King v Burwell, Dissenting Opinion of Justice Scalia, Excerpts
At page 21: "We should start calling this law SCOTUScare."
[excerpts]
[1]
1 Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
SCALIA, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 14114 DAVID KING, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. SYLVIA BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[June 25, 2015]
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE ALITO join, dissenting.
The Court holds that when the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act says Exchange established by the State it means Exchange established by the State or the Federal Government. That is of course quite absurd, and the Courts 21 pages of explanation make it no less so.
I The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act makes major reforms to the American health-insurance market.It provides, among other things, that every State shall . . .establish an American Health Benefit Exchangea marketplace where people can shop for health-insurance plans. 42 U. S. C. §18031(b)(1). And it provides that if a State does not comply with this instruction, the Secretary of Health and Human Services must establish and operate such Exchange within the State. §18041(c)(1). A separate part of the Acthoused in §36B of the Internal Revenue Codegrants premium tax credits to subsidize certain purchases of health insurance made on Exchanges. The tax credit consists of premium assistance amounts for coverage months. 26 U. S. C. §36B(b)(1). An individual has a coverage month only when he is cov-
[2]
ered by an insurance plan that was enrolled in through an Exchange established by the State under [§18031]. §36B(c)(2)(A). And the law ties the size of the premium assistance amount to the premiums for health plans which cover the individual and which were enrolled in through an Exchange established by the State under [§18031]. §36B(b)(2)(A). The premium assistance amount further depends on the cost of certain other insurance plans offered through the same Exchange. §36B(b)(3)(B)(i).
This case requires us to decide whether someone who buys insurance on an Exchange established by the Secretary gets tax credits. You would think the answer would be obviousso obvious there would hardly be a need for the Supreme Court to hear a case about it. In order to receive any money under §36B, an individual must enroll in an insurance plan through an Exchange established by the State. The Secretary of Health and Human Services is not a State. So an Exchange established by the Secretary is not an Exchange established by the Statewhich means people who buy health insurance through such an Exchange get no money under §36B.
Words no longer have meaning if an Exchange that is not established by a State is established by the State. It is hard to come up with a clearer way to limit tax credits to state Exchanges than to use the words established by the State. And it is hard to come up with a reason to include the words by the State other than the purpose of limiting credits to state Exchanges. [T]he plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense that nothing but the exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity and study of an acute and powerful intellect would discover. Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U. S. 364, 370 (1925) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under all the usual rules of interpretation, in short, the Government should lose this case. But normal rules of interpretation seem always to
[3]
yield to the overriding principle of the present Court: The Affordable Care Act must be saved.
II The Court interprets §36B to award tax credits on both federal and state Exchanges. It accepts that the most natural sense of the phrase Exchange established by the State is an Exchange established by a State. Ante, at 11. (Understatement, thy name is an opinion on the Afford- able Care Act!) Yet the opinion continues, with no semblance of shame, that it is also possible that the phrase refers to all Exchangesboth State and Federal. Ante, at 13. (Impossible possibility, thy name is an opinion on the Affordable Care Act!) The Court claims that the context and structure of the Act compel [it] to depart from what would otherwise be the most natural reading of the pertinent statutory phrase. Ante, at 21.
I wholeheartedly agree with the Court that sound interpretation requires paying attention to the whole law, not homing in on isolated words or even isolated sections. Context always matters. Let us not forget, however, why context matters: It is a tool for understanding the terms of the law, not an excuse for rewriting them.
Any effort to understand rather than to rewrite a law must accept and apply the presumption that lawmakers use words in their natural and ordinary signification. Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U. S. 1, 12 (1878). Ordinary connotation does not always prevail, but the more unnatural the proposed interpretation of a law, the more compelling the contextual evidence must be to show that it is correct. Todays interpretation is not merely unnatural; it is unheard of.Who would ever have dreamt that Exchange established by the State means Exchange established by the State or the Federal Government? Little short of an express statutory definition could justify adopting this singular reading.
[4]
Yet the only pertinent definition here provides that State means each of the 50 States and the District of Columbia. 42 U. S. C. §18024(d). Because the Secretary is neither one of the 50 States nor the District of Columbia, that definition positively contradicts the eccentric theory that an Exchange established by the Secretary has been established by the State.
Far from offering the overwhelming evidence of meaning needed to justify the Courts interpretation, other contextual clues undermine it at every turn. To begin with, other parts of the Act sharply distinguish between the establishment of an Exchange by a State and the establishment of an Exchange by the Federal Government. The States authority to set up Exchanges comes from one provision, §18031(b); the Secretarys authority comes from an entirely different provision, §18041(c). Funding for States to establish Exchanges comes from one part of thelaw, §18031(a); funding for the Secretary to establish Exchanges comes from an entirely different part of the law, §18121. States generally run state-created Exchanges; the Secretary generally runs federally created Exchanges. §18041(b)(c). And the Secretarys authority to set up an Exchange in a State depends upon the States [f]ailure to establish [an] Exchange. §18041(c) (emphasis added). Provisions such as these destroy any pretense that a federal Exchange is in some sense also established by a State.
Reading the rest of the Act also confirms that, as relevant here, there are only two ways to set up an Exchange in a State: establishment by a State and establishment by the Secretary. §§18031(b), 18041(c). So saying that an Exchange established by the Federal Government is established by the State goes beyond giving words bizarre meanings; it leaves the limiting phrase by the State with no operative effect at all. That is a stark violation of the elementary principle that requires an interpreter to give
[5]
effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute. Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 152 (1883). In weighing this argument, it is well to remember the difference between giving a term a meaning that duplicates another part of the law, and giving a term no meaning at all. Lawmakers sometimes repeat themselveswhether out of a desire to add emphasis, a sense of belt-andsuspenders caution, or a lawyerly penchant for doublets (aid and abet, cease and desist, null and void). Lawmakers do not, however, tend to use terms that have no operation at all. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174 (1803). So while the rule against treating a term as a redundancy is far from categorical, the rule against treating it as a nullity is as close to absolute as interpretive principles get. The Courts reading does not merely give by the State a duplicative effect; it causes the phrase to have no effect whatever.
Making matters worse, the reader of the whole Act will come across a number of provisions beyond §36B that referto the establishment of Exchanges by States. Adopting the Courts interpretation means nullifying the term by the State not just once, but again and again throughout the Act. Consider for the moment only those parts of the Act that mention an Exchange established by the State in connection with tax credits:
The formula for calculating the amount of the tax credit, as already explained, twice mentions an Exchange established by the State. 26 U. S. C. §36B(b)(2)(A), (c)(2)(A)(i).
The Act directs States to screen children for eligibility for [tax credits] under section 36B and for any other assistance or subsidies available for coverage obtained through an Exchange established by theState. 42 U. S. C. §1396w3(b)(1)(B)(C).
The Act requires an Exchange established by the
[6]
State to use a secure electronic interface to determine eligibility for (among other things) tax credits. §1396w3(b)(1)(D).
The Act authorizes an Exchange established by the State to make arrangements under which other state agencies determine whether a State resident is eligible for [tax credits] under section 36B. §1396w3(b)(2).
The Act directs States to operate Web sites that allow anyone who is eligible to receive [tax credits] under section 36B to compare insurance plans offered through an Exchange established by the State. §1396w3(b)(4).
One of the Acts provisions addresses the enrollmentof certain children in health plans offered through an Exchange established by the State and then dis- cusses the eligibility of these children for tax credits. §1397ee(d)(3)(B).
It is bad enough for a court to cross out by the State once. But seven times?
Congress did not, by the way, repeat Exchange established by the State under [§18031] by rote throughout the Act. Quite the contrary, clause after clause of the law uses a more general term such as Exchange or Exchange established under [§18031]. See, e.g., 42 U. S. C. §§18031(k), 18033; 26 U. S. C. §6055. It is common sense that any speaker who says Exchange some of the time, but Exchange established by the State the rest of the time, probably means something by the contrast.
[...]
[20]
Todays opinion changes the usual rules of statutory interpretation for the sake of the Affordable Care Act. That, alas, is not a novelty. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U. S. ___, this Court revised major components of the statute in order to save them from unconstitutionality. The Act that Congress passed provides that every individual shall maintain insurance or else pay a penalty. 26 U. S. C. §5000A. This Court, however, saw that the Commerce Clause does not authorize a federal mandate to buy health insurance. So it rewrote the mandate-cum-penalty as a tax. 567 U. S., at ______ (principal opinion) (slip op., at 1545). The Act that Congress passed also requires every State to
[21]
accept an expansion of its Medicaid program, or else risk losing all Medicaid funding. 42 U. S. C. §1396c. This Court, however, saw that the Spending Clause does not authorize this coercive condition. So it rewrote the law to withhold only the incremental funds associated with the Medicaid expansion. 567 U. S., at ______ (principal opinion) (slip op., at 4558). Having transformed two major parts of the law, the Court today has turned its attention to a third. The Act that Congress passed makes tax credits available only on an Exchange established by the State. This Court, however, concludes that this limitation would prevent the rest of the Act from working as well as hoped. So it rewrites the law to make tax credits available everywhere. We should start calling this law SCOTUScare.
Perhaps the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act will attain the enduring status of the Social Security Act or the Taft-Hartley Act; perhaps not. But this Courts two decisions on the Act will surely be remembered through the years. The somersaults of statutory interpretation they have performed (penalty means tax, further [Medicaid] payments to the State means only incremental Medicaid payments to the State, established by the State means not established by the State) will be cited by litigants endlessly, to the confusion of honest jurisprudence. And the cases will publish forever the discouraging truth that the Supreme Court of the United States favors some laws over others, and is prepared to do whatever it takes to uphold and assist its favorites.