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Title: nolu chan contends an amendment to repeal the 2nd Amdt could be passed
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Published: Jul 9, 2015
Author: tpaine
Post Date: 2015-07-09 10:39:45 by tpaine
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Views: 79635
Comments: 255
The Congress proposes, and three-fourths of the states ratify the following amendment
AMENDMENT 28.
Section 1. The second article of amendment is hereby repealed.
Section 2. The individual right to keep and bear, buy, make, and use arms is limited to .22 caliber handguns only.
Section 3. All non-conforming guns must be surrendered to government authorities or destroyed within 30 days of ratification of this amendment.
Section 4. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Poster Comment:
During a discussion with Nolu Chan, he asserted that an amendment repealing the 2nd could be ratified, and become a valid part of our Constitution. I contend such an amendment would be unconstitutional. Comments?
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#215. To: tpaine, Nolu Chan (#0)
This is very illustrative of how I see many so called conservatives use the "constitution". If an amendment is passed, of course, it is constitutional. But this is not the first time I have heard some (not all) so called conservatives proclaim an amendment to the constitution is not constitutional. In any case, here is some comedy:
William Rawle, A View of the Constitution, 1825, Chapter 20, of the Judicial Power, p. 188: Of the Judicial Power. NO form of government is complete unless it be accompanied with a judicial power. To make laws and to execute them are the two great operations of government, but they cannot be fully and correctly executed unless there is somewhere resident a power to expound and apply them. This power is auxiliary to the executive authority, and in some degree partakes of its nature. But it is also required at times to control the executive, and what it decides to be unlawful the executive cannot perform. It may also in some degree be said to participate in the legislative power. Its construction of the acts of the legislature is received as binding and conclusive, although it does not prevent the legislature from repairing its own defects, or clearing up its own ambiguities by subsequent laws, operating on subsequent cases. A high function also appertains to the judiciary in the exclusive right to expound the constitution, and thereby to test the validity of all the acts of the legislature. To the people at large, therefore, this institution is peculiarly valuable and ought to be eminently cherished by them. On its firm and independent structure they repose with safety, while they perceive in it a power which is only set in motion when applied to, but which when thus brought into action, proceeds with competent power when required, to correct the error or subdue the oppression of both or either of the two other branches. - - - - - - - - - - William Rawle, A View of the Constitution, 1825, Chapter 30, Of checks and controls on other branches of the Government, p. 277: - - - - - - - - - - Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, 1833, pages 693-694: § 1831. The propriety of this clause would seem to result from the very nature of the constitution. If it was to establish a national government, that government ought, to the extent of its powers and rights, to be supreme. It would be a perfect solecism to affirm, that a national government should exist with certain powers; and yet, that in the exercise of those powers it should not be supreme. What other inference could have been drawn, than of their supremacy, if the constitution had been totally silent? And surely a positive affirmance of that, which is necessarily implied, cannot in a case of such vital importance be deemed unimportant. The very circumstance, that a question might be made, would irresistibly lead to the conclusion, that it ought not to be left to inference. A law, by the very meaning of the term, includes supremacy. It is a rule, which those, to whom it is prescribed, are bound to observe. This results from every political association. If individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that society must be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a number of political societies enter into a larger political society, the laws, which the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers entrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme over those [694] societies, and the individuals, of whom they are composed, It would otherwise be a mere treaty, dependent upon the good faith of the parties, and not a government, which is only another name for political power and supremacy. But it will not follow, that acts of the larger society, which are not pursuant to its constitutional powers, but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the smaller societies, will become the supreme law of the land. They will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such. Hence we perceive, that the above clause only declares a truth, which flows immediately and necessarily from the institution of a national government.1 It will be observed, that the supremacy of the laws is attached to those only, which are made in pursuance of the constitution; a caution very proper in itself but in fact the limitation would have arisen by irresistible implication, if it had not been expressed.2 1 The Federalist, No. 33. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat R. 210, 211; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat R. 405, 406. — This passage from the Federalist (No. 33) has been, for another purpose, already cited in Vol. I. § 340; but it is necessary to be here repeated to give due effect to the subsequent passages. 2 Ibid. See also 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 369, 370. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, 1833, page 703:
Dickerson v United States, 530 US 428, 436-37 (2000) The law in this area is clear. This Court has supervisory authority over the federal courts, and we may use that authority to prescribe rules of evidence and procedure that are binding in those tribunals. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U. S. 416, 426 (1996). However, the power to judicially create and enforce nonconstitutional “rules of procedure and evidence for the federal courts exists only in the absence of a relevant Act of Congress.” Palermo v. United States, 360 U. S. 343, 353, n. 11 (1959) (citing Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371, 382 (1933), and Gordon v. United States, 344 U. S. 414, 418 (1953)). Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution. Palermo, supra, at 345–348; Carlisle, supra, at 426; Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U. S. 252, 265 (1980). But Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution. See, e. g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 517–521 (1997).
Please continue your hissy fit display though.. It's really getting amusing.. --- Particularly amusing is your last quote, which makes my point: --- Thank you, again...
Although you have proven your utter lack of reading comprehension, I will continue, at your request. As you make believe you are unable to fathom the bare fundamentals of judicial review, I will now cover your beloved Supremacy Clause, at the mention of which, magic unicorns fly out your arse and transform it into something previously unknown. The Federalist Papers There are two sections of The Federalist Papers that deal with the Supremacy Clause. In Federalist No. 33, Alexander Hamilton argues that the Supremacy Clause is simply an assurance that the government's powers can be properly executed, saying that a law itself implies supremacy, and without supremacy it would amount to nothing. In Federalist No. 44, James Madison similarly defends the Supremacy Clause as vital to the functioning of the nation. He noted that state legislatures were invested with all powers not specifically defined in the constitution, but also said that having the federal government subservient to various state constitutions would be an inversion of the principles of government, concluding that if supremacy were not established "it would have seen the authority of the whole society everywhere subordinate to the authority of the parts; it would have seen a monster, in which the head was under the direction of the members". - - - Supreme Court interpretations In Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796), the United States Supreme Court for the first time applied the Supremacy Clause to strike down a state statute. Virginia had passed a statute during the Revolutionary War allowing the state to confiscate debt payments by Virginia citizens to British creditors. The Supreme Court found that this Virginia statute was inconsistent with the Treaty of Paris with Britain, which protected the rights of British creditors. Relying on the Supremacy Clause, the Supreme Court held that the treaty superseded Virginia's statute, and that it was the duty of the courts to declare Virginia's statute "null and void". In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816), and Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821), the Supreme Court held that the Supremacy Clause and the judicial power granted in Article III give the Supreme Court the ultimate power to review state court decisions involving issues arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Therefore, the Supreme Court has the final say in matters involving federal law, including constitutional interpretation, and can overrule decisions by state courts. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), the Supreme Court reviewed a tax levied by Maryland on the federally incorporated Bank of the United States. The Court found that if a state had the power to tax a federally incorporated institution, then the state effectively had the power to destroy the federal institution, thereby thwarting the intent and purpose of Congress. This would make the states superior to the federal government. The Court found that this would be inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause, which makes federal law superior to state law. The Court therefore held that Maryland's tax on the bank was unconstitutional because the tax violated the Supremacy Clause. In Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1859), the Supreme Court held that state courts cannot issue rulings that contradict the decisions of federal courts, citing the Supremacy Clause, and overturning a decision by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Specifically, the court found it was illegal for state officials to interfere with the work of U.S. Marshals enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act or to order the release of federal prisoners held for violation of that Act. The Supreme Court reasoned that because the Supremacy Clause established federal law as the law of the land, the Wisconsin courts could not nullify the judgments of a federal court. The Supreme Court held that under Article III of the Constitution, the federal courts have the final jurisdiction in all cases involving the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that the states therefore cannot interfere with federal court judgments. In Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) the Supreme Court struck down the Pennsylvania Sedition Act, which made advocating the forceful overthrow of the federal government a crime under Pennsylvania state law. The Supreme Court held that when federal interest in an area of law is sufficiently dominant, federal law must be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject; and a state law is not to be declared a help when state law goes farther than Congress has seen fit to go. In Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), the Supreme Court held that the U.S. Constitution supersedes international treaties ratified by the U.S. Senate. In Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), the Supreme Court rejected attempts by Arkansas to nullify the Court's school desegregation decision, Brown v. Board of Education. The state of Arkansas, acting on a theory of states' rights, had adopted several statutes designed to nullify the desegregation ruling. The Supreme Court relied on the Supremacy Clause to hold that the federal law controlled and could not be nullified by state statutes or officials. In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), the Supreme Court ruled: "A state statute is void to the extent that it actually conflicts with a valid Federal statute". In effect, this means that a State law will be found to violate the Supremacy Clause when either of the following two conditions (or both) exist:[1] "State law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" In 1920, the Supreme Court applied the Supremacy Clause to international treaties, holding in the case of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, that the Federal government's ability to make treaties is supreme over any state concerns that such treaties might abrogate states' rights arising under the Tenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has also held that only specific, "unmistakable" acts of Congress may be held to trigger the Supremacy Clause. Montana had imposed a 30 percent tax on most sub-bituminous coal mined there. The Commonwealth Edison Company and other utility companies argued, in part, that the Montana tax "frustrated" the broad goals of the national energy policy. However, in the case of Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), the Supreme Court disagreed. Any appeal to claims about "national policy", the Court said, were insufficient to overturn a state law under the Supremacy Clause unless "the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained".[2] However, in the case of California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989), the Supreme Court held that if Congress expressedly intended to act in an area, this would trigger the enforcement of the Supremacy Clause, and hence nullify the state action. The Supreme Court further found in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000), that even when a state law is not in direct conflict with a federal law, the state law could still be found unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause if the "state law is an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of Congress's full purposes and objectives".[3] Congress need not expressly assert any preemption over state laws either, because Congress may implicitly assume this preemption under the Constitution.[4] - - - The Fourteenth Amendment Similarities exist between the Supremacy Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states: The difference between the two is that while the Supremacy Clause deals with the relationship between the Federal Government and the states, the Fourteenth Amendment deals with the relationships among the Federal Government, the States, and the citizens of the United States. - - - References Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470 (Fed Cir 1998). Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 634, quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-374. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 386-388.
http://supreme.justia.com/us/2/419/case.html Chisholm v Georgia, 2 Dal. 419 (1793) Justice Iredell at 2 Dal. 447 Justice Iredell at 2 Dal. 448 Justice Wilson at 2 Dal. 455 Cicero says so sublimely, “Nothing, which is exhibited upon our globe is more acceptable to that divinity which governs the whole universe than those communities and assemblages of men which, lawfully associated, are denominated states.” Let a state be considered as subordinate to the people. But let everything else be subordinate to the state. The latter part of this position is equally necessary with the former. For in the practice, and even at length, in the science of politics, there has very frequently been a strong current against the natural order of things, and an inconsiderate or an interested disposition to sacrifice the end to the means. As the state has claimed precedence of the people, so, in the same inverted course of things, the government has often claimed precedence of the state, and to this perversion in the second degree, many of the volumes of confusion concerning sovereignty owe their existence. The ministers, dignified very properly by the appellation of the magistrates, have wished, and have succeeded in their wish, to be considered as the sovereigns of the state. This second degree of perversion is confined to the old world, and begins to diminish even there; but the first degree is still too prevalent, even in the several States of which our union is composed. By a "state," I mean a complete body of free persons united together for their common benefit to enjoy peaceably what is their own and to do justice to others. It is an artificial person. It has its affairs and its interests; it has its rules; it has its rights; and it has its obligations. It may acquire property distinct from that of its members. It may incur debts to be discharged out of the public stock, not out of the private fortunes of individuals. It may be bound by contracts, and for damages arising from the breach of those contracts. In all our contemplations, however, concerning this feigned and artificial person, we should never forget that, in truth and nature, those who think and speak and act are men. Is the foregoing description of a state a true description? It will not be questioned but it is. Justice Wilson at 2 Dal. 457 Justice Wilson at 2 Dal. 462-63 Concerning the prerogative of Kings, and concerning the sovereignty of states, much has been said and written; but little has been said and written concerning a subject much more dignified and important, the majesty of the people. The mode of expression, which I would substitute in the place of that generally used, is not only politically, but also (for between true liberty and true taste there is a close alliance) classically more correct. On the mention of Athens, a thousand refined and endearing associations rush at once into the memory of the scholar, the philosopher, and the patriot. When Homer, one of the most correct, as well as the oldest of human authorities, enumerates the other nations of Greece whose forces acted at the siege of Troy, he arranges them under the names of their different Kings or Princes. But when he comes to the Athenians, he distinguishes them by the peculiar appellation of the PEOPLE of Athens. The well known address used by Demosthenes, when he harrangued and animated his assembled countrymen, was “O Men of Athens.” With the strictest propriety, therefore, classical and political, our national scene opens with the most magnificent object which the nation could present. “The PEOPLE of the United states” are the first personages introduced. Who were those people? They were the citizens of thirteen states, each of which had a separate constitution and government, and all of which were connected together by Articles of Confederation. Justice Cushing at 2 Dal. 468 Chief Justice Jay at 2 Dal. 470 Chief Justice Jay at 2 Dal. 473
218. To: nolu chan (#216) Please continue your hissy fit display though.. It's really getting amusing.. --- Particularly amusing is your this quote, which makes my point: --- Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, 1833, page 703: ---- § 1836. From this supremacy of the constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, within their constitutional scope, arises the duty of courts of justice to declare any unconstitutional law passed by congress or by a state legislature void. So, in like manner, the same duty arises, whenever any other department of the national or state governments exceeds its constitutional functions. But the judiciary of the United States has no general jurisdiction to declare acts of the several states void, unless they are repugnant to the constitution of the United States, notwithstanding they are repugnant to the state constitution. Such a power belongs to it only, when it sits to administer the local law of a state, and acts exactly, as a state tribunal is bound to act. But upon this subject it seems unnecessary to dwell, since the right of all courts, state as well as national, to declare unconstitutional laws void, seems settled beyond the reach of judicial controversy. Thank you, again.. Sorry but my request is for you to continue making a fool of YOUR self. --- And you're doing just fine.. Unlike you, I comprehend the plain words of our Constitution. --- It's wannabe lawyers, and shysters like you who have fouled up the judicial review system.
--- Particularly amusing is your this quote, which makes my point: --- Particulary amusing is your vivid imagination. Your assinine opinion is that SCOTUS lacks the authority to exercise judicial review and declare laws constitutional or strike them down as unconstitutional, and you go further to claim that the Executive and Legislative branches are empowered to ignore SCOTUS decisions by some hitherto unknown magical power bestowed by the Supremacy Clause. Justice Story wrote that "the right of all courts, state as well as national, to declare unconstitutional laws void, seems settled beyond the reach of judicial controversy." You vividly imagine that this statement confirming the authority to exercise judicial review somehow supports your brain fart. http://libertysflame.com/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=40004&Disp=73#C73 tpaine posted on 2015-06-09 10:03:28 ET Yep, those branches of gov can and have ignored SCOTUS opinions that they consider unconstitutional. -- This is their duty, under the provisions of the supremacy clause, Article VI.... Continuing at your invitation, from SCOTUS predating Marbury. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/2/409/case.html Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 409 (1792) 2 U.S. 409 MOTION FOR MANDAMUS This was a motion for a mandamus to be directed to the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania commanding the said court to proceed in a certain petition of Wm. Hayburn, who had applied to be put on the pension list of the United States as an invalid pensioner. The principal case arose upon the act of Congress passed 23 March, 1792. The Attorney General (Randolph) who made the motion for the mandamus, having premised that it was done ex officio, without an application from any particular person, but with a view to procure the execution of an act of Congress particularly interesting to a meritorious and unfortunate class of citizens, the court declared that it entertained great doubt upon his right, under such circumstances and in a case of this kind, to proceed ex officio, and directed him to state the principles on which he attempted to support the right. The Attorney General accordingly entered into an elaborate description of the powers and duties of his office. But the court being divided in opinion on that question, the motion, made ex officio, was not allowed. The Attorney General then changed the ground of his interposition, declaring it to be at the instance and on behalf of Hayburn, a party interested; and he entered into the merits of the case upon the act of Congress and the refusal of the judges to carry it into effect. The Court observed that it would hold the motion under advisement until the next term, but no decision was ever pronounced, as the legislature, at an intermediate 2 U. S. 410 session, provided in another way for the relief of the pensioners. * 2 U. S. 411 The Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania, consisting of Wilson, and Blair, Justices, and Peters, District Judge, made the following representation in a letter jointly addressed to the President of the United States on 18 April, 1792: “To you it officially belongs to ‘take care that the laws’ of the United States ‘to faithfully executed.’ Before you, therefore, we think it our duty to lay the sentiments which, on a late painful occasion, governed us with regard to an act passed by the legislature of the union.” “The people of the United States have vested in Congress all legislative powers ‘granted in the Constitution.’” “They have vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress shall establish ‘the judicial power of the United States.’” “It is worthy of remark that in Congress the whole legislative power of the United States is not vested. An important part of that power was exercised by the people themselves when they ‘ordained and established the Constitution.’” “This Constitution is ‘the Supreme Law of the Land.’ This supreme law ‘all judicial officers of the United States are bound, by oath or affirmation, to support.’” “It is a principle important to freedom that in government, the judicial should be distinct from and independent of the legislative department. To this important principle the people of the United States, in forming their Constitution, have manifested the highest regard.” “They have placed their judicial power not in Congress, but in ‘courts.’ They have ordained that the ‘judges of those courts shall hold their offices during good behavior,’ and that ‘during their continuance in office, their salaries shall not be diminished.’” “Congress has lately passed an act to regulate, among other things, ‘the claims to invalid pensions.’” “Upon due consideration, we have been unanimously of opinion that under this act, the circuit court held for the Pennsylvania District could not proceed” “1st. Because the business directed by this act is not of a judicial nature. It forms no part of the power vested by the Constitution in the courts of the United States; the circuit court must consequently have proceeded without constitutional authority.” “2d. Because if, upon that business, the court had proceeded, its judgments (for its opinions are its judgments) might, under the same act, have been revised and controlled by the legislature, and by an officer in the executive department. Such revision and control we deemed radically inconsistent with the independence of that judicial power which is vested in the courts, and consequently with that important principle which is so strictly observed by the Constitution of the United States. “ 2 U. S. 412 “These, Sir, are the reasons of our conduct. Be assured that though it became necessary, it was far from being pleasant. To be obliged to act contrary either to the obvious directions of Congress or to a constitutional principle, in our judgment equally obvious, excited feelings in us which we hope never to experience again.” The Circuit Court for the District of North Carolina (consisting of Iredell Justice, and Sitgreaves, District Judge) made the following representation in a letter jointly addressed to the President of the United States on 8 June, 1792. “We, the judges now attending at the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of North Carolina, conceive it our duty to lay before you some important observations which have occurred to us in the consideration of an act of Congress lately passed, entitled” “An act to provide for the settlement of the claims of widows and orphans barred by the limitations heretofore established, and to regulate the claims to invalid pensions.” “We beg leave to premise that it is as much our inclination as it is our duty to receive with all possible respect every act of the legislature, and that we never can find ourselves in a more painful situation than to be obliged to object to the execution of any, more especially to the execution of one founded on the purest principles of humanity and justice, which the act in question undoubtedly is. But however, lamentable a difference in opinion really may be, or with whatever difficulty we may have formed an opinion, we are under the indispensable necessity of acting according to the best dictates of our own judgment after duly weighing every consideration that can occur to us, which we have done on the present occasion.” “The extreme importance of the case and our desire of being explicit beyond the danger of being misunderstood, will, we hope, justify us in stating our observations in a systematic manner. We therefore, Sir, submit to you the following:” “1. That the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments are each formed in a separate and independent manner, and that the ultimate basis of each is the Constitution only, within the limits of which each department can alone justify any act of authority.” “2. That the legislature, among other important powers, unquestionably possess that of establishing courts in such a manner as to its wisdom shall appear best, limited by the terms of the Constitution only, and to whatever extent that power may be exercised, or however severe the duty it may think proper to require, the judges, when appointed in virtue of any such establishment, owe implicit and unreserved obedience to it.” “3. That at the same time, such courts cannot be warranted, as we conceive, by virtue of that part of the Constitution delegating Judicial power, for the exercise of which any act of the legislature is provided, in exercising (even under the authority of another act) 2 U. S. 413 any power not in its nature judicial, or, if judicial, not provided for upon the terms the Constitution requires.” “4. That whatever doubt may be suggested, whether the power in question is properly of a judicial nature, yet inasmuch as the decision of the court is not made final, but may be at least suspended in its operation by the Secretary at War, if he shall have cause to suspect imposition or mistake, this subjects the decision of the court to a mode of revision which we consider to be unwarranted by the Constitution, for though Congress may certainly establish, in instances not yet provided for, courts of appellate jurisdiction, yet such courts must consist of judges appointed in the manner the Constitution requires and holding their offices by no other tenure than that of their good behavior, by which tenure the office of Secretary at War is not held. And we beg leave to add with all due deference that no decision of any court of the United States can under any circumstances, in our opinion, agreeable to the Constitution, be liable to a reversion or even suspension by the legislature itself, in whom no judicial power of any kind appears to be vested but the important one relative to impeachments.” “These, sir, are our reasons for being of opinion, as we are at present, that this circuit court cannot be justified in the execution of that part of the act which requires it to examine and report an opinion on the unfortunate cases of officers and soldiers disabled in the service of the United States. The part of the act requiring the court to sit five days for the purpose of receiving applications from such persons we shall deem it our duty to comply with, for whether in our opinion such purpose can or cannot be answered, it is, as we conceive, our indispensable duty to keep open any court of which we have the honor to be judges as long as Congress shall direct.” “The high respect we entertain for the legislature, our feelings as men for persons whose situation requires the earliest as well as the most effectual relief, and our sincere desire to promote, whether officially or otherwise, the just and benevolent views of Congress so conspicuous on the present as well as on many other occasions have induced us to reflect whether we could be justified in acting under this act personally in the character of commissioners during the session of a court, and could we be satisfied that we had authority to do so, we would cheerfully devote such part of our time as might be necessary for the performance of the service. But we confess we have great doubts on this head. The power appears to be given to the court only, and not to the judges of it, and as the Secretary at War has not a discretion in all instances, but only in those where he has cause to suspect imposition or mistake, to withhold a person recommended by the court from being named on the pension list, it would be necessary for us to be well persuaded we possessed such an authority before we exercised a power, which might be a means of drawing money out of the public treasury as effectually as an express appropriation by law. We do not mean, however, to preclude ourselves from a very deliberate consideration whether we can be warranted in executing the purposes of the act in that manner in case an application should be made.” “No application has yet been made to the court or to ourselves individually, and therefore we have had some doubts as to the propriety of giving an opinion in a case which has not yet come regularly and judicially before us. None can be more sensible than we are of the necessity of judges’ being in general extremely cautious in not intimating an opinion in any case extrajudicially, because we well know how liable the best minds are, notwithstanding their utmost care, to a bias which may arise from a preconceived opinion, even unguardedly, much more deliberately, given. But in the present instance, as many unfortunate and meritorious individuals whom Congress have justly thought proper objects of immediate relief may suffer great distress even by a short delay and may be utterly ruined by a long one, we determined at all events to make our sentiments known as early as possible, considering this as a case which must be deemed an exception to the general rule upon every principle of humanity and justice; resolving however, that so far as we are concerned individually, in case an application should be made, we will most attentively hear it, and if we can be convinced this opinion is a wrong one, we shall not hesitate to act accordingly, being as far from the weakness of supposing that there is any reproach in having committed an error, to which the greatest and best men are sometimes liable, as we should be from so low a sense of duty, as to think it would not be the highest and most deserved reproach that could be bestowed on any men (much more on judges) that they were capable from any motive of persevering against conviction in apparently maintaining an opinion which they really thought to be erroneous. “ 2 U. S. 414 RULE. THE Attorney-General having moved for information relative to the system of practice by which the attorneys and counselors of this Court shall regulate themselves and of the place in which rules in causes here depending shall be obtained, THE CHIEF JUSTICE at a subsequent day stated that: The Court considers the practice of the Courts of King’s Bench and Chancery in England as affording outlines for the practice of this Court, and that it will from time to time make such alterations therein as circumstances may render necessary. * See an act passed 28 Feb., 1793. As the reasons assigned by the judges for declining to execute the first act of Congress involve a great constitutional question, it will not be thought improper to subjoin them in illustration of Hayburn’s Case. The Circuit Court for the District of New York (consisting of Jay, Chief Justice, Cushing Justice, and Duane, District Judge) proceeded on 5 April, 1791, to take into consideration the act of Congress entitled “An act to provide for the settlement of the claims of widows, and orphans barred by the limitations heretofore established, and to regulate the claims to invalid pensions,” and was thereupon unanimously of opinion and agreed “That by the Constitution of the United States, the government thereof is divided into three distinct and independent branches, and that it is the duty of each to abstain from and to oppose, encroachments on either.” “That neither the Legislative nor the Executive branches can constitutionally assign to the Judicial any duties but such as are properly judicial and to be performed in a judicial manner.” “That the duties assigned to the circuit courts by this act are not of that description, and that the act itself does not appear to contemplate them as such, inasmuch as it subjects the decisions of these courts, made pursuant to those duties, first to the consideration and suspension of the Secretary at War and then to the revision of the legislature, whereas by the Constitution, neither the Secretary at War nor any other Executive officer, nor even the legislature, is authorized to sit as a court of errors on the judicial acts or opinions of this court.” “As, therefore, the business assigned to this Court by the act is not judicial nor directed to be performed judicially, the act can only be considered as appointing commissioners for the purposes mentioned in it by official instead of personal descriptions.” “That the judges of this court regard themselves as being the commissioners designated by the act, and therefore as being at liberty to accept or decline that office.” “That as the objects of this act are exceedingly benevolent, and do real honor to the humanity and justice of Congress, and as the judges desire to manifest, on all proper occasions and in every proper manner their high respect for the national legislature, they will execute this act in the capacity of commissioners.” “That as the legislature has a right to extend the session of this court for any term which it may think proper by law to assign, the term of five days, as directed by this act, ought to be punctually observed.” “That the judges of this court will, as usual, during the session thereof, adjourn the court from day to day or other short periods as circumstances may render proper, and that they will regularly, between the adjournments, proceed as commissioners to execute the business of this act in the same courtroom or chamber.”
Yep, those branches of gov can and have ignored SCOTUS opinions that they consider unconstitutional. -- This is their duty, under the provisions of the supremacy clause, Article VI.... That's YOUR asinine opinion about my opinion, and my opinion is backed up by the supremacy clause. Read the clause. It says that all officials of our republic are duty bound to honor our Constitution as the supreme law. -- Which gives them the power to ignore unconstitutional 'laws'. ( At their own peril, of course) --- This concept is called 'checks and balances', and without it, we would have a tyranny run by smart assed wannabe lawyers, like you. You imagine that I'm having brain farts, while your own theories about our Constitution are akin to a bag of noxious fumes..
Continuing your remedial education. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/2/409/case.html U.S. Supreme Court Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 409 (1792) 2 U.S. 409 MOTION FOR MANDAMUS This was a motion for a mandamus to be directed to the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania commanding the said court to proceed in a certain petition of Wm. Hayburn, who had applied to be put on the pension list of the United States as an invalid pensioner. The principal case arose upon the act of Congress passed 23 March, 1792. The Attorney General (Randolph) who made the motion for the mandamus, having premised that it was done ex officio, without an application from any particular person, but with a view to procure the execution of an act of Congress particularly interesting to a meritorious and unfortunate class of citizens, the court declared that it entertained great doubt upon his right, under such circumstances and in a case of this kind, to proceed ex officio, and directed him to state the principles on which he attempted to support the right. The Attorney General accordingly entered into an elaborate description of the powers and duties of his office. But the court being divided in opinion on that question, the motion, made ex officio, was not allowed. The Attorney General then changed the ground of his interposition, declaring it to be at the instance and on behalf of Hayburn, a party interested; and he entered into the merits of the case upon the act of Congress and the refusal of the judges to carry it into effect. The Court observed that it would hold the motion under advisement until the next term, but no decision was ever pronounced, as the legislature, at an intermediate 2 U. S. 410 session, provided in another way for the relief of the pensioners. * 2 U. S. 411 The Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania, consisting of Wilson, and Blair, Justices, and Peters, District Judge, made the following representation in a letter jointly addressed to the President of the United States on 18 April, 1792: “To you it officially belongs to ‘take care that the laws’ of the United States ‘to faithfully executed.’ Before you, therefore, we think it our duty to lay the sentiments which, on a late painful occasion, governed us with regard to an act passed by the legislature of the union.” “The people of the United States have vested in Congress all legislative powers ‘granted in the Constitution.’” “They have vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress shall establish ‘the judicial power of the United States.’” “It is worthy of remark that in Congress the whole legislative power of the United States is not vested. An important part of that power was exercised by the people themselves when they ‘ordained and established the Constitution.’” “This Constitution is ‘the Supreme Law of the Land.’ This supreme law ‘all judicial officers of the United States are bound, by oath or affirmation, to support.’” “It is a principle important to freedom that in government, the judicial should be distinct from and independent of the legislative department. To this important principle the people of the United States, in forming their Constitution, have manifested the highest regard.” “They have placed their judicial power not in Congress, but in ‘courts.’ They have ordained that the ‘judges of those courts shall hold their offices during good behavior,’ and that ‘during their continuance in office, their salaries shall not be diminished.’” “Congress has lately passed an act to regulate, among other things, ‘the claims to invalid pensions.’” “Upon due consideration, we have been unanimously of opinion that under this act, the circuit court held for the Pennsylvania District could not proceed” “1st. Because the business directed by this act is not of a judicial nature. It forms no part of the power vested by the Constitution in the courts of the United States; the circuit court must consequently have proceeded without constitutional authority.” “2d. Because if, upon that business, the court had proceeded, its judgments (for its opinions are its judgments) might, under the same act, have been revised and controlled by the legislature, and by an officer in the executive department. Such revision and control we deemed radically inconsistent with the independence of that judicial power which is vested in the courts, and consequently with that important principle which is so strictly observed by the Constitution of the United States. “ 2 U. S. 412 “These, Sir, are the reasons of our conduct. Be assured that though it became necessary, it was far from being pleasant. To be obliged to act contrary either to the obvious directions of Congress or to a constitutional principle, in our judgment equally obvious, excited feelings in us which we hope never to experience again.” The Circuit Court for the District of North Carolina (consisting of Iredell Justice, and Sitgreaves, District Judge) made the following representation in a letter jointly addressed to the President of the United States on 8 June, 1792. “We, the judges now attending at the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of North Carolina, conceive it our duty to lay before you some important observations which have occurred to us in the consideration of an act of Congress lately passed, entitled” “An act to provide for the settlement of the claims of widows and orphans barred by the limitations heretofore established, and to regulate the claims to invalid pensions.” “We beg leave to premise that it is as much our inclination as it is our duty to receive with all possible respect every act of the legislature, and that we never can find ourselves in a more painful situation than to be obliged to object to the execution of any, more especially to the execution of one founded on the purest principles of humanity and justice, which the act in question undoubtedly is. But however, lamentable a difference in opinion really may be, or with whatever difficulty we may have formed an opinion, we are under the indispensable necessity of acting according to the best dictates of our own judgment after duly weighing every consideration that can occur to us, which we have done on the present occasion.” “The extreme importance of the case and our desire of being explicit beyond the danger of being misunderstood, will, we hope, justify us in stating our observations in a systematic manner. We therefore, Sir, submit to you the following:” “1. That the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments are each formed in a separate and independent manner, and that the ultimate basis of each is the Constitution only, within the limits of which each department can alone justify any act of authority.” “2. That the legislature, among other important powers, unquestionably possess that of establishing courts in such a manner as to its wisdom shall appear best, limited by the terms of the Constitution only, and to whatever extent that power may be exercised, or however severe the duty it may think proper to require, the judges, when appointed in virtue of any such establishment, owe implicit and unreserved obedience to it.” “3. That at the same time, such courts cannot be warranted, as we conceive, by virtue of that part of the Constitution delegating Judicial power, for the exercise of which any act of the legislature is provided, in exercising (even under the authority of another act) 2 U. S. 413 any power not in its nature judicial, or, if judicial, not provided for upon the terms the Constitution requires.” “4. That whatever doubt may be suggested, whether the power in question is properly of a judicial nature, yet inasmuch as the decision of the court is not made final, but may be at least suspended in its operation by the Secretary at War, if he shall have cause to suspect imposition or mistake, this subjects the decision of the court to a mode of revision which we consider to be unwarranted by the Constitution, for though Congress may certainly establish, in instances not yet provided for, courts of appellate jurisdiction, yet such courts must consist of judges appointed in the manner the Constitution requires and holding their offices by no other tenure than that of their good behavior, by which tenure the office of Secretary at War is not held. And we beg leave to add with all due deference that no decision of any court of the United States can under any circumstances, in our opinion, agreeable to the Constitution, be liable to a reversion or even suspension by the legislature itself, in whom no judicial power of any kind appears to be vested but the important one relative to impeachments.” “These, sir, are our reasons for being of opinion, as we are at present, that this circuit court cannot be justified in the execution of that part of the act which requires it to examine and report an opinion on the unfortunate cases of officers and soldiers disabled in the service of the United States. The part of the act requiring the court to sit five days for the purpose of receiving applications from such persons we shall deem it our duty to comply with, for whether in our opinion such purpose can or cannot be answered, it is, as we conceive, our indispensable duty to keep open any court of which we have the honor to be judges as long as Congress shall direct.” “The high respect we entertain for the legislature, our feelings as men for persons whose situation requires the earliest as well as the most effectual relief, and our sincere desire to promote, whether officially or otherwise, the just and benevolent views of Congress so conspicuous on the present as well as on many other occasions have induced us to reflect whether we could be justified in acting under this act personally in the character of commissioners during the session of a court, and could we be satisfied that we had authority to do so, we would cheerfully devote such part of our time as might be necessary for the performance of the service. But we confess we have great doubts on this head. The power appears to be given to the court only, and not to the judges of it, and as the Secretary at War has not a discretion in all instances, but only in those where he has cause to suspect imposition or mistake, to withhold a person recommended by the court from being named on the pension list, it would be necessary for us to be well persuaded we possessed such an authority before we exercised a power, which might be a means of drawing money out of the public treasury as effectually as an express appropriation by law. We do not mean, however, to preclude ourselves from a very deliberate consideration whether we can be warranted in executing the purposes of the act in that manner in case an application should be made.” “No application has yet been made to the court or to ourselves individually, and therefore we have had some doubts as to the propriety of giving an opinion in a case which has not yet come regularly and judicially before us. None can be more sensible than we are of the necessity of judges’ being in general extremely cautious in not intimating an opinion in any case extrajudicially, because we well know how liable the best minds are, notwithstanding their utmost care, to a bias which may arise from a preconceived opinion, even unguardedly, much more deliberately, given. But in the present instance, as many unfortunate and meritorious individuals whom Congress have justly thought proper objects of immediate relief may suffer great distress even by a short delay and may be utterly ruined by a long one, we determined at all events to make our sentiments known as early as possible, considering this as a case which must be deemed an exception to the general rule upon every principle of humanity and justice; resolving however, that so far as we are concerned individually, in case an application should be made, we will most attentively hear it, and if we can be convinced this opinion is a wrong one, we shall not hesitate to act accordingly, being as far from the weakness of supposing that there is any reproach in having committed an error, to which the greatest and best men are sometimes liable, as we should be from so low a sense of duty, as to think it would not be the highest and most deserved reproach that could be bestowed on any men (much more on judges) that they were capable from any motive of persevering against conviction in apparently maintaining an opinion which they really thought to be erroneous. “ 2 U. S. 414 RULE. THE Attorney-General having moved for information relative to the system of practice by which the attorneys and counselors of this Court shall regulate themselves and of the place in which rules in causes here depending shall be obtained, THE CHIEF JUSTICE at a subsequent day stated that: The Court considers the practice of the Courts of King’s Bench and Chancery in England as affording outlines for the practice of this Court, and that it will from time to time make such alterations therein as circumstances may render necessary. * See an act passed 28 Feb., 1793. As the reasons assigned by the judges for declining to execute the first act of Congress involve a great constitutional question, it will not be thought improper to subjoin them in illustration of Hayburn’s Case. The Circuit Court for the District of New York (consisting of Jay, Chief Justice, Cushing Justice, and Duane, District Judge) proceeded on 5 April, 1791, to take into consideration the act of Congress entitled “An act to provide for the settlement of the claims of widows, and orphans barred by the limitations heretofore established, and to regulate the claims to invalid pensions,” and was thereupon unanimously of opinion and agreed “That by the Constitution of the United States, the government thereof is divided into three distinct and independent branches, and that it is the duty of each to abstain from and to oppose, encroachments on either.” “That neither the Legislative nor the Executive branches can constitutionally assign to the Judicial any duties but such as are properly judicial and to be performed in a judicial manner.” “That the duties assigned to the circuit courts by this act are not of that description, and that the act itself does not appear to contemplate them as such, inasmuch as it subjects the decisions of these courts, made pursuant to those duties, first to the consideration and suspension of the Secretary at War and then to the revision of the legislature, whereas by the Constitution, neither the Secretary at War nor any other Executive officer, nor even the legislature, is authorized to sit as a court of errors on the judicial acts or opinions of this court.” “As, therefore, the business assigned to this Court by the act is not judicial nor directed to be performed judicially, the act can only be considered as appointing commissioners for the purposes mentioned in it by official instead of personal descriptions.” “That the judges of this court regard themselves as being the commissioners designated by the act, and therefore as being at liberty to accept or decline that office.” “That as the objects of this act are exceedingly benevolent, and do real honor to the humanity and justice of Congress, and as the judges desire to manifest, on all proper occasions and in every proper manner their high respect for the national legislature, they will execute this act in the capacity of commissioners.” “That as the legislature has a right to extend the session of this court for any term which it may think proper by law to assign, the term of five days, as directed by this act, ought to be punctually observed.” “That the judges of this court will, as usual, during the session thereof, adjourn the court from day to day or other short periods as circumstances may render proper, and that they will regularly, between the adjournments, proceed as commissioners to execute the business of this act in the same courtroom or chamber.”
Only in tpaine's Court of the Imagination. U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809) With great attention, and with serious concern, the Court has considered the return made by the Judge for the District of Pennsylvania to the mandamus directing him to execute the sentence pronounced by him in the case of Gideon Olmstead and others v. Rittenhouse’s Executrixes, or to show cause for not so doing. The cause shown is an act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania, passed subsequent to the rendition of his sentence. This act authorizes and requires the Governor to demand, for the use of the State of Pennsylvania, the money which had been decreed to Gideon Olmstead and others, and which was in the hands of the executrixes of David Rittenhouse; and, in default of payment, to direct the Attorney General to institute a suit for the recovery thereof. This act further authorizes and requires the Governor to use any further means he 9 U. S. 136 may think necessary for the protection of what it denominates “the just rights of the State,” and also to protect the persons and properties of the said executrixes of David Rittenhouse, deceased, against any process whatever, issued out of any federal Court in consequence of their obedience to the requisition of the said act. If the legislatures of the several States may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the Constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery, and the nation is deprived of the means of enforcing its laws by the instrumentality of its own tribunals. So fatal a result must be deprecated by all, and the people of Pennsylvania, not less than the citizens of every other State, must feel a deep interest in resisting principles so destructive of the union, and in averting consequences so fatal to themselves. The act in question does not, in terms, assert the universal right of the State to interpose in every case whatever, but assigns, as a motive for its interposition in this particular case, that the sentence the execution of which it prohibits was rendered in a cause over which the federal Courts have no jurisdiction. If the ultimate right to determine the jurisdiction of the courts of the Union is placed by the Constitution in the several State legislatures, then this act concludes the subject; but if that power necessarily resides in the supreme judicial tribunal of the nation, then the jurisdiction of the District Court of Pennsylvania over the case in which that jurisdiction was exercised ought to be most deliberately examined, and the act of Pennsylvania, with whatever respect it may be considered, cannot be permitted to prejudice the question. [snip] The Federalist No. 81 May 28, 1788 [excerpt] And there is a still greater absurdity in subjecting the decisions of men, selected for their knowledge of the laws, acquired by long and laborious study, to the revision and control of men who, for want of the same advantage, cannot but be deficient in that knowledge. The members of the legislature will rarely be chosen with a view to those qualifications which fit men for the stations of judges; and as, on this account, there will be great reason to apprehend all the ill consequences of defective information, so, on account of the natural propensity of such bodies to party divisions, there will be no less reason to fear that the pestilential breath of faction may poison the fountains of justice. The habit of being continually marshalled on opposite sides will be too apt to stifle the voice both of law and of equity. These considerations teach us to applaud the wisdom of those States who have committed the judicial power, in the last resort, not to a part of the legislature, but to distinct and independent bodies of men. Contrary to the supposition of those who have represented the plan of the convention, in this respect, as novel and unprecedented, it is but a copy of the constitutions of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia; and the preference which has been given to those models is highly to be commended.
Read the clause. It says that all officials of our republic are duty bound to honor our Constitution as the supreme law. -- Which gives them the power to ignore unconstitutional 'laws'. ( At their own peril, of course) --- This concept is called 'checks and balances', and without it, we would have a tyranny run by smart assed wannabe lawyers, like you. You imagine that I'm having brain farts, while your own theories about our Constitution are akin to a bag of noxious fumes.. All you're continuing is your repetitive postings of facts not in contention, in an unsuccessful, obsessive effort to gloss over the FACT that you do NOT support our Constitution's checks and balances doctrine. Poor you, stuck on stupid repetitions.
In tpaine's Court of the Imagination, the Supremacy Clause contains a secret codicil referred to as the Screw Off provision, which provides that when the Executive or Legislature of a State disagrees with a constitutional ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court, there is a secret power to tell the Court to screw off. tpaine holds the only known copy of the Supremacy Clause which includes the Screw Off provision, which he allegedly found steganographically encrypted in the dot of one of the semi-colons. The rest of the world only has the standard Supremacy Clause which reads, Try as one may, with the standard Supremacy Clause, one may not discover the provision which empowers the Executive and the Legislative branches to tell the Judiciary to screw off. In the real world, if a State declines to give Miranda warnings, its criminal convictions involving a violation of the Miranda Rule would be overturned one by one. Or, in the case of the Little Rock High School, the State Governor and Legislature will be persuaded to get their minds right. Indeed, the Governor called out the National Guard to exercise his tpaine Court of the Imagination right to tell the U.S. Supreme Court and their decision in Brown v. Board of Education, to screw off. Sensing a failure to communicate, then-President Eisenhower sent in the 101st Airborne Division to assist Governor Faubus in getting his mind right. He also federalized the Arkansas National Guard. Governor Faubus got his mind right. As a curious footnote, Governor Faubus was a Democrat who continued to run for office and win. In 1964, he defeated Republican Winthrop Rockefeller and won 81% of the Black vote while winning. Now, that is party loyalty. United States Supreme Court Cooper v. Aaron, (1958) No. 116 Argued: September 11, 1958 Decided: September 12, 1958 Opinion announced September 29, 1958. Fn [1] NOTE: The per curiam opinion announced on September 12, 1958, and printed in a footnote, post, p. 5, applies not only to this case but also to No. 1, Misc., August Special Term, 1958, Aaron et al. v. Cooper et al., on application for vacation of order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit staying issuance of its mandate, for stay of order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, and for such other orders as petitioners may be entitled to, argued August 28, 1958. Under a plan of gradual desegregation of the races in the public schools of Little Rock, Arkansas, adopted by petitioners and approved by the courts below, respondents, Negro children, were ordered admitted to a previously all-white high school at the beginning of the 1957-1958 school year. Due to actions by the Legislature and Governor of the State opposing desegregation, and to threats of mob violence resulting therefrom, respondents were unable to attend the school until troops were sent and maintained there by the Federal Government for their protection; but they [2] attended the school for the remainder of that school year. Finding that these events had resulted in tensions, bedlam, chaos and turmoil in the school, which disrupted the educational process, the District Court, in June 1958, granted petitioners’ request that operation of their plan of desegregation be suspended for two and one-half years, and that respondents be sent back to segregated schools. The Court of Appeals reversed. Held: The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the orders of the District Court enforcing petitioners’ plan of desegregation are reinstated, effective immediately. Pp. 4-20. 1. This Court cannot countenance a claim by the Governor and Legislature of a State that there is no duty on state officials to obey federal court orders resting on this Court’s considered interpretation of the United States Constitution in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483. P. 4. 2. This Court rejects the contention that it should uphold a suspension of the Little Rock School Board’s plan to do away with segregated public schools in Little Rock until state laws and efforts to upset and nullify its holding in the Brown case have been further challenged and tested in the courts. P. 4. 3. In many locations, obedience to the duty of desegregation will require the immediate general admission of Negro children, otherwise qualified as students for their appropriate classes, at particular schools. P. 7. 4. If, after analysis of the relevant factors (which, of course, excludes hostility to racial desegregation), a District Court concludes that justification exists for not requiring the present nonsegregated admission of all qualified Negro children to public schools, it should scrutinize the program of the school authorities to make sure that they have developed arrangements pointed toward the earliest practicable completion of desegregation, and have taken appropriate steps to put their program into effective operation. P. 7. 5. The petitioners stand in this litigation as the agents of the State, and they cannot assert their good faith as an excuse for delay in implementing the respondents’ constitutional rights, when vindication of those rights has been rendered difficult or impossible by the actions of other state officials. Pp. 15-16. 6. The constitutional rights of respondents are not to be sacrificed or yielded to the violence and disorder which have followed [3] upon the actions of the Governor and Legislature, and law and order are not here to be preserved by depriving the Negro children of their constitutional rights. P. 16. 7. The constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against in school admission on grounds of race or color declared by this Court in the Brown case can neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state executives or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted “ingeniously or ingenuously.” Pp. 16-17. 8. The interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” P. 18. 9. No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his solemn oath to support it. P. 18. 10. State support of segregated schools through any arrangement, management, funds or property cannot be squared with the command of the Fourteenth Amendment that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. P. 19. 257 F.2d 33, affirmed. Richard C. Butler argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were A. F. House and, by special leave of Court, John H. Haley, pro hac vice. Thurgood Marshall argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Wiley A. Branton, William Coleman, Jr., Jack Greenberg and Louis H. Pollak. Solicitor General Rankin, at the invitation of the Court, post, p. 27, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging that the relief sought by respondents should be granted. With him on the brief were Oscar H. Davis, Philip Elman and Ralph S. Spritzer. [4] Opinion of the Court by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BURTON, MR. JUSTICE CLARK, MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER. As this case reaches us it raises questions of the highest importance to the maintenance of our federal system of government. It necessarily involves a claim by the Governor and Legislature of a State that there is no duty on state officials to obey federal court orders resting on this Court’s considered interpretation of the United States Constitution. Specifically it involves actions by the Governor and Legislature of Arkansas upon the premise that they are not bound by our holding in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483. That holding was that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids States to use their governmental powers to bar children on racial grounds from attending schools where there is state participation through any arrangement, management, funds or property. We are urged to uphold a suspension of the Little Rock School Board’s plan to do away with segregated public schools in Little Rock until state laws and efforts to upset and nullify our holding in Brown v. Board of Education have been further challenged and tested in the courts. We reject these contentions. The case was argued before us on September 11, 1958. On the following day we unanimously affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 257 F.2d 33, which had reversed a judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, 163 F. Supp. 13. The District Court had granted the application of the petitioners, the Little Rock School Board and School Superintendent, to suspend for two and one-half years the operation of the School Board’s court-approved desegregation program. In order that the School Board [5] might know, without doubt, its duty in this regard before the opening of school, which had been set for the following Monday, September 15, 1958, we immediately issued the judgment, reserving the expression of our supporting views to a later date. * This opinion of all of the members of the Court embodies those views. The following are the facts and circumstances so far as necessary to show how the legal questions are presented. On May 17, 1954, this Court decided that enforced racial segregation in the public schools of a State is a denial of the equal protection of the laws enjoined by the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown v. Board of Education, [6] 347 U.S. 483 . The Court postponed, pending further argument, formulation of a decree to effectuate this decision. That decree was rendered May 31, 1955. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 . In the formulation of that decree the Court recognized that good faith compliance with the principles declared in Brown might in some situations “call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in making the transition to school systems operated in accordance with the constitutional principles set forth in our May 17, 1954, decision.” Id., at 300. The Court went on to state: “Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest in the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective manner. But it should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them. “While giving weight to these public and private considerations, the courts will require that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with our May 17, 1954, ruling. Once such a start has been made, the courts may find that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner. The burden rests upon the defendants to establish that such time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date. To that end, the courts may consider problems related to administration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems.” 349 U.S., at 300 -301. [7] Under such circumstances, the District Courts were directed to require “a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance,” and to take such action as was necessary to bring about the end of racial segregation in the public schools “with all deliberate speed.” Ibid. Of course, in many locations, obedience to the duty of desegregation would require the immediate general admission of Negro children, otherwise qualified as students for their appropriate classes, at particular schools. On the other hand, a District Court, after analysis of the relevant factors (which, of course, excludes hostility to racial desegregation), might conclude that justification existed for not requiring the present nonsegregated admission of all qualified Negro children. In such circumstances, however, the courts should scrutinize the program of the school authorities to make sure that they had developed arrangements pointed toward the earliest practicable completion of desegregation, and had taken appropriate steps to put their program into effective operation. It was made plain that delay in any guise in order to deny the constitutional rights of Negro children could not be countenanced, and that only a prompt start, diligently and earnestly pursued, to eliminate racial segregation from the public schools could constitute good faith compliance. State authorities were thus duty bound to devote every effort toward initiating desegregation and bringing about the elimination of racial discrimination in the public school system. On May 20, 1954, three days after the first Brown opinion, the Little Rock District School Board adopted, and on May 23, 1954, made public, a statement of policy entitled “Supreme Court Decision - Segregation in Public Schools.” In this statement the Board recognized that “It is our responsibility to comply with Federal Constitutional Requirements and we intend to do so when the Supreme Court of the United States outlines the method to be followed.” [8] Thereafter the Board undertook studies of the administrative problems confronting the transition to a desegregated public school system at Little Rock. It instructed the Superintendent of Schools to prepare a plan for desegregation, and approved such a plan on May 24, 1955, seven days before the second Brown opinion. The plan provided for desegregation at the senior high school level (grades 10 through 12) as the first stage. Desegregation at the junior high and elementary levels was to follow. It was contemplated that desegregation at the high school level would commence in the fall of 1957, and the expectation was that complete desegregation of the school system would be accomplished by 1963. Following the adoption of this plan, the Superintendent of Schools discussed it with a large number of citizen groups in the city. As a result of these discussions, the Board reached the conclusion that “a large majority of the residents” of Little Rock were of “the belief . . . that the Plan, although objectionable in principle,” from the point of view of those supporting segregated schools, “was still the best for the interests of all pupils in the District.” Upon challenge by a group of Negro plaintiffs desiring more rapid completion of the desegregation process, the District Court upheld the School Board’s plan, Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 243 F.2d 361. Review of that judgment was not sought here. While the School Board was thus going forward with its preparation for desegregating the Little Rock school system, other state authorities, in contrast, were actively pursuing a program designed to perpetuate in Arkansas the system of racial segregation which this Court had held violated the Fourteenth Amendment. First came, in November 1956, an amendment to the State Constitution flatly commanding the Arkansas General Assembly to oppose “in every Constitutional manner the Un-constitutional [9] desegregation decisions of May 17, 1954 and May 31, 1955 of the United States Supreme Court,” Ark. Const., Amend. 44, and, through the initiative, a pupil assignment law, Ark. Stat. 80-1519 to 80-1524. Pursuant to this state constitutional command, a law relieving school children from compulsory attendance at racially mixed schools, Ark. Stat. 80-1525, and a law establishing a State Sovereignty Commission, Ark. Stat. 6-801 to 6-824, were enacted by the General Assembly in February 1957. The School Board and the Superintendent of Schools nevertheless continued with preparations to carry out the first stage of the desegregation program. Nine Negro children were scheduled for admission in September 1957 to Central High School, which has more than two thousand students. Various administrative measures, designed to assure the smooth transition of this first stage of desegregation, were undertaken. On September 2, 1957, the day before these Negro students were to enter Central High, the school authorities were met with drastic opposing action on the part of the Governor of Arkansas who dispatched units of the Arkansas National Guard to the Central High School grounds and placed the school “off limits” to colored students. As found by the District Court in subsequent proceedings, the Governor’s action had not been requested by the school authorities, and was entirely unheralded. The findings were these: “Up to this time [September 2], no crowds had gathered about Central High School and no acts of violence or threats of violence in connection with the carrying out of the plan had occurred. Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, the school authorities had frequently conferred with the Mayor and Chief of Police of Little Rock about taking appropriate [10] steps by the Little Rock police to prevent any possible disturbances or acts of violence in connection with the attendance of the 9 colored students at Central High School. The Mayor considered that the Little Rock police force could adequately cope with any incidents which might arise at the opening of school. The Mayor, the Chief of Police, and the school authorities made no request to the Governor or any representative of his for State assistance in maintaining peace and order at Central High School. Neither the Governor nor any other official of the State government consulted with the Little Rock authorities about whether the Little Rock police were prepared to cope with any incidents which might arise at the school, about any need for State assistance in maintaining peace and order, or about stationing the Arkansas National Guard at Central High School.” Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220, 225. The Board’s petition for postponement in this proceeding states: “The effect of that action [of the Governor] was to harden the core of opposition to the Plan and cause many persons who theretofore had reluctantly accepted the Plan to believe there was some power in the State of Arkansas which, when exerted, could nullify the Federal law and permit disobedience of the decree of this [District] Court, and from that date hostility to the Plan was increased and criticism of the officials of the [School] District has become more bitter and unrestrained.” The Governor’s action caused the School Board to request the Negro students on September 2 not to attend the high school “until the legal dilemma was solved.” The next day, September 3, 1957, the Board petitioned the District Court for instructions, and the court, after a hearing, found that the Board’s [11] request of the Negro students to stay away from the high school had been made because of the stationing of the military guards by the state authorities. The court determined that this was not a reason for departing from the approved plan, and ordered the School Board and Superintendent to proceed with it. On the morning of the next day, September 4, 1957, the Negro children attempted to enter the high school but, as the District Court later found, units of the Arkansas National Guard “acting pursuant to the Governor’s order, stood shoulder to shoulder at the school grounds and thereby forcibly prevented the 9 Negro students . . . from entering,” as they continued to do every school day during the following three weeks. 156 F. Supp., at 225. That same day, September 4, 1957, the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Arkansas was requested by the District Court to begin an immediate investigation in order to fix responsibility for the interference with the orderly implementation of the District Court’s direction to carry out the desegregation program. Three days later, September 7, the District Court denied a petition of the School Board and the Superintendent of Schools for an order temporarily suspending continuance of the program. Upon completion of the United States Attorney’s investigation, he and the Attorney General of the United States, at the District Court’s request, entered the proceedings and filed a petition on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, to enjoin the Governor of Arkansas and officers of the Arkansas National Guard from further attempts to prevent obedience to the court’s order. After hearings on the petition, the District Court found that the School Board’s plan had been obstructed by the Governor through the use of National Guard troops, and granted a preliminary injunction on September [12] 20, 1957, enjoining the Governor and the officers of the Guard from preventing the attendance of Negro children at Central High School, and from otherwise obstructing or interfering with the orders of the court in connection with the plan. 156 F. Supp. 220, affirmed, Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797. The National Guard was then withdrawn from the school. The next school day was Monday, September 23, 1957. The Negro children entered the high school that morning under the protection of the Little Rock Police Department and members of the Arkansas State Police. But the officers caused the children to be removed from the school during the morning because they had difficulty controlling a large and demonstrating crowd which had gathered at the high school. 163 F. Supp., at 16. On September 25, however, the President of the United States dispatched federal troops to Central High School and admission of the Negro students to the school was thereby effected. Regular army troops continued at the high school until November 27, 1957. They were then replaced by federalized National Guardsmen who remained throughout the balance of the school year. Eight of the Negro students remained in attendance at the school throughout the school year. We come now to the aspect of the proceedings presently before us. On February 20, 1958, the School Board and the Superintendent of Schools filed a petition in the District Court seeking a postponement of their program for desegregation. Their position in essence was that because of extreme public hostility, which they stated had been engendered largely by the official attitudes and actions of the Governor and the Legislature, the maintenance of a sound educational program at Central High School, with the Negro students in attendance, would be impossible. The Board therefore proposed that the Negro students already admitted to the school be withdrawn [13] and sent to segregated schools, and that all further steps to carry out the Board’s desegregation program be postponed for a period later suggested by the Board to be two and one-half years. After a hearing the District Court granted the relief requested by the Board. Among other things the court found that the past year at Central High School had been attended by conditions of “chaos, bedlam and turmoil”; that there were “repeated incidents of more or less serious violence directed against the Negro students and their property”; that there was “tension and unrest among the school administrators, the class-room teachers, the pupils, and the latters’ parents, which inevitably had an adverse effect upon the educational program”; that a school official was threatened with violence; that a “serious financial burden” had been cast on the School District; that the education of the students had suffered “and under existing conditions will continue to suffer”; that the Board would continue to need “military assistance or its equivalent”; that the local police department would not be able “to detail enough men to afford the necessary protection”; and that the situation was “intolerable.” 163 F. Supp., at 20-26. The District Court’s judgment was dated June 20, 1958. The Negro respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and also sought there a stay of the District Court’s judgment. At the same time they filed a petition for certiorari in this Court asking us to review the District Court’s judgment without awaiting the disposition of their appeal to the Court of Appeals, or of their petition to that court for a stay. That we declined to do. 357 U.S. 566 . The Court of Appeals did not act on the petition for a stay, but, on August 18, 1958, after convening in special session on August 4 and hearing the appeal, reversed the District Court, 257 F.2d 33. On August 21, 1958, the Court of Appeals stayed its mandate [14] to permit the School Board to petition this Court for certiorari. Pending the filing of the School Board’s petition for certiorari, the Negro respondents, on August 23, 1958, applied to MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER, as Circuit Justice for the Eighth Circuit, to stay the order of the Court of Appeals withholding its own mandate and also to stay the District Court’s judgment. In view of the nature of the motions, he referred them to the entire Court. Recognizing the vital importance of a decision of the issues in time to permit arrangements to be made for the 1958-1959 school year, see Aaron v. Cooper, 357 U.S. 566, 567 , we convened in Special Term on August 28, 1958, and heard oral argument on the respondents’ motions, and also argument of the Solicitor General who, by invitation, appeared for the United States as amicus curiae, and asserted that the Court of Appeals’ judgment was clearly correct on the merits, and urged that we vacate its stay forthwith. Finding that respondents’ application necessarily involved consideration of the merits of the litigation, we entered an order which deferred decision upon the motions pending the disposition of the School Board’s petition for certiorari, and fixed September 8, 1958, as the day on or before which such petition might be filed, and September 11, 1958, for oral argument upon the petition. The petition for certiorari, duly filed, was granted in open Court on September 11. 1958, post, p. 29, and further arguments were had, the Solicitor General again urging the correctness of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. On September 12, 1958, as already mentioned, we unanimously affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the per curiam opinion set forth in the margin at the outset of this opinion, ante, p. 5. In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals which reversed the District Court we have accepted without reservation the position of the School Board, the [15] Superintendent of Schools, and their counsel that they displayed entire good faith in the conduct of these proceedings and in dealing with the unfortunate and distressing sequence of events which has been outlined. We likewise have accepted the findings of the District Court as to the conditions at Central High School during the 1957-1958 school year, and also the findings that the educational progress of all the students, white and colored, of that school has suffered and will continue to suffer if the conditions which prevailed last year are permitted to continue. The significance of these findings, however, is to be considered in light of the fact, indisputably revealed by the record before us, that the conditions they depict are directly traceable to the actions of legislators and executive officials of the State of Arkansas, taken in their official capacities, which reflect their own determination to resist this Court’s decision in the Brown case and which have brought about violent resistance to that decision in Arkansas. In its petition for certiorari filed in this Court, the School Board itself describes the situation in this language: “The legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the state government opposed the desegregation of Little Rock schools by enacting laws, calling out troops, making statements villifying federal law and federal courts, and failing to utilize state law enforcement agencies and judicial processes to maintain public peace.” One may well sympathize with the position of the Board in the face of the frustrating conditions which have confronted it, but, regardless of the Board’s good faith, the actions of the other state agencies responsible for those conditions compel us to reject the Board’s legal position. Had Central High School been under the direct management of the State itself, it could hardly be suggested [16] that those immediately in charge of the school should be heard to assert their own good faith as a legal excuse for delay in implementing the constitutional rights of these respondents, when vindication of those rights was rendered difficult or impossible by the actions of other state officials. The situation here is in no different posture because the members of the School Board and the Superintendent of Schools are local officials; from the point of view of the Fourteenth Amendment, they stand in this litigation as the agents of the State. The constitutional rights of respondents are not to be sacrificed or yielded to the violence and disorder which have followed upon the actions of the Governor and Legislature. As this Court said some 41 years ago in a unanimous opinion in a case involving another aspect of racial segregation: “It is urged that this proposed segregation will promote the public peace by preventing race conflicts. Desirable as this is, and important as is the preservation of the public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances which deny rights created or protected by the Federal Constitution.” Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 . Thus law and order are not here to be preserved by depriving the Negro children of their constitutional rights. The record before us clearly establishes that the growth of the Board’s difficulties to a magnitude beyond its unaided power to control is the product of state action. Those difficulties, as counsel for the Board forthrightly conceded on the oral argument in this Court, can also be brought under control by state action. The controlling legal principles are plain. The command of the Fourteenth Amendment is that no “State” shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. “A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities. It can act in no [17] other way. The constitutional provision, therefore, must mean that no agency of the State, or of the officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State government, . . . denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State’s power, his act is that of the State. This must be so, or the constitutional prohibition has no meaning.” Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 . Thus the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all action of the State denying equal protection of the laws; whatever the agency of the State taking the action, see Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 ; Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of Philadelphia, 353 U.S. 230 ; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 ; or whatever the guise in which it is taken, see Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922; Department of Conservation and Development v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615. In short, the constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against in school admission on grounds of race or color declared by this Court in the Brown case can neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted “ingeniously or ingenuously.” Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 . What has been said, in the light of the facts developed, is enough to dispose of the case. However, we should answer the premise of the actions of the Governor and Legislature that they are not bound by our holding in the Brown case. It is necessary only to recall some basic constitutional propositions which are settled doctrine. [18] Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the “supreme Law of the Land.” In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as “the fundamental and paramount law of the nation,” declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, that “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” This decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3, “to support this Constitution.” Chief Justice Taney, speaking for a unanimous Court in 1859, said that this requirement reflected the framers’ “anxiety to preserve it [the Constitution] in full force, in all its powers, and to guard against resistance to or evasion of its authority, on the part of a State . . . .” Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 524. No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it. Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous Court in saying that: “If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery . . . .” United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115, 136. A Governor who asserts a [19] power to nullify a federal court order is similarly restrained. If he had such power, said Chief Justice Hughes, in 1932, also for a unanimous Court, “it is manifest that the fiat of a state Governor, and not the Constitution of the United States, would be the supreme law of the land; that the restrictions of the Federal Constitution upon the exercise of state power would be but impotent phrases . . . .” Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397 -398. It is, of course, quite true that the responsibility for public education is primarily the concern of the States, but it is equally true that such responsibilities, like all other state activity, must be exercised consistently with federal constitutional requirements as they apply to state action. The Constitution created a government dedicated to equal justice under law. The Fourteenth Amendment embodied and emphasized that ideal. State support of segregated schools through any arrangement, management, funds, or property cannot be squared with the Amendment’s command that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The right of a student not to be segregated on racial grounds in schools so maintained is indeed so fundamental and pervasive that it is embraced in the concept of due process of law. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 . The basic decision in Brown was unanimously reached by this Court only after the case had been briefed and twice argued and the issues had been given the most serious consideration. Since the first Brown opinion three new Justices have come to the Court. They are at one with the Justices still on the Court who participated in that basic decision as to its correctness, and that decision is now unanimously reaffirmed. The principles announced in that decision and the obedience of the States to them, according to the command of the Constitution, [20] are indispensable for the protection of the freedoms guaranteed by our fundamental charter for all of us. Our constitutional ideal of equal justice under law is thus made a living truth. [Footnote * ] The following was the Court’s per curiam opinion: “PER CURIAM. “The Court, having fully deliberated upon the oral arguments had on August 28, 1958, as supplemented by the arguments presented on September 11, 1958, and all the briefs on file, is unanimously of the opinion that the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit of August 18, 1958, 257 F.2d 33, must be affirmed. In view of the imminent commencement of the new school year at the Central High School of Little Rock, Arkansas, we deem it important to make prompt announcement of our judgment affirming the Court of Appeals. The expression of the views supporting our judgment will be prepared and announced in due course. “It is accordingly ordered that the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, dated August 18, 1958, 257 F.2d 33, reversing the judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, dated June 20, 1958, 163 F. Supp. 13, be affirmed, and that the judgments of the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, dated August 28, 1956, see 143 F. Supp. 855, and September 3, 1957, enforcing the School Board’s plan for desegregation in compliance with the decision of this Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 349 U.S. 294, be reinstated. It follows that the order of the Court of Appeals dated August 21, 1958, staying its own mandate is of no further effect. “The judgment of this Court shall be effective immediately, and shall be communicated forthwith to the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.” Concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER. * While unreservedly participating with my brethren in our joint opinion, I deem it appropriate also to deal individually with the great issue here at stake. By working together, by sharing in a common effort, men of different minds and tempers, even if they do not reach agreement, acquire understanding and thereby tolerance of their differences. This process was under way in Little Rock. The detailed plan formulated by the Little Rock School Board, in the light of local circumstances, had been approved by the United States District Court in Arkansas as satisfying the requirements of this Court’s decree in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 . The Little Rock School Board had embarked on an educational effort “to obtain public acceptance” of its plan. Thus the process of the community’s accommodation to new demands of law upon it, the development of habits of acceptance of the right of colored children to the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Constitution, had peacefully and promisingly begun. The condition in Little Rock before this process was forcibly impeded by those in control of the government of Arkansas was thus described by the District Court, and these findings of fact have not been controverted: “14. Up to this time, no crowds had gathered about Central High School and no acts of violence or threats of violence in connection with the carrying out of the plan had occurred. Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, the school authorities had [21] frequently conferred with the Mayor and Chief of Police of Little Rock about taking appropriate steps by the Little Rock police to prevent any possible disturbances or acts of violence in connection with the attendance of the 9 colored students at Central High School. The Mayor considered that the Little Rock police force could adequately cope with any incidents which might arise at the opening of school. The Mayor, the Chief of Police, and the school authorities made no request to the Governor or any representative of his for State assistance in maintaining peace and order at Central High School. Neither the Governor nor any other official of the State government consulted with the Little Rock authorities about whether the Little Rock police were prepared to cope with any incidents which might arise at the school, about any need for State assistance in maintaining peace and order, or about stationing the Arkansas National Guard at Central High School.” 156 F. Supp. 220, 225. All this was disrupted by the introduction of the state militia and by other obstructive measures taken by the State. The illegality of these interferences with the constitutional right of Negro children qualified to enter the Central High School is unaffected by whatever action or non-action the Federal Government had seen fit to take. Nor is it neutralized by the undoubted good faith of the Little Rock School Board in endeavoring to discharge its constitutional duty. The use of force to further obedience to law is in any event a last resort and one not congenial to the spirit of our Nation. But the tragic aspect of this disruptive tactic was that the power of the State was used not to sustain law but as an instrument for thwarting law. The State of Arkansas is thus responsible for disabling one [22] of its subordinate agencies, the Little Rock School Board, from peacefully carrying out the Board’s and the State’s constitutional duty. Accordingly, while Arkansas is not a formal party in these proceedings and a decree cannot go against the State, it is legally and morally before the Court. We are now asked to hold that the illegal, forcible interference by the State of Arkansas with the continuance of what the Constitution commands, and the consequences in disorder that it entrained, should be recognized as justification for undoing what the School Board had formulated, what the District Court in 1955 had directed to be carried out, and what was in process of obedience. No explanation that may be offered in support of such a request can obscure the inescapable meaning that law should bow to force. To yield to such a claim would be to enthrone official lawlessness, and lawlessness if not checked is the precursor of anarchy. On the few tragic occasions in the history of the Nation, North and South, when law was forcibly resisted or systematically evaded, it has signalled the breakdown of constitutional processes of government on which ultimately rest the liberties of all. Violent resistance to law cannot be made a legal reason for its suspension without loosening the fabric of our society. What could this mean but to acknowledge that disorder under the aegis of a State has moral superiority over the law of the Constitution? For those in authority thus to defy the law of the land is profoundly subversive not only of our constitutional system but of the presuppositions of a democratic society. The State “must . . . yield to an authority that is paramount to the State.” This language of command to a State is Mr. Justice Holmes’, speaking for the Court that comprised Mr. Justice Van Devanter, Mr. Justice McReynolds, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Sutherland, [23] Mr. Justice Butler, and Mr. Justice Stone. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 179, 197 . When defiance of law judicially pronounced was last sought to be justified before this Court, views were expressed which are now especially relevant: “The historic phrase ‘a government of laws and not of men’ epitomizes the distinguishing character of our political society. When John Adams put that phrase into the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights he was not indulging in a rhetorical flourish. He was expressing the aim of those who, with him, framed the Declaration of Independence and founded the Republic. ‘A government of laws and not of men’ was the rejection in positive terms of rule by fiat, whether by the fiat of governmental or private power. Every act of government may be challenged by an appeal to law, as finally pronounced by this Court. Even this Court has the last say only for a time. Being composed of fallible men, it may err. But revision of its errors must be by orderly process of law. The Court may be asked to reconsider its decisions, and this has been done successfully again and again throughout our history. Or, what this Court has deemed its duty to decide may be changed by legislation, as it often has been, and, on occasion, by constitutional amendment. “But from their own experience and their deep reading in history, the Founders knew that Law alone saves a society from being rent by internecine strife or ruled by mere brute power however disguised. ‘Civilization involves subjection of force to reason, and the agency of this subjection is law.’ (Pound, The Future of Law (1937) 47 Yale L. J. 1, 13.) The conception of a government by laws dominated the thoughts of those who founded this [24] Nation and designed its Constitution, although they knew as well as the belittlers of the conception that laws have to be made, interpreted and enforced by men. To that end, they set apart a body of men, who were to be the depositories of law, who by their disciplined training and character and by withdrawal from the usual temptations of private interest may reasonably be expected to be ‘as free, impartial, and independent as the lot of humanity will admit.’ So strongly were the framers of the Constitution bent on securing a reign of law that they endowed the judicial office with extraordinary safeguards and prestige. No one, no matter how exalted his public office or how righteous his private motive, can be judge in his own case. That is what courts are for.” United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 307 -309 (concurring opinion). The duty to abstain from resistance to “the supreme Law of the Land,” U.S. Const., Art. VI § 2, as declared by the organ of our Government for ascertaining it, does not require immediate approval of it nor does it deny the right of dissent. Criticism need not be stilled. Active obstruction or defiance is barred. Our kind of society cannot endure if the controlling authority of the Law as derived from the Constitution is not to be the tribunal specially charged with the duty of ascertaining and declaring what is “the supreme Law of the Land.” (See President Andrew Jackson’s Message to Congress of January 16, 1833, II Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents (1896 ed.), 610, 623.) Particularly is this so where the declaration of what “the supreme Law” commands on an underlying moral issue is not the dubious pronouncement of a gravely divided Court but is the unanimous conclusion of a long-matured deliberative process. The Constitution is not the formulation of the [25] merely personal views of the members of this Court, nor can its authority be reduced to the claim that state officials are its controlling interpreters. Local customs, however hardened by time, are not decreed in heaven. Habits and feelings they engender may be counteracted and moderated. Experience attests that such local habits and feelings will yield, gradually though this be, to law and education. And educational influences are exerted not only by explicit teaching. They vigorously flow from the fruitful exercise of the responsibility of those charged with political official power and from the almost unconsciously transforming actualities of living under law. The process of ending unconstitutional exclusion of pupils from the common school system - “common” meaning shared alike - solely because of color is no doubt not an easy, overnight task in a few States where a drastic alteration in the ways of communities is involved. Deep emotions have, no doubt, been stirred. They will not be calmed by letting violence loose - violence and defiance employed and encouraged by those upon whom the duty of law observance should have the strongest claim - nor by submitting to it under whatever guise employed. Only the constructive use of time will achieve what an advanced civilization demands and the Constitution confirms. For carrying out the decision that color alone cannot bar a child from a public school, this Court has recognized the diversity of circumstances in local school situations. But is it a reasonable hope that the necessary endeavors for such adjustment will be furthered, that racial frictions will be ameliorated, by a reversal of the process and interrupting effective measures toward the necessary goal? The progress that has been made in respecting the constitutional rights of the Negro children, according to the graduated plan sanctioned by the two [26] lower courts, would have to be retraced, perhaps with even greater difficulty because of deference to forcible resistance. It would have to be retraced against the seemingly vindicated feeling of those who actively sought to block that progress. Is there not the strongest reason for concluding that to accede to the Board’s request, on the basis of the circumstances that gave rise to it, for a suspension of the Board’s non-segregation plan, would be but the beginning of a series of delays calculated to nullify this Court’s adamant decisions in the Brown case that the Constitution precludes compulsory segregation based on color in state-supported schools? That the responsibility of those who exercise power in a democratic government is not to reflect inflamed public feeling but to help form its understanding, is especially true when they are confronted with a problem like a racially discriminating public school system. This is the lesson to be drawn from the heartening experience in ending enforced racial segregation in the public schools in cities with Negro populations of large proportions. Compliance with decisions of this Court, as the constitutional organ of the supreme Law of the Land, has often, throughout our history, depended on active support by state and local authorities. It presupposes such support. To withhold it, and indeed to use political power to try to paralyze the supreme Law, precludes the maintenance of our federal system as we have known and cherished it for one hundred and seventy years. Lincoln’s appeal to “the better angels of our nature” failed to avert a fratricidal war. But the compassionate wisdom of Lincoln’s First and Second Inaugurals bequeathed to the Union, cemented with blood, a moral heritage which, when drawn upon in times of stress and strife, is sure to find specific ways and means to surmount difficulties that may appear to be insurmountable. [Footnote * ] [NOTE: This opinion was filed October 6, 1958.] [27]
As shown recently in 2012, in Arizona v. United States, the State authorities citing the Screw Off provision of the Supremacy Clause found only in the tpaine Court of the Imagination, are assisted in getting their minds right. Arizona v United States, 567 US 11-182 (2012) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus ARIZONA et al. v. UNITED STATES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 11–182. Argued April 25, 2012—Decided June 25, 2012 [excerpts] Syllabus Held: [Slip Op at 2.] - - - - - Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. [Slip Op at 7-8.] Federalism, central to the constitutional design, adopts the principle that both the National and State Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 457 (1991); U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). From the existence of two sovereigns follows the possibility that laws can be in conflict or at cross-purposes. The Supremacy Clause provides a clear rule that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Art. VI, cl. 2. Under this principle, Congress has the power to preempt state law. See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U. S. 363, 372 (2000) ; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 210–211 (1824). There is no doubt that Congress may withdraw specified powers from the States by enacting a statute containing an express preemption provision. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 4). State law must also give way to federal law in at least two other circumstances. First, the States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its proper authority, has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U. S. 88, 115 (1992) . The intent to displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of regulation "so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it" or where there is a "federal interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947) ; see English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U. S. 72, 79 (1990) . Second, state laws are preempted when they conflict with federal law. Crosby, supra, at 372. This includes cases where "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132 –143 (1963), and those instances where the challenged state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," Hines, 312 U. S., at 67; see also Crosby, supra, at 373 ("What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects"). In preemption analysis, courts should assume that "the historic police powers of the States" are not superseded "unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice, supra, at 230; see Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S. 555, 565 (2009). [Slip Op at 25.]
Read the clause. It says that all officials of our republic are duty bound to honor our Constitution as the supreme law. -- Which gives them the power to ignore unconstitutional 'laws'. ( At their own peril, of course) --- This concept is called 'checks and balances', and without it, we would have a tyranny run by smart assed wannabe lawyers, like you. All you're continuing is your repetitive postings of facts not in contention, in an unsuccessful, obsessive effort to gloss over the FACT that you do NOT support our Constitution's checks and balances doctrine. Poor you, stuck on stupid repetitions. This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. All three branches are empowered to ignore 'laws' that are NOT made "in pursuance thereof"... And you know it... But by all means, pick another lengthy, non-germaine court opinion to quote, as you know damn well no one bothers to read your wind bag efforts anyway.. Get a life, stop trying to prove you're LF's foremost legal beagle.
When SCOTUS has decided a law is constitutional or unconstitutional, the other branches are bound by the ruling, as you, Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas, Governor Jan Brewer of Arizona, and Sheriff Joe Arpaio know. You're blithering idiocy does not change the historical facts. When Faubus tried your bullshit in practice, he was met with the 82nd Airborne and had a come to Jesus moment. Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1 (1958) United States Supreme Court Cooper v. Aaron, (1958) No. 116 Argued: September 11, 1958 Decided: September 12, 1958 Opinion announced September 29, 1958. [excerpts] 2. This Court rejects the contention that it should uphold a suspension of the Little Rock School Board’s plan to do away with segregated public schools in Little Rock until state laws and efforts to upset and nullify its holding in the Brown case have been further challenged and tested in the courts. P. 4. [...] 8. The interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” P. 18. [...] Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the “supreme Law of the Land.” In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as “the fundamental and paramount law of the nation,” declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, that “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” This decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3, “to support this Constitution.” Chief Justice Taney, speaking for a unanimous Court in 1859, said that this requirement reflected the framers’ “anxiety to preserve it [the Constitution] in full force, in all its powers, and to guard against resistance to or evasion of its authority, on the part of a State . . . .” Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 524. - - - - - The Federalist No. 81 May 28, 1788 [excerpt] These considerations teach us to applaud the wisdom of those States who have committed the judicial power, in the last resort, not to a part of the legislature, but to distinct and independent bodies of men. Contrary to the supposition of those who have represented the plan of the convention, in this respect, as novel and unprecedented, it is but a copy of the constitutions of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia; and the preference which has been given to those models is highly to be commended.
ALl three branches are empowered to ignore 'laws' that are NOT made "in pursuance thereof"... And you know it... But by all means, pick another lengthy, non-germaine court opinion to quote, as you know damn well no one bothers to read your wind bag efforts anyway.. Get a life, stop trying to prove you're LF's foremost legal beagle. NOT true. -- Tell it to Dred Scott. The SCOTUS was backed up by Eisenhower.. Without Ike, the court would have been powerless to enforce its opinion. Get a grip, you're making fool of yourself.
Dred Scott was returned to slavery. He was manumitted after the case was over. Mrs. Emerson filed a motion to collect the wages earned by Scott during the litigation and held by the Missouri authorities. Congressman Chaffee was glad that was over. Scott v. Sanford was never judicially overturned. SCOTUS found it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. It took a constitutional amendment to overturn slavery. Dred Scott died in 1858 and never saw abolition.
State authority challenged a SCOTUS decision as you imagine is within their authority. The Federal government has ample ability to enforce SCOTUS decisions against State authorities. Governor Faubus got his mind right after a visit by the 82nd Airborne. By your assinine logic, legislation would not have force as the Legislative branch does not enforce it, the Executive does.
Your blithering idiocy does not change the historical facts. Ike decided to enforce the SCOTUS opinion with troops. He was NOT obligated to do so. The SCOTUS was backed up by Eisenhower.. Without Ike, the court would have been powerless to enforce its opinion. The feds can also CHOOSE to NOT enforce SCOTUS opinions.
In the famous case of Nixon and the Watergate tapes, Nixon interpreted the law for himself and contrary to the District Court. The U.S. Supreme Court slapped him down. While the judiciary does not have enforcement power, when the President defies the Court, the Legislative Branch may exercise its power of removal from office. Nixon released the tapes. Articles of impeachment were voted out of the House Judiciary Committee and, facing certain impeachment and removal from office, Nixon resigned and got out of Dodge. Once again, the imaginary tpaine screw you provision of the Supremacy Clause failed to save the day. SCOTUS once again confirmed that it is the final arbiter of what the law is. In no case has SCOTUS identified or referred to the tpaine imaginary screw you provision of the Supremacy Clause. tpaine can only reiterate his own blather of the imagination over and over. U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-05 (1974) 418 U. S. 704 series of cases, the Court interpreted the explicit immunity conferred by express provisions of the Constitution on Members of the House and Senate by the Speech or Debate Clause, U.S.Const. Art. I, § 6. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S. 169 (1966). Since this Court has consistently exercised the power to construe and delineate claims arising under express powers, it must follow that the Court has authority to interpret claims with respect to powers alleged to derive from enumerated powers. Our system of government Powell v. McCormack, supra, at 395 U. S. 549. And in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 369 U. S. 211, the Court stated: Notwithstanding the deference each branch must accord the others, the "judicial Power of the United States" vested in the federal courts by Art. III, § 1, of the Constitution can no more be shared with the Executive Branch than the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto. Any other conclusion would be contrary to the basic concept of separation of powers and the checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government. The Federalist, No. 47, p. 313 (S. Mittell ed. 418 U. S. 705 1938). We therefore reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this Court "to say what the law is" with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this case. Marbury v. Madison, supra, at 5 U. S. 177.
State authorities do not get to choose if they find OSHA agreeable or not. They comply or get sanctioned into oblivion. They do not get to invoke the tpaine imaginary screw you provision of the Supremacy Clause. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/505/88/case.html Gade v National Solid Waste Ass’n, 505 US 88, 108-09 (1992) [excerpt] We recognize that “the States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries, and that as part of their power to protect the public health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions.” Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773, 792 (1975); see also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 731 (1963); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 122 (1889). But under the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, “’any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.’” Felder v. Casey, 487 U. S., at 138 (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U. S. 663, 666 (1962)); see also De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351, 357 (1976) (“[E]ven state regulation designed to protect vital state interests must give way to paramount federal legislation”). We therefore reject petitioner’s argument that the State’s interest in licensing various occupations can save from OSH Act pre-emption those provisions that directly and substantially affect workplace safety. We also reject petitioner’s argument that the Illinois licensing acts do not regulate occupational safety and health at all, but are instead a “pre-condition” to employment. By that reasoning, the OSHA regulations themselves would not be considered occupational standards. SARA, however, makes clear that the training of employees engaged in hazardous waste operations is an occupational safety and health issue, and that certification requirements before an employee may engage in such work are occupational safety and health standards. See supra, at 92. Because nei- [109] ther of the OSH Act’s saving provisions are implicated, and because Illinois does not have an approved state plan under § 18(b), the state licensing acts are pre-empted by the OSH Act to the extent they establish occupational safety and health standards for training those who work with hazardous wastes. Like the Court of Appeals, we do not specifically consider which of the licensing acts’ provisions will stand or fall under the pre-emption analysis set forth above.
SCOTUS is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and not tpaine. They do not recognize the imaginary tpaine screw you provision of the Supremacy Clause. Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186, 211 (1962)
SCOTUS is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and not tpaine. They do not recognize the imaginary tpaine screw you provision of the Supremacy Clause. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (1999)
THAT is funny. Btw -- Must I launch a group intervention on this thread? :-)
When you are as important, and a constitutional scholar, like tpaine, you will recognize that your opinions are no longer opinions. They are better that Jeffersons own statements. I'm damn surprised the Supreme Court has managed to function this long without his induction by a past president. You surprise me, you already posted 175 posts more than I'd waste on this ridiculously fruitless thread. I'm the infidel... Allah warned you about. كافر المسلح
Nah. tpaine #40, imaginary constitutional law. tpaine #53, imaginary court proceedings. Not only did SCOTUS uphold the holding of the District Court, in an unusual opinion, it upheld the entire decree (opinion). tpaine #208, imaginary history. Both he and robertpaulsen slink away from the argument, in defeat. Try as he may to get me to slink away, I’m not going anywhere. tpaine can continue to demonstrate that he has nothing to support his bullshit, and he can assist me in developing a nice one-stop shopping experience for anyone who may need sources to rebut his subsequent bullshit. Help can be a bookmark away. In the tpaine Court of the Imagination, “SCOTUS opinions can be ignored on constitutional grounds and officials can refuse to implement/fund any attempts at forcement.” As Orval Faubus proved, that can bring a visit from the 82nd Airborne. tpaine can always just slink away, or he can keep demonstrating that he has nothing to support his bullshit. I, on the other hand, have over two centuries of on-topic judicial records to draw upon, all of them saying that tpaine is full of shit. It’s kind of like watering my pet geranium. For amusement, one can read books on imaginary law. You can learn that to be a natural born citizen and eligible for President, both parents must have been citizens at the time of birth. Judicial Review is unconstitutional. The new and secret Supremacy Clause. You can even learn that the grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court [Art. 3. Sect. 2, Cl. 2] means that the federal appellate courts could not take any such case claiming original jurisdiction and United States v. Arizona, was unconstitutional because it was started in a U.S. District Court. One may even take law classes and attend seminars to become birther educated about the Constitution. Yes indeed, birthers have now branched to expound upon constitutional law. 25 Myths of the United States Constitution, by Douglas V. Gibbs. The Basic Constitution: An Examination of the Principles and Philosophies of the United States Constitution by Douglas V. Gibbs. Or get a free look at the Gibbs blog, Political Pistachio. You can learn about Unconstitutionality of Judicial Review, June 29, 2012 And there’s more, Understanding the Supremacy Clause, November 15, 2011 And more, Myth #19: Being Born in the United States Satisfies the Definition of Natural Born Citizen, September 19, 2011 And more, Understanding the Eligibility Issue, Regarding Obama, Rubio. . . , January 30, 2012 And more, Understanding the term: Natural Born Citizen, July 31, 2009
nolu chan claims: --- Good idea, as nolu has obviously lost it, in claiming that I've seen some "imaginary" provision in the supremacy clause. -- Not so. He has the over active imagination, and its time to help out the poor delusional fella. --------------------------- #240. To: nolu chan (#237) Good golly, grand one, you've succumbed to the same delusions as nolu! -- I had no idea that he was infectious.... True enough.. Poor nolu has probably posted more fruitless verbiage on this thread than on most small books. -- And all he's proved is his own obsessive/compulsive behavior.
Judge Emmet G. Sullivan has issued an ORDER. Will Hillary Clinton, Huma Abedin, and Cheryl Mills invoke the screw you provision of the Supremacy Clause as expounded by the tpaine Court of the imagination? Judicial Watch v Department of State, DCDC 13-cv-01363-EGS, case filed 09-10-2013, DOCKET REPORT, unnumbered docket entry of 07-31-2015, MINUTE ORDER of Judge Emmet G. Sullivan, quoted from the Docket Report:
District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan issued an ORDER. Will the IRS invoke the screw you provision of the Supremacy Clause as expounded by the tpaine Court of the Imagination? Judicial Watch v IRS, DCDC 13-cv-01559-EGS, case filed 10-09-2013, DOCKET REPORT, unnumbered docket entry of 07-29-2015, MINUTE ORDER of District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan, quoted from the Docket Report: Also the next docket entry, also dated 07-29-2015, quoted from the docket report:
Some help is needed for the tpaine short-term memory loss and the attack of yukonism. So, you see, that it the U.S. Supreme Court rules, as it did in Brown v. Board of Education, that school segregation is unconstitutional, Governor Orval Faubus was exercising his constitutional right and duty under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI when he called out the National Guard to stop the Little Rock School District officials from integrating the Little Rock Central School. Governor Faubus deemed the SCOTUS to be in error and substituted his own judgment, per the imaginary screw off provision of the Supremacy Clause. Yes, read the clause: Good luck finding the imaginary content referred to by tpaine which empowers all officials to use their own interpretation of the Constitution and to tell the Supreme Court to screw off. That worked well for Governor Orval Faubus -- until the 82nd Airborne arrived and told him, “no, screw you.” One may take note of the glaring absence of case law cited and quoted by tpaine to support his bullshit. Nor does he cite and quote recognized legal authorities to support his bullshit. His bullshit is suported by more of his own bullshit. He has a B.S., M.S., and PhD in bullshit: bullshit, more shit, and piled higher and deeper. Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186, 211 (1962) the Court stated:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. Good luck finding the imaginary content referred to by tpaine which empowers all officials to use their own interpretation of the Constitution and to tell the Supreme Court to screw off. Needs repeating I'm the infidel... Allah warned you about. كافر المسلح
Read the clause. It says that all officials of our republic are duty bound to honor our Constitution as the supreme law. -- Which gives them the power to ignore unconstitutional 'laws'. ( At their own peril, of course) This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. "In pursuance thereof" is the content that you fellas want to ignore. Why would you want officials of our various branches of govt to obey constitutionally questionable 'laws' can only be answered by mental health professionals.
The Constitution designates the judiciary to decide whether the laws were made in pursuance thereof, and the judiciary declares null and void the laws it finds unconstitutional. When the Constitution is amended to delegate the authority to tpaine, you will be expounding something other than bullshit. A law violating a constitution established by the people themselves, would be considered by the Judges as null & void. - - - - - 2 Elliott 131: [Samuel Adams] [I]f any law made by the federal government shall be extended beyond the power granted by the proposed Constitution, and inconsistent with the constitution of this state, it will be an error, and adjudged by the courts of law to be void. - - - - - 2 Elliott 196: [Oliver Elsworth] If the United States go beyond their powers, if they make a law which the Constitution does not authorize, it is void; and the judicial power, the national judges, who, to secure their impartiality, are to be made independent, will declare it to be void. - - - - - 2 Elliott 445: [James Wilson] I say, under this Constitution, the legislature may be restrained, and kept within its prescribed bounds, by the interposition of the judicial department. - - - - - 4 Elliott 553: [John Marshall] Can they go beyond the delegated powers? If they were to make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would be considered by the judges as an infringement of the Constitution which they are to guard. They would not consider such a law as coming under their jurisdiction. They would declare it void. William Rawle, A View of the Constitution, 1825, Chapter 20, of the Judicial Power, p. 188: Of the Judicial Power. [...] Its construction of the acts of the legislature is received as binding and conclusive, although it does not prevent the legislature from repairing its own defects, or clearing up its own ambiguities by subsequent laws, operating on subsequent cases. A high function also appertains to the judiciary in the exclusive right to expound the constitution, and thereby to test the validity of all the acts of the legislature. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, 1833, page 703: Dickerson v United States, 530 US 428, 437 (2000): United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809): This was the original case on State Nulification. No Supreme Court decision has ever upheld State Nullification. It is currently only upheld by the tpaine Court of the imagination. Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1 (1958): [...] Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the “supreme Law of the Land.” In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as “the fundamental and paramount law of the nation,” declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, that “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” This decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3, “to support this Constitution.” The duty to abstain from resistance to “the supreme Law of the Land,” U.S. Const., Art. VI § 2, as declared by the organ of our Government for ascertaining it, does not require immediate approval of it nor does it deny the right of dissent. Criticism need not be stilled. Active obstruction or defiance is barred. Our kind of society cannot endure if the controlling authority of the Law as derived from the Constitution is not to be the tribunal specially charged with the duty of ascertaining and declaring what is “the supreme Law of the Land.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 211 (1962) the Court stated:
From the tpaine Court of the Imagination: Yep, just as 'we' can ignore scotus.. The concept of 'checks and balances' is built into our Constitution.. Only laws (or amendments) made "in pursuance thereof" (as the supremacy clause says) are part of our supreme law, the Constitution.. Your opinion, and that of the court, is erroneous. It is a bold new world, where everybody and his brother has original jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution and the laws, and are imbued with a personal right of nullification. The claimed State right of nullification has been held invalid for more than two centuries. In tpaineworld, “‘we’ can ignore scotus.” Anyone believeing this bullshit and acting upon it can try to explain it to a judge. In tpaineworld, tpaine’s anonymous Deemer can deem an Amendment to the Constitution to be unconstitutional. An Amendment is not enacted by Congress, it is ratified by the people. Prior to ratification, it is merely a proposal. Immediately upon ratification, it becomes an integral part of the Constitution, of equal stature to all other parts. No officer or body of the government, created by the people to serve the people, can nullify or void a sovereign act of the people.
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. "In pursuance thereof" is the content that you fellas want to ignore. Why would you want officials of our various branches of govt to obey constitutionally questionable 'laws' can only be answered by mental health professionals. Only laws (or amendments) made "in pursuance thereof" (as the supremacy clause says) are part of our supreme law, the Constitution.. Not so. Officials of every branch, at every level of our State, Fed, and local govts are sworn to support and defend the Constitution, and laws made "in pursuance thereof". They all must decide for themselves whether a law is constitutionally valid. Yep, that is one of their functions, just as I've noted before.
As tpaine has nothing to say but the reiteration of his own bullshit, supported by nothing, and contradicted by centuries of case law and the law tests of qualified legal experts, of which he neither does nor can cite any, it is time to sontinue his education. Case law is not receptive to the bullshit of natural law. - - - - - - - - - [386] AUGUST TERM, 1798. CALDER and wife v. BULL and wife. Constitutional law.—Eminent domain.—Ex post facto laws. The judiciary is a co-ordinate branch of the government, and may declare a statute to be void, as repugnant to the constitution. Private property may be taken for public use, by allowing the owners a reasonable equivalent. A statute granting a new trial in a particular case, is not unconstitutional, as an ex post facto law.1 An ex post facto law, within the meaning of the constitution, is one that punishes as a crime, an act done before its passage, and which, when committed, was not punishable; an act that aggravates a crime, or inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to it, when committed; or a law that alters the rules of evidence, in order to convict an offender. If congress, or a state legislature, pass a law, within the general scope of their constitutional power, the courts cannot pronounce it void, merely because, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice.1 IREDELL, J. An act of the legislature, contrary to the first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative power. CHASE, J. In error from the State of Connecticut. The cause was argued at the last term (in the absence of the Chief Justice) and now the court delivered their opinions seriatim. CHASE, Justice.—The decision of one question determines (in my opinion) the present dispute. I shall, therefore, state from the record no more of the case, than I think necessary for the consideration of that question only. The legislature of Connecticut, on the 2d Thursday of May 1795, passed a resolution or law, which, for the reasons assigned, set aside a decree of the Court of Probate for Hartford, on the 21st of March 1793, which decree disapproved of the will of Normand Morrison (the grandson), made the 21st of August 1779, and refused to record the said will; and granted a new hearing by the said court of probate, with liberty of appeal therefrom, in six months. A new hearing was had, in virtue of this resolution or law, before the said court of probate, who, on the 27th of July 1795, approved the said will, and ordered it to be recorded. At August 1795, appeal was then had to the superior court at Hartford, who, at February term 1796, affirmed the decree of the court of probate. Appeal was had to the supreme court of errors of Connecticut, who, in June 1796, adjudged that there were no errors. More than eighteen months elapsed from the decree of the court of probate (on the 1st of March 1793), and thereby Caleb Bull and wife were barred of all right _____ 1 It has been decided in Pennsylvania, that as the legislature possesses no judicial power, it cannot order a new trial. Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Penn. St. 18. Nor direct the court to entertain a bill of review. Boggs’ Appeal, 43 Id. 512. 2 To the same effect, see Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 21 Penn. St. 147; Erie and North East Railroad, 26 Id. 287. - - - - - - - - - - [387] of appeal, by a statute of Connecticut. There was no law of that state whereby a new hearing or trial, before the said court of probate, might be obtained. Calder and wife claimed the premises in question, in right of the wife, as heiress of N. Morrison, physician; Bull and wife claimed under the will of N. Morrison, the grandson. The counsel for the plaintiffs in error contend, that the said resolution or law of the legislature of Connecticut, granting a new hearing, in the above case, is an ex post facto law, prohibited by the constitution of the United States; that any law of the federal government, or of any of the state government, contrary to the constitution of the United States, is void; and that this court possesses the power to declare such law void. It appears to me a self-evident proposition, that the several state legislatures retain all the powers of legislation, delegated to them by the state constitutions; which are not expressly taken away by the constitution of the United States. The establishing courts of justice, the appointment of judges, and the making regulations for the administration of justice within each state, according to its laws, on all subjects not intrusted to the federal government, appears to me to be the peculiar and exclusive province and duty of tite state legislatures. All the powers delegated by the people of the United States to the federal government are defined, and no constructive powers can be exercised by it, and all the powers that remain in the state governments are indefinite; except only in the constitution of Massachusetts. The effect of the resolution or law of Connecticut, above stated, is to revise a decision of one of its inferior courts, called the court of probate for Hartford, and to direct a new hearing of the case by the same court of probate, that passed the decree against the will of Normand Morrison. By the existing law of Connecticut, a right to recover certain property had vested in Calder and wife (the appellants), in consequence of a decision of a court of justice, but in virtue of a subsequent resolution or law, and the new hearing thereof, and the decision in consequence, this right to recover certain property was divested, and the right to the property declared to be in Bull and wife, the appellees. The sole inquiry is, whether this resolution or law of Connecticut, having such operation, is an ex post facto law, within the prohibition of the federal constitution? Whether the legislature of any of the states can revise and correct by law, a decision of any of its courts of justice, although not prohibited by the constitution of the state, is a question of very great importance, and not necessary now to be determined; because the resolution or law in question does not go so far. I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a state - - - - - - - - - [388] legislature or that it is absolute and without control; although its authority should not be expressly restrained by the constitution, or fundamental law of the state. The people of the United States erected their constitutions or forms of government, to establish justice, to promote the general welfare, to secure the blessings of liberty, and to protect their persons and property from violence. The purposes for which men enter into society will determine the nature and terms of the social compact; and as they are the foundation of the legislative power, they will decide what are the proper objects of it. The nature, and ends of legislative power will limit the exercise of it. This fundamental principle flows from the very nature of our free republican governments, that no man should be compelled to do what the laws do not require; nor to refrain from acts which the laws permit. There are acts which the federal, or state legislature cannot do, without exceeding their authority. There are certain vital principles in our free republican governments, which will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as to authorize manifest injustice by positive law; or to take away that security for personal liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof the government was established. An act of the legislature (for I cannot call it a law), contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a righful exercise of legislative authority. The obligation of a law, in governments established on express compact, and on republican principles, must be determined by the nature of the power on which it is founded. A few instances will suffice to explain what I mean. A law that punished a citizen for an innocent action, or, in other words, for an act, which, when done, was in violation of no existing law; a law that destroys or impairs the lawful private contracts of citizens; a law that makes a man a judge in his own cause; or a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B.: it is against all reason and justice, for a people to intrust a legislature with such powers; and therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it. The genius, the nature and the spirit of our state governments, amount to a prohibition of such acts of legislation; and the general principles of law and reason forbid them. The legislature may enjoin, permit, forbid and punish; they may declare new crimes; and establish rules of conduct for all its citizens in future cases; they may command what is right, and prohibit what is wrong; but they cannot change innocence into guilt; or punish innocence as a crime; or violate the right of an antecedent lawful private contract; or the right of private property. To maintain that our federal, or state legislature possesses such powers, if they had not been expressly restrained; would, - - - - - - - - - [389] in my opinion, be a political heresy, altogether inadmissible in our free republican governments. All the restrictions contained in the constitution of the United States on the power of the state legislatures, were provided in favor of the authority of the federal government. The prohibition against their making any ex post facto laws was introduced for greater caution, and very probably arose from the knowledge, that the parliament of Great Britain claimed and exercised a power to pass such laws, under the denomination of bills of attainder, or bills of pains and penalties; the first inflicting capital, and the other less punishment. These acts were legislative judgments; and an exercise of judicial power. Sometimes, they respected the crime, by declaring acts to be treason, which were not treason, when committed;(*) at other times, they violated the rules of evidence (to supply a deficiency of legal proof) by admitting one witness, when the existing law required two; by receiving evidence without oath; or the oath of the wife against the husband; or other testimony, which the courts of justice would not admit;(a) at other times, they inflicted punishments, where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment;(b) and in other cases, they inflicted greater punishment, than the law annexed to the offence, (c) The ground for the exercise of such legislative power was this, that the safety of the kingdom depended on the death, or other punishment, of the offender: as if traitors, when discovered, could be so formidable, or the government so insecure! With very few exceptions, the advocates of such laws were stimulated by ambition, or personal resentment and vindictive malice. To prevent such and similar acts of violence and injustice, I believe, the federal and state legislatures were prohibited from passing any bill of attainder, or any ex post facto law. The constitution of the United States, article I., section 9, prohibits the legislature of the United States from passing any ex post facto law; and, in § 10, lays several restrictions on the authority of the legislatures of the several states; and, among them, “ that no state shall pass any ex post facto law.” It may be remembered, that the legislatures of several of the states, to wit, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and North and South Carolina, are expressly prohibited, by their state constitutions, from passing any ex post facto law. _____ (*) The case of the Earl of Strafford, in 1641. (a) The case of Sir John Fenwick, in 1696. (b) The banishment of Lord Clarendon, 1669 (19 Car. II, c. 10), and of the Bishop of Atterbury, in 1723 (9 Geo. I., c. 17). (c) The Coventry act, in 1670 (22 & 23 Car. IL, c. 1). - - - - - - - - - - [390] I shall endeavor to show what law is to be considered an ex post facto law, within the words and meaning of the prohibition in the federal constitution. The prohibition, “that no state shall pass any ex post facto law,” necessarily requires some explanation; for, naked and without explanation, it is unintelligible, and means nothing. Literally, it is only, that a law shall not be passed concerning, and after the fact, or thing done, or action committed. I would ask, what fact; of what nature or kind; and by whom done? That Charles L, king of England, was beheaded; that Oliver Cromwell was protector of England; that Louis XVI., late king of France, was guillotined; are all facts that have happened; but it would be nonsense to suppose, that the states were prohibited from making any law, after either of these events, and with reference thereto. The prohibition, in the letter, is not to pass any law concerning, and after the fact; but the plain and obvious meaning and intention of the prohibition is this: that the legislatures of the several states, shall not pass laws, after a fact done by a subject or citizen, which shall have relation to such fact, and shall punish him for having done it. The prohibition, considered in this light, is an additional bulwark in favor of the personal security of the subject, to protect his person from punishment by legislative acts, having a retrospective operation. I do not think it was inserted, to secure the citizen in his private rights of either property or contracts. The prohibitions not to make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, and not to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, were inserted to secure private rights; but the restriction not to pass any ex post facto law, was to secure the person of the subject from injury or punishment, in consequence of such law. If the prohibition against making ex post facto laws was intended to secure personal rights from being affected or injured by such laws, and the prohibition is sufficiently extensive for that object, the other restraints I have enumerated, were unnecessary, and therefore, improper; for both of them are retrospective.1 I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words and the intent of the prohibition. 1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. _____ 1 Southwick v. Southwick, 49 N. Y. 510. 2 Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88; Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456; Locke v. New Orleans, 4 Wall. 172; Cummings v. Missouri, Id. 277; United States v. hall, 2 W.C.C. 366; Shepherd v. People, 25 N.Y. 406. - - - - - - - - - [391] All these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive. In my opinion, the true distinction is between ex post facto laws, and retrospective laws. Every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective; but every retrospective law is not an ex post facto law: the former only are prohibited. Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested, agreeable to existing laws, is retrospective, and is generally unjust, and may be oppressive; and it is a good general rule, that a law should have no retrospect: but there are cases in which laws may justly, and for the benefit of the community, and also of individuals, relate to a time antecedent to their commencement; as statutes of oblivion or of pardon. They are certainly retrospective, and literally both concerning and after the facts committed. But I do not consider any law ex post facto, within the prohibition, that mollifies the rigor of the criminal law: but only those that create or aggravate the crime; or increase the punishment, or change the rules of evidence, for the purpose of conviction. Every law that is to have an operation before the making thereof, as to commence at an antecedent time; or to save time from the statute of limitations; or to excuse acts which were unlawful, and before committed, and the like, is retrospective. But such laws may be proper or necessary, as the case may be. There is a great and apparent difference between making an unlawful act lawful; and the making an innocent action criminal, and punishing it as a crime. The expressions “ ex post facto laws,” are technical, they had been in use long before the revolution, and had acquired an appropriate meaning, by legislators, lawyers and authors. The celebrated and judicious Sir William Blackstone, in his commentaries, considers an ex post facto law precisely in the same light as I have done. His opinion is confirmed by his successor, Mr. Wooddeson; and by the author of the Federalist, who I esteem superior to both, for his extensive and accurate knowledge of the true principles of government. I also rely greatly on the definition or explanation of ex post facto laws, as given by the conventions of Massachusetts, Maryland and North Carolina, in their several constitutions or forms of government. In the declaration of rights, by the convention of Massachusetts, part lst, § 24, “Laws made to punish actions done before the existence of such laws, and which have not been declared crimes by preceding laws, are unjust, &c.” In the declaration of rights, by the convention of Maryland, art. 15th, “Retrospective laws punishing facts committed before the existence of such laws, and by them - - - - - - - - - [392] only declared criminal, are oppressive, &c.” In the declaration of rights, by the convention of North Carolina, art. 24th, I find the same definition, precisely in the same words, as in the Maryland constitution. In the declaration of rights, by the convention of Delaware, art. 11th, the same definition was clearly intended, but inaccurately expressed: by saying “laws punishing offences (instead of actions or facts) committed before the existence of such laws, are oppressive, &c.” I am of opinion, that the fact, contemplated by the prohibition, and not to be affected by a subsequent law, was some fact to be done by a citizen or subject. In 2 Lord Raymond 1352, Raymond, Justice, called the stat. 7 Geo. I., stat. 2, par. 8, about registering contracts for South Sea stock, an ex post facto law; because it affected contracts made before the statute. In the present case, there is no fact done by Bull and wife, plaintiffs in error, that is in any manner affected by the law or resolution of Connecticut: it does not concern, or relate to, any act done by them. The decree of the court of probate of Hartford (on the 21st March), in consequence of which Calder and wife claim a right to the property in question, was given before the said law or resolution, and in that sense, was affected and set aside by it; and in consequence of the law allowing a hearing and the decision in favor of the will, they have lost what they would have been entitled to, if the law or resolution, and the decision in consequence thereof, had not been made. The decree of the court of probate is the only fact, on which the law or resolution operates. In my judgment, the case of the plaintiffs in error, is not within the letter of the prohibition; and for the reasons assigned, I am clearly of opinion, that it is not within the intention of the prohibition; and if within the intention, but out of the letter, I should not, therefore, consider myself justified to construe it within the prohibition, and therefore, that the whole was void. It was argued by the counsel for the plaintiffs in error, that the legislature of Connecticut had no constitutional power to make the resolution (or law) in question, granting a new hearing, &c. Without giving an opinion, at this time, whether this court has jurisdiction to decide that any law made by congress, contrary to the constitution of the United States, is void: I am fully satisfied, that this court has no jurisdiction to determine that any law of any state legislature, contrary to the constitution of such state, is void. Further, if this court had such jurisdiction, yet it does not appear to me, that the resolution (or law) in question, is contrary to the charter of Connecticut, or its constitution, which is said by counsel to be composed of its - - - - - - - - - [393] acts of assembly, and usages and customs. I should think, that the courts of Connecticut are the proper tribunals to decide, whether laws contrary to the constitution thereof, are void. In the present case, they have, both in the inferior and superior courts, determined that the resolution (or law) in question was not contrary to either their state, or the federal constitution. To show that the resolution was contrary to the constitution of the United States, it was contended, that the words, ex post facto law have a precise and accurate meaning, and convey but one idea to professional men, which is, “by matter of after fact; by something after the fact.” And Co. Litt. 241; Fearne’s Cont. Rem. (Old Ed.) 175 and 203; Powell on Devises 113, 133, 134, were cited; and the table to Coke’s Reports (by Wilson), title ex post facto, was referred to. There is no doubt, that a man may be a trespasser from the beginning, by matter of after fact; as where an entry is given by law, and the party abuses it; or where the law gives a distress, and the party kills or works the distress. I admit, an act unlawful in the beginning may, in some cases, become lawful by matter of after fact. I also agree, that the words “ex post facto” have the meaning contended for, and no other, in the cases cited, and in all similar cases, where they are used unconnected with, and without relation to, legislative acts or laws. There appears to me a manifest distinction between the case where one fact relates to, and affects, another fact, as where an after fact, by operation of law, makes a former fact either lawful or unlawful; and the case where a law made after a fact done, is to operate on, and to affect, such fact. In the first case, both the acts are done by private persons; in the second case, the first act is done by a private person, and the second act is done by the legislature, to affect the first act. I believe, that but one instance can be found in which a British judge called a statute, that affected contracts made before the statute, an ex post facto law; but the judges of Great Britain always considered penal statutes, that created crimes, or increased the punishment of them, as ex post facto laws. If the term ex post facto law is to be construed to include and to prohibit the enacting any law, after a fact, it will greatly restrict the power of the federal and state legislatures; and the consequences of such a construction may not be foreseen. If the prohibition to make no ex post facto law extends to all laws made after the fact, the two prohibitions, not to make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; and not; tp pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, were improper and unnecessary. - - - - - - - - - [394] It was further urged, that if the provision does not extend to -^ prohibit the making any law, after a fact, then all choses in action; all lands by devise; all personal property by bequest, or distribution; by elegit; by execution; by judgments, particularly on torts; will be unprotected from the legislative power of the states; rights vested may be divested at the will and pleasure of the state legislatures; and therefore, that the true construction and meaning of the prohibition is, that the states pass no law to deprive a citizen of any right vested in him by existing laws. It is not to be presumed, that the federal or state legislatures will pass laws to deprive citizens of rights vested in them by existing laws; unless for the benefit of the whole community; and on making full satisfaction. The restraint against making any ex post facto laws was not considered by the framers of the constitution, as extending to prohibit the depriving a citizen even of a vested right to property; or the provision that private property should not be taken for public use, without just compensation,” was unnecessary. It seems to me, that the right of property, in its origin, could only arise from compact, express or implied, and I think it the better opinion, that the right, as well as the mode, or manner of acquiring property, and of alienatii g or transferring, inheriting or transmitting it, is conferred by society; is regulated by civil institution, and is always subject to the rules prescribed by positive law. When I say, that a right is vested in a citizen, I mean, that he has the power to do certain actions; or to possess certain things, according to the law of the land. If any one has a right to property, such a right is perfect and exclusive right; but no one can have such right, before he has acquired a better right to the property, than any other person in the world; a right, therefore, only to recover property, cannot be called a perfect and exclusive right. I cannot agree, that a right to property vested in Calder and wife, in consequence of the decree (of the 21st of March 1783) disapproving of the will of Morrison, the grandson. If the will was valid, Mrs. Calder could have no right, as heiress of Morrison, the physician; but if the will was set aside, she had an undoubted title. The resolution (or law) alone had no manner of effect on any right whatever vested in Calder and wife. The resolution (or law), combined with the new hearing, and the decision in virtue of it, took away their right to recover the property in question. But when combined, they took away no right of property vested in Calder and wife; because, the decree against the will (21st March 1783) did not vest in or transfer any property to them. - - - - - - - - - - [395] I am under a necessity to give a construction or explanation of the words, “ ex post facto law,” because they have not any certain meaning attached to them. But I will not go further than I feel myself bound to do; and if I ever exercise the jurisdiction, I will not decide any law to be void, but in a very clear case. I am of opinion, that the decree of the supreme court of errors of Connecticut be affirmed, with costs. PATERSON, Justice.—The constitution of Connecticut is made up of usages, and it appears, that its legislature have, from the beginning, exercised the power of granting new trials. This has been uniformly the case, until the year 1762, when this power was, by a legislative act, imparted to the superior and county courts. But the act does not remove or annihilate the pre-existing power of the legislature, in this particular; it only communicates to other authorities a concurrence of jurisdiction, as to the awarding of new trials. And the fact is, that the legislature have, in two instances, exercised this power, since the passing of the law in 1762. They acted in a double capacity, as a house of legislation, with undefined authority, and also as a court of judicature, in certain exigencies. Whether the latter arose from the indefinite nature of their legislative powers, or in some other way, it is not necessary to discuss. From the best information, however, which I have been able to collect on this subject, it appears, that the legislature, or general court of Connecticut, originally possessed and exercised all legislative, executive and judicial authority; and Hutt, from time to time, they distributed the two latter in such manner as they thought proper; but without parting with the general superintending power, or the right of exercising the same, whenever they should judge it expedient. But be this as it may, it is sufficient for the present, to observe, that they have, on certain occasions, exercised judicial authority, from the commencement of their civil polity. This usage makes up part of the constitution of Connecticut, and we are bound to consider it as such, unless it be inconsistent with the constitution of the United States. True it is, that the awarding of new trials falls properly within the province of the judiciary; but if the legislature of Connecticut have been in the uninterrupted exercise of this authority, in certain cases, we must, in such cases, respect their decisions, as flowing from a competent jurisdiction or constitutional organ. And therefore, we may, in the present instance, consider the legislature of the state as having acted in their customary judicial capacity. If so, there is an end of the question. For if the power, thus exercised, comes more properly within the description of a judicial than of a legislative power; and if by usage or the - - - - - - - - - [396] constitution, which, in Connecticut, are synonymous terms, the legislature of that state acted in both capacities; then, in the case L now before us, it would be fair to consider the awarding of a new trial, as an act emanating from the judiciary side of the department. But as this view of the subject militates against the plaintiffs in error, their counsel has contended for a reversal of the judgment, on the ground, that the awarding of a new trial was the effect of a legislative act, and that it is unconstitutional, because an ex post facto law. For the sake of ascertaining the meaning of these terms, I will consider the resolution of the general court of Connecticut, as the exercise of a legislative and not a judicial authority. The question, then, which arises on the pleadings in this cause, is, whether the resolution of the legislature of Connecticut, be an ex post facto law, within the meaning of the constitution of the United States? I am of opinion, that it is not. The words, ex post facto, when applied to a law, have a technical meaning, and, in legal phraseology, refer to crimes, pains and penalties. Judge Blackstone’s description of the terms is clear and accurate. “There is,” says he, “a still more unreasonable method than this, which is called making of laws, ex post facto, when, after an action, indifferent in itself, is committed, the legislature, then, for the first time, declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment upon the person who has committed it. Here, it is impossible, that the party could foresee, that an action, innocent when it was done, should be afterwards converted to guilt, by a subsequent law; he had, therefore, no cause to abstain from it; and all punishment for not abstaining, must, of consequence, be cruel and unjust.” 1 Bl. Com. 46. Here, the meaning annexed to the terms ex post facto laws, unquestionably refers to crimes, and nothing else. The historic page abundantly evinces, that the power of passing such laws should be withheld from legislators; as it is a dangerous instrument in the hands of bold, unprincipled, aspiring and party men, and has been too often used to effect the most detestable purposes. On inspecting such of our state constitutions, as take notice of laws made ex post facto, we shall find, that they are understood in the same sense. The constitution of Massachusetts, article 24th of the declaration of rights: “Laws made to punish for actions done before the existence of such laws, and which have not been declared crimes by preceding laws, are unjust, oppressive, and inconsistent with the fundamental principles of a free government.” The constitution of Delaware, article 11th of the declaration of rights: - - - - - - - - - [397] “That retrospective laws punishing offences committed before the existence of such laws, are oppressive and unjust, and ought not to be made.” The constitution of Maryland, article 15th of the declaration of rights: “That retrospective laws, punishing facts committed before the existence of such laws, and by them only declared criminal, are oppressive, unjust and incompatible with liberty; wherefore, no ex post facto law ought to be made.” The constitution of North Carolina, article 24th of the declaration of rights: “That retrospective laws, punishing facts committed before the existence of such laws, and by them only declared criminal, are oppressive, unjust and incompatible with liberty; wherefore, no ex post facto law ought to be made.” From the above passages, it appears, that ex post facto laws have an appropriate signification; they extend to penal statutes and no further; they are restricted, in legal estimation, to the creation, and, perhaps, enhancement of crimes, pains and penalties. The enhancement of a crime or penalty seems to come within the same mischief as the creation of a crime or penalty; and therefore, they may be classed together. Again, the words of the constitution of the United States are, “That no state shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.” Article I., § 10. Where is the necessity or use of the latter words, if a law impairing the obligation of contracts, be comprehended within the terms ex post facto law? It is obvious, from the specification of contracts in the last member of the clause, that the framers of the constitution did not understand or use the words in the sense contended for on the part of the plaintiffs in error. They understood and used the words in their known and appropriate signification, as referring to crimes, pains and penalties, and no further. The arrangement of the distinct members of this section, necessarily points to this meaning. I had an ardent desire to have extended the provision in the constitution to retrospective laws in general. There is neither policy or safety in such laws; and therefore, I have always had a strong aversion against them. It may, in general, be truly observed of retrospective laws of every description, that they neither accord with sound legislation, nor the fundamental principles of the social compact. But on full consideration, I am convinced, that ex post facto laws must be limited in the manner already expressed; they must be taken in their technical, which is also their common and general, acceptation, and are not to be understood in their literal sense. - - - - - - - - - [398] Iredell, Justice.—Though I concur in the general result of the opinions which have been delivered, I cannot entirely adopt the reasons that are assigned upon the occasion. From the best information to be collected, relative to the constitution of Connecticut, it appears, that the legislature of that state has been in the uniform, uninterrupted habit of exercising a general superintending power over its courts of law, by granting new trials. It may, indeed, appear strange to some of us, that in any form, there should exist a power to grant, with respect to suits depending or adjudged, new rights of trial, new privileges of proceeding, not previously recognised and regulated by positive institutions; but such is the established usage of Connecticut, and it is obviously consistent with the general superintending authority of her legislature. Nor is it altogether without some sanction, for a legislature to act as a court of justice. In England, we know that one branch of the parliament, the House of Lords, not only exercises a judicial power, in cases of impeachment, and for the trial of its own members, but as the court of dernier resort, takes cognisance of many suits of law and in equity; and that in construction of law, the jurisdiction there exercised is by the king in full parliament; which shows that, in its origin, the causes were probably heard before the whole parliament. When Connecticut was settled, the right of empowering the legislature to superintend the courts of justice, was, I presume, early assumed; and its expediency, as applied to the local circumstances and municipal policy of the state, is sanctioned by a long and uniform practice. The power, however, is judicial in its nature; and whenever it is exercised, as in the present instance, it is an exercise of judicial, not of legislative, authority. But let us, for a moment, suppose, that the resolution, granting a new trial, was a legislative act, it will by no means follow, that it is an act affected by the constitutional prohibition, that “no state shall pass any ex post facto law.” I will endeavor to state the general principles which influence me, on this point, succinctly and clearly, though I have not had an opportunity to reduce my opinion to writing. If, then, a government, composed of legislative, executive and judicial departments, were established, by a constitution which imposed no limits on the legislative power, the consequence would inevitably be, that whatever the legislative power chose to enact, would be lawfully enacted, and the judicial power could never interpose to pronounce it void. It is true, that some speculative jurists have held, that a legislative act against natural justice must, in itself, be void; but I cannot think that, under such a government any court of justice would possess a power to declare it so. Sir William Blackstone, having put the strong case of an act of parliament, which - - - - - - - - - [399] authorize a man to try his own cause, explicitly adds, that even in that case, “there is no court that has power to defeat the intent of the legislature, when couched in such evident and express words, as leave no doubt whether it was the intent of the legislature, or no.” 1 Bl. Com. 91. In order, therefore, to guard against so great an evil, it has been the policy of all the American states, which have, individually, framed their state constitutions, since the revolution, and of the people of the United States, when they framed the federal constitution, to define with precision the objects of the legislative power, and to restrain its exercise within marked and settled boundaries. If any act of congress, or of the legislature of a state, violates those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void; though, I admit, that as the authority to declare it void is of a delicate and awful nature, the court will never resort to that authority, but in a clear and urgent case. If, on the other hand, the legislature of the Union, or the legislature of any member of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope of their constitutional power, the court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice. The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all that the court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natural justice. There are then but two lights, in which the subject can be viewed: 1st. If the legislature pursue the authority delegated to them, their acts are valid. 2d. If they transgress the boundaries of that authority, their acts are invalid. In the former case, they exercise the discretion vested in them by the people, to whom alone they are responsible for the faithful discharge of their trust: but in the latter case, they violate a fundamental law, which must be our guide, whenever we are called upon, as judges, to determine the validity of a legislative act. Still, however, in the present instance, the act or resolution of the legislature of Connecticut, cannot be regarded as an ex post facto law; for the true construction of the prohibition extends to criminal, not to civil cases. It is only in criminal cases, indeed, in which the danger to be guarded against, is greatly to be apprehended. The history of every country in Europe will furnish flagrant instances of tyranny exercised under the pretext of penal dispensations. Rival factions, in their efforts to crush each other, have superseded all the forms, and suppressed all the sentiments of justice; while attainders, on the principle of retaliation and proscription, have marked all - - - - - - - - - [400] vicissitudes of party triumph. The temptation to such abuses of power is unfortunately too alluring for human virtue; and therefore, the framers of the American constitutions have wisely denied to the respective legislatures, federal as well as state, the possession of the power itself: they snail not pass any ex post facto law; or, in other words, they shall not inflict a punishment for any act, which was innocent at the time it was committed; nor increase the degree of punishment previously denounced for any specific offence. The policy, the reason and humanity of the prohibition, do not, I repeat, extend to civil cases, to cases that merely affect the private property of citizens. Some of the most necessary and important acts of legislation are, on the contrary, founded upon the principle, that private rights must yield to public exigencies. Highways are run through private grounds; fortifications, light-houses, and ottier public edifices, are necessarily sometimes built upon the soil owned by individuals. In such, and similar cases, if the owners should refuse voluntarily to accommodate the public, they must be constrained, so far as the public necessities require; and justice is done, by allowing them a reasonable equivalent. Without the possession of this power, the operations of government would often be obstructed, and society itself would be endangered. It is not sufficient to urge, that the power may be abused, for such is the nature of all power—such is the tendency of every human institution: and, it might as fairly be said, that the power of taxation, which is only circumscribed by the discretion of the body in which it is vested, ought not to be granted, because the legislature, disregarding its true objects, might, for visionary and useless projects, impose a tax to the amount of nineteen shillings in the pound. We must be content to limit power, where we can, and where we cannot, consistently with its use, we must be content to repose a salutary confidence. It is our consolation, that there never existed a government, in ancient or modern times, more free from danger in this respect, than the governments of America. Upon the whole, though there cannot be a case, in which an ex post facto law in criminal matters is requisite or justifiable (for providence never can intend to promote the prosperity of any country by bad means), yet, in the present instance, the objection does not arise: because, 1st, if the act of the legislature of Connecticut was a judicial act, it is not within the words of the constitution; and 2d, even if it was a legislative act, it is not witliAi the meaning of the prohibition. Cushing, Justice.—The case appears to me to be clear of all difficulty, taken either way. If the act is a judicial act, it is not touched by the federal constitution: and if it is a legislative - - - - - - - - - [401] act, it is maintained and justified by the ancient and uniform practice of the state of Connecticut. Judgment affirmed.
This is what I have to say, supported by the Constitution.. This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. "In pursuance thereof" is the content that you fellas want to ignore. Why would you want officials of our various branches of govt to obey constitutionally questionable 'laws' can only be answered by mental health professionals. Only laws (or amendments) made "in pursuance thereof" (as the supremacy clause says) are part of our supreme law, the Constitution.. Not so. Officials of every branch, at every level of our State, Fed, and local govts are sworn to support and defend the Constitution, and laws made "in pursuance thereof". They all must decide for themselves whether a law is constitutionally valid. Yep, that is one of their functions, just as I've noted before.
As tpaine has been reduced to a chihuahua, able only to repeat his nonsense over and over, the lesson continues. U.S. Supreme Court Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 21 How. 506 (1858) Ableman v. Booth 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 Syllabus 1. The process of a State court or judge has no authority beyond the limits of the sovereignty which confers the judicial power. 2. A habeas corpus, issued by a State judge or court, has no authority within the limits of the sovereignty assigned by the Constitution to the United States. The sovereignty of the United States and of a State are distinct and independent of each other within their respective spheres of action, although both exist and exercise their powers within the same territorial limits. 3. When a writ of habeas corpus is served on a marshal or other person having a prisoner in custody under the authority of the United States, it is his duty, by a proper return, to make known to the State judge or court the authority by which he holds him. But, at the same time, it is his duty not to obey the process of the State authority, but to obey and execute the process of the United States. 4. This court has appellate power in all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, with such exceptions and regulations as Congress may make, whether the cases arise in a State Court or an inferior court of the United States. And, under the act of Congress of 1789, when the decision of the State court is against the right claimed under the Constitution or laws of the United States, a writ of error will lie to bring the judgment of the State court before this court for reexamination and revision. 5. The act of Congress of September 18, 1850, usually called the fugitive slave law, is constitutional in all its provisions. 6. The commissioner appointed by the District Court of the United States for the district of Wisconsin had authority to issue his warrant and commit the defendant in error for an offence against eh act of September 18, 1850. 7. The District Court of the United States had exclusive jurisdiction to try and punish the offence, and the validity of its proceedings and judgment cannot be reexamined and set aside by any other tribunal. These two cases were brought up from the Supreme Court 62 U. S. 507 of the State of Wisconsin by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the judiciary act. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court. The plaintiff in error in the first of these cases is the marshal of the United States for the district of Wisconsin, and the two cases have arisen out of the same transaction, and depend, to some extent, upon the same principles. On that account, they have been argued and considered together; and the following are the facts as they appear in the transcripts before us: Sherman M. Booth was charged before Winfield Smith, a commissioner duly appointed by the District Court of the United States for the district of Wisconsin, with having, on the 11th day of March, 1854, aided and abetted, at Milwaukee, in the said district, the escape of a fugitive slave from the deputy marshal, who had him in custody under a warrant issued by the district judge of the United States for that district, under the act of Congress of September 18, 1850. Upon the examination before the commissioner, he was satisfied that an offence had been committed as charged, and that there was probable cause to believe that Booth had been guilty of it, and thereupon held him to bail to appear and answer before the District Court of the United States for the district of Wisconsin on the first Monday in July then next ensuing. But on the 26th of May, his bail or surety in the recognisance delivered him to the marshal, in the presence of the commissioner, and requested the commissioner to recommit Booth to the custody of the marshal, and he having failed to recognise again for his appearance before the District Court, the commissioner committed him to the custody of the marshal, to be delivered to the keeper of the jail until he should be discharged by due course of law. Booth made application on the next day, the 27th of May, 62 U. S. 508 to A. D. Smith, one of the justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin, for a writ of habeas corpus, stating that he was restrained of his liberty by Stephen V. R. Ableman, marshal of the United States for that district, under the warrant of commitment hereinbefore mentioned, and alleging that his imprisonment was illegal because the act of Congress of September 18, 1850, was unconstitutional and void, and also that the warrant was defective, and did not describe the offence created by that act, even if the act were valid. Upon this application, the justice, on the same day, issued the writ of habeas corpus, directed to the marshal, requiring him forthwith to have the body of Booth before him (the said justice) together with the time and cause of his imprisonment. The marshal thereupon, on the day above mentioned, produced Booth and made his return, stating that he was received into his custody as marshal on the day before, and held in custody by virtue of the warrant of the commissioner above mentioned, a copy of which he annexed to and returned with the writ. To this return Booth demurred, as not sufficient in law to justify his detention. And upon the hearing the justice decided that his detention was illegal, and ordered the marshal to discharge him and set him at liberty, which was accordingly done. Afterwards, on the 9th of June in the same year, the marshal applied to the Supreme Court of the State for a certiorari, setting forth in his application the proceedings hereinbefore mentioned, and charging that the release of Booth by the justice was erroneous and unlawful, and praying that his proceedings might be brought before the Supreme Court of the State for revision. The certiorari was allowed on the same day, and the writ was accordingly issued on the 12th of the same month, and returnable on the third Tuesday of the month, and on the 20th, the return was made by the justice, stating the proceedings as hereinbefore mentioned. The case was argued before the Supreme Court of the State, and, on the 19th of July, it pronounced its judgment, affirming 62 U. S. 509 the decision of the associate justice discharging Booth from imprisonment, with costs against Ableman, the marshal. Afterwards, on the 26th of October, the marshal sued out a writ of error, returnable to this court on the first Monday of December, 1854, in order to bring the judgment here for revision, and the defendant in error was regularly cited to appear on that day, and the record and proceedings were certified to this court by the clerk of the State court in the usual form, in obedience to the writ of error. And on the 4th of December, Booth, the defendant in error, filed a memorandum in writing in this court, stating that he had been cited to appear here in this case, and that he submitted it to the judgment of this court on the reasoning in the argument and opinions in the printed pamphlets therewith sent. After the judgment was entered in the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and before the writ of error was sued out, the State court entered on its record that, in the final judgment it had rendered, the validity of the act of Congress of September 18, 1850, and of February 12, 1793, and the authority of the marshal to hold the defendant in his custody under the process mentioned in his return to the writ of habeas corpus were respectively drawn in question, and the decision of the court in the final judgment was against their validity, respectively. This certificate was not necessary to give this court jurisdiction, because the proceedings, upon their face, show that these questions arose, and how they were decided, but it shows that, at that time, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin did not question their obligation to obey the writ of error, nor the authority of this court to reexamine their judgment in the cases specified. And the certificate is given for the purpose of placing distinctly on the record the points that were raised and decided in that court, in order that this court might have no difficulty in exercising its appellate power and pronouncing its judgment upon all of them. We come now to the second case. At the January term of the District Court of the United States for the district of Wisconsin, after Booth had been set at liberty and after the transcript of the proceedings in the case above mentioned had been 62 U. S. 510 returned to and filed in this court, the grand jury found a bill of indictment against Booth for the offence with which he was charged before the commissioner and from which the State court had discharged him. The indictment was found on the 4th of January, 1855. On the 9th, a motion was made by counsel on behalf of the accused to quash the indictment, which was overruled by the court, and he thereupon pleaded not guilty, upon which issue was joined. On the 10th, a jury was called and appeared in court, when he challenged the array, but the challenge was overruled and the jury empaneled. The trial, it appears, continued from day to day, until the 13th, when the jury found him guilty in the manner and form in which he stood indicted in the fourth and fifth counts. On the 16th, he moved for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, which motions were argued on the 20th, and on the 23d the court overruled the motions and sentenced the prisoner to be imprisoned for one month, and to pay a fine of $1,000 and the costs of prosecution, and that he remain in custody until the sentence was complied with. We have stated more particularly these proceedings from a sense of justice to the District Court, as they show that every opportunity of making his defence was afforded him, and that his case was fully heard and considered. On the 26th of January, three days after the sentence was passed, the prisoner by his counsel filed his petition in the Supreme Court of the State, and with his petition filed a copy of the proceedings in the District Court, and also affidavits from the foreman and one other member of the jury who tried him, stating that their verdict was guilty on the fourth and fifth counts, and not guilty on the other three, and stated in his petition that his imprisonment was illegal because the fugitive slave law was unconstitutional, that the District Court had no jurisdiction to try or punish him for the matter charged against him, and that the proceedings and sentence of that court were absolute nullities in law. Various other objections to the proceedings are alleged which are unimportant in the questions now before the court, and need not, therefore, be particularly stated. On the next day, the 27th, the court directed 62 U. S. 511 two writs of habeas corpus to be issued, one to the marshal and one to the sheriff of Milwaukee, to whose actual keeping the prisoner was committed by the marshal, by order of the District Court. The habeas corpus directed each of them to produce the body of the prisoner and make known the cause of his imprisonment immediately after the receipt of the writ. On the 30th of January the marshal made his return, not acknowledging the jurisdiction but stating the sentence of the District Court as his authority; that the prisoner was delivered to, and was then in the actual keeping of the sheriff of Milwaukee county by order of the court, and he therefore had no control of the body of the prisoner; and if the sheriff had not received him, he should have so reported to the District Court, and should have conveyed him to some other place or prison, as the court should command. On the same day, the sheriff produced the body of Booth before the State court, and returned that he had been committed to his custody by the marshal by virtue of a transcript, a true copy of which was annexed to his return, and which was the only process or authority by which he detained him. This transcript was a full copy of the proceedings and sentence in the District Court of the United States, as hereinbefore stated. To this return the accused, by his counsel, filed a general demurrer. The court ordered the hearing to be postponed until the 2d of February, and notice to be given to the district attorney of the United States. It was accordingly heard on that day, and on the next (February 3d), the court decided that the imprisonment was illegal, and ordered and adjudged that Booth be, and he was by that judgment, forever discharged from that imprisonment and restraint, and he was accordingly set at liberty. On the 21st of April next following, the Attorney General of the United States presented a petition to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, stating briefly the facts in the case and at the same time presenting an exemplification of the proceedings hereinbefore stated, duly certified by the clerk of the State court and averring in his petition that the State court had no 62 U. S. 512 jurisdiction in the case, and praying that a writ of error might issue to bring its judgment before this court to correct the error. The writ of error was allowed and issued, and, according to the rules and practice of the court, was returnable on the first Monday of December, 1855, and a citation for the defendant in error to appear on that day was issued by the Chief Justice at the same time. No return having been made to this writ, the Attorney General, on the 1st of February, 1856, filed affidavits showing that the writ of error had been duly served on the clerk of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, at his office, on the 30th of May, 1855, and the citation served on the defendant in error on the 28th of June, in the same year. And also the affidavit of the district attorney of the United States for the district of Wisconsin, setting forth that when he served the writ of error upon the clerk, as above mentioned, he was informed by the clerk, and has also been informed by one of the justices of the Supreme Court, which released Booth, “that the court had directed the clerk to make no return to the writ of error, and to enter no order upon the journals or records of the court concerning the same.” And, upon these proofs, the Attorney General moved the court for an order upon the clerk to make return to the writ of error, on or before the first day of the next ensuing term of this court. The rule was accordingly laid, and, on the 22d of July, 1856, the Attorney General filed with the clerk of this court the affidavit of the marshal of the district of Wisconsin that he had served the rule on the clerk on the 7th of the month above mentioned, and no return having been made, the Attorney General, on the 27th of February, 1857, moved for leave to file the certified copy of the record of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, which he had produced with his application for the writ of error, and to docket the case in this court in conformity with a motion to that effect made at the last term. And the court thereupon, on the 6th of March, 1857, ordered the copy of the record filed by the Attorney General to be received and entered on the docket of this court, to have the same effect and legal operation as if returned by the clerk with the writ of error, and that the case stand for argument 62 U. S. 513 at the next ensuing term, without further notice to either party. The case was accordingly docketed, but was not reached for argument in the regular order and practice of the court until the present term. This detailed statement of the proceedings in the different courts has appeared to be necessary in order to form a just estimate of the action of the different tribunals in which it has been heard, and to account for the delay in the final decision of a case, which, from its character, would seem to have demanded prompt action. The first case, indeed, was reached for trial two terms ago. But as the two cases are different portions of the same prosecution for the same offence, they unavoidably, to some extent, involve the same principles of law, and it would hardly have been proper to hear and decide the first before the other was ready for hearing and decision. They have accordingly been argued together, by the Attorney General of the United States, at the present term. No counsel has in either case appeared for the defendant in error. But we have the pamphlet arguments filed and referred to by Booth in the first case, as hereinbefore mentioned, also the opinions and arguments of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and of the judges who compose it, in full, and are enabled, therefore, to see the grounds on which they rely to support their decisions. It will be seen from the foregoing statement of facts that a judge of the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin in the first of these cases, claimed and exercised the right to supervise and annul the proceedings of a commissioner of the United States, and to discharge a prisoner who had been committed by the commissioner for an offence against the laws of this Government, and that this exercise of power by the judge was afterwards sanctioned and affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. In the second case, the State court has gone a step further, and claimed and exercised jurisdiction over the proceedings and judgment of a District Court of the United States, and, upon a summary and collateral proceeding by habeas corpus, 62 U. S. 514 has set aside and annulled its judgment and discharged a prisoner who had been tried and found guilty of an offence against the laws of the United States and sentenced to imprisonment by the District Court. And it further appears that the State court have not only claimed and exercised this jurisdiction, but have also determined that their decision is final and conclusive upon all the courts of the United States, and ordered their clerk to disregard and refuse obedience to the writ of error issued by this court, pursuant to the act of Congress of 1789, to bring here for examination and revision the judgment of the State court. These propositions are new in the jurisprudence of the United States, as well as of the States; and the supremacy of the State courts over the courts of the United States, in cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, is now for the first time asserted and acted upon in the Supreme Court of a State. The supremacy is not, indeed, set forth distinctly and broadly, in so many words, in the printed opinions of the judges. It is intermixed with elaborate discussions of different provisions in the fugitive slave law, and of the privileges and power of the writ of habeas corpus. But the paramount power of the State court lies at the foundation of these decisions, for their commentaries upon the provisions of that law, and upon the privileges and power of the writ of habeas corpus, were out of place, and their judicial action upon them without authority of law, unless they had the power to revise and control the proceedings in the criminal case of which they were speaking, and their judgments releasing the prisoner and disregarding the writ of error from this court can rest upon no other foundation. If the judicial power exercised in this instance has been reserved to the States, no offence against the laws of the United States can be punished by their own courts without the permission and according to the judgment of the courts of the State in which the party happens to be imprisoned, for if the Supreme Court of Wisconsin possessed the power it has exercised in relation to offences against the act of Congress in question, 62 U. S. 515 it necessarily follows that they must have the same judicial authority in relation to any other law of the United States, and, consequently, their supervising and controlling power would embrace the whole criminal code of the United States, and extend to offences against our revenue laws, or any other law intended to guard the different departments of the General Government from fraud or violence. And it would embrace all crimes, from the highest to the lowest; including felonies, which are punished with death, as well as misdemeanors, which are punished by imprisonment. And, moreover, if the power is possessed by the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin, it must belong equally to every other State in the Union when the prisoner is within its territorial limits, and it is very certain that the State courts would not always agree in opinion, and it would often happen that an act which was admitted to be an offence, and justly punished, in one State would be regarded as innocent, and indeed as praiseworthy, in another. It would seem to be hardly necessary to do more than state the result to which these decisions of the State courts must inevitably lead. It is, of itself, a sufficient and conclusive answer, for no one will suppose that a Government which has now lasted nearly seventy years, enforcing its laws by its own tribunals and preserving the union of the States, could have lasted a single year, or fulfilled the high trusts committed to it, if offences against its laws could not have been punished without the consent of the State in which the culprit was found. The judges of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin do not distinctly state from what source they suppose they have derived this judicial power. There can be no such thing as judicial authority unless it is conferred by a Government or sovereignty, and if the judges and courts of Wisconsin possess the jurisdiction they claim, they must derive it either from the United States or the State. It certainly has not been conferred on them by the United States, and it is equally clear it was not in the power of the State to confer it, even if it had attempted to do so, for no State can authorize one of its judges 62 U. S. 516 or courts to exercise judicial power, by habeas corpus or otherwise, within the jurisdiction of another and independent Government. And although the State of Wisconsin is sovereign within its territorial limits to a certain extent, yet that sovereignty is limited and restricted by the Constitution of the United States. And the powers of the General Government, and of the State, although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other within their respective spheres. And the sphere of action appropriated to the United States is as far beyond the reach of the judicial process issued by a State judge or a State court, as if the line of division was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye. And the State of Wisconsin had no more power to authorize these proceedings of its judges and courts than it would have had if the prisoner had been confined in Michigan, or in any other State of the Union, for an offence against the laws of the State in which he was imprisoned. It is, however, due to the State to say that we do not find this claim of paramount jurisdiction in the State courts over the courts of the United States asserted or countenanced by the Constitution or laws of the State. We find it only in the decisions of the judges of the Supreme Court. Indeed, at the very time these decisions were made, there was a statute of the State which declares that a person brought up on a habeas corpus shall be remanded if it appears that he is confined: “1st. By virtue of process, by any court or judge of the United States, in a case where such court or judge has exclusive jurisdiction; or,” “2d. By virtue of the final judgment or decree of any competent court of civil or criminal jurisdiction.” Revised Statutes of the State of Wisconsin, 1849, ch. 124, 629. Even, therefore, if these cases depended upon the laws of Wisconsin, it would be difficult to find in these provisions such a grant of judicial power as the Supreme Court claims to have derived from the State. But, as we have already said, questions of this kind must 62 U. S. 517 always depend upon the Constitution and laws of the United States, and not of a State. The Constitution was not formed merely to guard the States against danger from foreign nations, but mainly to secure union and harmony at home, for if this object could be attained, there would be but little danger from abroad, and, to accomplish this purpose, it was felt by the statesmen who framed the Constitution and by the people who adopted it that it was necessary that many of the rights of sovereignty which the States then possessed should be ceded to the General Government, and that, in the sphere of action assigned to it, it should be supreme, and strong enough to execute its own laws by its own tribunals, without interruption from a State or from State authorities. And it was evident that anything short of this would be inadequate to the main objects for which the Government was established, and that local interests, local passions or prejudices, incited and fostered by individuals for sinister purposes, would lead to acts of aggression and injustice by one State upon the rights of another, which would ultimately terminate in violence and force unless there was a common arbiter between them, armed with power enough to protect and guard the rights of all by appropriate laws to be carried into execution peacefully by its judicial tribunals. The language of the Constitution by which this power is granted is too plain to admit of doubt or to need comment. It declares that “this Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be passed in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” But the supremacy thus conferred on this Government could not peacefully be maintained unless it was clothed with judicial power equally paramount in authority to carry it into execution, for if left to the courts of justice of the several States, conflicting decisions would unavoidably take place, and the local tribunals could hardly be expected to be always free 62 U. S. 518 from the local influences of which we have spoken. And the Constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, and the powers granted to the Federal Government, would soon receive different interpretations in different States, and the Government of the United States would soon become one thing in one State and another thing in another. It was essential, therefore, to its very existence as a Government that it should have the power of establishing courts of justice, altogether independent of State power, to carry into effect its own laws, and that a tribunal should be established in which all cases which might arise under the Constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, whether in a State court or a court of the United States, should be finally and conclusively decided. Without such a tribunal, it is obvious that there would be no uniformity of judicial decision, and that the supremacy, (which is but another name for independence) so carefully provided in the clause of the Constitution above referred to could not possibly be maintained peacefully unless it was associated with this paramount judicial authority. Accordingly, it was conferred on the General Government in clear, precise, and comprehensive terms. It is declared that its judicial power shall (among other subjects enumerated) extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that, in such cases, as well as the others there enumerated, this court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make. The appellate power, it will be observed, is conferred on this court in all cases or suits in which such a question shall arise. It is not confined to suits in the inferior courts of the United States, but extends to all cases where such a question arises, whether it be in a judicial tribunal of a State or of the United States. And it is manifest that this ultimate appellate power in a tribunal created by the Constitution itself was deemed essential to secure the independence and supremacy of the General Government in the sphere of action assigned to it, to make the Constitution and laws of the United States uniform, and the same in every State, and to guard against evils which would 62 U. S. 519 inevitably arise from conflicting opinions between the courts of a State and of the United States, if there was no common arbiter authorized to decide between them. The importance which the framers of the Constitution attached to such a tribunal, for the purpose of preserving internal tranquillity, is strikingly manifested by the clause which gives this court jurisdiction over the sovereign States which compose this Union when a controversy arises between them. Instead of reserving the right to seek redress for injustice from another State by their sovereign powers, they have bound themselves to submit to the decision of this court, and to abide by its judgment. And it is not out of place to say here that experience has demonstrated that this power was not unwisely surrendered by the States, for, in the time that has already elapsed since this Government came into existence, several irritating and angry controversies have taken place between adjoining States in relation to their respective boundaries, and which have sometimes threatened to end in force and violence but for the power vested in this court to hear them and decide between them. The same purposes are clearly indicated by the different language employed when conferring supremacy upon the laws of the United States, and jurisdiction upon its courts. In the first case, it provides that “this Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, and obligatory upon the judges in every State.” The words in italics show the precision and foresight which marks every clause in the instrument. The sovereignty to be created was to be limited in its powers of legislation, and if it passed a law not authorized by its enumerated powers, it was not to be regarded as the supreme law of the land, nor were the State judges bound to carry it into execution. And as the courts of a State, and the courts of the United States, might, and indeed certainly would, often differ as to the extent of the powers conferred by the General Government, it was manifest that serious controversies would arise between the authorities of the United States and of the States, which must be settled by force of arms unless some 62 U. S. 520 tribunal was created to decide between them finally and with out appeal. The Constitution has accordingly provided, as far as human foresight could provide, against this danger. And, in conferring judicial power upon the Federal Government, it declares that the jurisdiction of its courts shall extend to all cases arising under “this Constitution” and the laws of the United States -- leaving out the words of restriction contained in the grant of legislative power which we have above noticed. The judicial power covers every legislative act of Congress, whether it be made within the limits of its delegated powers or be an assumption of power beyond the grants in the Constitution. This judicial power was justly regarded as indispensable not merely to maintain the supremacy of the laws of the United States, but also to guard the States from any encroachment upon their reserved rights by the General Government. And as the Constitution is the fundamental and supreme law, if it appears that an act of Congress is not pursuant to and within the limits of the power assigned to the Federal Government, it is the duty of the courts of the United States to declare it unconstitutional and void. The grant of judicial power is not confined to the administration of laws passed in pursuance to the provisions of the Constitution, nor confined to the interpretation of such laws, but, by the very terms of the grant, the Constitution is under their view when any act of Congress is brought before them, and it is their duty to declare the law void, and refuse to execute it, if it is not pursuant to the legislative powers conferred upon Congress. And as the final appellate power in all such questions is given to this court, controversies as to the respective powers of the United States and the States, instead of being determined by military and physical force, are heard, investigated, and finally settled with the calmness and deliberation of judicial inquiry. And no one can fail to see that, if such an arbiter had not been provided in our complicated system of government, internal tranquillity could not have been preserved, and if such controversies were left to arbitrament of physical force, our Government, State and National, would soon cease to be Governments 62 U. S. 521 of laws, and revolutions by force of arms would take the place of courts of justice and judicial decisions. In organizing such a tribunal, it is evident that every precaution was taken which human wisdom could devise to fit it for the high duty with which it was intrusted. It was not left to Congress to create it by law, for the States could hardly be expected to confide in the impartiality of a tribunal created exclusively by the General Government without any participation on their part. And as the performance of its duty would sometimes come in conflict with individual ambition or interests and powerful political combinations, an act of Congress establishing such a tribunal might be repealed in order to establish another more subservient to the predominant political influences or excited passions of the day. This tribunal, therefore, was erected, and the powers of which we have spoken conferred upon it, not by the Federal Government, but by the people of the States, who formed and adopted that Government and conferred upon it all the powers, legislative, executive, and judicial, which it now possesses. And in order to secure its independence and enable it faithfully and firmly to perform its duty, it engrafted it upon the Constitution itself, and declared that this court should have appellate power in all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So long, therefore, as this Constitution shall endure, this tribunal must exist with it, deciding in the peaceful forms of judicial proceeding the angry and irritating controversies between sovereignties which, in other countries, have been determined by the arbitrament of force. These principles of constitutional law are confirmed and illustrated by the clause which confers legislative power upon Congress. That power is specifically given in article 1, section 8, paragraph 18, in the following words: “To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.” Under this clause of the Constitution, it became the duty of Congress to pass such laws as were necessary and proper to 62 U. S. 522 carry into execution the powers vested in the judicial department. And in the performance of this duty, the First Congress, at its first session, passed the act of 1789, ch. 20, entitled “An act to establish the judicial courts of the United States.” It will be remembered that many of the members of the Convention were also members of this Congress, and it cannot be supposed that they did not understand the meaning and intention of the great instrument which they had so anxiously and deliberately considered, clause by clause, and assisted to frame. And the law they passed to carry into execution the powers vested in the judicial department of the Government proves past doubt that their interpretation of the appellate powers conferred on this court was the same with that which we have now given, for, by the 25th section of the act of 1789, Congress authorized writs of error to be issued from this court to a State court whenever a right had been claimed under the Constitution or laws of the United States and the decision of the State court was against it. And to make this appellate power effectual and altogether independent of the action of State tribunals, this act further provides that, upon writs of error to a State court, instead of remanding the cause for a final decision in the State court, this court may, at their discretion, if the cause shall have been once remanded before, proceed to a final decision of the same and award execution. These provisions in the act of 1789 tell us, in language not to be mistaken, the great importance which the patriots and statement of the First Congress attached to this appellate power, and the foresight and care with which they guarded its free and independent exercise against interference or obstruction by States or State tribunals. In the case before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, a right was claimed under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and the decision was against the right claimed, and it refuses obedience to the writ of error, and regards its own judgment as final. It has not only reversed and annulled the judgment of the District Court of the United States, but it has reversed and annulled the provisions of the Constitution itself, 62 U. S. 523 and the act of Congress of 1789, and made the superior and appellate tribunal the inferior and subordinate one. We do not question the authority of State court or judge who is authorized by the laws of the State to issue the writ of habeas corpus to issue it in any case where the party is imprisoned within its territorial limits, provided it does not appear, when the application is made, that the person imprisoned is in custody under the authority of the United States. The court or judge has a right to inquire, in this mode of proceeding, for what cause and by what authority the prisoner is confined within the territorial limits of the State sovereignty. And it is the duty of the marshal or other person having the custody of the prisoner to make known to the judge or court, by a proper return, the authority by which he holds him in custody. This right to inquire by process of habeas corpus, and the duty of the officer to make a return, grows necessarily out of the complex character of our Government and the existence of two distinct and separate sovereignties within the same territorial space, each of them restricted in its powers and each within its sphere of action, prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, independent of the other. But, after the return is made and the State judge or court judicially apprized that the party is in custody under the authority of the United States, they can proceed no further. They then know that the prisoner is within the dominion and jurisdiction of another Government, and that neither the writ of habeas corpus nor any other process issued under State authority can pass over the line of division between the two sovereignties. He is then within the dominion and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. If he has committed an offence against their laws, their tribunals alone can punish him. If he is wrongfully imprisoned, their judicial tribunals can release him and afford him redress. And although, as we have said, it is the duty of the marshal or other person holding him to make known, by a proper return, the authority under which he detains him, it is at the same time imperatively his duty to obey the process of the United States, to hold the prisoner in custody under it, and to refuse obedience to the mandate or 62 U. S. 524 process of any other Government. And consequently it is his duty not to take the prisoner, nor suffer him to be taken, before a State judge or court upon a habeas corpus issued under State authority. No State judge or court, after they are judicially informed that the party is imprisoned under the authority of the United States, has any right to interfere with him or to require him to be brought before them. And if the authority of a State, in the form of judicial process or otherwise, should attempt to control the marshal or other authorized officer or agent of the United States in any respect, in the custody of his prisoner, it would be his duty to resist it, and to call to his aid any force that might be necessary to maintain the authority of law against illegal interference. No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any lawful authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the court or judge by whom it is issued, and an attempt to enforce it beyond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violence. Nor is there anything in this supremacy of the General Government, or the jurisdiction of its judicial tribunals to awaken the jealousy or offend the natural and just pride of State sovereignty. Neither this Government nor the powers of which we are speaking were forced upon the States. The Constitution of the United States, with all the powers conferred by it on the General Government and surrendered by the States, was the voluntary act of the people of the several States, deliberately done for their own protection and safety against injustice from one another. And their anxiety to preserve it in full force, in all its powers, and to guard against resistance to or evasion of its authority on the part of a State is proved by the clause which requires that the members of the State Legislatures and all executive and judicial officers of the several States (as well as those of the General Government) shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution. This is the last and closing clause of the Constitution, and inserted when the whole frame of Government, with the powers hereinbefore specified, had been adopted by the Convention, and it was in that form, and with these powers, that the Constitution 62 U. S. 525 was submitted to the people of the several States for their consideration and decision. Now, it certainly can be no humiliation to the citizen of a republic to yield a ready obedience to the laws as administered by the constituted authorities. On the contrary, it is among his first and highest duties as a citizen, because free government cannot exist without it. Nor can it be inconsistent with the dignity of a sovereign State to observe faithfully, and in the spirit of sincerity and truth, the compact into which it voluntarily entered when it became a State of this Union. On the contrary, the highest honor of sovereignty is untarnished faith. And certainly no faith could be more deliberately and solemnly pledged than that which every State has plighted to the other States to support the Constitution as it is, in all its provisions, until they shall be altered in the manner which the Constitution itself prescribes. In the emphatic language of the pledge required, it is to support this Constitution. And no power is more clearly conferred by the Constitution and laws of the United States than the power of this court to decide, ultimately and finally, all cases arising under such Constitution and laws, and for that purpose to bring here for revision, by writ of error, the judgment of a State court, where such questions have arisen, and the right claimed under them denied by the highest judicial tribunal in the State. We are sensible that we have extended the examination of these decisions beyond the limits required by any intrinsic difficulty in the questions. But the decisions in question were made by the supreme judicial tribunal of the State, and when a court so elevated in its position has pronounced a judgment which, if it could be maintained, would subvert the very foundations of this Government, it seemed to be the duty of this court, when exercising its appellate power, to show plainly the grave errors into which the State court has fallen and the consequences to which they would inevitably lead. But it can hardly be necessary to point out the errors which followed their mistaken view of the jurisdiction they might lawfully exercise, because, if there was any defect of power in the commissioner, or in his mode of proceeding, it was for the 62 U. S. 526 tribunals of the United States to revise and correct it, and not for a State court. And as regards the decision of the District Court, it had exclusive and final jurisdiction by the laws of the United States, and neither the regularity of its proceedings nor the validity of its sentence could be called in question in any other court, either of a State or the United States, by habeas corpus or any other process. But although we think it unnecessary to discuss these questions, yet, as they have been decided by the State court, and are before us on the record, and we are not willing to be misunderstood, it is proper to say that, in the judgment of this court, the act of Congress commonly called the fugitive slave law is, in all of its provisions, fully authorized by the Constitution of the United States, that the commissioner had lawful authority to issue the warrant and commit the party, and that his proceedings were regular and conformable to law. We have already stated the opinion and judgment of the court as to the exclusive jurisdiction of the District Court and the appellate powers which this court is authorized and required to exercise. And if any argument was needed to show the wisdom and necessity of this appellate power, the cases before us sufficiently prove it, and at the same time emphatically call for its exercise. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin must therefore be reversed in each of the cases now before the court.
Not so. Officials of every branch, at every level of our State, Fed, and local govts are sworn to support and defend the Constitution, and laws made "in pursuance thereof". They all must decide for themselves whether a law is constitutionally valid. Yep, that is one of their functions, just as I've noted before. Unable to refute my opinions, nolu is reduced to posting pictures of Chihuahuas, poor fella.
As tpaine has been reduced to a chihuahua, able only to repeat his nonsense over and over, the following is repeated for possible penetration. Dickerson v United States, 530 US 428, 437 (2000): United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809): This was the original case on State Nulification. No Supreme Court decision has ever upheld State Nullification. It is currently only upheld by the tpaine Court of the imagination. Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1 (1958): [...] Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the “supreme Law of the Land.” In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as “the fundamental and paramount law of the nation,” declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, that “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” This decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3, “to support this Constitution.” The duty to abstain from resistance to “the supreme Law of the Land,” U.S. Const., Art. VI § 2, as declared by the organ of our Government for ascertaining it, does not require immediate approval of it nor does it deny the right of dissent. Criticism need not be stilled. Active obstruction or defiance is barred. Our kind of society cannot endure if the controlling authority of the Law as derived from the Constitution is not to be the tribunal specially charged with the duty of ascertaining and declaring what is “the supreme Law of the Land.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 211 (1962) the Court stated: Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 517-21 (1858) “this Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be passed in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” But the supremacy thus conferred on this Government could not peacefully be maintained unless it was clothed with judicial power equally paramount in authority to carry it into execution, for if left to the courts of justice of the several States, conflicting decisions would unavoidably take place, and the local tribunals could hardly be expected to be always free 62 U. S. 518 from the local influences of which we have spoken. And the Constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, and the powers granted to the Federal Government, would soon receive different interpretations in different States, and the Government of the United States would soon become one thing in one State and another thing in another. It was essential, therefore, to its very existence as a Government that it should have the power of establishing courts of justice, altogether independent of State power, to carry into effect its own laws, and that a tribunal should be established in which all cases which might arise under the Constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, whether in a State court or a court of the United States, should be finally and conclusively decided. Without such a tribunal, it is obvious that there would be no uniformity of judicial decision, and that the supremacy, (which is but another name for independence) so carefully provided in the clause of the Constitution above referred to could not possibly be maintained peacefully unless it was associated with this paramount judicial authority. Accordingly, it was conferred on the General Government in clear, precise, and comprehensive terms. It is declared that its judicial power shall (among other subjects enumerated) extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that, in such cases, as well as the others there enumerated, this court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make. The appellate power, it will be observed, is conferred on this court in all cases or suits in which such a question shall arise. It is not confined to suits in the inferior courts of the United States, but extends to all cases where such a question arises, whether it be in a judicial tribunal of a State or of the United States. And it is manifest that this ultimate appellate power in a tribunal created by the Constitution itself was deemed essential to secure the independence and supremacy of the General Government in the sphere of action assigned to it, to make the Constitution and laws of the United States uniform, and the same in every State, and to guard against evils which would 62 U. S. 519 inevitably arise from conflicting opinions between the courts of a State and of the United States, if there was no common arbiter authorized to decide between them. The importance which the framers of the Constitution attached to such a tribunal, for the purpose of preserving internal tranquillity, is strikingly manifested by the clause which gives this court jurisdiction over the sovereign States which compose this Union when a controversy arises between them. Instead of reserving the right to seek redress for injustice from another State by their sovereign powers, they have bound themselves to submit to the decision of this court, and to abide by its judgment. And it is not out of place to say here that experience has demonstrated that this power was not unwisely surrendered by the States, for, in the time that has already elapsed since this Government came into existence, several irritating and angry controversies have taken place between adjoining States in relation to their respective boundaries, and which have sometimes threatened to end in force and violence but for the power vested in this court to hear them and decide between them. The same purposes are clearly indicated by the different language employed when conferring supremacy upon the laws of the United States, and jurisdiction upon its courts. In the first case, it provides that “this Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, and obligatory upon the judges in every State.” The words in italics show the precision and foresight which marks every clause in the instrument. The sovereignty to be created was to be limited in its powers of legislation, and if it passed a law not authorized by its enumerated powers, it was not to be regarded as the supreme law of the land, nor were the State judges bound to carry it into execution. And as the courts of a State, and the courts of the United States, might, and indeed certainly would, often differ as to the extent of the powers conferred by the General Government, it was manifest that serious controversies would arise between the authorities of the United States and of the States, which must be settled by force of arms unless some 62 U. S. 520 tribunal was created to decide between them finally and with out appeal. The Constitution has accordingly provided, as far as human foresight could provide, against this danger. And, in conferring judicial power upon the Federal Government, it declares that the jurisdiction of its courts shall extend to all cases arising under “this Constitution” and the laws of the United States -- leaving out the words of restriction contained in the grant of legislative power which we have above noticed. The judicial power covers every legislative act of Congress, whether it be made within the limits of its delegated powers or be an assumption of power beyond the grants in the Constitution. This judicial power was justly regarded as indispensable not merely to maintain the supremacy of the laws of the United States, but also to guard the States from any encroachment upon their reserved rights by the General Government. And as the Constitution is the fundamental and supreme law, if it appears that an act of Congress is not pursuant to and within the limits of the power assigned to the Federal Government, it is the duty of the courts of the United States to declare it unconstitutional and void. The grant of judicial power is not confined to the administration of laws passed in pursuance to the provisions of the Constitution, nor confined to the interpretation of such laws, but, by the very terms of the grant, the Constitution is under their view when any act of Congress is brought before them, and it is their duty to declare the law void, and refuse to execute it, if it is not pursuant to the legislative powers conferred upon Congress. And as the final appellate power in all such questions is given to this court, controversies as to the respective powers of the United States and the States, instead of being determined by military and physical force, are heard, investigated, and finally settled with the calmness and deliberation of judicial inquiry. And no one can fail to see that, if such an arbiter had not been provided in our complicated system of government, internal tranquillity could not have been preserved, and if such controversies were left to arbitrament of physical force, our Government, State and National, would soon cease to be Governments 62 U. S. 521 of laws, and revolutions by force of arms would take the place of courts of justice and judicial decisions.
During a discussion with Nolu Chan, he asserted that an amendment repealing the 2nd could be ratified, and become a valid part of our Constitution. I contend such an amendment would be unconstitutional. Comments?
#216. To: tpaine (#213)
As tpaine has been reduced to unintelligible spluttering, it is time to continue the basic history lessons. Today's lesson continues Judicial Power and the Supremacy Clause.
CHAPTER XX.
Secondly, as this may not always be a sufficient restraint, the judicial power presents an effectual barrier against its excesses, the observations on which need not be repeated. But, as observed, the judicial power possesses no spontaneous motion—it must be called into action by the application of others—either individuals or constituted authorities, and in the mean time, the obnoxious law may not only take its place in the statute book, but be injuriously acted upon. The third corrective therefore is in the hands of the people, who do not, as disingenuously remarked, make no other use of their power than to give it away. The biennial election of the house of representatives, of which the people can by no artifice be deprived, secures to them the power of removing every member of that house who has shown either an inability to comprehend, or an unwillingness to conform to the transcendent obligations of the constitution, which he has sworn to support. Here, then, we have the protection and safety unknown to those countries where either the legislature elect themselves, or enjoy an hereditary right, or where, although the representative principle may be nominally kept up, its exercise may be suspended or postponed at the pleasure of another part of the government.
§ 1830. The next clause is, "This constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land. And the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."
§ 1836. From this supremacy of the constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, within their constitutional scope, arises the duty of courts of justice to declare any unconstitutional law passed by congress or by a state legislature void. So, in like manner, the same duty arises, whenever any other department of the national or state governments exceeds its constitutional functions. But the judiciary of the United States has no general jurisdiction to declare acts of the several states void, unless they are repugnant to the constitution of the United States, notwithstanding they are repugnant to the state constitution. Such a power belongs to it only, when it sits to administer the local law of a state, and acts exactly, as a state tribunal is bound to act. But upon this subject it seems unnecessary to dwell, since the right of all courts, state as well as national, to declare unconstitutional laws void, seems settled beyond the reach of judicial controversy.
#217. To: tpaine (#213)
As tpaine has been reduced to unintelligible spluttering, it is time to continue the basic history lessons. Today's lesson is the U.S. Supreme Court explaining that Congress may not legislatively supersede its decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.
Given § 3501’s express designation of voluntariness as the touchstone of admissibility, its omission of any warning requirement, and the instruction for trial courts to consider a nonexclusive list of factors relevant to the circumstances of a confession, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Congress intended by its enactment to overrule Miranda. See also Davis v. United States, 512 U. S. 452, 464 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that, prior to Miranda, “voluntariness vel non was the touchstone of admissibility of confessions”). Because of the obvious conflict between our decision in Miranda and § 3501, we must address whether Congress has constitutional authority to thus supersede Miranda. If Congress has such authority, § 3501’s totality of- the-circumstances approach must prevail over Miranda’s requirement of warnings; if not, that section must yield to Miranda’s more specific requirements.
#218. To: nolu chan (#216)
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, 1833, page 703: ---- § 1836. From this supremacy of the constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, within their constitutional scope, arises the duty of courts of justice to declare any unconstitutional law passed by congress or by a state legislature void. So, in like manner, the same duty arises, whenever any other department of the national or state governments exceeds its constitutional functions. But the judiciary of the United States has no general jurisdiction to declare acts of the several states void, unless they are repugnant to the constitution of the United States, notwithstanding they are repugnant to the state constitution. Such a power belongs to it only, when it sits to administer the local law of a state, and acts exactly, as a state tribunal is bound to act. But upon this subject it seems unnecessary to dwell, since the right of all courts, state as well as national, to declare unconstitutional laws void, seems settled beyond the reach of judicial controversy.
#219. To: tpaine (#218)
But upon this subject it seems unnecessary to dwell, since the right of all courts, state as well as national, to declare unconstitutional laws void, seems settled beyond the reach of judicial controversy.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supremacy_Clause
Compliance with both the Federal and State laws is impossible
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."
#220. To: tpaine (#218)
Please continue ....
The word “corporations,” in its largest sense, has a more extensive meaning than people generally are aware of. Any body politic (sole or aggregate), whether its power be restricted or transcendant, is in this sense "a corporation."
A State does not owe its origin to the Government of the United States, in the highest or in any of its branches. It was in existence before it. It derives its authority from the same pure and sacred source as itself: the voluntary and deliberate choice of the people.
Man, fearfully and wonderfully made, is the workmanship of his all perfect Creator. A state, useful and valuable as the contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of man, and from his native dignity derives all its acquired importance. When I speak of a state as an inferior contrivance, I mean that it is a contrivance inferior only to that which is divine. Of all human contrivances, it is certainly most transcendantly excellent. It is concerning this contrivance that
As a citizen, I know the government of that state to be republican; and my short definition of such a government is one constructed on this principle — that the supreme power resides in the body of the people. As a judge of this court, I know, and can decide upon the knowledge that the citizens of Georgia, when they acted upon the large scale of the Union, as a part of the "People of the United states," did not surrender the supreme or sovereign power to that state, but, as to the purposes of the Union, retained it to themselves.
In the United states, and in the several states, which compose the Union, we go not so far, but still we go one step farther than we ought to go in this unnatural and inverted order of things. The states, rather than the people, for whose sakes the states exist, are frequently the objects which attract and arrest our principal attention. This, I believe, has produced much of the confusion and perplexity which have appeared in several proceedings and several publications on state politics, and on the politics, too, of the United states. Sentiments and expressions of this inaccurate kind prevail in our common, even in our convivial, language. Is a toast asked? “The United states,” instead of the “People of the United states,” is the toast given. This is not politically correct. The toast is meant to present to view the first great object in the Union: it presents only the second. It presents only the artificial person, instead of the natural persons who spoke it into existence. A state I cheerfully fully work of God.
But still it may be insisted that this will reduce States to mere corporations, and take away all sovereignty. As to corporations, all States whatever are corporations or bodies politic.
The Revolution, or rather the Declaration of Independence, found the people already united for general purposes, and at the same time providing for their more domestic concerns by State conventions and other temporary arrangements. From the Crown of Great Britain, the sovereignty of their country passed to the people of it, and it was then not an uncommon opinion that the unappropriated lands, which belonged to that Crown, passed not to the people of the Colony or States within whose limits they were situated, but to the whole people; on whatever principles this opinion rested, it did not give way to the other, and thirteen sovereignties were considered as emerged from the principles of the Revolution, combined with local convenience and considerations; the people nevertheless continued to consider themselves, in a national point of view, as one people; and they continued without interruption to manage their national concerns accordingly; afterwards, in the hurry of the war and in the warmth of mutual confidence, they made a Confederation of the States the basis of a general government.
There is at least one strong undeniable fact against this incompatibility, and that is this — any one State in the Union may sue another State, in this Court, that is, all the people of one State may sue all the people of another State.
#221. To: nolu chan (#220)
Although you have proven your utter lack of reading comprehension, I will continue, at your request.
As you make believe you are unable to fathom the bare fundamentals of judicial review,---
#222. To: tpaine (#221)
Please continue your hissy fit display though.. It's really getting amusing..
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, 1833, page 703: ---- § 1836. From this supremacy of the constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, within their constitutional scope, arises the duty of courts of justice to declare any unconstitutional law passed by congress or by a state legislature void. So, in like manner, the same duty arises, whenever any other department of the national or state governments exceeds its constitutional functions. But the judiciary of the United States has no general jurisdiction to declare acts of the several states void, unless they are repugnant to the constitution of the United States, notwithstanding they are repugnant to the state constitution. Such a power belongs to it only, when it sits to administer the local law of a state, and acts exactly, as a state tribunal is bound to act. But upon this subject it seems unnecessary to dwell, since the right of all courts, state as well as national, to declare unconstitutional laws void, seems settled beyond the reach of judicial controversy.
[nc] Yep, and in tpaineworld, Obama, the rest of the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch get to ignore the opinions issued by SCOTUS.
U.S. Supreme Court
#223. To: nolu chan (#222)
nc] Yep, and in tpaineworld, Obama, the rest of the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch get to ignore the opinions issued by SCOTUS.
Your assinine opinion is that SCOTUS lacks the authority to exercise judicial review and declare laws constitutional or strike them down as unconstitutional,
and you go further to claim that the Executive and Legislative branches are empowered to ignore SCOTUS decisions by some hitherto unknown magical power bestowed by the Supremacy Clause.
Justice Story wrote that "the right of all courts, state as well as national, to declare unconstitutional laws void, seems settled beyond the reach of judicial controversy." --- You vividly imagine that this statement confirming the authority to exercise judicial review somehow supports your brain fart.
#224. To: tpaine (#223)
Hayburn’s Case, 2 US 409 (1792)
#225. To: tpaine (#223)
Yep, those branches of gov can and have ignored SCOTUS opinions that they consider unconstitutional. -- This is their duty, under the provisions of the supremacy clause, Article VI....
Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Publius
[Alexander Hamilton] But perhaps the force of the objection may be thought to consist in the particular organization of the Supreme Court; in its being composed of a distinct body of magistrates, instead of being one of the branches of the legislature, as in the government of Great Britain and that of the State. To insist upon this point, the authors of the objection must renounce the meaning they have labored to annex to the celebrated maxim, requiring a separation of the departments of power. It shall, nevertheless, be conceded to them, agreeably to the interpretation given to that maxim in the course of these papers, that it is not violated by vesting the ultimate power of judging in a PART of the legislative body. But though this be not an absolute violation of that excellent rule, yet it verges so nearly upon it, as on this account alone to be less eligible than the mode preferred by the convention. From a body which had even a partial agency in passing bad laws, we could rarely expect a disposition to temper and moderate them in the application. The same spirit which had operated in making them, would be too apt in interpreting them; still less could it be expected that men who had infringed the Constitution in the character of legislators, would be disposed to repair the breach in the character of judges. Nor is this all. Every reason which recommends the tenure of good behavior for judicial offices, militates against placing the judiciary power, in the last resort, in a body composed of men chosen for a limited period. There is an absurdity in referring the determination of causes, in the first instance, to judges of permanent standing; in the last, to those of a temporary and mutable constitution.
#226. To: nolu chan (#225)
--- you go further to claim that the Executive and Legislative branches are empowered to ignore SCOTUS decisions by some hitherto unknown magical power bestowed by the Supremacy Clause.
Justice Story wrote that "the right of all courts, state as well as national, to declare unconstitutional laws void, seems settled beyond the reach of judicial controversy." --- You vividly imagine that this statement confirming the authority to exercise judicial review somehow supports your brain fart.
Continuing your remedial education.
#227. To: tpaine (#226)
Yep, those branches of gov can and have ignored SCOTUS opinions that they consider unconstitutional. -- This is their duty, under the provisions of the supremacy clause, Article VI....
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1 (1958)
#228. To: tpaine (#226)
Yep, those branches of gov can and have ignored SCOTUS opinions that they consider unconstitutional. -- This is their duty, under the provisions of the supremacy clause, Article VI....
2. The Supremacy Clause gives Congress the power to preempt state law. A statute may contain an express preemption provision, see, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting, 563 U. S. ___, ___, but state law must also give way to federal law in at least two other circumstances. First, States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U. S. 88 . Intent can be inferred from a framework of regulation "so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it" or where a "federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218. Second, state laws are preempted when they conflict with federal law, including when they stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 . Pp. 7–8.
III
The United States has established that §§3, 5(C), and 6 of S. B. 1070 are preempted.
#229. To: nolu chan (#228)
-- you go further to claim that the Executive and Legislative branches are empowered to ignore SCOTUS decisions by some hitherto unknown magical power bestowed by the Supremacy Clause.
Continuing your remedial education.
In tpaine's Court of the Imagination, the Supremacy Clause contains a secret codicil referred to as the Screw Off provision, which provides that when the Executive or Legislature of a State disagrees with a constitutional ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court, there is a secret power to tell the Court to screw off. --- tpaine holds the only known copy of the Supremacy Clause which includes the Screw Off provision, which he allegedly found steganographically encrypted in the dot of one of the semi-colons. The rest of the world only has the standard Supremacy Clause which reads,
Try as one may, with the standard Supremacy Clause, one may not discover the provision which empowers the Executive and the Legislative branches to tell the Judiciary to screw off.
#230. To: tpaine (#229)
All three branches are empowered to ignore 'laws' that are NOT made "in pursuance thereof"... And you know it...
1. This Court cannot countenance a claim by the Governor and Legislature of a State that there is no duty on state officials to obey federal court orders resting on this Court’s considered interpretation of the United States Constitution in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483. P. 4.
Publius
[Alexander Hamilton] And there is a still greater absurdity in subjecting the decisions of men, selected for their knowledge of the laws, acquired by long and laborious study, to the revision and control of men who, for want of the same advantage, cannot but be deficient in that knowledge. The members of the legislature will rarely be chosen with a view to those qualifications which fit men for the stations of judges; and as, on this account, there will be great reason to apprehend all the ill consequences of defective information, so, on account of the natural propensity of such bodies to party divisions, there will be no less reason to fear that the pestilential breath of faction may poison the fountains of justice. The habit of being continually marshalled on opposite sides will be too apt to stifle the voice both of law and of equity.
#231. To: nolu chan (#230)
When SCOTUS has decided a law is constitutional or unconstitutional, the other branches are bound by the ruling,
--- as you, Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas, Governor Jan Brewer of Arizona, and Sheriff Joe Arpaio know. --- You're blithering idiocy does not change the historical facts. When Faubus tried your bullshit in practice, he was met with the 82nd Airborne ---
#232. To: tpaine (#231)
NOT true. -- Tell it to Dred Scott.
#233. To: tpaine (#231)
The SCOTUS was backed up by Eisenhower.. Without Ike, the court would have been powerless to enforce its opinion.
#234. To: nolu chan (#233)
When Faubus tried your bullshit in practice, he was met with the 82nd Airborne ---
The Federal government has ample ability to enforce SCOTUS decisions against State authorities.
#235. To: tpaine (#234)
In the performance of assigned constitutional duties, each branch of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect from the others. The President's counsel, as we have noted, reads the Constitution as providing an absolute privilege of confidentiality for all Presidential communications. Many decisions of this Court, however, have unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Id. at 5 U. S. 177. No holding of the Court has defined the scope of judicial power specifically relating to the enforcement of a subpoena for confidential Presidential communications for use in a criminal prosecution, but other exercises of power by the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch have been found invalid as in conflict with the Constitution. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486 (1969); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). In a
“requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by another branch.”
“Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.”
#236. To: tpaine (#234)
IV
#237. To: tpaine (#234)
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.
#238. To: tpaine (#234)
We hold that Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves. We therefore hold that Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts.
#239. To: nolu chan, tpaine (#238)
SCOTUS is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and not tpaine. They do not recognize the imaginary tpaine screw you provision of the Supremacy Clause.
#240. To: nolu chan (#237)
#241. To: Liberator, GrandIsland (#239)
Btw -- Must I launch a group intervention on this thread? :-)
Again, I urge everyone who is still interested in this discussion to read at least the last portions of the last thread nolu posted.
#242. To: GrandIsland, liberator (#240)
SCOTUS is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and not tpaine. They do not recognize the imaginary tpaine screw you provision of the Supremacy Clause.
THAT is funny. Btw -- Must I launch a group intervention on this thread? :-) -- Liberator
When you are as important, and a constitutional scholar, like tpaine, you will recognize that your opinions are no longer opinions. They are better that Jeffersons own statements. I'm damn surprised the Supreme Court has managed to function this long without his induction by a past president.
You surprise me, you already posted 175 posts more than I'd waste on this ridiculously fruitless thread. --- GrandIsland posted.
#243. To: tpaine, GrandIsland, liberator (#242)
MINUTE ORDER. As agreed by the parties at the July 31, 2015 status hearing, the Government shall produce a copy of the letters sent by the State Department to Mrs. Hillary Clinton, Ms. Huma Abedin and Ms. Cheryl Mills regarding the collection of government records in their possession. These communications shall be posted on the docket forthwith. The Government has also agreed to share with Plaintiffs counsel the responses sent by Mrs. Clinton, Ms. Abedin and Ms. Mills. These communications shall also be posted on the docket forthwith. In addition, as related to Judicial Watch's FOIA requests in this case, the Government is HEREBY ORDERED to: (1) identify any and all servers, accounts, hard drives, or other devices currently in the possession or control of the State Department or otherwise that may contain responsive information; (2) request that the above named individuals confirm, under penalty of perjury, that they have produced all responsive information that was or is in their possession as a result of their employment at the State Department. If all such information has not yet been produced, the Government shall request the above named individuals produce the information forthwith; and (3) request that the above named individuals describe, under penalty of perjury, the extent to which Ms. Abedin and Ms. Mills used Mrs. Clinton's email server to conduct official government business. The Government shall inform the Court of the status of its compliance with this Order no later than August 7, 2015, including any response received from Mrs. Clinton, Ms. Abedin and Ms. Mills. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on July 31, 2015. (lcegs4) (Entered: 07/31/2015)
#244. To: tpaine, GrandIsland, liberator (#242)
As expressed at the hearing, the Government's reasoning is nonsensical. Officers of the Court who fail to comply with Court orders will be held in contempt. Also, in the event of non-compliance with future Court orders, the Commissioner of the IRS and others shall be directed to show cause as to why they should not be held in contempt of Court.
MINUTE ORDER. At the July 29, 2015 status hearing, the Government agreed that the Court's July 1, 2015 oral order from the bench was clear and enforceable. Nonetheless, the Government reasoned it inappropriate to file a motion for reconsideration until a written order was issued. As expressed at the hearing, the Government's reasoning is nonsensical. Officers of the Court who fail to comply with Court orders will be held in contempt. Also, in the event of non-compliance with future Court orders, the Commissioner of the IRS and others shall be directed to show cause as to why they should not be held in contempt of Court. The Court's July 1, 2015 ruling from the bench stands: (1) the Government shall produce relevant documents every Monday; (2) the Government's document production shall be accompanied by a status report that indicates (a) whether TIGTA has turned over any new documents to the IRS, (b) if so, the number of documents, and (c) a timeframe for the IRSs production of those documents. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on July 29, 2015. (Icegs4) (Entered: 07/29/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Emmet G. Sullivan: Status Conference held on 7/29/2015. Oral order directing the IRS to weekly produce the production of documents and status report. (Court Reporter Scott Wallace) (gdf) (Entered: 07/29/2015)
#245. To: tpaine, GrandIsland, liberator (#242)
[tpaine #242] Good idea, as nolu has obviously lost it, in claiming that I've seen some "imaginary" provision in the supremacy clause. -- Not so.
[tpaine #223] Yep, those branches of gov can and have ignored SCOTUS opinions that they consider unconstitutional. -- This is their duty, under the provisions of the supremacy clause, Article VI....
[tpaine #229] Read the clause. It says that all officials of our republic are duty bound to honor our Constitution as the supreme law. -- Which gives them the power to ignore unconstitutional 'laws'. ( At their own peril, of course)
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
“Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.”
#246. To: nolu chan (#245)
Yes, read the clause:
#247. To: GrandIsland, nolu chan, Y'ALL (#246)
Yes, read the clause:
Good luck finding the imaginary content referred to by tpaine which empowers all officials to use their own interpretation of the Constitution and to tell the Supreme Court to screw off.
#248. To: tpaine, GrandIsland (#247)
Good luck finding the imaginary content referred to by tpaine which empowers all officials to use their own interpretation of the Constitution and to tell the Supreme Court to screw off.
Only laws (or amendments) made "in pursuance thereof" (as the supremacy clause says) are part of our supreme law, the Constitution..
2 Farrand 93: [James Madison]
CHAPTER XX.
§ 1836. From this supremacy of the constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, within their constitutional scope, arises the duty of courts of justice to declare any unconstitutional law passed by congress or by a state legislature void.
But Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.
If the legislatures of the several States may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the Constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery, and the nation is deprived of the means of enforcing its laws by the instrumentality of its own tribunals. So fatal a result must be deprecated by all, and the people of Pennsylvania, not less than the citizens of every other State, must feel a deep interest in resisting principles so destructive of the union, and in averting consequences so fatal to themselves.
1. This Court cannot countenance a claim by the Governor and Legislature of a State that there is no duty on state officials to obey federal court orders resting on this Court’s considered interpretation of the United States Constitution in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483. P. 4.
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.
#249. To: tpaine (#247)
SCOTUS opinions can be ignored on constitutional grounds and officials can refuse to implement/fund any attempts at forcement.
Dream on that in Nolu Chan's world such an amendment could be valid. It would violate every principle inherent in our constitution, and thus would be null and void from its enactment.
#250. To: nolu chan (#248)
The Constitution designates the judiciary to decide whether the laws were made in pursuance thereof, ---
-- and the judiciary declares null and void the laws it finds unconstitutional.
#251. To: tpaine (#250)
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 385 (1798)
#252. To: nolu chan (#251)
As tpaine has nothing to say but the reiteration of his own bullshit, supported by nothing, and contradicted by centuries of case law and the law tests of qualified legal experts, of which he neither does nor can cite any, it is time to sontinue his education. Case law is not receptive to the bullshit of natural law.
The Constitution designates the judiciary to decide whether the laws were made in pursuance thereof, ---
-- and the judiciary declares null and void the laws it finds unconstitutional.
#253. To: tpaine (#252)
Ableman v Booth, 62 US 506 (1858)
#254. To: nolu chan, posting pictures of Chihuahuas, poor soul. (#253)
The Constitution designates the judiciary to decide whether the laws were made in pursuance thereof, ---
- and the judiciary declares null and void the laws it finds unconstitutional.
As tpaine has been reduced to a chihuahua, able only to repeat his nonsense over and over, the lesson continues.
#255. To: tpaine (#254)
[tpaine #254] Officials of every branch, at every level of our State, Fed, and local govts are sworn to support and defend the Constitution, and laws made "in pursuance thereof". They all must decide for themselves whether a law is constitutionally valid.
But Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.
If the legislatures of the several States may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the Constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery, and the nation is deprived of the means of enforcing its laws by the instrumentality of its own tribunals. So fatal a result must be deprecated by all, and the people of Pennsylvania, not less than the citizens of every other State, must feel a deep interest in resisting principles so destructive of the union, and in averting consequences so fatal to themselves.
1. This Court cannot countenance a claim by the Governor and Legislature of a State that there is no duty on state officials to obey federal court orders resting on this Court’s considered interpretation of the United States Constitution in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483. P. 4.
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.
The language of the Constitution by which this power is granted is too plain to admit of doubt or to need comment. It declares that
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