offered, by the state. When may force be offered in DEFENSE, and when may defense become so active that it is, in effect, legitimate offense? This forces us to grapple with the question of when life begins, and when we are going to protect it. How much force the state can use to enforce its laws and when the lawbreaking simply has to be tolerated (or the law removed) because the amount of force used would exceed reason. Legalists will say that NO amount of force is too excessive to uphold the concept of the Rule of Law. I disagree. That is where I will begin, because it's the only place that people of all or no religions, races, sexes and sexualities have a necessary common interest. Live and let live does require the let live part, and that's where the foundations should be laid.
I dislike the American Founders and do not hold them in any particular esteem. Therefore, I don't care what their intent was. That saddens me, Vic. I realize mankind disappoints you -- as they do me. Heck -- *I* disappoint *myself.* By as imperfect as man is, or the Founders were, they chose the option of We-The-People over We-Your-Lords. They rejected man's fundamental instinct to be King of the Hill and narcissism, for a humble governance and personal sovereignty superseding that of "Rulers." When in history has THAT ever been the case? How do you not respect that?? Those Founders pledged and sacrificed EVERYTHING. What I care about are the wants and needs of 21st Century Americans in 2015. If ONLY 21st Century narcissism of the ruling elite followed the template of the Founders we wouldn't be in this position of tyranny, pseudo-slavery, and a near-dictatorship. The structure of government we have underperforms and both under- and over- delivers on many things. To be reasonably free, we need to get society into the sweet spot, which lies above the threshold of enough social infrastructure to provide for the needs of an urbanized society, and below the threshold of overregulation and overcontrol. Foisting socialism and the 'Great Plantation Society' aka "urban society" RUINED the black family and made generations of blacks fatherless, penniless, and moral-less. Coerced socialism is NOT an American ideal, so I don't know how you can base such a "solution" or responsibility on any moral mooring. Societies that thrive learn to fish. NOT to be confused with a state-mandated obligation to subsidize the lazy and the irresponsible. The truly needy and lame are a different case, as a measure of Christian charity. The "sweet spot" is a matter of individual motivation and planning -- NOT a bureaucratic "Village" holding gun to the head of the rest of us. Going back to the 1700s will not achieve that [enough social infrastructure.] We need sewers, and that means eminent domain, taxation, and greater government imposition on private property than the Founders would have accepted. Pure conjecture. The Founders were wise, and they placed a huge priority on independence, liberty, and commerce and innovation -- but they were also pragmatists. The society of the Founders already pitched in together and helped build infrastructure for the common good of all -- ports, roads, water/sewerage conduits, achieved in large part by free market capitalists by necessity. IF you d like to point at FDR's "workfare" programs as a matter of state-mandated socialist "success stories," THEY were indeed successful because they took the idle and used them to built roads, bridges, sewers, tunnels, etc, for a population never imagined, BUT were necessary. Why can't we (as a compromise) put all those unemployed to work on THESE days for public infrastructure projects? Is it because "Workfare" = "slavery" in some minds? OR it it because Union-Commies have made "workfare" a political hot potato? Traditional conservatives are 20% of the electorate. There are not enough of you to win. You need allies. Pragmatic libertarians and pragmatic modern religious moralists - people like me - are the natural allies, and we need allies too. But there have to be terms of agreement. Yes, yes....I understand the conservative 20% number....and the necessity to aly with those which we disagree to various degrees. So what shall be THE common thread which binds us? Alliance has to be rooted in the present, without an a priori acceptance of either the Founders' desires, or Christianity or Judaism....A respect for human life and the desire to be as free as is reasonably possible, to not be ruled over and bullied, has to suffice. If not bound by traditional embracement of standards of wisdom, liberty, OR the Founders' insistence on personal nd economic sovereignty, than what common cause then binds ANY Americans as allies? ONLY the private sector
True. Look at how the war declaration clause was ignored, because the American electorate was not as interested in empire and overseas adventure as the ruling classes. So we went to war without formally declaring it. That became a precedent. And we've spent about $3.5 trillion in 2015 dollars, since 1946 - on a series of imperial wars we haven't won. Now it's a habit. Nobody cares about the war declaration clause anymore. That's $3.5 billion in DIRECT expenses. Add in the costs of operation and military retirements from a permanently expanded military maintained to have the option of war-on-demand, and the costs of permanent wounds, disability, welfare for destroyed lives, and those direct expenses probably triple. That's the cost of ignoring the need to declare war: $10 trillion and counting, most of the national debt.
Small societies. In a world of 6 billion, if everybody went fishing, the fish stocks in the rivers and lakes and oceans would be gone in a couple of years, and everybody would starve. In the modern, big, industrialized world with billions of people in it, merely learning to fish is NOT ENOUGH. It will certainly result in the end of fishing if everybody who wants or needs to fish just goes out fishing. We MUST have management of fisheries, that say when people can go fishing, and when they can't, and that intervene and stop people from fishing when the fisheries need to recover. Otherwise there will be no fish. That's not a theoretical. That is what has HAPPENED to key fisheries, and still is happening. And it is true across the board. A world with 6 billion people in it where people live in cities, not on farms, is a fundamentally different place that cannot operate on the same principles as a world where people could, and did, simple walk across a line of settlement to go live in the plains or the forests. There's no frontier anymore, and there are too many people to live every-man-for-himself. It saddens me that folks like you refuse to acknowledge this fundamental reality of an industrialized, heavily populated family. If we all live as though it were 1799, we will have epidemics and famines that will make the Black Death look modest. Philosophically, you are devoted to that past. I cannot follow you there. You're willing to look over the sins of the Founders, because you like them. You won't overlook the sins of, say, the Catholics, of any era, because you don't like them. That's nice for you. But no cooperation can be built on it. In realityville, we must have a heavy government infrastructure. And we will. We can make its footprint lighter upon our backs and foreheads, but we cannot will it away. I am willing to work with traditionalist conservatives to make things better. But going back to 1787 doesn't make anything better. So if that's the price, then there's no ability to deal, and that means that the Progressives, Liberals and Communists rule and run the state THEIR way.
I hope not either. But should this hijacked nation look more like Germany, 1938, and *some* of its citizenry scapegoated as the new "Jew," who knows how some will react.
If not bound by traditional embracement of standards of wisdom, liberty, OR the Founders' insistence on personal nd economic sovereignty, than what common cause then binds ANY Americans as allies? ONLY the private sector No, not "the private sector". Life itself. A respect for life itself. First, foremost, we have to decide how sacred life is, and why that is so, and what are its parameters, when can it be taken, and when not. This provides a template for military affairs, law enforcement, abortion, euthanasia, suicide, etc. For the religious, life is sacred because of a commandment of God. For the secular, the "sacredness" of life is a matter of what people value. It's finding the article of common interest, for different reasons, where cooperation is possible, because the subject of life itself moves a great deal of freight. Then we expand out from life to consider other liberties, including financial liberty. In the process, we find pragmatic agreement based on different personal beliefs. This is the approach that can work between seculars and Christians, and between Republicans and Democrats, or so-called "liberals", "libertarians" and "conservatives". Insisting on crucifying the country to the opinions of the Founders won't fly for the simple reason that the vast majority of the people don't care what the Founders thought, and won't. More and more people don't care what Jesus thought either. And Catholics and Protestants think that Jesus thought very different things. Nobody is going to accept anybody else's doctrine. So IF the basis of building anything must be that we all accept somebody else's fundamental doctrine, that means that we all lose, and those who have the largest modern doctrines win. But if we find common moral ground on key issues, and accept and understand that others who do not share our philosophical convictions will go no farther with us than that, we can form quite an immense group. There's no better place to start than you and me. You're a Protestant Christian. I'm a sloppdox Catholic whose reasoning is not based on Scripture but on my own intuitions of right and wrong. I think there is PLENTY of common ground between us, if we try to find it. It's a cinch that we'll never find it by talking about Thomas Jefferson, because I will focus on his hypocrisy. Nor will we find it by discussing St. Paul and Jesus, because our respective Churches actually believe that those men meant different things by what they said. So, instead of refighting the Reformation, the Revolution, the Civil War, the New Deal, the Great Society and all of the rest, and losing the moment, let's seize the moment. Here's a proposition: Human life is fundamental to all of our discussions. As a general rule, people should not kill other people, but sometimes we recognize that they may have to. I would think that every rational person would accept this statement as true: "As a general rule, we all agree that people should not kill other people, but we recognize that sometimes we may have to." Follow me here. Do you agree with this statement: "As a general rule, people should not kill other people, but we recognize that sometimes they may have to." ? This is the first brick for building consensus. It doesn't matter WHY you think it - Christ, YHWH, ahimsa, the Bhudda, your own personal ethics, secular reasoning. The key question is not WHY you agree with the statement, but that you agree with it. Because if you do, then we've found complete common ground, and we can try to take a second step.
Small societies. In a world of 6 billion, if everybody went fishing, the fish stocks in the rivers and lakes and oceans would be gone in a couple of years, and everybody would starve. I believe that used fishing as a metaphor, as an example of working for your daily bread rather than bread and circuses. The thing I see is that our fathers were able to take the Constitution that was handed down to us and make it work. But with the influx of the cultural Marxists to America from Russia by way of Germany, and the metastasizing of the cancer through the hippy ethos, all of the sudden our fathers were totally wrong. I do not buy that, the empirical evidence does not support that, it argues that our fathers were correct. They built the United States, the hippy generation has destroyed it.
During a discussion with Nolu Chan, he asserted that an amendment repealing the 2nd could be ratified, and become a valid part of our Constitution. I contend such an amendment would be unconstitutional, and that officials of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of our various levels of gov'ts could give their opinions to that effect, and refuse to implement such and act, as per their oaths of office Do you contend that our only recourse from a majority passing amendments that take away our basic human rights is violence? - 'Treasonous' violence? - Civil war? What a silly, click-baiting reply. -- Take your attempts to start a flame war elsewhere.
During a discussion with Nolu Chan, he asserted that an amendment repealing the 2nd could be ratified, and become a valid part of our Constitution. I contend such an amendment would be unconstitutional. Comments? No, Chan insists that the SCOTUS has the power to rule such an amendment valid, and that it must be obeyed.. He advocates SCOTUS as having the final say on what the Constitution means... Not so. Every official at every level of gov't is honor bound to protect and defend the Constitution as written, not as interpreted by the SCOTUS. SCOTUS opinions can be ignored on constitutional grounds and officials can refuse to implement/fund any attempts at forcement. Yep, just as 'we' can ignore scotus.. The concept of 'checks and balances' is built into our Constitution..
I'm sure he did. But my point stands. We cannot all go work for our daily bread alone in the modern world, and we cannot all go hunt it. It is impossible. There are too many people, now, and too little land, now, and all of that land belongs to somebody. There are too many mouths to feed. Higher levels of organization are absolutely REQUIRED for people to survive. It's a fundamental reality of nature. Also, the air has to be clean enough to breathe and the water clean enough to drink and use to water crops. Excessive environmentalism and regulation are a curse, but land and environmental regulation are also a NECESSITY for human survival. It's not a matter of either/or. We cannot live without the regulations. There will be mass death and mass illness, starvation and disease. We MUST have it, and "all experience hath shewn" that it must come from government. So we should not be resisting the reality of those needs. Instead of generally opposing government and environmental and land regulation as violating a primitive form of absolute liberty of property that we cannot permit today and live, we have to instead accept the reality that such regulation is necessary for survival, and then set the regulation at the level that is really needed for optimal survival - and not allow it to become a vehicle by which those who control the government can control everything and every one. The PROBLEM with people who deny reality, who deny that we need rather robust land controls and environmental regulations and social safety nets, is that they are unreasonable idiots who do not deal in reality. Because they don't deal in reality, they can't be reasoned with. There's no point in trying. It's a waste of time, because they won't accept things necessary for life. Their unreasonableness leaves us without the necessary strength of numbers to be able to resist the excessive encroachments of the social engineers and environmentalists who use the necessary as a means to obtain a whip for the compulsion of all over everything. The answer to "too much" isn't "none", because "none" means death and disease. The answer is "enough", and that requires reason. The Founders don't help us with that at all. We can say "thanks for the system" to them, but they're dead and don't hear anyway. Then we're back dealing with each other - which is what we need to do.
"honor bound"? What is this thing, "honor"? Define it. What are its parameters? Who says? Who enforces it?
Sure, we can ignore SCOTUS. But the authorities, the guys with guns and radios and barracks and prisons and courts and cop cars - those guys are not going to ignore SCOTUS, and if in the process of our "ignoring SCOTUS" we do the ignoring in front of one the uniformed (or un-uniformed) agents of SCOTUS at any level (i.e.: the State), then our "ignoring" will take a decidedly unpleasant turn for us. And the guy who bashes in our head and tazes us will get a good salary and benefits to do it. So yes, we can ignore away. Until there's a counterparty and it matters, then we will either be force-marched down the SCOTUS-delineated path, or frog- marched. Either way, we will go that way, because we will be forced to. Or we can choose to die, I suppose. I won't choose to die rather than comply. I'd rather comply, or lie about complying and do as I please. Standing in defiance and getting my head blown off seems unprofitable.
Did the U.S. Supreme Court just legislate gay marriage for the fifty states? Isn't it the Constitutional limitation for that Court to interpret the laws in accordance with the Constitution, rather than make Federal law?
In the modern, big, industrialized world with billions of people in it, merely learning to fish is NOT ENOUGH. It will certainly result in the end of fishing if everybody who wants or needs to fish just goes out fishing. We MUST have management of fisheries, that say when people can go fishing, and when they can't, and that intervene and stop people from fishing when the fisheries need to recover. Otherwise there will be no fish. That's not a theoretical. That is what has HAPPENED to key fisheries, and still is happening. And it is true across the board. I appreciate your addressing "fish" -- it's supply and demand and were it the context of my "Societies that thrive learn to fish" observation -- but it was a metaphor. People need to learn skills and crafts that allow them the self-respect and nobility of making their own living rather than relying on Uncle Sugar-Daddy Sam -- who thru its confiscated taxes which are supposed to maintain the infrastructure instead only help maintain their power over a voting constituency. Actually, fish-farming IS under-utilized source of food, don't you think? It seems easy enough to establish. Fisheries around the world -- specifically within the US's *former* 200 mile limit -- has been abused by *foreign* fisheries, which is yet more abuse of our sovereignty. As an aside, I do like your concept for management of domesticating deer for milk...but also could apply as meat. A world with 6 billion people in it where people live in cities, not on farms, is a fundamentally different place that cannot operate on the same principles as a world where people could, and did, simple walk across a line of settlement to go live in the plains or the forests. There's no frontier anymore, and there are too many people to live every-man-for-himself. And THAT is exactly the way the elites want it in America. On the plantation. Lazy, entitled, but 100% dependent upon the State for a FREE ride. They are "kept" voters. Like whores. Votes bought with the blood, sweat, and sacrifice of the producers and risk-takers. NOBODY is holding these people prison in America... As to the other billions, their corrupt governments (without a Founders' established American Bill of Rights/Constitution to un-bind them) keeps most of them in various states of economic slavery and serfdom. It saddens me that folks like you refuse to acknowledge this fundamental reality of an industrialized, heavily populated family. If we all live as though it were 1799, we will have epidemics and famines that will make the Black Death look modest....Philosophically, you are devoted to that past. I cannot follow you there. I am devoted to the principles and convictions of the American founders, much as I am to the Bible. The wise learn from the past and apply those principles to the present as well as future. NOT doing so is foolish. I also acknowledge and reject the lack of personal and national responsibly of those who embrace a herd mentality of entitlement, and those corrupt nations whose governments are ruled by tyranny and the elite few. THIS is why people have migrated to America -- some at great risk in the past and present. It is the Founders' fundamental concepts and laws steep in Judeo-Christian principles that created a standard of living and liberty that has been utterly unique in the annal of history. I expect the eventual famines and epidemics of disease. Why? Because America and her government no longer operate within the law and standards of moral and ethics it once did. And because we have rejected God, ergo we are no longer under His blessing. You're willing to look over the sins of the Founders, because you like them. You won't overlook the sins of, say, the Catholics, of any era, because you don't like them. That's nice for you. But no cooperation can be built on it. Can we both acknowledge that even the Founders were not perfect? That they sinned like every before and after them? CHALLENGE: Find me a better crop of men dedicated to the most noble ideals of man in history. CHALLENGE: Find group of leaders -- many Christian, God-fearing men -- more successful at creating a system dedicated to personal freedom and economic freedom, AND freedom to worship. WITHOUT COMPULSION to worship a man, a statue, an animal, several "gods" or the stars. Btw, I do not "dislike" Catholics; I do not dislike you, friend, and family are are Catholic. I dislike the notion that somehow the Popes are ANY such "Vicar of Christ." In my opinion, many Catholics are deceived. But that doesn't mean I dislike them necessarily. The Vatican and it's machination are a different story. In realityville, we must have a heavy government infrastructure. And we will. We can make its footprint lighter upon our backs and foreheads, but we cannot will it away. Dunno exactly what you mean; Are you suggesting that we need MORE heavy-handed government regs and bureaucratic control over our lives? Or by "infrastructure" do you mean maintenance and expansion of roads, bridges, water conduits, etc? 40 million uninvited illegal invaders have helped destroy our infrastructure. What do you propose about addressing the damage caused by the undocumented illegal invasion? I am willing to work with traditionalist conservatives to make things better. But going back to 1787 doesn't make anything better. So if that's the price, then there's no ability to deal, and that means that the Progressives, Liberals and Communists rule and run the state THEIR way. Your options are the same as mine, aren't they? :-) Except the principles AND convictions of the America, 1787, are ideals for a governance that STILL work in the year 2015. Instead, on what do you hang your ideological hat? A Monarchy?
IF this the case -- that the majority believe in NOTHING but a narcissistic vision straight out of lying lips of the asp -- then the Republic shall die ignominiously, and with it soul of the nation as well. Follow me here. Do you agree with this statement: "As a general rule, people should not kill other people, but we recognize that sometimes they may have to." ? Yes. Ecclesiastics sez there is a "time for all seasons." This is the first brick for building consensus....The key question is not WHY you agree with the statement, but that you agree with it. Because if you do, then we've found complete common ground, and we can try to take a second step.
Yup. Thank you. The thing I see is that our fathers were able to take the Constitution that was handed down to us and make it work. But with the influx of the cultural Marxists to America from Russia by way of Germany, and the metastasizing of the cancer through the hippy ethos, all of the sudden our fathers were totally wrong. I do not buy that, the empirical evidence does not support that, it argues that our fathers were correct. They built the United States, the hippy generation has destroyed it. +100. Moral relativist hippies, anarchists, the militant God-less, and the homofascists hijacked key positions in gubmint and our institutions, warped the USCON, and here we are -- living in the Twilight Zone where the Founders = Olde Dead White Guys, Up = Down, Evil = Good, and God = "Mean + Intolerant."
I have a feeling that this amendment will be heard and denied. The language concerning the limitations on "non-conforming" guns will be struck down on the argument that such conform infringes on that basic right.
Yes. And Chan is proven right. SCOTUS indeed does not only have the power to tell you how to crap, but when AND what color. Chan only reported what he already notes from SCOTUS -- not that he necessarily "advocates" the majority consensus; that 9 Justices are the only people in a nation of 320 million authorized to interpret the constitution any way they see fit. On this point he agrees with Justice Alito in his opinion. Every official at every level of gov't is honor bound to protect and defend the Constitution as written, not as interpreted by the SCOTUS. Theories are great, aren't they? Look -- the USCON is a fairy tale. You just happen to believe the fairy tale that gubmint actually executes "honor-bound" acts. IF they were "duty-bound" or "honor-bound" NONE of the 40 million illegal invaders would be in the country -- never mind their criminality aided and abetted in "Sanctuary Cities." MOREOVER, many officials would have already been Impeached or arrested for High Crimes. SCOTUS opinions can be ignored on constitutional grounds and officials can refuse to implement/fund any attempts at forcement. The keyword, "can" can be applied a million difference ways. In the context you presume, "enforcement" ain't never happenin', bud. Yep, just as 'we' can ignore scotus.. The concept of 'checks and balances' is built into our Constitution.. Funny how those supposed 'checks and balances' are built in, yet, ignored. TOTALLY.
Ummm....YEP. States Rights is dead. DING-DONG. Wadda constitution, eh? Isn't it the Constitutional limitation for that Court to interpret the laws in accordance with the Constitution, rather than make Federal law? Yes, again. You see how those "Checks and Balances" are NOT working? Congress is tasked with making law. Since they've refuse to act (thank you again, Boehner AND McConnell), they are grossly negligent and derelict in their duty. This entire supposed "Three Co-Equal Branches of Government" crock is a mockery of the constitution; That we have a working constitution is....a charade.
Except the principles AND convictions of the America, 1787, are ideals for a governance that STILL work in the year 2015. Instead, on what do you hang your ideological hat? A Monarchy? No, those ideas for governance don't work in 2015. I hang my ideological hat on direct reason from a handful of postulates, the first of which is the sanctity of life. Once that is acknowledged, then a whole lot of things necessarily follow, things that limit war and police power, and abortion and euthanasia. And things that require tending to matters of food, shelter, medicine and education. Monarchy? No. "...not tawdry rule of kings, but toil of serf and sweeper, the tale of lesser things." Yes, people need to learn skills and crafts and earn their own living. But the process of that learning requires many things, and most people cannot provide for them on their own. Literacy requires schooling. If schooling were all private, and based upon the resources of the parents, that would mean what it means every single place in the world, including America before universal public schooling was introduced in Massachusetts by the Puritans in the 1640s: 60-70% illiteracy rates overall, with double or triple the illiteracy rate among girls as boys. That's what it means. That's a fact of nature. Most people are not wealthy enough to provide a full private education to all of their children. Nowhere in the world have they ever been able to. In Colonial Puritan Massachusetts, the belief in Sola Scriptura meant that everybody needed to be able to read Scriptura, and that meant universal education. It was paid for by the people who could afford it. But for the poor who could not, it was paid for by taxes. And we have the records of people grousing about the taxes, and the colonial and religious leaders replying that it is MORE IMPORTANT that people read and know the Bible than that the people grousing about tithing for taxes to enable people to know the Scripture keep their money. It's an old fight. Net result: by 1650, THE most educated, most literate population in the world was Massachusetts Bay colony, a bunch of pioneers on a forest fringe. Universal public education, paid for by involuntary taxation, specifically to ensure that EVERYBODY, of both sexes, got an education and could be literate (and read the Bible), rapidly produced the best educated population in the world. By contrast, in the American South, there was no universal public education until the end of the 19th Century. Former slaves and poor whites had no schooling, and they were literally barefoot, dirty and barely getting by. In the modern industrial world, illiteracy means the inability to learn any useful skills. And THEREFORE, BECAUSE each child has to grow into adulthood, and 50-60% of parents are too poor to provide a full education to their children. We MUST HAVE universal public education, paid for by mandatory taxes. This is infrastructure in its purest form. It is a prerequisite for modern society, and for anybody getting any sort of job. It's not a luxury. It is as vital as clean water. It's not debatable. In truth, when local, state and federal expenditures on education are considered, education is THE single greatest expense of government - more than the military, more than Social Security. It is massively expensive, and it is vital. I would say that we need to regain control of the schools and return rationality to the process of hiring and paying teachers. There are vast administrative staffs who should be laid off: they do nothing productive. They create problems. That should end. But in ending that, we would not be cutting educational costs so as to reduce taxes. Nope. That money saved on useless administration should be poured back into getting more teachers, to bring down class sizes and make education better. Is universal public education "relying on Uncle Sugar-Daddy"? Well, it's paid for by taxes, it's really expensive, it's a permanent cost, and it's a huge gift to each child, so yes it is. And it is necessary infrastructure, the most expensive piece of all. It's not the only piece.
The Constitution and the Republic is dead.
You all contend that our only recourse from a majority passing amendments that take away our basic human rights is violence? - 'Treasonous' violence? - Civil war? The constitutionality of the 18th was challenged in 1920. The SCOTUS declined to issue an opinion on that specific issue, and left it at that, whereupon damn near everyone ignored the 'amendment, until it was repealed. What can I say? The question remains unanswered. -- Why would anyone want to give away, (to a super majority, as per the constitution) the power to repeal ANY of our bill of rights? -- ---- Do we, - our do we not, - have unalienable rights that cannot be infringed?
First off, creating a vanity thread to call out another poster is bad manners. Second, I looked at comments so far and one of two possibilities are evident: 1. Chan is showing restraint and dignity in not responding to your carnival barking. or 2. His response is forthcoming and no doubt he will hand you your 4th point of contact (for the civilians in the room the 4th point of contact is what you sit on; for paratroopers it is the 'fourth point' of the body hitting the ground in a 'dynamite' parachute landing fall [PLF]) They are doing it.
Every official at every level of gov't is honor bound - (by their oath of office), to support and defend our Constitution. Our various govts should enforce it. --- But as to the rest, perhaps you should consult your mental/moral health advisor.
Some people have the opinion that the SCOTUS opinion meant that, but I'd bet 'we' don't comply, any more than we complied with prohibition, -- or would comply with an amendment to repeal the 2nd.. Absolutely correct.. -- Only laws (or amendments) made "in pursuance thereof" (as the supremacy clause says) are part of our supreme law, the Constitution..
Below is the actual exchange on another thread, in context. One may readily recognize that tpaine's espoused blather therein is meritless. This highlights tpaine's ignorance of the law and amendments. Amendments are not enactments. Common legislation of Congress is enacted into law. He erroneously misconstrues the Supremacy Clause to imagine that a constitutional Amendment equates with common legislation. Amendments are ratified by the people acting in their sovereign capacity. The Congress does not have a yea or nay on ratification, and the President does not sign it into law. In a ministerial action, the ratification is certified as having happened. From that point forward, any amendment is considered a part of the Constitution, equal with all other parts of the Constitution. The imaginary world of tpaine: It has the power to issue an opinion that such an amendment is unconstitutional.. ... No entity in the government created by the will of the people, as expressed in the Constitution, may lawfully act contrary to the Constitution or with a purpose to subvert any part of the Constitution. The Constitution is the paramount and expresses those powers which the people chose to delegate to the Federal government. Congress has no lawful power to subvert any part of the Constitution by defunding. Congress does not have any lawful power to strike down any part of the Constitution. Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has any lawful authority to issue an opinion that any part of the Constitution is unconstitutional or null and void. The new, revised and better Declaration of Independence. An amendment to the constitution, made by the people in their sovereign capacity, with the permission and approval of tpaine, to delegate to the government the power to regulate the newfound inalienable right to buy, make, or use guns, may be enacted only in accordance with the new, revised and better Article 5, as enacted by the tpaine court of the imagination. The new, revised and better Article 5: The Congress proposes, and three-fourths of the states ratify the following amendment in tpaineworld. Section 1. The second article of amendment is hereby repealed. Section 2. The individual right to keep and bear, buy, make, and use arms is limited to .22 caliber handguns only. Section 3. All non-conforming guns must be surrendered to government authorities or destroyed within 30 days of ratification of this amendment. Section 4. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. Other than soiling yourself and bleating about it, what is to be done in tpaineworld? Does the Congress pass contrary legislation, telling the people that they have abused their sovereign right to amend their constitution? Does the Court strike down this part of the Constitution as unconstitutional? Does the Deemer of tpaineworld deem this part of the Constitution null and void? Does the tpaine court of the imagination tell the people that they can't infringe the right to buy, make, and use arms; deemed an unalienable right by the tpaine imaginary revised, new and improved Declaration of Independence. - - - - - I asked you if this means you would contend that an amendment could be passed that prohibited our inalienable rights to buy, make, or use guns? Your last post indicates you think this would be possible, and you even outline such an amendment: --- AMENDMENT 28. Section 1. The second article of amendment is hereby repealed. Section 2. The individual right to keep and bear, buy, make, and use arms is limited to .22 caliber handguns only. Section 3. All non-conforming guns must be surrendered to government authorities or destroyed within 30 days of ratification of this amendment. Section 4. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. Congress has the power to refuse to fund any efforts to implement the unconstitutional amendment, and to tell the people why. It has the power to issue an opinion that such an amendment is unconstitutional.. Dream on that in Nolu Chan's world such an amendment could be valid. It would violate every principle inherent in our constitution, and thus would be null and void from its enactment. - - - - -
The conversation was in the context of my repeatedly citing the actual law and legal precedent. In wingnut world, wingnuttery rules. In the real world, saying the court is erroneous does not change the fact that their holding is the law. No power of the government can deem any part of the Constitution to be null and void. The matter of ratification is a political question and the courts have no jurisdiction over political questions. Coleman v Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 440 (1939) The Supreme Court said it — "the official notice to the Secretary of State, duly authenticated … was conclusive upon the courts." LaVergne v Bryson, Secretary of Commerce, 3rd Cir 12-1171 (20 Sep 2012) And in tpaine's court of the imagination, "amendments to the constitution can be deemed unconstitutional." All you need to do is believe that when the court held Jane Roe has a constitutional right to an abortion, it only applied to Jane Roe. And when the court held that Obergefell had a constitutional right to marry a person of the same sex, it only applied to Obergefell. In wingnutworld, the legislature and the executive can give the holdings due consideration and choose whether to ignore them or not. Asserting the Supremacy Clause somehow supports the absurd claim that constitutional amendments can be deemed unconstitutional: Demonstrating a delusion about what the Supremacy Clause does, and explaining why his legal logic is so dicked up. The Supremacy Clause at Article 6, states, tpaine labors under the delusion that this clause sets the Constitution at equivalency with ordinary legislated laws and United States treaties. As legislation can be struck down by the court as unconstitutional, this brain fart entices him to imagine that the Constititution can be struck down by the court, or that amendments may be deemed unconstitutional, or that amendments pronounced ratified may be struck down by the courts — this only works if laws made by the legislature are equal to the Constitution, and that is so only in some imaginary world. Ignoring the holding in Coleman, (1939), not to mention the recitation of precedents in LaVergne v. Bryson (2012). What the Supremacy Clause actually states is that any form of Federal law takes precedence over any form of State law, whether the State law be statutory or constitutional. Note that the clause in the 6th Amendment only applied to "judges in every state." Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 3rd Ed., Vol. 1 (2000), pg. 255. In tpaine's court of the imagination, the court and Laurence Tribe are erroneous, along with anyone that does not adopt the absurd notions that flow from his imagination. Everyone in America knows that laws are struck down by the court when they are found to conflict with the Constitution. The Constitution is the paramount law and takes precedence over all other American law. Treaties and federal statutes are equal (but below the Constitution), with the most recently adopted controlling. * * * Treaties, however, cannot violate the Constitution. Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies, 2 Ed., Erwin Chemerinsky, 2002 at 361 This particular idiocy relates to the National Prohibition Cases in 1920, which was several prohibition cases heard together at the SCOTUS level. The question was not before the court to determine the constitutionality of the 18th Amendment. An amendment cannot be unconstitutional. Counsel did not argue the the amendment was unconstitutional, he argued that, due to its content, it was ordinary legislation and not an amendment at all. And, as ordinary legislation, the court had the authority to strike it down, according to this creative argument. Trust tpaine to bloviate endlessly about crap he has not seen or read. On brief: The briefs were ridiculed in W. F. Dodd, Amending the Federal Constitution, Yale Law Journal, Vl XXX, No. 4, February 1921, p. 322. This is the Yale Law Journal, not tpaine's court of the imagination. The argument was characterized in W. F. Dodd, Amending the Federal Constitution, Yale Law Journal, V1 XXX, No. 4, February 1921, p. 333. [...] Mr. Hughes’ brief in the Kentucky Distilleries Case presents the situation even more vigorously: “And what is ‘legislation’ which is thus said to lie outside the scope of the amending power according to the theory presented? Is it that the amendment must not be self-executing? But the obvious answer is that the Thirteenth Amendment is self-executing and it has been so adjudged by this court.... “Is it that the amendment must not directly affect the rights of persons without the intervention of legislation? The Thirteenth Amendment did that, for it made free men out of slaves. “Is it that the amendment must not directly disturb without further legislation vested rights of property? But the Thirteenth Amendment destroyed property in slaves. “The attempt is made to explain in some way that the Thirteenth Amendment, which did all these things, was not legislation. It is impossible then to understand in what sense the term “legislation” is used. For that which establishes a rule of law which, being self-executing, determines without further legislation the rights and status of persons and rights of property manifestly has the direct operation and effect of legislation.” The 18th Amendment was an amendment, not common legislation.
Congress can vote to propose an Amendment. The States that have ratified the Constitution are parties to the Constitution, not the Federal government. Congress gets no vote on ratification. That is by the State legislatures or State conventions. An amendment is ratified rather than passed, and it is adopted when three-fourths of the States have ratified. It is a sovereign act of the people, as was the adoption of the original Constitution before the constitutional government existed.
During a discussion with Nolu Chan, he asserted that an amendment repealing the 2nd could be ratified, and become a valid part of our Constitution. I contend such an amendment would be unconstitutional. Comments? That's your opinion, and I see you've pinged AKA Stone to give us his, --- but I think we're here to discuss the issues of the day, and Chan has certainly raised one by insisting the 2nd could be repealed. I served a couple of years in the 503rd and 502nd regiments, so your attempts to instruct me about 'PLF' is as silly as your "carnival barking" about this thread. By all means, come back when you have a real point to discuss..
I said to you before that you need to listen to nolu chan. I now say to you that you need to also listen to redleghunter. It will be to your advantage to learn from them.
The Court majority found a fundamental right to same-sex marriage somewhere in the due process clause, in a manner similar to how it found a right to abortion. I disagree with their "interpretation" of the Constitution, but it is not legislation. Were it legislation, it could be overturned by Congress with more legislation. A Supreme Court holding on a constitutional issue can only be changed by a constitutional amendment or by the Court itself revisiting the issue in a subsequent case. There can be no appeal of the decided case.
I now say to you that you need to also listen to redleghunter. It will be to your advantage to learn from them. Never fear my boy, I'm learning a lot from all you authoritarians. -- And I'm sure others here are. Probably, they're learning more about your politics than you want them to know..
What you state is true. My comments would apply to those proposing said amendment ( Congress ) and those voting to ratify ( states )
Si vis pacem, para bellum
Nolu chan is right on this one. It wouldn't be right morally. But it would follow the process laid out in the constitution. Remember the constitution isn't perfect. It is man made and contains flaws. It is worth protecting.
Even where one feels the opinion of the Court is erroneous, their opinion matters. Abortion and same-sex marriage is legal. All Federal and State laws to the contrary were struck down. However tpaine stated, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx U.S. Supreme Court website: The Court and Constitutional Interpretation https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/2/409/case.html Hayburn’s Case, 2 US 409, 414 (1792) http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/358/1.html Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1, 18 (1958)
Just so you know, every piece of content about the US Constitution can be destroyed by legislative acts. The Bill of Rights or any Amendments are not exonerated from the legislative process, either; I assume you think the Bill of Rights are built on a bedrock or fixed foundation that is unshakable. What is really sad is the government knows this FACT. That is why America is sinking into a cesspool of illegal immigration; it is to liberalize the foundations of America by creating a fascist government by clever opinions outside of American cultural norms or societal standards. Just as the Confederate Flag goes away for some of the states; just as the Ten Commandments goes away for some of the states; so goes the second amendment.
Yeah! They tried to take away our rights to drinking whiskey; and they gave it back! Now, if we can get rid of the fed.
Some people have the opinion that the SCOTUS opinion meant that, but I'd bet 'we' don't comply, any more than we complied with prohibition, -- or would comply with an amendment to repeal the 2nd.. Absolutely correct.. -- Only laws (or amendments) made "in pursuance thereof" (as the supremacy clause says) are part of our supreme law, the Constitution.. We agree... We disagree. -- There is nothing in our constitution itself that supports your opinion. -- Your lengthy postings of opinions by other authorities are just that, --- opinions. They do not prove your case.
The only rights that one has in the real world are the rights that one can defend. Otherwise it's Katy bar the door. потому что Бог хочет это тот путь
Remember the constitution isn't perfect. It is man made and contains flaws. If the sovereign people do not have the power to change the organic law of the country as they choose, the Constitution and the government formed under it surely resulted from unlawful acts. The explanation of the power exercised is that the people are the sovereigns, and the sovereign answers to nobody. There is no guarantee they will act wisely. It was definitely not done pursuant to the Articles of Confederation. Article 13 of the Articles of Confederation:
Your posting your wingnut nonsense certainly does not prove your point.
Good commentary. The issue today, particularly because the US government is so weak with debt while stricken with an anemic economy for the past decade is, they are ripping the place up attempting to install disipline to the people obeying a government. Tpaine makes good points about his considerations. But the second amendment (as all amendments) are only reliable and trustworthy as the people and the representative government that is voted by the people.
This claim is false, as previously explained thoroughly on the other thread. The question was not before the court to determine the constitutionality of the 18th Amendment. An amendment cannot be unconstitutional. Counsel did not argue the the amendment was unconstitutional, he argued that, due to its content, it was ordinary legislation and not an amendment at all. And, as ordinary legislation, the court had the authority to strike it down, according to this creative argument. Trust tpaine to bloviate endlessly about crap he has not seen or read. On brief: The briefs were ridiculed in W. F. Dodd, Amending the Federal Constitution, Yale Law Journal, Vl XXX, No. 4, February 1921, p. 322. This is the Yale Law Journal, not tpaine's court of the imagination. The argument was characterized in W. F. Dodd, Amending the Federal Constitution, Yale Law Journal, V1 XXX, No. 4, February 1921, p. 333. [...] Mr. Hughes’ brief in the Kentucky Distilleries Case presents the situation even more vigorously: “And what is ‘legislation’ which is thus said to lie outside the scope of the amending power according to the theory presented? Is it that the amendment must not be self-executing? But the obvious answer is that the Thirteenth Amendment is self-executing and it has been so adjudged by this court.... “Is it that the amendment must not directly affect the rights of persons without the intervention of legislation? The Thirteenth Amendment did that, for it made free men out of slaves. “Is it that the amendment must not directly disturb without further legislation vested rights of property? But the Thirteenth Amendment destroyed property in slaves. “The attempt is made to explain in some way that the Thirteenth Amendment, which did all these things, was not legislation. It is impossible then to understand in what sense the term “legislation” is used. For that which establishes a rule of law which, being self-executing, determines without further legislation the rights and status of persons and rights of property manifestly has the direct operation and effect of legislation.” The 18th Amendment was an amendment, not common legislation. In 264 Federal Reporter 186, on the Feigenspan case, the headnotes read, 2. Every grant of power to the federal government, whether by the Constitution as orlglnally framed or by subsequent amendment, necessariy diminished powers of the several st.ates, and that an amendment takes away a pollce power previously In the state dpes not render It invalid. 3. That a constitutional amendment is in effect legislation controlling the conduct of private individuals, in that it ordains a final permanent law prohibiting certain acts, not alterable at the will of a majority, does not render it invalid. 4. The provision of Const. art. 5, authorizing Congress to propose amendments "whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary," does not require that a joint resolution proposing an amendment shall expressly declare that it is deemed necessary. 5. Congress alone, of all departments of the federal government, is intrusted with the power of proposing amendments to the Constitution, and the form of resolutions by which it proposes an amendment is not subject to judicial investigation. 6. In Const. art. 5, providing that a proposed amendment shall be valid "when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states," when that mode shall be proposed by Congress, the word "Legislature" means the then recognized representative law-making bodies of the states, and the validity of an amendment ratified by the requisite number of such Legislatures cannot be affected by state laws providing for, or permitting, a referendum vote on legislative acts. 7. Eighteenth Amendment, § 2, providing that "the Congress and the several states shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislatlon," must be construed, in harmony with its purpose, to expressly authorize effective legislation for enforcement of section 1, which excludes a construction making concurrence of the states necessary to tbe effectiveness of congressional legislation, and such legislation, if enacted, is parramount, and, while it may be supplemented by state legislation, it cannot be defeated by any action or nonaction of the states. In the absence of action by Congress, any state may enact enforcement legislation effective within its borders. 8. National Prohibition Act Oct. 28, 1919, § 1, in providing that "intoxicating liquor" as used in the act, shall be construed to include all liquors, liquids, or compounds containing one-half of 1 per centum or more of alcohol by volume, does not make a definition which may be declared arbitrary and unconstitutional by the courts, but one which it was within the reasonable discretion of Congress to make for the purposes of the act. 9. National Prohibition Act Oct 28, 1919, held not invalid, as taking private property for public use without just compensution, in violation of Fifth Amendment, because, as incidental to the exercise of a lawful power, loss may result to certain species of property. 10. "Amendment" includes additions to, as well as corrections of, matters already treated, and there is nothing in the context of Const. art. 5, providing that Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments, which suggests that it was used in a restricted sense. The Decree in Feigenspan was affirmed by SCOTUS. 253 US 350, 40 Sup Ct 486.
During a discussion with Nolu Chan, he asserted that an amendment repealing the 2nd could be ratified, and become a valid part of our Constitution. I contend such an amendment would be unconstitutional. I beg to differ. I think we have an unalienable right to keep and bear arms. -- I see nothing in the Constitution itself that says we could amendment away that right. I've been asking Chan to point out where in the Constitution it allows a majority to repeal ANY of our basic inalienable rights. He can't quite find it. --- Can anyone?? We agree..
Damn right..
Yes you do. It is called the Amendment process. It is a built in mechanism of the US Constitution. Here is an authoritative glimse: The authority to amend the Constitution of the United States is derived from Article V of the Constitution. After Congress proposes an amendment, the Archivist of the United States, who heads the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), is charged with responsibility for administering the ratification process under the provisions of 1 U.S.C. 106b. The Archivist has delegated many of the ministerial duties associated with this function to the Director of the Federal Register. Neither Article V of the Constitution nor section 106b describe the ratification process in detail. The Archivist and the Director of the Federal Register follow procedures and customs established by the Secretary of State, who performed these duties until 1950, and the Administrator of General Services, who served in this capacity until NARA assumed responsibility as an independent agency in 1985. The Constitution provides that an amendment may be proposed either by the Congress with a two-thirds majority vote in both the House of Representatives and the Senate or by a constitutional convention called for by two-thirds of the State legislatures. None of the 27 amendments to the Constitution have been proposed by constitutional convention. The Congress proposes an amendment in the form of a joint resolution. Since the President does not have a constitutional role in the amendment process, the joint resolution does not go to the White House for signature or approval. The original document is forwarded directly to NARA's Office of the Federal Register (OFR) for processing and publication. The OFR adds legislative history notes to the joint resolution and publishes it in slip law format. The OFR also assembles an information package for the States which includes formal "red-line" copies of the joint resolution, copies of the joint resolution in slip law format, and the statutory procedure for ratification under 1 U.S.C. 106b. The Archivist submits the proposed amendment to the States for their consideration by sending a letter of notification to each Governor along with the informational material prepared by the OFR. The Governors then formally submit the amendment to their State legislatures. In the past, some State legislatures have not waited to receive official notice before taking action on a proposed amendment. When a State ratifies a proposed amendment, it sends the Archivist an original or certified copy of the State action, which is immediately conveyed to the Director of the Federal Register. The OFR examines ratification documents for facial legal sufficiency and an authenticating signature. If the documents are found to be in good order, the Director acknowledges receipt and maintains custody of them. The OFR retains these documents until an amendment is adopted or fails, and then transfers the records to the National Archives for preservation. A proposed amendment becomes part of the Constitution as soon as it is ratified by three-fourths of the States (38 of 50 States). When the OFR verifies that it has received the required number of authenticated ratification documents, it drafts a formal proclamation for the Archivist to certify that the amendment is valid and has become part of the Constitution. This certification is published in the Federal Register and U.S. Statutes at Large and serves as official notice to the Congress and to the Nation that the amendment process has been completed. In a few instances, States have sent official documents to NARA to record the rejection of an amendment or the rescission of a prior ratification. The Archivist does not make any substantive determinations as to the validity of State ratification actions, but it has been established that the Archivist's certification of the facial legal sufficiency of ratification documents is final and conclusive. In recent history, the signing of the certification has become a ceremonial function attended by various dignitaries, which may include the President. President Johnson signed the certifications for the 24th and 25th Amendments as a witness, and President Nixon similarly witnessed the certification of the 26th Amendment along with three young scholars. On May 18, 1992, the Archivist performed the duties of the certifying official for the first time to recognize the ratification of the 27th Amendment, and the Director of the Federal Register signed the certification as a witness.
We agree... We disagree. -- There is nothing in our constitution itself that supports your opinion. -- Your lengthy postings of opinions by other authorities are just that, --- opinions. They do not prove your case. Your pejorative comments lead me to believe you want to end this discussion in a flame war. -- No thanks...
I see no limitation on the amendments. Is there somewhere that says the second amendment can't be amended. Now I think it is a stupid idea to try to repeal the second amendment. But technically speaking I don't see how it would be unconstitutional. It would be against the Declaration of Independence. A superior document.
tpaine: Damn right.. In these days of
A flame war does not consist of mildly perjorative comments. I am expressing my disdain for your blather.
We disagree. -- There is nothing in our constitution itself that supports your opinion. -- Who has ever successfully defied a Supreme Court ruling on a consitutional issue? What is the avenue of appeal other than what nolu has identified? потому что Бог хочет это тот путь
I forgot to include Deckard in my above post. Almost daily, he confirms that a Fascist America is alive & thriving while begging to ensure that a police state over-powers American citizens.
Actually not even that as the recent Supreme Court decisions prove. потому что Бог хочет это тот путь
BTW, what does the Consitution say about the involuntary removal of a Supreme Court judge?
потому что Бог хочет это тот путь
He asked, "Does this mean you would contend that an amendment could be passed that prohibited our inalienable rights to buy, make, or use guns?" [emphasis added] I replied with an example of such an Amendment and asked how it could be struck down. I did not advocate for such an Amendment, but only observed that the people, as the sovereigns, have the power to do it. I would advocate for an amendment strengthening the RKBA and 2nd Amdt. What would prevent an amendment taking away the RKBA today would be the requirement of getting 38 states to ratify it.
Nolu chan never proposed any such amendment. I changed the Title.
The constitutionality of the 18th was challenged in 1920. The SCOTUS declined to issue an opinion on that specific issue, and left it at that, whereupon damn near everyone ignored the 'amendment, until it was repealed. Anyone can read the other thread, and see that you did not prove your claim. Root made that argument, among others. Your lengthy posts only cite the others, and the opinions about those other arguments.. So you've been claiming, (without any constitutional basis) - for several days now. -- It's your opinion. As I've noted before, you seem to want to end this discussion (because you realise you can't what - 'win'?) with a flame war. --- No sale..
The US Supreme Court can not strike down an amendment. They infer or "interpret" a decision based acceptable cases rising on their scrutiny for cse law for and about the US Constitution requirements. They are a "whacky, weird set of opinions" too. For what it is worth, I disagree with just about every decision they make. I disagee with the process for their cases, alo ... as they are as politically motivated as a pile of pirates begging for some rum in a nudity bar and getting a quickie in a backroom.
In 1804, the Senate held an impeachment trial for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase. He was not convicted.
They don't have to strike it down. What would have happened if SCOTUS ruled the other way against the various City and State laws resticting gun ownership by implementing extremely onerous, if not practically impossible, permiting requirements? Also, what happens if the Fed refuses to enforce a constitutional valid law or Supreme Court decision for itself or for a State? SCOTUS does not have any enforcement power. потому что Бог хочет это тот путь
Who presided? потому что Бог хочет это тот путь
I asked, "Does this mean you would contend that an amendment could be passed that prohibited our inalienable rights to buy, make, or use guns?" [emphasis added] And I read your example, and observed that it seemed you advocated the power of the people to pass such an unconstitutional act.. It's unfortunate you didn't revise your comments over on the other thread, isn't it..
Well stated. The USSC can simply "interpret the laws under the US Constitution." So, they practice "due diligence" as blacked robed thieves of citizen rights, liberties, freedoms and dignites. They have been performing their black maejiick nearly since their first appearance.
The way I look at it, when you drill down to the core, all liberty repose in the rules of evidence. You have the liberty to do everything permitted by the laws of physics: you CAN do whatever is POSSIBLE to do. The real question is whether you will be punished or not for doing it. And THAT is really determined, first and foremost, by whether anybody can prove you did it before a tribunal. Likewise, the authorities CAN charge you with anything, whether you're innocent or not, and seek your incarceration or death. In all such cases, guilt or innocence is decided by the tribunal by applying rules, and the rules that matter most are the rules that determine what your accusers get to say to the trier of fact, and what you get to say in rebuttal. Who has the "burden of proof" is usually dospositive. And THAT is why all liberty ultimately repose in the rules of evidence
Try reading the court opinions. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/253/350/case.html National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920) tares of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate." The text of the Eighteenth Amendment, proposed by Congress in 1917 and proclaimed as ratified in 1919, 40 Stat. 1050, 1941, is as follows: "Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited. "Sec. 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." We here are concerned with seven cases involving the validity of that Amendment and of certain general features of the National Prohibition Law, known as the Volstead Act, c. 83,41 Stat. 305, which was adopted to enforce the Amendment. The relief sought in each case is an injunction against the execution of that act. Two of the cases —Nos. 29 and 30, Original,—were brought in this court, and the others in district courts. Nos. 696, 752, 788 and 837 are here on appeals from decrees refusing injunctions, and No. 794 from a decree granting an injunction. The cases have been elaborately argued at the bar and in [386] Conclusions of the Court printed briefs; and the arguments have been attentively considered, with the result that we reach and announce the following conclusions on the questions involved: 1. The adoption by both houses of Congress, each by a two-thirds vote, of a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution sufficiently shows that the proposal was deemed necessary by all who voted for it. An express declaration that they regarded it as necessary is not essential. None of the resolutions whereby prior amendments were proposed contained such a declaration. 2. The two-thirds vote in each house which is required in proposing an amendment is a vote of two-thirds of the members present—assuming the presence of a quorum— and not a vote of two-thirds of the entire membership, present and absent. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U. S. 276. 3. The referendum provisions of state constitutions and statutes cannot be applied, consistently with the Constitution of the United States, in the ratification or rejection of amendments to it. Hawke v. Smith, ante, 221. 4. The prohibition of the manufacture, sale, transportation, importation and exportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, as embodied in the Eighteenth Amendment, is within the power to amend reserved by Article V of the Constitution. 5. That Amendment, by lawful proposal and ratification, has become a part of the Constitution, and must be respected and given effect the same as other provisions of that instrument. 6. The first section of the Amendment—the one embodying the prohibition—is operative throughout the entire territorial limits of the United States, binds all legislative bodies, courts, public officers and individuals within those limits, and of its own force invalidates every [387] Conclusions of the Court legislative act—whether by Congress, by a state legislature, or by a territorial assembly—which authorises or sanctions what the section prohibits. 7. The second section of the Amendment—the one declaring "The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation"—does not enable Congress or the several States to defeat or thwart the prohibition; but only to enforce it by appropriate means. 8. The words "concurrent power " in that section do not mean joint power, or require that legislation thereunder by Congress, to be effective, shall be approved or sanctioned by the several States or any of them; nor do they mean that the power to enforce is divided between Congress and the several States along the lines which separate or distinguish foreign and interstate commerce from intrastate affairs. 9. The power confided to Congress by that section, while not exclusive, is territorially coextensive with the prohibition of the first section, embraces manufacture and other intrastate transactions as w$ll as importation, exportation and interstate traffic, and is in no wise dependent on or affected by action or inaction on the part of the several States or any of them. 10. That power may be exerted against the disposal for beverage purposes of liquors manufactured before the Amendment became effective just as it may be against subsequent manufacture for those purposes. In either case it is a constitutional mandate or prohibition that is being enforced. 11. While recognising that there are limits beyond which Congress cannot go in treating beverages as within its power of enforcement, we think those limits are not transcended by the provision of the Volstead Act (Title II, § 1), wherein liquors containing as much as one-half of one per cent, of alcohol by volume and fit for use for beverage [388] purpose are treated as within that power. Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264. Giving effect to these conclusions, we dispose of the cases as follows: In Nos. 29 and 30, Original, the bills are dismissed. In No. 794 the decree is reversed. In Nos. 696, 762, 788 and 837 the decrees are affirmed. Feigenspan was case #788 as cited by SCOTUS in affirming the decree thereof. Feigenspan is found at 264 Federal Reporter 186 (1920), below is the first headnote of the holding.
No. It led you to make an ass of yourself.
Not first and foremosr, just ask anyone in a society in which vendettas are tolerated, if not the norm. потому что Бог хочет это тот путь
Aaron Burr. The House impeached in 1804 and the trial was in 1805.
It's unfortunate you didn't revise your comments over on the other thread, isn't it.. Sigh, another silly, uncalled for pejorative flame.. -- Very unprofessional for a guy trying to pass himself off as one..
I totally disagree. Irrespective of what the written law may be, practice trumps it. No tribunal, be it a judge or jury or whatever, is ever bound or forced to reach its decision on the basis of evidence. Kanagroo courts abound, always have and always will. A law that isn't enforced is de facto not a law. Histroy is on my side on this. потому что Бог хочет это тот путь
Aaron Burr. I thought impeachment hearings had to be presided over by the Chief Justice. Was that not always the case? Aaron Burr, you say. Wasn't he the man that shot Liberty Valance? потому что Бог хочет это тот путь
But even kangaroo cots feel constrained to set up a procedure, to have a "court". Within our system in America, our prosecutors all powers and abuses often render our justice system kangaroo courts. But they are still bound by the rules of evidence, and if they ignore procedure in their rush to judgement, they are subject to multiple levels of review.
Let's see what happens to those Baltimore cops. потому что Бог хочет это тот путь
At the end of the final appeal.
Yes the point is several posters have confirmed any Amendment can be amended. Perhaps a more accurate way of asking your question is: Can our enumerated rights, the Bill of Rights be amended? Short answer is yes. Long answer is if we do we scrap the philosophical founding of our nation, the DoI. It all goes back to the terms used by the founders of "self evident" and "endowed by their Creator." If our government decided to amend any of the enumerated rights, the response of freedom loving people should be similar to this: When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.ht ml No. Aaron Burr was Vice President at the time, which made him President of the Senate. This was not a presidential impeachment. Article 1, Section 3, Clause 6 provides:
Of course, I have no need to revise my comments. You asked "Does this mean you would contend that an amendment could be passed that prohibited our inalienable rights to buy, make, or use guns? " I correctly affirmed that such an amendment could be passed. I answered the question you asked. Your arguments, if tried in court, would result in Rule 11 sanctions. "There is no room for a pure heart, empty head defense under Rule 11." First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Vinita v. Kissee (1993), 1993 OK 96, 859 P.2d 502 Does Obama enjoy the power you espouse to ignore the Court and the laws? Does his interpretation of the Constitution and the laws supplant that of the Court for the Executive branch? Can Barack Obama lawfully deem that he is not required to comply with the immigration laws and can permit open borders, and take no action on illegal immigration? Can Obama lawfully deem 12-million illegal aliens to be citizens? Can Obama lawfully deem he can authorize the naturalization of an illegal alien?
Yep, ignore SCOTUS and focus on the tpaine court of the imagination, in your imaginary world. http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx U.S. Supreme Court website: The Court and Constitutional Interpretation - - - - - US v McDonald, 9th Cir 88-5239, 919 F.2d 146 (26 Nov 1990) Whenever official notice is received at the Department of State that any amendment proposed to the Constitution of the United States has been adopted, according to the provisions of the Constitution, the Secretary of State shall forthwith cause the amendment to be published in the newspapers authorized to promulgate the laws, with his certificate, specifying the States by which the same may have been adopted, and that the same has become valid, to all intents and purposes, as a part of the Constitution of the United States. Act of April 20, 1818, ch. 80, Sec. 2, Rev.Stat. Sec. 205 (2d ed. 1878) (amended version codified at 5 U.S.C. § 160 (1940) (repealed Oct. 31, 1951); current version, as amended, at 1 U.S.C. § 106b (Supp. II 1984)). Secretary of State Knox's certification of the adoption of the sixteenth amendment is conclusive upon the courts. United States v. Thomas, 788 F.2d 1250, 1253-54 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137, 42 S. Ct. 217, 218, 66 L. Ed. 505 (1922). In Leser suit was brought to strike the names of two women from the list of qualified voters in Maryland on the ground that the constitution of Maryland limited suffrage to men. Maryland had refused to ratify the Nineteenth Amendment. The necessary minimum of thirty-six states had ratified the amendment. The Secretary of State of the United States had certified its adoption. It was contended, however, that the ratifying resolutions of Tennessee and West Virginia, two of the states that had ratified the amendment, were inoperative because the resolutions of those states had been adopted in violation of their rules of legislative procedure. In answer to that contention the Court ruled: The proclamation by the Secretary certified that from official documents on file in the Department of State it appeared that the proposed Amendment was ratified by the legislatures of thirty-six States, and that it "has become valid to all intents and purposes as a part of the Constitution of the United States." As the legislatures of Tennessee and of West Virginia had power to adopt the resolutions of ratification, official notice to the Secretary, duly authenticated, that they had done so was conclusive upon him, and, being certified to by his proclamation, is conclusive upon the courts. United States v. Stahl, 792 F.2d 1438, 1439 (9th Cir. 1986) - - - - -
Illegal immigration?
You started this thread to solicit support for your contention. You asked for comments and you received them. It is obvious this thread has now run its course. Will you therefore please post a summation of the comments you asked for and received....then state for everyone to view, the results of your effort and the conclusive finding.
Illegal immigration? LOL!
Fair enough. потому что Бог хочет это тот путь
Also, what happens if the Fed refuses to enforce a constitutional valid law...? Illegal immigration? Among other things. потому что Бог хочет это тот путь
I contend that an attempt to amend away our enumerated basic human rights would violate the basic principles inherent in our constitution, -- and therefore would be unconstitutional. So essentially, we agree. Thanks.. Here's one of my points: - If a super majority somehow ratifies an amendment to repeal the 2nd, -- the remaining minority has the constitutional right to use every non-violent means available to fight, before resorting to armed separation/rebellion..
I asked, "Does this mean you would contend that an amendment could be passed that prohibited our inalienable rights to buy, make, or use guns?" And I read your example, and observed that it seemed you advocated the power of the people to pass such an unconstitutional act.. It's unfortunate you didn't revise your comments over on the other thread, isn't it.. You affirmed such a power, and provided an example of how such an amendment could be worded. You did not indicate that you would not advocate the power to so amend. It's unfortunate you didn't post that revision. Well, we're not in court, but I do have a pure heart. As for empty heads, I suggest you address gatlin, our empty head expert..
correct . There were many challenges to the prohibition laws . Any amendment that contradicts the text of the Constitution itself or an earlier amendment will nullify the earlier text. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
No need to address this, chan. It is quite obvious that everyone showed tpaine to be wrong. And tpaine will never man up to admit he was wrong. It is now quite evident that tpaine is no Constitutional expert. He is what he is....just an opinionated, bullheaded idiot.
It is now quite evident that tpaine is no Constitutional expert. He is what he is.. Yep, I'm a retired building contractor, who has never claimed to be a constitutional expert, -- but it's an easy to read document, and our common sense tell us that it did NOT give a moral super majority the power to amend away our inalienable rights, outlined in the Bill of Rights.
It most certainly did. потому что Бог хочет это тот путь
If our government decided to amend any of the enumerated rights, the response of freedom loving people should be similar to this: Amen. (Are we there yet, Daddy??) ;-) We desperately need a bold leader who will echo your exactly post with absolute conviction.
--- it's an easy to read document, and our common sense tell us that it did NOT give a moralistic super majority the power to amend away our inalienable rights, as outlined in the Bill of Rights. Thanks for your fiat opinion. - You've made big brownie points with gatlin and chan.
And I suppose unfortunately neither can an "interpretation" *of* the Constitution by any one of nine Justices be deemed "unconstitutional." We are all held hostage by ideologues until they surrender their lifetime appointments (can Congress rescind those "lifetime appointments"? Thus in a liberal-dominated court, aren't the USCON's principles severely compromised, as well as ALL justice, law, and the Bill of Rights itself? If Congress refuses to enact laws, and retain its status as co-equal branch of government, and remains derelict in its duty, what recourse have We The People in recalibrating the im-balance before its too late? Btw, I've enjoyed attending your "class."
Don't care. You may chose to continue to live in your fantasy world but most of us do understand what the Constitution means and fully understand that even the Bill of Rights can be modified or nullified if there are enough votes for that to happen. And there is not thing one that SOCTUS can do about it. потому что Бог хочет это тот путь
Why do 'most' of you WANT to give that power to a moralistic super majority, -- like the tea-totaling idiots that prohibited booze? To date, no one on this forum, LP, or FR, has ever been able to explain why such majority rule would be desirable. And I'd bet you can't either...
No one will ever be able to explain anything to you, tpaine. Some people are exactly who they are and despite being presented the truth, they will continue to believe what they want to believe….you are one of those people. Your have an inherent desire to be right. You have an overwhelmingly strong will to always be correct and to prove your are smart….to show that you “know” the Constitution. There is that little something inside you that refuses to see when your are “wrong”….it will forever hold you back from learning, growing, and ultimately having a correctly formed and educated opinion. I’m done here.
I wouldn't even waste my time starting with him. Why beat your head on the tpaine brick wall by arguing with someone that asks this... "Why do 'most' of you WANT to give that power to a moralistic super majority".... and willingly lives in a nazi state of Kookifornia... and paying that tyrannical state some of the highest taxes for the chains he wears. I'm the infidel... Allah warned you about. كافر المسلح
To date, no one on this forum, LP, or FR, has ever been able to explain why such majority rule would be desirable. I don't think some folks understand that they shouldn't just be accepting what is going on, that they should be fighting it instead. Oh wait never mind PC has taken over and they just want to "get along" so some dumbasses will like them. "SPIT"!!! “Political correctness is a doctrine, fostered by a delusional, illogical minority, and rapidly promoted by mainstream media, which holds forth the proposition that it is entirely possible to pick up a turd by the clean end.â€
“Political correctness is a doctrine, fostered by a delusional, illogical minority, and rapidly promoted by mainstream media, which holds forth the proposition that it is entirely possible to pick up a turd by the clean end.â€
That's a cute one....I have copied it for future use, thanks.
I’m done here. I wouldn't even waste my time starting with him. Why beat your head on the tpaine brick wall by arguing with someone that asks this... "Why do 'most' of you WANT to give that power to a moralistic super majority".... and willingly lives in a nazi state of Kookifornia... and paying that tyrannical state some of the highest taxes for the chains he wears.
Yo, anyone at home in your head. Nobody made any claim about desireability. That has not been the issue being discussed. The issue is what the Consitution permits re: the giving or taking of so-called rights. And what the Constitution permits is that a super majority can change it without limits on what may or may not be changed. Further, as long as the process described in the Consitution is followed SCOTUS can't do thing one about it. The only recourse appears to be rebellion. What's the chances of that occuring? потому что Бог хочет это тот путь
Why do 'most' of you WANT to give that power to a moralistic super majority, -- like the tea-totaling idiots that prohibited booze? To date, no one on this forum, LP, or FR, has ever been able to explain why such majority rule would be desirable. (In a Constitutional sense) And typically, like gatlin and grandisland, they quit when challenged. - Pitiful little people..
Why do 'most' of you WANT to give that power to a moralistic super majority, -- like the tea-totaling idiots that prohibited booze? To date, no one on this forum, LP, or FR, has ever been able to explain why such majority rule would be desirable. (In a Constitutional sense) That's what you (prohibitionists?) claim, without constitutional proofs. Can you answer the question or not?
I've noted over the months I've been lurking that there are quite a few of you who too often don't.
When you boycott nazi occupied Kookifornia, buy moving out of that shithole state, I'll agree with everything you say. Until then, you are... H Y P O C R I T I C A L and have no room to even have a constitutional opinion. I'm the infidel... Allah warned you about. كافر المسلح
Yes. The 17th amendment conflicted with a fundamental concept of the original constitutional government under which the House was the representative body of the people, elected by popular vote of the people, and the Senate was the representative body of the state governments, elected by the state legislatures. As revised, the state legislatures elect no representative to the Federal government, and the popularly elected senator may be a 20- or 30-year incumbent not representative of the majority party in the current state legislature. It's what the people chose to do.
I answered your question, i.e. - no-one made a claim as to desireability. I certainly didn't. What part of that answer don't you understand? All anyone said is that the Constitution allows itself to amended in away as long as the procedure described in the Consitution is followed Do you have another question? потому что Бог хочет это тот путь
Thus in a liberal-dominated court, aren't the USCON's principles severely compromised, as well as ALL justice, law, and the Bill of Rights itself? If Congress refuses to enact laws, and retain its status as co-equal branch of government, and remains derelict in its duty, what recourse have We The People in recalibrating the im-balance before its too late? Not by the Legislature or Executive. The Court can and has reversed itself on an interpretation, but it does not hold its prior holding unconstitutional. The people can amend the Constitution. Only a majority of the justices sitting on a case can issue a holding. A lifetime appointment (during good behavior) cannot be rescinded. A justice can be impeached. A politically dominated court had a profound effect on how our government and laws came to be viewed. At the outset, the capital in the southern location of D.C. was given to the southrons. The ability of the president to appoint the Supreme Court justices had a significant and lasting effect. SCOTUS had five justices early on. Between Washington and Adams, they appointed 13 justices. That would be 13 members of the Federalist party, the last of which was CJ John Marshall. Marshall remained CJ for over 30 years. Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and J.Q. Adams appointed members of the Dem.-Rep. party. Jackson, Van Buren, Tyler, and Polk appointed 11 straight members of the Democrat party. Jackson appointed Taney who remained CJ nearly 30 years. The driving force for congress critters today is to get reelected. The people of 435 districts vote for the guy who can deliver the pork to their district and complain about the other 434. Congress properly flexing its muscle vs. the Executive may not be popular at election time. The Prez has the bully pulpit and an endless supply of spokesholes. Delivering pork and not doing unpopular stuff works.
Your arguments, if tried in court, would result in Rule 11 sanctions. "There is no room for a pure heart, empty head defense under Rule 11." First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Vinita v. Kissee (1993), 1993 OK 96, 859 P.2d 502 Does Obama enjoy the power you espouse to ignore the Court and the laws? Does his interpretation of the Constitution and the laws supplant that of the Court for the Executive branch? Can Barack Obama lawfully deem that he is not required to comply with the immigration laws and can permit open borders, and take no action on illegal immigration? Can Obama lawfully deem 12-million illegal aliens to be citizens? Can Obama lawfully deem he can authorize the naturalization of an illegal alien? Of course, you must run and hide from my questions as your dingbat legal theory emanating from the tpaine court of the imagination ineluctably deems that Barack Obama and the Executive branch can lawfully ignore the laws and the Constitution and lawfully authorize open borders, grant citizenship to millions of illegal aliens, and naturalize illegal aliens. I answered your question. Why must you hide from mine? Man up. Answer how your version of the law applies to Obama or how it selectively applies only according to your whims.
/sarc. The entire Constitution is unconstitutional, and null and void, as it was proposed and ratified in violation of then existing organic law, the Articles of Confederation. Article 13 clearly and explicitly stated: The Constitution was proposed to be effective upon the ratification of NINE states. The new constitutional government was formed and George Washington was inaugurated as its new President, after the ratification by ELEVEN states. See: Being the ELEVEN STATES that have Ratified the Constitution of the Government of the United States. Containing an Impartial Account of The most interesting Speeches and Motions; and accurate Copies of remarkable Papers laid before and offered to the House.. Taken in short hand by Thomas Lloyd. Volume I New-York, Printed for the Editor by Harrison and Purdy, M,DCC,LXXXIX North Carolina and Rhode Island had not ratified. Congressional Register Volume 1, aka Lloyd's Debates (1789) By what lawful authority or power was the "perpetual union" under the Articles of Confederation destroyed, and a new union of ELEVEN states formed? How could any alteration lawfully be done when the Articles provide that they will be inviolably observed by every state, and no alteration could be made unless confirmed by the legislature of every state? How was the Bill of Rights passed through Congress with only ELEVEN states in the union? Is the Constitution unlawful, null and void? If not, why not?
The Senate was the construct of the Connecticut compromise ;one of many such compromises that united the 13 states into a Federal Republic. I personally think we had some great statesmen in the Senate in the 19th century . But the people thought there was a legitimate reason for changing it. The principle argument was that state legislatures selecting led to corruption. But how can we say today that the current system is any less corrupt? We went from pols being corrupt to pols being corrupt AND states losing their representation in the Federal Government . So if you are asking me if I'd be in favor of a repeal amendment .My answer would be yes . Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
then again ,the legislature of my state ;NY ,is one of the most dysfunctional ,and corrupt in the nation. then again ,the people of my state are pretty wacked too.
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
I was not really asking, but observing that an amendment can be odds with the existing system and take away the representation of state governments. The people have the power, whether the exercise of it was wise is debatable. The Framers had some wisdom in the room, and they may have had it right.
Yep, you answered the question that lead to this thread. Now you've revised your answer, claiming you do not advocate using an amendment power to repeal the 2nd. - - Fine.. Here's another: --- Why do 'most' of you WANT to give that power to a moralistic super majority, -- like the tea-totaling idiots that prohibited booze? To date, no one on this forum, LP, or FR, has ever been able to explain why such majority rule would be desirable. (In a Constitutional sense) I do not ineluctably deem that Barack Obama and the Executive branch can lawfully ignore the laws and the Constitution and lawfully authorize open borders, grant citizenship to millions of illegal aliens, and naturalize illegal aliens. Your turn, -- answer mine.
Well, bless your heart. I can see how desperate you are to see what else I have written on the right to keep and bear arms, but you seem to be too incompetent to read any of that and must rely on assertions spewed from your imagination. Here, read about the right to keep and bear arms. http://libertysflame.com/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=40004&Disp=25#C25 It seems clear that the Supremes indicated that in 1939. More recently, they indicated "Putting all of these textual elements together, we find that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation." District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) Note however, this quote from the article. After Heller, there is not much left of Miller. FWIW, my personal opinion is that Scalia's Opinion in Heller is correct. Miller has been sharply narrowed by Heller. Miller does very little. Heller at 625. Heller at 592 Heller at 579-581 a. “Right of the People.” The first salient feature of the operative clause is that it codifies a “right of the people.” The unamended Constitution and the Bill of Rights use the phrase “right of the people” two other times, in the First Amendment’s Assembly-and-Petition Clause and in the Fourth Amendment’s Search-and-Seizure Clause. The Ninth Amendment uses very similar terminology (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people”). All three of these instances unambiguously refer to individual rights, not “collective” rights, or rights that may be exercised only through participation in some corporate body.5 Three provisions of the Constitution refer to “the people” in a context other than “rights”—the famous preamble (“We the people”), §2 of Article I (providing that “the people” will choose members of the House), and the Tenth Amendment (providing that those powers not given the Federal Government remain with “the States” or “the people”). Those provisions arguably refer to “the people” acting collectively—but they deal with the exercise or reservation of powers, not rights. Nowhere else in the Constitution does a “right” attributed to “the people” refer to anything other than an individual right. What is more, in all six other provisions of the Constitution that mention “the people,” the term unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset. As we said in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259, 265 (1990): This contrasts markedly with the phrase “the militia” in the prefatory clause. As we will describe below, the “militia” in colonial America consisted of a subset of “the people”—those who were male, able bodied, and within a certain age range. Reading the Second Amendment as protecting only the right to “keep and bear Arms” in an organized militia therefore fits poorly with the operative clause’s description of the holder of that right as “the people.” We start therefore with a strong presumption that the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all Americans.
Nolu chan never said that. He just said it was possible to do under the wording of the constitution.
You have been taking this same verbal dump on the internet for at least 8 years. Here is my answer to you from 8 years ago. http://libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=204789&Disp=All&#C99 nolu chan to tpaine. tpaine's #86 was also addressed to robertpaulsen. I have not addressed the subject of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, but for the record I will provide my opinion on it. I do not hold the opinion you have repeatedly attempted to attribute to me. Many amendments assert something on the order of "Congress shall make no law...." The Second Amendment was intentionally phrased differently: At that time, the militia was not the National Guard but "We the People." The Federal standing army was very small. At the outbreak of the Civil War, Lincoln had a standing army of only 75,000 men. This was intentional. The protection against an power-grabbing Federal government was an armed citizenry, and the State Militias were intended to be able to be more powerful than the Federal standing army and act as our protection against Federal expansion. The right to keep and bear arms was then as fundamental as any other right, such as free speech. I find the right to be a personal one and reject the notion that it only applies to protecting the right to arm the National Guard or something similar. At the time of passage, "we the people" and the militia were synonymous. Its purpose is to protect the right of "we the people" as individuals to keep and bear arms. This should prevent the Federal government from infringing in any way. Interesting are the musings of Laurence Tribe on the observations of Akhil Amar to the effect that the right to keep and bear arms was viewed as a privilege of national citizenship, and therefore assertable against the states as such. Further, as a right of individuals, it would be assertable against the Federal government. I would hold that the right to keep and bear arms was viewed as a privilege of national citizenship at the time of the framing and, therefore, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, it cannot be abridged by state law. [...] nolu chan posted on 2007-10-31 21:36:38 ET [Locked]
Seek psychiatric help. You have been acting like yukon now for at least 8 years. http://libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=204789&Disp=100#C100 Chan: Not true, -- you are arguing for the concept "that the Bill of Rights [thus the 2nd] did not originally apply to the States. They were restrictions on the Federal government." Admit it. If the Bill of Rights did not originally apply to the States -- and they were restrictions ONLY on the Federal government, -- then States can claim the power to prohibit arms, -- as California is doing. [...] tpaine posted on 2007-10-31 21:36:39 ET [Locked] http://libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=204789&Disp=104#C104 I repeat again, for possible penetration -- I believe the RKBA should be protected against Federal or State infringement. Why do you keep repeating that silly bilge? You can repeat it until you are blue in the face and I still made no such argument. If I had, you would quote what I said, rather than offer your blather instead. That the Bill of Rights did not originally apply to the states is law that has been well settled over two centuries. That you do not like that fact does not change it. As I explicitly stated, that situation changed with the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. As the Fourteenth Amendment is nearly 140 years old, it is time to stop hyperventilating about the state of the law before it. I am in agreement with paulsen where he stated that the BOR did not originally apply to the states and has since not been fully incorporated. Two centuries of judicial precedent leaves that as settled law. I did not express any agreement (or disagreement) about RKBA. I gave you my opinion in #99. At that time, the militia was not the National Guard but "We the People." The Federal standing army was very small. At the outbreak of the Civil War, Lincoln had a standing army of only 75,000 men. This was intentional. The protection against an power-grabbing Federal government was an armed citizenry, and the State Militias were intended to be able to be more powerful than the Federal standing army and act as our protection against Federal expansion. The right to keep and bear arms was then as fundamental as any other right, such as free speech. I find the right to be a personal one and reject the notion that it only applies to protecting the right to arm the National Guard or something similar. At the time of passage, "we the people" and the militia were synonymous. Its purpose is to protect the right of "we the people" as individuals to keep and bear arms. This should prevent the Federal government from infringing in any way. Interesting are the musings of Laurence Tribe on the observations of Akhil Amar to the effect that the right to keep and bear arms was viewed as a privilege of national citizenship, and therefore assertable against the states as such. Further, as a right of individuals, it would be assertable against the Federal government. I would hold that the right to keep and bear arms was viewed as a privilege of national citizenship and a fundamental right at the time of the framing and, therefore, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, it cannot be abridged by state law. If one holds the right to keep and bear arms as a privilege of national citizenship, it is protected from Federal intervention by the Second Amendment and from State intervention by the Fourteenth Amendment's application of the Second Amendment to the States. Our Constitution's Second Amendment refers to, "the right of the people to keep and bear arms." It does not establish the RKBA as some new right, but acknowledges it as an existing right which the people brought with them into the Union. As the people never ceded this right, they continue to hold it. The Second Amendment prohibits Federal infringement of a right which predates the Constitution and all of its amendments. The parties to the Constitution were States, not individuals. The Constitution refers to "the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same." In drafting a Constitution, the parties to the Constitution apparently did not see a need to guarantee protection from themselves. The people, acting in their sovereign capacity, organized into political units called states, chose to create a Federal government and prescribe limits for that Federal government. Whatever power was not granted to the Federal government was retained by the States or the people. As demonstrated, it is perfectly possible for all of the following to be true: nolu chan posted on 2007-11-01 0:57:04 ET [Locked]
#136. To: tpaine, CZ82 (#134) I don't think I've noted over the months I've been lurking that there are quite a few of you who too often don't. Kluane posted on 2015-07-10 19:02:11 ET Reply Trace Private Reply And then (just like clockwork) yukon comes running to their rescue!! LOL. “Political correctness is a doctrine, fostered by a delusional, illogical minority, and rapidly promoted by mainstream media, which holds forth the proposition that it is entirely possible to pick up a turd by the clean end.â€
I posted to: nolu chan,----- Now you've revised your answer, claiming you do not advocate using an amendment power to repeal the 2nd. Here's what Chan posted about that subject: -- Now I have no idea WHY my remark above raised such a hissy fit, -- but obviously, that is what Chan posted. As I said before, this discussion is getting bizarro. Why in hell does my opinion, -- that amendments cannot alienate away our basic rights, as outlined in the Bill of Rights, --- that they would be unconstitutional, -- become such a divisive issue?
Because man-made documents, such as Amendments may be changed at any tyme. They are not permanent structures in America or anywhere on this planet.
Now you've revised your answer, claiming you do not advocate using an amendment power to repeal the 2nd. libertysflame.com/cgi-bin/readart.cgi? http://ArtNum=40004&Disp=25#C25">libertysflame.com/cgi-bin...? ArtNum=40004&Disp=25#C25 Well bless your heart too. Thanks for the link to that old thread, as it proves my point completely.. You gave up the discussion shortly after the excerpts you just posted because you couldn't refute my answers. --- I urge anyone here to read the complete thread to verify.
Why in hell does my opinion, -- that amendments cannot alienate away our basic rights, as outlined in the Bill of Rights, --- that they would be unconstitutional, -- become such a divisive issue? That is not an answer.. Thanks for your comment, Capt Obvious..
You are welcome. So depite your belief that documents are designed to be permanent fixtures of institutions built by men, ant man or group may change them at any tyme.
Not at all. The Constitution is a document designed to be a permanent protection for our inalienable rights within a republican form of government. Naturally, some aspects of it can be changed at any time, but changing its basic principles would be unconstitutional and render null & void the proposed changes.
So, in your opinion, the US Constitution is "immutable" or "unchangeable" ... where does any document suggest that whether within or without the US Constitution?
The Constitution is a document designed to be a permanent protection for our inalienable rights within a republican form of government. The declaration of independence is the document that suggests that principle.
Nope. Nope. You can't even find permanent interpretations of GOD in any man-made document or otherwise: called the Bible, Koran, etc.
Whatever.. Why don't you direct your energies to harassing gatlin? -- Your pretty good at that..
In this case, tpaine, you are ripe for ridicule, on your own thread, for considering that the documents formulating the foundations of the US Constitution or even the US Government are sacrosanct.
Hyperbole anyone? Whoever suggested that they were sacrosanct?
I've noted over the months I've been lurking that there are quite a few of you who too often don't. Don't you mean...years, yu-klown? Are you out of rehab already? Your boring style is unmistakable. The partial excerpt...the insult -- trademark yu-klown. I guess you ditched the old-new scriptural citing :-( Kluane National Park and Reserve are two units of Canada's national park system, located in the extreme southwestern corner of Yukon, Canada. Lol...
Then, you know that all documents can be changed including the Bill of Rights irrespective of origininal intentions.
Good catch, lib.
;-)
“Political correctness is a doctrine, fostered by a delusional, illogical minority, and rapidly promoted by mainstream media, which holds forth the proposition that it is entirely possible to pick up a turd by the clean end.â€
Yea he's as unmistakeable as a dose of the screaming schitts. “Political correctness is a doctrine, fostered by a delusional, illogical minority, and rapidly promoted by mainstream media, which holds forth the proposition that it is entirely possible to pick up a turd by the clean end.â€
I think the correct analogy would be "amuses the hell out of them".
“Political correctness is a doctrine, fostered by a delusional, illogical minority, and rapidly promoted by mainstream media, which holds forth the proposition that it is entirely possible to pick up a turd by the clean end.â€
You forgot the one where he named himself after a rodent, be he only lasted a few days that time. Kinda reminds you of Gatlin's other pal Mojave/Palmdale, naming himself after things in S. Calif. “Political correctness is a doctrine, fostered by a delusional, illogical minority, and rapidly promoted by mainstream media, which holds forth the proposition that it is entirely possible to pick up a turd by the clean end.â€
Some people do have a morbid sense of humor to feed their abnormally that is susceptible to being characterized by gloomy or unwholesome feelings….they are often referred to as “Sickos.” We seen to have a goodly number of those around here.
And then there is Jim Rob's summation of tpaine as "inflicting pain is your game." Hah! That's rich. "Personal attacks and insults" are your first and last names and inflicting pain is your game. Abuse reports from people with unclean hands are not taken seriously. If you want to be taken seriously on this forum you might think about cleaning up your act. 257 posted on 7/28/02 4:10 PM Pacific by Jim Robinson Your game has not changed in over 10 years. You spout utter nonsense and attempt to frustrate others until a flame war erupts. Then you try to report someone and have them banned. You are one sick puppy. I am unable to help it if you have an overabundance of the stupid gene and your inferior intellect is unable to comprehend my posts. You do make kind of a nice pet to keep around though, just to have some fun. 100 posted on 9/24/2003, 2:05:17 AM by nolu chan - - - To: tpaine 42 101 posted on 9/24/2003, 2:07:08 AM by nolu chan
My #142 documented that the Articles of Confederation not only suggested permanancy but explicitly stated it was permanent. All member states agreed to observes the articles. Article 13 expressly stated that no alteration could be made without the consent of every state legislature. And yet, the Framers had a meeting, proposed an entirely new form of government, stated that it would be effective unpon ratification of 9 of the 13 states, and a new government was formed, and Washington was inaugurated upon an election with 10 states participating, and with 2 states having not ratified and, therefore, not being part of the new union when the new government took effect. I asked, How could any alteration lawfully be done when the Articles provide that they will be inviolably observed by every state, and no alteration could be made unless confirmed by the legislature of every state? How was the Bill of Rights passed through Congress with only ELEVEN states in the union? Is the Constitution unlawful, null and void? If not, why not? C-R-I-C-K-E-T-S The Constitution binds the Federal government and the State governments. It does not bind the sovereign power that made it. One generation cannot bind another, for all time. When acting as the sovereign (as opposed to citizens), the people are always free to change their form of government to one more of their liking. It is what explains the power to change the Articles of Confederation, dissolve that perpetual union, and not only alter but abolish it, without having the approval of every state. Otherwise, the adoption of the Constitution itself was an unlawful act.
Suggested principles in a political declaration are not law and govern no one.
Thanks for the link (at #147) to that old thread, as it proves my point completely.. You gave up the discussion shortly after the excerpts you just posted because you couldn't refute my answers. --- I urge anyone here to read the complete thread to verify. You've gone out of your mind. Sure, I've had a lot of discussions that have frustrated people like you, misterwhite, gatlin, etc... But I have NEVER tried to have anyone banned. -- It's usually the other way around. --- As you well know.
I have not revised my answer. You asked if the 2nd Amendment could be repealed. My answer has consistently been that it could be repealed by another amendment, in the same manner that the 18th was repealed by the 21st. You did not here ask if I favored or opposed such repeal. I have not changed my mind on that either. I just not comport with the fantasy argument you have been cut and pasting for a decade. The RKBA is protected by the 2nd Amendment and the right is an individual right. The 2nd Amendment did not grant a right to anyone, but recognized a pre-existing right, inhering to the people. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incorporation_of_the_Bill_of_Rights Right to keep and bear arms This right has been fully incorporated against the states. Described as a fundamental and individual right that will necessarily be subject to strict scrutiny by the courts,See McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010). Self Defense is described as a "central component" of the Second Amendment in McDonald, supra. As the 2nd Amendment has been incorporated against the states, it applies equally to the states due to the 14th Amendment. If it were not (or before it was) incorporated, that would not confer a delegation of sovereign power to state to mess with the RKBA. The right was individual and I do not see when the people have ever chosen to delegate away their RBKA power in any state. It is not delegated away by silence in the organic law. As Jim Rob summed you up, inflicting pain is your game. You strive to be a pain in the ass and see if you can get a reaction. Hah! That's rich. "Personal attacks and insults" are your first and last names and inflicting pain is your game. Abuse reports from people with unclean hands are not taken seriously. If you want to be taken seriously on this forum you might think about cleaning up your act. 257 posted on 7/28/02 4:10 PM Pacific by Jim Robinson
You've gone out of your mind. Sure, I've had a lot of discussions that have frustrated people like you, misterwhite, gatlin, etc... But I have NEVER tried to have anyone banned. -- It's usually the other way around. --- As you well know. Whatever. -- You're repeating yourself again. --- Get some new lines...
It is amazing how your cited documentation in support of your bullshit looks so different when it is removed from your bullshit mischaracterization, and actually quoted. This, no doubt, is why you don't quote it when it directly contradicts you. At nolu chan #69 The BOR does not apply only to citizens. It applies to non-citizens as well. For example, the search and seizure clause applies equally to citizens and non-citizens. I did not choose and they already have. Whoever opines, I want them to continue to find an individual right to keep and bear arms, unless another amendment changes that. As misterwhite observed at #67, "Don't beat up the retard. That can't be any fun." I brushed you side like the insignificant pest that you are. http://libertysflame.com/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=40004&Disp=66#C66 Your unsupported opinion does not overturn two centuries of jurisprudence. The Court says what the law is. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch. 137, 177 (1803) provides, - - - - - Not true.. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch. 137, 180 (1803) Thus, the particular phraseology of the Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written Constitutions, that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. Your claim, taken to its logical conclusion, indicates mass confusion. The Supreme Court issues opinions just to pass the time of day and to amuse itself. The other branches of government are free to ignore such opinions. The failure of Congress to legislate abortion away since Roe v. Wade is merely a legislative failure. And now there will be no more complaints about Obama's open borders as he has no need to pay attention to court opinions. Indeed, should the Court find that subsidies on federal exchanges are not authorized, we should recognize that the Executive is free to ignore that opinion and keep paying subsidies. Only the President interprets the laws as they apply to the President. It's good to be King. Indeed, as the President can interpret the law, and ignore the courts, Obama should be able to interpret the Constitution to permit him a third term and run for reelection. He need not heed anyone else's opinion. Don't beat up the retard. That can't be any fun. I believe he's referring to court dicta, not court opinion. The quote was from an 1829 letter to Joseph Cabell. Miller said the second amendment does not protect those weapons not typically associated with the preservation of a militia. AND they said they didn't know if a sawed-off, double-barreled shotgun qualified. Miller had no holding on the issue. The case had not been heard in the District Court. Nothing had been decided following any argument. An indictment was issued, the indictment was challenged for insufficiency, and the indictment was quashed by the District judge. That was appealed to SCOTUS. The National Firearms Act of 1934 came under 26 U.S.C., the Internal Revenue Code. The District Court upheld the demurrer based on its finding that Section 11 of the Act violated the Constitution. Section 11 reads, "It shall be unlawful for any person who is required to register as provided in section 5 hereof and who shall not have so registered, or any other person who has not in his possession a stamp-affixed order as provided in section 4 hereof, to ship, carry, or deliver any firearm in interstate commerce." SCOTUS held the Act (1) not unconstitutional as an invasion of the reserved powers of the States, and (2) not violative of the Second amendment of the Constitution. As the case had not been heard below in the District Court, it was remanded in order for it to be heard for the first time. SCOTUS was only acting on the contested demurrer and quashing of the indictment. SCOTUS reinstated the indictment. Of course it was not based on Miller's meandering dicta. Dicta is not precedent. Heller's holding is precedent. BULLSHIT! You are entitled to your opinion and SCOTUS is entitled to theirs. Theirs carries more weight. SCOTUS gets to decide what the law is. The BOR does not apply only to citizens. It applies to non-citizens as well. For example, the search and seizure clause applies equally to citizens and non-citizens. I did not choose and they already have. Whoever opines, I want them to continue to find an individual right to keep and bear arms, unless another amendment changes that. They were required to be possessed by all able-bodied white males eligible for the militia. Federal law specified all between 18 and 45. State laws varied to a wider age range. Gun ownership was not restricted as you assume. Their were no police forces in the 1700's. Elliott's Debates contain some interesting quotes from the State debates on the Constitution. Elliott's Debates, Vol 1, 2nd Ed., p. 328, New York Convention, July 26, 1788, emphasis as in original: Elliott's Debates, Vol 1, 2nd Ed., p. 335, Rhode Island Convention, May 29, 1790: Elliott's Debates, Vol 3, 2nd Ed., p. 385-86, Virginia Convention, Patrick Henry. Elliott's Debates, Vol 3, 2nd Ed., p. 659, Virginia Convention, And, of course, there is the following, United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939) You are entitled to your opinion. SCOTUS is entitled to theirs. They did not conclude that handguns were not protected by the second amendment. They found and individual right to keep and bear arms. SCOTUS stated what the law is. It applies nationwide.
Jim Rob on FR is not the only example, Hah! That's rich. "Personal attacks and insults" are your first and last names and inflicting pain is your game. Abuse reports from people with unclean hands are not taken seriously. If you want to be taken seriously on this forum you might think about cleaning up your act. 257 posted on 7/28/02 4:10 PM Pacific by Jim Robinson but it is a good one because he absolutely nailed your bullshit act. Your posting history provides a lifetime of material. I will never run out of examples of you squatting and depositing some turd of thought. Let's see how you were tossed off of LP. Title: ‘Uncivil obedience’ ‘Uncivil obedience’ [Article redacted to due to copyright violation] [Thread Locked] Other drivers have been cussing at me for 46 years because I'm one of the few people who always stay within the speed limit.... Well almost always... sometimes it's prudent and safer to just go with the flow when traffic is extra heavy... I don't like it, but it's much safer that way. But from Wikipedia: which unfortunately resuscitates long dormant memories of L.A. Times v. Free Republic So I don't know how you guys want to handle copyright infringement issues, but from my perspective, I'd only post excerpts from what's freely available on the web & totally avoid posting anything that's behind a paywall. One of the reasons LP is dark. In January 2014 The Volokh Conspiracy migrated to the Washington Post and was moved behind a paywall in June 2014. which unfortunately resuscitates long dormant memories of L.A. Times v. Free Republic So I don't know how you guys want to handle copyright infringement issues, but from my perspective, I'd only post excerpts from what's freely available on the web & totally avoid posting anything that's behind a paywall. Thanks for raising the subject, Willy. I'd say we should wait and see if the washpost sends us another infringement notice. -- I'd bet that since we no longer have an 'owner' (subject to finding Goldies will), that they simply won't bother, and so will no one else. It's futile to sue close to 100 individuals for posting freely available articles. From the article posted:--- Our copywrite infringement laws are now being challenged by literally millions of US Citizens who are posting freely available articles, videos, music, etc., all over the web. -- IMO, -- If you are serious about defending a copyright, you had best not publish your material on an easily copied format. Opinions? Anyone caught deliberately posting material from a source that has prohibited its distribution will be banned. There are not too many things that I'd consider taking that kind of action for, but illegal activity fits the bill. If anyone wants to challenge copyright laws feel free to do so on your own server. L.A. Times v. Free Republic Source: The Washington Post. I can see it now: The Washington Post v. Liberty Post courtesy of tpaine. How much did the lawsuit cost Free Republic? Sys Admin - I suggest you remove the article and include tpaine in your ping since he posted it. Goldi Has repeatedly stated NOTHING is to be posted from The Washington Post as per the letter TWP sent to her and tpaine KNOWS this. I suspect that is why he intentionally left the source blank. http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/05/uncivil- obedience/ FYI www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1111944/posts Not good. Not good. Not good at all!!! Are you guys saying that tpaine deliberately posted copyrighted material and attempted to hide that it was coming from such a source? That is a serious charge. Tpaine, I'm giving you the opportunity to explain whether or not this is the case. In the meantime I am going to redact the original article until the truth of this can be determined. I'd say we should wait and see if the washpost sends us another infringement notice. -- I'd bet that since we no longer have an 'owner' (subject to finding Goldies will), that they simply won't bother, and so will no one else. It's futile to sue close to 100 individuals for posting freely available articles. I'll consider myself warned. But pray tell, where did you get the authority to arbitrarily ban anyone for this arguable infraction? (I won't dignify the concept that this is an 'illegal activity', as millions of citizens are doing this, and absolutely NO specific individual is being prosecuted). Do you own the server? And did the washpost threaten to sue both Goldie and the server owner? Yes, I now "own" the virtual server LP is running on as I am the one one paying the bill. Very soon LP will be running on my own server. I am the one who will be held responsible for any violations. I'm very sorry, but I will not tolerate illegal actions of any kind here. NO WARNINGS FOR ILLEGAL ACTIVITY. You're gone. Since the offending material has been removed I will leave this thread here as a warning. I'll leave it open for now but may lock it after hearing what the community has to say.
Hah! That's rich. "Personal attacks and insults" are your first and last names and inflicting pain is your game. Abuse reports from people with unclean hands are not taken seriously. If you want to be taken seriously on this forum you might think about cleaning up your act. 257 posted on 7/28/02 4:10 PM Pacific by Jim Robinson
Wow, did you just learn that? There are mountains, a large lake, lodges, businesses and an electoral district with the name Kluane also.
Why are you repeatedly reposting that tired old post from JR? Feel free, but dream on if you really imagine it proves anything...
Feel free, but dream on if you really imagine it proves anything... I guess you should keep reading it until it becomes clearer. Perhaps if I emphasize the obvious a bit more. Hah! That's rich. "Personal attacks and insults" are your first and last names and inflicting pain is your game. Abuse reports from people with unclean hands are not taken seriously. If you want to be taken seriously on this forum you might think about cleaning up your act. 257 posted on 7/28/02 4:10 PM Pacific by Jim Robinson You poor thing. Jim Rob would not take your abuse report seriously.
Some people do have a morbid sense of humor to feed their abnormally that is susceptible to being characterized by gloomy or unwholesome feelings….they are often referred to as “Sickos.” We seen to have a goodly number of those around here. I find him amusing cause he just never learns and you find him amusing because you think he pisses people off, you think he takes after you and that's why you support him. So doesn't that mean that you're also describing yourself?? “Political correctness is a doctrine, fostered by a delusional, illogical minority, and rapidly promoted by mainstream media, which holds forth the proposition that it is entirely possible to pick up a turd by the clean end.â€
You poor thing, trying to imply that filing 'abuse reports' at that time on FR meant attempting to get someone banned. --- Hell, for a while there, it was the sites sport, as everyone competed to see who could get the mods to 'delete' your opponents personally offensive remarks. To my knowledge, NONE of my opponents were ever banned for anything I posted. Quite the opposite actually occurred.
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/650379/posts?page=29#29 I understand your frustration, believe me. -- But get this: --- I was once suspended for a week for 'abusing abuse'. When abuse first came in, it was 'abused'. By a lot of us. -- I was the first to be honored to know it was to be verboten, -- at a mods discretion.] 29 posted on 3/20/2002, 6:47:15 PM by tpaine Damn. How many times did you have to hit the abuse button to get suspended for a week for abusing abuse?
To my knowledge, NONE of my opponents were ever banned for anything I posted. Quite the opposite actually occurred. And for proof, read the thread below, cited by Chan. www.freerepublic.com/focu...t/650379/posts?page=29#29 To: Eagle Eye I understand your frustration, believe me. -- But get this: --- I was once suspended for a week for 'abusing abuse'. When abuse first came in, it was 'abused'. By a lot of us. -- I was the first to be honored to know it was to be verboten, -- at a mods discretion.] 29 posted on 3/20/2002, 6:47:15 PM by tpaine If you really read the thread you would know, --- not many.. ---- At this point in my FR 'career', JR was really on my case, and working himself up to permanently banning a number of us 'disruptors'. Which he eventually did... I urge anyone to read the whole thread for context. It was a very fun time for most of us at FR ---- Except for JR and his band of sick sycophants.
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/650379/posts tpaine vanity whine vanity ^ | 3/20/02 | tpaine Posted on 3/20/2002, 4:46:13 PM by tpaine On the afternnoon of 3/18 Texaggie79 and I got into a type of discussion that is becoming all too common at FR. In an effort to defend his position as a drug warrior, tex decided to attack the motives of his percieved enemies, 'the libertarians'. --- Here is that thread: Cannabis Cafes Set To Open All Around Britain As Law Changes Posts #205/206 are one of our more typical exchanges. -- Shortly after our disagreement ended, -- on that thread. Later that same evening, I had just responded to a concealed carry question at #15, - on this thread: Sheriff says 'gun nut' concealing the truth ---- When my correspondent asked if I was still 'harrassing' texaggie. --- I denied any such intent, -- and Tex immediately posted the URL of the cannibus tread as his 'proof' of being harrassed. Thus, Tex set off another 'flame war' between us on the same subject as the previous post. Eventually, others on the thread protested his hijack of the thread. -- In response, I tried to show that texaggies constitutional position was not only against drugs, but could also be applied against guns. -- Just as this point was about to be established, -- the anonomods decided that tex & I were having a 'flamewar' . No one was violating any socalled forum 'rules' at that point, in my estimation. I'd like to protest this rather silly form of censorship. -- Tex & I were hurting no one but each other with our exchange. And for the umteenth time, I'd like to call for a better definition of the posting guidlelines, and for some sort of accountability from the capracious acts of the anonomods. I won't hold my breath for a reasonable answer. TOPICS: Cheese, Moose, Sister; Free Republic Policy/Q&A; Humor KEYWORDS: Navigation: use the links below to view more comments. first 1-50, 51-100, 101-125 next last 1 posted on 3/20/2002, 4:46:13 PM by tpaine http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/650379/posts?page=17#17 You should be flamed just for starting a whole bleeping thread for your edification. What was wrong with leaving your WOD battle where it was? Gotta have a thread with your name on the top or something? I don't care that you posted this turkey in cheese-ville. 17 posted on 3/20/2002, 5:55:00 PM by Cyber Liberty http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/650379/posts?page=24#24 And you with there wondering why "discussions" with you always turn to flame-fests. You are either stupid or just self-absorbed to the point that you have no idea how ridiculous you look. Buh bye. I have some hot dogs to go steam. 24 posted on 3/20/2002, 6:08:38 PM by Cyber Liberty http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/650379/posts?page=29#29' I understand your frustration, believe me. -- But get this: --- I was once suspended for a week for 'abusing abuse'. When abuse first came in, it was 'abused'. By a lot of us. -- I was the first to be honored to know it was to be verboten, -- at a mods discretion.] 29 posted on 3/20/2002, 6:47:15 PM by tpaine Damn. How many times did you have to hit the abuse button to get suspended for a week for abusing abuse? = = = = = = = = = = A tpaine victory http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/650379/posts?page=36#36 You and Tex completely ruined that thread. You dragged in an unrelated ongoing argument and ended up taking the thread completely off topic. What was particularly galling was that you continued your flame war even after Mr. March, the subject of the article, made an appearance on the thread and even went as far as asking you to stop. You pissed him off so bad that now he is banned for using vulgar language. 36 posted on 3/20/2002, 7:35:31 PM by Sandy http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/650379/posts?page=37#37 I was about to respond [belatedly, I admit] to him, and offer encouragement, etc, when he blew up. I am sorry that you think, -- that I was at fault beyond that. -- I don't see it that way at all. I'm responsible for what I actually do or say. - Not for anyones perceived opinions about my actions. 37 posted on 3/20/2002, 8:03:49 PM by tpaine http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/650379/posts?page=40#40">http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/650379/posts?page=40#40 I'll ask John to start a new topic called "Whine and Cheese" just for you. Thanks, Jim 40 posted on 3/20/2002, 9:33:42 PM by Jim Robinson And the unanswered question remains, How many times did you have to hit the abuse button to get suspended for a week for abusing abuse? And you were obviously referring to your antics on yet some previous thread.
13/14 years ago, I posted: --- -- the anonomods decided that tex & I were having a 'flamewar' . 'They' - [JR?] -- suspended tex & I for 24 hrs, --- while we were in mid- discussion of a constitutional issue on gun control. No one was violating any socalled forum 'rules' at that point, in my estimation. I'd like to protest this rather silly form of censorship. -- Tex & I were hurting no one but each other with our exchange. And for the umteenth time, I'd like to call for a better definition of the posting guidlelines, and for some sort of accountability from the capracious acts of the anonomods. I won't hold my breath for a reasonable answer. -- And please, -- spare me any more snide whine n' cheese remarks. ---- I, and many others, are well aware that the FR-PTB don't give a damn about dissenting opinions. 1 posted on 3/20/2002, 4:46:13 PM by tpaine Shortly after, I received this post from JR.. And, if memory serves, JR suspended me for another short period, right after that.. I answered, just above, that I have no idea 'how many times'. -- Look it up if it's important to you. -- That seems to be your major obsession the last few days, trying to convict be of some 'crime' over at FR, 13 years ago. Get a life. Find a new hobby. -- Or rave on, and continue your obsessive- compulsive behaviour. It's becoming funny/weird.
http://libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=349961&Disp=10#C10 There was an article TPR recently posted purely to instigate a flame war. I pinged you with a request to move it to the Biker Bar. --- Gatlin I saw that and fixed the title accordingly. TPR has been warned that one more incident and he's busted down to a lower posting level. --- sysadmin Gatlin keeps posting barely disguised remarks referring to me as a "stalker" purely to instigate a flame war. I'm pinging you with a request to give him a warning. tpaine posted on 2015-01-06 18:47:32 ET http://libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=349961&Disp=16#C16 Palmdale keeps posting barely disguised silly words referring to me as "pt/tp" purely to instigate a flame war. I'm pinging you with a request to give him a warning. tpaine posted on 2015-01-06 19:09:14 ET http://libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=349961&Disp=17#C17 If I were to start issuing formal warnings to every person here who uses "silly words" in their comments I'd have time for nothing else. People make fun of each other and call each other names here at least a dozen times before breakfast and it continues throughout the day. It is part and parcel of political debate even face-to-face in many instances, and it is very easy to fall into that habit when dealing with anonymous, faceless opponents online. (Frankly I believe in most cases the people doing the name calling are saying more about themselves than the persons being targeted.) However, I will keep an eye out for reports of anything that rises to the level of being truly objectionable. As always, if you guys (or anyone else) really want to get into it with each other that's no skin off my nose but please take it to the Biker Bar where it belongs. sysadmin posted on 2015-01-06 20:39:31 ET http://libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=349961&Disp=18#C18 Sorry about the silly words. I'll try to be less of a tpettifogger starting at some unspecified date in the near future. Palmdale posted on 2015-01-06 20:48:34 ET http://libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=349961&Disp=19#C19 OK, thanks -- just don't graduate to silly walks or we'll be in real trouble! sysadmin posted on 2015-01-06 20:57:28 ET http://libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=349961&Disp=20#C20 Pthe tpoor ptattle ptale... ---- Palmdale You are just insufferable. Stop whining. SOD posted on 2015-01-06 21:21:18 ET Everybody else tries to instigate flame wars with you, but you remain resolute in keeping the peace. It's a tough job but somebody has to do it.
Thank you for reposting those remarks. Obviously, I'm opposed by a lot of very unstable people who are very unhappy about them. Makes me proud.
Makes me proud. Yes, everybody else is unstable. You poor baby. You accuse everyone of trying to start a flame war with you. On this thread you started your modus operandi at your #39 to TooConservative. You continued your modus operandi at your #79 to myself, nolu chan. I have been documenting your pulling this same stunt at this site and other sites. By doing it with me (again), you invited the rebuttal. Sometimes the truth hurts. I am not flaming you, I am coldly, almost robotically, destroying your whines. http://www2.libertysflame.com/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=40732&Disp=39#C39 During a discussion with Nolu Chan, he asserted that an amendment repealing the 2nd could be ratified, and become a valid part of our Constitution. I contend such an amendment would be unconstitutional, and that officials of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of our various levels of gov'ts could give their opinions to that effect, and refuse to implement such and act, as per their oaths of office Do you contend that our only recourse from a majority passing amendments that take away our basic human rights is violence? - 'Treasonous' violence? - Civil war? What a silly clickbait vanity thread. What a silly, click-baiting reply. -- Take your attempts to start a flame war elsewhere. tpaine posted on 2015-07-09 15:33:25 ET http://www2.libertysflame.com/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=40732&Disp=79#C79 We agree... We disagree. -- There is nothing in our constitution itself that supports your opinion. -- Your lengthy postings of opinions by other authorities are just that, --- opinions. They do not prove your case. Your pejorative comments lead me to believe you want to end this discussion in a flame war. -- No thanks... tpaine posted on 2015-07-09 21:45:58 ET http://www2.libertysflame.com/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=40732&Disp=82#C82 A flame war does not consist of mildly perjorative comments. I am expressing my disdain for your blather. nolu chan posted on 2015-07-09 21:55:09 ET http://www2.libertysflame.com/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=40732&Disp=89#C89 [...] As I've noted before, you seem to want to end this discussion (because you realise you can't what - 'win'?) with a flame war. --- No sale.. tpaine posted on 2015-07-09 22:05:19 ET This is the #75 that you respond to by saying I want to end this discussion with a flame war. What you characterize as an entry in a flame war bears repeating to show your desperation. This claim is false, as previously explained thoroughly on the other thread. The question was not before the court to determine the constitutionality of the 18th Amendment. An amendment cannot be unconstitutional. Counsel did not argue the the amendment was unconstitutional, he argued that, due to its content, it was ordinary legislation and not an amendment at all. And, as ordinary legislation, the court had the authority to strike it down, according to this creative argument. Trust tpaine to bloviate endlessly about crap he has not seen or read. On brief: The briefs were ridiculed in W. F. Dodd, Amending the Federal Constitution, Yale Law Journal, Vl XXX, No. 4, February 1921, p. 322. This is the Yale Law Journal, not tpaine's court of the imagination. The argument was characterized in W. F. Dodd, Amending the Federal Constitution, Yale Law Journal, V1 XXX, No. 4, February 1921, p. 333. [...] Mr. Hughes’ brief in the Kentucky Distilleries Case presents the situation even more vigorously: “And what is ‘legislation’ which is thus said to lie outside the scope of the amending power according to the theory presented? Is it that the amendment must not be self-executing? But the obvious answer is that the Thirteenth Amendment is self-executing and it has been so adjudged by this court.... “Is it that the amendment must not directly affect the rights of persons without the intervention of legislation? The Thirteenth Amendment did that, for it made free men out of slaves. “Is it that the amendment must not directly disturb without further legislation vested rights of property? But the Thirteenth Amendment destroyed property in slaves. “The attempt is made to explain in some way that the Thirteenth Amendment, which did all these things, was not legislation. It is impossible then to understand in what sense the term “legislation” is used. For that which establishes a rule of law which, being self-executing, determines without further legislation the rights and status of persons and rights of property manifestly has the direct operation and effect of legislation.” The 18th Amendment was an amendment, not common legislation. In 264 Federal Reporter 186, on the Feigenspan case, the headnotes read, 2. Every grant of power to the federal government, whether by the Constitution as orlglnally framed or by subsequent amendment, necessariy diminished powers of the several st.ates, and that an amendment takes away a pollce power previously In the state dpes not render It invalid. 3. That a constitutional amendment is in effect legislation controlling the conduct of private individuals, in that it ordains a final permanent law prohibiting certain acts, not alterable at the will of a majority, does not render it invalid. 4. The provision of Const. art. 5, authorizing Congress to propose amendments "whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary," does not require that a joint resolution proposing an amendment shall expressly declare that it is deemed necessary. 5. Congress alone, of all departments of the federal government, is intrusted with the power of proposing amendments to the Constitution, and the form of resolutions by which it proposes an amendment is not subject to judicial investigation. 6. In Const. art. 5, providing that a proposed amendment shall be valid "when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states," when that mode shall be proposed by Congress, the word "Legislature" means the then recognized representative law-making bodies of the states, and the validity of an amendment ratified by the requisite number of such Legislatures cannot be affected by state laws providing for, or permitting, a referendum vote on legislative acts. 7. Eighteenth Amendment, § 2, providing that "the Congress and the several states shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislatlon," must be construed, in harmony with its purpose, to expressly authorize effective legislation for enforcement of section 1, which excludes a construction making concurrence of the states necessary to tbe effectiveness of congressional legislation, and such legislation, if enacted, is parramount, and, while it may be supplemented by state legislation, it cannot be defeated by any action or nonaction of the states. In the absence of action by Congress, any state may enact enforcement legislation effective within its borders. 8. National Prohibition Act Oct. 28, 1919, § 1, in providing that "intoxicating liquor" as used in the act, shall be construed to include all liquors, liquids, or compounds containing one-half of 1 per centum or more of alcohol by volume, does not make a definition which may be declared arbitrary and unconstitutional by the courts, but one which it was within the reasonable discretion of Congress to make for the purposes of the act. 9. National Prohibition Act Oct 28, 1919, held not invalid, as taking private property for public use without just compensution, in violation of Fifth Amendment, because, as incidental to the exercise of a lawful power, loss may result to certain species of property. 10. "Amendment" includes additions to, as well as corrections of, matters already treated, and there is nothing in the context of Const. art. 5, providing that Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments, which suggests that it was used in a restricted sense. The Decree in Feigenspan was affirmed by SCOTUS. 253 US 350, 40 Sup Ct 486.
Thank you for reposting those remarks. Obviously, I'm opposed by a lot of very unstable people who are very unhappy about them. Makes me proud. What can I say? -- You're certainly overwrought, as evidenced by your last reply.. Who's acting like a poor baby? You are kiddo. Whatever.... But do tell us more about your robotic fantasies....
But do tell us more about your robotic fantasies.... If you insist on more stories about your legal acumen and the pride you take in your posting history, I am compelled to comply. When Legal Giants Collide http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/802290/posts?page=133#133 This is absolute lunacy. In order for there to be a crime, someone must be injured by either force or fraud. Period. Otherwise no crime has been committed. 133 posted on 12/6/2002, 10:25:27 PM by Jonathon Spectre http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/802290/posts?page=211#211 Jonathon Spectre said: "In order for there to be a crime, someone must be injured by either force or fraud. Period." False. Period. Give JS & I an example of a 'criminal' act we could commit upon *you*, roscoe, -- that would injure you without using force or fraud. Sure. You could open a crack house in my neighborhood. Hmmm, - I open a 'bootleg' party house in your neighborhood. Unless we create a disturbance/cause harm, there is no criminal action committed to affect *you*, billy. -- But if the peace of the neighborhood is being disturbed, you are being *forced* to contend with an undesireable situation, and if it continued your property could also lose value, -a type of *fraud*. - You would have lawful recourse for your injuries. 211 posted on Saturday, December 07, 2002 17:33:37 by tpaine Let's see, disturbing the peace is a form of fraud. Only in tpaineworld. I prefer to give examples of what could be done to In tpaineworld, how does one commit a crime against another person, with or without violence? You could always violate the laws of nature.
You reAlly are going off the deep end with your last post, my boy. I'd recommend a mental health counselor, but I don't know any. Please, get help. I'm sorry that you feel I've driven you to this compulsion...
That one way to avoid admitting that you do not any more clue about criminal law than you do about constitutional law. You don't even know what I was talking about, you are that incompetent.
Your mistaken opinions about my character have been noted and you are entitled to them, but you really should lighten up, for your own mental health.. I've disputed your opinions about our Constitution. You really should try to live with the possibility that your education (in some politically correct law school?) may be flawed.. But in any case, it is not the end of the world when someone disputes what you INSIST are the way things MUST be. And believe me, I really am concerned about your compulsive and repetitive posts. Please, get help...
That's one way to avoid admitting that you do not any more clue about criminal law than you do about constitutional law. You don't even know what I was talking about, you are that incompetent. http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/802290/posts?page=224#224 bvw: No, he can't. My comments at #211 stand unrefuted by you three clowns, -- and now, to divert attention away from that fact, you claim that victimless 'crime' law is historically justified. -- This nations constitution was written in an attempt to correct such historical injustice. You boys, and your weird opinions on constitutional law are testimony that much work remains to educate americans on their own liberty. 224 posted on 12/8/2002, 1:59:56 PM by tpaine Unrefuted, indeed! Observing the Dean of the tpaine School of Law flail about in the dark is more fun than the typical TV sitcom. Nobody could possibly refute your scholarship at criminal law. Americans need to be educated oni the law and you, as leader of the Black Widows, are the one for the job.
How weird that you pick 'Roscoe' for your hero. --- But that's fine. --- Just another example of how overwrought and unstable you've become. I still don't understand just what disturbs you so.. The mere fact that we disagree about the constitutionality of amending away our basic human rights, -- shouldn't have set you off to this extent. Please nolu, tell us what is really bothering you...If you can..
Nothing. I am having a good time laughing at your helplessness. You can only try to divert attention from the fact that you are unable to understand why your comments on criminal law are so absurd. Your legal acumen was accurately assessed years ago by dpa5923. Your lack of understanding of criminal law is almost criminal. http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1907774/posts?page=177#177 Do not take up law as a profession. Your lack of understanding of basic principles of constitution or common law is almost criminal. It would definitely be grounds for malpractice if you ever tried to present such flawed arguments in a court of law. Before I call this issue dead, I feel I must address this though... You invited me on your property to do business. My concealed weapon does not make me a trespasser. If I invite you on my property with the stipulation that you must not be armed and you are indeed armed without my consent, then you have entered my property without my consent (my consent was conditional on you not being armed) and you would be a trespasser. If I make no mention of such a condition you would not be trespassing until I tell you that you cannot be on my land with weapons and you refused to leave. That's the law (which does not contradict the US Constitution) 177 posted on 10/13/2007, 5:07:03 PM by dpa5923
I still don't understand just what disturbs you so.. The mere fact that we disagree about the constitutionality of amending away our basic human rights, -- shouldn't have set you off to this extent. Please nolu, tell us what is really bothering you...If you can.. Me? Helpless? Dream on boy. You keep repeating your mistaken opinions and attempt to prove them by digging up old threads from FR. --- Do you really imagine this silly tactic is working? www.freerepublic.com/focu...907774/posts?page=177#177 Thanks again for the link. I urge anyone to read the thread for context.
I see that you have entered your excuse making phase to explain why you are incapable of discerning what is so boneheaded about your discussion of criminal law quoted in my #197 and #201. Your abject lack of legal knowledge, i.e. not knowing what you were talking about, now leaves you helpless to to do anything but bluster and bloviate. It is fun to watch. While I have not claimed to be a lawyer, you allusion to my purported politically correct law school education is your way of explaining why your own knowledge of law is revealed to be so deficient. It is a crutch to explain the boneheaded nature of your discussion of criminal law. [tpaine #204] Please nolu, tell us what is really bothering you...If you can.. Asked and answered at my #203, "Nothing. I am having a good time laughing at your helplessness." http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1907774/posts?page=177#177 Thanks again for the link. I urge anyone to read the thread for context. Oh, that's alright, I'll repeat the context. It was that "[y]our lack of understanding of basic principles of constitution or common law is almost criminal. It would definitely be grounds for malpractice if you ever tried to present such flawed arguments in a court of law." Do not take up law as a profession. Your lack of understanding of basic principles of constitution or common law is almost criminal. It would definitely be grounds for malpractice if you ever tried to present such flawed arguments in a court of law. Before I call this issue dead, I feel I must address this though... You invited me on your property to do business. My concealed weapon does not make me a trespasser. If I invite you on my property with the stipulation that you must not be armed and you are indeed armed without my consent, then you have entered my property without my consent (my consent was conditional on you not being armed) and you would be a trespasser. If I make no mention of such a condition you would not be trespassing until I tell you that you cannot be on my land with weapons and you refused to leave. That's the law (which does not contradict the US Constitution) 177 posted on 10/13/2007, 5:07:03 PM by dpa5923 As for your general legal acumen, the following is a fun example: http://libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=204789&Disp=30#C30 [...] It is correct to state that the right to life is an inalienable right that man cannot take away. The right to self defense is part of that inalienable right to life. Everyone has it. A four-year-old has it. A prisoner has it. An illegal alien has it. A foreign visitor has it. An insane person has it. It is then argued that our inalienable right to self defense does not include using a gun because if it did, then the aforementioned group would have the right to use one and they don't; -- which is faulty logic. If any of the above group use a weapon of any type in self defense, a fully informed jury, judging both the facts and the law of the case at hand [self defense] would be duty bound to rule the defendant innocent. Case closed. [to those with logical, open minds] tpaine posted on 2007-10-30 9:08:50 ET In tpaineworld, certified lunatics have the inalienable right to keep and bear arms. And to deposit their turds of thought upon the internet. I prefer to print them out, cut them into 4-inch squares, and store them in the little reading room to see if any of tpaine's inspired wisdom will rub off. Amendment V As per tpaine, "the right to life is an inalienable right that man cannot take away," I suppose the capital crime cited in the Constitution must refer to a crime committed in Washington, D.C. As for the certified insane having a right to keep and bear arms, some people should not be allowed to keep and bear keyboards.
tpaine #200] I've disputed your opinions about our Constitution. You really should try to live with the possibility that your education (in some politically correct law school?) may be flawed.. Thanks for finally admitting you are not a lawyer, arguing as an authority. -- Thus, your opinions are just that, opinions. I and many others, both here and on other forums, have rejected some of your opinions, as your links to FR and LP have proved. Thanks again do posting them.. libertypost.org/cgi- bin/r...ArtNum=204789&Disp=30#C30 #30. To: robertpaulsen, tolsti, yall (#28) [...] It is correct to state that the right to life is an inalienable right that man cannot take away. The right to self defense is part of that inalienable right to life. Everyone has it. A four-year-old has it. A prisoner has it. An illegal alien has it. A foreign visitor has it. An insane person has it. It is then argued that our inalienable right to self defense does not include using a gun because if it did, then the aforementioned group would have the right to use one and they don't; -- which is faulty logic. If any of the above group use a weapon of any type in self defense, a fully informed jury, judging both the facts and the law of the case at hand [self defense] would be duty bound to rule the defendant innocent. Case closed. [to those with logical, open minds] tpaine posted on 2007-10-30 9:08:50 ET Yada yada, --- on you go with your silly effort to prove something, -- any damn thing... Again, I urge everyone who is still interested in this discussion to read at leastcthe last portions of the thread nolu posted. Both he and robertpaulsen slink away from the argument, in defeat.
It's like rock 'n' roll, the hits just keep on coming. Continuing to review your legal incompetence, Any claim to be a lawyer by an internet handle is meaningless. Citations to and quotes of competent legal authority are not. My quotes and citations outweigh your brain farts, such as your still hilarious about what acts do, or do not, constitute a crime of one person against another person. Amendment V: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless...." It is correct to state that the DoI, a political statement, refers to inalienable rights, such as the right to liberty and the pursuit of happiness, except for their slaves, and the inalienable right to life. It is correct to state that the DoI has never been adopted as the law of any jurisdiction. The paramount law of the United States explicitly provides for capital punishment. While you maintain that the right to life is an inalienable right that man can not take away, the law of the land provides for executions. The several states and the United States have executed man and woman, using such methods as firing squad, hanging, electrocution, gas chamber, and lethal injection. The objects of the exercise found their supposed inalienable right was quite alienable. Of course, the person ineligible to possess a weapon, or if the weapon was unlawful to possess, would be guilty of illegal possession of a weapon. The right to self-defense does not authorize unlawful possession of a weapon. In the Bernhard Goetz case, he was found not guilty of four counts of attempted murder, three counts of assault in the first degree, but was found guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (N.Y.P.L. 265.02). Goetz served time as a result of the criminal conviction. People v Pons, Ct App NY, 68 NY2d 264, 266 (1986) Juries have consistently found the guilty party to be guilty, contrary to your baseless claim to the contrary. The right to self-defense does not infer a right to unlawful possession of a weapon.
Yada yada, --- on you go with your silly effort to prove something, -- any damn thing... Again, I urge everyone who is still interested in this discussion to read at least the last portions of the last thread nolu posted. Both he and robertpaulsen slink away from the argument, in defeat. You imagine you're 'hitting' me? How idiotic, -- all you're doing is displaying your obsessive weirdness, by posting old threads on which you and I disagreed, most of which you left, unable to prove your points. You're acting like a real crazy guy on FR, 'Roscoe'.. Keep up the good work.
At #208 As for the inalienable right to life, You imagine you're 'hitting' me? How idiotic, Only tpaine responds to my #207 with the following quote, making believe it appears in my #207. I does not. This is the actual content of my #207 which so flattened his #206 that he cannot respond in substance but must make believe. Any claim to be a lawyer by an internet handle is meaningless. Citations to and quotes of competent legal authority are not. My quotes and citations outweigh your brain farts, such as your still hilarious about what acts do, or do not, constitute a crime of one person against another person. Amendment V: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless...." It is correct to state that the DoI, a political statement, refers to inalienable rights, such as the right to liberty and the pursuit of happiness, except for their slaves, and the inalienable right to life. It is correct to state that the DoI has never been adopted as the law of any jurisdiction. The paramount law of the United States explicitly provides for capital punishment. While you maintain that the right to life is an inalienable right that man can not take away, the law of the land provides for executions. The several states and the United States have executed man and woman, using such methods as firing squad, hanging, electrocution, gas chamber, and lethal injection. The objects of the exercise found their supposed inalienable right was quite alienable. Of course, the person ineligible to possess a weapon, or if the weapon was unlawful to possess, would be guilty of illegal possession of a weapon. The right to self-defense does not authorize unlawful possession of a weapon. In the Bernhard Goetz case, he was found not guilty of four counts of attempted murder, three counts of assault in the first degree, but was found guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (N.Y.P.L. 265.02). Goetz served time as a result of the criminal conviction. People v Pons, Ct App NY, 68 NY2d 264, 266 (1986) Juries have consistently found the guilty party to be guilty, contrary to your baseless claim to the contrary. The right to self-defense does not infer a right to unlawful possession of a weapon.
tpaine only wishes I would slink away. I have left him hit from argument like a trapped rat. Whenever tpaine presents his clueless interpretations of the Constitution to an attorney, he is told that he is a fool. http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1149329/posts?page=45#45 It is crystal clear that the Bill of Rights was written to restrain the power and reach of the federal government only. Your own words above confirm that you support the State of California's 'power' to prohibit assault weapons. Congressman Billybob wrote: I haven't said a word about California gun laws. I HAVE said that you are a fool for not understanding that the Constitution means what it says. The supremacy clause of Art VI says that the States are bound to honor our Constitution/BOR's. You are wrong in saying that States are not "restrained" by our BOR's; -- namely, the 2nd Amendment. Case closed. 45 posted on 6/8/2004, 12:24:43 AM by tpaine (The line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart of every human be" -- Solzhenitsyn) http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1149329/posts?page=46#46 The only "case closed" is your inability to read and understand plain English used in the Constitution. You remain a fool. 46 posted on 6/8/2004, 12:31:09 AM by Congressman Billybob Congressman Billybob, the late John Armor, was an attorney.
Yada yada, --- on you go with your silly effort to prove something, -- any damn thing... Again, I urge everyone who is still interested in this discussion to read at least the last portions of the thread nolu posted, where both he and robertpaulsen slink away from the argument, in defeat. Anyone can read the thread in question, wherein both you and Paulsen quit posting. Big deal. Most anyone on FR at that time could also testify that he was a big bag of wind.. --- Just as you experienced yourself.. Please continue your hissy fit display though.. It's really getting amusing..
Again, I urge everyone who is still interested in this discussion to read at least the last portions of the thread nolu posted, where both he and robertpaulsen slink away from the argument, in defeat. One will have to gain entry to tpaine's mind to find a place where anyone has ever slinked away from tpaine in defeat. Here on the tpaine vanity thread, he has been reduced to responding with "yada, yada, yada," because he is unable to debate the merits of his inane legal arguments, or the lack of such merts. So far, tpain has opined that the courts are wrong, the lawyers are wrong, anyone who disagrees with his nonsense is insane, and has cited imaginary comments. As he has been reduced to unintelligible spluttering, it is time for basic history lessons. Today's lesson is Judicial Review, as explained in the constitutional debates prior to ratification. Reality is readily found, tpaine's bloviations are unsupported. JUDICIAL REVIEW: Farrand and Elliot, Constitutional Debates Farrand's Records is a record of the Federal Constitutional Convention, in three volumes. Elliott's Debates is a record of the State Conventions on the Constitution in five volumes. 1 Farrand 21-22: [James Madison] 9. Resd. that a National Judiciary be established to consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour; and to receive punctually at stated [22] times fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution, that the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear & determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in the dernier resort, all piracies & felonies on the high seas, captures from an enemy; cases in which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested, or which respect the collection of the National revenue; impeachments of any National officers, and questions which may involve the national peace and harmony. Note: dernier resort means last resort. - - - - - 1 Farrand 97: [Elbridge Gerry] Mr. Gerry doubts whether the Judiciary ought to form a part of it [nc - a Council of Revision], as they will have a sufficient check agst. encroachments on their own department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a power of deciding on their Constitutionality. - - - - - 2 Farrand 27: [Governeur Morris and Roger Sherman] Mr. Govr. Morris opposed this power as likely to be terrible to the States, and not necessary, if sufficient Legislative authority should be given to the Genl. Government. Mr. Sherman thought it unnecessary, as the Courts of the States would not consider as valid any law contravening the Authority of the Union, and which the legislature would wish to be negatived. - - - - - 2 Farrand 28: [James Madison] - - - - - 2 Farrand 93: [James Madison] - - - - - 2 Elliott 131: [Samuel Adams] - - - - - 2 Elliott 196: [Oliver Elsworth] - - - - - 2 Elliott 443: [George Nicholas] - - - - - 2 Elliott 445: [James Wilson] This could not have been the case in a compound legislature; it is therefore proper to have efficient restraints upon the legislative body. These restraints arise from different sources. I will mention some of them. In this Constitution, they will be produced, in a very considerable degree, by a division of the power in the legislative body itself. Under this system, they may arise likewise from the interference of those officers who will be introduced into the executive and judicial departments. They may spring also from another source — the election by the people; and finally, under this Constitution, they may proceed from the great and last resort — from the people themselves. I say, under this Constitution, the legislature may be restrained, and kept within its prescribed bounds, by the interposition of the judicial department. - - - - - 4 Elliott 553: [John Marshall]
--- nolu chan contends an amendment to repeal the 2nd Amdt could be passed --- Nolu wrote this proposed amendment that follows, and claims that it would be constitutional.. Poster Comment: During a discussion with Nolu Chan, he asserted that an amendment repealing the 2nd could be ratified, and become a valid part of our Constitution. I contend such an amendment would be unconstitutional. Since posting this thread, I'm flat amazed at how many self described 'conservatives' agree with Nolu, that a tyranny of a (super?) majority could repeal the 2nd Amendment, in a supposedly constitutional manner. Now, of course, nolu is still posting opinions from courts and 'expert' authorities that agree with his opinions. -- None of which, in my opinion, have proved his point. - -- (Although in his last post, oddly enough, he quotes from opinions that agree with points I have made, previously). -- His other efforts, to smear me, --- only reinforce, in my opinion, nolu' s obsessive and almost fanatical delusion that the majority rules in this Republic. We formed this Republic under the rule of law, Constitutional law, to protect individual rights. -- Passing amendments that repealed individual rights would in effect, nullify our constitutional principles..
tpaine feels a need to put derisive quotation marks around expert when referring back to James Madison, Elbridge Gerry, Governeur Morris, Roger Sherman, and Samuel Adams at the Federal constitution convention, and Oliver Ellsworth, George Nicholas, James Wilson, and John Marshall at the State conventions in debate about the Constitution. Those are the experts I quoted at my #212. Here on the tpaine vanity thread, he has been reduced to responding with "yada, yada, yada," because he is unable to debate the merits of his inane legal arguments, or the lack of such merits. Again, tpaine has opined that the courts are wrong, the legal experts are wrong. tpaine is amazed the a Constitution of the people, which permits amendment, can be amended by the people, without the approval of tpaine or his imaginary “deemers.” In all the years he has been excreting his mental dumps upon the net, he has not cited recognized legal authority to support his absurdities. As he has been reduced to unintelligible spluttering, it is time to continue the basic history lessons. Today's lesson continues Jurisdiction and Judicial Review. - - - Henry St. George Tucker, Lectures on Constitutional Law, for the use of the Law Class at the University of Virginia, Lecture VII, pp. 205-207. A citizen of Pennsylvania sues a Virginian in the federal court of this state in a case, in which the constitutional question of the right to sue is involved. Judgment is rendered against the Virginian. He appeals to his state for redress. Virginia decides that the law or judgment is unconstitutional, and that there was no right to sue. The judgment then must be suspended till three fourths approve it. With this state of things the Pennsylvanian is dissatisfied. He appeals to his state, which decides that there was a right to sue. He then demands an enforcement of the judgment, until three fourths of the states pronounce it wrong. Thus Virginia denies that there is any right to sue unless three fourths of the states determine otherwise. On the other hand, Pennsylvania, with equal rights, insists that there is a right to sue until three fourths of the states determine otherwise. Both cannot be. For one or the other must be overruled by one more than one fourth. Which shall it be ? A casuist even would be puzzled to decide. It is earnestly contended, indeed, that the right of the states to determine, for themselves, every question of constitutional law, and to decide whether the compact is broken, is inseparable from its sovereignty. This is, indeed, most true, where no umpire is appointed to decide the question. But where parties standing in antagonist relations appoint an umpire, they cannot question or renounce his decision. Bona fides demands their compliance with it. Now, as will be presently shewn, the judiciary have been appointed by the states to decide all questions arising under the constitution. They do therefore constitute the umpire between the states and the United States, and between the several states of the confederacy and their citi- - - - - - [206] zens, and both parties are conclusively bound by its decisions. Nor can there be danger in such an umpirage. Selected for their virtues and ability, and lifted above all fear or favour or affection, they merit confidence from all; but as they are citizens of the states and attached peculiarly to them, the states have surely little reason for distrust: And if we could suspect them of any leaning which does not spring from honest conviction, we should surely apprehend a leaning to the states. Let us see then in whom are the judicial powers of the government vested by the constitution. The third article, section 1st, declares that they “shall be vested in ONE supreme court, and in such inferior courts as congress may from time to time ordain vand establish.” And in the 2d section it provides, that the judicial power shall extend to ALL cases arising under the constitution,” so that the decision of ALL cases arising under the constitution, is vested in the supreme court, and such inferior courts, &c. But if the constitution of the United States vests the power to decide a question arising under the constitution in the supreme court, there can be no constitutional appeal from its decision; for if there could, it would no longer be supreme. For the power to decide (which is the judicial power), is a power to determine a question or dispute;(o) and the vesting that power in one supreme court, is a negative of the power of any other body to controvert its determination. For if the judgment of the supreme court may be controverted by another court, then it is clear that the court is not supreme, and that its judgment has not determined [or put an end to] the question, although, the power to determine it is given by the constitution. The judgments then of the supreme court, “in cases arising under the constitution,” must be final and conclusive. This, indeed, seems to be admitted as to all other tribunals;(p) and I think I have shewn there can be no other appeal, except that which consists in a rejection of the “cancelled obligations of the violated compact, and a resort to original rights, and the law of self-preservation.” What then are “cases arising under the constitution?” Are questions of constitutional law, and questions of the (o) Walker’s Dictionary. (p) Review p. 80, para. 2. - - - - - [207] jurisdiction of the supreme court such cases? If so, they are comprehended by the judicial power which is vested in the supreme court, and its decisions thereupon are final and conclusive. Now, it would not seem to admit of doubt that all questions of constitutional law, whether respecting the true meaning and intention of the instrument, or the extent and character of the several powers granted to the federal government, or any department thereof, are questions arising under the constitution; and all cases between proper parties, which depend upon such questions, are, therefore, cases arising under the constitution. To all such cases it is declared that the jurisdiction shall extend. When, therefore, the court is in possession of such a case, the determination of which depends upon a constitutional question, it must of necessity determine that question, if it determines the case; and that determination, we have endeavoured to shew, must be final and conclusive. This is emphatically the case as to the subject of jurisdiction,(q) and, therefore, the judgment of the supreme court, on a question of jurisdiction, however erroneous it may seem, is final and conclusive, and cannot be controverted by any other court or organ of the government. The supreme court itself, indeed, may, in a subsequent case, reconsider the question and overrule the precedent; but until they do so, it must be held to be final and conclusive, and can in no wise be lawfully resisted. The states may, indeed, amend the constitution, but until amended there seems to be no mode of getting rid of an obnoxious precedent, but by the act of the court itself in overruling it. (q) “It is admitted,” says the reviewer very truly, “that every court must necessarily determine every question of jurisdiction before it, and, so far, it must of course be the judge of its own powers. If it be a court of the last resort, its decision is necessarily final, so far as those authorities are concerned which belong to the same system of government with itself.”
This is very illustrative of how I see many so called conservatives use the "constitution". If an amendment is passed, of course, it is constitutional. But this is not the first time I have heard some (not all) so called conservatives proclaim an amendment to the constitution is not constitutional. In any case, here is some comedy:
William Rawle, A View of the Constitution, 1825, Chapter 20, of the Judicial Power, p. 188: Of the Judicial Power. NO form of government is complete unless it be accompanied with a judicial power. To make laws and to execute them are the two great operations of government, but they cannot be fully and correctly executed unless there is somewhere resident a power to expound and apply them. This power is auxiliary to the executive authority, and in some degree partakes of its nature. But it is also required at times to control the executive, and what it decides to be unlawful the executive cannot perform. It may also in some degree be said to participate in the legislative power. Its construction of the acts of the legislature is received as binding and conclusive, although it does not prevent the legislature from repairing its own defects, or clearing up its own ambiguities by subsequent laws, operating on subsequent cases. A high function also appertains to the judiciary in the exclusive right to expound the constitution, and thereby to test the validity of all the acts of the legislature. To the people at large, therefore, this institution is peculiarly valuable and ought to be eminently cherished by them. On its firm and independent structure they repose with safety, while they perceive in it a power which is only set in motion when applied to, but which when thus brought into action, proceeds with competent power when required, to correct the error or subdue the oppression of both or either of the two other branches. - - - - - - - - - - William Rawle, A View of the Constitution, 1825, Chapter 30, Of checks and controls on other branches of the Government, p. 277: - - - - - - - - - - Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, 1833, pages 693-694: § 1831. The propriety of this clause would seem to result from the very nature of the constitution. If it was to establish a national government, that government ought, to the extent of its powers and rights, to be supreme. It would be a perfect solecism to affirm, that a national government should exist with certain powers; and yet, that in the exercise of those powers it should not be supreme. What other inference could have been drawn, than of their supremacy, if the constitution had been totally silent? And surely a positive affirmance of that, which is necessarily implied, cannot in a case of such vital importance be deemed unimportant. The very circumstance, that a question might be made, would irresistibly lead to the conclusion, that it ought not to be left to inference. A law, by the very meaning of the term, includes supremacy. It is a rule, which those, to whom it is prescribed, are bound to observe. This results from every political association. If individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that society must be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a number of political societies enter into a larger political society, the laws, which the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers entrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme over those [694] societies, and the individuals, of whom they are composed, It would otherwise be a mere treaty, dependent upon the good faith of the parties, and not a government, which is only another name for political power and supremacy. But it will not follow, that acts of the larger society, which are not pursuant to its constitutional powers, but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the smaller societies, will become the supreme law of the land. They will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such. Hence we perceive, that the above clause only declares a truth, which flows immediately and necessarily from the institution of a national government.1 It will be observed, that the supremacy of the laws is attached to those only, which are made in pursuance of the constitution; a caution very proper in itself but in fact the limitation would have arisen by irresistible implication, if it had not been expressed.2 1 The Federalist, No. 33. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat R. 210, 211; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat R. 405, 406. — This passage from the Federalist (No. 33) has been, for another purpose, already cited in Vol. I. § 340; but it is necessary to be here repeated to give due effect to the subsequent passages. 2 Ibid. See also 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 369, 370. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, 1833, page 703:
Dickerson v United States, 530 US 428, 436-37 (2000) The law in this area is clear. This Court has supervisory authority over the federal courts, and we may use that authority to prescribe rules of evidence and procedure that are binding in those tribunals. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U. S. 416, 426 (1996). However, the power to judicially create and enforce nonconstitutional “rules of procedure and evidence for the federal courts exists only in the absence of a relevant Act of Congress.” Palermo v. United States, 360 U. S. 343, 353, n. 11 (1959) (citing Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371, 382 (1933), and Gordon v. United States, 344 U. S. 414, 418 (1953)). Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution. Palermo, supra, at 345–348; Carlisle, supra, at 426; Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U. S. 252, 265 (1980). But Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution. See, e. g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 517–521 (1997).
Please continue your hissy fit display though.. It's really getting amusing.. --- Particularly amusing is your last quote, which makes my point: --- Thank you, again...
Although you have proven your utter lack of reading comprehension, I will continue, at your request. As you make believe you are unable to fathom the bare fundamentals of judicial review, I will now cover your beloved Supremacy Clause, at the mention of which, magic unicorns fly out your arse and transform it into something previously unknown. The Federalist Papers There are two sections of The Federalist Papers that deal with the Supremacy Clause. In Federalist No. 33, Alexander Hamilton argues that the Supremacy Clause is simply an assurance that the government's powers can be properly executed, saying that a law itself implies supremacy, and without supremacy it would amount to nothing. In Federalist No. 44, James Madison similarly defends the Supremacy Clause as vital to the functioning of the nation. He noted that state legislatures were invested with all powers not specifically defined in the constitution, but also said that having the federal government subservient to various state constitutions would be an inversion of the principles of government, concluding that if supremacy were not established "it would have seen the authority of the whole society everywhere subordinate to the authority of the parts; it would have seen a monster, in which the head was under the direction of the members". - - - Supreme Court interpretations In Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796), the United States Supreme Court for the first time applied the Supremacy Clause to strike down a state statute. Virginia had passed a statute during the Revolutionary War allowing the state to confiscate debt payments by Virginia citizens to British creditors. The Supreme Court found that this Virginia statute was inconsistent with the Treaty of Paris with Britain, which protected the rights of British creditors. Relying on the Supremacy Clause, the Supreme Court held that the treaty superseded Virginia's statute, and that it was the duty of the courts to declare Virginia's statute "null and void". In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816), and Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821), the Supreme Court held that the Supremacy Clause and the judicial power granted in Article III give the Supreme Court the ultimate power to review state court decisions involving issues arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Therefore, the Supreme Court has the final say in matters involving federal law, including constitutional interpretation, and can overrule decisions by state courts. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), the Supreme Court reviewed a tax levied by Maryland on the federally incorporated Bank of the United States. The Court found that if a state had the power to tax a federally incorporated institution, then the state effectively had the power to destroy the federal institution, thereby thwarting the intent and purpose of Congress. This would make the states superior to the federal government. The Court found that this would be inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause, which makes federal law superior to state law. The Court therefore held that Maryland's tax on the bank was unconstitutional because the tax violated the Supremacy Clause. In Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1859), the Supreme Court held that state courts cannot issue rulings that contradict the decisions of federal courts, citing the Supremacy Clause, and overturning a decision by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Specifically, the court found it was illegal for state officials to interfere with the work of U.S. Marshals enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act or to order the release of federal prisoners held for violation of that Act. The Supreme Court reasoned that because the Supremacy Clause established federal law as the law of the land, the Wisconsin courts could not nullify the judgments of a federal court. The Supreme Court held that under Article III of the Constitution, the federal courts have the final jurisdiction in all cases involving the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that the states therefore cannot interfere with federal court judgments. In Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) the Supreme Court struck down the Pennsylvania Sedition Act, which made advocating the forceful overthrow of the federal government a crime under Pennsylvania state law. The Supreme Court held that when federal interest in an area of law is sufficiently dominant, federal law must be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject; and a state law is not to be declared a help when state law goes farther than Congress has seen fit to go. In Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), the Supreme Court held that the U.S. Constitution supersedes international treaties ratified by the U.S. Senate. In Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), the Supreme Court rejected attempts by Arkansas to nullify the Court's school desegregation decision, Brown v. Board of Education. The state of Arkansas, acting on a theory of states' rights, had adopted several statutes designed to nullify the desegregation ruling. The Supreme Court relied on the Supremacy Clause to hold that the federal law controlled and could not be nullified by state statutes or officials. In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), the Supreme Court ruled: "A state statute is void to the extent that it actually conflicts with a valid Federal statute". In effect, this means that a State law will be found to violate the Supremacy Clause when either of the following two conditions (or both) exist:[1] "State law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" In 1920, the Supreme Court applied the Supremacy Clause to international treaties, holding in the case of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, that the Federal government's ability to make treaties is supreme over any state concerns that such treaties might abrogate states' rights arising under the Tenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has also held that only specific, "unmistakable" acts of Congress may be held to trigger the Supremacy Clause. Montana had imposed a 30 percent tax on most sub-bituminous coal mined there. The Commonwealth Edison Company and other utility companies argued, in part, that the Montana tax "frustrated" the broad goals of the national energy policy. However, in the case of Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), the Supreme Court disagreed. Any appeal to claims about "national policy", the Court said, were insufficient to overturn a state law under the Supremacy Clause unless "the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained".[2] However, in the case of California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989), the Supreme Court held that if Congress expressedly intended to act in an area, this would trigger the enforcement of the Supremacy Clause, and hence nullify the state action. The Supreme Court further found in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000), that even when a state law is not in direct conflict with a federal law, the state law could still be found unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause if the "state law is an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of Congress's full purposes and objectives".[3] Congress need not expressly assert any preemption over state laws either, because Congress may implicitly assume this preemption under the Constitution.[4] - - - The Fourteenth Amendment Similarities exist between the Supremacy Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states: The difference between the two is that while the Supremacy Clause deals with the relationship between the Federal Government and the states, the Fourteenth Amendment deals with the relationships among the Federal Government, the States, and the citizens of the United States. - - - References Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470 (Fed Cir 1998). Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 634, quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-374. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 386-388.
http://supreme.justia.com/us/2/419/case.html Chisholm v Georgia, 2 Dal. 419 (1793) Justice Iredell at 2 Dal. 447 Justice Iredell at 2 Dal. 448 Justice Wilson at 2 Dal. 455 Cicero says so sublimely, “Nothing, which is exhibited upon our globe is more acceptable to that divinity which governs the whole universe than those communities and assemblages of men which, lawfully associated, are denominated states.” Let a state be considered as subordinate to the people. But let everything else be subordinate to the state. The latter part of this position is equally necessary with the former. For in the practice, and even at length, in the science of politics, there has very frequently been a strong current against the natural order of things, and an inconsiderate or an interested disposition to sacrifice the end to the means. As the state has claimed precedence of the people, so, in the same inverted course of things, the government has often claimed precedence of the state, and to this perversion in the second degree, many of the volumes of confusion concerning sovereignty owe their existence. The ministers, dignified very properly by the appellation of the magistrates, have wished, and have succeeded in their wish, to be considered as the sovereigns of the state. This second degree of perversion is confined to the old world, and begins to diminish even there; but the first degree is still too prevalent, even in the several States of which our union is composed. By a "state," I mean a complete body of free persons united together for their common benefit to enjoy peaceably what is their own and to do justice to others. It is an artificial person. It has its affairs and its interests; it has its rules; it has its rights; and it has its obligations. It may acquire property distinct from that of its members. It may incur debts to be discharged out of the public stock, not out of the private fortunes of individuals. It may be bound by contracts, and for damages arising from the breach of those contracts. In all our contemplations, however, concerning this feigned and artificial person, we should never forget that, in truth and nature, those who think and speak and act are men. Is the foregoing description of a state a true description? It will not be questioned but it is. Justice Wilson at 2 Dal. 457 Justice Wilson at 2 Dal. 462-63 Concerning the prerogative of Kings, and concerning the sovereignty of states, much has been said and written; but little has been said and written concerning a subject much more dignified and important, the majesty of the people. The mode of expression, which I would substitute in the place of that generally used, is not only politically, but also (for between true liberty and true taste there is a close alliance) classically more correct. On the mention of Athens, a thousand refined and endearing associations rush at once into the memory of the scholar, the philosopher, and the patriot. When Homer, one of the most correct, as well as the oldest of human authorities, enumerates the other nations of Greece whose forces acted at the siege of Troy, he arranges them under the names of their different Kings or Princes. But when he comes to the Athenians, he distinguishes them by the peculiar appellation of the PEOPLE of Athens. The well known address used by Demosthenes, when he harrangued and animated his assembled countrymen, was “O Men of Athens.” With the strictest propriety, therefore, classical and political, our national scene opens with the most magnificent object which the nation could present. “The PEOPLE of the United states” are the first personages introduced. Who were those people? They were the citizens of thirteen states, each of which had a separate constitution and government, and all of which were connected together by Articles of Confederation. Justice Cushing at 2 Dal. 468 Chief Justice Jay at 2 Dal. 470 Chief Justice Jay at 2 Dal. 473
218. To: nolu chan (#216) Please continue your hissy fit display though.. It's really getting amusing.. --- Particularly amusing is your this quote, which makes my point: --- Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, 1833, page 703: ---- § 1836. From this supremacy of the constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, within their constitutional scope, arises the duty of courts of justice to declare any unconstitutional law passed by congress or by a state legislature void. So, in like manner, the same duty arises, whenever any other department of the national or state governments exceeds its constitutional functions. But the judiciary of the United States has no general jurisdiction to declare acts of the several states void, unless they are repugnant to the constitution of the United States, notwithstanding they are repugnant to the state constitution. Such a power belongs to it only, when it sits to administer the local law of a state, and acts exactly, as a state tribunal is bound to act. But upon this subject it seems unnecessary to dwell, since the right of all courts, state as well as national, to declare unconstitutional laws void, seems settled beyond the reach of judicial controversy. Thank you, again.. Sorry but my request is for you to continue making a fool of YOUR self. --- And you're doing just fine.. Unlike you, I comprehend the plain words of our Constitution. --- It's wannabe lawyers, and shysters like you who have fouled up the judicial review system.
--- Particularly amusing is your this quote, which makes my point: --- Particulary amusing is your vivid imagination. Your assinine opinion is that SCOTUS lacks the authority to exercise judicial review and declare laws constitutional or strike them down as unconstitutional, and you go further to claim that the Executive and Legislative branches are empowered to ignore SCOTUS decisions by some hitherto unknown magical power bestowed by the Supremacy Clause. Justice Story wrote that "the right of all courts, state as well as national, to declare unconstitutional laws void, seems settled beyond the reach of judicial controversy." You vividly imagine that this statement confirming the authority to exercise judicial review somehow supports your brain fart. http://libertysflame.com/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=40004&Disp=73#C73 tpaine posted on 2015-06-09 10:03:28 ET Yep, those branches of gov can and have ignored SCOTUS opinions that they consider unconstitutional. -- This is their duty, under the provisions of the supremacy clause, Article VI.... Continuing at your invitation, from SCOTUS predating Marbury. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/2/409/case.html Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 409 (1792) 2 U.S. 409 MOTION FOR MANDAMUS This was a motion for a mandamus to be directed to the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania commanding the said court to proceed in a certain petition of Wm. Hayburn, who had applied to be put on the pension list of the United States as an invalid pensioner. The principal case arose upon the act of Congress passed 23 March, 1792. The Attorney General (Randolph) who made the motion for the mandamus, having premised that it was done ex officio, without an application from any particular person, but with a view to procure the execution of an act of Congress particularly interesting to a meritorious and unfortunate class of citizens, the court declared that it entertained great doubt upon his right, under such circumstances and in a case of this kind, to proceed ex officio, and directed him to state the principles on which he attempted to support the right. The Attorney General accordingly entered into an elaborate description of the powers and duties of his office. But the court being divided in opinion on that question, the motion, made ex officio, was not allowed. The Attorney General then changed the ground of his interposition, declaring it to be at the instance and on behalf of Hayburn, a party interested; and he entered into the merits of the case upon the act of Congress and the refusal of the judges to carry it into effect. The Court observed that it would hold the motion under advisement until the next term, but no decision was ever pronounced, as the legislature, at an intermediate 2 U. S. 410 session, provided in another way for the relief of the pensioners. * 2 U. S. 411 The Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania, consisting of Wilson, and Blair, Justices, and Peters, District Judge, made the following representation in a letter jointly addressed to the President of the United States on 18 April, 1792: “To you it officially belongs to ‘take care that the laws’ of the United States ‘to faithfully executed.’ Before you, therefore, we think it our duty to lay the sentiments which, on a late painful occasion, governed us with regard to an act passed by the legislature of the union.” “The people of the United States have vested in Congress all legislative powers ‘granted in the Constitution.’” “They have vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress shall establish ‘the judicial power of the United States.’” “It is worthy of remark that in Congress the whole legislative power of the United States is not vested. An important part of that power was exercised by the people themselves when they ‘ordained and established the Constitution.’” “This Constitution is ‘the Supreme Law of the Land.’ This supreme law ‘all judicial officers of the United States are bound, by oath or affirmation, to support.’” “It is a principle important to freedom that in government, the judicial should be distinct from and independent of the legislative department. To this important principle the people of the United States, in forming their Constitution, have manifested the highest regard.” “They have placed their judicial power not in Congress, but in ‘courts.’ They have ordained that the ‘judges of those courts shall hold their offices during good behavior,’ and that ‘during their continuance in office, their salaries shall not be diminished.’” “Congress has lately passed an act to regulate, among other things, ‘the claims to invalid pensions.’” “Upon due consideration, we have been unanimously of opinion that under this act, the circuit court held for the Pennsylvania District could not proceed” “1st. Because the business directed by this act is not of a judicial nature. It forms no part of the power vested by the Constitution in the courts of the United States; the circuit court must consequently have proceeded without constitutional authority.” “2d. Because if, upon that business, the court had proceeded, its judgments (for its opinions are its judgments) might, under the same act, have been revised and controlled by the legislature, and by an officer in the executive department. Such revision and control we deemed radically inconsistent with the independence of that judicial power which is vested in the courts, and consequently with that important principle which is so strictly observed by the Constitution of the United States. “ 2 U. S. 412 “These, Sir, are the reasons of our conduct. Be assured that though it became necessary, it was far from being pleasant. To be obliged to act contrary either to the obvious directions of Congress or to a constitutional principle, in our judgment equally obvious, excited feelings in us which we hope never to experience again.” The Circuit Court for the District of North Carolina (consisting of Iredell Justice, and Sitgreaves, District Judge) made the following representation in a letter jointly addressed to the President of the United States on 8 June, 1792. “We, the judges now attending at the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of North Carolina, conceive it our duty to lay before you some important observations which have occurred to us in the consideration of an act of Congress lately passed, entitled” “An act to provide for the settlement of the claims of widows and orphans barred by the limitations heretofore established, and to regulate the claims to invalid pensions.” “We beg leave to premise that it is as much our inclination as it is our duty to receive with all possible respect every act of the legislature, and that we never can find ourselves in a more painful situation than to be obliged to object to the execution of any, more especially to the execution of one founded on the purest principles of humanity and justice, which the act in question undoubtedly is. But however, lamentable a difference in opinion really may be, or with whatever difficulty we may have formed an opinion, we are under the indispensable necessity of acting according to the best dictates of our own judgment after duly weighing every consideration that can occur to us, which we have done on the present occasion.” “The extreme importance of the case and our desire of being explicit beyond the danger of being misunderstood, will, we hope, justify us in stating our observations in a systematic manner. We therefore, Sir, submit to you the following:” “1. That the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments are each formed in a separate and independent manner, and that the ultimate basis of each is the Constitution only, within the limits of which each department can alone justify any act of authority.” “2. That the legislature, among other important powers, unquestionably possess that of establishing courts in such a manner as to its wisdom shall appear best, limited by the terms of the Constitution only, and to whatever extent that power may be exercised, or however severe the duty it may think proper to require, the judges, when appointed in virtue of any such establishment, owe implicit and unreserved obedience to it.” “3. That at the same time, such courts cannot be warranted, as we conceive, by virtue of that part of the Constitution delegating Judicial power, for the exercise of which any act of the legislature is provided, in exercising (even under the authority of another act) 2 U. S. 413 any power not in its nature judicial, or, if judicial, not provided for upon the terms the Constitution requires.” “4. That whatever doubt may be suggested, whether the power in question is properly of a judicial nature, yet inasmuch as the decision of the court is not made final, but may be at least suspended in its operation by the Secretary at War, if he shall have cause to suspect imposition or mistake, this subjects the decision of the court to a mode of revision which we consider to be unwarranted by the Constitution, for though Congress may certainly establish, in instances not yet provided for, courts of appellate jurisdiction, yet such courts must consist of judges appointed in the manner the Constitution requires and holding their offices by no other tenure than that of their good behavior, by which tenure the office of Secretary at War is not held. And we beg leave to add with all due deference that no decision of any court of the United States can under any circumstances, in our opinion, agreeable to the Constitution, be liable to a reversion or even suspension by the legislature itself, in whom no judicial power of any kind appears to be vested but the important one relative to impeachments.” “These, sir, are our reasons for being of opinion, as we are at present, that this circuit court cannot be justified in the execution of that part of the act which requires it to examine and report an opinion on the unfortunate cases of officers and soldiers disabled in the service of the United States. The part of the act requiring the court to sit five days for the purpose of receiving applications from such persons we shall deem it our duty to comply with, for whether in our opinion such purpose can or cannot be answered, it is, as we conceive, our indispensable duty to keep open any court of which we have the honor to be judges as long as Congress shall direct.” “The high respect we entertain for the legislature, our feelings as men for persons whose situation requires the earliest as well as the most effectual relief, and our sincere desire to promote, whether officially or otherwise, the just and benevolent views of Congress so conspicuous on the present as well as on many other occasions have induced us to reflect whether we could be justified in acting under this act personally in the character of commissioners during the session of a court, and could we be satisfied that we had authority to do so, we would cheerfully devote such part of our time as might be necessary for the performance of the service. But we confess we have great doubts on this head. The power appears to be given to the court only, and not to the judges of it, and as the Secretary at War has not a discretion in all instances, but only in those where he has cause to suspect imposition or mistake, to withhold a person recommended by the court from being named on the pension list, it would be necessary for us to be well persuaded we possessed such an authority before we exercised a power, which might be a means of drawing money out of the public treasury as effectually as an express appropriation by law. We do not mean, however, to preclude ourselves from a very deliberate consideration whether we can be warranted in executing the purposes of the act in that manner in case an application should be made.” “No application has yet been made to the court or to ourselves individually, and therefore we have had some doubts as to the propriety of giving an opinion in a case which has not yet come regularly and judicially before us. None can be more sensible than we are of the necessity of judges’ being in general extremely cautious in not intimating an opinion in any case extrajudicially, because we well know how liable the best minds are, notwithstanding their utmost care, to a bias which may arise from a preconceived opinion, even unguardedly, much more deliberately, given. But in the present instance, as many unfortunate and meritorious individuals whom Congress have justly thought proper objects of immediate relief may suffer great distress even by a short delay and may be utterly ruined by a long one, we determined at all events to make our sentiments known as early as possible, considering this as a case which must be deemed an exception to the general rule upon every principle of humanity and justice; resolving however, that so far as we are concerned individually, in case an application should be made, we will most attentively hear it, and if we can be convinced this opinion is a wrong one, we shall not hesitate to act accordingly, being as far from the weakness of supposing that there is any reproach in having committed an error, to which the greatest and best men are sometimes liable, as we should be from so low a sense of duty, as to think it would not be the highest and most deserved reproach that could be bestowed on any men (much more on judges) that they were capable from any motive of persevering against conviction in apparently maintaining an opinion which they really thought to be erroneous. “ 2 U. S. 414 RULE. THE Attorney-General having moved for information relative to the system of practice by which the attorneys and counselors of this Court shall regulate themselves and of the place in which rules in causes here depending shall be obtained, THE CHIEF JUSTICE at a subsequent day stated that: The Court considers the practice of the Courts of King’s Bench and Chancery in England as affording outlines for the practice of this Court, and that it will from time to time make such alterations therein as circumstances may render necessary. * See an act passed 28 Feb., 1793. As the reasons assigned by the judges for declining to execute the first act of Congress involve a great constitutional question, it will not be thought improper to subjoin them in illustration of Hayburn’s Case. The Circuit Court for the District of New York (consisting of Jay, Chief Justice, Cushing Justice, and Duane, District Judge) proceeded on 5 April, 1791, to take into consideration the act of Congress entitled “An act to provide for the settlement of the claims of widows, and orphans barred by the limitations heretofore established, and to regulate the claims to invalid pensions,” and was thereupon unanimously of opinion and agreed “That by the Constitution of the United States, the government thereof is divided into three distinct and independent branches, and that it is the duty of each to abstain from and to oppose, encroachments on either.” “That neither the Legislative nor the Executive branches can constitutionally assign to the Judicial any duties but such as are properly judicial and to be performed in a judicial manner.” “That the duties assigned to the circuit courts by this act are not of that description, and that the act itself does not appear to contemplate them as such, inasmuch as it subjects the decisions of these courts, made pursuant to those duties, first to the consideration and suspension of the Secretary at War and then to the revision of the legislature, whereas by the Constitution, neither the Secretary at War nor any other Executive officer, nor even the legislature, is authorized to sit as a court of errors on the judicial acts or opinions of this court.” “As, therefore, the business assigned to this Court by the act is not judicial nor directed to be performed judicially, the act can only be considered as appointing commissioners for the purposes mentioned in it by official instead of personal descriptions.” “That the judges of this court regard themselves as being the commissioners designated by the act, and therefore as being at liberty to accept or decline that office.” “That as the objects of this act are exceedingly benevolent, and do real honor to the humanity and justice of Congress, and as the judges desire to manifest, on all proper occasions and in every proper manner their high respect for the national legislature, they will execute this act in the capacity of commissioners.” “That as the legislature has a right to extend the session of this court for any term which it may think proper by law to assign, the term of five days, as directed by this act, ought to be punctually observed.” “That the judges of this court will, as usual, during the session thereof, adjourn the court from day to day or other short periods as circumstances may render proper, and that they will regularly, between the adjournments, proceed as commissioners to execute the business of this act in the same courtroom or chamber.”
Yep, those branches of gov can and have ignored SCOTUS opinions that they consider unconstitutional. -- This is their duty, under the provisions of the supremacy clause, Article VI.... That's YOUR asinine opinion about my opinion, and my opinion is backed up by the supremacy clause. Read the clause. It says that all officials of our republic are duty bound to honor our Constitution as the supreme law. -- Which gives them the power to ignore unconstitutional 'laws'. ( At their own peril, of course) --- This concept is called 'checks and balances', and without it, we would have a tyranny run by smart assed wannabe lawyers, like you. You imagine that I'm having brain farts, while your own theories about our Constitution are akin to a bag of noxious fumes..
Continuing your remedial education. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/2/409/case.html U.S. Supreme Court Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 409 (1792) 2 U.S. 409 MOTION FOR MANDAMUS This was a motion for a mandamus to be directed to the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania commanding the said court to proceed in a certain petition of Wm. Hayburn, who had applied to be put on the pension list of the United States as an invalid pensioner. The principal case arose upon the act of Congress passed 23 March, 1792. The Attorney General (Randolph) who made the motion for the mandamus, having premised that it was done ex officio, without an application from any particular person, but with a view to procure the execution of an act of Congress particularly interesting to a meritorious and unfortunate class of citizens, the court declared that it entertained great doubt upon his right, under such circumstances and in a case of this kind, to proceed ex officio, and directed him to state the principles on which he attempted to support the right. The Attorney General accordingly entered into an elaborate description of the powers and duties of his office. But the court being divided in opinion on that question, the motion, made ex officio, was not allowed. The Attorney General then changed the ground of his interposition, declaring it to be at the instance and on behalf of Hayburn, a party interested; and he entered into the merits of the case upon the act of Congress and the refusal of the judges to carry it into effect. The Court observed that it would hold the motion under advisement until the next term, but no decision was ever pronounced, as the legislature, at an intermediate 2 U. S. 410 session, provided in another way for the relief of the pensioners. * 2 U. S. 411 The Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania, consisting of Wilson, and Blair, Justices, and Peters, District Judge, made the following representation in a letter jointly addressed to the President of the United States on 18 April, 1792: “To you it officially belongs to ‘take care that the laws’ of the United States ‘to faithfully executed.’ Before you, therefore, we think it our duty to lay the sentiments which, on a late painful occasion, governed us with regard to an act passed by the legislature of the union.” “The people of the United States have vested in Congress all legislative powers ‘granted in the Constitution.’” “They have vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress shall establish ‘the judicial power of the United States.’” “It is worthy of remark that in Congress the whole legislative power of the United States is not vested. An important part of that power was exercised by the people themselves when they ‘ordained and established the Constitution.’” “This Constitution is ‘the Supreme Law of the Land.’ This supreme law ‘all judicial officers of the United States are bound, by oath or affirmation, to support.’” “It is a principle important to freedom that in government, the judicial should be distinct from and independent of the legislative department. To this important principle the people of the United States, in forming their Constitution, have manifested the highest regard.” “They have placed their judicial power not in Congress, but in ‘courts.’ They have ordained that the ‘judges of those courts shall hold their offices during good behavior,’ and that ‘during their continuance in office, their salaries shall not be diminished.’” “Congress has lately passed an act to regulate, among other things, ‘the claims to invalid pensions.’” “Upon due consideration, we have been unanimously of opinion that under this act, the circuit court held for the Pennsylvania District could not proceed” “1st. Because the business directed by this act is not of a judicial nature. It forms no part of the power vested by the Constitution in the courts of the United States; the circuit court must consequently have proceeded without constitutional authority.” “2d. Because if, upon that business, the court had proceeded, its judgments (for its opinions are its judgments) might, under the same act, have been revised and controlled by the legislature, and by an officer in the executive department. Such revision and control we deemed radically inconsistent with the independence of that judicial power which is vested in the courts, and consequently with that important principle which is so strictly observed by the Constitution of the United States. “ 2 U. S. 412 “These, Sir, are the reasons of our conduct. Be assured that though it became necessary, it was far from being pleasant. To be obliged to act contrary either to the obvious directions of Congress or to a constitutional principle, in our judgment equally obvious, excited feelings in us which we hope never to experience again.” The Circuit Court for the District of North Carolina (consisting of Iredell Justice, and Sitgreaves, District Judge) made the following representation in a letter jointly addressed to the President of the United States on 8 June, 1792. “We, the judges now attending at the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of North Carolina, conceive it our duty to lay before you some important observations which have occurred to us in the consideration of an act of Congress lately passed, entitled” “An act to provide for the settlement of the claims of widows and orphans barred by the limitations heretofore established, and to regulate the claims to invalid pensions.” “We beg leave to premise that it is as much our inclination as it is our duty to receive with all possible respect every act of the legislature, and that we never can find ourselves in a more painful situation than to be obliged to object to the execution of any, more especially to the execution of one founded on the purest principles of humanity and justice, which the act in question undoubtedly is. But however, lamentable a difference in opinion really may be, or with whatever difficulty we may have formed an opinion, we are under the indispensable necessity of acting according to the best dictates of our own judgment after duly weighing every consideration that can occur to us, which we have done on the present occasion.” “The extreme importance of the case and our desire of being explicit beyond the danger of being misunderstood, will, we hope, justify us in stating our observations in a systematic manner. We therefore, Sir, submit to you the following:” “1. That the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments are each formed in a separate and independent manner, and that the ultimate basis of each is the Constitution only, within the limits of which each department can alone justify any act of authority.” “2. That the legislature, among other important powers, unquestionably possess that of establishing courts in such a manner as to its wisdom shall appear best, limited by the terms of the Constitution only, and to whatever extent that power may be exercised, or however severe the duty it may think proper to require, the judges, when appointed in virtue of any such establishment, owe implicit and unreserved obedience to it.” “3. That at the same time, such courts cannot be warranted, as we conceive, by virtue of that part of the Constitution delegating Judicial power, for the exercise of which any act of the legislature is provided, in exercising (even under the authority of another act) 2 U. S. 413 any power not in its nature judicial, or, if judicial, not provided for upon the terms the Constitution requires.” “4. That whatever doubt may be suggested, whether the power in question is properly of a judicial nature, yet inasmuch as the decision of the court is not made final, but may be at least suspended in its operation by the Secretary at War, if he shall have cause to suspect imposition or mistake, this subjects the decision of the court to a mode of revision which we consider to be unwarranted by the Constitution, for though Congress may certainly establish, in instances not yet provided for, courts of appellate jurisdiction, yet such courts must consist of judges appointed in the manner the Constitution requires and holding their offices by no other tenure than that of their good behavior, by which tenure the office of Secretary at War is not held. And we beg leave to add with all due deference that no decision of any court of the United States can under any circumstances, in our opinion, agreeable to the Constitution, be liable to a reversion or even suspension by the legislature itself, in whom no judicial power of any kind appears to be vested but the important one relative to impeachments.” “These, sir, are our reasons for being of opinion, as we are at present, that this circuit court cannot be justified in the execution of that part of the act which requires it to examine and report an opinion on the unfortunate cases of officers and soldiers disabled in the service of the United States. The part of the act requiring the court to sit five days for the purpose of receiving applications from such persons we shall deem it our duty to comply with, for whether in our opinion such purpose can or cannot be answered, it is, as we conceive, our indispensable duty to keep open any court of which we have the honor to be judges as long as Congress shall direct.” “The high respect we entertain for the legislature, our feelings as men for persons whose situation requires the earliest as well as the most effectual relief, and our sincere desire to promote, whether officially or otherwise, the just and benevolent views of Congress so conspicuous on the present as well as on many other occasions have induced us to reflect whether we could be justified in acting under this act personally in the character of commissioners during the session of a court, and could we be satisfied that we had authority to do so, we would cheerfully devote such part of our time as might be necessary for the performance of the service. But we confess we have great doubts on this head. The power appears to be given to the court only, and not to the judges of it, and as the Secretary at War has not a discretion in all instances, but only in those where he has cause to suspect imposition or mistake, to withhold a person recommended by the court from being named on the pension list, it would be necessary for us to be well persuaded we possessed such an authority before we exercised a power, which might be a means of drawing money out of the public treasury as effectually as an express appropriation by law. We do not mean, however, to preclude ourselves from a very deliberate consideration whether we can be warranted in executing the purposes of the act in that manner in case an application should be made.” “No application has yet been made to the court or to ourselves individually, and therefore we have had some doubts as to the propriety of giving an opinion in a case which has not yet come regularly and judicially before us. None can be more sensible than we are of the necessity of judges’ being in general extremely cautious in not intimating an opinion in any case extrajudicially, because we well know how liable the best minds are, notwithstanding their utmost care, to a bias which may arise from a preconceived opinion, even unguardedly, much more deliberately, given. But in the present instance, as many unfortunate and meritorious individuals whom Congress have justly thought proper objects of immediate relief may suffer great distress even by a short delay and may be utterly ruined by a long one, we determined at all events to make our sentiments known as early as possible, considering this as a case which must be deemed an exception to the general rule upon every principle of humanity and justice; resolving however, that so far as we are concerned individually, in case an application should be made, we will most attentively hear it, and if we can be convinced this opinion is a wrong one, we shall not hesitate to act accordingly, being as far from the weakness of supposing that there is any reproach in having committed an error, to which the greatest and best men are sometimes liable, as we should be from so low a sense of duty, as to think it would not be the highest and most deserved reproach that could be bestowed on any men (much more on judges) that they were capable from any motive of persevering against conviction in apparently maintaining an opinion which they really thought to be erroneous. “ 2 U. S. 414 RULE. THE Attorney-General having moved for information relative to the system of practice by which the attorneys and counselors of this Court shall regulate themselves and of the place in which rules in causes here depending shall be obtained, THE CHIEF JUSTICE at a subsequent day stated that: The Court considers the practice of the Courts of King’s Bench and Chancery in England as affording outlines for the practice of this Court, and that it will from time to time make such alterations therein as circumstances may render necessary. * See an act passed 28 Feb., 1793. As the reasons assigned by the judges for declining to execute the first act of Congress involve a great constitutional question, it will not be thought improper to subjoin them in illustration of Hayburn’s Case. The Circuit Court for the District of New York (consisting of Jay, Chief Justice, Cushing Justice, and Duane, District Judge) proceeded on 5 April, 1791, to take into consideration the act of Congress entitled “An act to provide for the settlement of the claims of widows, and orphans barred by the limitations heretofore established, and to regulate the claims to invalid pensions,” and was thereupon unanimously of opinion and agreed “That by the Constitution of the United States, the government thereof is divided into three distinct and independent branches, and that it is the duty of each to abstain from and to oppose, encroachments on either.” “That neither the Legislative nor the Executive branches can constitutionally assign to the Judicial any duties but such as are properly judicial and to be performed in a judicial manner.” “That the duties assigned to the circuit courts by this act are not of that description, and that the act itself does not appear to contemplate them as such, inasmuch as it subjects the decisions of these courts, made pursuant to those duties, first to the consideration and suspension of the Secretary at War and then to the revision of the legislature, whereas by the Constitution, neither the Secretary at War nor any other Executive officer, nor even the legislature, is authorized to sit as a court of errors on the judicial acts or opinions of this court.” “As, therefore, the business assigned to this Court by the act is not judicial nor directed to be performed judicially, the act can only be considered as appointing commissioners for the purposes mentioned in it by official instead of personal descriptions.” “That the judges of this court regard themselves as being the commissioners designated by the act, and therefore as being at liberty to accept or decline that office.” “That as the objects of this act are exceedingly benevolent, and do real honor to the humanity and justice of Congress, and as the judges desire to manifest, on all proper occasions and in every proper manner their high respect for the national legislature, they will execute this act in the capacity of commissioners.” “That as the legislature has a right to extend the session of this court for any term which it may think proper by law to assign, the term of five days, as directed by this act, ought to be punctually observed.” “That the judges of this court will, as usual, during the session thereof, adjourn the court from day to day or other short periods as circumstances may render proper, and that they will regularly, between the adjournments, proceed as commissioners to execute the business of this act in the same courtroom or chamber.”
Only in tpaine's Court of the Imagination. U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809) With great attention, and with serious concern, the Court has considered the return made by the Judge for the District of Pennsylvania to the mandamus directing him to execute the sentence pronounced by him in the case of Gideon Olmstead and others v. Rittenhouse’s Executrixes, or to show cause for not so doing. The cause shown is an act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania, passed subsequent to the rendition of his sentence. This act authorizes and requires the Governor to demand, for the use of the State of Pennsylvania, the money which had been decreed to Gideon Olmstead and others, and which was in the hands of the executrixes of David Rittenhouse; and, in default of payment, to direct the Attorney General to institute a suit for the recovery thereof. This act further authorizes and requires the Governor to use any further means he 9 U. S. 136 may think necessary for the protection of what it denominates “the just rights of the State,” and also to protect the persons and properties of the said executrixes of David Rittenhouse, deceased, against any process whatever, issued out of any federal Court in consequence of their obedience to the requisition of the said act. If the legislatures of the several States may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the Constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery, and the nation is deprived of the means of enforcing its laws by the instrumentality of its own tribunals. So fatal a result must be deprecated by all, and the people of Pennsylvania, not less than the citizens of every other State, must feel a deep interest in resisting principles so destructive of the union, and in averting consequences so fatal to themselves. The act in question does not, in terms, assert the universal right of the State to interpose in every case whatever, but assigns, as a motive for its interposition in this particular case, that the sentence the execution of which it prohibits was rendered in a cause over which the federal Courts have no jurisdiction. If the ultimate right to determine the jurisdiction of the courts of the Union is placed by the Constitution in the several State legislatures, then this act concludes the subject; but if that power necessarily resides in the supreme judicial tribunal of the nation, then the jurisdiction of the District Court of Pennsylvania over the case in which that jurisdiction was exercised ought to be most deliberately examined, and the act of Pennsylvania, with whatever respect it may be considered, cannot be permitted to prejudice the question. [snip] The Federalist No. 81 May 28, 1788 [excerpt] And there is a still greater absurdity in subjecting the decisions of men, selected for their knowledge of the laws, acquired by long and laborious study, to the revision and control of men who, for want of the same advantage, cannot but be deficient in that knowledge. The members of the legislature will rarely be chosen with a view to those qualifications which fit men for the stations of judges; and as, on this account, there will be great reason to apprehend all the ill consequences of defective information, so, on account of the natural propensity of such bodies to party divisions, there will be no less reason to fear that the pestilential breath of faction may poison the fountains of justice. The habit of being continually marshalled on opposite sides will be too apt to stifle the voice both of law and of equity. These considerations teach us to applaud the wisdom of those States who have committed the judicial power, in the last resort, not to a part of the legislature, but to distinct and independent bodies of men. Contrary to the supposition of those who have represented the plan of the convention, in this respect, as novel and unprecedented, it is but a copy of the constitutions of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia; and the preference which has been given to those models is highly to be commended.
Read the clause. It says that all officials of our republic are duty bound to honor our Constitution as the supreme law. -- Which gives them the power to ignore unconstitutional 'laws'. ( At their own peril, of course) --- This concept is called 'checks and balances', and without it, we would have a tyranny run by smart assed wannabe lawyers, like you. You imagine that I'm having brain farts, while your own theories about our Constitution are akin to a bag of noxious fumes.. All you're continuing is your repetitive postings of facts not in contention, in an unsuccessful, obsessive effort to gloss over the FACT that you do NOT support our Constitution's checks and balances doctrine. Poor you, stuck on stupid repetitions.
In tpaine's Court of the Imagination, the Supremacy Clause contains a secret codicil referred to as the Screw Off provision, which provides that when the Executive or Legislature of a State disagrees with a constitutional ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court, there is a secret power to tell the Court to screw off. tpaine holds the only known copy of the Supremacy Clause which includes the Screw Off provision, which he allegedly found steganographically encrypted in the dot of one of the semi-colons. The rest of the world only has the standard Supremacy Clause which reads, Try as one may, with the standard Supremacy Clause, one may not discover the provision which empowers the Executive and the Legislative branches to tell the Judiciary to screw off. In the real world, if a State declines to give Miranda warnings, its criminal convictions involving a violation of the Miranda Rule would be overturned one by one. Or, in the case of the Little Rock High School, the State Governor and Legislature will be persuaded to get their minds right. Indeed, the Governor called out the National Guard to exercise his tpaine Court of the Imagination right to tell the U.S. Supreme Court and their decision in Brown v. Board of Education, to screw off. Sensing a failure to communicate, then-President Eisenhower sent in the 101st Airborne Division to assist Governor Faubus in getting his mind right. He also federalized the Arkansas National Guard. Governor Faubus got his mind right. As a curious footnote, Governor Faubus was a Democrat who continued to run for office and win. In 1964, he defeated Republican Winthrop Rockefeller and won 81% of the Black vote while winning. Now, that is party loyalty. United States Supreme Court Cooper v. Aaron, (1958) No. 116 Argued: September 11, 1958 Decided: September 12, 1958 Opinion announced September 29, 1958. Fn [1] NOTE: The per curiam opinion announced on September 12, 1958, and printed in a footnote, post, p. 5, applies not only to this case but also to No. 1, Misc., August Special Term, 1958, Aaron et al. v. Cooper et al., on application for vacation of order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit staying issuance of its mandate, for stay of order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, and for such other orders as petitioners may be entitled to, argued August 28, 1958. Under a plan of gradual desegregation of the races in the public schools of Little Rock, Arkansas, adopted by petitioners and approved by the courts below, respondents, Negro children, were ordered admitted to a previously all-white high school at the beginning of the 1957-1958 school year. Due to actions by the Legislature and Governor of the State opposing desegregation, and to threats of mob violence resulting therefrom, respondents were unable to attend the school until troops were sent and maintained there by the Federal Government for their protection; but they [2] attended the school for the remainder of that school year. Finding that these events had resulted in tensions, bedlam, chaos and turmoil in the school, which disrupted the educational process, the District Court, in June 1958, granted petitioners’ request that operation of their plan of desegregation be suspended for two and one-half years, and that respondents be sent back to segregated schools. The Court of Appeals reversed. Held: The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the orders of the District Court enforcing petitioners’ plan of desegregation are reinstated, effective immediately. Pp. 4-20. 1. This Court cannot countenance a claim by the Governor and Legislature of a State that there is no duty on state officials to obey federal court orders resting on this Court’s considered interpretation of the United States Constitution in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483. P. 4. 2. This Court rejects the contention that it should uphold a suspension of the Little Rock School Board’s plan to do away with segregated public schools in Little Rock until state laws and efforts to upset and nullify its holding in the Brown case have been further challenged and tested in the courts. P. 4. 3. In many locations, obedience to the duty of desegregation will require the immediate general admission of Negro children, otherwise qualified as students for their appropriate classes, at particular schools. P. 7. 4. If, after analysis of the relevant factors (which, of course, excludes hostility to racial desegregation), a District Court concludes that justification exists for not requiring the present nonsegregated admission of all qualified Negro children to public schools, it should scrutinize the program of the school authorities to make sure that they have developed arrangements pointed toward the earliest practicable completion of desegregation, and have taken appropriate steps to put their program into effective operation. P. 7. 5. The petitioners stand in this litigation as the agents of the State, and they cannot assert their good faith as an excuse for delay in implementing the respondents’ constitutional rights, when vindication of those rights has been rendered difficult or impossible by the actions of other state officials. Pp. 15-16. 6. The constitutional rights of respondents are not to be sacrificed or yielded to the violence and disorder which have followed [3] upon the actions of the Governor and Legislature, and law and order are not here to be preserved by depriving the Negro children of their constitutional rights. P. 16. 7. The constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against in school admission on grounds of race or color declared by this Court in the Brown case can neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state executives or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted “ingeniously or ingenuously.” Pp. 16-17. 8. The interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” P. 18. 9. No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his solemn oath to support it. P. 18. 10. State support of segregated schools through any arrangement, management, funds or property cannot be squared with the command of the Fourteenth Amendment that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. P. 19. 257 F.2d 33, affirmed. Richard C. Butler argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were A. F. House and, by special leave of Court, John H. Haley, pro hac vice. Thurgood Marshall argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Wiley A. Branton, William Coleman, Jr., Jack Greenberg and Louis H. Pollak. Solicitor General Rankin, at the invitation of the Court, post, p. 27, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging that the relief sought by respondents should be granted. With him on the brief were Oscar H. Davis, Philip Elman and Ralph S. Spritzer. [4] Opinion of the Court by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BURTON, MR. JUSTICE CLARK, MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER. As this case reaches us it raises questions of the highest importance to the maintenance of our federal system of government. It necessarily involves a claim by the Governor and Legislature of a State that there is no duty on state officials to obey federal court orders resting on this Court’s considered interpretation of the United States Constitution. Specifically it involves actions by the Governor and Legislature of Arkansas upon the premise that they are not bound by our holding in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483. That holding was that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids States to use their governmental powers to bar children on racial grounds from attending schools where there is state participation through any arrangement, management, funds or property. We are urged to uphold a suspension of the Little Rock School Board’s plan to do away with segregated public schools in Little Rock until state laws and efforts to upset and nullify our holding in Brown v. Board of Education have been further challenged and tested in the courts. We reject these contentions. The case was argued before us on September 11, 1958. On the following day we unanimously affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 257 F.2d 33, which had reversed a judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, 163 F. Supp. 13. The District Court had granted the application of the petitioners, the Little Rock School Board and School Superintendent, to suspend for two and one-half years the operation of the School Board’s court-approved desegregation program. In order that the School Board [5] might know, without doubt, its duty in this regard before the opening of school, which had been set for the following Monday, September 15, 1958, we immediately issued the judgment, reserving the expression of our supporting views to a later date. * This opinion of all of the members of the Court embodies those views. The following are the facts and circumstances so far as necessary to show how the legal questions are presented. On May 17, 1954, this Court decided that enforced racial segregation in the public schools of a State is a denial of the equal protection of the laws enjoined by the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown v. Board of Education, [6] 347 U.S. 483 . The Court postponed, pending further argument, formulation of a decree to effectuate this decision. That decree was rendered May 31, 1955. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 . In the formulation of that decree the Court recognized that good faith compliance with the principles declared in Brown might in some situations “call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in making the transition to school systems operated in accordance with the constitutional principles set forth in our May 17, 1954, decision.” Id., at 300. The Court went on to state: “Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest in the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective manner. But it should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them. “While giving weight to these public and private considerations, the courts will require that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with our May 17, 1954, ruling. Once such a start has been made, the courts may find that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner. The burden rests upon the defendants to establish that such time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date. To that end, the courts may consider problems related to administration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems.” 349 U.S., at 300 -301. [7] Under such circumstances, the District Courts were directed to require “a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance,” and to take such action as was necessary to bring about the end of racial segregation in the public schools “with all deliberate speed.” Ibid. Of course, in many locations, obedience to the duty of desegregation would require the immediate general admission of Negro children, otherwise qualified as students for their appropriate classes, at particular schools. On the other hand, a District Court, after analysis of the relevant factors (which, of course, excludes hostility to racial desegregation), might conclude that justification existed for not requiring the present nonsegregated admission of all qualified Negro children. In such circumstances, however, the courts should scrutinize the program of the school authorities to make sure that they had developed arrangements pointed toward the earliest practicable completion of desegregation, and had taken appropriate steps to put their program into effective operation. It was made plain that delay in any guise in order to deny the constitutional rights of Negro children could not be countenanced, and that only a prompt start, diligently and earnestly pursued, to eliminate racial segregation from the public schools could constitute good faith compliance. State authorities were thus duty bound to devote every effort toward initiating desegregation and bringing about the elimination of racial discrimination in the public school system. On May 20, 1954, three days after the first Brown opinion, the Little Rock District School Board adopted, and on May 23, 1954, made public, a statement of policy entitled “Supreme Court Decision - Segregation in Public Schools.” In this statement the Board recognized that “It is our responsibility to comply with Federal Constitutional Requirements and we intend to do so when the Supreme Court of the United States outlines the method to be followed.” [8] Thereafter the Board undertook studies of the administrative problems confronting the transition to a desegregated public school system at Little Rock. It instructed the Superintendent of Schools to prepare a plan for desegregation, and approved such a plan on May 24, 1955, seven days before the second Brown opinion. The plan provided for desegregation at the senior high school level (grades 10 through 12) as the first stage. Desegregation at the junior high and elementary levels was to follow. It was contemplated that desegregation at the high school level would commence in the fall of 1957, and the expectation was that complete desegregation of the school system would be accomplished by 1963. Following the adoption of this plan, the Superintendent of Schools discussed it with a large number of citizen groups in the city. As a result of these discussions, the Board reached the conclusion that “a large majority of the residents” of Little Rock were of “the belief . . . that the Plan, although objectionable in principle,” from the point of view of those supporting segregated schools, “was still the best for the interests of all pupils in the District.” Upon challenge by a group of Negro plaintiffs desiring more rapid completion of the desegregation process, the District Court upheld the School Board’s plan, Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 243 F.2d 361. Review of that judgment was not sought here. While the School Board was thus going forward with its preparation for desegregating the Little Rock school system, other state authorities, in contrast, were actively pursuing a program designed to perpetuate in Arkansas the system of racial segregation which this Court had held violated the Fourteenth Amendment. First came, in November 1956, an amendment to the State Constitution flatly commanding the Arkansas General Assembly to oppose “in every Constitutional manner the Un-constitutional [9] desegregation decisions of May 17, 1954 and May 31, 1955 of the United States Supreme Court,” Ark. Const., Amend. 44, and, through the initiative, a pupil assignment law, Ark. Stat. 80-1519 to 80-1524. Pursuant to this state constitutional command, a law relieving school children from compulsory attendance at racially mixed schools, Ark. Stat. 80-1525, and a law establishing a State Sovereignty Commission, Ark. Stat. 6-801 to 6-824, were enacted by the General Assembly in February 1957. The School Board and the Superintendent of Schools nevertheless continued with preparations to carry out the first stage of the desegregation program. Nine Negro children were scheduled for admission in September 1957 to Central High School, which has more than two thousand students. Various administrative measures, designed to assure the smooth transition of this first stage of desegregation, were undertaken. On September 2, 1957, the day before these Negro students were to enter Central High, the school authorities were met with drastic opposing action on the part of the Governor of Arkansas who dispatched units of the Arkansas National Guard to the Central High School grounds and placed the school “off limits” to colored students. As found by the District Court in subsequent proceedings, the Governor’s action had not been requested by the school authorities, and was entirely unheralded. The findings were these: “Up to this time [September 2], no crowds had gathered about Central High School and no acts of violence or threats of violence in connection with the carrying out of the plan had occurred. Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, the school authorities had frequently conferred with the Mayor and Chief of Police of Little Rock about taking appropriate [10] steps by the Little Rock police to prevent any possible disturbances or acts of violence in connection with the attendance of the 9 colored students at Central High School. The Mayor considered that the Little Rock police force could adequately cope with any incidents which might arise at the opening of school. The Mayor, the Chief of Police, and the school authorities made no request to the Governor or any representative of his for State assistance in maintaining peace and order at Central High School. Neither the Governor nor any other official of the State government consulted with the Little Rock authorities about whether the Little Rock police were prepared to cope with any incidents which might arise at the school, about any need for State assistance in maintaining peace and order, or about stationing the Arkansas National Guard at Central High School.” Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220, 225. The Board’s petition for postponement in this proceeding states: “The effect of that action [of the Governor] was to harden the core of opposition to the Plan and cause many persons who theretofore had reluctantly accepted the Plan to believe there was some power in the State of Arkansas which, when exerted, could nullify the Federal law and permit disobedience of the decree of this [District] Court, and from that date hostility to the Plan was increased and criticism of the officials of the [School] District has become more bitter and unrestrained.” The Governor’s action caused the School Board to request the Negro students on September 2 not to attend the high school “until the legal dilemma was solved.” The next day, September 3, 1957, the Board petitioned the District Court for instructions, and the court, after a hearing, found that the Board’s [11] request of the Negro students to stay away from the high school had been made because of the stationing of the military guards by the state authorities. The court determined that this was not a reason for departing from the approved plan, and ordered the School Board and Superintendent to proceed with it. On the morning of the next day, September 4, 1957, the Negro children attempted to enter the high school but, as the District Court later found, units of the Arkansas National Guard “acting pursuant to the Governor’s order, stood shoulder to shoulder at the school grounds and thereby forcibly prevented the 9 Negro students . . . from entering,” as they continued to do every school day during the following three weeks. 156 F. Supp., at 225. That same day, September 4, 1957, the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Arkansas was requested by the District Court to begin an immediate investigation in order to fix responsibility for the interference with the orderly implementation of the District Court’s direction to carry out the desegregation program. Three days later, September 7, the District Court denied a petition of the School Board and the Superintendent of Schools for an order temporarily suspending continuance of the program. Upon completion of the United States Attorney’s investigation, he and the Attorney General of the United States, at the District Court’s request, entered the proceedings and filed a petition on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, to enjoin the Governor of Arkansas and officers of the Arkansas National Guard from further attempts to prevent obedience to the court’s order. After hearings on the petition, the District Court found that the School Board’s plan had been obstructed by the Governor through the use of National Guard troops, and granted a preliminary injunction on September [12] 20, 1957, enjoining the Governor and the officers of the Guard from preventing the attendance of Negro children at Central High School, and from otherwise obstructing or interfering with the orders of the court in connection with the plan. 156 F. Supp. 220, affirmed, Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797. The National Guard was then withdrawn from the school. The next school day was Monday, September 23, 1957. The Negro children entered the high school that morning under the protection of the Little Rock Police Department and members of the Arkansas State Police. But the officers caused the children to be removed from the school during the morning because they had difficulty controlling a large and demonstrating crowd which had gathered at the high school. 163 F. Supp., at 16. On September 25, however, the President of the United States dispatched federal troops to Central High School and admission of the Negro students to the school was thereby effected. Regular army troops continued at the high school until November 27, 1957. They were then replaced by federalized National Guardsmen who remained throughout the balance of the school year. Eight of the Negro students remained in attendance at the school throughout the school year. We come now to the aspect of the proceedings presently before us. On February 20, 1958, the School Board and the Superintendent of Schools filed a petition in the District Court seeking a postponement of their program for desegregation. Their position in essence was that because of extreme public hostility, which they stated had been engendered largely by the official attitudes and actions of the Governor and the Legislature, the maintenance of a sound educational program at Central High School, with the Negro students in attendance, would be impossible. The Board therefore proposed that the Negro students already admitted to the school be withdrawn [13] and sent to segregated schools, and that all further steps to carry out the Board’s desegregation program be postponed for a period later suggested by the Board to be two and one-half years. After a hearing the District Court granted the relief requested by the Board. Among other things the court found that the past year at Central High School had been attended by conditions of “chaos, bedlam and turmoil”; that there were “repeated incidents of more or less serious violence directed against the Negro students and their property”; that there was “tension and unrest among the school administrators, the class-room teachers, the pupils, and the latters’ parents, which inevitably had an adverse effect upon the educational program”; that a school official was threatened with violence; that a “serious financial burden” had been cast on the School District; that the education of the students had suffered “and under existing conditions will continue to suffer”; that the Board would continue to need “military assistance or its equivalent”; that the local police department would not be able “to detail enough men to afford the necessary protection”; and that the situation was “intolerable.” 163 F. Supp., at 20-26. The District Court’s judgment was dated June 20, 1958. The Negro respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and also sought there a stay of the District Court’s judgment. At the same time they filed a petition for certiorari in this Court asking us to review the District Court’s judgment without awaiting the disposition of their appeal to the Court of Appeals, or of their petition to that court for a stay. That we declined to do. 357 U.S. 566 . The Court of Appeals did not act on the petition for a stay, but, on August 18, 1958, after convening in special session on August 4 and hearing the appeal, reversed the District Court, 257 F.2d 33. On August 21, 1958, the Court of Appeals stayed its mandate [14] to permit the School Board to petition this Court for certiorari. Pending the filing of the School Board’s petition for certiorari, the Negro respondents, on August 23, 1958, applied to MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER, as Circuit Justice for the Eighth Circuit, to stay the order of the Court of Appeals withholding its own mandate and also to stay the District Court’s judgment. In view of the nature of the motions, he referred them to the entire Court. Recognizing the vital importance of a decision of the issues in time to permit arrangements to be made for the 1958-1959 school year, see Aaron v. Cooper, 357 U.S. 566, 567 , we convened in Special Term on August 28, 1958, and heard oral argument on the respondents’ motions, and also argument of the Solicitor General who, by invitation, appeared for the United States as amicus curiae, and asserted that the Court of Appeals’ judgment was clearly correct on the merits, and urged that we vacate its stay forthwith. Finding that respondents’ application necessarily involved consideration of the merits of the litigation, we entered an order which deferred decision upon the motions pending the disposition of the School Board’s petition for certiorari, and fixed September 8, 1958, as the day on or before which such petition might be filed, and September 11, 1958, for oral argument upon the petition. The petition for certiorari, duly filed, was granted in open Court on September 11. 1958, post, p. 29, and further arguments were had, the Solicitor General again urging the correctness of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. On September 12, 1958, as already mentioned, we unanimously affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the per curiam opinion set forth in the margin at the outset of this opinion, ante, p. 5. In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals which reversed the District Court we have accepted without reservation the position of the School Board, the [15] Superintendent of Schools, and their counsel that they displayed entire good faith in the conduct of these proceedings and in dealing with the unfortunate and distressing sequence of events which has been outlined. We likewise have accepted the findings of the District Court as to the conditions at Central High School during the 1957-1958 school year, and also the findings that the educational progress of all the students, white and colored, of that school has suffered and will continue to suffer if the conditions which prevailed last year are permitted to continue. The significance of these findings, however, is to be considered in light of the fact, indisputably revealed by the record before us, that the conditions they depict are directly traceable to the actions of legislators and executive officials of the State of Arkansas, taken in their official capacities, which reflect their own determination to resist this Court’s decision in the Brown case and which have brought about violent resistance to that decision in Arkansas. In its petition for certiorari filed in this Court, the School Board itself describes the situation in this language: “The legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the state government opposed the desegregation of Little Rock schools by enacting laws, calling out troops, making statements villifying federal law and federal courts, and failing to utilize state law enforcement agencies and judicial processes to maintain public peace.” One may well sympathize with the position of the Board in the face of the frustrating conditions which have confronted it, but, regardless of the Board’s good faith, the actions of the other state agencies responsible for those conditions compel us to reject the Board’s legal position. Had Central High School been under the direct management of the State itself, it could hardly be suggested [16] that those immediately in charge of the school should be heard to assert their own good faith as a legal excuse for delay in implementing the constitutional rights of these respondents, when vindication of those rights was rendered difficult or impossible by the actions of other state officials. The situation here is in no different posture because the members of the School Board and the Superintendent of Schools are local officials; from the point of view of the Fourteenth Amendment, they stand in this litigation as the agents of the State. The constitutional rights of respondents are not to be sacrificed or yielded to the violence and disorder which have followed upon the actions of the Governor and Legislature. As this Court said some 41 years ago in a unanimous opinion in a case involving another aspect of racial segregation: “It is urged that this proposed segregation will promote the public peace by preventing race conflicts. Desirable as this is, and important as is the preservation of the public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances which deny rights created or protected by the Federal Constitution.” Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 . Thus law and order are not here to be preserved by depriving the Negro children of their constitutional rights. The record before us clearly establishes that the growth of the Board’s difficulties to a magnitude beyond its unaided power to control is the product of state action. Those difficulties, as counsel for the Board forthrightly conceded on the oral argument in this Court, can also be brought under control by state action. The controlling legal principles are plain. The command of the Fourteenth Amendment is that no “State” shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. “A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities. It can act in no [17] other way. The constitutional provision, therefore, must mean that no agency of the State, or of the officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State government, . . . denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State’s power, his act is that of the State. This must be so, or the constitutional prohibition has no meaning.” Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 . Thus the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all action of the State denying equal protection of the laws; whatever the agency of the State taking the action, see Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 ; Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of Philadelphia, 353 U.S. 230 ; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 ; or whatever the guise in which it is taken, see Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922; Department of Conservation and Development v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615. In short, the constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against in school admission on grounds of race or color declared by this Court in the Brown case can neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted “ingeniously or ingenuously.” Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 . What has been said, in the light of the facts developed, is enough to dispose of the case. However, we should answer the premise of the actions of the Governor and Legislature that they are not bound by our holding in the Brown case. It is necessary only to recall some basic constitutional propositions which are settled doctrine. [18] Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the “supreme Law of the Land.” In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as “the fundamental and paramount law of the nation,” declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, that “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” This decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3, “to support this Constitution.” Chief Justice Taney, speaking for a unanimous Court in 1859, said that this requirement reflected the framers’ “anxiety to preserve it [the Constitution] in full force, in all its powers, and to guard against resistance to or evasion of its authority, on the part of a State . . . .” Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 524. No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it. Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous Court in saying that: “If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery . . . .” United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115, 136. A Governor who asserts a [19] power to nullify a federal court order is similarly restrained. If he had such power, said Chief Justice Hughes, in 1932, also for a unanimous Court, “it is manifest that the fiat of a state Governor, and not the Constitution of the United States, would be the supreme law of the land; that the restrictions of the Federal Constitution upon the exercise of state power would be but impotent phrases . . . .” Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397 -398. It is, of course, quite true that the responsibility for public education is primarily the concern of the States, but it is equally true that such responsibilities, like all other state activity, must be exercised consistently with federal constitutional requirements as they apply to state action. The Constitution created a government dedicated to equal justice under law. The Fourteenth Amendment embodied and emphasized that ideal. State support of segregated schools through any arrangement, management, funds, or property cannot be squared with the Amendment’s command that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The right of a student not to be segregated on racial grounds in schools so maintained is indeed so fundamental and pervasive that it is embraced in the concept of due process of law. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 . The basic decision in Brown was unanimously reached by this Court only after the case had been briefed and twice argued and the issues had been given the most serious consideration. Since the first Brown opinion three new Justices have come to the Court. They are at one with the Justices still on the Court who participated in that basic decision as to its correctness, and that decision is now unanimously reaffirmed. The principles announced in that decision and the obedience of the States to them, according to the command of the Constitution, [20] are indispensable for the protection of the freedoms guaranteed by our fundamental charter for all of us. Our constitutional ideal of equal justice under law is thus made a living truth. [Footnote * ] The following was the Court’s per curiam opinion: “PER CURIAM. “The Court, having fully deliberated upon the oral arguments had on August 28, 1958, as supplemented by the arguments presented on September 11, 1958, and all the briefs on file, is unanimously of the opinion that the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit of August 18, 1958, 257 F.2d 33, must be affirmed. In view of the imminent commencement of the new school year at the Central High School of Little Rock, Arkansas, we deem it important to make prompt announcement of our judgment affirming the Court of Appeals. The expression of the views supporting our judgment will be prepared and announced in due course. “It is accordingly ordered that the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, dated August 18, 1958, 257 F.2d 33, reversing the judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, dated June 20, 1958, 163 F. Supp. 13, be affirmed, and that the judgments of the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, dated August 28, 1956, see 143 F. Supp. 855, and September 3, 1957, enforcing the School Board’s plan for desegregation in compliance with the decision of this Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 349 U.S. 294, be reinstated. It follows that the order of the Court of Appeals dated August 21, 1958, staying its own mandate is of no further effect. “The judgment of this Court shall be effective immediately, and shall be communicated forthwith to the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.” Concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER. * While unreservedly participating with my brethren in our joint opinion, I deem it appropriate also to deal individually with the great issue here at stake. By working together, by sharing in a common effort, men of different minds and tempers, even if they do not reach agreement, acquire understanding and thereby tolerance of their differences. This process was under way in Little Rock. The detailed plan formulated by the Little Rock School Board, in the light of local circumstances, had been approved by the United States District Court in Arkansas as satisfying the requirements of this Court’s decree in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 . The Little Rock School Board had embarked on an educational effort “to obtain public acceptance” of its plan. Thus the process of the community’s accommodation to new demands of law upon it, the development of habits of acceptance of the right of colored children to the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Constitution, had peacefully and promisingly begun. The condition in Little Rock before this process was forcibly impeded by those in control of the government of Arkansas was thus described by the District Court, and these findings of fact have not been controverted: “14. Up to this time, no crowds had gathered about Central High School and no acts of violence or threats of violence in connection with the carrying out of the plan had occurred. Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, the school authorities had [21] frequently conferred with the Mayor and Chief of Police of Little Rock about taking appropriate steps by the Little Rock police to prevent any possible disturbances or acts of violence in connection with the attendance of the 9 colored students at Central High School. The Mayor considered that the Little Rock police force could adequately cope with any incidents which might arise at the opening of school. The Mayor, the Chief of Police, and the school authorities made no request to the Governor or any representative of his for State assistance in maintaining peace and order at Central High School. Neither the Governor nor any other official of the State government consulted with the Little Rock authorities about whether the Little Rock police were prepared to cope with any incidents which might arise at the school, about any need for State assistance in maintaining peace and order, or about stationing the Arkansas National Guard at Central High School.” 156 F. Supp. 220, 225. All this was disrupted by the introduction of the state militia and by other obstructive measures taken by the State. The illegality of these interferences with the constitutional right of Negro children qualified to enter the Central High School is unaffected by whatever action or non-action the Federal Government had seen fit to take. Nor is it neutralized by the undoubted good faith of the Little Rock School Board in endeavoring to discharge its constitutional duty. The use of force to further obedience to law is in any event a last resort and one not congenial to the spirit of our Nation. But the tragic aspect of this disruptive tactic was that the power of the State was used not to sustain law but as an instrument for thwarting law. The State of Arkansas is thus responsible for disabling one [22] of its subordinate agencies, the Little Rock School Board, from peacefully carrying out the Board’s and the State’s constitutional duty. Accordingly, while Arkansas is not a formal party in these proceedings and a decree cannot go against the State, it is legally and morally before the Court. We are now asked to hold that the illegal, forcible interference by the State of Arkansas with the continuance of what the Constitution commands, and the consequences in disorder that it entrained, should be recognized as justification for undoing what the School Board had formulated, what the District Court in 1955 had directed to be carried out, and what was in process of obedience. No explanation that may be offered in support of such a request can obscure the inescapable meaning that law should bow to force. To yield to such a claim would be to enthrone official lawlessness, and lawlessness if not checked is the precursor of anarchy. On the few tragic occasions in the history of the Nation, North and South, when law was forcibly resisted or systematically evaded, it has signalled the breakdown of constitutional processes of government on which ultimately rest the liberties of all. Violent resistance to law cannot be made a legal reason for its suspension without loosening the fabric of our society. What could this mean but to acknowledge that disorder under the aegis of a State has moral superiority over the law of the Constitution? For those in authority thus to defy the law of the land is profoundly subversive not only of our constitutional system but of the presuppositions of a democratic society. The State “must . . . yield to an authority that is paramount to the State.” This language of command to a State is Mr. Justice Holmes’, speaking for the Court that comprised Mr. Justice Van Devanter, Mr. Justice McReynolds, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Sutherland, [23] Mr. Justice Butler, and Mr. Justice Stone. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 179, 197 . When defiance of law judicially pronounced was last sought to be justified before this Court, views were expressed which are now especially relevant: “The historic phrase ‘a government of laws and not of men’ epitomizes the distinguishing character of our political society. When John Adams put that phrase into the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights he was not indulging in a rhetorical flourish. He was expressing the aim of those who, with him, framed the Declaration of Independence and founded the Republic. ‘A government of laws and not of men’ was the rejection in positive terms of rule by fiat, whether by the fiat of governmental or private power. Every act of government may be challenged by an appeal to law, as finally pronounced by this Court. Even this Court has the last say only for a time. Being composed of fallible men, it may err. But revision of its errors must be by orderly process of law. The Court may be asked to reconsider its decisions, and this has been done successfully again and again throughout our history. Or, what this Court has deemed its duty to decide may be changed by legislation, as it often has been, and, on occasion, by constitutional amendment. “But from their own experience and their deep reading in history, the Founders knew that Law alone saves a society from being rent by internecine strife or ruled by mere brute power however disguised. ‘Civilization involves subjection of force to reason, and the agency of this subjection is law.’ (Pound, The Future of Law (1937) 47 Yale L. J. 1, 13.) The conception of a government by laws dominated the thoughts of those who founded this [24] Nation and designed its Constitution, although they knew as well as the belittlers of the conception that laws have to be made, interpreted and enforced by men. To that end, they set apart a body of men, who were to be the depositories of law, who by their disciplined training and character and by withdrawal from the usual temptations of private interest may reasonably be expected to be ‘as free, impartial, and independent as the lot of humanity will admit.’ So strongly were the framers of the Constitution bent on securing a reign of law that they endowed the judicial office with extraordinary safeguards and prestige. No one, no matter how exalted his public office or how righteous his private motive, can be judge in his own case. That is what courts are for.” United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 307 -309 (concurring opinion). The duty to abstain from resistance to “the supreme Law of the Land,” U.S. Const., Art. VI § 2, as declared by the organ of our Government for ascertaining it, does not require immediate approval of it nor does it deny the right of dissent. Criticism need not be stilled. Active obstruction or defiance is barred. Our kind of society cannot endure if the controlling authority of the Law as derived from the Constitution is not to be the tribunal specially charged with the duty of ascertaining and declaring what is “the supreme Law of the Land.” (See President Andrew Jackson’s Message to Congress of January 16, 1833, II Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents (1896 ed.), 610, 623.) Particularly is this so where the declaration of what “the supreme Law” commands on an underlying moral issue is not the dubious pronouncement of a gravely divided Court but is the unanimous conclusion of a long-matured deliberative process. The Constitution is not the formulation of the [25] merely personal views of the members of this Court, nor can its authority be reduced to the claim that state officials are its controlling interpreters. Local customs, however hardened by time, are not decreed in heaven. Habits and feelings they engender may be counteracted and moderated. Experience attests that such local habits and feelings will yield, gradually though this be, to law and education. And educational influences are exerted not only by explicit teaching. They vigorously flow from the fruitful exercise of the responsibility of those charged with political official power and from the almost unconsciously transforming actualities of living under law. The process of ending unconstitutional exclusion of pupils from the common school system - “common” meaning shared alike - solely because of color is no doubt not an easy, overnight task in a few States where a drastic alteration in the ways of communities is involved. Deep emotions have, no doubt, been stirred. They will not be calmed by letting violence loose - violence and defiance employed and encouraged by those upon whom the duty of law observance should have the strongest claim - nor by submitting to it under whatever guise employed. Only the constructive use of time will achieve what an advanced civilization demands and the Constitution confirms. For carrying out the decision that color alone cannot bar a child from a public school, this Court has recognized the diversity of circumstances in local school situations. But is it a reasonable hope that the necessary endeavors for such adjustment will be furthered, that racial frictions will be ameliorated, by a reversal of the process and interrupting effective measures toward the necessary goal? The progress that has been made in respecting the constitutional rights of the Negro children, according to the graduated plan sanctioned by the two [26] lower courts, would have to be retraced, perhaps with even greater difficulty because of deference to forcible resistance. It would have to be retraced against the seemingly vindicated feeling of those who actively sought to block that progress. Is there not the strongest reason for concluding that to accede to the Board’s request, on the basis of the circumstances that gave rise to it, for a suspension of the Board’s non-segregation plan, would be but the beginning of a series of delays calculated to nullify this Court’s adamant decisions in the Brown case that the Constitution precludes compulsory segregation based on color in state-supported schools? That the responsibility of those who exercise power in a democratic government is not to reflect inflamed public feeling but to help form its understanding, is especially true when they are confronted with a problem like a racially discriminating public school system. This is the lesson to be drawn from the heartening experience in ending enforced racial segregation in the public schools in cities with Negro populations of large proportions. Compliance with decisions of this Court, as the constitutional organ of the supreme Law of the Land, has often, throughout our history, depended on active support by state and local authorities. It presupposes such support. To withhold it, and indeed to use political power to try to paralyze the supreme Law, precludes the maintenance of our federal system as we have known and cherished it for one hundred and seventy years. Lincoln’s appeal to “the better angels of our nature” failed to avert a fratricidal war. But the compassionate wisdom of Lincoln’s First and Second Inaugurals bequeathed to the Union, cemented with blood, a moral heritage which, when drawn upon in times of stress and strife, is sure to find specific ways and means to surmount difficulties that may appear to be insurmountable. [Footnote * ] [NOTE: This opinion was filed October 6, 1958.] [27]
As shown recently in 2012, in Arizona v. United States, the State authorities citing the Screw Off provision of the Supremacy Clause found only in the tpaine Court of the Imagination, are assisted in getting their minds right. Arizona v United States, 567 US 11-182 (2012) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus ARIZONA et al. v. UNITED STATES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 11–182. Argued April 25, 2012—Decided June 25, 2012 [excerpts] Syllabus Held: [Slip Op at 2.] - - - - - Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. [Slip Op at 7-8.] Federalism, central to the constitutional design, adopts the principle that both the National and State Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 457 (1991); U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). From the existence of two sovereigns follows the possibility that laws can be in conflict or at cross-purposes. The Supremacy Clause provides a clear rule that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Art. VI, cl. 2. Under this principle, Congress has the power to preempt state law. See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U. S. 363, 372 (2000) ; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 210–211 (1824). There is no doubt that Congress may withdraw specified powers from the States by enacting a statute containing an express preemption provision. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 4). State law must also give way to federal law in at least two other circumstances. First, the States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its proper authority, has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U. S. 88, 115 (1992) . The intent to displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of regulation "so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it" or where there is a "federal interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947) ; see English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U. S. 72, 79 (1990) . Second, state laws are preempted when they conflict with federal law. Crosby, supra, at 372. This includes cases where "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132 –143 (1963), and those instances where the challenged state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," Hines, 312 U. S., at 67; see also Crosby, supra, at 373 ("What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects"). In preemption analysis, courts should assume that "the historic police powers of the States" are not superseded "unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice, supra, at 230; see Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S. 555, 565 (2009). [Slip Op at 25.]
Read the clause. It says that all officials of our republic are duty bound to honor our Constitution as the supreme law. -- Which gives them the power to ignore unconstitutional 'laws'. ( At their own peril, of course) --- This concept is called 'checks and balances', and without it, we would have a tyranny run by smart assed wannabe lawyers, like you. All you're continuing is your repetitive postings of facts not in contention, in an unsuccessful, obsessive effort to gloss over the FACT that you do NOT support our Constitution's checks and balances doctrine. Poor you, stuck on stupid repetitions. This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. All three branches are empowered to ignore 'laws' that are NOT made "in pursuance thereof"... And you know it... But by all means, pick another lengthy, non-germaine court opinion to quote, as you know damn well no one bothers to read your wind bag efforts anyway.. Get a life, stop trying to prove you're LF's foremost legal beagle.
When SCOTUS has decided a law is constitutional or unconstitutional, the other branches are bound by the ruling, as you, Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas, Governor Jan Brewer of Arizona, and Sheriff Joe Arpaio know. You're blithering idiocy does not change the historical facts. When Faubus tried your bullshit in practice, he was met with the 82nd Airborne and had a come to Jesus moment. Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1 (1958) United States Supreme Court Cooper v. Aaron, (1958) No. 116 Argued: September 11, 1958 Decided: September 12, 1958 Opinion announced September 29, 1958. [excerpts] 2. This Court rejects the contention that it should uphold a suspension of the Little Rock School Board’s plan to do away with segregated public schools in Little Rock until state laws and efforts to upset and nullify its holding in the Brown case have been further challenged and tested in the courts. P. 4. [...] 8. The interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” P. 18. [...] Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the “supreme Law of the Land.” In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as “the fundamental and paramount law of the nation,” declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, that “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” This decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3, “to support this Constitution.” Chief Justice Taney, speaking for a unanimous Court in 1859, said that this requirement reflected the framers’ “anxiety to preserve it [the Constitution] in full force, in all its powers, and to guard against resistance to or evasion of its authority, on the part of a State . . . .” Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 524. - - - - - The Federalist No. 81 May 28, 1788 [excerpt] These considerations teach us to applaud the wisdom of those States who have committed the judicial power, in the last resort, not to a part of the legislature, but to distinct and independent bodies of men. Contrary to the supposition of those who have represented the plan of the convention, in this respect, as novel and unprecedented, it is but a copy of the constitutions of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia; and the preference which has been given to those models is highly to be commended.
ALl three branches are empowered to ignore 'laws' that are NOT made "in pursuance thereof"... And you know it... But by all means, pick another lengthy, non-germaine court opinion to quote, as you know damn well no one bothers to read your wind bag efforts anyway.. Get a life, stop trying to prove you're LF's foremost legal beagle. NOT true. -- Tell it to Dred Scott. The SCOTUS was backed up by Eisenhower.. Without Ike, the court would have been powerless to enforce its opinion. Get a grip, you're making fool of yourself.
Dred Scott was returned to slavery. He was manumitted after the case was over. Mrs. Emerson filed a motion to collect the wages earned by Scott during the litigation and held by the Missouri authorities. Congressman Chaffee was glad that was over. Scott v. Sanford was never judicially overturned. SCOTUS found it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. It took a constitutional amendment to overturn slavery. Dred Scott died in 1858 and never saw abolition.
State authority challenged a SCOTUS decision as you imagine is within their authority. The Federal government has ample ability to enforce SCOTUS decisions against State authorities. Governor Faubus got his mind right after a visit by the 82nd Airborne. By your assinine logic, legislation would not have force as the Legislative branch does not enforce it, the Executive does.
Your blithering idiocy does not change the historical facts. Ike decided to enforce the SCOTUS opinion with troops. He was NOT obligated to do so. The SCOTUS was backed up by Eisenhower.. Without Ike, the court would have been powerless to enforce its opinion. The feds can also CHOOSE to NOT enforce SCOTUS opinions.
In the famous case of Nixon and the Watergate tapes, Nixon interpreted the law for himself and contrary to the District Court. The U.S. Supreme Court slapped him down. While the judiciary does not have enforcement power, when the President defies the Court, the Legislative Branch may exercise its power of removal from office. Nixon released the tapes. Articles of impeachment were voted out of the House Judiciary Committee and, facing certain impeachment and removal from office, Nixon resigned and got out of Dodge. Once again, the imaginary tpaine screw you provision of the Supremacy Clause failed to save the day. SCOTUS once again confirmed that it is the final arbiter of what the law is. In no case has SCOTUS identified or referred to the tpaine imaginary screw you provision of the Supremacy Clause. tpaine can only reiterate his own blather of the imagination over and over. U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-05 (1974) 418 U. S. 704 series of cases, the Court interpreted the explicit immunity conferred by express provisions of the Constitution on Members of the House and Senate by the Speech or Debate Clause, U.S.Const. Art. I, § 6. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S. 169 (1966). Since this Court has consistently exercised the power to construe and delineate claims arising under express powers, it must follow that the Court has authority to interpret claims with respect to powers alleged to derive from enumerated powers. Our system of government Powell v. McCormack, supra, at 395 U. S. 549. And in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 369 U. S. 211, the Court stated: Notwithstanding the deference each branch must accord the others, the "judicial Power of the United States" vested in the federal courts by Art. III, § 1, of the Constitution can no more be shared with the Executive Branch than the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto. Any other conclusion would be contrary to the basic concept of separation of powers and the checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government. The Federalist, No. 47, p. 313 (S. Mittell ed. 418 U. S. 705 1938). We therefore reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this Court "to say what the law is" with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this case. Marbury v. Madison, supra, at 5 U. S. 177.
State authorities do not get to choose if they find OSHA agreeable or not. They comply or get sanctioned into oblivion. They do not get to invoke the tpaine imaginary screw you provision of the Supremacy Clause. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/505/88/case.html Gade v National Solid Waste Ass’n, 505 US 88, 108-09 (1992) [excerpt] We recognize that “the States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries, and that as part of their power to protect the public health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions.” Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773, 792 (1975); see also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 731 (1963); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 122 (1889). But under the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, “’any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.’” Felder v. Casey, 487 U. S., at 138 (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U. S. 663, 666 (1962)); see also De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351, 357 (1976) (“[E]ven state regulation designed to protect vital state interests must give way to paramount federal legislation”). We therefore reject petitioner’s argument that the State’s interest in licensing various occupations can save from OSH Act pre-emption those provisions that directly and substantially affect workplace safety. We also reject petitioner’s argument that the Illinois licensing acts do not regulate occupational safety and health at all, but are instead a “pre-condition” to employment. By that reasoning, the OSHA regulations themselves would not be considered occupational standards. SARA, however, makes clear that the training of employees engaged in hazardous waste operations is an occupational safety and health issue, and that certification requirements before an employee may engage in such work are occupational safety and health standards. See supra, at 92. Because nei- [109] ther of the OSH Act’s saving provisions are implicated, and because Illinois does not have an approved state plan under § 18(b), the state licensing acts are pre-empted by the OSH Act to the extent they establish occupational safety and health standards for training those who work with hazardous wastes. Like the Court of Appeals, we do not specifically consider which of the licensing acts’ provisions will stand or fall under the pre-emption analysis set forth above.
SCOTUS is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and not tpaine. They do not recognize the imaginary tpaine screw you provision of the Supremacy Clause. Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186, 211 (1962)
SCOTUS is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and not tpaine. They do not recognize the imaginary tpaine screw you provision of the Supremacy Clause. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (1999)
THAT is funny. Btw -- Must I launch a group intervention on this thread? :-)
When you are as important, and a constitutional scholar, like tpaine, you will recognize that your opinions are no longer opinions. They are better that Jeffersons own statements. I'm damn surprised the Supreme Court has managed to function this long without his induction by a past president. You surprise me, you already posted 175 posts more than I'd waste on this ridiculously fruitless thread. I'm the infidel... Allah warned you about. كافر المسلح
Nah. tpaine #40, imaginary constitutional law. tpaine #53, imaginary court proceedings. Not only did SCOTUS uphold the holding of the District Court, in an unusual opinion, it upheld the entire decree (opinion). tpaine #208, imaginary history. Both he and robertpaulsen slink away from the argument, in defeat. Try as he may to get me to slink away, I’m not going anywhere. tpaine can continue to demonstrate that he has nothing to support his bullshit, and he can assist me in developing a nice one-stop shopping experience for anyone who may need sources to rebut his subsequent bullshit. Help can be a bookmark away. In the tpaine Court of the Imagination, “SCOTUS opinions can be ignored on constitutional grounds and officials can refuse to implement/fund any attempts at forcement.” As Orval Faubus proved, that can bring a visit from the 82nd Airborne. tpaine can always just slink away, or he can keep demonstrating that he has nothing to support his bullshit. I, on the other hand, have over two centuries of on-topic judicial records to draw upon, all of them saying that tpaine is full of shit. It’s kind of like watering my pet geranium. For amusement, one can read books on imaginary law. You can learn that to be a natural born citizen and eligible for President, both parents must have been citizens at the time of birth. Judicial Review is unconstitutional. The new and secret Supremacy Clause. You can even learn that the grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court [Art. 3. Sect. 2, Cl. 2] means that the federal appellate courts could not take any such case claiming original jurisdiction and United States v. Arizona, was unconstitutional because it was started in a U.S. District Court. One may even take law classes and attend seminars to become birther educated about the Constitution. Yes indeed, birthers have now branched to expound upon constitutional law. 25 Myths of the United States Constitution, by Douglas V. Gibbs. The Basic Constitution: An Examination of the Principles and Philosophies of the United States Constitution by Douglas V. Gibbs. Or get a free look at the Gibbs blog, Political Pistachio. You can learn about Unconstitutionality of Judicial Review, June 29, 2012 And there’s more, Understanding the Supremacy Clause, November 15, 2011 And more, Myth #19: Being Born in the United States Satisfies the Definition of Natural Born Citizen, September 19, 2011 And more, Understanding the Eligibility Issue, Regarding Obama, Rubio. . . , January 30, 2012 And more, Understanding the term: Natural Born Citizen, July 31, 2009
nolu chan claims: --- Good idea, as nolu has obviously lost it, in claiming that I've seen some "imaginary" provision in the supremacy clause. -- Not so. He has the over active imagination, and its time to help out the poor delusional fella. --------------------------- #240. To: nolu chan (#237) Good golly, grand one, you've succumbed to the same delusions as nolu! -- I had no idea that he was infectious.... True enough.. Poor nolu has probably posted more fruitless verbiage on this thread than on most small books. -- And all he's proved is his own obsessive/compulsive behavior.
Judge Emmet G. Sullivan has issued an ORDER. Will Hillary Clinton, Huma Abedin, and Cheryl Mills invoke the screw you provision of the Supremacy Clause as expounded by the tpaine Court of the imagination? Judicial Watch v Department of State, DCDC 13-cv-01363-EGS, case filed 09-10-2013, DOCKET REPORT, unnumbered docket entry of 07-31-2015, MINUTE ORDER of Judge Emmet G. Sullivan, quoted from the Docket Report:
District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan issued an ORDER. Will the IRS invoke the screw you provision of the Supremacy Clause as expounded by the tpaine Court of the Imagination? Judicial Watch v IRS, DCDC 13-cv-01559-EGS, case filed 10-09-2013, DOCKET REPORT, unnumbered docket entry of 07-29-2015, MINUTE ORDER of District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan, quoted from the Docket Report: Also the next docket entry, also dated 07-29-2015, quoted from the docket report:
Some help is needed for the tpaine short-term memory loss and the attack of yukonism. So, you see, that it the U.S. Supreme Court rules, as it did in Brown v. Board of Education, that school segregation is unconstitutional, Governor Orval Faubus was exercising his constitutional right and duty under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI when he called out the National Guard to stop the Little Rock School District officials from integrating the Little Rock Central School. Governor Faubus deemed the SCOTUS to be in error and substituted his own judgment, per the imaginary screw off provision of the Supremacy Clause. Yes, read the clause: Good luck finding the imaginary content referred to by tpaine which empowers all officials to use their own interpretation of the Constitution and to tell the Supreme Court to screw off. That worked well for Governor Orval Faubus -- until the 82nd Airborne arrived and told him, “no, screw you.” One may take note of the glaring absence of case law cited and quoted by tpaine to support his bullshit. Nor does he cite and quote recognized legal authorities to support his bullshit. His bullshit is suported by more of his own bullshit. He has a B.S., M.S., and PhD in bullshit: bullshit, more shit, and piled higher and deeper. Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186, 211 (1962) the Court stated:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. Good luck finding the imaginary content referred to by tpaine which empowers all officials to use their own interpretation of the Constitution and to tell the Supreme Court to screw off. Needs repeating I'm the infidel... Allah warned you about. كافر المسلح
Read the clause. It says that all officials of our republic are duty bound to honor our Constitution as the supreme law. -- Which gives them the power to ignore unconstitutional 'laws'. ( At their own peril, of course) This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. "In pursuance thereof" is the content that you fellas want to ignore. Why would you want officials of our various branches of govt to obey constitutionally questionable 'laws' can only be answered by mental health professionals.
The Constitution designates the judiciary to decide whether the laws were made in pursuance thereof, and the judiciary declares null and void the laws it finds unconstitutional. When the Constitution is amended to delegate the authority to tpaine, you will be expounding something other than bullshit. A law violating a constitution established by the people themselves, would be considered by the Judges as null & void. - - - - - 2 Elliott 131: [Samuel Adams] [I]f any law made by the federal government shall be extended beyond the power granted by the proposed Constitution, and inconsistent with the constitution of this state, it will be an error, and adjudged by the courts of law to be void. - - - - - 2 Elliott 196: [Oliver Elsworth] If the United States go beyond their powers, if they make a law which the Constitution does not authorize, it is void; and the judicial power, the national judges, who, to secure their impartiality, are to be made independent, will declare it to be void. - - - - - 2 Elliott 445: [James Wilson] I say, under this Constitution, the legislature may be restrained, and kept within its prescribed bounds, by the interposition of the judicial department. - - - - - 4 Elliott 553: [John Marshall] Can they go beyond the delegated powers? If they were to make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would be considered by the judges as an infringement of the Constitution which they are to guard. They would not consider such a law as coming under their jurisdiction. They would declare it void. William Rawle, A View of the Constitution, 1825, Chapter 20, of the Judicial Power, p. 188: Of the Judicial Power. [...] Its construction of the acts of the legislature is received as binding and conclusive, although it does not prevent the legislature from repairing its own defects, or clearing up its own ambiguities by subsequent laws, operating on subsequent cases. A high function also appertains to the judiciary in the exclusive right to expound the constitution, and thereby to test the validity of all the acts of the legislature. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, 1833, page 703: Dickerson v United States, 530 US 428, 437 (2000): United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809): This was the original case on State Nulification. No Supreme Court decision has ever upheld State Nullification. It is currently only upheld by the tpaine Court of the imagination. Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1 (1958): [...] Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the “supreme Law of the Land.” In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as “the fundamental and paramount law of the nation,” declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, that “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” This decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3, “to support this Constitution.” The duty to abstain from resistance to “the supreme Law of the Land,” U.S. Const., Art. VI § 2, as declared by the organ of our Government for ascertaining it, does not require immediate approval of it nor does it deny the right of dissent. Criticism need not be stilled. Active obstruction or defiance is barred. Our kind of society cannot endure if the controlling authority of the Law as derived from the Constitution is not to be the tribunal specially charged with the duty of ascertaining and declaring what is “the supreme Law of the Land.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 211 (1962) the Court stated:
From the tpaine Court of the Imagination: Yep, just as 'we' can ignore scotus.. The concept of 'checks and balances' is built into our Constitution.. Only laws (or amendments) made "in pursuance thereof" (as the supremacy clause says) are part of our supreme law, the Constitution.. Your opinion, and that of the court, is erroneous. It is a bold new world, where everybody and his brother has original jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution and the laws, and are imbued with a personal right of nullification. The claimed State right of nullification has been held invalid for more than two centuries. In tpaineworld, “‘we’ can ignore scotus.” Anyone believeing this bullshit and acting upon it can try to explain it to a judge. In tpaineworld, tpaine’s anonymous Deemer can deem an Amendment to the Constitution to be unconstitutional. An Amendment is not enacted by Congress, it is ratified by the people. Prior to ratification, it is merely a proposal. Immediately upon ratification, it becomes an integral part of the Constitution, of equal stature to all other parts. No officer or body of the government, created by the people to serve the people, can nullify or void a sovereign act of the people.
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. "In pursuance thereof" is the content that you fellas want to ignore. Why would you want officials of our various branches of govt to obey constitutionally questionable 'laws' can only be answered by mental health professionals. Only laws (or amendments) made "in pursuance thereof" (as the supremacy clause says) are part of our supreme law, the Constitution.. Not so. Officials of every branch, at every level of our State, Fed, and local govts are sworn to support and defend the Constitution, and laws made "in pursuance thereof". They all must decide for themselves whether a law is constitutionally valid. Yep, that is one of their functions, just as I've noted before.
As tpaine has nothing to say but the reiteration of his own bullshit, supported by nothing, and contradicted by centuries of case law and the law tests of qualified legal experts, of which he neither does nor can cite any, it is time to sontinue his education. Case law is not receptive to the bullshit of natural law. - - - - - - - - - [386] AUGUST TERM, 1798. CALDER and wife v. BULL and wife. Constitutional law.—Eminent domain.—Ex post facto laws. The judiciary is a co-ordinate branch of the government, and may declare a statute to be void, as repugnant to the constitution. Private property may be taken for public use, by allowing the owners a reasonable equivalent. A statute granting a new trial in a particular case, is not unconstitutional, as an ex post facto law.1 An ex post facto law, within the meaning of the constitution, is one that punishes as a crime, an act done before its passage, and which, when committed, was not punishable; an act that aggravates a crime, or inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to it, when committed; or a law that alters the rules of evidence, in order to convict an offender. If congress, or a state legislature, pass a law, within the general scope of their constitutional power, the courts cannot pronounce it void, merely because, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice.1 IREDELL, J. An act of the legislature, contrary to the first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative power. CHASE, J. In error from the State of Connecticut. The cause was argued at the last term (in the absence of the Chief Justice) and now the court delivered their opinions seriatim. CHASE, Justice.—The decision of one question determines (in my opinion) the present dispute. I shall, therefore, state from the record no more of the case, than I think necessary for the consideration of that question only. The legislature of Connecticut, on the 2d Thursday of May 1795, passed a resolution or law, which, for the reasons assigned, set aside a decree of the Court of Probate for Hartford, on the 21st of March 1793, which decree disapproved of the will of Normand Morrison (the grandson), made the 21st of August 1779, and refused to record the said will; and granted a new hearing by the said court of probate, with liberty of appeal therefrom, in six months. A new hearing was had, in virtue of this resolution or law, before the said court of probate, who, on the 27th of July 1795, approved the said will, and ordered it to be recorded. At August 1795, appeal was then had to the superior court at Hartford, who, at February term 1796, affirmed the decree of the court of probate. Appeal was had to the supreme court of errors of Connecticut, who, in June 1796, adjudged that there were no errors. More than eighteen months elapsed from the decree of the court of probate (on the 1st of March 1793), and thereby Caleb Bull and wife were barred of all right _____ 1 It has been decided in Pennsylvania, that as the legislature possesses no judicial power, it cannot order a new trial. Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Penn. St. 18. Nor direct the court to entertain a bill of review. Boggs’ Appeal, 43 Id. 512. 2 To the same effect, see Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 21 Penn. St. 147; Erie and North East Railroad, 26 Id. 287. - - - - - - - - - - [387] of appeal, by a statute of Connecticut. There was no law of that state whereby a new hearing or trial, before the said court of probate, might be obtained. Calder and wife claimed the premises in question, in right of the wife, as heiress of N. Morrison, physician; Bull and wife claimed under the will of N. Morrison, the grandson. The counsel for the plaintiffs in error contend, that the said resolution or law of the legislature of Connecticut, granting a new hearing, in the above case, is an ex post facto law, prohibited by the constitution of the United States; that any law of the federal government, or of any of the state government, contrary to the constitution of the United States, is void; and that this court possesses the power to declare such law void. It appears to me a self-evident proposition, that the several state legislatures retain all the powers of legislation, delegated to them by the state constitutions; which are not expressly taken away by the constitution of the United States. The establishing courts of justice, the appointment of judges, and the making regulations for the administration of justice within each state, according to its laws, on all subjects not intrusted to the federal government, appears to me to be the peculiar and exclusive province and duty of tite state legislatures. All the powers delegated by the people of the United States to the federal government are defined, and no constructive powers can be exercised by it, and all the powers that remain in the state governments are indefinite; except only in the constitution of Massachusetts. The effect of the resolution or law of Connecticut, above stated, is to revise a decision of one of its inferior courts, called the court of probate for Hartford, and to direct a new hearing of the case by the same court of probate, that passed the decree against the will of Normand Morrison. By the existing law of Connecticut, a right to recover certain property had vested in Calder and wife (the appellants), in consequence of a decision of a court of justice, but in virtue of a subsequent resolution or law, and the new hearing thereof, and the decision in consequence, this right to recover certain property was divested, and the right to the property declared to be in Bull and wife, the appellees. The sole inquiry is, whether this resolution or law of Connecticut, having such operation, is an ex post facto law, within the prohibition of the federal constitution? Whether the legislature of any of the states can revise and correct by law, a decision of any of its courts of justice, although not prohibited by the constitution of the state, is a question of very great importance, and not necessary now to be determined; because the resolution or law in question does not go so far. I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a state - - - - - - - - - [388] legislature or that it is absolute and without control; although its authority should not be expressly restrained by the constitution, or fundamental law of the state. The people of the United States erected their constitutions or forms of government, to establish justice, to promote the general welfare, to secure the blessings of liberty, and to protect their persons and property from violence. The purposes for which men enter into society will determine the nature and terms of the social compact; and as they are the foundation of the legislative power, they will decide what are the proper objects of it. The nature, and ends of legislative power will limit the exercise of it. This fundamental principle flows from the very nature of our free republican governments, that no man should be compelled to do what the laws do not require; nor to refrain from acts which the laws permit. There are acts which the federal, or state legislature cannot do, without exceeding their authority. There are certain vital principles in our free republican governments, which will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as to authorize manifest injustice by positive law; or to take away that security for personal liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof the government was established. An act of the legislature (for I cannot call it a law), contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a righful exercise of legislative authority. The obligation of a law, in governments established on express compact, and on republican principles, must be determined by the nature of the power on which it is founded. A few instances will suffice to explain what I mean. A law that punished a citizen for an innocent action, or, in other words, for an act, which, when done, was in violation of no existing law; a law that destroys or impairs the lawful private contracts of citizens; a law that makes a man a judge in his own cause; or a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B.: it is against all reason and justice, for a people to intrust a legislature with such powers; and therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it. The genius, the nature and the spirit of our state governments, amount to a prohibition of such acts of legislation; and the general principles of law and reason forbid them. The legislature may enjoin, permit, forbid and punish; they may declare new crimes; and establish rules of conduct for all its citizens in future cases; they may command what is right, and prohibit what is wrong; but they cannot change innocence into guilt; or punish innocence as a crime; or violate the right of an antecedent lawful private contract; or the right of private property. To maintain that our federal, or state legislature possesses such powers, if they had not been expressly restrained; would, - - - - - - - - - [389] in my opinion, be a political heresy, altogether inadmissible in our free republican governments. All the restrictions contained in the constitution of the United States on the power of the state legislatures, were provided in favor of the authority of the federal government. The prohibition against their making any ex post facto laws was introduced for greater caution, and very probably arose from the knowledge, that the parliament of Great Britain claimed and exercised a power to pass such laws, under the denomination of bills of attainder, or bills of pains and penalties; the first inflicting capital, and the other less punishment. These acts were legislative judgments; and an exercise of judicial power. Sometimes, they respected the crime, by declaring acts to be treason, which were not treason, when committed;(*) at other times, they violated the rules of evidence (to supply a deficiency of legal proof) by admitting one witness, when the existing law required two; by receiving evidence without oath; or the oath of the wife against the husband; or other testimony, which the courts of justice would not admit;(a) at other times, they inflicted punishments, where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment;(b) and in other cases, they inflicted greater punishment, than the law annexed to the offence, (c) The ground for the exercise of such legislative power was this, that the safety of the kingdom depended on the death, or other punishment, of the offender: as if traitors, when discovered, could be so formidable, or the government so insecure! With very few exceptions, the advocates of such laws were stimulated by ambition, or personal resentment and vindictive malice. To prevent such and similar acts of violence and injustice, I believe, the federal and state legislatures were prohibited from passing any bill of attainder, or any ex post facto law. The constitution of the United States, article I., section 9, prohibits the legislature of the United States from passing any ex post facto law; and, in § 10, lays several restrictions on the authority of the legislatures of the several states; and, among them, “ that no state shall pass any ex post facto law.” It may be remembered, that the legislatures of several of the states, to wit, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and North and South Carolina, are expressly prohibited, by their state constitutions, from passing any ex post facto law. _____ (*) The case of the Earl of Strafford, in 1641. (a) The case of Sir John Fenwick, in 1696. (b) The banishment of Lord Clarendon, 1669 (19 Car. II, c. 10), and of the Bishop of Atterbury, in 1723 (9 Geo. I., c. 17). (c) The Coventry act, in 1670 (22 & 23 Car. IL, c. 1). - - - - - - - - - - [390] I shall endeavor to show what law is to be considered an ex post facto law, within the words and meaning of the prohibition in the federal constitution. The prohibition, “that no state shall pass any ex post facto law,” necessarily requires some explanation; for, naked and without explanation, it is unintelligible, and means nothing. Literally, it is only, that a law shall not be passed concerning, and after the fact, or thing done, or action committed. I would ask, what fact; of what nature or kind; and by whom done? That Charles L, king of England, was beheaded; that Oliver Cromwell was protector of England; that Louis XVI., late king of France, was guillotined; are all facts that have happened; but it would be nonsense to suppose, that the states were prohibited from making any law, after either of these events, and with reference thereto. The prohibition, in the letter, is not to pass any law concerning, and after the fact; but the plain and obvious meaning and intention of the prohibition is this: that the legislatures of the several states, shall not pass laws, after a fact done by a subject or citizen, which shall have relation to such fact, and shall punish him for having done it. The prohibition, considered in this light, is an additional bulwark in favor of the personal security of the subject, to protect his person from punishment by legislative acts, having a retrospective operation. I do not think it was inserted, to secure the citizen in his private rights of either property or contracts. The prohibitions not to make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, and not to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, were inserted to secure private rights; but the restriction not to pass any ex post facto law, was to secure the person of the subject from injury or punishment, in consequence of such law. If the prohibition against making ex post facto laws was intended to secure personal rights from being affected or injured by such laws, and the prohibition is sufficiently extensive for that object, the other restraints I have enumerated, were unnecessary, and therefore, improper; for both of them are retrospective.1 I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words and the intent of the prohibition. 1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. _____ 1 Southwick v. Southwick, 49 N. Y. 510. 2 Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88; Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456; Locke v. New Orleans, 4 Wall. 172; Cummings v. Missouri, Id. 277; United States v. hall, 2 W.C.C. 366; Shepherd v. People, 25 N.Y. 406. - - - - - - - - - [391] All these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive. In my opinion, the true distinction is between ex post facto laws, and retrospective laws. Every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective; but every retrospective law is not an ex post facto law: the former only are prohibited. Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested, agreeable to existing laws, is retrospective, and is generally unjust, and may be oppressive; and it is a good general rule, that a law should have no retrospect: but there are cases in which laws may justly, and for the benefit of the community, and also of individuals, relate to a time antecedent to their commencement; as statutes of oblivion or of pardon. They are certainly retrospective, and literally both concerning and after the facts committed. But I do not consider any law ex post facto, within the prohibition, that mollifies the rigor of the criminal law: but only those that create or aggravate the crime; or increase the punishment, or change the rules of evidence, for the purpose of conviction. Every law that is to have an operation before the making thereof, as to commence at an antecedent time; or to save time from the statute of limitations; or to excuse acts which were unlawful, and before committed, and the like, is retrospective. But such laws may be proper or necessary, as the case may be. There is a great and apparent difference between making an unlawful act lawful; and the making an innocent action criminal, and punishing it as a crime. The expressions “ ex post facto laws,” are technical, they had been in use long before the revolution, and had acquired an appropriate meaning, by legislators, lawyers and authors. The celebrated and judicious Sir William Blackstone, in his commentaries, considers an ex post facto law precisely in the same light as I have done. His opinion is confirmed by his successor, Mr. Wooddeson; and by the author of the Federalist, who I esteem superior to both, for his extensive and accurate knowledge of the true principles of government. I also rely greatly on the definition or explanation of ex post facto laws, as given by the conventions of Massachusetts, Maryland and North Carolina, in their several constitutions or forms of government. In the declaration of rights, by the convention of Massachusetts, part lst, § 24, “Laws made to punish actions done before the existence of such laws, and which have not been declared crimes by preceding laws, are unjust, &c.” In the declaration of rights, by the convention of Maryland, art. 15th, “Retrospective laws punishing facts committed before the existence of such laws, and by them - - - - - - - - - [392] only declared criminal, are oppressive, &c.” In the declaration of rights, by the convention of North Carolina, art. 24th, I find the same definition, precisely in the same words, as in the Maryland constitution. In the declaration of rights, by the convention of Delaware, art. 11th, the same definition was clearly intended, but inaccurately expressed: by saying “laws punishing offences (instead of actions or facts) committed before the existence of such laws, are oppressive, &c.” I am of opinion, that the fact, contemplated by the prohibition, and not to be affected by a subsequent law, was some fact to be done by a citizen or subject. In 2 Lord Raymond 1352, Raymond, Justice, called the stat. 7 Geo. I., stat. 2, par. 8, about registering contracts for South Sea stock, an ex post facto law; because it affected contracts made before the statute. In the present case, there is no fact done by Bull and wife, plaintiffs in error, that is in any manner affected by the law or resolution of Connecticut: it does not concern, or relate to, any act done by them. The decree of the court of probate of Hartford (on the 21st March), in consequence of which Calder and wife claim a right to the property in question, was given before the said law or resolution, and in that sense, was affected and set aside by it; and in consequence of the law allowing a hearing and the decision in favor of the will, they have lost what they would have been entitled to, if the law or resolution, and the decision in consequence thereof, had not been made. The decree of the court of probate is the only fact, on which the law or resolution operates. In my judgment, the case of the plaintiffs in error, is not within the letter of the prohibition; and for the reasons assigned, I am clearly of opinion, that it is not within the intention of the prohibition; and if within the intention, but out of the letter, I should not, therefore, consider myself justified to construe it within the prohibition, and therefore, that the whole was void. It was argued by the counsel for the plaintiffs in error, that the legislature of Connecticut had no constitutional power to make the resolution (or law) in question, granting a new hearing, &c. Without giving an opinion, at this time, whether this court has jurisdiction to decide that any law made by congress, contrary to the constitution of the United States, is void: I am fully satisfied, that this court has no jurisdiction to determine that any law of any state legislature, contrary to the constitution of such state, is void. Further, if this court had such jurisdiction, yet it does not appear to me, that the resolution (or law) in question, is contrary to the charter of Connecticut, or its constitution, which is said by counsel to be composed of its - - - - - - - - - [393] acts of assembly, and usages and customs. I should think, that the courts of Connecticut are the proper tribunals to decide, whether laws contrary to the constitution thereof, are void. In the present case, they have, both in the inferior and superior courts, determined that the resolution (or law) in question was not contrary to either their state, or the federal constitution. To show that the resolution was contrary to the constitution of the United States, it was contended, that the words, ex post facto law have a precise and accurate meaning, and convey but one idea to professional men, which is, “by matter of after fact; by something after the fact.” And Co. Litt. 241; Fearne’s Cont. Rem. (Old Ed.) 175 and 203; Powell on Devises 113, 133, 134, were cited; and the table to Coke’s Reports (by Wilson), title ex post facto, was referred to. There is no doubt, that a man may be a trespasser from the beginning, by matter of after fact; as where an entry is given by law, and the party abuses it; or where the law gives a distress, and the party kills or works the distress. I admit, an act unlawful in the beginning may, in some cases, become lawful by matter of after fact. I also agree, that the words “ex post facto” have the meaning contended for, and no other, in the cases cited, and in all similar cases, where they are used unconnected with, and without relation to, legislative acts or laws. There appears to me a manifest distinction between the case where one fact relates to, and affects, another fact, as where an after fact, by operation of law, makes a former fact either lawful or unlawful; and the case where a law made after a fact done, is to operate on, and to affect, such fact. In the first case, both the acts are done by private persons; in the second case, the first act is done by a private person, and the second act is done by the legislature, to affect the first act. I believe, that but one instance can be found in which a British judge called a statute, that affected contracts made before the statute, an ex post facto law; but the judges of Great Britain always considered penal statutes, that created crimes, or increased the punishment of them, as ex post facto laws. If the term ex post facto law is to be construed to include and to prohibit the enacting any law, after a fact, it will greatly restrict the power of the federal and state legislatures; and the consequences of such a construction may not be foreseen. If the prohibition to make no ex post facto law extends to all laws made after the fact, the two prohibitions, not to make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; and not; tp pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, were improper and unnecessary. - - - - - - - - - [394] It was further urged, that if the provision does not extend to -^ prohibit the making any law, after a fact, then all choses in action; all lands by devise; all personal property by bequest, or distribution; by elegit; by execution; by judgments, particularly on torts; will be unprotected from the legislative power of the states; rights vested may be divested at the will and pleasure of the state legislatures; and therefore, that the true construction and meaning of the prohibition is, that the states pass no law to deprive a citizen of any right vested in him by existing laws. It is not to be presumed, that the federal or state legislatures will pass laws to deprive citizens of rights vested in them by existing laws; unless for the benefit of the whole community; and on making full satisfaction. The restraint against making any ex post facto laws was not considered by the framers of the constitution, as extending to prohibit the depriving a citizen even of a vested right to property; or the provision that private property should not be taken for public use, without just compensation,” was unnecessary. It seems to me, that the right of property, in its origin, could only arise from compact, express or implied, and I think it the better opinion, that the right, as well as the mode, or manner of acquiring property, and of alienatii g or transferring, inheriting or transmitting it, is conferred by society; is regulated by civil institution, and is always subject to the rules prescribed by positive law. When I say, that a right is vested in a citizen, I mean, that he has the power to do certain actions; or to possess certain things, according to the law of the land. If any one has a right to property, such a right is perfect and exclusive right; but no one can have such right, before he has acquired a better right to the property, than any other person in the world; a right, therefore, only to recover property, cannot be called a perfect and exclusive right. I cannot agree, that a right to property vested in Calder and wife, in consequence of the decree (of the 21st of March 1783) disapproving of the will of Morrison, the grandson. If the will was valid, Mrs. Calder could have no right, as heiress of Morrison, the physician; but if the will was set aside, she had an undoubted title. The resolution (or law) alone had no manner of effect on any right whatever vested in Calder and wife. The resolution (or law), combined with the new hearing, and the decision in virtue of it, took away their right to recover the property in question. But when combined, they took away no right of property vested in Calder and wife; because, the decree against the will (21st March 1783) did not vest in or transfer any property to them. - - - - - - - - - - [395] I am under a necessity to give a construction or explanation of the words, “ ex post facto law,” because they have not any certain meaning attached to them. But I will not go further than I feel myself bound to do; and if I ever exercise the jurisdiction, I will not decide any law to be void, but in a very clear case. I am of opinion, that the decree of the supreme court of errors of Connecticut be affirmed, with costs. PATERSON, Justice.—The constitution of Connecticut is made up of usages, and it appears, that its legislature have, from the beginning, exercised the power of granting new trials. This has been uniformly the case, until the year 1762, when this power was, by a legislative act, imparted to the superior and county courts. But the act does not remove or annihilate the pre-existing power of the legislature, in this particular; it only communicates to other authorities a concurrence of jurisdiction, as to the awarding of new trials. And the fact is, that the legislature have, in two instances, exercised this power, since the passing of the law in 1762. They acted in a double capacity, as a house of legislation, with undefined authority, and also as a court of judicature, in certain exigencies. Whether the latter arose from the indefinite nature of their legislative powers, or in some other way, it is not necessary to discuss. From the best information, however, which I have been able to collect on this subject, it appears, that the legislature, or general court of Connecticut, originally possessed and exercised all legislative, executive and judicial authority; and Hutt, from time to time, they distributed the two latter in such manner as they thought proper; but without parting with the general superintending power, or the right of exercising the same, whenever they should judge it expedient. But be this as it may, it is sufficient for the present, to observe, that they have, on certain occasions, exercised judicial authority, from the commencement of their civil polity. This usage makes up part of the constitution of Connecticut, and we are bound to consider it as such, unless it be inconsistent with the constitution of the United States. True it is, that the awarding of new trials falls properly within the province of the judiciary; but if the legislature of Connecticut have been in the uninterrupted exercise of this authority, in certain cases, we must, in such cases, respect their decisions, as flowing from a competent jurisdiction or constitutional organ. And therefore, we may, in the present instance, consider the legislature of the state as having acted in their customary judicial capacity. If so, there is an end of the question. For if the power, thus exercised, comes more properly within the description of a judicial than of a legislative power; and if by usage or the - - - - - - - - - [396] constitution, which, in Connecticut, are synonymous terms, the legislature of that state acted in both capacities; then, in the case L now before us, it would be fair to consider the awarding of a new trial, as an act emanating from the judiciary side of the department. But as this view of the subject militates against the plaintiffs in error, their counsel has contended for a reversal of the judgment, on the ground, that the awarding of a new trial was the effect of a legislative act, and that it is unconstitutional, because an ex post facto law. For the sake of ascertaining the meaning of these terms, I will consider the resolution of the general court of Connecticut, as the exercise of a legislative and not a judicial authority. The question, then, which arises on the pleadings in this cause, is, whether the resolution of the legislature of Connecticut, be an ex post facto law, within the meaning of the constitution of the United States? I am of opinion, that it is not. The words, ex post facto, when applied to a law, have a technical meaning, and, in legal phraseology, refer to crimes, pains and penalties. Judge Blackstone’s description of the terms is clear and accurate. “There is,” says he, “a still more unreasonable method than this, which is called making of laws, ex post facto, when, after an action, indifferent in itself, is committed, the legislature, then, for the first time, declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment upon the person who has committed it. Here, it is impossible, that the party could foresee, that an action, innocent when it was done, should be afterwards converted to guilt, by a subsequent law; he had, therefore, no cause to abstain from it; and all punishment for not abstaining, must, of consequence, be cruel and unjust.” 1 Bl. Com. 46. Here, the meaning annexed to the terms ex post facto laws, unquestionably refers to crimes, and nothing else. The historic page abundantly evinces, that the power of passing such laws should be withheld from legislators; as it is a dangerous instrument in the hands of bold, unprincipled, aspiring and party men, and has been too often used to effect the most detestable purposes. On inspecting such of our state constitutions, as take notice of laws made ex post facto, we shall find, that they are understood in the same sense. The constitution of Massachusetts, article 24th of the declaration of rights: “Laws made to punish for actions done before the existence of such laws, and which have not been declared crimes by preceding laws, are unjust, oppressive, and inconsistent with the fundamental principles of a free government.” The constitution of Delaware, article 11th of the declaration of rights: - - - - - - - - - [397] “That retrospective laws punishing offences committed before the existence of such laws, are oppressive and unjust, and ought not to be made.” The constitution of Maryland, article 15th of the declaration of rights: “That retrospective laws, punishing facts committed before the existence of such laws, and by them only declared criminal, are oppressive, unjust and incompatible with liberty; wherefore, no ex post facto law ought to be made.” The constitution of North Carolina, article 24th of the declaration of rights: “That retrospective laws, punishing facts committed before the existence of such laws, and by them only declared criminal, are oppressive, unjust and incompatible with liberty; wherefore, no ex post facto law ought to be made.” From the above passages, it appears, that ex post facto laws have an appropriate signification; they extend to penal statutes and no further; they are restricted, in legal estimation, to the creation, and, perhaps, enhancement of crimes, pains and penalties. The enhancement of a crime or penalty seems to come within the same mischief as the creation of a crime or penalty; and therefore, they may be classed together. Again, the words of the constitution of the United States are, “That no state shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.” Article I., § 10. Where is the necessity or use of the latter words, if a law impairing the obligation of contracts, be comprehended within the terms ex post facto law? It is obvious, from the specification of contracts in the last member of the clause, that the framers of the constitution did not understand or use the words in the sense contended for on the part of the plaintiffs in error. They understood and used the words in their known and appropriate signification, as referring to crimes, pains and penalties, and no further. The arrangement of the distinct members of this section, necessarily points to this meaning. I had an ardent desire to have extended the provision in the constitution to retrospective laws in general. There is neither policy or safety in such laws; and therefore, I have always had a strong aversion against them. It may, in general, be truly observed of retrospective laws of every description, that they neither accord with sound legislation, nor the fundamental principles of the social compact. But on full consideration, I am convinced, that ex post facto laws must be limited in the manner already expressed; they must be taken in their technical, which is also their common and general, acceptation, and are not to be understood in their literal sense. - - - - - - - - - [398] Iredell, Justice.—Though I concur in the general result of the opinions which have been delivered, I cannot entirely adopt the reasons that are assigned upon the occasion. From the best information to be collected, relative to the constitution of Connecticut, it appears, that the legislature of that state has been in the uniform, uninterrupted habit of exercising a general superintending power over its courts of law, by granting new trials. It may, indeed, appear strange to some of us, that in any form, there should exist a power to grant, with respect to suits depending or adjudged, new rights of trial, new privileges of proceeding, not previously recognised and regulated by positive institutions; but such is the established usage of Connecticut, and it is obviously consistent with the general superintending authority of her legislature. Nor is it altogether without some sanction, for a legislature to act as a court of justice. In England, we know that one branch of the parliament, the House of Lords, not only exercises a judicial power, in cases of impeachment, and for the trial of its own members, but as the court of dernier resort, takes cognisance of many suits of law and in equity; and that in construction of law, the jurisdiction there exercised is by the king in full parliament; which shows that, in its origin, the causes were probably heard before the whole parliament. When Connecticut was settled, the right of empowering the legislature to superintend the courts of justice, was, I presume, early assumed; and its expediency, as applied to the local circumstances and municipal policy of the state, is sanctioned by a long and uniform practice. The power, however, is judicial in its nature; and whenever it is exercised, as in the present instance, it is an exercise of judicial, not of legislative, authority. But let us, for a moment, suppose, that the resolution, granting a new trial, was a legislative act, it will by no means follow, that it is an act affected by the constitutional prohibition, that “no state shall pass any ex post facto law.” I will endeavor to state the general principles which influence me, on this point, succinctly and clearly, though I have not had an opportunity to reduce my opinion to writing. If, then, a government, composed of legislative, executive and judicial departments, were established, by a constitution which imposed no limits on the legislative power, the consequence would inevitably be, that whatever the legislative power chose to enact, would be lawfully enacted, and the judicial power could never interpose to pronounce it void. It is true, that some speculative jurists have held, that a legislative act against natural justice must, in itself, be void; but I cannot think that, under such a government any court of justice would possess a power to declare it so. Sir William Blackstone, having put the strong case of an act of parliament, which - - - - - - - - - [399] authorize a man to try his own cause, explicitly adds, that even in that case, “there is no court that has power to defeat the intent of the legislature, when couched in such evident and express words, as leave no doubt whether it was the intent of the legislature, or no.” 1 Bl. Com. 91. In order, therefore, to guard against so great an evil, it has been the policy of all the American states, which have, individually, framed their state constitutions, since the revolution, and of the people of the United States, when they framed the federal constitution, to define with precision the objects of the legislative power, and to restrain its exercise within marked and settled boundaries. If any act of congress, or of the legislature of a state, violates those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void; though, I admit, that as the authority to declare it void is of a delicate and awful nature, the court will never resort to that authority, but in a clear and urgent case. If, on the other hand, the legislature of the Union, or the legislature of any member of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope of their constitutional power, the court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice. The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all that the court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natural justice. There are then but two lights, in which the subject can be viewed: 1st. If the legislature pursue the authority delegated to them, their acts are valid. 2d. If they transgress the boundaries of that authority, their acts are invalid. In the former case, they exercise the discretion vested in them by the people, to whom alone they are responsible for the faithful discharge of their trust: but in the latter case, they violate a fundamental law, which must be our guide, whenever we are called upon, as judges, to determine the validity of a legislative act. Still, however, in the present instance, the act or resolution of the legislature of Connecticut, cannot be regarded as an ex post facto law; for the true construction of the prohibition extends to criminal, not to civil cases. It is only in criminal cases, indeed, in which the danger to be guarded against, is greatly to be apprehended. The history of every country in Europe will furnish flagrant instances of tyranny exercised under the pretext of penal dispensations. Rival factions, in their efforts to crush each other, have superseded all the forms, and suppressed all the sentiments of justice; while attainders, on the principle of retaliation and proscription, have marked all - - - - - - - - - [400] vicissitudes of party triumph. The temptation to such abuses of power is unfortunately too alluring for human virtue; and therefore, the framers of the American constitutions have wisely denied to the respective legislatures, federal as well as state, the possession of the power itself: they snail not pass any ex post facto law; or, in other words, they shall not inflict a punishment for any act, which was innocent at the time it was committed; nor increase the degree of punishment previously denounced for any specific offence. The policy, the reason and humanity of the prohibition, do not, I repeat, extend to civil cases, to cases that merely affect the private property of citizens. Some of the most necessary and important acts of legislation are, on the contrary, founded upon the principle, that private rights must yield to public exigencies. Highways are run through private grounds; fortifications, light-houses, and ottier public edifices, are necessarily sometimes built upon the soil owned by individuals. In such, and similar cases, if the owners should refuse voluntarily to accommodate the public, they must be constrained, so far as the public necessities require; and justice is done, by allowing them a reasonable equivalent. Without the possession of this power, the operations of government would often be obstructed, and society itself would be endangered. It is not sufficient to urge, that the power may be abused, for such is the nature of all power—such is the tendency of every human institution: and, it might as fairly be said, that the power of taxation, which is only circumscribed by the discretion of the body in which it is vested, ought not to be granted, because the legislature, disregarding its true objects, might, for visionary and useless projects, impose a tax to the amount of nineteen shillings in the pound. We must be content to limit power, where we can, and where we cannot, consistently with its use, we must be content to repose a salutary confidence. It is our consolation, that there never existed a government, in ancient or modern times, more free from danger in this respect, than the governments of America. Upon the whole, though there cannot be a case, in which an ex post facto law in criminal matters is requisite or justifiable (for providence never can intend to promote the prosperity of any country by bad means), yet, in the present instance, the objection does not arise: because, 1st, if the act of the legislature of Connecticut was a judicial act, it is not within the words of the constitution; and 2d, even if it was a legislative act, it is not witliAi the meaning of the prohibition. Cushing, Justice.—The case appears to me to be clear of all difficulty, taken either way. If the act is a judicial act, it is not touched by the federal constitution: and if it is a legislative - - - - - - - - - [401] act, it is maintained and justified by the ancient and uniform practice of the state of Connecticut. Judgment affirmed.
This is what I have to say, supported by the Constitution.. This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. "In pursuance thereof" is the content that you fellas want to ignore. Why would you want officials of our various branches of govt to obey constitutionally questionable 'laws' can only be answered by mental health professionals. Only laws (or amendments) made "in pursuance thereof" (as the supremacy clause says) are part of our supreme law, the Constitution.. Not so. Officials of every branch, at every level of our State, Fed, and local govts are sworn to support and defend the Constitution, and laws made "in pursuance thereof". They all must decide for themselves whether a law is constitutionally valid. Yep, that is one of their functions, just as I've noted before.
As tpaine has been reduced to a chihuahua, able only to repeat his nonsense over and over, the lesson continues. U.S. Supreme Court Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 21 How. 506 (1858) Ableman v. Booth 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 Syllabus 1. The process of a State court or judge has no authority beyond the limits of the sovereignty which confers the judicial power. 2. A habeas corpus, issued by a State judge or court, has no authority within the limits of the sovereignty assigned by the Constitution to the United States. The sovereignty of the United States and of a State are distinct and independent of each other within their respective spheres of action, although both exist and exercise their powers within the same territorial limits. 3. When a writ of habeas corpus is served on a marshal or other person having a prisoner in custody under the authority of the United States, it is his duty, by a proper return, to make known to the State judge or court the authority by which he holds him. But, at the same time, it is his duty not to obey the process of the State authority, but to obey and execute the process of the United States. 4. This court has appellate power in all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, with such exceptions and regulations as Congress may make, whether the cases arise in a State Court or an inferior court of the United States. And, under the act of Congress of 1789, when the decision of the State court is against the right claimed under the Constitution or laws of the United States, a writ of error will lie to bring the judgment of the State court before this court for reexamination and revision. 5. The act of Congress of September 18, 1850, usually called the fugitive slave law, is constitutional in all its provisions. 6. The commissioner appointed by the District Court of the United States for the district of Wisconsin had authority to issue his warrant and commit the defendant in error for an offence against eh act of September 18, 1850. 7. The District Court of the United States had exclusive jurisdiction to try and punish the offence, and the validity of its proceedings and judgment cannot be reexamined and set aside by any other tribunal. These two cases were brought up from the Supreme Court 62 U. S. 507 of the State of Wisconsin by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the judiciary act. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court. The plaintiff in error in the first of these cases is the marshal of the United States for the district of Wisconsin, and the two cases have arisen out of the same transaction, and depend, to some extent, upon the same principles. On that account, they have been argued and considered together; and the following are the facts as they appear in the transcripts before us: Sherman M. Booth was charged before Winfield Smith, a commissioner duly appointed by the District Court of the United States for the district of Wisconsin, with having, on the 11th day of March, 1854, aided and abetted, at Milwaukee, in the said district, the escape of a fugitive slave from the deputy marshal, who had him in custody under a warrant issued by the district judge of the United States for that district, under the act of Congress of September 18, 1850. Upon the examination before the commissioner, he was satisfied that an offence had been committed as charged, and that there was probable cause to believe that Booth had been guilty of it, and thereupon held him to bail to appear and answer before the District Court of the United States for the district of Wisconsin on the first Monday in July then next ensuing. But on the 26th of May, his bail or surety in the recognisance delivered him to the marshal, in the presence of the commissioner, and requested the commissioner to recommit Booth to the custody of the marshal, and he having failed to recognise again for his appearance before the District Court, the commissioner committed him to the custody of the marshal, to be delivered to the keeper of the jail until he should be discharged by due course of law. Booth made application on the next day, the 27th of May, 62 U. S. 508 to A. D. Smith, one of the justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin, for a writ of habeas corpus, stating that he was restrained of his liberty by Stephen V. R. Ableman, marshal of the United States for that district, under the warrant of commitment hereinbefore mentioned, and alleging that his imprisonment was illegal because the act of Congress of September 18, 1850, was unconstitutional and void, and also that the warrant was defective, and did not describe the offence created by that act, even if the act were valid. Upon this application, the justice, on the same day, issued the writ of habeas corpus, directed to the marshal, requiring him forthwith to have the body of Booth before him (the said justice) together with the time and cause of his imprisonment. The marshal thereupon, on the day above mentioned, produced Booth and made his return, stating that he was received into his custody as marshal on the day before, and held in custody by virtue of the warrant of the commissioner above mentioned, a copy of which he annexed to and returned with the writ. To this return Booth demurred, as not sufficient in law to justify his detention. And upon the hearing the justice decided that his detention was illegal, and ordered the marshal to discharge him and set him at liberty, which was accordingly done. Afterwards, on the 9th of June in the same year, the marshal applied to the Supreme Court of the State for a certiorari, setting forth in his application the proceedings hereinbefore mentioned, and charging that the release of Booth by the justice was erroneous and unlawful, and praying that his proceedings might be brought before the Supreme Court of the State for revision. The certiorari was allowed on the same day, and the writ was accordingly issued on the 12th of the same month, and returnable on the third Tuesday of the month, and on the 20th, the return was made by the justice, stating the proceedings as hereinbefore mentioned. The case was argued before the Supreme Court of the State, and, on the 19th of July, it pronounced its judgment, affirming 62 U. S. 509 the decision of the associate justice discharging Booth from imprisonment, with costs against Ableman, the marshal. Afterwards, on the 26th of October, the marshal sued out a writ of error, returnable to this court on the first Monday of December, 1854, in order to bring the judgment here for revision, and the defendant in error was regularly cited to appear on that day, and the record and proceedings were certified to this court by the clerk of the State court in the usual form, in obedience to the writ of error. And on the 4th of December, Booth, the defendant in error, filed a memorandum in writing in this court, stating that he had been cited to appear here in this case, and that he submitted it to the judgment of this court on the reasoning in the argument and opinions in the printed pamphlets therewith sent. After the judgment was entered in the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and before the writ of error was sued out, the State court entered on its record that, in the final judgment it had rendered, the validity of the act of Congress of September 18, 1850, and of February 12, 1793, and the authority of the marshal to hold the defendant in his custody under the process mentioned in his return to the writ of habeas corpus were respectively drawn in question, and the decision of the court in the final judgment was against their validity, respectively. This certificate was not necessary to give this court jurisdiction, because the proceedings, upon their face, show that these questions arose, and how they were decided, but it shows that, at that time, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin did not question their obligation to obey the writ of error, nor the authority of this court to reexamine their judgment in the cases specified. And the certificate is given for the purpose of placing distinctly on the record the points that were raised and decided in that court, in order that this court might have no difficulty in exercising its appellate power and pronouncing its judgment upon all of them. We come now to the second case. At the January term of the District Court of the United States for the district of Wisconsin, after Booth had been set at liberty and after the transcript of the proceedings in the case above mentioned had been 62 U. S. 510 returned to and filed in this court, the grand jury found a bill of indictment against Booth for the offence with which he was charged before the commissioner and from which the State court had discharged him. The indictment was found on the 4th of January, 1855. On the 9th, a motion was made by counsel on behalf of the accused to quash the indictment, which was overruled by the court, and he thereupon pleaded not guilty, upon which issue was joined. On the 10th, a jury was called and appeared in court, when he challenged the array, but the challenge was overruled and the jury empaneled. The trial, it appears, continued from day to day, until the 13th, when the jury found him guilty in the manner and form in which he stood indicted in the fourth and fifth counts. On the 16th, he moved for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, which motions were argued on the 20th, and on the 23d the court overruled the motions and sentenced the prisoner to be imprisoned for one month, and to pay a fine of $1,000 and the costs of prosecution, and that he remain in custody until the sentence was complied with. We have stated more particularly these proceedings from a sense of justice to the District Court, as they show that every opportunity of making his defence was afforded him, and that his case was fully heard and considered. On the 26th of January, three days after the sentence was passed, the prisoner by his counsel filed his petition in the Supreme Court of the State, and with his petition filed a copy of the proceedings in the District Court, and also affidavits from the foreman and one other member of the jury who tried him, stating that their verdict was guilty on the fourth and fifth counts, and not guilty on the other three, and stated in his petition that his imprisonment was illegal because the fugitive slave law was unconstitutional, that the District Court had no jurisdiction to try or punish him for the matter charged against him, and that the proceedings and sentence of that court were absolute nullities in law. Various other objections to the proceedings are alleged which are unimportant in the questions now before the court, and need not, therefore, be particularly stated. On the next day, the 27th, the court directed 62 U. S. 511 two writs of habeas corpus to be issued, one to the marshal and one to the sheriff of Milwaukee, to whose actual keeping the prisoner was committed by the marshal, by order of the District Court. The habeas corpus directed each of them to produce the body of the prisoner and make known the cause of his imprisonment immediately after the receipt of the writ. On the 30th of January the marshal made his return, not acknowledging the jurisdiction but stating the sentence of the District Court as his authority; that the prisoner was delivered to, and was then in the actual keeping of the sheriff of Milwaukee county by order of the court, and he therefore had no control of the body of the prisoner; and if the sheriff had not received him, he should have so reported to the District Court, and should have conveyed him to some other place or prison, as the court should command. On the same day, the sheriff produced the body of Booth before the State court, and returned that he had been committed to his custody by the marshal by virtue of a transcript, a true copy of which was annexed to his return, and which was the only process or authority by which he detained him. This transcript was a full copy of the proceedings and sentence in the District Court of the United States, as hereinbefore stated. To this return the accused, by his counsel, filed a general demurrer. The court ordered the hearing to be postponed until the 2d of February, and notice to be given to the district attorney of the United States. It was accordingly heard on that day, and on the next (February 3d), the court decided that the imprisonment was illegal, and ordered and adjudged that Booth be, and he was by that judgment, forever discharged from that imprisonment and restraint, and he was accordingly set at liberty. On the 21st of April next following, the Attorney General of the United States presented a petition to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, stating briefly the facts in the case and at the same time presenting an exemplification of the proceedings hereinbefore stated, duly certified by the clerk of the State court and averring in his petition that the State court had no 62 U. S. 512 jurisdiction in the case, and praying that a writ of error might issue to bring its judgment before this court to correct the error. The writ of error was allowed and issued, and, according to the rules and practice of the court, was returnable on the first Monday of December, 1855, and a citation for the defendant in error to appear on that day was issued by the Chief Justice at the same time. No return having been made to this writ, the Attorney General, on the 1st of February, 1856, filed affidavits showing that the writ of error had been duly served on the clerk of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, at his office, on the 30th of May, 1855, and the citation served on the defendant in error on the 28th of June, in the same year. And also the affidavit of the district attorney of the United States for the district of Wisconsin, setting forth that when he served the writ of error upon the clerk, as above mentioned, he was informed by the clerk, and has also been informed by one of the justices of the Supreme Court, which released Booth, “that the court had directed the clerk to make no return to the writ of error, and to enter no order upon the journals or records of the court concerning the same.” And, upon these proofs, the Attorney General moved the court for an order upon the clerk to make return to the writ of error, on or before the first day of the next ensuing term of this court. The rule was accordingly laid, and, on the 22d of July, 1856, the Attorney General filed with the clerk of this court the affidavit of the marshal of the district of Wisconsin that he had served the rule on the clerk on the 7th of the month above mentioned, and no return having been made, the Attorney General, on the 27th of February, 1857, moved for leave to file the certified copy of the record of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, which he had produced with his application for the writ of error, and to docket the case in this court in conformity with a motion to that effect made at the last term. And the court thereupon, on the 6th of March, 1857, ordered the copy of the record filed by the Attorney General to be received and entered on the docket of this court, to have the same effect and legal operation as if returned by the clerk with the writ of error, and that the case stand for argument 62 U. S. 513 at the next ensuing term, without further notice to either party. The case was accordingly docketed, but was not reached for argument in the regular order and practice of the court until the present term. This detailed statement of the proceedings in the different courts has appeared to be necessary in order to form a just estimate of the action of the different tribunals in which it has been heard, and to account for the delay in the final decision of a case, which, from its character, would seem to have demanded prompt action. The first case, indeed, was reached for trial two terms ago. But as the two cases are different portions of the same prosecution for the same offence, they unavoidably, to some extent, involve the same principles of law, and it would hardly have been proper to hear and decide the first before the other was ready for hearing and decision. They have accordingly been argued together, by the Attorney General of the United States, at the present term. No counsel has in either case appeared for the defendant in error. But we have the pamphlet arguments filed and referred to by Booth in the first case, as hereinbefore mentioned, also the opinions and arguments of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and of the judges who compose it, in full, and are enabled, therefore, to see the grounds on which they rely to support their decisions. It will be seen from the foregoing statement of facts that a judge of the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin in the first of these cases, claimed and exercised the right to supervise and annul the proceedings of a commissioner of the United States, and to discharge a prisoner who had been committed by the commissioner for an offence against the laws of this Government, and that this exercise of power by the judge was afterwards sanctioned and affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. In the second case, the State court has gone a step further, and claimed and exercised jurisdiction over the proceedings and judgment of a District Court of the United States, and, upon a summary and collateral proceeding by habeas corpus, 62 U. S. 514 has set aside and annulled its judgment and discharged a prisoner who had been tried and found guilty of an offence against the laws of the United States and sentenced to imprisonment by the District Court. And it further appears that the State court have not only claimed and exercised this jurisdiction, but have also determined that their decision is final and conclusive upon all the courts of the United States, and ordered their clerk to disregard and refuse obedience to the writ of error issued by this court, pursuant to the act of Congress of 1789, to bring here for examination and revision the judgment of the State court. These propositions are new in the jurisprudence of the United States, as well as of the States; and the supremacy of the State courts over the courts of the United States, in cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, is now for the first time asserted and acted upon in the Supreme Court of a State. The supremacy is not, indeed, set forth distinctly and broadly, in so many words, in the printed opinions of the judges. It is intermixed with elaborate discussions of different provisions in the fugitive slave law, and of the privileges and power of the writ of habeas corpus. But the paramount power of the State court lies at the foundation of these decisions, for their commentaries upon the provisions of that law, and upon the privileges and power of the writ of habeas corpus, were out of place, and their judicial action upon them without authority of law, unless they had the power to revise and control the proceedings in the criminal case of which they were speaking, and their judgments releasing the prisoner and disregarding the writ of error from this court can rest upon no other foundation. If the judicial power exercised in this instance has been reserved to the States, no offence against the laws of the United States can be punished by their own courts without the permission and according to the judgment of the courts of the State in which the party happens to be imprisoned, for if the Supreme Court of Wisconsin possessed the power it has exercised in relation to offences against the act of Congress in question, 62 U. S. 515 it necessarily follows that they must have the same judicial authority in relation to any other law of the United States, and, consequently, their supervising and controlling power would embrace the whole criminal code of the United States, and extend to offences against our revenue laws, or any other law intended to guard the different departments of the General Government from fraud or violence. And it would embrace all crimes, from the highest to the lowest; including felonies, which are punished with death, as well as misdemeanors, which are punished by imprisonment. And, moreover, if the power is possessed by the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin, it must belong equally to every other State in the Union when the prisoner is within its territorial limits, and it is very certain that the State courts would not always agree in opinion, and it would often happen that an act which was admitted to be an offence, and justly punished, in one State would be regarded as innocent, and indeed as praiseworthy, in another. It would seem to be hardly necessary to do more than state the result to which these decisions of the State courts must inevitably lead. It is, of itself, a sufficient and conclusive answer, for no one will suppose that a Government which has now lasted nearly seventy years, enforcing its laws by its own tribunals and preserving the union of the States, could have lasted a single year, or fulfilled the high trusts committed to it, if offences against its laws could not have been punished without the consent of the State in which the culprit was found. The judges of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin do not distinctly state from what source they suppose they have derived this judicial power. There can be no such thing as judicial authority unless it is conferred by a Government or sovereignty, and if the judges and courts of Wisconsin possess the jurisdiction they claim, they must derive it either from the United States or the State. It certainly has not been conferred on them by the United States, and it is equally clear it was not in the power of the State to confer it, even if it had attempted to do so, for no State can authorize one of its judges 62 U. S. 516 or courts to exercise judicial power, by habeas corpus or otherwise, within the jurisdiction of another and independent Government. And although the State of Wisconsin is sovereign within its territorial limits to a certain extent, yet that sovereignty is limited and restricted by the Constitution of the United States. And the powers of the General Government, and of the State, although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other within their respective spheres. And the sphere of action appropriated to the United States is as far beyond the reach of the judicial process issued by a State judge or a State court, as if the line of division was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye. And the State of Wisconsin had no more power to authorize these proceedings of its judges and courts than it would have had if the prisoner had been confined in Michigan, or in any other State of the Union, for an offence against the laws of the State in which he was imprisoned. It is, however, due to the State to say that we do not find this claim of paramount jurisdiction in the State courts over the courts of the United States asserted or countenanced by the Constitution or laws of the State. We find it only in the decisions of the judges of the Supreme Court. Indeed, at the very time these decisions were made, there was a statute of the State which declares that a person brought up on a habeas corpus shall be remanded if it appears that he is confined: “1st. By virtue of process, by any court or judge of the United States, in a case where such court or judge has exclusive jurisdiction; or,” “2d. By virtue of the final judgment or decree of any competent court of civil or criminal jurisdiction.” Revised Statutes of the State of Wisconsin, 1849, ch. 124, 629. Even, therefore, if these cases depended upon the laws of Wisconsin, it would be difficult to find in these provisions such a grant of judicial power as the Supreme Court claims to have derived from the State. But, as we have already said, questions of this kind must 62 U. S. 517 always depend upon the Constitution and laws of the United States, and not of a State. The Constitution was not formed merely to guard the States against danger from foreign nations, but mainly to secure union and harmony at home, for if this object could be attained, there would be but little danger from abroad, and, to accomplish this purpose, it was felt by the statesmen who framed the Constitution and by the people who adopted it that it was necessary that many of the rights of sovereignty which the States then possessed should be ceded to the General Government, and that, in the sphere of action assigned to it, it should be supreme, and strong enough to execute its own laws by its own tribunals, without interruption from a State or from State authorities. And it was evident that anything short of this would be inadequate to the main objects for which the Government was established, and that local interests, local passions or prejudices, incited and fostered by individuals for sinister purposes, would lead to acts of aggression and injustice by one State upon the rights of another, which would ultimately terminate in violence and force unless there was a common arbiter between them, armed with power enough to protect and guard the rights of all by appropriate laws to be carried into execution peacefully by its judicial tribunals. The language of the Constitution by which this power is granted is too plain to admit of doubt or to need comment. It declares that “this Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be passed in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” But the supremacy thus conferred on this Government could not peacefully be maintained unless it was clothed with judicial power equally paramount in authority to carry it into execution, for if left to the courts of justice of the several States, conflicting decisions would unavoidably take place, and the local tribunals could hardly be expected to be always free 62 U. S. 518 from the local influences of which we have spoken. And the Constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, and the powers granted to the Federal Government, would soon receive different interpretations in different States, and the Government of the United States would soon become one thing in one State and another thing in another. It was essential, therefore, to its very existence as a Government that it should have the power of establishing courts of justice, altogether independent of State power, to carry into effect its own laws, and that a tribunal should be established in which all cases which might arise under the Constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, whether in a State court or a court of the United States, should be finally and conclusively decided. Without such a tribunal, it is obvious that there would be no uniformity of judicial decision, and that the supremacy, (which is but another name for independence) so carefully provided in the clause of the Constitution above referred to could not possibly be maintained peacefully unless it was associated with this paramount judicial authority. Accordingly, it was conferred on the General Government in clear, precise, and comprehensive terms. It is declared that its judicial power shall (among other subjects enumerated) extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that, in such cases, as well as the others there enumerated, this court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make. The appellate power, it will be observed, is conferred on this court in all cases or suits in which such a question shall arise. It is not confined to suits in the inferior courts of the United States, but extends to all cases where such a question arises, whether it be in a judicial tribunal of a State or of the United States. And it is manifest that this ultimate appellate power in a tribunal created by the Constitution itself was deemed essential to secure the independence and supremacy of the General Government in the sphere of action assigned to it, to make the Constitution and laws of the United States uniform, and the same in every State, and to guard against evils which would 62 U. S. 519 inevitably arise from conflicting opinions between the courts of a State and of the United States, if there was no common arbiter authorized to decide between them. The importance which the framers of the Constitution attached to such a tribunal, for the purpose of preserving internal tranquillity, is strikingly manifested by the clause which gives this court jurisdiction over the sovereign States which compose this Union when a controversy arises between them. Instead of reserving the right to seek redress for injustice from another State by their sovereign powers, they have bound themselves to submit to the decision of this court, and to abide by its judgment. And it is not out of place to say here that experience has demonstrated that this power was not unwisely surrendered by the States, for, in the time that has already elapsed since this Government came into existence, several irritating and angry controversies have taken place between adjoining States in relation to their respective boundaries, and which have sometimes threatened to end in force and violence but for the power vested in this court to hear them and decide between them. The same purposes are clearly indicated by the different language employed when conferring supremacy upon the laws of the United States, and jurisdiction upon its courts. In the first case, it provides that “this Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, and obligatory upon the judges in every State.” The words in italics show the precision and foresight which marks every clause in the instrument. The sovereignty to be created was to be limited in its powers of legislation, and if it passed a law not authorized by its enumerated powers, it was not to be regarded as the supreme law of the land, nor were the State judges bound to carry it into execution. And as the courts of a State, and the courts of the United States, might, and indeed certainly would, often differ as to the extent of the powers conferred by the General Government, it was manifest that serious controversies would arise between the authorities of the United States and of the States, which must be settled by force of arms unless some 62 U. S. 520 tribunal was created to decide between them finally and with out appeal. The Constitution has accordingly provided, as far as human foresight could provide, against this danger. And, in conferring judicial power upon the Federal Government, it declares that the jurisdiction of its courts shall extend to all cases arising under “this Constitution” and the laws of the United States -- leaving out the words of restriction contained in the grant of legislative power which we have above noticed. The judicial power covers every legislative act of Congress, whether it be made within the limits of its delegated powers or be an assumption of power beyond the grants in the Constitution. This judicial power was justly regarded as indispensable not merely to maintain the supremacy of the laws of the United States, but also to guard the States from any encroachment upon their reserved rights by the General Government. And as the Constitution is the fundamental and supreme law, if it appears that an act of Congress is not pursuant to and within the limits of the power assigned to the Federal Government, it is the duty of the courts of the United States to declare it unconstitutional and void. The grant of judicial power is not confined to the administration of laws passed in pursuance to the provisions of the Constitution, nor confined to the interpretation of such laws, but, by the very terms of the grant, the Constitution is under their view when any act of Congress is brought before them, and it is their duty to declare the law void, and refuse to execute it, if it is not pursuant to the legislative powers conferred upon Congress. And as the final appellate power in all such questions is given to this court, controversies as to the respective powers of the United States and the States, instead of being determined by military and physical force, are heard, investigated, and finally settled with the calmness and deliberation of judicial inquiry. And no one can fail to see that, if such an arbiter had not been provided in our complicated system of government, internal tranquillity could not have been preserved, and if such controversies were left to arbitrament of physical force, our Government, State and National, would soon cease to be Governments 62 U. S. 521 of laws, and revolutions by force of arms would take the place of courts of justice and judicial decisions. In organizing such a tribunal, it is evident that every precaution was taken which human wisdom could devise to fit it for the high duty with which it was intrusted. It was not left to Congress to create it by law, for the States could hardly be expected to confide in the impartiality of a tribunal created exclusively by the General Government without any participation on their part. And as the performance of its duty would sometimes come in conflict with individual ambition or interests and powerful political combinations, an act of Congress establishing such a tribunal might be repealed in order to establish another more subservient to the predominant political influences or excited passions of the day. This tribunal, therefore, was erected, and the powers of which we have spoken conferred upon it, not by the Federal Government, but by the people of the States, who formed and adopted that Government and conferred upon it all the powers, legislative, executive, and judicial, which it now possesses. And in order to secure its independence and enable it faithfully and firmly to perform its duty, it engrafted it upon the Constitution itself, and declared that this court should have appellate power in all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So long, therefore, as this Constitution shall endure, this tribunal must exist with it, deciding in the peaceful forms of judicial proceeding the angry and irritating controversies between sovereignties which, in other countries, have been determined by the arbitrament of force. These principles of constitutional law are confirmed and illustrated by the clause which confers legislative power upon Congress. That power is specifically given in article 1, section 8, paragraph 18, in the following words: “To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.” Under this clause of the Constitution, it became the duty of Congress to pass such laws as were necessary and proper to 62 U. S. 522 carry into execution the powers vested in the judicial department. And in the performance of this duty, the First Congress, at its first session, passed the act of 1789, ch. 20, entitled “An act to establish the judicial courts of the United States.” It will be remembered that many of the members of the Convention were also members of this Congress, and it cannot be supposed that they did not understand the meaning and intention of the great instrument which they had so anxiously and deliberately considered, clause by clause, and assisted to frame. And the law they passed to carry into execution the powers vested in the judicial department of the Government proves past doubt that their interpretation of the appellate powers conferred on this court was the same with that which we have now given, for, by the 25th section of the act of 1789, Congress authorized writs of error to be issued from this court to a State court whenever a right had been claimed under the Constitution or laws of the United States and the decision of the State court was against it. And to make this appellate power effectual and altogether independent of the action of State tribunals, this act further provides that, upon writs of error to a State court, instead of remanding the cause for a final decision in the State court, this court may, at their discretion, if the cause shall have been once remanded before, proceed to a final decision of the same and award execution. These provisions in the act of 1789 tell us, in language not to be mistaken, the great importance which the patriots and statement of the First Congress attached to this appellate power, and the foresight and care with which they guarded its free and independent exercise against interference or obstruction by States or State tribunals. In the case before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, a right was claimed under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and the decision was against the right claimed, and it refuses obedience to the writ of error, and regards its own judgment as final. It has not only reversed and annulled the judgment of the District Court of the United States, but it has reversed and annulled the provisions of the Constitution itself, 62 U. S. 523 and the act of Congress of 1789, and made the superior and appellate tribunal the inferior and subordinate one. We do not question the authority of State court or judge who is authorized by the laws of the State to issue the writ of habeas corpus to issue it in any case where the party is imprisoned within its territorial limits, provided it does not appear, when the application is made, that the person imprisoned is in custody under the authority of the United States. The court or judge has a right to inquire, in this mode of proceeding, for what cause and by what authority the prisoner is confined within the territorial limits of the State sovereignty. And it is the duty of the marshal or other person having the custody of the prisoner to make known to the judge or court, by a proper return, the authority by which he holds him in custody. This right to inquire by process of habeas corpus, and the duty of the officer to make a return, grows necessarily out of the complex character of our Government and the existence of two distinct and separate sovereignties within the same territorial space, each of them restricted in its powers and each within its sphere of action, prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, independent of the other. But, after the return is made and the State judge or court judicially apprized that the party is in custody under the authority of the United States, they can proceed no further. They then know that the prisoner is within the dominion and jurisdiction of another Government, and that neither the writ of habeas corpus nor any other process issued under State authority can pass over the line of division between the two sovereignties. He is then within the dominion and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. If he has committed an offence against their laws, their tribunals alone can punish him. If he is wrongfully imprisoned, their judicial tribunals can release him and afford him redress. And although, as we have said, it is the duty of the marshal or other person holding him to make known, by a proper return, the authority under which he detains him, it is at the same time imperatively his duty to obey the process of the United States, to hold the prisoner in custody under it, and to refuse obedience to the mandate or 62 U. S. 524 process of any other Government. And consequently it is his duty not to take the prisoner, nor suffer him to be taken, before a State judge or court upon a habeas corpus issued under State authority. No State judge or court, after they are judicially informed that the party is imprisoned under the authority of the United States, has any right to interfere with him or to require him to be brought before them. And if the authority of a State, in the form of judicial process or otherwise, should attempt to control the marshal or other authorized officer or agent of the United States in any respect, in the custody of his prisoner, it would be his duty to resist it, and to call to his aid any force that might be necessary to maintain the authority of law against illegal interference. No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any lawful authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the court or judge by whom it is issued, and an attempt to enforce it beyond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violence. Nor is there anything in this supremacy of the General Government, or the jurisdiction of its judicial tribunals to awaken the jealousy or offend the natural and just pride of State sovereignty. Neither this Government nor the powers of which we are speaking were forced upon the States. The Constitution of the United States, with all the powers conferred by it on the General Government and surrendered by the States, was the voluntary act of the people of the several States, deliberately done for their own protection and safety against injustice from one another. And their anxiety to preserve it in full force, in all its powers, and to guard against resistance to or evasion of its authority on the part of a State is proved by the clause which requires that the members of the State Legislatures and all executive and judicial officers of the several States (as well as those of the General Government) shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution. This is the last and closing clause of the Constitution, and inserted when the whole frame of Government, with the powers hereinbefore specified, had been adopted by the Convention, and it was in that form, and with these powers, that the Constitution 62 U. S. 525 was submitted to the people of the several States for their consideration and decision. Now, it certainly can be no humiliation to the citizen of a republic to yield a ready obedience to the laws as administered by the constituted authorities. On the contrary, it is among his first and highest duties as a citizen, because free government cannot exist without it. Nor can it be inconsistent with the dignity of a sovereign State to observe faithfully, and in the spirit of sincerity and truth, the compact into which it voluntarily entered when it became a State of this Union. On the contrary, the highest honor of sovereignty is untarnished faith. And certainly no faith could be more deliberately and solemnly pledged than that which every State has plighted to the other States to support the Constitution as it is, in all its provisions, until they shall be altered in the manner which the Constitution itself prescribes. In the emphatic language of the pledge required, it is to support this Constitution. And no power is more clearly conferred by the Constitution and laws of the United States than the power of this court to decide, ultimately and finally, all cases arising under such Constitution and laws, and for that purpose to bring here for revision, by writ of error, the judgment of a State court, where such questions have arisen, and the right claimed under them denied by the highest judicial tribunal in the State. We are sensible that we have extended the examination of these decisions beyond the limits required by any intrinsic difficulty in the questions. But the decisions in question were made by the supreme judicial tribunal of the State, and when a court so elevated in its position has pronounced a judgment which, if it could be maintained, would subvert the very foundations of this Government, it seemed to be the duty of this court, when exercising its appellate power, to show plainly the grave errors into which the State court has fallen and the consequences to which they would inevitably lead. But it can hardly be necessary to point out the errors which followed their mistaken view of the jurisdiction they might lawfully exercise, because, if there was any defect of power in the commissioner, or in his mode of proceeding, it was for the 62 U. S. 526 tribunals of the United States to revise and correct it, and not for a State court. And as regards the decision of the District Court, it had exclusive and final jurisdiction by the laws of the United States, and neither the regularity of its proceedings nor the validity of its sentence could be called in question in any other court, either of a State or the United States, by habeas corpus or any other process. But although we think it unnecessary to discuss these questions, yet, as they have been decided by the State court, and are before us on the record, and we are not willing to be misunderstood, it is proper to say that, in the judgment of this court, the act of Congress commonly called the fugitive slave law is, in all of its provisions, fully authorized by the Constitution of the United States, that the commissioner had lawful authority to issue the warrant and commit the party, and that his proceedings were regular and conformable to law. We have already stated the opinion and judgment of the court as to the exclusive jurisdiction of the District Court and the appellate powers which this court is authorized and required to exercise. And if any argument was needed to show the wisdom and necessity of this appellate power, the cases before us sufficiently prove it, and at the same time emphatically call for its exercise. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin must therefore be reversed in each of the cases now before the court.
Not so. Officials of every branch, at every level of our State, Fed, and local govts are sworn to support and defend the Constitution, and laws made "in pursuance thereof". They all must decide for themselves whether a law is constitutionally valid. Yep, that is one of their functions, just as I've noted before. Unable to refute my opinions, nolu is reduced to posting pictures of Chihuahuas, poor fella.
As tpaine has been reduced to a chihuahua, able only to repeat his nonsense over and over, the following is repeated for possible penetration. Dickerson v United States, 530 US 428, 437 (2000): United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809): This was the original case on State Nulification. No Supreme Court decision has ever upheld State Nullification. It is currently only upheld by the tpaine Court of the imagination. Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1 (1958): [...] Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the “supreme Law of the Land.” In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as “the fundamental and paramount law of the nation,” declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, that “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” This decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3, “to support this Constitution.” The duty to abstain from resistance to “the supreme Law of the Land,” U.S. Const., Art. VI § 2, as declared by the organ of our Government for ascertaining it, does not require immediate approval of it nor does it deny the right of dissent. Criticism need not be stilled. Active obstruction or defiance is barred. Our kind of society cannot endure if the controlling authority of the Law as derived from the Constitution is not to be the tribunal specially charged with the duty of ascertaining and declaring what is “the supreme Law of the Land.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 211 (1962) the Court stated: Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 517-21 (1858) “this Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be passed in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” But the supremacy thus conferred on this Government could not peacefully be maintained unless it was clothed with judicial power equally paramount in authority to carry it into execution, for if left to the courts of justice of the several States, conflicting decisions would unavoidably take place, and the local tribunals could hardly be expected to be always free 62 U. S. 518 from the local influences of which we have spoken. And the Constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, and the powers granted to the Federal Government, would soon receive different interpretations in different States, and the Government of the United States would soon become one thing in one State and another thing in another. It was essential, therefore, to its very existence as a Government that it should have the power of establishing courts of justice, altogether independent of State power, to carry into effect its own laws, and that a tribunal should be established in which all cases which might arise under the Constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, whether in a State court or a court of the United States, should be finally and conclusively decided. Without such a tribunal, it is obvious that there would be no uniformity of judicial decision, and that the supremacy, (which is but another name for independence) so carefully provided in the clause of the Constitution above referred to could not possibly be maintained peacefully unless it was associated with this paramount judicial authority. Accordingly, it was conferred on the General Government in clear, precise, and comprehensive terms. It is declared that its judicial power shall (among other subjects enumerated) extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that, in such cases, as well as the others there enumerated, this court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make. The appellate power, it will be observed, is conferred on this court in all cases or suits in which such a question shall arise. It is not confined to suits in the inferior courts of the United States, but extends to all cases where such a question arises, whether it be in a judicial tribunal of a State or of the United States. And it is manifest that this ultimate appellate power in a tribunal created by the Constitution itself was deemed essential to secure the independence and supremacy of the General Government in the sphere of action assigned to it, to make the Constitution and laws of the United States uniform, and the same in every State, and to guard against evils which would 62 U. S. 519 inevitably arise from conflicting opinions between the courts of a State and of the United States, if there was no common arbiter authorized to decide between them. The importance which the framers of the Constitution attached to such a tribunal, for the purpose of preserving internal tranquillity, is strikingly manifested by the clause which gives this court jurisdiction over the sovereign States which compose this Union when a controversy arises between them. Instead of reserving the right to seek redress for injustice from another State by their sovereign powers, they have bound themselves to submit to the decision of this court, and to abide by its judgment. And it is not out of place to say here that experience has demonstrated that this power was not unwisely surrendered by the States, for, in the time that has already elapsed since this Government came into existence, several irritating and angry controversies have taken place between adjoining States in relation to their respective boundaries, and which have sometimes threatened to end in force and violence but for the power vested in this court to hear them and decide between them. The same purposes are clearly indicated by the different language employed when conferring supremacy upon the laws of the United States, and jurisdiction upon its courts. In the first case, it provides that “this Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, and obligatory upon the judges in every State.” The words in italics show the precision and foresight which marks every clause in the instrument. The sovereignty to be created was to be limited in its powers of legislation, and if it passed a law not authorized by its enumerated powers, it was not to be regarded as the supreme law of the land, nor were the State judges bound to carry it into execution. And as the courts of a State, and the courts of the United States, might, and indeed certainly would, often differ as to the extent of the powers conferred by the General Government, it was manifest that serious controversies would arise between the authorities of the United States and of the States, which must be settled by force of arms unless some 62 U. S. 520 tribunal was created to decide between them finally and with out appeal. The Constitution has accordingly provided, as far as human foresight could provide, against this danger. And, in conferring judicial power upon the Federal Government, it declares that the jurisdiction of its courts shall extend to all cases arising under “this Constitution” and the laws of the United States -- leaving out the words of restriction contained in the grant of legislative power which we have above noticed. The judicial power covers every legislative act of Congress, whether it be made within the limits of its delegated powers or be an assumption of power beyond the grants in the Constitution. This judicial power was justly regarded as indispensable not merely to maintain the supremacy of the laws of the United States, but also to guard the States from any encroachment upon their reserved rights by the General Government. And as the Constitution is the fundamental and supreme law, if it appears that an act of Congress is not pursuant to and within the limits of the power assigned to the Federal Government, it is the duty of the courts of the United States to declare it unconstitutional and void. The grant of judicial power is not confined to the administration of laws passed in pursuance to the provisions of the Constitution, nor confined to the interpretation of such laws, but, by the very terms of the grant, the Constitution is under their view when any act of Congress is brought before them, and it is their duty to declare the law void, and refuse to execute it, if it is not pursuant to the legislative powers conferred upon Congress. And as the final appellate power in all such questions is given to this court, controversies as to the respective powers of the United States and the States, instead of being determined by military and physical force, are heard, investigated, and finally settled with the calmness and deliberation of judicial inquiry. And no one can fail to see that, if such an arbiter had not been provided in our complicated system of government, internal tranquillity could not have been preserved, and if such controversies were left to arbitrament of physical force, our Government, State and National, would soon cease to be Governments 62 U. S. 521 of laws, and revolutions by force of arms would take the place of courts of justice and judicial decisions.
#2. To: tpaine (#0)
(Edited)
Comments?
#3. To: tpaine (#0)
During a discussion with Nolu Chan, he asserted that an amendment repealing the 2nd could be ratified, and become a valid part of our Constitution. I contend such an amendment would be unconstitutional. Comments?
#4. To: tpaine (#0)
#5. To: Vicomte13, tomder 55, gatlin (#3)
The Constitution could be amended to require the sacrifice of first-born children. And if the sufficient majorities were found to vote for that, it would be "constitutional".
#6. To: Gatlin, Nolu Chan, Y'ALL (#2)
(Edited)
You are making more of a ass of yourself than ever seemed possible.
#7. To: tpaine (#5)
You all contend that our only recourse from a majority passing amendments that take away our basic human rights is violence? - 'Treasonous' violence? - Civil war?
#8. To: tpaine (#0)
During a discussion with Nolu Chan, he asserted that an amendment repealing the 2nd could be ratified, and become a valid part of our Constitution. I contend such an amendment would be unconstitutional. Comments?
#9. To: tpaine, nolu chan (#0)
During a discussion with Nolu Chan, he asserted that an amendment repealing the 2nd could be ratified, and become a valid part of our Constitution.
#10. To: Liberator (#9)
"Unconstitutional" is now in the eye of the beholder of nine justices of SCOTUS.
#11. To: tpaine (#5)
You all contend that our only recourse from a majority passing amendments that take away our basic human rights is violence? - 'Treasonous' violence? - Civil war?
#12. To: tpaine, Vicomte13, tomder 55, Y'ALL (#5)
You all contend that our only recourse from a majority passing amendments that take away our basic human rights is violence? - 'Treasonous' violence? - Civil war?
#13. To: Vicomte13, nolu chan (#3)
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
#14. To: Vicomte13 (#10)
(Edited)
Five. It's the "Rule of Five".
#15. To: Vicomte13, tpaine, nolu chan (#3)
The Constitution could be amended to require the sacrifice of first-born children. And if the sufficient majorities were found to vote for that, it would be "constitutional"....
#16. To: TooConservative (#13)
I see nothing requiring unanimity nor do I recall any other such unanimous requirements for amendments.
#17. To: Liberator (#15)
Houston, we've got a problem. A HUGE one. Even IF the 14A was eliminated.
#18. To: Vicomte13 (#16)
"Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate."
#19. To: tpaine (#6)
(Edited)
You....should look in a mirror..
#20. To: tpaine (#0)
#21. To: Vicomte13 (#3)
America was always depraved. First there was slavery, then there was Indian genocide and segregation. Those things ended, but now we have abortion and the glorification of buggery.
#22. To: Liberator (#12)
Let's flip this; What is YOUR solution to reclaiming the constitution and re-establishing the Founders' REAL intent??
#23. To: Vicomte13 (#17)
At the root of it all are about three garden variety sins: greed, lust and pride.
#24. To: Vicomte13, tpaine (#22)
#25. To: Liberator (#21)
#26. To: TooConservative, Vicomte13 (#18)
Given how the Court is just wiping its ass with the Constitution in recent years, how much difference would it make?
#27. To: TooConservative (#18)
Just amend the Article. Given how the Court is just wiping its ass with the Constitution in recent years, how much difference would it make?
#28. To: Vicomte13 (#17)
At the root of it all are about three garden variety sins: greed, lust and pride.
#29. To: Liberator (#26)
There aren't enough fingers and toes in China to plug up this dike. This statist/liberal ideological war of attrition has been won. UNLESS conservatives have yet to unleash their ideological version of the 'Samson Option'.
#30. To: Vicomte13 (#27)
Judicial ratification is not required. Mere judicial abdication suffices.
#31. To: Gatlin (#19)
" I did a "mirror, mirron on the wall....who is the intelligent and handsome?
#32. To: Liberator (#24)
I originally asked for paine's solution, but yes, I'd also be interested in yours as well.
#33. To: Vicomte13 (#25)
Well, this is where traditional conservatives and I part ways.
#34. To: TooConservative (#30)
When the executive is feckless and the courts and Congress tolerate (or encourage) a lawless executive, nothing written in law or Constitution provides any real guarantee. The Constitution becomes pointless. Amend it, don't amend it. No difference.
#35. To: Liberator (#33)
Societies that thrive learn to fish.
#36. To: redleghunter (#29)
I hope 'our' Samson 'option' is not the same as what Israel (modern) has in mind:)
#37. To: Liberator (#33)
(Edited)
Yes, yes....I understand the conservative 20% number....and the necessity to aly with those which we disagree to various degrees. So what shall be THE common thread which binds us?
#38. To: Vicomte13, Liberator (#35)
Societies that thrive learn to fish.
#39. To: TooConservative, Y'ALL (#8)
Nolu is correct. Every portion of the Constitution can be amended. Or it could be abolished entirely.
What a silly clickbait vanity thread.
#40. To: Liberator (#12)
Yes, I have a comment (or two.) --- Chan is only the bearer of bad (obvious) news. Don't kill the messenger.
"Unconstitutional" is now in the eye of the beholder of nine justices of SCOTUS.
We now have a "living breathing" Constitution. Just five tyrants of SCOTUS have already interpreted the Founders intent any way they want (emotionally), and changed federal law (without Congressional or State consent.) -- What exactly would stop SCOTUS from repealing the 2A? Congress?? "Public outrage? HA! Precedence has been set.
Paine, I admire your commitment to the Fairy Tale that is the "US Constitution," but recent Presidents have ignored it; Congress has ignored it; And SCOTUS ignores it....
#41. To: nativist nationalist (#38)
(Edited)
I believe that used fishing as a metaphor, as an example of working for your daily bread rather than bread and circuses.
#42. To: tpaine (#40)
Every official at every level of gov't is honor bound
#43. To: tpaine (#40)
Yep, just as 'we' can ignore scotus.
#44. To: tpaine (#40)
#45. To: Vicomte13 (#35)
Small societies. In a world of 6 billion, if everybody went fishing, the fish stocks in the rivers and lakes and oceans would be gone in a couple of years, and everybody would starve.
#46. To: Vicomte13 (#37)
The vast majority of the people don't care what the Founders thought, and won't. More and more people don't care what Jesus thought either.
#47. To: nativist nationalist, Vicomte13 (#38)
believe that used fishing as a metaphor, as an example of working for your daily bread rather than bread and circuses.
#48. To: tpaine (#0)
#49. To: tpaine, nolu chan (#40)
(Edited)
Chan insists that the SCOTUS has the power to rule such an amendment valid, and that it must be obeyed.. He advocates SCOTUS as having the final say on what the Constitution means...
#50. To: Don, tpaine (#44)
Did the U.S. Supreme Court just legislate gay marriage for the fifty states?
#51. To: Liberator (#45)
People need to learn skills and crafts that allow them the self-respect and nobility of making their own living rather than relying on Uncle Sugar-Daddy Sam -- who thru its confiscated taxes which are supposed to maintain the infrastructure
#52. To: Liberator (#50)
#53. To: tomder55, Y'ALL (#11)
The 18th amendment outlawed alcohol . The 21st amendment repealed the 18th . Yes it can be done. -- tomder
I didn't say "only " I provided an example where an amendment was reversed by an ( amendment . But to answer this new question ......possibly.
Let's look at the amendments that the "progressives" don't like . --- Clearly they don't like the 2nd . They have proven to me beyond a shadow of doubt that they don't like the 1st amendment free exercise clause ( Wisconsin's junior Senator Tammy Baldwin said on MSNBC that the free exercise of religion extends only to religious institutions ,and not to individuals outside the church).They clearly would put restrictions of the free speech provisions (ie the movement to amend the constitution to reverse the 'Citizens United' decision ). freespeechforpeople.org/t...cy-for-all-amendment/#sj- res- 5-114th-congress ----- They are trying to control the internet to limit free speech .Before that they wanted to censor talk radio . They had a 'fairness doctrine ' that required the airing of opposing views at one time. They want to outlaw so called 'hate speech'. Now if they managed to amend the Constitution to strip provisions that the founders thought were so basic that some of them did not believe it necessary to include them in the Constitution originally, then what would the recourse be ? Perhaps amending the constitution again ,or in the extreme ,"when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security."
#54. To: tpaine, Nolu Chan, liberator, A K A Stone (#0)
During a discussion with Nolu Chan, he asserted that an amendment repealing the 2nd could be ratified, and become a valid part of our Constitution. I contend such an amendment would be unconstitutional. Comments?
#55. To: tpaine (#53)
#56. To: Vicomte13 (#42)
"honor bound"?
What is this thing, "honor"? -- Define it.--- What are its parameters? ---- Who says? ---- Who enforces it?
#57. To: Don (#44)
Did the U.S. Supreme Court just legislate gay marriage for the fifty states?
Isn't it the Constitutional limitation for that Court to interpret the laws in accordance with the Constitution, rather than make Federal law?
#58. To: tpaine, Gatlin, Vicomte13, tomder55, TooConservative, Liberator, Stoner, Don, goldilucky (#0)
Dream on that in Nolu Chan's world such an amendment could be valid. It would violate every principle inherent in our constitution, and thus would be null and void from its enactment.
Congress has the power to refuse to fund any efforts to implement the unconstitutional amendment, and to tell the people why. ...
#134. To: tpaine (#123)
Does this mean you would contend that an amendment could be passed that prohibited our inalienable rights to buy, make, or use guns?
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness, and to buy, make, or use guns.
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress; provided that the amendment may be considered common legislation; and provided further that tpaine approves the content; and provided further that the amendment may be deemed unconstitutional; and provided further that the courts may strike down the amendment; and provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article; and that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.
AMENDMENT 28.
#136. To: nolu chan, proposes an amendment to repeal the 2nd !! (#134)
The Congress proposes, and three-fourths of the states ratify the following amendment in Nolu Chan's world.
Other than soiling yourself and bleating about it, what is to be done in tpaineworld? --- Does the Congress pass contrary legislation, telling the people that they have abused their sovereign right to amend their constitution?
Does the Court strike down this part of the Constitution as unconstitutional?
Does the Deemer of tpaineworld deem this part of the Constitution null and void? ----- Does the tpaine court of the imagination tell the people that they can't infringe the right to buy, make, and use arms; deemed an unalienable right by the tpaine imaginary revised, new and improved Declaration of Independence.
#59. To: tpaine, Gatlin, Vicomte13, tomder55, TooConservative, Liberator, Stoner, Don, goldilucky (#58)
Your opinion, and that of the court, is erroneous.
amendments to the constitution can be deemed unconstitutional.
holding that the official notice to the Secretary of State, duly authenticated, of the action of the legislatures of the States, whose alleged ratifications were assailed, was conclusive upon the Secretary of State, and that his proclamation accordingly of ratification was conclusive upon the courts, we affirmed the judgment of the state court.
LaVergne’s claims also fail on other grounds, including lack of justiciability. LaVergne’s constitutional challenge to § 2a is primarily based on his argument that the apportionment method violates Article the First. He alleges that this proposed constitutional amendment was ratified by the states in November 1791 or June 1792. Putting aside the considerable factual and historical problems with his argument, “[t]he issue of whether a constitutional amendment has been properly ratified is a political question.” United States v. McDonald, 919 F.2d 146, 1990 WL 186103 (table), at *3 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939)). In Coleman, the Supreme Court held that “the question of the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures . . . should be regarded as a political question pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over the promulgation of the adoption of the amendment.” 307 U.S. at 450. See also Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 39 (1849) (holding that “the political department has always determined whether the proposed constitution or amendment was ratified or not by the people of the State, and the judicial power has followed its decision”); United States v. Foster, 789 F.2d 457, 463 n.6 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the issue of “the validity of an amendment’s ratification [is] a non-justiciable political question” and citing, among other cases, Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922), and Coleman, 307 U.S. at 450).
SCOTUS opinions apply to the case at hand and are given due consideration by the other branches of govt, and by the people.
But you can't refute the fact of the supremacy clause.
Legislation (or amendments) passed contrary to the constitution, are null and void.
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
Read narrowly, the Supremacy Clause binds only state judges. But other provisions of the Constitution, most notably the Fourteenth Amendment, directly constrain the action of all state officials, often without regard to whether state courts have ruled on the validity of those officials' acts; moreover, Article VI declares that "the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers . . . of the several states, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution. ... " Accordingly, the Court has not limited to state judges its demand for compliance with the federal Constitution. In Cooper v. Aaron, a school desegregation case decided against the background of Governor Faubus's resistance to the desegregation of public schools in Little Rock, Arkansas, the Supreme Court asserted what is probably its broadest definition of its own power: "Marbury v. Madison ... declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land.... Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath ... 'to support this Constitution.'"
Treaties, agreements between the United States and a foreign country that are negotiated by the president and ratified by the Senate, are permitted unless they violate the Constitution. It is firmly established that if there is a conflict between a treaty and a federal statute, the one adopted last in time controls.
The quote below proves that the SCOTUS heard and considered the constitutionality of the new amendment.. -- Your opinion is wrong...
In this respect a constitutional amendment granting to the government power to prohibit intoxicants would be quite different from an attempted amendment itself directly declaring the prohibition of intoxicants. The former would merely add to the powers of government and would, therefore, in this regard at least, be a proper form of constitutional amendment; while the latter in its essence neither would add nor withdraw powers of government, but would be direct legislation. The Eighteenth Amendment is, therefore, in substance and effect a statute, not a constitutional provision akin to any in the federal Constitution.
The briefs presented against the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment are addressed more to what the opposing interests thought ought to be, than to any issues which may properly be termed legal in character. When read, these briefs in many cases seem to be arguments of counsel who were employed to find arguments, and must, therefore, do so, even though they knew the arguments to be untenable. The most effective statements presented to the Court were those submitted in behalf of a number of states as amici curiae, in the cases of Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co. v. Gregory and Rhode Island v. Palmer. These briefs bear the name of Mr. Charles E. Hughes.
This argument might be termed somewhat ridiculous, had it not appeared under the distinguished name of Mr. Elihu Root.
#60. To: Stoner, tpaine (#20)
Well, I guess they could propose and vote on such an amendment. But I would suspect that anyone & everyone that tried to get it passed, would soon seriously regret their participation!
#61. To: redleghunter (#54)
First off, creating a vanity thread to call out another poster is bad manners.
Second, I looked at comments so far and one of two possibilities are evident: - -- 1. Chan is showing restraint and dignity in not responding to your carnival barking. --- or ---- 2. His response is forthcoming and no doubt he will hand you your 4th point of contact (for the civilians in the room the 4th point of contact is what you sit on; for paratroopers it is the 'fourth point' of the body hitting the ground in a 'dynamite' parachute landing fall [PLF])
#62. To: tpaine, redleghunter, nolu chan (#61)
#63. To: Don, tpaine (#44)
Did the U.S. Supreme Court just legislate gay marriage for the fifty states? Isn't it the Constitutional limitation for that Court to interpret the laws in accordance with the Constitution, rather than make Federal law?
#64. To: Gatlin (#62)
I said to you before that you need to listen to nolu chan.
#65. To: nolu chan (#60)
#66. To: tpaine (#64)
#67. To: tpaine, Liberator (#40)
Not so. Every official at every level of gov't is honor bound to protect and defend the Constitution as written, not as interpreted by the SCOTUS.
Your opinion, and that of the court, is erroneous.
When the Supreme Court rules on a constitutional issue, that judgment is virtually final; its decisions can be altered only by the rarely used procedure of constitutional amendment or by a new ruling of the Court. However, when the Court interprets a statute, new legislative action can be taken.
“That the duties assigned to the circuit courts by this act are not of that description, and that the act itself does not appear to contemplate them as such, inasmuch as it subjects the decisions of these courts, made pursuant to those duties, first to the consideration and suspension of the Secretary at War and then to the revision of the legislature, whereas by the Constitution, neither the Secretary at War nor any other Executive officer, nor even the legislature, is authorized to sit as a court of errors on the judicial acts or opinions of this court.”
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the “supreme Law of the Land.” In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as “the fundamental and paramount law of the nation,” declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, that “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” This decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.
#68. To: tpaine (#64)
(Edited)
#69. To: A K A Stone (#66)
Remember the constitution isn't perfect. It is man made and contains flaws.
#70. To: nolu chan (#63)
Don (#44) --- Did the U.S. Supreme Court just legislate gay marriage for the fifty states?
Isn't it the Constitutional limitation for that Court to interpret the laws in accordance with the Constitution, rather than make Federal law?
Nolu Chan -- The Court majority found a fundamental right to same-sex marriage somewhere in the due process clause, in a manner similar to how it found a right to abortion. --- I disagree with their "interpretation" of the Constitution, but it is not legislation. Were it legislation, it could be overturned by Congress with more legislation.
A Supreme Court holding on a constitutional issue can only be changed by a constitutional amendment or by the Court itself revisiting the issue in a subsequent case. There can be no appeal of the decided case.
#71. To: buckeroo, tpaine, nolu chan, All (#68)
The Bill of Rights or any Amendments are not exonerated from the legislative process, either; I assume you think the Bill of Rights are built on a bedrock or fixed foundation that is unshakable.
#72. To: A K A Stone, tpaine (#66)
Nolu chan is right on this one. It wouldn't be right morally. But it would follow the process laid out in the constitution.
Every State shall abide by the determination of the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State.
#73. To: tpaine (#70)
Your lengthy postings of opinions by other authorities are just that, --- opinions. They do not prove your case.
#74. To: SOSO, tpaine (#71)
The only rights that one has in the real world are the rights that one can defend.
#75. To: tpaine, tomder55 (#53)
The constitutionality of the 18th was challenged in 1920. The SCOTUS declined to issue an opinion on that specific issue, and left it at that, whereupon damn near everyone ignored the 'amendment, until it was repealed.
In this respect a constitutional amendment granting to the government power to prohibit intoxicants would be quite different from an attempted amendment itself directly declaring the prohibition of intoxicants. The former would merely add to the powers of government and would, therefore, in this regard at least, be a proper form of constitutional amendment; while the latter in its essence neither would add nor withdraw powers of government, but would be direct legislation. The Eighteenth Amendment is, therefore, in substance and effect a statute, not a constitutional provision akin to any in the federal Constitution.
The briefs presented against the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment are addressed more to what the opposing interests thought ought to be, than to any issues which may properly be termed legal in character. When read, these briefs in many cases seem to be arguments of counsel who were employed to find arguments, and must, therefore, do so, even though they knew the arguments to be untenable. The most effective statements presented to the Court were those submitted in behalf of a number of states as amici curiae, in the cases of Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co. v. Gregory and Rhode Island v. Palmer. These briefs bear the name of Mr. Charles E. Hughes.
This argument might be termed somewhat ridiculous, had it not appeared under the distinguished name of Mr. Elihu Root.
1. Eighteenth Amendment, with respect to its subject-matter, held within the power to amend given by article 5, and valid.
#76. To: A K A Stone, nolu chan, Y'ALL (#66)
Nolu chan is right on this one.
It wouldn't be right morally. But it would follow the process laid out in the constitution.
Remember the constitution isn't perfect. It is man made and contains flaws. --- It is worth protecting.
#77. To: buckeroo (#68)
I assume you think the Bill of Rights are built on a bedrock or fixed foundation that is unshakable.
#78. To: tpaine (#76)
I think we have an unalienable right to keep and bear arms. -- I see nothing in the Constitution itself that says we could amendment away that right.
The Constitutional Amendment Process
From: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/constitution/
#79. To: nolu chan (#73)
Nolu Chan -- The Court majority found a fundamental right to same-sex marriage somewhere in the due process clause, in a manner similar to how it found a right to abortion. --- I disagree with their "interpretation" of the Constitution, but it is not legislation. Were it legislation, it could be overturned by Congress with more legislation.
A Supreme Court holding on a constitutional issue can only be changed by a constitutional amendment or by the Court itself revisiting the issue in a subsequent case. There can be no appeal of the decided case.
Your posting your wingnut nonsense certainly does not prove your point.
#80. To: tpaine (#76)
I see nothing in the Constitution itself that says we could amendment away that right.
#81. To: tpaine (#77)
buckeroo: I assume you think the Bill of Rights are built on a bedrock or fixed foundation that is unshakable.
increasing incredible fascism in America, what makes you think there is any safety about our personal dignity or rights anymore?
#82. To: tpaine (#79)
Your pejorative comments lead me to believe you want to end this discussion in a flame war. -- No thanks...
#83. To: tpaine, nolu chan (#79)
Supreme Court holding on a constitutional issue can only be changed by a constitutional amendment or by the Court itself revisiting the issue in a subsequent case. There can be no appeal of the decided case.
#84. To: All, tpaine, Deckard (#81)
#85. To: buckeroo (#74)
But the second amendment (as all amendments) are only reliable and trustworthy as the people and the representative government that is voted by the people.
#86. To: tpaine, nolu chan (#83)
#87. To: Liberator, tpaine (#9)
Chan is only the bearer of bad (obvious) news. Don't kill the messenger.
#88. To: tpaine (#0)
#89. To: nolu chan (#75)
This claim is false, as previously explained thoroughly on the other thread.
The question was not before the court to determine the constitutionality of the 18th Amendment.
An amendment cannot be unconstitutional.
Counsel did not argue the the amendment was unconstitutional, he argued that, due to its content, it was ordinary legislation and not an amendment at all. And, as ordinary legislation, the court had the authority to strike it down, according to this creative argument. Trust tpaine to bloviate endlessly about crap he has not seen or read.
#90. To: SOSO (#85)
Actually not even that as the recent Supreme Court decisions prove.
#91. To: SOSO, tpaine (#86)
BTW, what does the Consitution say about the involuntary removal of a Supreme Court judge?
The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
#92. To: buckeroo (#90)
The US Supreme Court can not strike down an amendment.
#93. To: nolu chan (#91)
In 1804, the Senate held an impeachment trial for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase. He was not convicted.
#94. To: nolu chan (#87)
I replied with an example of such an Amendment and asked how it could be struck down. ---- I did not advocate for such an Amendment, but only observed that the people, as the sovereigns, have the power to do it.
I would advocate for an amendment strengthening the RKBA and 2nd Amdt. -- What would prevent an amendment taking away the RKBA today would be the requirement of getting 38 states to ratify it.
#95. To: SOSO (#92)
They don't have to strike it down. What would have happened if SCOTUS ruled the other way against the various City and State laws resticting gun ownership by implementing extremely onerous, if not practically impossible, permiting requirements?
#96. To: SOSO, nolu chan (#71)
The only rights we have in the real world are those rights we can defend.
#97. To: tpaine (#89)
The constitutionality of the 18th was challenged in 1920. The SCOTUS declined to issue an opinion on that specific issue, and left it at that, whereupon damn near everyone ignored the 'amendment, until it was repealed.
[385] Conclusions of the Court
1. Eighteenth Amendment, with respect to its subject-matter, held within the power to amend given by article 5, and valid.
#98. To: tpaine (#94)
It's unfortunate you didn't revise your comments over on the other thread, isn't it..
#99. To: Vicomte13, nolu chan (#96)
And THAT is really determined, first and foremost, by whether anybody can prove you did it before a tribunal.
#100. To: SOSO (#93)
(Edited)
Who presided?
#101. To: nolu chan (#98)
No. It led you to make an ass of yourself.
#102. To: Vicomte13, nolu chan, buckeroo (#96)
And THAT is why all liberty ultimately repose in the rules of evidence
#103. To: nolu chan (#100)
Who presided?
#104. To: SOSO (#102)
#105. To: Vicomte13 (#104)
But they are still bound by the rules of evidence, and if they ignore procedure in their rush to judgement, they are subject to multiple levels of review.
#106. To: SOSO (#105)
#107. To: tpaine (#61)
#108. To: SOSO (#103)
I thought impeachment hearings had to be presided over by the Chief Justice. Was that not always the case?
The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present.
#109. To: tpaine (#101)
It's unfortunate you didn't revise your comments over on the other thread, isn't it..
#110. To: tpaine, Liberator (#40)
When the Supreme Court rules on a constitutional issue, that judgment is virtually final; its decisions can be altered only by the rarely used procedure of constitutional amendment or by a new ruling of the Court. However, when the Court interprets a statute, new legislative action can be taken.
Stahl argues that the sixteenth amendment was never ratified by the requisite number of states because of clerical errors in the ratifying resolutions of the various state legislatures and other errors in the ratification process. He further argues that Secretary of State Knox committed fraud by certifying the adoption of the amendment despite these alleged errors. Secretary of State Knox certified that the sixteenth amendment had been ratified by the legislatures of thirty-eight states, two more than the thirty-six then required for ratification. His certification of the adoption of the amendment was made pursuant to Section 205 of the Revised Statutes of the United States which provided:
#111. To: SOSO, buckeroo (#92)
Also, what happens if the Fed refuses to enforce a constitutional valid law...?
#112. To: tpaine, nolu chan, All (#0)
(Edited)
During a discussion with Nolu Chan, he asserted that an amendment repealing the 2nd could be ratified, and become a valid part of our Constitution. I contend such an amendment would be unconstitutional. Comments?
#113. To: nolu chan (#111)
Also, what happens if the Fed refuses to enforce a constitutional valid law...?
#114. To: Vicomte13 (#106)
At the end of the final appeal.
#115. To: nolu chan, buckeroo (#111)
#116. To: redleghunter, nolu chan, y'all (#107)
-- the point is several posters have confirmed any Amendment can be amended. -- - Perhaps a more accurate way of asking your question is: ---- Can our enumerated rights, the Bill of Rights be amended? --- Short answer is yes.
Long answer is if we do we scrap the philosophical founding of our nation, the DoI.
It all goes back to the terms used by the founders of "self evident" and "endowed by their Creator." ----- If our government decided to amend any of the enumerated rights, the response of freedom loving people should be similar to this: ------- When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.
#117. To: nolu chan, gatlin, Y'ALL (#109)
I replied with an example of such an Amendment and asked how it could be struck down. ---- I did not advocate for such an Amendment, but only observed that the people, as the sovereigns, have the power to do it.
I would advocate for an amendment strengthening the RKBA and 2nd Amdt. -- What would prevent an amendment taking away the RKBA today would be the requirement of getting 38 states to ratify it.
Of course, I have no need to revise my comments. You asked "Does this mean you would contend that an amendment could be passed that prohibited our inalienable rights to buy, make, or use guns? " I correctly affirmed that such an amendment could be passed. I answered the question you asked.
Your arguments, if tried in court, would result in Rule 11 sanctions. --- "There is no room for a pure heart, empty head defense under Rule 11." First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Vinita v. Kissee (1993), 1993 OK 96, 859 P.2d 502>>
#118. To: nolu chan (#75)
(Edited)
The question was not before the court to determine the constitutionality of the 18th Amendment. An amendment cannot be unconstitutional
#119. To: tpaine, nolu chan, ALL (#117)
(Edited)
I suggest you address gatlin, our empty head expert..
#120. To: Gatlin, Nolu Chan, Y'ALL (#119)
#121. To: tpaine, Gatlin, Nolu Chan (#120)
but it's an easy to read document, and our common sense tell us that it did NOT give a moral super majority the power to amend away our inalienable rights, outlined in the Bill of Rights.
#122. To: redleghunter, tpaine (#107)
It all goes back to the terms used by the founders of "self evident" and "endowed by their Creator."
When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.
#123. To: SOSO, gatlin, nolu chan, Y'ALL (#121)
It most certainly did. --- SOSO
#124. To: nolu chan (#75)
The question was not before the court to determine the constitutionality of the 18th Amendment. An amendment cannot be unconstitutional.
#125. To: tpaine, gatlin, nolu chan, Y'ALL (#123)
You've made big brownie points with gatlin and chan.
#126. To: SOSO, gatlin, nolu chan, Y'ALL (#125)
--- most of us do understand what the Constitution means and fully understand that even the Bill of Rights can be modified or nullified if there are enough votes for that to happen.
#127. To: tpaine, SOSO, nolu chan, ALL (#126)
To date, no one on this forum, LP, or FR, has ever been able to explain why ...
I’ve seen many people who don’t change and they always get left behind. Smart people learn things, so they change their minds. Only stupid people never change their minds. ~ Those were the recent words spoken by Donald Trump.
The greatest deception men suffer is from their own opinions. ~ Leonardo da Vinci
#128. To: Gatlin (#127)
(Edited)
I’m done here.
#129. To: tpaine (#126)
Why do 'most' of you WANT to give that power to a moralistic super majority, -- like the tea-totaling idiots that prohibited booze?
#130. To: Gatlin (#127)
I’m done here.
#131. To: CZ82 (#130)
#132. To: GrandIsland (#128)
(Edited)
#133. To: tpaine (#126)
To date, no one on this forum, LP, or FR, has ever been able to explain why such majority rule would be desirable.
#134. To: CZ82, gatlin, grandisland, y'all (#129)
I don't think some folks understand that they shouldn't just be accepting what is going on, that they should be fighting it instead.
#135. To: SOSO, y'all (#133)
Yo, anyone at home in your head. Nobody made any claim about desireability. That has not been the issue being discussed. The issue is what the Consitution permits re: the giving or taking of so-called rights. And what the Constitution permits is that a super majority can change it without limits on what may or may not be changed.
#136. To: tpaine, CZ82 (#134)
I don't think
#137. To: tpaine (#134)
#138. To: tomder55 (#118)
Any amendment that contradicts the text of the Constitution itself or an earlier amendment will nullify the earlier text.
#139. To: tpaine (#135)
Can you answer the question or not?
#140. To: Liberator (#124)
And I suppose unfortunately neither can an "interpretation" *of* the Constitution by any one of nine Justices be deemed "unconstitutional." We are all held hostage by ideologues until they surrender their lifetime appointments (can Congress rescind those "lifetime appointments"?
#141. To: tpaine (#117)
Of course, I have no need to revise my comments. You asked "Does this mean you would contend that an amendment could be passed that prohibited our inalienable rights to buy, make, or use guns? " I correctly affirmed that such an amendment could be passed. I answered the question you asked.
#142. To: tpaine, redleghunter (#116)
I contend that an attempt to amend away our enumerated basic human rights would violate the basic principles inherent in our constitution, -- and therefore would be unconstitutional.
Every State shall abide by the determination of the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State.
The Congressional Register; or History of the Proceedings and Debates of the First House of Representatives of the United States of America; Namely, New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsyvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South-Carolina, and Georgia.
#143. To: nolu chan (#138)
It's what the people chose to do.
#144. To: nolu chan (#143)
(Edited)
#145. To: tomder55 (#143)
So if you are asking me if I'd be in favor of a repeal amendment .My answer would be yes .
#146. To: nolu chan (#141)
I answered your question.
Man up. Answer how your version of the law applies to Obama or how it selectively applies only according to your whims.
#147. To: tpaine (#146)
Now you've revised your answer, claiming you do not advocate using an amendment power to repeal the 2nd.
#25. To: misterwhite (#24)
Seems pretty clear that the U.S. Supreme Court believed the second amendment only protects militia-type arms in relation to a militia, doesn't it?
Oddly, Second Amendment scholars have largely ignored Miller. While individual and collective right theorists alike claim Miller supports their position, most provide only a perfunctory account of the case. The few exceptions focus on the text of the opinion, rather than the history of the case, and the context in which it was decided. All conclude Miller is an impenetrable mess.
We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.
c. Meaning of the Operative Clause. Putting all of these textual elements together, we find that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation. This meaning is strongly confirmed by the historical background of the Second Amendment. We look to this because it has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right. The very text of the Second Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-existence of the right and declares only that it “shall not be infringed.” As we said in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 553 (1876), “[t]his is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed ....”
1. Operative Clause.
“‘[T]he people’ seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution. . . . [Its uses] sugges[t] that ‘the people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community.”
#148. To: nolu chan, tpaine (#147)
Now you've revised your answer, claiming you do not advocate using an amendment power to repeal the 2nd.
#149. To: tpaine (#146)
[tpaine #117] And I read your example, and observed that it seemed you advocated the power of the people to pass such an unconstitutional act..
[tpaine #146] Now you've revised your answer, claiming you do not advocate using an amendment power to repeal the 2nd.
#99. To: tpaine (#86)
[tpaine] So, -- why do you two ~argue for~ the States to have the power to prohibit arms?
...the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
#150. To: tpaine (#146)
[tpaine #146] Now you've revised your answer, claiming you do not advocate using an amendment power to repeal the 2nd.
#100. To: roberpaulsen, nolu chan (#95)
I did not, as you put it, ~argue for~ the States to have the power to prohibit arms. I merely documented that the Bill of Rights did not originally apply to the States. They were restrictions on the Federal government.
#104. To: tpaine (#101)
So, -- why do you two ~argue for~ the States to have the power to prohibit arms?
Which is it? -- Are you in "perfect agreement" with paulsen? -- Or with our Constitution's 2nd?
Many amendments assert something on the order of "Congress shall make no law...." The Second Amendment was intentionally phrased differently:
...the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
#151. To: tpaine, A K A Stone, Liberator, redleghunter, nativist nationalist (#134)
And typically, like gatlin and grandisland, they quit when challenged. - Pitiful little people..
#152. To: CZ82 (#151)
And then (just like clockwork) yukon comes running to their rescue!! LOL.
#153. To: A K A Stone, nolu chan, Y'ALL (#148)
AKA Stone --- nolu chan never said that. He just said it was possible to do under the wording of the constitution.
He asked, "Does this mean you would contend that an amendment could be passed that prohibited our inalienable rights to buy, make, or use guns?" [emphasis added]
I replied with an example of such an Amendment and asked how it could be struck down.
I did not advocate for such an Amendment, but only observed that the people, as the sovereigns, have the power to do it. I would advocate for an amendment strengthening the RKBA and 2nd Amdt.
What would prevent an amendment taking away the RKBA today would be the requirement of getting 38 states to ratify it.
#154. To: tpaine (#153)
Why in hell does my opinion, -- that amendments cannot alienate away our basic rights, as outlined in the Bill of Rights, --- that they would be unconstitutional, -- become such a divisive issue?
#155. To: nolu chan (#147)
Well, bless your heart. I can see how desperate you are to see what else I have written on the right to keep and bear arms, but you seem to be too incompetent to read any of that and must rely on assertions spewed from your imagination. Here, read about the right to keep and bear arms.
#156. To: buckeroo (#154)
Because ---
--- man-made documents, such as Amendments may be changed at any tyme. They are not permanent structures in America or anywhere on this planet.
#157. To: tpaine (#156)
#158. To: buckeroo, y'all (#157)
So depite your belief that documents are designed to be permanent fixtures of institutions built by men, ant man or group may change them at any tyme.
#159. To: tpaine (#158)
The Constitution is a document designed to be a permanent protection for our inalienable rights within a republican form of government.
#160. To: buckeroo (#159)
... where does any document suggest that whether within or without the US Constitution?
#161. To: tpaine (#160)
The Constitution is a document designed to be a permanent protection for our inalienable rights within a republican form of government.
The declaration of independence is the document that suggests that principle [suggests permanency].
#162. To: buckeroo, y'all, gatlin (#161)
You can't even find permanent interpretations of GOD in any man-made document or otherwise: called the Bible, Koran, etc.
#163. To: tpaine (#162)
#164. To: buckeroo (#163)
---sacrosanct ---
#165. To: Kluane, aka yu-klown, tpaine, CZ82, Deckard (#136)
(I don't think)
#166. To: tpaine (#164)
#167. To: Liberator (#165)
Kluane National Park and Reserve are two units of Canada's national park system, located in the extreme southwestern corner of Yukon, Canada.
#168. To: buckeroo (#167)
#169. To: Gatlin (#152)
I have a sneaking suspicion he won't be here long
#170. To: CZ82 (#169)
(Edited)
That he is still on everyone's mind and bugs the Hell out of them with the mere mention of his name...
#171. To: Liberator (#165)
is unmistakable.
#172. To: Gatlin (#170)
#173. To: Liberator, tpaine (#165)
Kluane National Park and Reserve are two units of Canada's national park system, located in the extreme southwestern corner of Yukon, Canada.
#174. To: CZ82 (#172)
#175. To: tpaine (#155)
[tpaine] Now you've revised your answer, claiming you do not advocate using an amendment power to repeal the 2nd.
To: tpaine
To: tpaine
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 98 | View Replies]
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 99 | View Replies]
#176. To: tpaine, buckeroo (#160)
The Constitution is a document designed to be a permanent protection for our inalienable rights within a republican form of government.
By what lawful authority or power was the "perpetual union" under the Articles of Confederation destroyed, and a new union of ELEVEN states formed?
#177. To: tpaine, buckeroo (#160)
The declaration of independence is the document that suggests that principle.
#178. To: nolu chan, misterwhite, gatlin, Y'ALL (#175)
And then there is Jim Rob's summation of tpaine as "inflicting pain is your game." -------- To: tpaine - Hah! That's rich. "Personal attacks and insults" are your first and last names and inflicting pain is your game. Abuse reports from people with unclean hands are not taken seriously. If you want to be taken seriously on this forum you might think about cleaning up your act. - 257 posted on 7/28/02 4:10 PM Pacific by Jim Robinson
Your game has not changed in over 10 years. You spout utter nonsense and attempt to frustrate others until a flame war erupts. Then you try to report someone and have them banned. You are one sick puppy.
#179. To: tpaine (#153)
[tpaine #153] I posted to: nolu chan,----- Now you've revised your answer, claiming you do not advocate using an amendment power to repeal the 2nd.
Amendment II
To: tpaine
#180. To: nolu chan (#179)
Your game has not changed in over 10 years. You spout utter nonsense and attempt to frustrate others until a flame war erupts. Then you try to report someone and have them banned.
As Jim Rob summed you up, inflicting pain is your game. You strive to be a pain in the ass and see if you can get a reaction.
#181. To: tpaine, misterwhite, Gatlin (#178)
Thanks for the link (at #147) to that old thread, as it proves my point completely.. You gave up the discussion shortly after the excerpts you just posted because you couldn't refute my answers. --- I urge anyone here to read the complete thread to verify.
[tpaine] If the Founders wanted to refer to individuals they would have simply said, "the right of each citizen to keep and bear arms ...".
[tpaine] Geez Louise. You want THIS court to interpret the second amendment? How about:
#66. To: tpaine, misterwhite (#57)
Both the Miller and the Heller Courts issued opinions. -- SCOTUS opinions are NOT law.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.
Both of you seem to imagine that the other branches of our Fed/state/local governments are constitutionally bound to conform to supreme court opinions.
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation that, in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the Constitution itself is first mentioned, and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the Constitution, have that rank.
"Could you please source this to something that James Madison wrote or said?"
"We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns."
Exactly what I meant when I said the Heller court ignored Miller. That is NOT what Miller said.
"Heller's holding prevails over Miller's dicta."
Yes. But don't pretend for a minute that Heller's holding was based on Miller's dicta.
The holding in Heller is as convoluted as the holding in Roe v Wade. For example, in Heller, "the people" refers to individuals if it's a right, but "the people" refers to a group if it's a power.
If the Founders wanted to refer to individuals they would have simply said, "the right of each citizen to keep and bear arms ...".
Geez Louise. You want THIS court to interpret the second amendment? How about:
At the time the second amendment was written, handguns were "not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes". What few there were, they were carried concealed by criminals for nefarious purposes.
That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated militia, including the body of the people capable of bearing arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state.
XVII. That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated militia, including the body of the people capable of bearing arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state....
The militia, sir, is our ultimate safety. We can have no security without it. . . . The great object is, that every man be armed. . . . Everyone who is able may have a gun.
17th. That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state; that standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and protection of the community will admit; and that, in all cases, the military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.
The signification attributed to the term Militia appears from the debates in the Convention, the history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of approved commentators. These show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. "A body of citizens enrolled for military discipline." And further, that ordinarily, when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.
Therefore, the court could conclude handguns are not protected by the second amendment, using the exact same argument they used in Heller. AND, that ruling would apply nationwide.
#182. To: tpaine (#180)
Whatever. -- You're repeating yourself again. --- Get some new lines...
To: tpaine
Constitution & Law
See other Constitution & Law Articles
Source: volokh conspiracy
URL Source: [None]
Published: Jan 5, 2015
Author: Eugene Volokh
Post Date: 2015-01-05 22:01:50 by tpaine
Comments: 66
Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/LatestSource: volokh conspiracy
In January 2014 The Volokh Conspiracy migrated to the Washington Post and was moved behind a paywall in June 2014.
#2. To: Willie Green (#1)
#3. To: Willie Green (#1) From Wikipedia:
#4. To: Willie Green, Y'ALL (#1) (Edited) This Article asks how we might theorize and respond to these more paradoxical challenges to the status quo. We seek to identify, define, and elucidate the phenomenon we call uncivil obedience. In important respects, uncivil obedience is the mirror image of civil disobedience. On most accounts, civil disobedience consists of an open violation of law and a willingness to submit to punishment.
#5. To: Willie Green, All (#1) So I don't know how you guys want to handle copyright infringement issues, but from my perspective, I'd only post excerpts from what's freely available on the web & totally avoid posting anything that's behind a paywall.
#6. To: sysadmin (#5) (Edited) URL Source: [None]
Post Date: 2015-01-05 22:01:50 by tpaine
#7. To: sysadmin (#5)
#8. To: Gatlin (#6) Goldi Has repeatedly stated NOTHING is to be posted from The Washington Post as per the letter TWP sent to her and tpaine know this. I suspect that is why he intentionally left the source blank.
#9. To: Palmdale (#8) Goldi Has repeatedly stated NOTHING is to be posted from The Washington Post as per the letter TWP sent to her and tpaine know this. I suspect that is why he intentionally left the source blank.
#10. To: Gatlin, Palmdale, tpaine (#9)
#11. To: sysadmin, threatens bannings, Y'ALL (#5) Anyone caught deliberately posting material from a source that has prohibited its distribution will be banned.
There are not too many things that I'd consider taking that kind of action for, but illegal activity fits the bill. If anyone wants to challenge copyright laws feel free to do so on your own server.
#12. To: tpaine (#11) I'd say we should wait and see if the washpost sends us another infringement notice. -- I'd bet that since we no longer have an 'owner' (subject to finding Goldies will), that they simply won't bother, and so will no one else.
#183. To: tpaine (#180)
You've gone out of your mind. Sure, I've had a lot of discussions that have frustrated people like you, misterwhite, gatlin, etc... But I have NEVER tried to have anyone banned.
To: tpaine
#184. To: Liberator (#165)
Kluane National Park and Reserve are two units of Canada's national park system, located in the extreme southwestern corner of Yukon, Canada.
#185. To: nolu chan (#183)
#186. To: tpaine (#185)
Why are you repeatedly reposting that tired old post from JR?
[tpaine] You've gone out of your mind. Sure, I've had a lot of discussions that have frustrated people like you, misterwhite, gatlin, etc... But I have NEVER tried to have anyone banned.
To: tpaine
#187. To: Gatlin (#174)
I think the correct analogy would be "amuses the hell out of them".
#188. To: nolu chan, poor thing, uses JR for support. (#186)
You poor thing. Jim Rob would not take your abuse report seriously.
#189. To: tpaine (#188)
To my knowledge, NONE of my opponents were ever banned for anything I posted. Quite the opposite actually occurred.
To: Eagle Eye
#190. To: nolu chan, trying to prove his point by citing JR at FR (#189)
Damn. How many times did you have to hit the abuse button to get suspended for a week for abusing abuse?
#191. To: tpaine (#190)
I urge anyone to read the whole thread for context. It was a very fun time for most of us at FR ---- Except for JR and his band of sick sycophants.
'Flame war' or Constitutional debate?
Address:http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/648477/posts?q=1&&page=201
Address:http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/648911/posts
'They' - [JR?] -- suspended tex & I for 24 hrs, --- while we were in mid-discussion of a constitutional issue on gun control.
-- And please, -- spare me any more snide whine n' cheese remarks. ---- I, and many others, are well aware that the FR-PTB don't give a damn about dissenting opinions.. To: tpaine
To: tpaine
To: Eagle Eye
To: tpaine
To: Sandy
To: tpaine
#192. To: nolu chan (#191)
To: tpaine --- I'll ask John to start a new topic called "Whine and Cheese" just for you. Thanks, Jim ----- 40 posted on 3/20/2002, 9:33:42 PM by Jim Robinson
And the unanswered question remains, How many times did you have to hit the abuse button to get suspended for a week for abusing abuse?
#193. To: tpaine (#192)
Get a life. Find a new hobby. -- Or rave on, and continue your obsessive- compulsive behaviour. It's becoming funny/weird.
#10. To: sysadmin, gatlin, Y'ALL (#5)
I also thank TC for his contributions to help improve LP. I noticed he tried to talk some common sense to a couple of stalkers and agitators to have them see the error in their ways. I doubt it worked and I will not know since I have them on bozo. Gatlin
#16. To: Palmdale, sysadmin, Y'ALL (#14)
Pthe tpoor ptattle ptale... ---- Palmdale
#17. To: tpaine, Palmdale, All (#16)
Palmdale keeps posting barely disguised silly words referring to me as "pt/tp" purely to instigate a flame war. I'm pinging you with a request to give him a warning.
#18. To: sysadmin (#17)
#19. To: Palmdale (#18)
Sorry about the silly words. I'll try to be less of a tpettifogger starting at some unspecified date in the near future.
#20. To: tpaine (#16)
To: Palmdale, sysadmin, Y'ALL Palmdale keeps posting barely disguised silly words referring to me as "pt/tp" purely to instigate a flame war. I'm pinging you with a request to give him a warning.
#194. To: nolu chan (#193)
(Edited)
#195. To: tpaine (#194)
Thank you for reposting those remarks. Obviously, I'm opposed by a lot of very unstable people who are very unhappy about them.
#39. To: TooConservative, Y'ALL (#8)
Nolu is correct. Every portion of the Constitution can be amended. Or it could be abolished entirely.
#79. To: nolu chan (#73)
Nolu Chan -- The Court majority found a fundamental right to same-sex marriage somewhere in the due process clause, in a manner similar to how it found a right to abortion. --- I disagree with their "interpretation" of the Constitution, but it is not legislation. Were it legislation, it could be overturned by Congress with more legislation.
A Supreme Court holding on a constitutional issue can only be changed by a constitutional amendment or by the Court itself revisiting the issue in a subsequent case. There can be no appeal of the decided case.
Your posting your wingnut nonsense certainly does not prove your point.
#82. To: tpaine (#79)
Your pejorative comments lead me to believe you want to end this discussion in a flame war. -- No thanks...
#89. To: nolu chan (#75)
#75. To: tpaine, tomder55 (#53)
The constitutionality of the 18th was challenged in 1920. The SCOTUS declined to issue an opinion on that specific issue, and left it at that, whereupon damn near everyone ignored the 'amendment, until it was repealed.
In this respect a constitutional amendment granting to the government power to prohibit intoxicants would be quite different from an attempted amendment itself directly declaring the prohibition of intoxicants. The former would merely add to the powers of government and would, therefore, in this regard at least, be a proper form of constitutional amendment; while the latter in its essence neither would add nor withdraw powers of government, but would be direct legislation. The Eighteenth Amendment is, therefore, in substance and effect a statute, not a constitutional provision akin to any in the federal Constitution.
The briefs presented against the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment are addressed more to what the opposing interests thought ought to be, than to any issues which may properly be termed legal in character. When read, these briefs in many cases seem to be arguments of counsel who were employed to find arguments, and must, therefore, do so, even though they knew the arguments to be untenable. The most effective statements presented to the Court were those submitted in behalf of a number of states as amici curiae, in the cases of Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co. v. Gregory and Rhode Island v. Palmer. These briefs bear the name of Mr. Charles E. Hughes.
This argument might be termed somewhat ridiculous, had it not appeared under the distinguished name of Mr. Elihu Root.
1. Eighteenth Amendment, with respect to its subject-matter, held within the power to amend given by article 5, and valid.
#196. To: nolu chan (#195)
(Edited)
Yes, everybody else is unstable.
You poor baby. You accuse everyone of trying to start a flame war with you. On this thread you started your modus operandi at your #39 to TooConservative.--- You continued your modus operandi at your #79 to myself, nolu chan.
I have been documenting your pulling this same stunt at this site and other sites. By doing it with me (again), you invited the rebuttal. Sometimes the truth hurts. I am not flaming you, I am coldly, almost robotically, destroying your whines.
#197. To: tpaine (#196)
Thank you for reposting those remarks. Obviously, I'm opposed by a lot of very unstable people who are very unhappy about them.
To: bvw
Homosexual sodomy is a criminal act
To: Illbay
193 - roscoe
- Can you?
196 posted on 12/07/2002 1:05 PM PST by tpaine
How am I defrauded? How am I forced?
209 - illb
Unless I'm really stupid, and let my customers disturb the peace, you wouldn't even know we were there, correct? Give JS & I an example of a 'criminal' act we could commit upon *you*, roscoe, -- that would injure you without using force or fraud.
yukon tpaine without using force or fraud.
#198. To: nolu chan (#197)
--- I am compelled to comply.
#199. To: tpaine (#198)
You reAlly are going off the deep end with your last post, my boy. I'd recommend a mental health counselor, but I don't know any.
#200. To: nolu chan (#199)
That one way to avoid admitting that you do not any more clue about criminal law than you do about constitutional law. You don't even know what I was talking about, you are that incompetent.
#201. To: tpaine (#200)
Your mistaken opinions about my character have been noted and you are entitled to them, but you really should lighten up, for your own mental health..
To: Roscoe; Illbay; bvw
Other than you and young Sprout's own imaginations and wanna-be-ism can you give any historical support for your novel definition of crime?
218 - roscoe lies -
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 218 | View Replies]
#202. To: nolu chan (#201)
#203. To: tpaine (#202)
Please nolu, tell us what is really bothering you...If you can..
To: tpaine; Kevmo
#204. To: nolu chan (#203)
Nothing. I am having a good time laughing at your helplessness.
You can only try to divert attention from the fact that you are unable to understand why your comments on criminal law are so absurd.
Your legal acumen was accurately assessed years ago by dpa5923. Your lack of understanding of criminal law is almost criminal.
#205. To: tpaine (#204)
[tpaine #200] I've disputed your opinions about our Constitution. You really should try to live with the possibility that your education (in some politically correct law school?) may be flawed..
[tpaine #202] Please nolu, tell us what is really bothering you...If you can..
Your legal acumen was accurately assessed years ago by dpa5923. Your lack of understanding of criminal law is almost criminal.
To: tpaine; Kevmo
#30. To: robertpaulsen, tolsti, yall (#28)
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
#206. To: nolu chan, continues reposting old threads, in an obsessive effort to 'win' something? (#205)
»I see that you have entered your excuse making phase to explain why you are incapable of discerning what is so boneheaded about your discussion of criminal law quoted in my #197 and #201. Your abject lack of legal knowledge, i.e. not knowing what you were talking about, now leaves you helpless to to do anything but bluster and bloviate. It is fun to watch. --- While I have not claimed to be a lawyer, you allusion to my purported politically correct law school education is your way of explaining why your own knowledge of law is revealed to be so deficient. It is a crutch to explain the boneheaded nature of your discussion of criminal law.
As for your general legal acumen, the following is a fun example:
In tpaineworld, certified lunatics have the inalienable right to keep and bear arms. And to deposit their turds of thought upon the internet. I prefer to print them out, cut them into 4-inch squares, and store them in the little reading room to see if any of tpaine's -----
#207. To: tpaine (#206)
Thanks for finally admitting you are not a lawyer, arguing as an authority. -- Thus, your opinions are just that, opinions.
It is correct to state that the right to life is an inalienable right that man cannot take away.
If any of the above group use a weapon of any type in self defense, a fully informed jury, judging both the facts and the law of the case at hand [self defense] would be duty bound to rule the defendant innocent.
In People v Almodovar (62 N.Y.2d 126, supra), where defendant was charged with counts of murder, assault and criminal possession of a weapon, we held that the court correctly refused to charge justification as a defense to criminal possession of a weapon, second degree. There, defendant claimed that he came into possession of the weapon by wresting control of it from the victim who had attacked him with a gun and a screwdriver. We concluded that "the only charge defendant was entitled to on the [possession] count of the indictment was temporary innocent possession" (id., at p 130) and that any benefit "he was entitled to because of the claim of self-defense pertained to the use of a weapon and he received that when the court charged justification in connection with the counts of attempted murder and assault" (id., at pp 130-131). Emphasizing that crimes involving possession of a weapon are distinct from those involving its use, we observed that once "the unlawful possession of the weapon is established, the possessory crime is complete and any unlawful use of the weapon is punishable as a separate crime" (id., at p 130).
#208. To: nolu chan, continuing on with his strange obsession.. (#207)
In tpaineworld, certified lunatics have the inalienable right to keep and bear arms. And to deposit their turds of thought upon the internet. I prefer to print them out, cut them into 4-inch squares, and store them in the little reading room to see if any of tpaine's -----
It's like rock 'n' roll, the hits just keep on coming. Continuing to review your legal incompetence,
#209. To: tpaine (#208)
yukon tpaine once again demonstrates his yukonesque to spew ad hominems and blather about imaginary victories when he cannot respond in substance because he has been shown, yet again, to not know what he is talking about, as with his fun debate about what does, or does not, constitute a crime by one person against another. Poor fella is still running and hiding like a trapped rat from that one. yukon tpaine cannot explain the constitutional provision for capital crimes. The death penalty is in the Constitution, the purported inalienable right to life (or guns) is not. Inalienable rights are political rhetoric, not law. The capital crimes of the 5th Amdt and the attendant executions are law. It's like rock 'n' roll, the hits just keep on coming. Continuing to review your legal incompetence,
yukon tpaine would consider rock 'n' roll hits to be people beating up on each other. It is a mark of his desperation. yukon tpaine has trouble explaining how his inalienable right to keep and bear arms by everyone asserts a right to keep and bear arms by lunatics, such as himself, and by prison inmates. Either the claimed right is inalienable or it is not. Use in self-defense does not excuse unlawful possession of a firearm or other weapon by anyone. I provide the specific case of Bernhard Goetz who served time for unlawful possession of a firearm, even though he was acquitted of all other charges in the subway shooting of four yoots. And I provide the court opinion in Pons. Faced with proof that his claims are bullcrap, yukon tpaine predictably blathers. In tpaineworld, certified lunatics have the inalienable right to keep and bear arms. And to deposit their turds of thought upon the internet. I prefer to print them out, cut them into 4-inch squares, and store them in the little reading room to see if any of tpaine's -----
It's like rock 'n' roll, the hits just keep on coming. Continuing to review your legal incompetence,
Thanks for finally admitting you are not a lawyer, arguing as an authority. -- Thus, your opinions are just that, opinions.
It is correct to state that the right to life is an inalienable right that man cannot take away.
If any of the above group use a weapon of any type in self defense, a fully informed jury, judging both the facts and the law of the case at hand [self defense] would be duty bound to rule the defendant innocent.
In People v Almodovar (62 N.Y.2d 126, supra), where defendant was charged with counts of murder, assault and criminal possession of a weapon, we held that the court correctly refused to charge justification as a defense to criminal possession of a weapon, second degree. There, defendant claimed that he came into possession of the weapon by wresting control of it from the victim who had attacked him with a gun and a screwdriver. We concluded that "the only charge defendant was entitled to on the [possession] count of the indictment was temporary innocent possession" (id., at p 130) and that any benefit "he was entitled to because of the claim of self-defense pertained to the use of a weapon and he received that when the court charged justification in connection with the counts of attempted murder and assault" (id., at pp 130-131). Emphasizing that crimes involving possession of a weapon are distinct from those involving its use, we observed that once "the unlawful possession of the weapon is established, the possessory crime is complete and any unlawful use of the weapon is punishable as a separate crime" (id., at p 130).
#210. To: tpaine (#208)
Both he and robertpaulsen slink away from the argument, in defeat.
To: Congressman Billybob
-Billybob-
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 44 | View Replies] To: tpaine
(www.ArmorforCongress.com Visit. Join. Help. Please.)
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 45 | View Replies]
#211. To: nolu chan (#210)
In tpaineworld, certified lunatics have the inalienable right to keep and bear arms. And to deposit their turds of thought upon the internet. I prefer to print them out, cut them into 4-inch squares, and store them in the little reading room to see if any of tpaine's ----
tpaine only wishes I would slink away. I have left him hit from argument like a trapped rat.
Whenever tpaine presents his clueless interpretations of the Constitution to an attorney, he is told that he is a fool. Congressman Billybob, the late John Armor, was an attorney.
#212. To: tpaine (#211)
Yada yada, --- on you go with your silly effort to prove something, -- any damn thing...
8. Resd. that the Executive and a convenient number of the National Judiciary, ought to compose a council of revision with authority to examine every act of the National Legislature before it shall operate, & every act of a particular Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be final; and that the dissent of the said Council shall amount to a rejection, unless the Act of the National Legislature be again passed, or that of a particular Legislature be again negatived by of the members of each branch.
(First) Clause (of Proposition 8th) relating to a Council of Revision taken into consideration.
(The next. —) "To negative all laws passed by the several States (contravening in the opinion of the Nat: Legislature the articles of Union, or any treaties subsisting under the authority of ye Union")
In R. Island the Judges who refused to execute an unconstitutional law were displaced, and others substituted, by the Legislature who would be willing instruments of the wicked & arbitrary plans of their masters. A power of negativing the improper laws of the States is at once the most mild & certain means of preserving the harmony of the system.
He considered the difference between a system founded on the Legislatures only, and one founded on the people, to be the true difference between a league or treaty, and a Constitution. The former in point of moral obligation might be as inviolable as the latter. In point of political operation, there were two important distinctions in favor of the latter. 1. A law violating a treaty ratified by a preexisting law, might be respected by the Judges as a law, though an unwise or perfidious one. A law violating a constitution established by the people themselves, would be considered by the Judges as null & void.
Your excellency's first proposition is, "that it be explicitly declared, that all powers not expressly delegated to Congress are reserved to the several states, to be by them exercised." This appears, to my mind, to be a summary of a bill of rights, which gentlemen are anxious to obtain. It removes a doubt which many have entertained respecting the matter, and gives assurance that, if any law made by the federal government shall be extended beyond the power granted by the proposed Constitution, and inconsistent with the constitution of this state, it will be an error, and adjudged by the courts of law to be void.
If the United States go beyond their powers, if they make a law which the Constitution does not authorize, it is void; and the judicial power, the national judges, who, to secure their impartiality, are to be made independent, will declare it to be void.
Upon what principle is it contended that the sovereign power resides in the state governments? The honorable gentleman has said truly, that there can be no subordinate sovereignty. Now, if there cannot, my position is, that the sovereignty resides in the people ; they have not parted with it; they have only dispensed such portions of power as were conceived necessary for the public welfare. This Constitution stands upon this broad principle.
As far as I can understand the idea of magistracy in every government, this seems to be a proper arrangement; the judicial department is considered as a part of the executive authority of government. Now, I have no idea that the authority should be restricted so as not to be able to perform its functions with full effect. I would not have the legislature sit to make laws which cannot be executed. It is not meant here that the laws shall be a dead letter: it is meant that they shall be carefully and duly considered before they are enacted, and that then they shall be honestly and faithfully executed. This observation naturally leads to a more particular consideration of the government before us. In order, sir, to give permanency, stability, and security to any government, I conceive it of essential importance, that its legislature should be restrained; that there should not only be what we call a passive, but an active power over it for, of all kinds of despotism, this is the most dreadful, and the most difficult to be corrected. With how much contempt have we seen the authority of the people treated by the legislature of this state! and how often have we seen it making laws in one session, that have been repealed the next, either on account of the fluctuation of party, or their own impropriety.
These, sir, are the points of federal jurisdiction to which he objects, with a few exceptions. Let us examine each of them with a supposition that the same impartiality will be observed there as in other courts, and then see if any mischief will result from them. With respect to its cognizance in all cases arising under the Constitution and the laws of the United States, he says that, the laws of the United States being paramount to the laws of the particular states, there is no case but what this will extend to. Has the government of the United States power to make laws on every subject? Does he understand it so? Can they make laws affecting the mode of transferring property, or contracts, or claims, between citizens of the same state? Can they go beyond the delegated powers? If they were to make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would be considered by the judges as an infringement of the Constitution which they are to guard. They would not consider such a law as coming under their jurisdiction. They would declare it void.
#213. To: nolu chan, Y'ALL (#212)
(Edited)
The Congress proposes, and three-fourths of the states ratify the following amendment
AMENDMENT 28.
Section 1. The second article of amendment is hereby repealed.
Section 2. The individual right to keep and bear, buy, make, and use arms is limited to .22 caliber handguns only.
Section 3. All non-conforming guns must be surrendered to government authorities or destroyed within 30 days of ratification of this amendment.
Section 4. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
#214. To: tpaine (#213)
[tpaine #213 to nolu chan #212] Now, of course, nolu is still posting opinions from courts and 'expert' authorities that agree with his opinions.
205
#215. To: tpaine, Nolu Chan (#0)
During a discussion with Nolu Chan, he asserted that an amendment repealing the 2nd could be ratified, and become a valid part of our Constitution. I contend such an amendment would be unconstitutional. Comments?
#216. To: tpaine (#213)
As tpaine has been reduced to unintelligible spluttering, it is time to continue the basic history lessons. Today's lesson continues Judicial Power and the Supremacy Clause.
CHAPTER XX.
Secondly, as this may not always be a sufficient restraint, the judicial power presents an effectual barrier against its excesses, the observations on which need not be repeated. But, as observed, the judicial power possesses no spontaneous motion—it must be called into action by the application of others—either individuals or constituted authorities, and in the mean time, the obnoxious law may not only take its place in the statute book, but be injuriously acted upon. The third corrective therefore is in the hands of the people, who do not, as disingenuously remarked, make no other use of their power than to give it away. The biennial election of the house of representatives, of which the people can by no artifice be deprived, secures to them the power of removing every member of that house who has shown either an inability to comprehend, or an unwillingness to conform to the transcendent obligations of the constitution, which he has sworn to support. Here, then, we have the protection and safety unknown to those countries where either the legislature elect themselves, or enjoy an hereditary right, or where, although the representative principle may be nominally kept up, its exercise may be suspended or postponed at the pleasure of another part of the government.
§ 1830. The next clause is, "This constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land. And the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."
§ 1836. From this supremacy of the constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, within their constitutional scope, arises the duty of courts of justice to declare any unconstitutional law passed by congress or by a state legislature void. So, in like manner, the same duty arises, whenever any other department of the national or state governments exceeds its constitutional functions. But the judiciary of the United States has no general jurisdiction to declare acts of the several states void, unless they are repugnant to the constitution of the United States, notwithstanding they are repugnant to the state constitution. Such a power belongs to it only, when it sits to administer the local law of a state, and acts exactly, as a state tribunal is bound to act. But upon this subject it seems unnecessary to dwell, since the right of all courts, state as well as national, to declare unconstitutional laws void, seems settled beyond the reach of judicial controversy.
#217. To: tpaine (#213)
As tpaine has been reduced to unintelligible spluttering, it is time to continue the basic history lessons. Today's lesson is the U.S. Supreme Court explaining that Congress may not legislatively supersede its decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.
Given § 3501’s express designation of voluntariness as the touchstone of admissibility, its omission of any warning requirement, and the instruction for trial courts to consider a nonexclusive list of factors relevant to the circumstances of a confession, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Congress intended by its enactment to overrule Miranda. See also Davis v. United States, 512 U. S. 452, 464 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that, prior to Miranda, “voluntariness vel non was the touchstone of admissibility of confessions”). Because of the obvious conflict between our decision in Miranda and § 3501, we must address whether Congress has constitutional authority to thus supersede Miranda. If Congress has such authority, § 3501’s totality of- the-circumstances approach must prevail over Miranda’s requirement of warnings; if not, that section must yield to Miranda’s more specific requirements.
#218. To: nolu chan (#216)
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, 1833, page 703: ---- § 1836. From this supremacy of the constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, within their constitutional scope, arises the duty of courts of justice to declare any unconstitutional law passed by congress or by a state legislature void. So, in like manner, the same duty arises, whenever any other department of the national or state governments exceeds its constitutional functions. But the judiciary of the United States has no general jurisdiction to declare acts of the several states void, unless they are repugnant to the constitution of the United States, notwithstanding they are repugnant to the state constitution. Such a power belongs to it only, when it sits to administer the local law of a state, and acts exactly, as a state tribunal is bound to act. But upon this subject it seems unnecessary to dwell, since the right of all courts, state as well as national, to declare unconstitutional laws void, seems settled beyond the reach of judicial controversy.
#219. To: tpaine (#218)
But upon this subject it seems unnecessary to dwell, since the right of all courts, state as well as national, to declare unconstitutional laws void, seems settled beyond the reach of judicial controversy.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supremacy_Clause
Compliance with both the Federal and State laws is impossible
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."
#220. To: tpaine (#218)
Please continue ....
The word “corporations,” in its largest sense, has a more extensive meaning than people generally are aware of. Any body politic (sole or aggregate), whether its power be restricted or transcendant, is in this sense "a corporation."
A State does not owe its origin to the Government of the United States, in the highest or in any of its branches. It was in existence before it. It derives its authority from the same pure and sacred source as itself: the voluntary and deliberate choice of the people.
Man, fearfully and wonderfully made, is the workmanship of his all perfect Creator. A state, useful and valuable as the contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of man, and from his native dignity derives all its acquired importance. When I speak of a state as an inferior contrivance, I mean that it is a contrivance inferior only to that which is divine. Of all human contrivances, it is certainly most transcendantly excellent. It is concerning this contrivance that
As a citizen, I know the government of that state to be republican; and my short definition of such a government is one constructed on this principle — that the supreme power resides in the body of the people. As a judge of this court, I know, and can decide upon the knowledge that the citizens of Georgia, when they acted upon the large scale of the Union, as a part of the "People of the United states," did not surrender the supreme or sovereign power to that state, but, as to the purposes of the Union, retained it to themselves.
In the United states, and in the several states, which compose the Union, we go not so far, but still we go one step farther than we ought to go in this unnatural and inverted order of things. The states, rather than the people, for whose sakes the states exist, are frequently the objects which attract and arrest our principal attention. This, I believe, has produced much of the confusion and perplexity which have appeared in several proceedings and several publications on state politics, and on the politics, too, of the United states. Sentiments and expressions of this inaccurate kind prevail in our common, even in our convivial, language. Is a toast asked? “The United states,” instead of the “People of the United states,” is the toast given. This is not politically correct. The toast is meant to present to view the first great object in the Union: it presents only the second. It presents only the artificial person, instead of the natural persons who spoke it into existence. A state I cheerfully fully work of God.
But still it may be insisted that this will reduce States to mere corporations, and take away all sovereignty. As to corporations, all States whatever are corporations or bodies politic.
The Revolution, or rather the Declaration of Independence, found the people already united for general purposes, and at the same time providing for their more domestic concerns by State conventions and other temporary arrangements. From the Crown of Great Britain, the sovereignty of their country passed to the people of it, and it was then not an uncommon opinion that the unappropriated lands, which belonged to that Crown, passed not to the people of the Colony or States within whose limits they were situated, but to the whole people; on whatever principles this opinion rested, it did not give way to the other, and thirteen sovereignties were considered as emerged from the principles of the Revolution, combined with local convenience and considerations; the people nevertheless continued to consider themselves, in a national point of view, as one people; and they continued without interruption to manage their national concerns accordingly; afterwards, in the hurry of the war and in the warmth of mutual confidence, they made a Confederation of the States the basis of a general government.
There is at least one strong undeniable fact against this incompatibility, and that is this — any one State in the Union may sue another State, in this Court, that is, all the people of one State may sue all the people of another State.
#221. To: nolu chan (#220)
Although you have proven your utter lack of reading comprehension, I will continue, at your request.
As you make believe you are unable to fathom the bare fundamentals of judicial review,---
#222. To: tpaine (#221)
Please continue your hissy fit display though.. It's really getting amusing..
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, 1833, page 703: ---- § 1836. From this supremacy of the constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, within their constitutional scope, arises the duty of courts of justice to declare any unconstitutional law passed by congress or by a state legislature void. So, in like manner, the same duty arises, whenever any other department of the national or state governments exceeds its constitutional functions. But the judiciary of the United States has no general jurisdiction to declare acts of the several states void, unless they are repugnant to the constitution of the United States, notwithstanding they are repugnant to the state constitution. Such a power belongs to it only, when it sits to administer the local law of a state, and acts exactly, as a state tribunal is bound to act. But upon this subject it seems unnecessary to dwell, since the right of all courts, state as well as national, to declare unconstitutional laws void, seems settled beyond the reach of judicial controversy.
[nc] Yep, and in tpaineworld, Obama, the rest of the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch get to ignore the opinions issued by SCOTUS.
U.S. Supreme Court
#223. To: nolu chan (#222)
nc] Yep, and in tpaineworld, Obama, the rest of the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch get to ignore the opinions issued by SCOTUS.
Your assinine opinion is that SCOTUS lacks the authority to exercise judicial review and declare laws constitutional or strike them down as unconstitutional,
and you go further to claim that the Executive and Legislative branches are empowered to ignore SCOTUS decisions by some hitherto unknown magical power bestowed by the Supremacy Clause.
Justice Story wrote that "the right of all courts, state as well as national, to declare unconstitutional laws void, seems settled beyond the reach of judicial controversy." --- You vividly imagine that this statement confirming the authority to exercise judicial review somehow supports your brain fart.
#224. To: tpaine (#223)
Hayburn’s Case, 2 US 409 (1792)
#225. To: tpaine (#223)
Yep, those branches of gov can and have ignored SCOTUS opinions that they consider unconstitutional. -- This is their duty, under the provisions of the supremacy clause, Article VI....
Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Publius
[Alexander Hamilton] But perhaps the force of the objection may be thought to consist in the particular organization of the Supreme Court; in its being composed of a distinct body of magistrates, instead of being one of the branches of the legislature, as in the government of Great Britain and that of the State. To insist upon this point, the authors of the objection must renounce the meaning they have labored to annex to the celebrated maxim, requiring a separation of the departments of power. It shall, nevertheless, be conceded to them, agreeably to the interpretation given to that maxim in the course of these papers, that it is not violated by vesting the ultimate power of judging in a PART of the legislative body. But though this be not an absolute violation of that excellent rule, yet it verges so nearly upon it, as on this account alone to be less eligible than the mode preferred by the convention. From a body which had even a partial agency in passing bad laws, we could rarely expect a disposition to temper and moderate them in the application. The same spirit which had operated in making them, would be too apt in interpreting them; still less could it be expected that men who had infringed the Constitution in the character of legislators, would be disposed to repair the breach in the character of judges. Nor is this all. Every reason which recommends the tenure of good behavior for judicial offices, militates against placing the judiciary power, in the last resort, in a body composed of men chosen for a limited period. There is an absurdity in referring the determination of causes, in the first instance, to judges of permanent standing; in the last, to those of a temporary and mutable constitution.
#226. To: nolu chan (#225)
--- you go further to claim that the Executive and Legislative branches are empowered to ignore SCOTUS decisions by some hitherto unknown magical power bestowed by the Supremacy Clause.
Justice Story wrote that "the right of all courts, state as well as national, to declare unconstitutional laws void, seems settled beyond the reach of judicial controversy." --- You vividly imagine that this statement confirming the authority to exercise judicial review somehow supports your brain fart.
Continuing your remedial education.
#227. To: tpaine (#226)
Yep, those branches of gov can and have ignored SCOTUS opinions that they consider unconstitutional. -- This is their duty, under the provisions of the supremacy clause, Article VI....
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1 (1958)
#228. To: tpaine (#226)
Yep, those branches of gov can and have ignored SCOTUS opinions that they consider unconstitutional. -- This is their duty, under the provisions of the supremacy clause, Article VI....
2. The Supremacy Clause gives Congress the power to preempt state law. A statute may contain an express preemption provision, see, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting, 563 U. S. ___, ___, but state law must also give way to federal law in at least two other circumstances. First, States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U. S. 88 . Intent can be inferred from a framework of regulation "so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it" or where a "federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218. Second, state laws are preempted when they conflict with federal law, including when they stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 . Pp. 7–8.
III
The United States has established that §§3, 5(C), and 6 of S. B. 1070 are preempted.
#229. To: nolu chan (#228)
-- you go further to claim that the Executive and Legislative branches are empowered to ignore SCOTUS decisions by some hitherto unknown magical power bestowed by the Supremacy Clause.
Continuing your remedial education.
In tpaine's Court of the Imagination, the Supremacy Clause contains a secret codicil referred to as the Screw Off provision, which provides that when the Executive or Legislature of a State disagrees with a constitutional ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court, there is a secret power to tell the Court to screw off. --- tpaine holds the only known copy of the Supremacy Clause which includes the Screw Off provision, which he allegedly found steganographically encrypted in the dot of one of the semi-colons. The rest of the world only has the standard Supremacy Clause which reads,
Try as one may, with the standard Supremacy Clause, one may not discover the provision which empowers the Executive and the Legislative branches to tell the Judiciary to screw off.
#230. To: tpaine (#229)
All three branches are empowered to ignore 'laws' that are NOT made "in pursuance thereof"... And you know it...
1. This Court cannot countenance a claim by the Governor and Legislature of a State that there is no duty on state officials to obey federal court orders resting on this Court’s considered interpretation of the United States Constitution in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483. P. 4.
Publius
[Alexander Hamilton] And there is a still greater absurdity in subjecting the decisions of men, selected for their knowledge of the laws, acquired by long and laborious study, to the revision and control of men who, for want of the same advantage, cannot but be deficient in that knowledge. The members of the legislature will rarely be chosen with a view to those qualifications which fit men for the stations of judges; and as, on this account, there will be great reason to apprehend all the ill consequences of defective information, so, on account of the natural propensity of such bodies to party divisions, there will be no less reason to fear that the pestilential breath of faction may poison the fountains of justice. The habit of being continually marshalled on opposite sides will be too apt to stifle the voice both of law and of equity.
#231. To: nolu chan (#230)
When SCOTUS has decided a law is constitutional or unconstitutional, the other branches are bound by the ruling,
--- as you, Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas, Governor Jan Brewer of Arizona, and Sheriff Joe Arpaio know. --- You're blithering idiocy does not change the historical facts. When Faubus tried your bullshit in practice, he was met with the 82nd Airborne ---
#232. To: tpaine (#231)
NOT true. -- Tell it to Dred Scott.
#233. To: tpaine (#231)
The SCOTUS was backed up by Eisenhower.. Without Ike, the court would have been powerless to enforce its opinion.
#234. To: nolu chan (#233)
When Faubus tried your bullshit in practice, he was met with the 82nd Airborne ---
The Federal government has ample ability to enforce SCOTUS decisions against State authorities.
#235. To: tpaine (#234)
In the performance of assigned constitutional duties, each branch of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect from the others. The President's counsel, as we have noted, reads the Constitution as providing an absolute privilege of confidentiality for all Presidential communications. Many decisions of this Court, however, have unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Id. at 5 U. S. 177. No holding of the Court has defined the scope of judicial power specifically relating to the enforcement of a subpoena for confidential Presidential communications for use in a criminal prosecution, but other exercises of power by the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch have been found invalid as in conflict with the Constitution. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486 (1969); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). In a
“requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by another branch.”
“Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.”
#236. To: tpaine (#234)
IV
#237. To: tpaine (#234)
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.
#238. To: tpaine (#234)
We hold that Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves. We therefore hold that Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts.
#239. To: nolu chan, tpaine (#238)
SCOTUS is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and not tpaine. They do not recognize the imaginary tpaine screw you provision of the Supremacy Clause.
#240. To: nolu chan (#237)
#241. To: Liberator, GrandIsland (#239)
Btw -- Must I launch a group intervention on this thread? :-)
Again, I urge everyone who is still interested in this discussion to read at least the last portions of the last thread nolu posted.
#242. To: GrandIsland, liberator (#240)
SCOTUS is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and not tpaine. They do not recognize the imaginary tpaine screw you provision of the Supremacy Clause.
THAT is funny. Btw -- Must I launch a group intervention on this thread? :-) -- Liberator
When you are as important, and a constitutional scholar, like tpaine, you will recognize that your opinions are no longer opinions. They are better that Jeffersons own statements. I'm damn surprised the Supreme Court has managed to function this long without his induction by a past president.
You surprise me, you already posted 175 posts more than I'd waste on this ridiculously fruitless thread. --- GrandIsland posted.
#243. To: tpaine, GrandIsland, liberator (#242)
MINUTE ORDER. As agreed by the parties at the July 31, 2015 status hearing, the Government shall produce a copy of the letters sent by the State Department to Mrs. Hillary Clinton, Ms. Huma Abedin and Ms. Cheryl Mills regarding the collection of government records in their possession. These communications shall be posted on the docket forthwith. The Government has also agreed to share with Plaintiffs counsel the responses sent by Mrs. Clinton, Ms. Abedin and Ms. Mills. These communications shall also be posted on the docket forthwith. In addition, as related to Judicial Watch's FOIA requests in this case, the Government is HEREBY ORDERED to: (1) identify any and all servers, accounts, hard drives, or other devices currently in the possession or control of the State Department or otherwise that may contain responsive information; (2) request that the above named individuals confirm, under penalty of perjury, that they have produced all responsive information that was or is in their possession as a result of their employment at the State Department. If all such information has not yet been produced, the Government shall request the above named individuals produce the information forthwith; and (3) request that the above named individuals describe, under penalty of perjury, the extent to which Ms. Abedin and Ms. Mills used Mrs. Clinton's email server to conduct official government business. The Government shall inform the Court of the status of its compliance with this Order no later than August 7, 2015, including any response received from Mrs. Clinton, Ms. Abedin and Ms. Mills. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on July 31, 2015. (lcegs4) (Entered: 07/31/2015)
#244. To: tpaine, GrandIsland, liberator (#242)
As expressed at the hearing, the Government's reasoning is nonsensical. Officers of the Court who fail to comply with Court orders will be held in contempt. Also, in the event of non-compliance with future Court orders, the Commissioner of the IRS and others shall be directed to show cause as to why they should not be held in contempt of Court.
MINUTE ORDER. At the July 29, 2015 status hearing, the Government agreed that the Court's July 1, 2015 oral order from the bench was clear and enforceable. Nonetheless, the Government reasoned it inappropriate to file a motion for reconsideration until a written order was issued. As expressed at the hearing, the Government's reasoning is nonsensical. Officers of the Court who fail to comply with Court orders will be held in contempt. Also, in the event of non-compliance with future Court orders, the Commissioner of the IRS and others shall be directed to show cause as to why they should not be held in contempt of Court. The Court's July 1, 2015 ruling from the bench stands: (1) the Government shall produce relevant documents every Monday; (2) the Government's document production shall be accompanied by a status report that indicates (a) whether TIGTA has turned over any new documents to the IRS, (b) if so, the number of documents, and (c) a timeframe for the IRSs production of those documents. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on July 29, 2015. (Icegs4) (Entered: 07/29/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Emmet G. Sullivan: Status Conference held on 7/29/2015. Oral order directing the IRS to weekly produce the production of documents and status report. (Court Reporter Scott Wallace) (gdf) (Entered: 07/29/2015)
#245. To: tpaine, GrandIsland, liberator (#242)
[tpaine #242] Good idea, as nolu has obviously lost it, in claiming that I've seen some "imaginary" provision in the supremacy clause. -- Not so.
[tpaine #223] Yep, those branches of gov can and have ignored SCOTUS opinions that they consider unconstitutional. -- This is their duty, under the provisions of the supremacy clause, Article VI....
[tpaine #229] Read the clause. It says that all officials of our republic are duty bound to honor our Constitution as the supreme law. -- Which gives them the power to ignore unconstitutional 'laws'. ( At their own peril, of course)
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
“Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.”
#246. To: nolu chan (#245)
Yes, read the clause:
#247. To: GrandIsland, nolu chan, Y'ALL (#246)
Yes, read the clause:
Good luck finding the imaginary content referred to by tpaine which empowers all officials to use their own interpretation of the Constitution and to tell the Supreme Court to screw off.
#248. To: tpaine, GrandIsland (#247)
Good luck finding the imaginary content referred to by tpaine which empowers all officials to use their own interpretation of the Constitution and to tell the Supreme Court to screw off.
Only laws (or amendments) made "in pursuance thereof" (as the supremacy clause says) are part of our supreme law, the Constitution..
2 Farrand 93: [James Madison]
CHAPTER XX.
§ 1836. From this supremacy of the constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, within their constitutional scope, arises the duty of courts of justice to declare any unconstitutional law passed by congress or by a state legislature void.
But Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.
If the legislatures of the several States may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the Constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery, and the nation is deprived of the means of enforcing its laws by the instrumentality of its own tribunals. So fatal a result must be deprecated by all, and the people of Pennsylvania, not less than the citizens of every other State, must feel a deep interest in resisting principles so destructive of the union, and in averting consequences so fatal to themselves.
1. This Court cannot countenance a claim by the Governor and Legislature of a State that there is no duty on state officials to obey federal court orders resting on this Court’s considered interpretation of the United States Constitution in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483. P. 4.
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.
#249. To: tpaine (#247)
SCOTUS opinions can be ignored on constitutional grounds and officials can refuse to implement/fund any attempts at forcement.
Dream on that in Nolu Chan's world such an amendment could be valid. It would violate every principle inherent in our constitution, and thus would be null and void from its enactment.
#250. To: nolu chan (#248)
The Constitution designates the judiciary to decide whether the laws were made in pursuance thereof, ---
-- and the judiciary declares null and void the laws it finds unconstitutional.
#251. To: tpaine (#250)
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 385 (1798)
#252. To: nolu chan (#251)
As tpaine has nothing to say but the reiteration of his own bullshit, supported by nothing, and contradicted by centuries of case law and the law tests of qualified legal experts, of which he neither does nor can cite any, it is time to sontinue his education. Case law is not receptive to the bullshit of natural law.
The Constitution designates the judiciary to decide whether the laws were made in pursuance thereof, ---
-- and the judiciary declares null and void the laws it finds unconstitutional.
#253. To: tpaine (#252)
Ableman v Booth, 62 US 506 (1858)
#254. To: nolu chan, posting pictures of Chihuahuas, poor soul. (#253)
The Constitution designates the judiciary to decide whether the laws were made in pursuance thereof, ---
- and the judiciary declares null and void the laws it finds unconstitutional.
As tpaine has been reduced to a chihuahua, able only to repeat his nonsense over and over, the lesson continues.
#255. To: tpaine (#254)
[tpaine #254] Officials of every branch, at every level of our State, Fed, and local govts are sworn to support and defend the Constitution, and laws made "in pursuance thereof". They all must decide for themselves whether a law is constitutionally valid.
But Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.
If the legislatures of the several States may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the Constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery, and the nation is deprived of the means of enforcing its laws by the instrumentality of its own tribunals. So fatal a result must be deprecated by all, and the people of Pennsylvania, not less than the citizens of every other State, must feel a deep interest in resisting principles so destructive of the union, and in averting consequences so fatal to themselves.
1. This Court cannot countenance a claim by the Governor and Legislature of a State that there is no duty on state officials to obey federal court orders resting on this Court’s considered interpretation of the United States Constitution in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483. P. 4.
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.
The language of the Constitution by which this power is granted is too plain to admit of doubt or to need comment. It declares that
Top • Page Up • Full Thread • Page Down • Bottom/Latest
[Home] [Headlines] [Latest Articles] [Latest Comments] [Post] [Mail] [Sign-in] [Setup] [Help] [Register]