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Title: Police Celebrate 4th Of July With Nationwide No Refusal Checkpoints and Forced Blood Draws
Source:
Free Thought Project
URL Source: http://thefreethoughtproject.com/po ... ationwide-refusal-checkpoints/
Published: Jul 4, 2015
Author: John Vibes
Post Date: 2015-07-04 10:46:33 by Deckard
Keywords: None
Views: 68999
Comments: 141
Happy 4th of July, the day where Americans celebrate imaginary freedom, and police departments nationwide make millions of dollars violating the rights of nonviolent individuals. Under the pretense of catching drunk drivers, police will be patrolling the streets and setting up checkpoints all over the country this weekend. In some cases they will arrest drunk drivers, in others they will search and arrest nonviolent drug offenders, while other people may get citations for problems with their vehicle or registration. Especially for people who haven’t even done anything wrong, these checkpoints are a gross violation of privacy and other natural born rights. Free people should not be stopped and searched or questioned in any way if they are attempting to travel freely. However, we sadly now live in a world where rights like traveling are seen as privileges, to be given and taken by government. As it stands right now, the way that the state deals with drunk driving is tyrannical and infringes upon everyone’s rights, even people like myself, who hardly ever drink. Economist Jeffrey Tucker wrote an article on this subject and discussed the problems with the status quo while offering some solutions as well. Laws against drunk driving have vastly expanded police power and done nothing to stop the practice. The best prevention against unsafe driving from drinking has been provided privately: friends, services offered by bars and restaurants, community interest groups, etc. This is the humane and rational way societies deal with social risks. The police have only messed up this process by adding a coercive element that targets liberty rather than crime. And we can see where this is heading. Texting is now illegal in most places. So is talking on the phone. Maybe talking itself should be illegal. Some communities are talking about banning eating. All of this is a distraction from the real issue. If our ultimate goals are to reduce driver impairment and maximize highway safety, we should be punishing reckless driving. It shouldn’t matter if it’s caused by alcohol, sleep deprivation, prescription medication, text messaging, or road rage. If lawmakers want to stick it to dangerous drivers who threaten everyone else on the road, they can dial up the civil and criminal liability for reckless driving, especially in cases that result in injury or property damage. Doing away with the specific charge of drunk driving sounds radical at first blush, but it would put the focus back on impairment, where it belongs. It might repair some of the civil-liberties damage done by the invasive powers the government says it needs to catch and convict drunk drivers. If the offense were reckless driving rather than drunk driving, for example, repeated swerving over the median line would be enough to justify the charge. There would be no need for a cop to jam a needle in your arm alongside a busy highway. Scrapping the DWI offense in favor of better enforcement of reckless driving laws would also bring some logical consistency to our laws, which treat a driver with a BAC of 0.08 much more harshly than, say, a driver distracted by his kids or a cell phone call, despite similar levels of impairment. The punishable act should be violating road rules or causing an accident, not the factors that led to those offenses. Singling out alcohol impairment for extra punishment isn’t about making the roads safer. It’s about a lingering hostility toward demon rum. There is no doubt that drunk driving should be discouraged and that solutions to prevent people from driving drunk should be explored. However, it is entirely possible to do this without violating anyone’s rights in the process. Meanwhile, in police state USA, it is business as usual. John Vibes is an author, researcher and investigative journalist who takes a special interest in the counter culture and the drug war. In addition to his writing and activist work he organizes a number of large events including the Free Your Mind Conference, which features top caliber speakers and whistle-blowers from all over the world. You can contact him and stay connected to his work at his Facebook page. You can find his 65 chapter Book entitled “Alchemy of the Timeless Renaissance” at bookpatch.com.
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#102. To: tpaine (#100)
The challenge was rejected. You might mention that part. Citing a failed desperate grope argument of counsel, thumpingly rejected by the court, is not quite like citing legal precedent, or an approving recognized legal text. In this case, a brewery owner was desperate to stop prohibition from going into effect. In Feigenspan, the lead National Prohibition case, District Judge Rellstab whote in his opinion, which was upheld by SCOTUS: Plaintiff alleges it is invalid. First, because of its subject-matter. At the outset let us keep clearly in mind that the issue here relates solely to power—the power to amend the United States Constitution. In discussing the challenges of the plaintiffs articulated under this head, that fact must not be forgotten. The other attacks upon the amendment, to be considered under separate heads, relate to the use made of the power, if it be found to exist. If the plaintiff, is right in its contention of lack of power to insert the Eighteenth Amendment into the United States Constitution because of its subject-matter, it follows that there is no way to incorporate it and others of like character, into the National organic law, except through revolution. This, the plaintiff concedes, is the inevitable conclusion of its contention. This is so startling a proposition that the judicial mind may be pardoned for not readily cceding to it, and for insisting that only the most convincing reasons will justify its acceptance. [...] The Eighteenth Amendment but carries forward into the national Constitution what had already been inserted into the organic law of the greater number of States, and if the reasons herein expressed are sound there is no limitation in the United States Constitution, express or implied, that forbids its incorporation therein by action pursuant to Art. V thereof. - - - - - Live and learn. Another amendment works. It is the only thing that repeals an amendment to the Constitution. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/2/409/case.html Hayburn’s Case, 2 US 409, 414 (1792) http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx U.S. Supreme Court website: The Court and Constitutional Interpretation The Federalist No. 81 May 28, 1788 [excerpt] These considerations teach us to applaud the wisdom of those States who have committed the judicial power, in the last resort, not to a part of the legislature, but to distinct and independent bodies of men. Contrary to the supposition of those who have represented the plan of the convention, in this respect, as novel and unprecedented, it is but a copy of the constitutions of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia; and the preference which has been given to those models is highly to be commended. It is not true, in the second place, that the Parliament of Great Britain, or the legislatures of the particular States, can rectify the exceptionable decisions of their respective courts, in any other sense than might be done by a future legislature of the United States. The theory, neither of the British, nor the State constitutions, authorizes the revisal of a judicial sentence by a legislative act. Nor is there any thing in the proposed Constitution, more than in either of them, by which it is forbidden. In the former, as well as in the latter, the impropriety of the thing, on the general principles of law and reason, is the sole obstacle. A legislature, without exceeding its province, cannot reverse a determination once made in a particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for future cases. This is the principle, and it applies in all its consequences, exactly in the same manner and extent, to the State governments, as to the national government now under consideration. Not the least difference can be pointed out in any view of the subject.
To repeat, the above is the point of contention. It is a fact. The Constitution need not address every absurd idea of the human imagination in order to be applicable. While it does not directly express the absurdity of a judiciary, by the express soveign will of the people created to serve the people, striking down the express sovereign will of the people — it is not necessary to do so. The Court created by the sovereign, was granted limited power by the sovereign. The expressed sovereign will of the people is not subservient to the government they created. It can never have a case, under the Constitution, to abolish a part of the Constitution. So, you may claim all you want that the court can strike down part of the Constitution, but it has never been done, and the Court has never claimed the power to do so. It was argued almost a century ago against the 18th amendment, and failed resoundingly. From the instant an amendment is declared ratified, it binds all courts and legislative bodies. It is the organic, paramount law, and prevails over all other laws. It is an expression of the sovereign will of the people and can be changed only by another expression of the sovereign will of the people. Only the people can do that, not the government. As the Supreme Court held, the "Amendment, by lawful proposal and ratification, has become a part of the Constitution, and must be respected and given effect the same as other provisions of that instrument. Would you believe that SCOTUS could strike down the Bill of Rights? https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/253/350/case.html National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920) [...] Syllabus The adoption by both houses of Congress, each by a two-thirds vote, of a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution sufficiently shows that the proposal was deemed necessary by all who voted for it. An express declaration that they regarded it as necessary is not essential. P. 253 U. S. 386. The two-thirds vote in each house which is required in proposing an amendment is a vote of two-thirds of the members present -- assuming the presence of a quorum -- and not a vote of two-thirds of the entire membership, present and absent. Id. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U. S. 276. The referendum provisions of state constitutions and statutes cannot be applied, consistently with the Constitution of the United States, in the ratification or rejection of amendments to it. Id. Hawke v. Smith, ante, 253 U. S. 221. The prohibition of the manufacture, sale, transportation, importation and exportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, as embodied in the Eighteenth Amendment, is within the power to amend reserved by Article V of the Constitution. Id. That Amendment, by lawful proposal and ratification, has become a part of the Constitution, and must be respected and given effect the same as other provisions of that instrument. Id. The first section of the Amendment -- the one embodying the prohibition -- is operative throughout the entire territorial limits of the United States, binds all legislative bodies, courts, public officers, and individuals within those limits, and, of its own force, invalidates every legislative act -- whether by Congress, by a state legislature, or by a territorial assembly -- which authorizes or sanctions what the section prohibits. Id. The second section of the Amendment -- the one declaring "[t]he Congress and the several states shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation" -- does not enable Congress or the several states to defeat or thwart the prohibition, but only to enforce it by appropriate means. P. 253 U. S. 387.
The quote below proves that the SCOTUS heard and considered the constitutionality of the new amendment.. -- Your opinion is wrong... I didn't need to, as I knew you would, in your attempt to gloss over the fact that the case was heard, proving you wrong. Yada, yada. -- You're the one who's sounding desperate.
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.... It can never have a case, under the Constitution, to abolish a part of the Constitution. --- chan Nevertheless, the case was heard, making the scotus of the day 'absurd', according to Chan...
I am not the one citing the losing argument of attorney in a futile legal case as authority. The argument that you forgot to read is, indeed, absurd. Charles Evans Hughes demonstrated that it was absurd. Root for plaintiff argued that the ratified amendment was a piece of ordinary legislation and did not fall under the authority granted by Article V. Root's absurdity was nicely covered in the Yale Law Journal in 1921 which I have shown you before but which beares repeating if you are to make believe that the massacred argument of Elihu Root makes your babble any less absurd. As noted in W. F. Dodd, Amending the Federal Constitution, Yale Law Journal, Vl XXX, No. 4, February 1921, p. 322. If a millionaire was willing to pay to get an argument presented, a lawyer was willing to take his money. Mr. Elihu Root for the plaintiff argued, with a straight face, the 18th amendment was an ordinary piece of legislation, and therefore not within the power granted by the 5th Amendment. While a noted lawyer, Root's problem was a meritless argument combined with facing the legal legend. Charles Evans Hughes on the other side. Feigenspan v. Bodine, et al., (U. S. Dist. Court, Dist. of New Jersey, March 9, 1920). W. F. Dodd, Amending the Federal Constitution, Yale Law Journal, V1 XXX, No. 4, February 1921, pp. 332-334. The point under contention is made perhaps even clearer by another statement in this brief: “In this respect a constitutional amendment granting to the government power to prohibit intoxicants would be quite different from an 34 At p. 16. [333] attempted amendment itself directly declaring the prohibition of intoxicants. The former would merely add to the powers of government and would, therefore, in this regard at least, be a proper form of constitutional amendment; while the latter in its essence neither would add nor withdraw powers of government, but would be direct legislation. The Eighteenth Amendment is, therefore, in substance and effect a statute, not a constitutional provision akin to any in the federal Constitution.” It is sought to bolster up this argument by the provision of the Constitution vesting all legislative power in Congress; and to sustain it further by the purely political argument that legislation thus embodied in the Constitution becomes permanent and beyond the control of the majority, because of the fact that change may be prevented by fourteen states containing only a very small minority of the population of the country.35 A similar argument will be found in an article which recently appeared in the Harvard Law Review.36 This argument might be termed somewhat ridiculous, had it not appeared under the distinguished name of Mr. Elihu Root. The Solicitor General’s brief in the Feigenspan Case reviews a number of provisions of the original Constitution and of amendments thereto before the Eighteenth Amendment, and properly says: “That the provisions referred to are acts of legislation in the sense that they establish rules of law can not be doubted. They and other provisions constitute a body of laws which the framers of the. Constitution deemed of such importance that they should be enacted and placed beyond the control of any branch of the government.”37 Mr. Hughes’ brief in the Kentucky Distilleries Case presents the situation even more vigorously: “And what is ‘legislation’ which is thus said to lie outside the scope of the amending power according to the theory presented? Is it that the amendment must not be self-executing? But the obvious answer is that the Thirteenth Amendment is self-executing and it has been so adjudged by this court.... “Is it that the amendment must not directly affect the rights of persons without the intervention of legislation? The Thirteenth Amendment did that, for it made free men out of slaves. “Is it that the amendment must not directly disturb without further legislation vested rights of property? But the Thirteenth Amendment destroyed property in slaves. “The attempt is made to explain in some way that the Thirteenth 35 pp. 11, 14 et seq., 48. 36 William L. Marbury, The Limitations upon the Amending Power (1919) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 223. See a reply to this article by William L. Frierson, Amending the Constitution of the United States: A Reply to Mr. Marbury (1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 659. Mr. Frierson’s name will also be found signed to the brief for the appellees in the case of Feigenspan v. Bodine. 37 At p. 37. [334] Amendment, which did all these things, was not legislation. It is impossible then to understand in what sense the term “legislation” is used. For that which establishes a rule of law which, being self-executing, determines without further legislation the rights and status of persons and rights of property manifestly has the direct operation and effect of legislation.”38 38 At pp. 51-52.
No. It is unfortunate that you do not read or understand the court decisions you spout about. The Court did not hear an argument about whether the Amendment was constitutional. It heard an argument about whether the Amendment was a piece of ordinary legislation and not an Amendment under the amendment making power conferred by Amendment 5. You are one of the few who argues the absurd losing argument make their own argument less absurd, and without bothering to read and absurd the losing argument. See Coleman which I've shown you before. You can make believe as much as you want. You will just get to read it again. Or perhaps read it for the first time. Citing Coleman v Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), Laurence H. Tribe wrote in American Constitutional Law, Third Edition, Volume 1, at 105, that "Coleman can be regarded today as imposing an absolute bar on judicial review of the amendment process. The Court's instinct that most questions regarding the amendment process should be nonjusticiable is on target: constitutional amendment is a political, not legal, process, and judicial supervision of that process threatens to undermine the independence of Article V from normal legal processes—and poses particular problems when the amendment at issue is one proposed in response to judicial decisions." Coleman at 440. Once the Secretary of State declares that the Amendment has been ratified and become part of the Constitution, his declaration is conclusive upon the courts. As for the absurdity of the argument for plaintiff in your cited losing case, the Yale Law Journal covered it nicely in 1921. Read it as many times as needed. W. F. Dodd, Amending the Federal Constitution, Yale Law Journal, V1 XXX, No. 4, February 1921, pp. 332-334. The point under contention is made perhaps even clearer by another statement in this brief: “In this respect a constitutional amendment granting to the government power to prohibit intoxicants would be quite different from an 34 At p. 16. [333] attempted amendment itself directly declaring the prohibition of intoxicants. The former would merely add to the powers of government and would, therefore, in this regard at least, be a proper form of constitutional amendment; while the latter in its essence neither would add nor withdraw powers of government, but would be direct legislation. The Eighteenth Amendment is, therefore, in substance and effect a statute, not a constitutional provision akin to any in the federal Constitution.” It is sought to bolster up this argument by the provision of the Constitution vesting all legislative power in Congress; and to sustain it further by the purely political argument that legislation thus embodied in the Constitution becomes permanent and beyond the control of the majority, because of the fact that change may be prevented by fourteen states containing only a very small minority of the population of the country.35 A similar argument will be found in an article which recently appeared in the Harvard Law Review.36 This argument might be termed somewhat ridiculous, had it not appeared under the distinguished name of Mr. Elihu Root. The Solicitor General’s brief in the Feigenspan Case reviews a number of provisions of the original Constitution and of amendments thereto before the Eighteenth Amendment, and properly says: “That the provisions referred to are acts of legislation in the sense that they establish rules of law can not be doubted. They and other provisions constitute a body of laws which the framers of the. Constitution deemed of such importance that they should be enacted and placed beyond the control of any branch of the government.”37 Mr. Hughes’ brief in the Kentucky Distilleries Case presents the situation even more vigorously: “And what is ‘legislation’ which is thus said to lie outside the scope of the amending power according to the theory presented? Is it that the amendment must not be self-executing? But the obvious answer is that the Thirteenth Amendment is self-executing and it has been so adjudged by this court.... “Is it that the amendment must not directly affect the rights of persons without the intervention of legislation? The Thirteenth Amendment did that, for it made free men out of slaves. “Is it that the amendment must not directly disturb without further legislation vested rights of property? But the Thirteenth Amendment destroyed property in slaves. “The attempt is made to explain in some way that the Thirteenth 35 pp. 11, 14 et seq., 48. 36 William L. Marbury, The Limitations upon the Amending Power (1919) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 223. See a reply to this article by William L. Frierson, Amending the Constitution of the United States: A Reply to Mr. Marbury (1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 659. Mr. Frierson’s name will also be found signed to the brief for the appellees in the case of Feigenspan v. Bodine. 37 At p. 37. [334] Amendment, which did all these things, was not legislation. It is impossible then to understand in what sense the term “legislation” is used. For that which establishes a rule of law which, being self-executing, determines without further legislation the rights and status of persons and rights of property manifestly has the direct operation and effect of legislation.”38 38 At pp. 51-52.
Nevertheless, the case was heard, making the scotus of the day 'absurd', according to Chan... The quote above proves that the SCOTUS heard and considered the constitutionality of the new amendment.. -- Your opinion is wrong... Root made an argument before the SCOTUS that, among others, the prohibition amendment was unconstitutional because, in effect, it is absurd to contend that people can amend away their, or others, inalienable rights to buy, make, or drink alcohol. Why you are defending this insane concept is beyond comprehension. Does this mean you would contend that an amendment could be passed that prohibited our inalienable rights to buy, make, or use guns? Thanks once again in giving us your opinion about 'absurdity'.
I've only caught bits and pieces. I would think that if an amendment is lawully passed. It can't be ruled unconstitutional.
That's because of Chan's posting 'style'; --- he posts lengthy opinions that are vaguely on topic, hoping to impress everyone with his ability to access what, - nexus? If that's the case, our bill of rights could be infringed upon or repealed by a Article V convention, after ratification by a tyranny of the majority, making our constitutional principles a joke...
I would think that if an amendment is lawully passed. It can't be ruled unconstitutional. Catch this part. iting Coleman v Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), Laurence H. Tribe wrote in American Constitutional Law, Third Edition, Volume 1, at 105, that "Coleman can be regarded today as imposing an absolute bar on judicial review of the amendment process. The Court's instinct that most questions regarding the amendment process should be nonjusticiable is on target: constitutional amendment is a political, not legal, process, and judicial supervision of that process threatens to undermine the independence of Article V from normal legal processes—and poses particular problems when the amendment at issue is one proposed in response to judicial decisions." Coleman at 440.
I am not the one citing the losing argument of attorney in a futile legal case as authority. The argument that you forgot to read is, indeed, absurd. Charles Evans Hughes demonstrated that it was absurd. Root for plaintiff argued that the ratified amendment was a piece of ordinary legislation and did not fall under the authority granted by Article V. Root's absurdity was nicely covered in the Yale Law Journal in 1921 which I have shown you before but which beares repeating if you are to make believe that the massacred argument of Elihu Root makes your babble any less absurd. As noted in W. F. Dodd, Amending the Federal Constitution, Yale Law Journal, Vl XXX, No. 4, February 1921, p. 322. If a millionaire was willing to pay to get an argument presented, a lawyer was willing to take his money. Mr. Elihu Root for the plaintiff argued, with a straight face, the 18th amendment was an ordinary piece of legislation, and therefore not within the power granted by the 5th Amendment. While a noted lawyer, Root's problem was a meritless argument combined with facing the legal legend. Charles Evans Hughes on the other side. Feigenspan v. Bodine, et al., (U. S. Dist. Court, Dist. of New Jersey, March 9, 1920). W. F. Dodd, Amending the Federal Constitution, Yale Law Journal, V1 XXX, No. 4, February 1921, pp. 332-334. The point under contention is made perhaps even clearer by another statement in this brief: “In this respect a constitutional amendment granting to the government power to prohibit intoxicants would be quite different from an 34 At p. 16. [333] attempted amendment itself directly declaring the prohibition of intoxicants. The former would merely add to the powers of government and would, therefore, in this regard at least, be a proper form of constitutional amendment; while the latter in its essence neither would add nor withdraw powers of government, but would be direct legislation. The Eighteenth Amendment is, therefore, in substance and effect a statute, not a constitutional provision akin to any in the federal Constitution.” It is sought to bolster up this argument by the provision of the Constitution vesting all legislative power in Congress; and to sustain it further by the purely political argument that legislation thus embodied in the Constitution becomes permanent and beyond the control of the majority, because of the fact that change may be prevented by fourteen states containing only a very small minority of the population of the country.35 A similar argument will be found in an article which recently appeared in the Harvard Law Review.36 This argument might be termed somewhat ridiculous, had it not appeared under the distinguished name of Mr. Elihu Root. The Solicitor General’s brief in the Feigenspan Case reviews a number of provisions of the original Constitution and of amendments thereto before the Eighteenth Amendment, and properly says: “That the provisions referred to are acts of legislation in the sense that they establish rules of law can not be doubted. They and other provisions constitute a body of laws which the framers of the. Constitution deemed of such importance that they should be enacted and placed beyond the control of any branch of the government.”37 Mr. Hughes’ brief in the Kentucky Distilleries Case presents the situation even more vigorously: “And what is ‘legislation’ which is thus said to lie outside the scope of the amending power according to the theory presented? Is it that the amendment must not be self-executing? But the obvious answer is that the Thirteenth Amendment is self-executing and it has been so adjudged by this court.... “Is it that the amendment must not directly affect the rights of persons without the intervention of legislation? The Thirteenth Amendment did that, for it made free men out of slaves. “Is it that the amendment must not directly disturb without further legislation vested rights of property? But the Thirteenth Amendment destroyed property in slaves. “The attempt is made to explain in some way that the Thirteenth 35 pp. 11, 14 et seq., 48. 36 William L. Marbury, The Limitations upon the Amending Power (1919) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 223. See a reply to this article by William L. Frierson, Amending the Constitution of the United States: A Reply to Mr. Marbury (1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 659. Mr. Frierson’s name will also be found signed to the brief for the appellees in the case of Feigenspan v. Bodine. 37 At p. 37. [334] Amendment, which did all these things, was not legislation. It is impossible then to understand in what sense the term “legislation” is used. For that which establishes a rule of law which, being self-executing, determines without further legislation the rights and status of persons and rights of property manifestly has the direct operation and effect of legislation.”38 38 At pp. 51-52.
Root made an argument before the SCOTUS that, among others, the prohibition amendment was unconstitutional because, in effect, it is absurd to contend that people can amend away their, or others, inalienable rights to buy, make, or drink alcohol.. Your tiresome repetitions of your opinions, and those of others, prove nothing. Why you are defending this insane concept is beyond comprehension. Does this mean you would contend that an amendment could be passed that prohibited our inalienable rights to buy, make, or use guns?
L-O-S-T. It was found to have no merit. Like your nonsense.
In wingnut world, wingnuttery rules. In the real world, saying the court is erroneous does not change the fact that their holding is the law. No power of the government can deem any part of the Constitution to be null and void. The matter of ratification is a political question and the courts have no jurisdiction over political questions. Coleman v Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 440 (1939) The Supreme Court said it — "the official notice to the Secretary of State, duly authenticated … was conclusive upon the courts." LaVergne v Bryson, Secretary of Commerce, 3rd Cir 12-1171 (20 Sep 2012) And in tpaine's court of the imagination, "amendments to the constitution can be deemed unconstitutional." All you need to do is believe that when the court held Jane Roe has a constitutional right to an abortion, it only applied to Jane Roe. And when the court held that Obergefell had a constitutional right to marry a person of the same sex, it only applied to Obergefell. In wingnutworld, the legislature and the executive can give the holdings due consideration and choose whether to ignore them or not. Asserting the Supremacy Clause somehow supports the absurd claim that constitutional amendments can be deemed unconstitutional: Demonstrating a delusion about what the Supremacy Clause does, and explaining why his legal logic is so dicked up. The Supremacy Clause at Article 6, states, tpaine labors under the delusion that this clause sets the Constitution at equivalency with ordinary legislated laws and United States treaties. As legislation can be struck down by the court as unconstitutional, this brain fart entices him to imagine that the Constititution can be struck down by the court, or that amendments may be deemed unconstitutional, or that amendments pronounced ratified may be struck down by the courts — this only works if laws made by the legislature are equal to the Constitution, and that is so only in some imaginary world. Ignoring the holding in Coleman, (1939), not to mention the recitation of precedents in LaVergne v. Bryson (2012). What the Supremacy Clause actually states is that any form of Federal law takes precedence over any form of State law, whether the State law be statutory or constitutional. Note that the clause in the 6th Amendment only applied to "judges in every state." Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 3rd Ed., Vol. 1 (2000), pg. 255. In tpaine's court of the imagination, the court and Laurence Tribe are erroneous, along with anyone that does not adopt the absurd notions that flow from his imagination. Everyone in America knows that laws are struck down by the court when they are found to conflict with the Constitution. The Constitution is the paramount law and takes precedence over all other American law. Treaties and federal statutes are equal (but below the Constitution), with the most recently adopted controlling. * * * Treaties, however, cannot violate the Constitution. Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies, 2 Ed., Erwin Chemerinsky, 2002 at 361 This particular idiocy relates to the National Prohibition Cases in 1920, which was several prohibition cases heard together at the SCOTUS level. The question was not before the court to determine the constitutionality of the 18th Amendment. An amendment cannot be unconstitutional. Counsel did not argue the the amendment was unconstitutional, he argued that, due to its content, it was ordinary legislation and not an amendment at all. And, as ordinary legislation, the court had the authority to strike it down, according to this creative argument. Trust tpaine to bloviate endlessly about crap he has not seen or read. On brief: The briefs were ridiculed in W. F. Dodd, Amending the Federal Constitution, Yale Law Journal, Vl XXX, No. 4, February 1921, p. 322. This is the Yale Law Journal, not tpaine's court of the imagination. The argument was characterized in W. F. Dodd, Amending the Federal Constitution, Yale Law Journal, V1 XXX, No. 4, February 1921, p. 333. [...] Mr. Hughes’ brief in the Kentucky Distilleries Case presents the situation even more vigorously: “And what is ‘legislation’ which is thus said to lie outside the scope of the amending power according to the theory presented? Is it that the amendment must not be self-executing? But the obvious answer is that the Thirteenth Amendment is self-executing and it has been so adjudged by this court.... “Is it that the amendment must not directly affect the rights of persons without the intervention of legislation? The Thirteenth Amendment did that, for it made free men out of slaves. “Is it that the amendment must not directly disturb without further legislation vested rights of property? But the Thirteenth Amendment destroyed property in slaves. “The attempt is made to explain in some way that the Thirteenth Amendment, which did all these things, was not legislation. It is impossible then to understand in what sense the term “legislation” is used. For that which establishes a rule of law which, being self-executing, determines without further legislation the rights and status of persons and rights of property manifestly has the direct operation and effect of legislation.” The 18th Amendment was an amendment, not common legislation.
Root made an argument before the SCOTUS that, among others, the prohibition amendment was unconstitutional because, in effect, it is absurd to contend that people can amend away their, or others, inalienable rights to buy, make, or drink alcohol.. The point is that the SCOTUS heard the argument. You claim they can't, and you're wrong. Inevitably, when you can't address my arguments (as above, about our inalienable rights), -- you call them nonsense or absurd. -- You're making yourself look very unprofessional. -- I assume you've had legal training, and are at least a wannabe lawyer. -- How about acting like a pro, and controlling yourself? Your tiresome repetitions of your opinions, and citing lengthy parts of others, prove nothing. Why you are defending this insane concept is beyond comprehension. Does this mean you would contend that an amendment could be passed that prohibited our inalienable rights to buy, make, or use guns? Answer please. -- Second request...
In wingnut world, wingnuttery rules. In the real world, saying the court is erroneous does not change the fact that their holding is the law. No power of the government can deem any part of the Constitution to be null and void. The matter of ratification is a political question and the courts have no jurisdiction over political questions. Coleman v Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 440 (1939) The Supreme Court said it — "the official notice to the Secretary of State, duly authenticated … was conclusive upon the courts." LaVergne v Bryson, Secretary of Commerce, 3rd Cir 12-1171 (20 Sep 2012) And in tpaine's court of the imagination, "amendments to the constitution can be deemed unconstitutional." All you need to do is believe that when the court held Jane Roe has a constitutional right to an abortion, it only applied to Jane Roe. And when the court held that Obergefell had a constitutional right to marry a person of the same sex, it only applied to Obergefell. In wingnutworld, the legislature and the executive can give the holdings due consideration and choose whether to ignore them or not. Asserting the Supremacy Clause somehow supports the absurd claim that constitutional amendments can be deemed unconstitutional: Demonstrating a delusion about what the Supremacy Clause does, and explaining why his legal logic is so dicked up. The Supremacy Clause at Article 6, states, tpaine labors under the delusion that this clause sets the Constitution at equivalency with ordinary legislated laws and United States treaties. As legislation can be struck down by the court as unconstitutional, this brain fart entices him to imagine that the Constititution can be struck down by the court, or that amendments may be deemed unconstitutional, or that amendments pronounced ratified may be struck down by the courts — this only works if laws made by the legislature are equal to the Constitution, and that is so only in some imaginary world. Ignoring the holding in Coleman, (1939), not to mention the recitation of precedents in LaVergne v. Bryson (2012). What the Supremacy Clause actually states is that any form of Federal law takes precedence over any form of State law, whether the State law be statutory or constitutional. Note that the clause in the 6th Amendment only applied to "judges in every state." Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 3rd Ed., Vol. 1 (2000), pg. 255. In tpaine's court of the imagination, the court and Laurence Tribe are erroneous, along with anyone that does not adopt the absurd notions that flow from his imagination. Everyone in America knows that laws are struck down by the court when they are found to conflict with the Constitution. The Constitution is the paramount law and takes precedence over all other American law. Treaties and federal statutes are equal (but below the Constitution), with the most recently adopted controlling. * * * Treaties, however, cannot violate the Constitution. Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies, 2 Ed., Erwin Chemerinsky, 2002 at 361 This particular idiocy relates to the National Prohibition Cases in 1920, which was several prohibition cases heard together at the SCOTUS level. The question was not before the court to determine the constitutionality of the 18th Amendment. An amendment cannot be unconstitutional. Counsel did not argue the the amendment was unconstitutional, he argued that, due to its content, it was ordinary legislation and not an amendment at all. And, as ordinary legislation, the court had the authority to strike it down, according to this creative argument. Trust tpaine to bloviate endlessly about crap he has not seen or read. On brief: The briefs were ridiculed in W. F. Dodd, Amending the Federal Constitution, Yale Law Journal, Vl XXX, No. 4, February 1921, p. 322. This is the Yale Law Journal, not tpaine's court of the imagination. The argument was characterized in W. F. Dodd, Amending the Federal Constitution, Yale Law Journal, V1 XXX, No. 4, February 1921, p. 333. [...] Mr. Hughes’ brief in the Kentucky Distilleries Case presents the situation even more vigorously: “And what is ‘legislation’ which is thus said to lie outside the scope of the amending power according to the theory presented? Is it that the amendment must not be self-executing? But the obvious answer is that the Thirteenth Amendment is self-executing and it has been so adjudged by this court.... “Is it that the amendment must not directly affect the rights of persons without the intervention of legislation? The Thirteenth Amendment did that, for it made free men out of slaves. “Is it that the amendment must not directly disturb without further legislation vested rights of property? But the Thirteenth Amendment destroyed property in slaves. “The attempt is made to explain in some way that the Thirteenth Amendment, which did all these things, was not legislation. It is impossible then to understand in what sense the term “legislation” is used. For that which establishes a rule of law which, being self-executing, determines without further legislation the rights and status of persons and rights of property manifestly has the direct operation and effect of legislation.” The 18th Amendment was an amendment, not common legislation.
The new, revised and better Declaration of Independence.
I disagree. They shouldn't be stopped at all unless there is PC. We used to be a land where we gave up our lives to protect our freedom. Now we give up our freedom to protect our lives.
You can't. Whether we like it or not, we cannot make that decision, only SCOTUS can. The Supreme Court has determined that DUI checkpoints do not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure. I can. Simply with the text of the 4th amendment. I know I don't have to post it for you but I will. I know that you know what it says. It's states in very plain language that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Blanket warrants are unconstitutional and that is exactly what a checkpoint is. I don't care what the SCOTUS says. And the irony here is that you know that I'm right, whether you argue differently or not. We used to be a land where we gave up our lives to protect our freedom. Now we give up our freedom to protect our lives.
The Supreme Court publishes its opinions. They do not make rulings. They are a co-equal branch of the federal government, not the supreme branch. We used to be a land where we gave up our lives to protect our freedom. Now we give up our freedom to protect our lives.
Speaking of knowing that I'm right, where is Yukon these days? We used to be a land where we gave up our lives to protect our freedom. Now we give up our freedom to protect our lives.
Does this mean you would contend that an amendment could be passed that prohibited our inalienable rights to buy, make, or use guns? Now we're getting somewhere! -- Thanks for your ridicule.. It tells me a lot about your true political agenda.
The same place as harrowup... In 'gatlins' basement with his other cast of characters.
Rent free he lives in your puny mind. lol I'm the infidel... Allah warned you about. كافر المسلح
Does this mean that your revised Declaration of Independence has been declared the law of the land by the people of the United States?
He's still lurking he just can't help himself, assholes are that way you know. He probably thinks his neighbor is shooting blue death rays at him (even though he's over a mile away) so he doesn't go out unless it's an emergency, like he's run out of Sterno!! “Political correctness is a doctrine, fostered by a delusional, illogical minority, and rapidly promoted by mainstream media, which holds forth the proposition that it is entirely possible to pick up a turd by the clean end.”
The Supreme Court publishes its opinions. They do not make rulings. Okay, The Supreme Court has "published an opinion" that DUI checkpoints do not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure. And DUI checkpoints are being run throughout the country....right?
The same place as harrowup... In 'gatlins' basement with his other cast of characters
Hondo:
tater, your obnoxious behaviour is not excusable within this fine publick venue. Moderator X, do your banishment!
Pointing out a REALISTIC physical contortion is not obnoxious behavior....it's a community service, well performed and enlightening.
It is indefensible with your tongue hanging out over your own ass. The publick need not see these sorts of contortionist shenanigans that yukon taught you.
The new, revised and better Declaration of Independence. An amendment to the constitution, made by the people in their sovereign capacity, with the permission and approval of tpaine, to delegate to the government the power to regulate the newfound inalienable right to buy, make, or use guns, may be enacted only in accordance with the new, revised and better Article 5, as enacted by the tpaine court of the imagination. The new, revised and better Article 5: The Congress proposes, and three-fourths of the states ratify the following amendment in tpaineworld. Section 1. The second article of amendment is hereby repealed. Section 2. The individual right to keep and bear, buy, make, and use arms is limited to .22 caliber handguns only. Section 3. All non-conforming guns must be surrendered to government authorities or destroyed within 30 days of ratification of this amendment. Section 4. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. Other than soiling yourself and bleating about it, what is to be done in tpaineworld? Does the Congress pass contrary legislation, telling the people that they have abused their sovereign right to amend their constitution? Does the Court strike down this part of the Constitution as unconstitutional? Does the Deemer of tpaineworld deem this part of the Constitution null and void? Does the tpaine court of the imagination tell the people that they can't infringe the right to buy, make, and use arms; deemed an unalienable right by the tpaine imaginary revised, new and improved Declaration of Independence.
With a tongue like that he puts Gene Simmons to shame. “Political correctness is a doctrine, fostered by a delusional, illogical minority, and rapidly promoted by mainstream media, which holds forth the proposition that it is entirely possible to pick up a turd by the clean end.”
I asked you if this means you would contend that an amendment could be passed that prohibited our inalienable rights to buy, make, or use guns? Your last post indicates you think this would be possible, and you even outline such an amendment: --- AMENDMENT 28. Section 1. The second article of amendment is hereby repealed. Section 2. The individual right to keep and bear, buy, make, and use arms is limited to .22 caliber handguns only. Section 3. All non-conforming guns must be surrendered to government authorities or destroyed within 30 days of ratification of this amendment. Section 4. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. Congress has the power to refuse to fund any efforts to implement the unconstitutional amendment, and to tell the people why. It has the power to issue an opinion that such an amendment is unconstitutional.. Dream on that in Nolu Chan's world such an amendment could be valid. It would violate every principle inherent in our constitution, and thus would be null and void from its enactment.
And would be so deemed by the Deemer of tpaine's court of the imagination.
Whatever.
Rent free he lives in your puny mind. lol Awwwww, somewhere along the line I have hurt your feelings. I do apologize. Truth is, I miss the old crank. We used to be a land where we gave up our lives to protect our freedom. Now we give up our freedom to protect our lives.
You didn't hurt nothing of mine. I don't take stuff posted by some here personal. lol I was just making a point, it seems a little odd that some here are still talking about Yukon. He left his mark well. lol I'm the infidel... Allah warned you about. كافر المسلح
He's still lurking he just can't help himself, assholes are that way you know. He probably thinks his neighbor is shooting blue death rays at him (even though he's over a mile away) so he doesn't go out unless it's an emergency, like he's run out of Sterno!! Bwaahaa!! Gotta laugh outta that... ...as I notice WTP's cameo.
The constitutionality of the new law and the amendment itself were challenged in a series of legal cases that were brought before the US Supreme Court as the National Prohibition Cases (1920).
Section 1 of the Eighteenth Amendment (which alone concerns us at present) it will be noted, is not a delegation of power to be exercised, but a mandate operative by its own terms. If valid, the incorporation of it into the United States Constitution, prohibits the manufacture of, and all dealings in, intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes throughout the United States and all the territory subject to its jurisdiction. For brevity, the transactions thereby prohibited will be hereinafter referred to as the "liquor traffic" or "trafficking in liquors." The prohibition covers both intrastate and interstate business in such beverages.
Thirteen years later, the Twenty-first Amendment was ratified, overturning the Eighteenth Amendment and ending national prohibition in 1933.
“That the duties assigned to the circuit courts by this act are not of that description, and that the act itself does not appear to contemplate them as such, inasmuch as it subjects the decisions of these courts, made pursuant to those duties, first to the consideration and suspension of the Secretary at War and then to the revision of the legislature, whereas by the Constitution, neither the Secretary at War nor any other Executive officer, nor even the legislature, is authorized to sit as a court of errors on the judicial acts or opinions of this court.”
When the Supreme Court rules on a constitutional issue, that judgment is virtually final; its decisions can be altered only by the rarely used procedure of constitutional amendment or by a new ruling of the Court. However, when the Court interprets a statute, new legislative action can be taken.
Publius
[Alexander Hamilton] But perhaps the force of the objection may be thought to consist in the particular organization of the Supreme Court; in its being composed of a distinct body of magistrates, instead of being one of the branches of the legislature, as in the government of Great Britain and that of the State. To insist upon this point, the authors of the objection must renounce the meaning they have labored to annex to the celebrated maxim, requiring a separation of the departments of power. It shall, nevertheless, be conceded to them, agreeably to the interpretation given to that maxim in the course of these papers, that it is not violated by vesting the ultimate power of judging in a PART of the legislative body. But though this be not an absolute violation of that excellent rule, yet it verges so nearly upon it, as on this account alone to be less eligible than the mode preferred by the convention. From a body which had even a partial agency in passing bad laws, we could rarely expect a disposition to temper and moderate them in the application. The same spirit which had operated in making them, would be too apt in interpreting them; still less could it be expected that men who had infringed the Constitution in the character of legislators, would be disposed to repair the breach in the character of judges. Nor is this all. Every reason which recommends the tenure of good behavior for judicial offices, militates against placing the judiciary power, in the last resort, in a body composed of men chosen for a limited period. There is an absurdity in referring the determination of causes, in the first instance, to judges of permanent standing; in the last, to those of a temporary and mutable constitution. And there is a still greater absurdity in subjecting the decisions of men, selected for their knowledge of the laws, acquired by long and laborious study, to the revision and control of men who, for want of the same advantage, cannot but be deficient in that knowledge. The members of the legislature will rarely be chosen with a view to those qualifications which fit men for the stations of judges; and as, on this account, there will be great reason to apprehend all the ill consequences of defective information, so, on account of the natural propensity of such bodies to party divisions, there will be no less reason to fear that the pestilential breath of faction may poison the fountains of justice. The habit of being continually marshalled on opposite sides will be too apt to stifle the voice both of law and of equity.
#103. To: A K A Stone (#101)
[nc #78] The assertion that a constitutional amendment, or any part of the Constitution, can be struck down by the judiciary, or that anyone is free to legally ignore any part of the Constitution, continues to be an unsupportable legal absurdity.
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority....
U.S. Supreme Court
#104. To: nolu chan (#102)
nc] Fro[m] the instant an Amendment is declared ratified, it is an integral part of the Constitution, equal with all other parts. The notion that Congress can legislate or SCOTUS can rule any part of the Constitution to be unconstitutional is absurd.
The constitutionality of the new law and the amendment itself were challenged in a series of legal cases that were brought before the US Supreme Court as the National Prohibition Cases (1920).
The challenge was rejected. You might mention that part.
Citing a failed desperate grope argument of counsel, thumpingly rejected by the court, is not quite like citing legal precedent, or an approving recognized legal text. In this case, a brewery owner was desperate to stop prohibition from going into effect.
#105. To: nolu chan, aka stone, Y'ALL (#103)
The constitutionality of the new law and the amendment itself were challenged in a series of legal cases that were brought before the US Supreme Court as the National Prohibition Cases (1920).
#106. To: tpaine (#105)
Nevertheless, the case was heard, making the scotus of the day 'absurd', according to Chan...
The briefs presented against the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment are addressed more to what the opposing interests thought ought to be, than to any issues which may properly be termed legal in character. When read, these briefs in many cases seem to be arguments of counsel who were employed to find arguments, and must, therefore, do so, even though they knew the arguments to be untenable. The most effective statements presented to the Court were those submitted in behalf of a number of states as amici curiae, in the cases of Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co. v. Gregory and Rhode Island v. Palmer. These briefs bear the name of Mr. Charles E. Hughes.
By the Thirteenth Amendment the right of an individual to buy, sell, possess, transport and use another human being was absolutely prohibited. By substituting “slavery” of the Thirteenth Amendment, for “intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes” of the Eighteenth Amendment, we have in legal effect the same kind of mandatory prohibition. Every argument advanced here to deny the power to incorporate the Eighteenth Amendment into the Constitution could be applied equally against the power to ordain the Thirteenth Amendment.
Another argument based upon the word "amendment" is that presented by the appellant's brief in the Feigenspan Case. Here counsel argued that the Eighteenth Amendment is in effect legislation, in that it lays down a rule operative upon the states and upon individuals without the necessity for congressional legislation, and that such an amendment, being legislation, is not within the express power conferred upon Congress by Article 5 of the Constitution. It will be well to quote the language of the brief, which bears Mr. Root's name:
“Our contention is not for a further exception to the power granted; it is that the grant itself does not include the power of ordinary legislation. This is no more affected by the fact that there are express exceptions to the power which was granted than would be the proposition that the grant of the Fifth Article does not include the judicial power or power to command the army and navy.”34
#107. To: tpaine (#104)
[nc] Fro[m] the instant an Amendment is declared ratified, it is an integral part of the Constitution, equal with all other parts. The notion that Congress can legislate or SCOTUS can rule any part of the Constitution to be unconstitutional is absurd.
The quote below proves that the SCOTUS heard and considered the constitutionality of the new amendment.. -- Your opinion is wrong...
holding that the official notice to the Secretary of State, duly authenticated, of the action of the legislatures of the States, whose alleged ratifications were assailed, was conclusive upon the Secretary of State, and that his proclamation accordingly of ratification was conclusive upon the courts, we affirmed the judgment of the state court.
Another argument based upon the word "amendment" is that presented by the appellant's brief in the Feigenspan Case. Here counsel argued that the Eighteenth Amendment is in effect legislation, in that it lays down a rule operative upon the states and upon individuals without the necessity for congressional legislation, and that such an amendment, being legislation, is not within the express power conferred upon Congress by Article 5 of the Constitution. It will be well to quote the language of the brief, which bears Mr. Root's name:
“Our contention is not for a further exception to the power granted; it is that the grant itself does not include the power of ordinary legislation. This is no more affected by the fact that there are express exceptions to the power which was granted than would be the proposition that the grant of the Fifth Article does not include the judicial power or power to command the army and navy.”34
#108. To: nolu chan (#107)
It (SCOTUS) can never have a case, under the Constitution, to abolish a part of the Constitution. --- chan
The constitutionality of the new law and the amendment itself were challenged in a series of legal cases that were brought before the US Supreme Court as the National Prohibition Cases (1920).
No. It is unfortunate that you do not read or understand the court decisions you spout about. --- The Court did not hear an argument about whether the Amendment was constitutional. It heard an argument about whether the Amendment was a piece of ordinary legislation and not an Amendment under the amendment making power conferred by Amendment 5.
You are one of the few who argues the absurd losing argument make their own argument less absurd, and without bothering to read and absurd the losing argument.
#109. To: tpaine (#108)
#110. To: A K A Stone (#109)
I've only caught bits and pieces.
I would think that if an amendment is lawully passed. It can't be ruled unconstitutional.
#111. To: A K A Stone, tpaine (#109)
I've only caught bits and pieces.
holding that the official notice to the Secretary of State, duly authenticated, of the action of the legislatures of the States, whose alleged ratifications were assailed, was conclusive upon the Secretary of State, and that his proclamation accordingly of ratification was conclusive upon the courts, we affirmed the judgment of the state court.
#112. To: tpaine, A K A Stone (#108)
Nevertheless, the case was heard, making the scotus of the day 'absurd', according to Chan...
The briefs presented against the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment are addressed more to what the opposing interests thought ought to be, than to any issues which may properly be termed legal in character. When read, these briefs in many cases seem to be arguments of counsel who were employed to find arguments, and must, therefore, do so, even though they knew the arguments to be untenable. The most effective statements presented to the Court were those submitted in behalf of a number of states as amici curiae, in the cases of Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co. v. Gregory and Rhode Island v. Palmer. These briefs bear the name of Mr. Charles E. Hughes.
By the Thirteenth Amendment the right of an individual to buy, sell, possess, transport and use another human being was absolutely prohibited. By substituting “slavery” of the Thirteenth Amendment, for “intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes” of the Eighteenth Amendment, we have in legal effect the same kind of mandatory prohibition. Every argument advanced here to deny the power to incorporate the Eighteenth Amendment into the Constitution could be applied equally against the power to ordain the Thirteenth Amendment.
Another argument based upon the word "amendment" is that presented by the appellant's brief in the Feigenspan Case. Here counsel argued that the Eighteenth Amendment is in effect legislation, in that it lays down a rule operative upon the states and upon individuals without the necessity for congressional legislation, and that such an amendment, being legislation, is not within the express power conferred upon Congress by Article 5 of the Constitution. It will be well to quote the language of the brief, which bears Mr. Root's name:
“Our contention is not for a further exception to the power granted; it is that the grant itself does not include the power of ordinary legislation. This is no more affected by the fact that there are express exceptions to the power which was granted than would be the proposition that the grant of the Fifth Article does not include the judicial power or power to command the army and navy.”34
#113. To: nolu chan (#112)
I am not the one citing the losing argument of attorney in a futile legal case as authority. The argument that you forgot to read is, indeed, absurd. Charles Evans Hughes demonstrated that it was absurd. Root for plaintiff argued that the ratified amendment was a piece of ordinary legislation and did not fall under the authority granted by Article V. Root's absurdity was nicely covered in the Yale Law Journal in 1921 which I have shown you before but which beares repeating if you are to make believe that the massacred argument of Elihu Root makes your babble any less absurd.
#114. To: tpaine (#113)
Root made an argument before the SCOTUS that,
#115. To: tpaine (#113)
Your opinion, and that of the court, is erroneous.
amendments to the constitution can be deemed unconstitutional.
holding that the official notice to the Secretary of State, duly authenticated, of the action of the legislatures of the States, whose alleged ratifications were assailed, was conclusive upon the Secretary of State, and that his proclamation accordingly of ratification was conclusive upon the courts, we affirmed the judgment of the state court.
LaVergne’s claims also fail on other grounds, including lack of justiciability. LaVergne’s constitutional challenge to § 2a is primarily based on his argument that the apportionment method violates Article the First. He alleges that this proposed constitutional amendment was ratified by the states in November 1791 or June 1792. Putting aside the considerable factual and historical problems with his argument, “[t]he issue of whether a constitutional amendment has been properly ratified is a political question.” United States v. McDonald, 919 F.2d 146, 1990 WL 186103 (table), at *3 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939)). In Coleman, the Supreme Court held that “the question of the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures . . . should be regarded as a political question pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over the promulgation of the adoption of the amendment.” 307 U.S. at 450. See also Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 39 (1849) (holding that “the political department has always determined whether the proposed constitution or amendment was ratified or not by the people of the State, and the judicial power has followed its decision”); United States v. Foster, 789 F.2d 457, 463 n.6 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the issue of “the validity of an amendment’s ratification [is] a non-justiciable political question” and citing, among other cases, Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922), and Coleman, 307 U.S. at 450).
SCOTUS opinions apply to the case at hand and are given due consideration by the other branches of govt, and by the people.
But you can't refute the fact of the supremacy clause.
Legislation (or amendments) passed contrary to the constitution, are null and void.
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
Read narrowly, the Supremacy Clause binds only state judges. But other provisions of the Constitution, most notably the Fourteenth Amendment, directly constrain the action of all state officials, often without regard to whether state courts have ruled on the validity of those officials' acts; moreover, Article VI declares that "the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers . . . of the several states, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution. ... " Accordingly, the Court has not limited to state judges its demand for compliance with the federal Constitution. In Cooper v. Aaron, a school desegregation case decided against the background of Governor Faubus's resistance to the desegregation of public schools in Little Rock, Arkansas, the Supreme Court asserted what is probably its broadest definition of its own power: "Marbury v. Madison ... declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land.... Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath ... 'to support this Constitution.'"
Treaties, agreements between the United States and a foreign country that are negotiated by the president and ratified by the Senate, are permitted unless they violate the Constitution. It is firmly established that if there is a conflict between a treaty and a federal statute, the one adopted last in time controls.
The quote below proves that the SCOTUS heard and considered the constitutionality of the new amendment.. -- Your opinion is wrong...
In this respect a constitutional amendment granting to the government power to prohibit intoxicants would be quite different from an attempted amendment itself directly declaring the prohibition of intoxicants. The former would merely add to the powers of government and would, therefore, in this regard at least, be a proper form of constitutional amendment; while the latter in its essence neither would add nor withdraw powers of government, but would be direct legislation. The Eighteenth Amendment is, therefore, in substance and effect a statute, not a constitutional provision akin to any in the federal Constitution.
The briefs presented against the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment are addressed more to what the opposing interests thought ought to be, than to any issues which may properly be termed legal in character. When read, these briefs in many cases seem to be arguments of counsel who were employed to find arguments, and must, therefore, do so, even though they knew the arguments to be untenable. The most effective statements presented to the Court were those submitted in behalf of a number of states as amici curiae, in the cases of Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co. v. Gregory and Rhode Island v. Palmer. These briefs bear the name of Mr. Charles E. Hughes.
This argument might be termed somewhat ridiculous, had it not appeared under the distinguished name of Mr. Elihu Root.
#116. To: nolu chan (#114)
Root made an argument before the SCOTUS that, L-O-S-T.
It was found to have no merit. Like your nonsense.
I am not the one citing the losing argument of attorney in a futile legal case as authority. The argument that you forgot to read is, indeed, absurd. Charles Evans Hughes demonstrated that it was absurd. Root for plaintiff argued that the ratified amendment was a piece of ordinary legislation and did not fall under the authority granted by Article V. Root's absurdity was nicely covered in the Yale Law Journal in 1921 which I have shown you before but which beares repeating if you are to make believe that the massacred argument of Elihu Root makes your babble any less absurd.
#117. To: tpaine (#116)
Root made an argument before the SCOTUS that, among others, the prohibition amendment was unconstitutional because, in effect, it is absurd to contend that people can amend away their, or others, inalienable rights to buy, make, or drink alcohol..
Your opinion, and that of the court, is erroneous.
amendments to the constitution can be deemed unconstitutional.
holding that the official notice to the Secretary of State, duly authenticated, of the action of the legislatures of the States, whose alleged ratifications were assailed, was conclusive upon the Secretary of State, and that his proclamation accordingly of ratification was conclusive upon the courts, we affirmed the judgment of the state court.
LaVergne’s claims also fail on other grounds, including lack of justiciability. LaVergne’s constitutional challenge to § 2a is primarily based on his argument that the apportionment method violates Article the First. He alleges that this proposed constitutional amendment was ratified by the states in November 1791 or June 1792. Putting aside the considerable factual and historical problems with his argument, “[t]he issue of whether a constitutional amendment has been properly ratified is a political question.” United States v. McDonald, 919 F.2d 146, 1990 WL 186103 (table), at *3 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939)). In Coleman, the Supreme Court held that “the question of the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures . . . should be regarded as a political question pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over the promulgation of the adoption of the amendment.” 307 U.S. at 450. See also Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 39 (1849) (holding that “the political department has always determined whether the proposed constitution or amendment was ratified or not by the people of the State, and the judicial power has followed its decision”); United States v. Foster, 789 F.2d 457, 463 n.6 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the issue of “the validity of an amendment’s ratification [is] a non-justiciable political question” and citing, among other cases, Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922), and Coleman, 307 U.S. at 450).
SCOTUS opinions apply to the case at hand and are given due consideration by the other branches of govt, and by the people.
But you can't refute the fact of the supremacy clause.
Legislation (or amendments) passed contrary to the constitution, are null and void.
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
Read narrowly, the Supremacy Clause binds only state judges. But other provisions of the Constitution, most notably the Fourteenth Amendment, directly constrain the action of all state officials, often without regard to whether state courts have ruled on the validity of those officials' acts; moreover, Article VI declares that "the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers . . . of the several states, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution. ... " Accordingly, the Court has not limited to state judges its demand for compliance with the federal Constitution. In Cooper v. Aaron, a school desegregation case decided against the background of Governor Faubus's resistance to the desegregation of public schools in Little Rock, Arkansas, the Supreme Court asserted what is probably its broadest definition of its own power: "Marbury v. Madison ... declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land.... Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath ... 'to support this Constitution.'"
Treaties, agreements between the United States and a foreign country that are negotiated by the president and ratified by the Senate, are permitted unless they violate the Constitution. It is firmly established that if there is a conflict between a treaty and a federal statute, the one adopted last in time controls.
The quote below proves that the SCOTUS heard and considered the constitutionality of the new amendment.. -- Your opinion is wrong...
In this respect a constitutional amendment granting to the government power to prohibit intoxicants would be quite different from an attempted amendment itself directly declaring the prohibition of intoxicants. The former would merely add to the powers of government and would, therefore, in this regard at least, be a proper form of constitutional amendment; while the latter in its essence neither would add nor withdraw powers of government, but would be direct legislation. The Eighteenth Amendment is, therefore, in substance and effect a statute, not a constitutional provision akin to any in the federal Constitution.
The briefs presented against the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment are addressed more to what the opposing interests thought ought to be, than to any issues which may properly be termed legal in character. When read, these briefs in many cases seem to be arguments of counsel who were employed to find arguments, and must, therefore, do so, even though they knew the arguments to be untenable. The most effective statements presented to the Court were those submitted in behalf of a number of states as amici curiae, in the cases of Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co. v. Gregory and Rhode Island v. Palmer. These briefs bear the name of Mr. Charles E. Hughes.
This argument might be termed somewhat ridiculous, had it not appeared under the distinguished name of Mr. Elihu Root.
#118. To: tpaine (#113)
Does this mean you would contend that an amendment could be passed that prohibited our inalienable rights to buy, make, or use guns?
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness, and to buy, make, or use guns.
#119. To: GrandIsland (#31)
I don't believe stopping for 3 seconds on a public funded roadway and then driving though is unreasonable. They are only stopped longer and more intrusive if there is PC they are committing a crime.
#120. To: Gatlin (#33)
(Edited)
To: hondo68 "Checkpoints" are a 4th amendment violation. PROVE THAT!
#121. To: Gatlin (#33)
(Edited)
The Supreme Court has determined that DUI checkpoints do not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure.
#122. To: Gatlin (#33)
And the irony here is that you know that I'm right, whether you argue differently or not.
#123. To: nolu chan, -- ridicules our right to keep and bear arms (#118)
The new, revised and better Declaration of Independence. ---- We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness, and to buy, make, or use guns.
#124. To: We The People, gatlin, Y'ALL (#122)
--- where is Yukon these days?
#125. To: We The People (#122)
where is Yukon these days?
#126. To: tpaine (#123)
Does this mean you would contend that an amendment could be passed that prohibited our inalienable rights to buy, make, or use guns?
#127. To: We The People, Liberator, Gay Canary Posse (#122)
Speaking of knowing that I'm right, where is Yukon these days?
#128. To: We The People (#121)
(Edited)
The Supreme Court has determined that DUI checkpoints do not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure.
#129. To: tpaine, CZ82, We The People, tater, gatlin, FireIsland, yukon, Percy Muslimtoad, scoflaw cops, *Bill of Rights-Constitution* (#124)
#130. To: hondo68 (#129)
#131. To: Gatlin, Moderator X (#130)
#132. To: buckeroo, Moderator X (#131)
(Edited)
tater, your obnoxious behaviour
#133. To: Gatlin, Moderator X (#132)
#134. To: tpaine (#123)
Does this mean you would contend that an amendment could be passed that prohibited our inalienable rights to buy, make, or use guns?
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness, and to buy, make, or use guns.
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress; provided that the amendment may be considered common legislation; and provided further that tpaine approves the content; and provided further that the amendment may be deemed unconstitutional; and provided further that the courts may strike down the amendment; and provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article; and that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.
AMENDMENT 28.
#135. To: buckeroo (#133)
It is indefensible with your tongue hanging out over your own ass.
#136. To: nolu chan, proposes an amendment to repeal the 2nd !! (#134)
The Congress proposes, and three-fourths of the states ratify the following amendment in Nolu Chan's world.
Other than soiling yourself and bleating about it, what is to be done in tpaineworld? --- Does the Congress pass contrary legislation, telling the people that they have abused their sovereign right to amend their constitution?
Does the Court strike down this part of the Constitution as unconstitutional?
Does the Deemer of tpaineworld deem this part of the Constitution null and void? ----- Does the tpaine court of the imagination tell the people that they can't infringe the right to buy, make, and use arms; deemed an unalienable right by the tpaine imaginary revised, new and improved Declaration of Independence.
#137. To: tpaine (#136)
It would violate every principle inherent in our constitution, and thus would be null and void from its enactment.
#138. To: nolu chan (#137)
#139. To: GrandIsland (#125)
where is Yukon these days?
#140. To: We The People (#139)
#141. To: CZ82, We The People, Gay Canary Posse (#127)
Speaking of knowing that I'm right, where is Yukon these days?
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